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NOREF Report July 2012 NOREF Report Thailand: contested politics and democracy Naruemon Thabchumpon Executive summary This report assesses the current political cross-class networks that have adopted situation in Thailand. It first explores the a dual strategy: engaging in the issue- politics of contestation after the 2011 based politics of favour or against a election, upcoming events on the electoral particular person or subject matter, while calendar and the 2007 constitutional at the same time forming a social grouping amendment. It then examines the politics for the betterment of the people. Since of change in Thailand’s political landscape there has been more agitation against the and the effect of political parties’ policies on political role of the military, the idea of a the country’s socioeconomic conditions. judicial coup d’état has been increasing Thereafter it discusses the country’s seen in Thai political society. By using democratic space and the limited freedom such arguments, the contestation over of expression, especially in terms of the meaning of democracy of the political issues and the lese-majesty law. abovementioned networks can be seen as Finally, it analyses possible scenarios a mechanism to unite ordinary people into for democratic change and conflict a political force and is thus related to the transformation in terms of the politics of issue of ordinary citizens’ access to power. succession. The report argues that Thailand’s politics of contestation can be seen as a set of Naruemon Thabchumpon, PhD, is a lecturer in politics and government in the Faculty of Political Sciences and director of the International Development Studies Programme at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. Her research interests focus on the issues of participatory democracy, the politics of human rights, and the role of civil society organisations in development and the democratisation process. Thailand: contested politics and democracy Introduction months of political turmoil and to protect the monarchy.1 The military gave a commitment to Thailand has just chosen its first female restore democratic government within one year. prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, a Thai businesswoman-cum-politician and the To understand the Thai military, we need to youngest sister of former prime minister Thaksin consider its rationale as a guardian of the Shinawatra, who is seen as a key player in country. According to the 1997 and 2007 contemporary Thai politics, even though he is still constitutions, the role of the Thai military is to in self-imposed exile. Following the 2011 general protect and uphold the country’s independence, election (which had more than a 60% turnout of sovereignty, national security and the institution voters) and with 265 seats in the 500-seat House of the monarchy. Its duty is to protect the national of Representatives, Yingluck’s political role as interest and the democratic government, with the the 28th prime minister of Thailand is seen as king as head of state.2 Therefore, concerns over heralding a new political era of contested political military intervention in Thai politics are certainly networks. justified, especially when it is claimed that such interventions could adversely affect the institution This report is an attempt to assess the current of the monarchy and national security.3 political situation in Thailand. It will first explore the politics of contestation after the 2011 election, It can also be argued that many political crises upcoming events on the electoral calendar and have demonstrated the persistent characters the 2007 constitutional amendment. Secondly, it of Thai politics: a strong military, weak political will examine the politics of change in the country’s parties, personalised leadership, lack of political landscape and the effect of political “democratic consciousness” on the part of civil parties’ policies on the country’s socioeconomic society and the general public, and the important conditions. Thirdly, it will examine the democratic role of rumours and opinions put out by the press, space and its limited freedom of speech and including the role of the so-called “Monarchy expression. Finally, it will analyse possible Network” in Thailand’s politics. This network scenarios for democratic change and conflict played a dominant role between the September transformation in Thai society in terms of the 2006 coup and the December 2007 election, in politics of succession. which the People Power party, a successor of the dissolved Thai Rak Thai party, won the first post- coup election. The politics of contestation in In the last five years Thai society has faced various Thai society conflicts and violence resulting from political In Thailand, the political system currently operates confrontation between two political networks: within the framework of a constitutional monarchy the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD/the in terms of which the prime minister is the head Yellowshirts) and the United Front for Democracy of government and a hereditary monarch is head against Dictatorship (UDD/the Redshirts). Such of state. The country has a political history of long periods of authoritarianism alternating with 1 The CDR’s statement argued that the Thaksin government had periods of “semi-democratic” government. Since caused a serious rupture in Thai society, had resulted in widespread 1932, the military has interrupted the constitutional corruption and nepotism, and had interfered in the activities of independent agencies. The government was also accused of re- order more than 18 times, with Thai citizens peatedly insulting the king. Thus the CDR claimed that it needed witnessing more than 20 changes of government to seize power to control the situation, to restore normalcy and to and 18 written constitutions after the abolition of create unity as soon as possible. See Ukrist Pathmanand, “A dif- ferent coup d’état?”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol 38, no. absolute monarchy. The most recent coup was in 1, February 2008, pp. 124–142, http://www.sameskybooks.org/ September 2006, when the elected government wp-content/uploads/2008/02/j-of-contem-asia-2008-ukrist-path- of Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by the manand-a-different-coup-detat.pdf. 2 See section 72 of the 1997 Constitution and section 77 of the 2007 military in the form of the so-called Council for Constitution. Democratic Reform (CDR), which argued that it 3 According a military source, civilian violence between the two con- needed to seize power to unite the nation after tending mass movements is seen as one of the most important na- tional security problems, because it affects the unity of the country. - 2 - Thailand: contested politics and democracy conflicts4 can be considered as a politics of from her political networks and electoral bases. contestation between the establishment and Ironically, most flood victims in the provinces of the emerging social classes over the meaning the central Chao Phraya River basin put the blame of democracy. While the establishment is more on the Bangkok governor and Bangkok residents, concerned with preserving the existing order, even if the idea of protecting Bangkok from the the emerging social groups are more interested floods came from the government. The crisis of in changing it. The 2011 general election was confidence came from the country’s economic regarded as a way out of conflict and the start of rather than political sector. a process that would lead to reconciliation in the country. Regarding Thaksin Shinawatra, as one of the political factors in Thailand’s crisis, the ex-prime After the 2011 election, the Yingluck government minister still plays a key role in evaluating and was formed with 265 seats in the 500-seat supervising the current cabinet’s performance and parliament. Her coalition included Chart- influencing cabinet appointments. An example is Thai-Pattana, Chart-Pattana-Puea Pandin, the cabinet reshuffle in early 2012 to increase Phalangchon, Mahachon and New Democracy. loyalty to the head of government and as a reaction The first female prime minister of Thailand to discontent with the government’s management announced that the new government’s of the 2011 flood disaster. Some new ministers priorities were peoples’ livelihoods and national are seen as having close connections with the ex- reconciliation. Since coalition parties control prime minister.6 Since Thaksin has publicly stated parliament, the government can implement its that he wants to come back to Thailand,7 without 2020 vision of eliminating poverty through its mentioning how this will happen, conflicts will likely programmes of increasing the minimum wage to intensify. The consequence of such an attempt 300 baht per day for unskilled labourers and paying to return may cause a new political crisis, on top salaries of 15,000 baht per month to university of economic uncertainty and questions around graduates starting in April 2012. Due to the 2011 government stability. Even though Prime Minister flood problem, the success of a government plan Yingluck has insisted that the government would for a guaranteed rice price of 15,000 baht per concentrate on economics, not politics, some of ton was in question, while the implementation her cabinet members and Pheu Thai MPs have of a credit card for farmers’ loan schemes was introduced a political agenda by proposing an postponed. However, the government continued amnesty law that would pave the way for Thaksin with the 2005 Thai Rak Thai policy of One Laptop to return to Thailand under an amnesty for his Per Child (OLPC) by providing a tablet PC to every alleged illegal activities.8 Examples of divisive grade 1 schoolchild, which was implemented in opinions on Thaksin’s possible return can be seen May 2012.5 in the debates and disagreements over granting a general amnesty to those who face criminal Even though Prime Minister Yingluck’s leadership charges in the 2012 King Prajadhipok’s Institute has been questioned, especially during the 2011 peace report.9 flood crisis, she has been able to draw sympathy 6 Example included Nalinee Thaweesin, Niwatthamrong Boonsong- 4 Examples included the 2008 PAD protests, which involved occupy- paisan and Natthawuth Saikua.
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