ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SUEZ CRISIS Ashraf Mohsen Mohamed Mohsen Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. in Politics in the Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London January 1993 1 ProQuest Number: 10673062 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10673062 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the reconstruction of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the aftermath of the Suez crisis during the period 1957-1961. The research starts by showing that this relationship was ruptured as a result of conflicts in the foreign policies of the two states. This rupture occurred during the period 1954-1956 despite the fact that all problems in the bilateral field between the two countries were settled in 1953 and 1954. The sudden rupture in Anglo- Egyptian relations created several problems in the field of bilateral relations. These problems generated sufficient pressure on the governments of both countries to force them to meet, negotiate and make compromises on their initial positions in order to reach an agreement. The research starts with an introductory chapter (Chapter One) which shows the development of Anglo-Egyptian relations up to 1957. The second chapter exposes the problems in bilateral relations between the two states as a result of the rupture in 1956, and their impact on both states. Chapter Three describes the start of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and how Egypt tried to reach an agreement with the United Kingdom in 1957. Chapter Four shows how an agreement was reached between the two states, the U.K.’s efforts to reach an agreement, and demonstrates the negligible impact of the conflicts in the foreign policies of the two states on the negotiations. The fifth and final chapter deals with the reconstruction of official relations and the impact of this on bilateral relations between Egypt and the U.K. and on the region as a whole. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 2 Dedication 8 Acknowledgements 9 INTRODUCTION 11 Chapter 1: SETTING THE SCENE 39 I Introduction 39 II Legality and Pattern of the British Rule of Egypt up to 1952 41 HI Confirmation of Loss of British Control: The 1952 Coup d’Etat 50 IV The Road to Suez 54 V Competition in the Arab World 59 VI The Final Straw 63 VII After the War 67 VUI Conclusion 71 Chapter 2 : FACTORS AFFECTING ANGLO- EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AFTER SUEZ 84 I Factors Affecting the Relations Between Egypt and the U.K. 86 A — Factors Related to the Respective Power of the U.K. and Egypt 87 1 — Egypt 88 3 A: Effects of Suez on Egypt’s Political System 8 8 B: Developments in the Egyptian Economy After Suez 92 C: Developments in Egypt’s External Relationships 98 2 — The United Kingdom 106 A: Effects of the Internal Changes in the U.K. on Relations with Egypt 106 B: The Change in the U.K. Position on the Arab-Israeli Conflict 109 C: The Effect of Suez on the U.K.’s Foreign Relations. 112 B — Factors Solely Related to Bilateral Issues Between the U.K. and Egypt 116 1 — Importance of Egypt for the United Kingdom in 1957 118 A: The Suez Canal 119 B: British Property in Egypt 122 C: Trade with Egypt 123 2 — Importance of the United Kingdom for Egypt: Why Egypt Needed an Agreement 124 4 Chapter 3 : THE START OF THE ANGLO- EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS AFTER SUEZ 137 I Negotiations Between Egypt and the U.K. After Suez: 1957 137 II First Phase of Negotiations between the U.K. and Egypt 140 A — The First Round of Negotiations, May 5-9, 1957 140 IH Reaction to the Basle Agreement in the U.K. 144 IV Reaction to the Basle Agreement in Egypt 145 A — The Start of the Anglo-Egyptian Financial Talks (Rome) 150 1. Egypt’s Attempts at Reconciliation 154 B — Second Round of Negotiations: Autumn and Winter 1957 162 V Conclusion 183 Chapter 4 : FINANCIAL AGREEMENT 195 I Introduction 195 H Changes in the Negotiating Stance of Both Countries 196 A — The U.K. 196 B — Egypt 199 HI The Negotiations 202 IV Note on the Effect of the Regional Conflict on Bilateral Issues 216 V Pressures on the United Kingdom to Reach an 5 Agreement 224 A — Internal Pressures 225 1: British Evacuees from Egypt 225 2: Trade with Egypt 228 3: Oil 230 B — External Pressures 231 1: Franco-Egyptian Financial Agreement 231 C — The Removal of the Obstacles to the Agreement 233 1: Suez Canal Agreement 234 2: Shell Agreement 235 VI Remarks on the Egyptian Negotiating Position 236 VII Financial Agreement 241 A — British Attempts at Using Mediation over the Financial Agreement 242 B — The Conclusion of the Financial Agreement 246 VIH Conclusion 252 Chapter 5 : THE RESTORATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS 267 I Introduction 267 II The U.K.’s Efforts at Reconstructing the Official Relationship and Egyptian Objections 269 A —The Mission 269 B —• The Reasons for the Egyptian Refusal to Normalise Relationships with the U.K. 280 C —The Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 291 6 1- Charges d’Affaires 291 2- Ambassadors 305 HI The Attitude of Both States to the Relations 315 A — The U.K. 315 B — Egypt 320 IV A Good Start for the Relations 322 A — Decrease in Regional Conflict: Kuwait 323 B — Improvement in Bilateral Ties 3 26 V Conclusion 332 CONCLUSION 349 BIBLIOGRAPHY 355 7 TO MOHSEN MOHAMED The Historian and The Journalist...My Father ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe more than the customary gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Charles Tripp, without whose support, guidance, patience and tolerance this work would never have been completed. Dr. Tripp’s guidance and support have enabled me to improve my work no end, and for this and for all his assistance, academic and moral, I shall always be grateful. I have to acknowledge my greatest debt to Mohsen Mohamed, Hend Abul Saud, Mervat Mohsen and Rahma, without whose help this work would never have started and certainly never been completed. No son has received more love or support from his family. Their help went much beyond physical or moral support. My father’s insight and advice was essential, my mother’s prayers and my sister’s love and concern enabled me to start and complete this research, I owe them more than I can ever repay. I owe a debt of gratitude to H. E. Mr. Amre Moussa, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, without whose support and encouragement I would not have been able to continue my work. To Professor P.J. Vatikiotis, I owe more than gratitude. Professor Vatikiotis kindly accepted me in the Ph.D. program at S.O.A.S and his advice and assistance to me have never stopped, even after his retirement from full-time academic duties. 9 I also owe a debt of gratitude to the professors of the Department of Politics of the American University in Cairo, Professor Robert Bianchi, Professor Enid Hill, Professor Gail Gerhard, Professor Walid Kazziha, Professor Dan Tchirgi and Professor Tim (Earl) Sullivan. I also owe special gratitude to my close friends and second family, W. Youssef and K. Abadir, Dr. Maher Abadir and Mrs. Shahira Abadir and Terry and Georgina Bishop, whose support and encouragement helped me endure the combination of full-time research and a full-time career. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Ms Jane Firbank, who helped me tremendously with the production of my text. While I gratefully acknowledge my debts to all the persons mentioned above, and many others whom I have not mentioned, I remain solely responsible for any factual errors and the views I have expressed in this study. 10 INTRODUCTION This research aims to examine the restoration of diplomatic relations between a major power and its former client state after the severance of relations between them, as a result of clashes between the foreign policies of the two states in question. In such a case, conflict between the foreign policy goals and orientations of these two states obviously affects bilateral links and ties, leading ultimately to the severance of the diplomatic relations themselves. The most important variables which are to be examined in this research are the relationships between the two states in the case study, both on the level of bilateral issues and in the realm of larger foreign policy issues. Bilateral issues mean all those problems or outstanding issues between the two states in the narrow area of bilateral relations, such as questions relating to the property and citizens of one state in the other, the level and the status of trade and commercial relations between the two states, as well as the state of official — i.e. diplomatic and consular — relations between the two states. At the same time, the degrees of congruency or conflict of their general foreign policies are also examined, since the rift which occurred between the two states was a result of foreign policy clashes.