no. 3. 2017 special edition

ISSN 2543-9839

t:

Repor

disinformation in CEE © Pavel Bobrovskiy (Fotolia) Editorial

Dear Readers,

eeting the challenges of the present day, the Warsaw Institute has prepared a special issue of our quarterly, dedicated to Mdisinformation. The Warsaw Institute Review Special Edition: Disinformation includes a report on organized and planned disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe, with particular focus on Visegrád Group (V4) countries, Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Organized disinformation has in recent years increasingly influenced the policies of states and the mentality of societies. The ease of publishing on the Internet and widespread access to the web eases the spread of "fake news" and shapes the attitudes and behavior of both ordinary citizens and political decision makers. Its targets are also traditional media and institutions of the state. Used on a wide scale it is a tool for aggressive state policies, and even a component of hybrid warfare. This phenomenon occurs regularly in the Visegrád Group countries, and with particular intensity in areas of key importance to certain states, such as energy and defense. This special edition presents, in the form of analytical articles, the essence of disinformation and the resulting threats to private and public entities. Examples of information warfare are also described in each country, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine, as well as in the Baltic States. These analyses pay special attention to the Russian Federation's activity

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in this area and its influence on the information sphere of other countries. An attempt was also made to identify The the dangers posed by disinformation to government Warsaw administration, business and society. Also, the Warsaw Institute Institute has tried to present recommendations for the Review aforementioned groups threatened by disinformation. The study was prepared by Warsaw Institute experts, © Copyright 2017 as well as by analysts working with the think tanks: The Warsaw Institute European Values (Czech Republic) and Political Capital Foundation Warsaw, Poland (Hungary).

Editor-in-Chief Anna Karolina Piekarska I also encourage you to confirm your desire to continue [email protected] receiving your free copy of The Warsaw Institute Review quarterly through the registration form Editorial Secretary Krzysztof Kamiński at www.WarsawInstitute.Review

Editorial Assistant Magdalena Piątkowska Krzysztof Kamiński Translations and proofreading President of The Warsaw Institute Foundation Nicholas Siekierski Aleksandra Iskra [email protected]

Cover and Layout Katarzyna Dinwebel Jacek Kotela

DTP and Printing www.sindruk.pl

Publisher The Warsaw Institute Foundation Wilcza 9, 00-538 Warsaw www.WarsawInstitute.org This publication was co-founded by: [email protected] Editorial office The Warsaw Institute Review Wilcza 9 00-538 Warsaw www.WarsawInstitute.Review

The opinions given and the positions held in the materials published in The Warsaw Institute Review solely reflect the views of the authors. Partners of the special report – disinformation:

ISSN 2543-9839

4 The Warsaw Institute Review Contents

6 15 70 jacek Borecki: Maria Zielińska: Joanna Kwiecień: Disinformation as In the Age of Post-Truth: Poland through Eurasian a threat to private Best Practices Eyes: Russian Propaganda and state-owned business in Fighting Messages in the Media Disinformation

Jacek Borecki: Aleksander Król: Disinformation as a threat Defending the Information to private and state-owned Space: the Lithuanian, 6 business Latvian and Estonian 47 Example Maria Zielińska: In the Age of Post-Truth: Aleksander Król: Best Practices Russian Information 15 in Fighting Warfare in the Baltic Disinformation 54 States – Resources and Aims

Jakub Janda, Aleksander Król: Veronika Víchová: Information Warfare The kremlin’s hostile against Strategic 25 influence in the Czech Investments in the Baltic Republic: the state of play 62 States and Poland

Lóránt Győri, Péter Krekó: Joanna Kwiecień: Russian disinformation Poland through Eurasian 35 and extremism Eyes: Russian Propaganda in Hungary 70 Messages in the Media

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Disinformation as a threat to PR I VATE a n d state-owned business Jacek Borecki From the spread of the Internet to the takeover of the world by smartphones, the technological revolution has redefined the notion of disinformation and propaganda, a tool widely used by Russia and other threat actors. How can coordinated disinformation operations affect society, business, and government?

fter the Information Age the state, and reputable experts;1 (1990s) and the “age of and, finally, the death of expertise, the citizen” (2000s), a new and the elevation of one’s own, often era has begun. It is called weak, Wikipedia-supplemented Amany things by experts: the post- knowledge, over professional -truth era, or a world where personal research. In addition, methods of beliefs and emotions are more communication have completely important than facts; the age of the customer, where customers, through 1 G. Osbourne, Strategic Communications: Insights from the commercial sector, NATO Stratcom CoE, popular opinion and review culture April 26, 2017, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/strategic- have an edge over entrepreneurs, communications-insights-commercial-sector.

6 The Warsaw Institute Review Dezinformacja jako zagrożenie dla prywatnych...

© arloo (Fotolia)

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transformed: a glut of messages can expense of the West, especially in the reach a mass audience instantaneously areas perceived by the Kremlin to and through many channels. The constitute Russia’s sphere of influence speed of their transmission and (i.e. the post-Soviet states). The the lack of critical thinking upon protection of its economic interests is those who receive them legitimizes also fundamental to Russia, including unverified information when users lobbying and manipulation in order to share it on social networking sites. lift sanctions, as well as maintaining This is the mechanism of modern Gazprom’s monopoly in East-Central disinformation. Europe. It’s a priority to weaken or eliminate competition, prevent What purpose does the implementation of local and disinformation serve? international projects (especially when In the case of Russia, generally they bypass Russia), which would speaking, disinformation is one of the decrease dependence on the Kremlin instruments for pursuing the strategic and would deprive them of a tool of foreign policy interests of the Russian economic pressure. Russia’s economic Federation. The main objective is interests also include ensuring a to strengthen Russia’s international market for its energy resources. Russia position and extend its reach at the is interested in taking over (by hostile

8 The Warsaw Institute Review Disinformation as a threat to private and state-owned business or conventional means) companies of strategic value for a given country’s economy, at the lowest possible price – The protection of and thus, through disinformation and propaganda, Russia attempts to reduce its economic interests the market value of such companies. is also fundamental With the help of specially-tailored narratives2 in the information space, to Russia, including including traditional media, new media and cyberspace, attempts are lobbying and made to manipulate virtually every community in target countries. Is the manipulation in order threat real? According to a CitizenLab analysis, of 218 investigated attacks to lift sanctions, on unauthorized access to private computers, 21% of attacks were as well as maintaining business-related and 24% targeted Gazprom's monopoly government representatives.3 Experience and history teach us, in East-Central Europe. however, that propaganda and the accompanying disinformation have far greater reach and with much goal of inducing a wave of criticism. worse effects. Damaging a company’s reputation is also achieved by ridiculing, Areas of disinformation denigrating or compromising influence on business the people at the top, perhaps by Disinformation is another challenge linking them to institutions, media that must be faced by both private and people who act as agents of and public entrepreneurs. The first influence. For this reason, the most purpose of disinformation is to sensitive area is marketing and have a detrimental effect on the PR: sponsoring the wrong events, reputation and brand of an institution awarding a scholarship or grant to or company. An important element individuals or organizations involved of creating a bad image is a mass in extremist activity, or de facto campaign of baseless criticism financing disinformation activities online (trolling), and attributing online through advertising buys, are negative actions to a company just some examples of disinformation for which it is not responsible, operations. causing an exceptionally strong emotional response from society. Hostile actions in the information These accusations may include: space are also intended to steer the breaking the law, environmental leadership of government institutions damage, corruption, etc., with the towards making decisions that are conducive to the Kremlin’s foreign 2 See: Poland Through Eurasian Eyes, page 70. policy. These may be company-level 3 A. Hulcoop, J. Scott-Railton, P. Tanchak, M. Brooks, decisions, such as withdrawing and R. Deibert, TAINTED LEAKS Disinformation from a project under the influence and Phishing With a Russian Nexus, The CitizenLab, May 25, 2017, https://citizenlab.ca/2017/05/tainted- of false information, but political leaks-disinformation-phish/. decisions, such as influencing a given

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hand, attacks are aimed at decisions that could limit Gazprom’s monopoly False information favors in the region. confrontational and Finally, the target audience most vulnerable to propaganda and radical attitudes, and the disinformation is society itself. False manipulation of social information favors confrontational and radical attitudes, and the attitudes. manipulation of social attitudes. These factors in turn have an impact on the country’s regulations and legislation stability of the state and the potential (or international regulations, such for the mobilization of society, for as in the EU). Because Russia’s main example: on protests against economic export commodities are gas and oil, projects4. Society also has a direct disinformation often targets projects influence on the direction of state that diversify the supply of these raw policy as voters and participants materials. For example, the Nord in referendums. Disinformation Stream 2 gas pipeline is presented campaigns could be seen during as a German project, while criticism of it from Central Europe is cast as 4 See: Information Warfare against Strategic Russophobic hysteria. On the other Investments in the Baltic States and Poland, page 62.

10 The Warsaw Institute Review Disinformation as a threat to private and state-owned business the presidential elections in the layoffs) or consumer boycotts. U.S. and France, as well as during Of course, it should be noted the referendum in the Netherlands that not every criticism, black (on the Ukraine-European Union PR action or strike is caused by Association Agreement) and the hostile information operations. United Kingdom (on leaving the However, it is quite possible to European Union). On a smaller determine whether something is an scale, targeted disinformation can hit organized action or an independent specific companies and institutions, opinion, by analyzing the messages which may result in strikes (for accompanying negative reviews, their example, corporate documents that time of publication and the tools are published, suggesting massive used.

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Disinformation weapons – critic David Satter, and then their deception, manipulation, publication on the website of the and fake news Russian hacker group CyberBerkut, Disinformation, as part of the after falsifying the e-mails to persuade information war, has a number of the public of Western funding for the tools at its disposal that take advantage Russian opposition, including Alexei of common cognitive defects and the Navalny.6 An example of military specificity of the modern information camouflaging is the introduction environment. Techniques used on a of regular troops under the guise case-by-case basis will vary depending of peacekeepers, as in the case of on the target group and distribution Abkhazia or South Ossetia (the channel. It should also be mentioned occupied region of Georgia), as well as that Russian intelligence on the way “humanitarian convoys” for separatists a given country operates, issues in eastern Ukraine. This category important for its citizens, culture, includes all kinds of fake institutions, stereotypes and internal divisions, such as the “consulate” of the so-called is extremely extensive. Donetsk People’s Republic in Ostrava in the Czech Republic.7 Tools based on deception The task of media deception provokes Social engineering tools desired events that are later exploited Such instruments are based primarily by media distribution channels. on knowledge of the human psyche There are standard forgeries, such and the influence of modern as the fabricated letter of Ukraine’s technologies on how people process Minister of Finance Natalie Jaresko information. The main tool in this to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State category is propaganda: long-term, for European and Eurasian Affairs intrusive interaction, combined with Victoria Nuland, which requested manipulation. A specific variation a postponement of the Dutch of disinformation is historical referendum on the association revisionism8, targeted primarily at agreement with Ukraine.5 But states located in the former Soviet deception is also created by controlled sphere of influence in countries such leaks. These leaks are primarily based as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, on the acquisition of documents Georgia and Ukraine. As a tool of through legitimate (official) or illegal misinformation, trolling is also used. (by phishing, cyber espionage or The task of trolls is to attract attention manipulation) sources and then the to a particular topic which their client manipulation of their content by wants to highlight and bring it into cutting out certain parts of the text the social or political discussion, and substituting others – or publishing 6 A. Hulcoop, J. Scott-Railton, P. Tanchak, only part of the content without M. Brooks, and R. Deibert, TAINTED LEAKS context. An example of a controlled Disinformation and Phishing With a Russian Nexus, leak was the illegal acquisition of The CitizenLab, May 25, 2017, https://citizenlab. ca/2017/05/tainted-leaks-disinformation-phish/. the emails of journalist and Kremlin 7 M. Lebduška, L. Tysyachna, The EU entry has been detrimental to Czechia, the fake ‘DPR consul’ Lisková 5 G. Kobzaru, Ukraine struntar and Nederländernas says, StopFake, November 21, 2016, http://www. opinion, Pressbladet, April 1, 2016, http://www. stopfake.org/en/the-eu-entry -has-been-detrimental- svenskpress.se/papers/pressbladet/articles/view/ to-the-czechia-dpr-consul-Liskova-says/. ukraina-struntar-i-nederlandernas-opinion. The 8 See: Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic article now reads Probably fake news. States, page 54.

12 The Warsaw Institute Review Disinformation as a threat to private and state-owned business

manipulating it and promoting Their task is to soften the image of narratives beneficial to Russia. In Russia, spread conspiracy theories and addition to trolling, the popularity distract the “target” from work. It is of the topic is also enhanced with another social engineering tool, taking Internet bots. The volume of messaging advantage of the halo effect, that is, creates a bandwagon effect – the more adding credibility to a messenger who people that are able to support a given is physically attractive, clean and neat. idea, the more they are convinced that the majority has accepted it. An Fake news interesting case are the “bikini trolls” Fake news is a synthesis of the two whose profiles contain pictures of above categories, because it both young, attractive, scantily-clad women.9 deceives and influences. It usually also

9 More on trolls, Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare January 25, 2016, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/ tool: the case of Latvia, NATO StratCom CoE, internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case- Latvia-0/.

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who pointed out that the German Nowadays it is the police were slow to react due to political correctness.10 This example most common form of shows how easy it is to unify specific environments and mobilize them to disinformation because take anti-government action. of the low costs and the While often downplayed, disinformation and propaganda tend large payoff. to strike at the weakest point in the functioning of every business – the human element. The problem is also includes elements of truth, because the frenetic pace of technological familiar facts facilitate the acceptance development, which legislation can’t of the message. Nowadays it is the keep up with, and whose gains can most common form of disinformation quickly be transformed into tools for because of the low costs and the large further influence. Nevertheless, the payoff. One of the examples: effects of disinformation attacks can the case of Lisa, a German woman of be reduced by developing counter Russian descent who was supposedly strategies. raped by migrants. The Russian media widely covered Lisa’s case. Following broadcasts in social media groups and Jacek Borecki right-wing media, demonstrations July 25, 2017 were organized, mobilizing extremists and the Russian-German minority. 10 S. Meister, The ‘Lisa’ case: Germany as a target of The Lisa case was also commented Russian disinformation, NATO Review magazine, July 25, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/ upon by Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Also-in-2016/ lisa-case-germany-target-russian- Minister of the Russian Federation, disinformation / EN / index.htm.

14 The Warsaw Institute Review In the Age of Post-Truth: Best Practices in Fighting Disinformation Maria Zielińska The post-truth world is one in which emotions are more important than facts. This relationship is absolutely exploited by propagandists and disinformation agents. The good news is that many effective instruments for fighting disinformation and propaganda already exist.

or many years, East-Central as elections (USA, France) and European countries have referendums (Great Britain, the warned against placing Netherlands), the Western community excessive trust in the seeks appropriate measures to FKremlin by neglecting the activities safeguard its societies from foreign of Russia’s quasi non-governmental influence, not only in a military organizations and the influx of context, but in the information sphere. Russian capital into Europe, especially from Gazprom. Back then, those The problem has also been noticed misgivings were attributed to by the European Parliament, which hysteria and alleged Russophobia, in its resolution on June 10, 2016, in stemming from historical events. addition to mentioning areas subject Today, after the Kremlin’s intervention to propaganda (e.g. falsification of in key democratic processes, such history), pointed to the need for

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creating a group to tackle deceptive method used by Radio Sputnik was to information about the European buy airtime on radio stations that had Union spread by media tied to Russia.1 the appropriate broadcaster’s license. In 2016, thanks in part to the report This was the case with Radio Hobby of MEP Anna Fotyga, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, EEAS East StratCom started regular operations. This and other means In the context of are included in the following six steps for combating the harmful effects information warfare, of Russian messaging in the information war. however, media

First of all: rule of law and regulations are good governance The law is a great instrument for paramount. fighting propaganda distribution channels. On the one hand, it allows from Legionowo in Poland, as well as the blocking of broadcasts or online R-Radio and Radio Monte-Carlo in publishing and the imposition of high Georgia. Because the station managers fines. The real possibility of imposing did not contribute to the production financial penalties on entities that of the broadcasts, this meant the rebroadcast Kremlin propaganda illegal ceding of their frequency to content significantly increases the cost another entity, which resulted in the of such activities, and discourages cancellation of their broadcast licenses other outlets from working with and financial penalties. Moreover, the agencies like Sputnik. rebroadcast of Sputnik’s material by these stations was also met with strong In the context of information public criticism.3 warfare, however, media regulations are paramount. Latvia in 2014 and Another way to limit attacks in the Lithuania in 2015 temporarily blocked information war is to introduce the Russian RTR-Planeta channel due changes to legislation and include to their incitement of hatred against them in official documents. For Ukrainians. On several occasions, the example, in the Czech National British communications regulator Security Audit, two important Ofcom officially identified RT chapters were included: “Influence (previously Russia Today) material of Foreign Powers” and “Hybrid as being biased, manipulative, tendentious and in violation of the broadcasting code, ordering RT to sep/21/rt-sanctioned-over-series-of-misleading- articles-by-media-watchdog and John Plunkett, 2 broadcast a correction. Another Russia Today threatened with Ofcom sanctions due to bias, The Guardian, November 10, 2014, https:// 1 European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on www.theguardian.com/media/2014/nov/10/russia- the state of EU-Russia relations, European Parliament, today-ofcom-sanctions-impartiality-ukraine- Strasbourg, June 10, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa. coverage. eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA- 3 Threats of Russian Hard and Soft Power in Georgia, 2015-0225+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. ed. L.Tughushi, European Initiative Liberal 2 RT sanctioned by Ofcom over series of misleading Academy Tbilisi, Tbilisi, 2016, http://www.ei-lat.ge/ and biased articles, The Guardian, September 21, images/doc/threats%20of%20russian%20soft%20 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/ and%20hard%20power.pdf.

16 The Warsaw Institute Review W epoce postprawdy: dobre praktyki w zwalczaniu...

Moscow, Russia. View of Moscow Kremlin and center of Moscow from the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour.

© Konstantin Kokoshkin (PAP/RUSSIAN LOOK)

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Threats.”4 The presence of these besides excellent citizenship initiatives chapters allowed for the undertaking such as StopFake, through the Ministry of more advanced measures to of Information, also publishes very combat disinformation. One of the well-produced brochures on facts and recommendations was to create evidence denied by Russia. an official unit responsible for information security, which resulted Another important issue faced by in the establishment of the Center Western countries is the reluctance Against Terrorism and Hybrid to openly call things by name and Threats.5 identify the aggressor. Hence, the aforementioned European Parliament Second: inform, inform, inform resolution is extremely important The problem for countries that as it highlights the specific source of currently face the information war is propaganda. While at the bureaucratic their past neglect in communicating level, it takes a great deal of time to with the public in a broad context, and push such a strategy, new media, improperly communicating official namely social media, is faster. In government decisions. The biggest Poland, reporting on the Kremlin ties challenge for East-Central Europe of the organizers of anti-Ukrainian is to reach out to Russian-speaking activities as well as the actions of minorities, traditionally well-oriented other disinformers, propagandists and in information from Russian television instigators is done on the Facebook and publications. As a good practice in page “Rosyjska V Kolumna w this area, we can see the increasingly Polsce” (The Russian Fifth Column frequent launches of official services in Poland),6 run by Marcin Rey. On in Russian, based on the example of Polish Twitter, a leading profile is the European Union and NATO, and @Disinfo_Digest,7 run by the Cyber ​​ above all, the creation of domestic Security Foundation. Disinfo Digest media. It is worth mentioning the is more focused on current fake news program “Nastoyaschee Vremya” and falsifications from Russia, and (Current Time), which was created also collects material on identifying by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty falsehoods and the mechanisms of (RFE/RL) and Voice of America disinformation. (VOA). In fact, RFE/RL itself strives to reach its audience in more than Another interesting project is the twenty languages. Estonia also Integrity Initiative8 of The Institute launched a Russian-language public for Statecraft in the UK. The Integrity television channel. Ukraine, having Initiative accumulates knowledge the most significant experience in the from other organizations that information war being led by Russia, deal with the subject of Russian influence, and connects people – at 4 Policy shift overview: How the Czech Republic is one the civil society level – working on of the leaders in countering Russian disinformation, Kremlin Watch (European Values), Prague, May 10, 6 2017, http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/ Profile of The Russian Fifth Column in Poland uploads/2017/05/Policy-shift-overview-How-the- on Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ Czech-Republic-became-one-of-the-European- RosyjskaVKolumnawPolsce/. leaders-in-countering- Russian-disinformation-1.pdf. 7 Disinfo_Digest profile on Twitter, https://twitter. 5 Center Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, com/Disinfo_Digest. http://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/centre-against- 8 Integrity Initiative Project Website, http://www. terrorism-and-hybrid-threats.aspx. integrityinitiative.net/about.

18 The Warsaw Institute Review In the Age of Post-Truth: Best Practices in Fighting... the same issues. Another think tank Third: debunk and prevent seriously analyzing propaganda Many institutions and organizations and disinformation in East-Central engage in the policy of revealing Europe, is the Center for European false information, simultaneously Policy Analysis (CEPA), headed juxtaposing it with facts. Work of by Edward Lucas, a journalist and massive proportions is being done expert in the methods of the Russian by the previously mentioned East

special services. Another success is StratCom team, which regularly the Slovakian project conspiratori. reports on incidents of disinformation sk (Conspirators) and the French in Europe and anti-Western CrossCheck project,9 joint projects narratives imposed by Russia, in the of First Draft and Google News Lab. Disinformation Review, and through their Facebook and Twitter profile A relatively new strategy is to (EU Mythbusters). A positive sign on provide the public with some of the the battlefield against disinformation information collected by the security are the training videos prepared by services. The security agencies of NATO and the EU, which have the the Baltic republics publish some of chance to reach younger generations their reports where they share their who use the Internet as their sole accumulated knowledge with the source of information. public. The dissemination of concrete information about the Kremlin’s The largest initiative, run in several agents of influence shows the actions languages, is StopFake, as well as two of many pro-Russian activists in Georgian projects: Myth Detector/ a new light and undermines their Euro Communicator of the Media future activities. Development Foundation (MDF) and FactCheck, which also checks the 9 CrossCheck project site, https://crosscheck. veracity of politicians’ statements. In firstdraftnews.com/france-en/. the Baltic countries, where it is easy

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began to appear in several sources that this was an ethnically motivated In deconstructing murder, that the women were shot because they were Russians, and disinformation, that the killer was a former soldier. This was a typical example of a quick reaction disinformation, as all three victims were Finns, and the killer had no and co-operation connection with the army. In this case, a quick official statement stopped the with government circulation of disinformation. institutions is key. Fourth: analyze, educate, and investigate to mobilize the online community, In recent years, many reports, groups against online trolls are analyses and articles have been growing in popularity. “Elves” are written about modern propaganda groups of Internet users fighting and disinformation. Nevertheless, false accounts through which it is worth mentioning papers disinformation is spread on social developed by practitioners, media. Journalists, including Jessikka experienced researchers, and cross- Aro from Finland, who studied troll -sectional research (produced through factories and their operations in international cooperation). They St. Petersburg, and German journalist present examples of the coordination Julian Röpcke, who was one of the of information operations, the first to reveal the full force of Russia’s recycling of propaganda messages and engagement in triggering armed fake news, as well as the mechanism of conflict in Ukraine, deserve great introducing propaganda messages into credit for revealing the mechanisms the media through various channels. of disinformation. At present, Röpcke studies Russian influence in Germany, Solid pieces of work worth including the links between German mentioning are from StopFake in politicians and Russian capital, e.g. Ukraine and European Values ​​in Gazprom. Similarly, the Czech think the Czech Republic as practical tank European Values ​​also runs recommendations for action. Their the Kremlin Watch program. This value is in the presentation of program aims to investigate and propaganda messages, documented disclose disinformation and influence with the source material. StopFake the operations of the Russian has prepared, among other things, Federation. materials on identifying fake news, and a report called European In deconstructing disinformation, Values ​​— a cross-sectional report a quick reaction and co-operation on defending against disinformation with government institutions is in EU countries, as well as the key. An example of coordinated, fundamentals of protecting elections appropriate action, was the quashing from hostile interference. of speculation by the Finnish police The Georgian MDF (Municipal about the murder of three women in Development Fund) and Transparency 2016. After the murders, information International Georgia, are preparing

20 The Warsaw Institute Review In the Age of Post-Truth: Best Practices in Fighting... reports analyzing anti-Western and anti-Turkish propaganda in Georgia and distribution channels for disinformation, as well as the financing of media and political parties. Whereas the Hungarian think tank, Political Capital, in cooperation with other European organizations, has prepared reports on the weaponization of culture by Russia and the activities of pro-Russian extremist groups in Central Europe.10

Important institutions dealing with foreign affairs in NATO and EU countries are the Centers of Excellence (CoE), specialized centers accredited by NATO. The Strategic Communications CoE in Riga, Latvia has published a series of online publications on the tools and mechanisms used by the Kremlin to influence its Western neighbors and their own population. The Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, created in Finland, is an example of successful cooperation between the European Union and NATO, which is best illustrated by the attempts of Finnish agents of influence in the Kremlin to create an MAURI RATILAINEN (PAP/EPA) RATILAINEN © MAURI organization patterned after the Center. Helsinki, Finland, October 2, 2017. Jens In terms of research and analysis, the Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, speaks at Strategic Communications CoE is the the opening of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threat in Helsinki. center leader, having released more than a is only open to EU and NATO countries. The twelve dozen practical studies of examples of countries that have joined so far are Estonia, influence operations. Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain and In addition, Alliance countries such as the United States. Denmark have decided to train their soldiers in combating disinformation before they are posted to NATO especially Sweden and Finland, place service.11 Other Nordic countries, great emphasis on media literacy in schools already, which is shaping good

10 The activity of pro-Russian extremist groups in habits in using the media and the Central-Eastern Europe, Political Capital, April ability to determine their credibility. 28, 2017, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/news. The Czech NGO People In Need, php?article_read=1&article_id=933. through the One World in Schools 11 Denmark to train NATO soldiers to fight Russian misinformation, Reuters, July 17, 2017, http://mobile. project, supports teachers who want reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN1A21FU. to tackle the subject of disinformation

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Frame from the program of the Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas "Derzhites' tam!". The name is a paraphrase of Dmitry Medvedev's response to complaints from Crimean pensioners, who pointed to huge price increases.

campaigns with their students.12 The Internal Security Police of Estonia failure of critical thinking is pointed discouraged government officials out by experts as one of the main from contact with employees of causes of the popularity of “alternative Sputnik. Concerned about the use of media.” First Draft, the co-creator of their image in Sputnik propaganda CrossCheck, is a platform dedicated campaigns, they didn’t even want to to raising the standards of online be photographed in the company of journalism and information sharing Sputnik employees. On May 9, 2016, online, but its activities are especially Olga Ivanov, one of the members of important because it brought in the ruling Estonian Center Party, Google, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, gave an interview with the “Bronze and other popular news sites as Soldier” (a monument of a Soviet partners in its network. soldier in Tallinn) as a backdrop, and even this appearance was met with Fifth: shame and ridicule sharp criticism from Prime Minister Awareness of the origins of some Jüri Ratas.13 outlets allows this knowledge to be In addition to the powerful weapon appropriately used in such a way as of social ostracism, it is possible to to protect one’s employees or citizens use the slightly smaller caliber of from unwanted contacts. Once again, using an Estonian example: the 13 Р. Болотская, Как не стать полезными идиотами Кремля: стратегия медиавойн, Ukrinform, May 30, 2017, https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric- 12 One World in Schools website, https://www.jsns.cz/ polytics/2237142-kak-ne-stat-poleznymi-idiotami- cz/article/111/What_is_jsns.html?id=243. kremla-strategia-mediavojn.html.

22 The Warsaw Institute Review In the Age of Post-Truth: Best Practices in Fighting... humor and satire. Caricatures that ridicule certain social phenomena or politicians are certainly not new, Information attacks but are nevertheless remain a useful tool for laughing at the absurdity are not only limited of Kremlin propaganda or the inconsistency between the image to disinformation, of Russia painted by the Russian but also threaten all elites and the reality. An example of the humorous approach is a projects, processes crowdfunded Lithuanian, satirical- -informative program “Derżites’ and reforms that tam!” (Hang In There!). While the European Values think tank strengthen a given presents the “Putin’s Champion Award,” which “indicates the amount country. of friendliness and appeasement of Western public figures to the message apart from a so-called Russian Federation’s policies parody, it tells you something...”16 which are set to undermine its neighborhood and the West.”14 Sixth: have a strategic It is also easier to show the user communications strategy the unreliability of a given source Europe will always be ready for if, apart from information that dialogue with Russian society. discredits Ukraine and glorifies However, the Russian authorities Russia, it also publishes articles take advantage of the values that the about lizard people, Illuminati or the West gained with great difficulty allegedly harmful effects of vaccines. over the centuries, such as freedom of speech and tolerance. By taking It is worth noting that a good portion any steps that limit the spread of of Internet users are a perfect target lies on the web, you must count for humor and satire. Reaching them on the alarm being raised and the by this route is the most effective way. invocation of exactly the same values Just look at the popularity of Twitter by agents of influence – often people star Darth Putin, commenting on ignorant of whose interests they current events related to the Kremlin are really defending. It is therefore and the U.S. One of Darth Putin’s important to be able to explain pieces of advice is: “Do not believe your actions and to have support in *anything* until the Kremlin denies research, evidence and in the law. it .” 15 On his blog, Darth Putin also writes: “The one thing the Kremlin Information attacks are not only cannot take is being laughed at. If limited to disinformation, but also the public cannot tell the Kremlin’s threaten all projects, processes and reforms that strengthen a given 14 Think Tank Website European Values First​​ Putin’s country. That is why it is important to Champion of the Week, http://www.europeanvalues. bear in mind the potential weak points net/kremlinwatch/putins-champion-of-the-week-en/. 15 Tweet of user @DarthPutinKGB, July 20, 16 Crowd Fund, Darth Putin blog, January 25, 2017, 2017, https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/ https://darthputinkgb.blogspot.com/2017/01/crowd- status/888002533331017728. fund.html.

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often say that they are always ready for dialogue with Russian society – it’s not Strategic communication necessary to blame all Russian citizens for the faults of their corrupt elites. therefore takes into account Of course, we can discuss the appropriateness and effectiveness of not only the diversity of the measures mentioned above to combat disinformation. Nevertheless, one's own society and the the multitude of these tools and their different origins – international, international community, administrative or non-governmental – allow us to gauge how far we’ve but also the changes in come in a relatively short period of time. Not all treatments will be media usage and the use effective everywhere; but exchanges of knowledge and cooperation are of the Internet. important, both among nations, and between government administrations that are susceptible to information and non-governmental organizations. attack, especially in the case of Our societies should respect different international projects, where it is opinions, however, as Lithuanian enough to block the implementation Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičus of a project in one country. When said, “[a] lie is not an alternative point implementing new reforms, an of view. Propaganda is not a legitimate appropriate strategy for informing form of public diplomacy. It’s our the public should be prepared naivety which is preventing us from (which in no way can be synonymous taking appropriate action, even as the with deception). other side advances its undeclared info-war.”17 It cannot be expected that Strategic communication therefore the Russian Federation, a state based takes into account not only the on its intelligence services, will give diversity of one’s own society and up using its most well-developed the international community, but tools and active measures, and stop also the changes in media usage and interfering in the internal affairs of the the use of the Internet. Therefore, in countries it considers its opponents. communicating with the public, with But if it uses lies as weapons, everyone customers, with foreign partners and has the right to defend against them. their recipients, it must be done in a way that people will want to hear and that maintains trust in official sources of information. Hence, there Maria Zielińska is a high level of online activity by EU July 25, 2017 actors and a movement away from stiff, bureaucratic language, focusing instead on presenting information in the form of infographics or video content. This is also part of a broader 17 L. Linkevicus, No freedom to lie, EUobserver, concept of one’s own positive narrative September 10, 2015; https://euobserver.com/ – NATO and the EU representatives opinion/130188.

24 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic: The state of play Jakub Janda, Veronika Víchová This is a brief report on the state of play of the Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic as of July 2017, and on what is being done to counter it.

t consists of four basic responses What is the general character to questions, put together from of Czech-Russian relations? the reports and papers authored The relations between the Czech or co-authored by the European Republic and the Russian Federation IValues Think-Tank and complemented have always been marked by the by open sources in order to make the legacy Czechs carry from the report as current as possible. The goal communist era and the invasion of this report is to present the situation of the Warsaw Pact military into in the Czech Republic, to introduce Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, the main channels of the Kremlin’s there is still a considerable part of the hostile influence, their effectiveness, population that shares pro-Kremlin and the most relevant responses from sentiments, especially amongst the government and the civil society. voters of the Communist Party of

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© Vit Simanek (PAP/CTK) Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, 2016. embassy of the russian federation.

Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), pragmatically when dealing with the third-most popular party in the Russia in the past, focusing mostly on country. Generally, Czechs have acted economic and energy interests, but repeatedly expressing concerns about democracy and human rights issues. Generally, Czechs have According to the 2012 Czech Export Strategy, Russia was among twelve acted pragmatically when priority countries. dealing with Russia in Energy security is possibly the most sensitive topic in the Czech-Russian the past, focusing mostly relations, with the Czech Republic being slightly dependent on Russia on economic and energy and the Russian nuclear energy giant interests, but repeatedly Rosatom being an exclusive supplier of fuel for the Temelin nuclear plant. expressing concerns about The reputation of Russia as a reliable supplier was damaged after turmoil democracy and human accompanying the previous efforts of the United States to allocate rights issues. anti-missile defence systems in the

26 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic...

Czech Republic and in Poland, to What tools of Kremlin’s which Russia reacted by curtailing influence are most active in oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline the Czech Republic? in the Czech Republic by 50%. Since then, the Czech Republic has Active measures been a vocal supporter of projects Prague, the Capital of the Czech reducing the negative impacts of Republic, has always been a fruitful energy dependency on Russia. The soil for Kremlin’s active measures and Czech energy sector is still of interest clandestine operations, partly because of to Russian business, especially its convenient geographical position in Gazprom, as well as espionage. the centre of Europe. According to the Annual Report2 of the BIS, the Russian The economic exchange has been intelligence services were the most active declining recently following the ones in the Czech Republic in 2015. devaluation of rouble, the recession Russian intelligence officers often operate of Russian economy, and economic under diplomatic cover of the Russian sanctions. The Czech Security Embassy which has more employees than Information Service (BIS) warned embassies of other states, including the in its Annual Report against the United States and China, the report says. penetration of Russian capital connected to the grey zone economy As of 2017, the Russian Embassy in in the Czech environment, and Prague consists of 48 members of the strengthening of the Kremlin’s diplomatic personnel and 81 members of political influence in the Czech administration and technical personnel. Republic. But the Czech foreign These numbers are still higher than the policy continues being active in the ones of the United States (40 diplomats) Eastern partnership region.1 and China (25 diplomats).3

After the start of the conflict in According to anonymous sources from Ukraine and the annexation of the the Czech counter-intelligence services, Crimean Peninsula by Russia, the there is a base of Soviet espionage from Czech Republic shifted its views the 1969 in Prague which never left on the political level. By now, the and revived its contacts after the Velvet Czech Republic is well aware of revolution. These former Soviet agents the threats posed by the Kremlin, are now operating within the circles of even though the Czech President organized crime and make an effort to Miloš Zeman works on maintaining influence high politics and enhance the relations between the two countries, dependency of the Czech Republic on denies the presence of Russian Russia.4 troops in Ukraine and has repeatedly 2 Annual Report of the Security Information Service criticised the EU sanctions against for 2015, Security Information Service (BIS), Russia. 2016, https://www.bis.cz/vyrocni-zpravaEN890a. html?ArticleID=1104. 3 1 J. Janda, Policy Shift Overview: How the Czech R. Břešťan, Ruské velvyslanectví v Praze je stale při Republic became one of the European leaders in síle,. Působí na něm nejvíce lidí ze všech ambasád, Info. countering Russian disinformation, European cz, June 14, 2017; http://www.info.cz/cesko/ruske- Values Think-Tank, May 10, 2017; http://www. velvyslanectvi-v-praze-je-stale-pri-sile-pusobi-na- europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ nem-nejvice-lidi-ze-vsech-ambasad-11275.html. Policy-shift-overview-How-the-Czech-Republic- 4 J. Janda, O. Kundra, Schéma fungování vlivu became-one-of-the-European-leaders-in-countering- Ruské federace v České republice, European Values Russian-disinformation-1.pdf. Think-Tank, September 16, 2016; http://www.

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It is not an easy task for the Czech interests. Most of these disinformation Republic to respond to the state of and manipulation websites are largely overpopulation at the Russian Embassy non-transparent, they do not disclose in Prague. The number of Czech the names of the authors of the diplomats in Moscow is lower than the content, financial resources or owners. size of Russian spy community in the In cases where the people behind the Czech Republic. Therefore, expulsion websites are known, they are often of Russian diplomatic employees might widely personally interconnected. soon result in an empty Czech Embassy Several websites are owned by only in the Russian Federation. one person and the authors of opinion articles and commentaries publish on Disinformation operations many of them at the same time as well. The Czech media space has problems The same characteristics apply also of its own, primarily the conflict to social media campaigns, which are of interest due to the ownership of more often than not focused not only several media outlets by the former on supporting Russia, but on stirring Deputy Prime Minister and a hot emotions about the refugee crisis in candidate for the Prime Minister’s seat Europe. after the general elections in October 2017. Despite these issues, it is important to note that the mainstream and public media manage to inform But there are also the Czechs objectively and responsibly, many subjects and for the most part. The few cases of bias were mostly connected to the TV personalities which, Prima channel which applied a policy of only broadcasting negative reports directly or indirectly about Syrian refugees.5 serve the interests There is only one official Russian quasi-media project in Czech of the Kremlin. language, the website Sputnik. But there are also many subjects and The disinformation spread in the personalities which, directly or Czech-language online outlets and indirectly serve the interests of the social networks often originate Kremlin. Furthermore, there are from foreign servers, mostly around 40 Czech-language websites either Kremlin’s official channels without known links to the Russian or conspiracy websites in English government, which repeatedly publish language, like Global Research or false reports and spread manipulative Southfront. Many of the websites do narratives, often motivated by not even produce their own content, adoration of Russia or economic only translate foreign articles, with a very low quality. What the articles lack evropskehodnoty.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ SCH%C3%89MA-FUNGOV%C3%81N%C3%8D- in quality, they gain in quantity – the VLIVU-RUSK%C3%89-FEDERACE-V- number of reports per week is very %C4%8CESK%C3%89-REPUBLICE1.pdf. high and is reinforced by sharing on 5 Skandál TV Prima: nařídila redaktorům negativně social networks, especially Facebook. informovat o uprchlících, ECHO24, May 30, 2016; http://echo24.cz/a/iSwfA/skandal-tv-prima-naridila- The Czech President Miloš Zeman redaktorum-negativne-informovat-o-uprchlicich. plays a crucial role in the Czech

28 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic... European Values © European The STRATCOM SUMMIT 2017 in Prague, organized by the Czech think-tank European Values, is an excellent example of the cooperation between administration, business and NGOs which is crucial for the fight against disinformation.

But there are also disinformation scene. He repeats many subjects and the disinformation and narratives supported by these websites (for The disinformation personalities which, example, he repeated the statements spread in the Czech- about the alleged Banders in Ukraine6 directly or indirectly or the non-truths about the alleged language online outlets Ukrainian language law7), and serve the interests these outlets also come to his aid and social networks and support when he needs it. His of the Kremlin. statements and opinions are regularly often originate from repeated by disinformation outlets and foreign servers. he is generally presented as the only person in the Czech Republic who who tend to share articles from actually cares about its citizens. But these websites on their social media there are also other politicians who accounts and sometimes they even let help the disinformation ecosystem themselves get caught while trusting grow, either intentionally or because reports which are not based on facts.8 of their ignorance. Across the political spectrum, there are individuals Two of the most popular disinformation stories of 2017 6 Nepoužívejte termín banderovci, kárají vědci 9 Zemana. A nabízejí radu, Lidovky.cz, August 28, so far come from a notorious 2014; http://www.lidovky.cz/nepouzivejte-termin- banderovci-karaji-vedci-zemana-nabizeji-radu-p90-/ 8 V. Víchová, Kdo sdílí prokremelské weby na zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A140828_145147_ln_zahranici_ facebooku?, European Values Think-Tank, June 30, msl. 2016; http://www.evropskehodnoty.cz/wp-content/ 7 K. Hendrychová, Český prezident užívá nepravdivá uploads/2016/07/Kdo-sd%C3%ADl%C3%AD- tvrzení podle linie Kremlu, European Values prokremelsk%C3%A9-weby-na-facebooku4.pdf. Think-Tank, November 11, 2014; http://www. 9 Radioaktivní mrak, arabština na úřadech i CIA útočí evropskehodnoty.cz/cesky-prezident-uziva- v Sýrii. Sestavili jsme nový žebříček falešných zpráv, nepravdiva-tvrzeni-podle-linie-kremlu/. iROZHLAS, 2017, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-

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website Aeronet, which provides disinformation websites after any no information about its personal natural disaster or terrorist attack – structures whatsoever. The first accusing someone from a false flag informed about an alleged radioactive operation. After the recent tragic cloud above Europe10 coming from chemical attacks in Syria, Aeronet a “strange explosion in the French reported that there is evidence nuclear plant”, accusing European confirming that the attacks in Idlib governments from keeping it secret were staged by the White Helmets and and recommending that Czech the CIA.12

Support of political allies In many European countries, there But there are also other are politicians with significant influence, who are sympathetic politicians who help the towards the behaviour of the Russian disinformation ecosystem Federation. They often advocate for Kremlin’s interpretation of the grow, either intentionally Ukrainian conflict or oppose the sanctions policies of the EU and the or because of their United States. They can get aid from the Russian Federation, which can ignorance. be either ideological and political, for example by regular invitations citizens buy Iodine tablets and for ceremonial visits in Moscow or dosimeters. In reality, the slightly Crimea, or financial, as we saw in the increased levels of radioactive Iodine case of the French National Front. in the air were possibly coming from a These politicians can later help the different source more to the East and Kremlin with legitimization in front were not dangerous for human health of domestic audiences. in any way, unlike the Iodine tablets people were recommended to digest.11 The Czech Republic is no exception. Amongst the key political allies of the The second example represents Kremlin, there are the President Miloš very well a typical reaction of Zeman, most of the representatives of the Communist Party of Bohemia and domov/nasli-jsme-nejsdilenejsi-falesne-zpravy- Moravia, a few of the representatives uplynuleho-pulroku_1705240600_zlo. of the Czech Social Democratic 10 VK, Nad Evropou se valí radioaktivní mrak Party and some representatives of the pocházející zřejmě z podivné exploze ve francouzské jaderné elektrárně. Vlády mlčí, Francie se snaží extreme right. bagatelizovat celý incident slovy o neškodnosti radionuklidů a my doporučujeme okamžitě 12 VK, “A je to venku! Důkazy a fotografie potvrdily, nakoupit jódové tablety a dozimetry!, Aeronet.cz, že chemický útok v Idlíbu byl zinscenovaný Bílými February 22, 2017; http://aeronet.cz/news/nad- přilbami a americkou CIA. Syrská opozice na Twitteru evropou-se-vali-radioaktivni-mrak-pochazejici- informovala o chemickém útoku den předem! Trump zrejme-z-podivne-exploze-ve-francouzske- má vážný problém, má kolem sebe zrádce, lháře jaderne-elektrarne-vlady-mlci-francie-se-snazi- a nekontroluje silové složky USA stejně, jako je bagatelizovat-cely-incident-slovy-o-neskodnosti- nekontroloval Obama!”, Aeronet.cz, April 7, 2017; radionuklidu/#!parentId=88471. http://aeronet.cz/news/a-je-to-venku-dukazy-a- 11 Hoax, Radiační mrak nad Evropu z utajené exploze ve fotografie-potvrdily-ze-chemicky-utok-v-idlibu- francouzské elektrárně, Manipulátoři.cz, February 22, byl-zinscenovany-bilymi-prilbami-a-americkou- 2017; http://manipulatori.cz/hoax-radiacni-mrak-nad- cia-syrska-opozice-na-twitteru-informovala-o- evropou-utajene-exploze-ve-francouzske-elektrarne/. chemickem-utoku-den-predem/.

30 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic...

President Zeman is used by the Zeman’s office did not get security Kremlin’s hostile influence operations clearance20 at all and the chief of the for domestic reasons inside Russia President’s military office did not get as much as for disrupting the Czech his clearance prolonged.21 society from the inside. He undermines the Czech membership in NATO and How successful the Kremlin the EU,13 he denies organized Russian is in influencing the Czech military presence in Ukraine,14 and he Republic? also calls for lifting sanctions against The unfortunate truth is that the data the Russian Federation.15 Russian state calculating the exact impact of the media portray him as a European ally of Kremlin’s disinformation operations Vladimir Putin,16 a critic of the Russian on the Czech society are missing. We opposition and a fighter against the can find out whether Czechs believe United States.17 the Kremlin-friendly narratives and the Kremlin’s interpretation of international Besides President Zeman’s behaviour and domestic events. To some extent, and proclamations, there are also the we can even measure whether the advisors surrounding him, often with main goal of the Russian Federation very dubious backgrounds. The chief is being fulfilled – the level of trust of economic adviser of the president citizens towards democratic institutions worked as an executive of an energy and mainstream media. But what we company with close links to the Kremlin cannot do is to attribute these results to for many years18 and the company a specific disinformation campaign or even payed a fine for him when he report, to the activity of a group was convicted of selling aviation oil of websites, etc. from strategic reserves.19 The chief of In 2016, the public polls conducted in 13 Referendu o odchodu z Unie by Zeman nebránil. cooperation with the STEM agency Vláda je proti, Česká televize, July 1, 2016; http://www. ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/1834439-referendu-o- showed that over 25% of the Czech odchodu-z-unie-zeman-nebranil-vlada-je-proti. population believes disinformation and 14 J. Wirnitzer, Žádná invaze, zbytečné sankce, tvrdil over 24% of people trust disinformation Zeman. Ve Walesu mluvil jinak, iDnes.cz, September and manipulation media outlets more 5, 2014; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zeman-o-rusech-na- ukrajine-09h-/domaci.aspx?c=A140905_114819_ than mainstream media. These people domaci_jw. perceive threats and the role of Russia 15 Czech President Claims Number of Anti- differently from the rest. Russian Sanctions Opponents Growing, Sputnik News, May 11, 2015; http://sputniknews.com/ politics/20150511/1022003662.html#ixzz42neEqqf4. When we look at specific narratives, 16 T. Lindner, Economist: Rusko považuje Zemana za over half of Czech citizens think that svého spojence, Respekt, April 2, 2015; https://www. respekt.cz/denni-menu/economist-rusko-povazuje- prazsky-hrad-lukoil-martin-nejedly-dub-/domaci. zemana-za-sveho-spojence. aspx?c=A161103_202521_domaci_fer. 17 R. Máca, Analýza: Mediální obraz Miloše Zemana 20 Mynář nedostal prověrku i proto, že NBÚ v ruských médiích, Neovlivní.cz, October 6, 2015; zamlčel 30 let starou nehodu v opilosti, Lidovky. http://neovlivni.cz/analyza-medialni-obraz-milose- cz, October 7, 2015; http://www.lidovky.cz/mynar- zemana-v-ruskych-mediich/. nedostal-proverku-i-proto-ze-nbu-zamlcel-30- 18 Lukoil Zemanova poradce Nejedlého po obří pokutě let-starou-nehodu-v-opilosti-1xc-/zpravy-domov. skončil v likvidaci, iDNES.cz, June 29, 2015; http:// aspx?c=A151007_133040_ln_domov_ele. zpravy.idnes.cz/nejedleho-lukoil-je-v-likvidaci-dmx-/ 21 K. Hrubeš, Generálův pád: Pilc nedostal prověrku domaci.aspx?c=A150629_115548_domaci_cen. kvůli ženám a vazbám na Rusko, iDNES.cz, 19 V. Srnka, Milionovou pokutu za Nejedlého December 14, 2015; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/okolnosti- zaplatil Lukoil, sám nedal ani korunu, iDNES. neudeleni-proverky-generalu-pilcovi-fr9-/domaci. cz, November 4, 2016; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ aspx?c=A151213_214528_domaci_rych.

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When we speak about the impact of the Kremlin’s hostile influence, it is Czech people are the most also important to note that despite the efforts of reporting tubes of Eurosceptic within the the Kremlin in the Czech politics, the general direction of the Czech Visegrad region, but NATO foreign policy stays unchanged. The Czech Foreign Ministry continuously still has strong support, with supports the integrity of Ukraine,22 considers it a priority country for the exception of locating transformation cooperation, and recently also published a statement NATO facilities highlighting the fact that the Czech Republic considers the so-called on Czech soil. “people’s republics” in the Eastern part of Ukraine non-legitimate and the the United States is responsible for Russian military presence in Ukraine the hundreds of thousands of Syrian to be a gross violation of international refugees coming to Europe, while law23. over 28% of the Czech public believes that Russian military intervention What is the Czech Republic in Syria helps solve the refugee doing to counter the influence crisis. Almost 3 out of 10 people also of the Kremlin? blamed the United States for the The Czech government conducted Ukrainian crisis, even though it is the National Security Audit24 last the Russian military occupying part year, within which it evaluated all the of the Ukrainian territory. On the strengths and weaknesses of the Czech other hand, only 1/5 of respondents defence and security policies, including stated to believe the lie that there are in the area of resilience against foreign no organized Russian military forces powers’ influence. The Audit included in Ukraine, despite the repetition of a set of specific recommendations in these claims by the President Miloš order to enhance the resilience of the Zeman. Czech people are the most Czech Republic, based on which an Eurosceptic within the Visegrad action plan was created. Several of these region, but NATO still has strong recommendations are already support, with the exception of being implemented. locating NATO facilities on Czech soil. Within the National Security Audit framework, the Centre against Slovak think-tank GLOBSEC repeated 22 Česká podpora Ukrajině, Velvyslanectví České similar polling in 2017, confirming that republiky v Kyjevě, 2017; http://www.mzv.cz/kiev/ Czechs think they should geopolitically cz/vzajemne_vztahy/ceska_podpora_ukrajine/index. stand somewhere between the West html. 23 Prohlášení MZV k tzv. „lidovým republikám”, and the East and remain as neutral as Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky, possible. According to this survey, 30% 18.7.2017; http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_ of Czech also believes that autocracy media/prohlaseni_a_stanoviska/x2017_07_18_ would be the best political system for prohlaseni_mzv_k_tzv_lidovym_republikam.html. 24 National Security Audit, Ministestvo vnitra České our country and 49% of them does not republiky, 2016; http://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/ believe the mainstream media. audit-narodni-bezpecnosti.aspx.

32 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kremlin’s hostile influence in the Czech Republic...

Terrorism and Hybrid Threats has been established. It has been operational since January 2017 and amongst other things, it is supposed to monitor the disinformation community in the Czech Republic, respond to disinformation stories which pose danger to internal security, and keep track of the most important narratives spread by foreign powers. Its job is also to coordinate the efforts within different ministries to counter hostile influence and to train and educate civil servants. The first trainings already began in cooperation with European Values © European Czech intelligence services, with Kremlin Watch is a strategic program of the European the main goal to better prepare civil Values Think-Tank, which aims to expose and confront servants for defence against foreign instruments of Russian influence and disinformation operations focused against Western democracies. efforts to get sensitive information.25

There are also several civil society Academia is also active, with the initiatives which try to tackle some researchers from the Masaryk of the tools used by the Kremlin to University taking the lead, dedicating spread its influence in the Czech their work to manipulation techniques Republic. The European Values of disinformation websites. Also, the Think-Tank has a Kremlin Watch Zvol si info initiative originated by the Program focusing on monitoring students of the university, shows young the disinformation operations in the people how to confirm their sources and Czech Republic, and also regular choose objective and reliable news. Last briefings and policy development on but not least, individual journalists are the European level. The Association conducting investigations from time to for International Affairs launched time, in order to reveal the origins and a Czech-language version of the connections of the people behind the Ukrainian website Stopfake.org fact- disinformation projects in the Czech -checking news about the situation Republic. A good example would be in Ukraine. The People in Need the work of Ondřej Kundra from the organization provides teachers with Respekt magazine who inquired about education material on the Kremlin’s the Aeronet website26. disinformation campaign and organizes workshops and lectures on Jakub Janda, Veronika Víchová media literacy. July 25, 2017

26 Kremlin Influence Index, Media Sapiens, 2017; 25 https://www.bis.cz/clanek54a5. http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/content/files/ html?ArticleID=1129&utm_ dm_iik_engl_pravka-compressed.pdf; July 18, 2017; source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_ Vulnerability Index, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, campaign=kremlin_watch_monitor_russian_ 2017; http://www.globsec.org/upload/documents/ influence_means_more_than_cyber_attacks_and_ vulnerability-index/globsec-vulnerability-index.pdf, fake_news&utm_term=2017-07-28. July 18, 2017.

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Russian disinformation and extremism in Hungary Lóránt Győri, Péter Krekó Their relationship with Russia is one of the most divisive issues among V4 countries.

hese divisions are also society, public perception and state manifested in their countermeasures.1 On the other vulnerability to the Russian hand, Poland is the most resilient influence. Among the V4, Hungary is the most exposed to 1 How Vulnerable Are the Visegrad Four Societies?, T GLOBSEC, April 11, 2017, https://www.globsec.org/ subversive Russian influence in the news/vulnerable-visegrad-four-societies/, accessed areas of political leadership, civil October 16, 2017.

34 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian disinformation and extremism in Hungary

Budapest, Hungary, February 17, 2015. Russian President Vladimir Putin stands on the terrace of the presidential Alexander Palace in Budapest.

© NOEMI BRUZAK (PAP/EPA)

to Russian power projection due to the high political and societal Among the V4, Hungary consciousness of the Kremlin’s actions, especially after the annexation of is the most exposed to Crimea. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are slotted in between subversive Russian Poland and Hungary. The latter’s situation is strongly paradoxical: influence in the areas despite Hungarians’ pro-Western orientation and the government’s of political leadership, adherence to its obligations in EU and NATO structures, the political civil society, public elite’s “Eastern Opening” foreign policy pursuing strong political perception and state and energetic alignment with the Kremlin also opens the door for countermeasures. political corruption. This influence is composed of three main layers: the political mainstream (current and Hungary. In the following, we will former), far-right actors and radical provide you with an overview of the extremists – mainly on the right, examples of Russian influence exerted since the radical left is very weak in through these groups.

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Sleeper agents of disinformation It came as a surprise on the sleepy Disinformation strategy summer day of August 15, 2014 that in its official communique, in Central Eastern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’s (MFA) Europe based on locally accused the Hungarian government (its most important ally in Central operated pro-Russian Eastern Europe) of selling T-72 tanks to Ukraine illegally to escalate the new media platforms Eastern Ukrainian conflict following the Crimean annexation. embedded into extremist This accusation followed the old Kremlin playbook: blame your enemy political subcultures, for what you are doing. In this case, the enemy was not Hungary of course, usually espousing but the EU – the puppet of the US in the Russian state’s narrative. As the extreme right and statement said: “Weapons supplies to Ukraine by the EU member- extreme left ideologies. countries… violate legally binding obligations – the Arms Trade Treaty neo-Nazi paramilitary group (ATT).”2 Hungarian National Front (Magyar The interesting and rather new aspect Nemzeti Arcvonal – MNA) at the of the story, at least in Hungary, was end of 2012.However, it was quickly the uninhibited use of active measures transformed into the Kremlin’s in this foreign policy manoeuvre. geopolitical platform primarily used The Russian MFA relied on an as a “Russian secret service messaging article published by an “alternative” board”, as evidenced by the form and extreme right site called Hídfő. content of articles.4 To blow away any net (“Bridgehead” in English) that clouds of doubt about its real source published fake photos of the tanks and function, the website was put on and claimed that the “USA had asked” a Russian server shortly after serving NATO members in possession of as the source of the Russian Foreign former Soviet military hardware to Ministry – and its current domain deliver weapons to Ukraine.3 name is Hídfő.ru. This Russian mouthpiece, totally The above-mentioned T-72 tank unknown to the broader public at scandal constitutes a classical “active that time, was founded by the measure” utilizing a “sleeper” disinformation cell, that is Hídfő.net, 2 Russia Says Weapons Supplies to Ukraine by EU Countries Violate Arms Trade Treaty, Sputnik and a paramilitary organization, the International, August 15, 2014, https://sputniknews. MNA, which have most probably been com/politics/20140815192053875-Russia-Says- Weapons-Supplies-to-Ukraine-by-EU-Countries- Violate/, accessed October 16, 2017. 4 A. Juhász, L. Győri, P. Krekó, A. Dezső, I Am 3 Külföld - Moszkva Ukrajnai Fegyverszállítással Eurasian The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Vádolja Magyarországot, Index, August 15, 2014, Far-Right, Political Capital, March 2015, http://www. http://index.hu/kulfold/2014/08/15/moszkva_ politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_SDI_ fegyverszallitassal_vadolja_magyarorszagot/, Boll_study_IamEurasian.pdf, accessed accessed October 16, 2017. October 16, 2017.

36 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian disinformation and extremism in Hungary

infiltrated well before the Crimean secret service intelligence operations crisis, in 2012. in Hungary exploiting the extreme Disinformation strategy Two years later, on October 26, 2016, right, but it also presents the role of a police officer was tragically shot the mainstream. While this tragic in Central Eastern in the head by István Győrkös – the event was followed by arrests and leader of the MNA and founder of investigations, the law enforcement Europe based on locally the above mentioned website – when agencies and government politicians the police raided his house in search only focused on the extremist part operated pro-Russian for illegal arms and ammunition.5 of the story, and seemed to totally Subsequently, investigative journalists ignore any connections with Russia. new media platforms revealed that the paramilitary MNA Hídfő.ru is alive and well, spreading had been conducting airsoft drills with pro-Kremlin propaganda amplified embedded into extremist so-called “Russian diplomats,” – in by social media sites spreading fact, members of the Russian military conspiracy theories, Russian political subcultures, intelligence (GRU).6 This kind of propaganda and nationalist messages. evolving liaison between the neo- usually espousing Nazi MNA, its media and Kremlin Political mainstream: general figures fits perfectly into the Kremlin’s vulnerability towards Russia extreme right and increasingly decentralized post-Crimea When Viktor Orbán returned to disinformation strategy in Central power in 2010, one of his main extreme left ideologies. Eastern Europe based on locally and openly expressed goals was to operated pro-Russian new media establish “friendly” ties with Moscow platforms embedded into extremist that was quite understandable on political subcultures, usually espousing a practical economic policy level extreme right and extreme left given Hungary’s continuous energy ideologies, their numbers running in dependence on Russian gas, oil, the hundreds in the region and around and nuclear fuel imports even after 100 in Hungary alone.7 Some of these the transition in 1989. While the websites, blogs and Facebook pages Kremlin established strong and are new, while some of them, such as institutionalized connections with the Hídfő, have simply been “occupied” post-communist Hungarian Socialist and taken over. The more extreme and Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – marginal the website is, the easier it is MSZP), enjoying its benefits when the to influence it from the outside. socialists were in government (mainly Not only does this story of the MNA 2002-2010), the right-wing political reveal the striking banality of Russian elite’s pro-Russian geopolitical turn after 2010 has provided the 5 Far-Right Murder of Hungarian Police Officer: Pro- Russian Radicalization in the CEE, Political Capital, Kremlin with further inroads into the November 4, 2016, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/ mainstream of the Hungarian political news.php?article_read=1&article_id=320, accessed system when it comes to the export October 16, 2017. of energy, illiberal values, policies 6 D. András, P. Szabolcs, Orosz Diplomaták Gyakorlatoztak a Rendőrgyilkos Brigádjával, and disinformation. According to Index, October 27, 2016, http://index.hu/ the Globsec Trends 2017 data on belfold/2016/10/27/orosz_hirszerzok_ gyakorlatoztak_a_rendorgyilkos_harcosaival/, Hungary, compiled by the Political accessed October 16, 2017. Capital Institute, this resulted in a 7 A. Bátorfy, Z. Szánthó, Bivalybasznádi seemingly paradoxical situation: the Álhírvállalkozók És Oroszország Magyar Hangjai, mainstream media overwhelmingly VS, April 7, 2016, https://vs.hu/kozelet/osszes/ bivalybasznadi-alhirvallalkozok-es-oroszorszag- controlled by the ruling Fidesz- magyar-hangjai-0407, accessed October 16, 2017. -KDNP pursues an outright pro-

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through disseminating pro-Kremlin messages in the media controlled by Pro-Russian geopolitical or close to the government. Figure 1. The Hungarian population’s turn after 2010 has provided geopolitical orientation in 2017 the Kremlin with further The Hungarian political mainstream’s pro-Russian media activity is crucial, inroads into the mainstream since Russian state-owned media is not capable of influencing the of the Hungarian political Hungarian public deeply and directly. There is no direct Russian media system when it comes presence on the Hungarian media market, since the Hungarian-speaking to the export of energy, Voice of Russia was shut down and transformed into Sputnik in illiberal values, policies December 2014,10 and the Hungarian audience does not speak Russian to and disinformation. directly access Russian media online or via satellite. Hungary also lacks Russian geopolitical platform despite a significant Russian diaspora their electorate and the Hungarian or Orthodox community. majority’s pro-Western, pro-NATO Fidesz announced its so-called attitude. The data shows (see figure “Eastern Opening” foreign policy 1) that 39% of Hungarians think that after 2010 that manifested itself Hungary should exclusively be a part visibly in the bilateral deal struck in of the West, while only 5% supported January 2014 between Russia and the country’s Eastern affiliation. Hungary on the Paks II project.11 53% put Hungary between the East The two governments’ foreign policy and the West in a geopolitical and cooperation has expanded to the point cultural sense.8 In Hungary, it is not where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán the people who are trying to replace and Vladimir Putin have held bilateral the pro-Western elite, but meetings every year since 2013, which a pro-Russian elite is trying to replace is a unique performance among the pro-Western public.9 To achieve European leaders, especially after the this goal, the Hungarian government Russian invasion of Crimea. has not only formulated The government’s centralized media a pro-Kremlin stance, it tries to 10 For defunct Hungarian Voice of Russia see, change the Hungarian populace’s Oroszország Hangja, http://hungarian.ruvr.ru/, geopolitical attitude by opening accessed October 12, 2017; http://hungarian.ruvr.ru/, towards Russian disinformation accessed October 16, 2017. 11 The Paks II nuclear project is about building a new nuclear power plant to substitute the the Paks 8 GLOBSEC Trends 2017: Mixed Messages and I nuclear bloc that was originally constructed with Signs of Hope from Central and Eastern Europe, the assistance of the USSR back in 1982. The Paks II GLOBSEC, August 1, 2017, https://www.globsec.org/ plant’s construction is set to begin in January 2017 publications/globsec-trends-2017-mixed-messages- by Rosatom and it is funded by a Russian loan worth signs-hope-central-eastern-europe-2/, accessed EUR 10 billion. C. Keszthelyi, PM’s Office Declares October 16, 2017. Paks II Deal Classified, The Budapest Business 9 P. Krekó, A Magyar Szakadék, HVG, June 28, 2017, Journal, January 8, 2015, https://bbj.hu/economy/ http://hvg.hu/hetilap/2017.26/201726_a_magyar_ pms-office-declares-paks-ii-deal-classified_90486, szakadek, accessed October 16, 2017. accessed October 16, 2017.

38 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian disinformation and extremism in Hungary

Fig. 1. Hungary’s geopolitical belonging (2017)

production, which represented the of the Maidan conflict, the Hungarian government’s position for 95% of public media, echoing the Kremlin’s the time in the anti-migration quota voice, labelled the Maidan protesters referendum in 2016,12 paired with the merely as “terrorists.”14 Furthermore, censorship of the news programmes the Hungarian state-owned media, of the Public Broadcaster (PBS) led as a gesture to Moscow, is running to the pro-Russian foreign policy a Russian language news programme of Fidesz-KDNP and other anti- – despite the fact that there are only -Western, pro-Kremlin narratives a few thousand Russian speakers being disseminated freely in the living in Hungary and most of them Hungarian public discourse.13 speak Hungarian fluently. But the real There are a few examples accurately power of Russian disinformation in illustrating the degree of pro-Russian the Hungarian mainstream media is bias in the public and pro-government best demonstrated by the pro-Kremlin media. For instance, at the beginning conspiracy theories disseminated by pro-government outlets about,15 12 Media Bias in Hungary During the Referendum, Campaign on EU Refugee Quotas, Mertek Media 14 K. Pynnöniemi, A. Rácz, Report - Fog of Falsehood: Monitor, October 4, 2016, http://mertek.eu/ Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict en/2016/10/04/dri-mertek-study-media-bias- in Ukraine, The Finnish institute of International hungary-durning-referendu-campaign-eu-refugee- Affairs, May 10, 2016, http://www.fiia.fi/en/ quotas/, accessed October 16, 2017. publication/588/fog_of_falsehood/, 13 Belső szerkesztői utasításra nem szerepelhetnek accessed October 16, 2017. gyerekek a köztévé menekültes anyagaiban, 444, 15 A Legnépszerűbb Orosz Összeesküvés-Elméletek a August 25, 2015, https://444.hu/2015/08/25/belso- Magyar Kormánypárti Sajtóban, PC blog, July 13, 2016, szerkesztoi-utasitasra-nem-szerepelhetnek-gyerekek- https://pcblog.atlatszo.hu/2016/07/13/a-legnepszerubb- a-kozszolgalati-teve-menekultes-anyagaiban/, orosz-osszeeskuves-elmeletek-a-magyar-kormanyparti- accessed March 31, 2017. sajtoban/, accessed October 16, 2017.

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Budapest, Hungary, June 23, 2017. Deputies vote during the session in the Parliament.

for example, the Maidan revolution the crash,18 or Boris Nemtsov having having beenbinitiated by a US- or been killed by Western intelligence NATO-led coup,16 17 Malaysia Airlines agencies to cast a shadow on Putin Flight 17 having been “prepared” by with the aid of a “Russian fake- the secret services before take-off and Kennedy” figure capable of mobilizing the opposition.19 The importance of

16 L. Tóth Gy., A Magára Hagyott Ukrajna, Magyar these theories is more borne out of the Idők, March 29, 2016, http://magyaridok.hu/ velemeny/a-magara-hagyott-ukrajna-524623/, 18 Ma Reggel, M1, October 27, 2014, http://nava.hu/ accessed October 16, 2017. id/1991378/, accessed October 16, 2017. 17 G. Máté T., Moszkvai Jalta, Magyar Hírlap, 19 G. Máté T., Lövések És Köd, Magyar Hírlap, March February 6, 2015, http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/16617/ 2, 2015, http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/18641/Lovesek_ Moszkvai_Jalta, accessed October 16, 2017. es_kod, accessed October 16, 2017.

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2017, the Fidesz-KDNP parliamentary group adopted the Hungarian version of the “foreign agents act” forcing Hungarian NGOs to declare themselves “foreign funded organisations” in case they receive over HUF 7.2 million (around EUR 23.000) from foreign entities, including funds received directly from the European Union’s institutions.21 Further, Hungarian Chief Prosecutor Péter Polt met with his Russian counterpart in January to discuss cooperation on corruption and money-laundering.22 As for the cultural issues, the government announced the renovation of several old Orthodox churches, for which Patriarch Kirill of Moscow was officially invited to Budapest, and he is expected to attend inauguration ceremonies in 2017.23 Furthermore, the Hungarian government hosted the pro-Russian ultra-conservative World Congress of Families at the end of May, where representatives of several Russian orthodox oligarchs were present, such as Natalia V. Yakunina (Sanity of Motherhood Program) or Alexey Komov.24 So it is no surprise that PM Orbán frequently praises the Putin regime’s success openly, as he did in a speech in January 2017: “Here is Russia, which – let’s be frank –

© Szilard Koszticsak (PAP/EPA) 21 Elfogadták a Civiltörvényt, a Célba Vett Szervezetek Ellenállást Hirdetnek, HVG, June 13, 2017, http://hvg. hu/itthon/20170613_Megszavaztak_a_civiltorvenyt_ Orbannal_tiltakozott_Szabo_Timea, accessed Kremlin’s geopolitical needs and has October 16, 2017. only indirect implications or functions 22 M. Herczeg, Polt Péter Legfőbb Ügyész Az Orosz in Hungarian domestic politics, they Kollégájával Tárgyalt Moszkvában, 444, January 18, 2017, http://444.hu/2017/01/18/polt-peter-legfobb- highlight the Hungarian government’s ugyesz-az-orosz-kollegajaval-targyalt-moszkvaban, political dependence on the Kremlin accessed October 16, 2017. instead.20 23 G. Medvegy, Nem Csak Putyin, Az Orosz Pátriárka Is Budapestre Jön, 24, January 8, 2017, http://24. The Hungarian government also follows hu/belfold/2017/01/08/nem-csak-putyin-az-orosz- the illiberal legal and political example patriarka-is-budapestre-jon/, of the Russian regime. On June 13, accessed October 16, 2017. 24 World Congress of Families XI, Budapest Family Summit, May 27, 2017, https://www. 20 A Legnépszerűbb Orosz Összeesküvés-Elméletek budapestfamilysummit.com/en/may-26-friday/, a Magyar Kormánypárti Sajtóban. accessed October 16, 2017.

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has survived Western attempts to politicians and stakeholders for party isolate and overthrow the regime, chairman Gábor Vona, largely thanks the low price of oil, sanctions, and to the relations he accumulated as a the internal activity of independent, former businessman in Russia (see impartial, allegedly non-governmental below for more details). The pro- organisations void of any outside -Russian stance of the party was more interference. She has survived all of than strange in light of the Hungarian this, so she is here, and therefore it far-right’s traditional vehement and is not very reasonable – especially in widespread anti-communist stance. Europe – to disregard the force and From Jobbik’s obvious pro-Russian opportunity presented by Russia.”25 shift in during 2007-2008, the party supported and legitimized Russian the Political far right: Jobbik issues on all levels in the domestic The more we go to the margins, the and international political arena. stronger Russian influence becomes. Jobbik’s 2009 party programme The far-right Jobbik party, founded already mentioned the construction in 2003, followed a very obvious of the Paks II nuclear reactor,28 pro-Russian line almost from its and the party organized an energy inception, and especially after Béla conference together with Gazprom in Kovács, nicknamed “KGBéla” even 2013.29 The same year, Gábor Vona by his own comrades within the party and Béla Kovács gave a joint lecture because of his extensive Russian on “traditional values” during which ties, joined the party in 2005.26 He they accused the EU of “being the immediately became the head of traitor” of Europe at Lomonosov Jobbik’s Foreign Policy Cabinet after, University on the invitation of and thus turned the party towards Alexander Dugin.30 Vona later praised Russia.27 Kovács, who was also the the advantages of the Eurasian single biggest donor of the party in Economic Union in the the early years, started to organize following way: high-level meetings with Russian “For me Eurasianism means that Hungary may become a bridge between Europe and Asia. […] The advantage of Eurasianism comes The more we go to the from the fact that, in contrast to EU-integration, it preserves the margins, the stronger independence of regions engaged 31 Russian influence becomes. in continental cooperation.” 28 Az országnak szüksége van Paks bővítésére, Jobbik, January 21, 2014, https://jobbik.hu/hireink/az- orszagnak-szuksege-van-paks-bovitesere, 25 V. Orbán, Orbán Viktor Beszéde Lámfalussy accessed October 16, 2017. Lectures Szakmai Konferencián, Miniszterelnok.Hu, 29 I. Marnitz, Jobbik-Gázkonferencia a Gazprommal, January 23, 2017, miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor- NOL, November 15, 2013, http://nol.hu/gazdasag/ beszede-lamfalussy-lectures-szakmai-konferencian/, jobbik-gazkonferencia_a_gazprommal-1426445, accessed October 16, 2017. accessed October 16, 2017. 26 A. Juhász, L. Győri, P. Krekó, A. Dezső, I Am 30 Vona Gábor a Lomonoszov Egyetemen tartott Eurasian, The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian előadást, Jobbik, May 21, 2013, https://jobbik.hu/ Far-Right. hireink/vona-gabor-lomonoszov-egyetemen-tartott- 27 B. Kovács, Jobbik, May 13, 2009, https://jobbik.hu/ eloadast, accessed October 16, 2017. rovatok/ep-lista/7_kovacs_bela, 31 The Russian Connection, The Spread of pro- accessed October 16, 2017. Russian Policies on the European Far Right,

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Béla Kovács participated in the illegal “national self-determination” and Crimean secession referendum accused the Ukrainian government as an “independent European of committing crimes against observer” alongside of Mateusz humanity after coming to power Piskorski,32 the founder and leader with a bloody coup financed by the of the Polish Zmiana party.33 Jobbik USA.37 Moreover, Jobbik has long worked strongly on the territorial agreed with Russian disinformation disintegration of Ukraine as well, claiming that Ukraine’s territorial asking for the support of Duma integrity is just an “illusion” and lawmakers to establish Hungarian- Hungary should refrain from -Russian autonomy in the Trans- supporting Kiev to remain “neutral” -Carpathian region of Western in the conflict.38 It does not do so Ukraine.34 After Béla Kovács was in the case of the Syrian conflict, accused by the Hungarian authorities though. Media close to Jobbik of spying against the European supported the Russian military Union in favour of Russia,35 Márton intervention on the side of Bashar Gyöngyösi, Vice Chairman of the al-Assad and the Russian anti- Committee on Foreign Affairs in terrorism narrative in general.39 the National Assembly, Deputy 40 Finally, the Belarusian activist Leader of the Jobbik parliamentary Alexander Usovsky’s files revealed group stepped into his shoes to Jobbik and the paramilitary and monitor the illegal Donetsk People’s revisionist The Sixty-Four Counties Republic’s referendum in 2014 Youth Movement (Hatvannégy and “parliamentary election” in Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom – 2015, also accompanied by Mr. HVIM) may have been part of Piskorski.36 In his open letter to the Russian active or disinformation peoples of Ukraine Gábor Vona measures for years, and might have underlined the importance of been paid by Russian stakeholders to stage anti-Ukrainian protests.41 Political Capital, March 14, 2014, http://www. riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/pc_flash_ report_russian_connection.pdf, 37 G. Vona, Nyílt Levél Ukrajna Népeihez, accessed October 16, 2017. Mandiner, February 7, 2015, http://mandiner.hu/ 32 Europejska Mieszanka Lewacko-Nazistowska cikk/20150207_vona_gabor_nyilt_level_ukrajna_ w Służbie Kremla. Wśród Nich Polacy, Niezależna.pl, nepeihez, accessed October 16, 2017. March 17, 2014, http://niezalezna.pl/52986-europejska- 38 Határozott, kemény program, nyugodt, higgadt erő, mieszanka-lewacko-nazistowska-w-sluzbie-kremla- Jobbik, February 2, 2015, https://jobbik.hu/hireink/ wsrod-nich-polacy, accessed October 16, 2017. hatarozott-kemeny-program-nyugodt-higgadt-ero, 33 A. Shekhovtsov, Pro-Russian Extremists Observe accessed October 16, 2017. the Illegitimate Crimean ‘Referendum, Anton 39 Orosz Gépekkel Is Támadja Mától a Szíriai Hadsereg Shekhovtsov’s Blog, March 17, 2014, http://anton- Az Iszlám Államot, Kuruc.Info Hírportál, September shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/03/pro-russian- 24, 2015, https://kuruc.info/r/4/148829/, accessed extremists-observe.html, accessed October 16, 2017. October 16, 2017. 34 Moszkvába ment az autonómiáról tárgyalni 40 A. Dezső, S. Panyi, Jobbikos Politikusnak Fedte Vona Gábor, Jobbik, June 19, 2014, https://jobbik. Fel Magát Az Orosz Propagandaoldal Újságírója, hu/hireink/moszkvaba-ment-az-autonomiarol- Index, November 3, 2016, http://index.hu/ targyalni-vona-gabor, accessed October 16, 2017. belfold/2016/11/03/azt_sem_kepes_megvarni_ 35 Moszkvába ment az autonómiáról tárgyalni Vona hogy_hatalomra_kerulunk/, accessed October 16, Gábor. 2017. 36 Piskorski himself is currently under arrest by 41 P. Krekó, L. Győri, E. Zgut, From Russia with the Polish authorities allegedly on spying charges. Hate, Political Capital, April 28, 2017, http://www. See,Keleten Senki Nem Bízik Orbánban, 444, March politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/ 30, 2015, http://444.hu/2015/03/30/jobbik-kulpol- PC_NED_summary_analysis_EN_20170428.pdf, gyongyosi, accessed October 16, 2017. accessed October 16, 2017.

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Beyond the political: far-right he popped up among a group of pro- extremism -Russian propagandists aiming to Political Capital Institute’s analyses organize a welcome march for Vladimir highlighted that the Kremlin has Putin’s visit in Hungary in 2015.43 systematically reached out to far-right, An interesting element of the extremist, paramilitary political actors Hungarian scene is that the political in Hungary and the region. The role of far-right and the extreme right extremist organizations became much organizations frequently cooperated more important after the Crimean in their attempts to destabilize annexation.42 Ukraine, reviving old cross-border The Kremlin is fuelling the narrative historical tensions, chauvinism, that some old historical grievances territorial claims dating back to two between Central-Eastern-European world wars. Jobbik and its satellite states can be revived, and national organization, the Sixty-Four Counties borders can be redrawn based on Youth Movement (Hatvannégy those “historical claims” dating back Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom – to two world wars – on the premise HVIM) organised a protest in of Ukraine’s territorial dissolution front of the Ukrainian Embassy in or transformation into somewhat Budapest to demand autonomy for of a commonwealth entity. Radical Transcarpathia and the federalisation organizations usually fulfil three basic of Ukraine in August 2014.44 functions for the Kremlin: 1. Destabilization of the EU, its member states, the vulnerable regions and the transatlantic The Kremlin is fuelling relations; 2. Legitimization of the Russian the narrative that some regime and its policies; 3. Gathering information and old historical grievances spreading disinformation. between Central-Eastern- These efforts are nothing new. For example, the Hungarian People’s -European states can be Welfare Alliance (Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség – MNSZ), led by a well- revived, and national -known far-right figure, Albert Szabó, used every public appearance after borders can be redrawn 1994 to campaign against Hungary's future NATO and EU accession, and based on those “historical endorsing the “Euro-Asian” alliance. Even back then, there were strong claims” dating back to two suspicions about his relations with Russian secret services. These suspicions world wars.

were amplified a few years ago, when 43 A. Dezső, Putyin Érkezése, Szabó Albert Újra Aktív, Index, February 10, 2015, http://index.hu/ 42 Az Oroszbarát Szélsőséges Csoportok Aktivitása belfold/2015/02/10/putyin_erkezese_szabo_albert_ Közép-Kelet-Európában, Political Capital, April ujra_aktiv/, accessed October 16, 2017. 28, 2017, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/hireink. 44 “Ez a háború nem a magyarság háborúja, Jobbik, php?article_read=1&article_id=934, accessed August 9, 2014, https://jobbik.hu/hireink/ez-haboru- October 16, 2017. nem-magyarsag-haboruja, accessed October 16, 2017.

44 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian disinformation and extremism in Hungary

The HVIM is such an important “At times like these, we see how player in Russian disinformation it is impossible to define what it activities supporting the territorial means to be a Nazi these days. disintegration of Ukraine that the The skinheads who are currently Ukrainian paramilitary organisation fighting for Ukraine, ideologically Karpatska Sich threatened Jobbik and speaking, may be opposing against HVIM activists operating in Western Russian aggression, but they are also Ukraine with murder, which was sacrificing their lives in the interest of also discussed in the Committee on advancing U.S. geopolitical aims. (…) National Security of the Hungarian And then you have Russian rebels, National Assembly.45 During the who are fighting viciously against gathering on the Heroes Square the advancement of Zionist and U.S. in Budapest, the HVIM thanked geopolitical aims, and while they do „Donetsk People’s Republic” leader this under a sickle-and-hammer flag, Alexander Zakharchenko for releasing they may still find themselves in a ethnic Hungarian POWs serving in far more symbiotic relationship with the Ukrainian army.46 Moreover, Zsolt national socialist principles, because Dér, the leader of the paramilitary these directions and efforts were organisation Wolves (Farkasok) and originally its greatest enemy.”47 a member of the neo-Nazi Army of Outlaws (Betyársereg), was called Countermeasures upon by the separatists to fight Official countermeasures against the alongside them in Eastern Ukraine. Kremlin-led disinformation (or the The organisations are all closely Russian influence) in Hungary are The Kremlin is fuelling connected and funded by Jobbik, so practically non-existent, given the their pro-Russian stance is partly a government’s pro-Russian stance the narrative that some consequence of the party’s geopolitical and the part it plays in the Russian orientation. Ideologically, they propaganda activities. When it old historical grievances support Russia as the great Eastern comes to the official documents, both power promising territorial revision Governmental Decree 1035/2012 on between Central-Eastern- and denouncing all the geopolitical Hungary’s National Security Strategy48 foes they stand against like the liberal and Governmental Decree 1139/2013 -European states can be world order, American or Brussels’ on Hungary’s Cyber Security dominance, Zionist conspiracies, Strategy49 mention the threat posed revived, and national etc. The leader of the Army of by information warfare as a national Outlaws, Zsolt Tyirityán, who is borders can be redrawn currently building a new extreme 47 R.Tóth, S. Jászberényi, Tyirityán: Nem Tartjuk Orbánt Közellenségnek, 24, November 23, 2016, http://24.hu/ right movement, clearly linked the kozelet/2016/11/23/tyirityan-nem-tartjuk-orbant- based on those “historical neo-Nazi and the Russian nationalist, kozellensegnek/, accessed October 16, 2017. imperial agenda in his statement: 48 A Kormány 1035/2012. (II. 21.) Korm. Határozata claims” dating back to two Magyarország Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiájáról, Magyar Közlöny, 2012/19 edition, accessed 45 Fegyveres Ukrán Szervezet Fenyegette Meg a October 16, 2017, http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/ world wars. Jobbikot És a HVIM-Et, Alfahír, April 24, 2015, download/f/49/70000/1035_2012_korm_hatarozat. https://alfahir.hu/fegyveres_ukran_szervezet_ pdf, accessed October 16, 2017. fenyegette_meg_a_jobbikot_es_a_hvim_et, accessed 49 Government Decision No. 1139/2013 (21 March) October 16, 2017. on the National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary, 46 Far-Right Murder of Hungarian Police Officer: Pro- The European Union Agency for Network and Russian Radicalization in the CEE, Political Capital, Information Security, March 21, 2013, https://www. November 4, 2016, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/ enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security- news.php?article_read=1&article_id=320, accessed strategies/ncss-map/HU_NCSS.pdf, accessed October 16, 2017. October 16, 2017.

3/2017 45 special edition: disinformation

The case of Béla Kovács case is also being prolonged and the Hungarian The government have authorities seem to be surprisingly slow in the matter. Unlike Mateusz recently expelled some Piskorski, Kovács52 has not been arrested since being indicted in pro-Russian right-wing 2014 and he has been operating in Brussels and Hungary freely despite extremists from Hungary the EP having lifted his immunity – and despite having obvious links without any justification – to Russian secret services.53 As a cherry on top, the same investigative most likely responding journalist has revealed the MNA was not only in contact with the GRU, to pressure exerted but Béla Kovács, and his Russian wife Svetlana was on good personal by NATO allies. terms with the family of the group’s leader.54

security challenge to the country, however, no measures have been Lóránt Győri, Péter Krekó enacted to counter such threat or July 25, 2017 name Russia as a primary problem in this respect. The government have recently expelled some pro- Russian right-wing extremists from Hungary without any justification – most likely responding to pressure exerted by NATO allies.50 The MNA scandal revealed that there is not political will to put up a fight against Russian activities threatening Hungarian

national security in individual July 19, 2017, http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/ cases. Although the Committee lezarult-nyomozas-bonyi-rendorgyilkossag- on National Security of the ugyeben-1967407/, accessed October 16, 2017. Hungarian parliament put the 52 A. Dezső, A Glorious Match Made in Russia, Index, September 28, 2014, http://index.hu/ MNA’s connections to the GRU on belfold/2014/09/28/a_glorious_match_made_in_ its agenda, the Hungarian police russia/, accessed October 16, 2017. is apparently closing down the 53 European Parliament Lifts Immunity of Jobbik investigation without raising a word MEP Béla Kovács, Politics, July 2, 2017, http://www. politics.hu/20170602/european-parliament-lifts- about the issue of interference immunity-of-jobbik-mep-bela-kovacs/, accessed by foreign intelligence agencies.51 October 16, 2017; A Kémügyről Nem Is Kérdezték Kovács Bélát Az Ügyészségen, HVG, July 19, 2017, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20170719_A_kemugyrol_ 50 C. Keszthelyi, Ex-BNP Extremist Expelled from nem_is_kerdeztek_Kovacs_Belat_az_ugyeszsegen, Hungary, Budapest Business Journal, May 26, 2017, accessed October 16, 2017. https://bbj.hu/politics/ex-bnp-extremist-expelled- 54 The great escape of ‘KGBéla’, Hungarian MEP from-hungary_133451, accessed October 16, 2017. Accused of Spying for Russia, Vsquare, October 4, 51 J.S. László, Lezárult a Nyomozás a Bőnyi 2017, https://vsquare.org/the-great-escape-of-kgb/, Rendőrgyilkosság Ügyében, Magyar Idők, accessed October 16, 2017.

46 The Warsaw Institute Review Defending the Information Space: the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Example Aleksander Król The Baltic States are among the most experienced at developing tools for protecting against disinformation and propaganda. Their practices, related to counteracting the Kremlin’s information war, are very valuable and may provide a good example for the Western world, which must join efforts to combat the phenomenon of fake news.

mong the various effects — most of them are calculated approaches to combatting for the long run. The most difficult hostile disinformation ventures to carry out are strategic ones, operations, the most such as building appealing Russian- Aimportant ones fall into three -language media domestically or areas: limiting access to the Russian fighting Russian messaging at the state information space, counteractions by level. It is therefore worth looking at administrative and legal systems, and the various forms of anti-propaganda citizen activism online. Only part of the measures and their effectiveness, to above arsenal of actions has short-term evaluate examples of best practices.

3/2017 47 Economy

© Olaf Speier (Fotolia)

Limiting direct access to the Latvia have shown that this idea is not Russian information space universally supported by society,1 the In the Baltic states, television has the data collected in Lithuania are more greatest impact on the majority of the optimistic. Thanks to the temporary population, which consists of Russian- bans, the popularity of Russian -speaking minorities. This is the channels is steadily decreasing. In result of the widespread knowledge 2013, Russian programs were watched of Russian and access to Russian by 16% of viewers in Lithuania, and in channels from cable TV subscriptions 2016, according to a study conducted offered by local service providers. Both after the ban was lifted, the audience Latvia and Lithuania have tried to was reduced to 7%.2 solve this problem. Faced with charges of breaking local laws – broadcasting 1 A. Rožukalne, Jautājums - ko darīt ar krievu TV kanāliem? Atbilde - Neko! Neko?, LSM.lv, March 16, unauthorized political advertising 2015, http://www.lsm.lv/raksts/arpus-etera/arpus- or inciting ethnic hatred – state etera/anda-rozukalne-jautajums-ko-darit-ar-krievu- authorities have imposed months-long tv-kanaliem-atbilde-neko-neko.a121678/. 2 broadcast bans for specific television R. Jasiulionis, Rusiškų kanalų Lietuvoje ribojimo pasekmės: per 3 m. Žiūrimumas krito dvigubai, channels. Although opinion polls in Ziuniuradijas.lt, November 16, 2016, http://www.

48 The Warsaw Institute Review Defending the Information Space: the Lithuanian...

The disadvantage of such a solution is the time-consuming and complicated administrative procedure that The refusal to register suspends the broadcast of a particular foreign channel. This difficulty might the Latvian version be further aggravated after Brexit, as some companies rebroadcasting these of Sputnik on the.lv Russian channels are registered in the United Kingdom. Legal actions against domain was symbolic these companies during the “transition period” will require an even more and demonstrative. complicated legal procedure than now. But even if the broadcaster moves to the EU, the Baltic states will still have less controversial. One of the key to conduct complex legal battles with initiatives taken at the government Russian television rebroadcasters.3 level is the establishment of a special The refusal to register the Latvian center under the auspices of NATO. version of Sputnik on the.lv domain The NATO Strategic Communications was symbolic and demonstrative. Centre of Excellence (NATO Sputnik’s Latvian website still works, StratCom CoE), established in but with the.com ending. Among 2014, is a supra-regional analytical journalists in the Baltic States, center aimed at addressing the latest there was no illusion about the real challenges in information security. purpose of the Sputnik project. Not only the Baltic States, but also The difficulties encountered by the Poland, Germany, Italy and the United creators of Estonian Sputnik prove Kingdom, participate in this initiative. this. Journalists who have been offered One of the main activities of StratCom work there have usually turned CoE is to monitor Russian activity in it down.4 the information sphere. The center analyzes the messages and directions Counteractions by state of Kremlin propaganda, and also institutions studies the latest technological Involvement of state security developments used for spreading institutions in long-term and planned disinformation. counter-disinformation activities seems much more effective and Non-governmental initiatives to fight disinformation ziniuradijas.lt/laidos/aktualioji-valanda/rusisku- The main method of fighting Russian kanalu-lietuvoje-ribojimo-pasekmes-per-3-m- media disinformation is the active and ziurimumas-krito-dvigubai?video=1. responsible attitude of civil society. 3 A. Mellkauls, The Audiovisual Media Services Spontaneously formed groups of Directive and Propaganda, in: Resisting Foreign State Propaganda in the New Information Enviroment: The volunteers, composed of pundits, Case of the European Union, Russia, and the Eastern journalists and ordinary citizens, Partnership Countries, Foundation for European Progresive Studies, 2016, http://appc.lv/wp-content/ are much more effective than formal uploads/2016/09/Propoganda_petijums.pdf. structures set up by state institutions. 4 Krievijas propagandas kanāls ‘Sputnik’ cenšas The most famous group of Baltic pārvilināt igauņu žurnālistus, delfi.lv, February 18, Internet activists is a Lithuanian 2015, http://www.delfi.lv/news/arzemes/krievijas- propagandas-kanals-sputnik-censas-parvilinat- group, which refers to itself as the igaunu-zurnalistus.d?id=45594180. “elves.” This is a group of volunteers

3/2017 49 special edition: disinformation © VALDA KALNINA (PAP/EPA)

Riga, Lativia, August 20, 2015. Lithuanian president Dalia GrybauskaitĖ, Latvian president Raimonds Vejonis and U.S. Senator John McCain during NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence opening ceremony. The NATO StratCom COE, contributes to improved strategic communications capabilities within the Alliance and Allied nations.

who conduct activities online in of the Lithuanian elves gained their free time. Their work is a popularity last fall, after they were direct response to the actions of the given the spotlight by the (mostly lowest level, professional Russian Western) media. New groups of propagandists, commonly referred to elves are being organized in other as “trolls.” The media spokesperson countries. Latvia also took up the of the Lithuanian elves is Ričardas initiative, where in March 2017, Savukynas,5 a 43-year-old blogger recruitment began to the local elven and business consultant. group.7 Elves primarily engage in reporting The effectiveness of grassroots fraudulent accounts to forum initiatives in the fight against and social media administrators. disinformation is illustrated by an They are successful in discovering online campaign launched by a them by monitoring comments on 6 http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-baltic-elves- information portals. The activities taking-on-pro-russian-trolls. 7 Aicinājums iestāties Latvijas internet elfu vienībā, 5 Elves vs Trolls – fighting disinformation in cīņai pret dezinformāciju un meliem Latvijas Lithuania, youtube.com; https://www.youtube.com/ internet vidē, appc.lv, February 27, 2017, http:// watch?v=KDsrwSX7piw. appc.lv/blog/aicinajums-iestaties-latvijas-interneta- 6 M. Weiss, The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian elfu-vieniba-cinai-pret-dezinformaciju-un-meliem- Trolls, thedailybeast.com, March 20, 2016, latvijas-interneta-vide.

50 The Warsaw Institute Review Defending the Information Space: the Lithuanian... © facebook

Response of Lithuanian internet users against the manipulation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on Facebook. Among activists were people with a high level of influence.

Lithuanian publicist and journalist, Andrius Tapinas. In response to The main method of Russian distortions about the Baltic underground resistance to the Soviet fighting Russian media Union in the 1940s, Tapinas launched the hashtag campaign disinformation is the #Кремльнашуисториюнеперепишешь (#Kremlin you will not falsify our active and responsible history), which went viral among Lithuanian Internet users in a attitude of civil society. matter of hours. Both ordinary Lithuanians and well-known public figures took part. The involvement of 5 stars, to just 1 star. At present, of popular journalists, actors and ratings for the Russian Ministry of social activists attracted even more Foreign Affairs page are blocked. average Internet users. Lithuanians flooded the Facebook page of the Journalist organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the educating news consumers Russian Federation, where one of the Increasing media literacy is cited as propaganda infographics that set off one of the ways to counter hostile the campaign had been uploaded, information operations. Baltic and more than 13,000 comments journalists, united in The Baltic Center were posted, exposing the falsehoods for Media Excellence, are working it presented. In addition, as a result on projects aimed at improving of the coordinated mass action on the qualifications of journalists, Facebook, the rating of the Russian promoting the media environment ministry’s page dropped from 4.2 out in the Eastern Partnership countries

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by sharing their experiences and need for such tools in Latvia is examples of best practices, and evidenced by a 2017 study, where reinforcing critical thinking in media 80% of participants reported that they had contact with fake news, but it turned out that those surveyed overestimated their ability to recognize false information.10 Some websites in the Baltic countries highlight news about hostile information operations. The editorial board of Delfi in Lithuania,

Subject section of the DELFI.LT website © DELFI.LT the largest news exposing Russian fake news. portal in the region, even consumers and users.8 Workshops are launched a special section titled also organized in libraries, where easy- “Unmasking”. Lithuanian journalists -going public lectures by journalists publish analyses debunking fake stimulate and develop media literacy news produced by the Russian media. in citizens. This initiative is also open to readers of the Delfi portal. There is a form on Latvian journalists are also involved the main subpage of the site where in global projects aimed at combating readers can suggest topics or report fake news. The Re:Baltica web fake news to journalists. portal and Toneboard, an IT start- up, received a grant from Google Creating an alternative for to create a platform to verify the Russian-speakers in the credibility of news.9 A considerable information space Since Russian-speaking consumers 8 S. van Zundert, "Strengthening pluralistic media and information environment through journalism train- in the Baltic States are the ones most ing, literacy and knowledge-sharing across Estonia, exposed to the information war, Latvia, Lithuania, the EU Eastern Partnership and Estonia and Latvia have decided to beyond", in: Resisting Foreign Propaganda in the New Information Enviroment: The case of the European create an alternative to the better- Union, Russia, and the Countries of the European Union, Foundation for European Progresive Studies, Enviroment: The case of the European Union, Russia, and 2016, http://appc.lv/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ the Countries of the European Union, Foundation for Propoganda_petijums.pdf. European Progresive Studies, 2016, http://appc.lv/wp- 9 S. van Zundert, Strengthening pluralistic media and content/uploads/2016/09/Propoganda_petijums.pdf. information environment through journalism training, 10 Re: Baltica un Toneboardsaņem 50 000 no Google literacy and knowledge-sharing across Estonia, Latvia, jauna rīka izstrādei, Re: Baltica, July 6, 2017, http:// Lithuania, the EU Eastern Partnership and beyond, in: rebaltica.lv/2017/07/rebaltica-un-toneboard-sanem- Resisting Foreign Propaganda in the New Information 50-000-no-google-jauna-rika-izstradei/.

52 The Warsaw Institute Review Defending the Information Space: the Lithuanian...

in Russian, began broadcasting.11 Nevertheless, the process of gaining Creating a Russian- viewership and significant market position is complex and time -language television consuming. The popularity of ETV+ among Estonian-speaking Russians channel was an has gradually increased, though only marginally. Programs produced in idea developed Russia still dominate. In Latvia, the Russian-speaking by the Estonians minority is more numerous than in Estonia, but no separate channel has a decade ago. been created on public television. However, on the LT7 state channel, funded Russian media space. The there are blocks of programming in decision to increase Russian-language Russian. There is also the Russian- informational programming was language state radio station Program made at the governmental level. 4 (Latvijas Radio 4). The station is Creating a Russian-language quite popular among listeners. television channel was an idea developed by the Estonians a decade *** ago. The impulse for the introduction The specificity of defending the of such a project by Estonian State information space in the Baltic Television were the events in Tallinn States involves the parallel use of in 2007, when Russian-speaking state institutions, non-governmental residents began riots in the streets of organizations and grassroots social the capital, sparked by the transfer of initiatives. At the same time, the a Soviet monument from the center sources must reach different groups of the city to the military cemetery. of society – not all projects addressed The riots were accompanied by to ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians attacks by pro-Kremlin youths on and Estonians will be effective in the Estonian Embassy in Moscow Russian-speaking communities and cyberattacks on the digital and vice versa. Moreover, they infrastructure of Estonia that lasted require constant funding, and their several months. effectiveness can often only be The Russian information campaign assessed after a longer period of time. which was taking place at the This, of course, requires a proper time, undoubtedly influenced and coherent message directed to the radicalization of the mood. one’s own citizens – as well as to the This situation clearly revealed the outside, meaning the international need to create a Russian-language community in which these countries information channel, independent of operate. Russian influence. Voices of support for this project spoke out after the Aleksander Król Russian invasion of Georgia in July 26, 2017 2008, and the project was launched a few years later. In the autumn of 11 M. Klūga, Kārlis Roķis Aptauja: 80% ir saskārušies ar viltus ziņām, LSM.lv, May 19, 2017, http://www. 2015, after the start of the conflict in lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/aptauja-80-ir-saskarusies- Ukraine, ETV+, the Estonian channel ar-viltus-zinam.a236992/.

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Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic States – Resources and Aims Aleksander Król A resurgence of fascism, rampant Russophobia, the ethnic cleansing of local Russian populations, drunk NATO soldiers – this is how Russia portrays and slanders the societies of the Baltic States.

he Russian offensive in the is to capture the hearts and minds of information sphere isn’t the Baltic peoples. just a stream of buzzwords, invented by sensationalist The Kremlin’s aggressive rhetoric Tjournalists and bored political directed toward the Baltic states is not scientists. It is a strategically planned a new phenomenon. TV programs, onslaught of disinformation and websites and magazines, the channels propaganda designed to manipulate of Russian disinformation, have been public opinion. In the long run, its aim overtaken the Baltic media market.

54 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic States...

© YURY KOCHETKOV (PAP/EPA) Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2017. Russian military servicemen march along the Red Square during the Victory Day military parade. We’ve witnessed Russia’s The outbreak of conflict in Ukraine in transition into an 2014 was a decisive moment: western analysts became aware of the security aggressive, comprehensive deficiencies in the Baltic states region, particularly the threats directed at the policy in the information information sphere. In addition to the aggressive narratives circulating there, sphere, coordinated the Russian Federation’s activities included intelligence activities and by state institutions 1 military provocations. and financed through Since that conflict began, we’ve witnessed Russia’s transition into an their budgets. aggressive, comprehensive policy in the information sphere, coordinated There were also cases of cyber-attacks by state institutions and financed to which local media outlets fell through their budgets, often filtered victim. through the medium of allegedly non-governmental organizations and National Minorities in the foundations. Their activity consists Crosshairs of disseminating lies in the form of Russian information operations in propaganda and disinformation on the Baltic States are directed mainly internal political issues, the economy at Russian-speaking minority and the security of the Baltic States. communities. These communities consist of not only residents of 1 An example of such activities are the movements of the Russian fleet near the coastal waters of the Baltic the region, who identify as ethnic states and the notorious violation of their airspace. Russians, but also other minorities

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– Ukrainians, Belarussians, Poles is located. In the case of Lithuania, – who speak Russian in everyday this issue is much less important life. For the Kremlin, this is the core than in the other two countries. group of recipients for the messages Ethnic Russians in Lithuania account of the information war and a tool for only 6% of the population, and for influencing public opinion in the percentage of all nationalities Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. susceptible to the influence of Russian media is estimated at 14–16%. Areas Russian-speaking minorities in Lithuania inhabited in large part constitute a significant proportion of by national minorities are Vilnius, the populations of Latvia and Estonia, Visaginas (a city built near a now and to a lesser extent, Lithuania. The inoperative nuclear power plant), and largest percentage of this minority Klaipeda (a port city)2. With such an is in Latvia, where about 35% of the ethnic structure, the Russian language population are Russophones. The becomes a natural cultural link situation is shaping up similarly in through which Russia can easily reach Estonia where 29% of the population the people of the three Baltic states. can be counted as part of the Apart from these Russian-speaking Russian-language community. These populations, a working knowledge groups usually live in cities where of Russian is still quite common industry was well-developed during among the older generation of ethnic the Soviet occupation. In Latvia, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. the main centers inhabited by the Russian-speaking population are Control the Media, Rule the Riga (about 50% of the population) World and the eastern part of the country As the main platform of the Russian information war is Kremlin- -controlled media operating in the With such an ethnic Baltic information space, the tools used to spread propaganda include structure, the Russian the popular, formally local or EU-registered TV stations, a series of language becomes websites, and a network of magazines. a natural cultural link Both the biggest influence and threat is television, which remains the through which Russia can most popular source of information in the region. In 2005, the Russians easily reach the people of launched a powerful television the three Baltic states. platform broadcasting to the entire region – the Baltic Media Alliance (Latgale) with the largest, post- (BMA). The company is officially -industrial city, Daugavpils, which registered in the UK and retransmits is an important transportation specially modified content produced hub. Likewise, in Estonia, Russian- by Russian television. The flagship -speakers outside of Tallinn inhabit product of the company owned by the highly industrialized Ida-Virumaa region, where Narva, the town with 2 Data according to Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued by the highest percentage of Russian- Statistics Lithuania in 2015; http://osp.stat.gov.lt/ -speaking inhabitants in the country, services-portlet/pub-edition-file?id=19698.

56 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic States...

Riga, Lativia, October 15, 2017. The © Victor Lisitsyn (PAP/RUSSIAN LOOK) Russian Riga public organization seeks an official transfer of the date of liberation of Riga from the Nazis.

Latvian entrepreneur Oleg Solodovs, is First Baltic Channel (PBK). Within The tools used to spread this channel there are three national propaganda include editorial boards (Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian) which prepare country- the popular, formally -specific programs.3 The importance local or EU-registered of local news editors is vividly illustrated by the fact that the daily TV stations, a series of news program only covers local news; accordingly called: Latvian, Estonian websites, and a network or Lithuanian Vremya (Time). On of magazines. the other hand, PBK viewers get their world news from the Russian program a number of entertainment channels, Vremya. In addition, PBK broadcasts are available in the Baltic states. include talk shows and entertainment programs from the Russian Channel The most important focus of Russian One. Thanks to the presence of BMA, information activities, however, is channels produced on the basis of the virtual space. There are dozens Russian REN TV, NTV-MIR and of Russian-language information portals on the Internet, addressed 3 S. Jemberga, Жизнь в тумане, Re: Baltica, October specifically to the Baltic audience, 24, 2015; https://ru.rebaltica.lv/2015/10/136/. presenting themselves as either

3/2017 57 special edition: disinformation © Ria.ru, accessed: 2017. July 19, One of the headlines on the RIA Novosti website: "Nazism has developed in the Baltic states after their accession into the EU and NATO".

portal was aimed at strengthening The two largest platforms the resources of Russian information warfare in the region. Officially, three of this type, editorialized editions of the portal (dedicated separately to Lithuania, Latvia and according to the Kremlin's Estonia) are registered by a number of foreign companies located in vision, are local versions the Netherlands and Russia, whose ownership structure leads back to the of Sputnik and Baltnews. Russian state media company Rossiya Segodnya.4 The editors of these portals analytical or “infotainment.” The are people closely associated with the two largest platforms of this type, Russian diplomatic missions in Riga, editorialized according to the Vilnius and Tallinn. Unlike openly Kremlin’s vision, are local versions pro-Russian websites in the region, of Sputnik and Baltnews. While the headlines at Baltnews5 are more Sputnik is openly associated with

the Kremlin and serves as the official 4 Annual Report of the Lithuanian Special Forces pro-Russian propaganda instrument, 2016, Vilnius 2017; https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/ the Baltnews editorial board has uploads/2017/03/2016-gr%C4%97smi%C5%B3- avoided publicly disclosing links to vertinimas.pdf. 5 I. Spriņģe, S. Jemberga, Sputnik’s Unknown Brother, the Kremlin. Launched in 2014, in Re: Baltica, April 6, 2017; http://en.rebaltica. reaction to the events in Ukraine, the lv/2017/04/sputniks-unknown-brother/.

58 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic States... subtle, but the information on the site importance of blogging platforms, comes mostly from the Russian media. in which extremely pro-Russian Baltnews occasionally provides space activists can easily popularize their on its website to Russian publicists, views and gain potential followers. well-known for their anti-Western One such form of information views, such as the Russian journalist warfare is the blog network (mostly for Komsomolskaya Pravda, Galina Russian-speaking) IHMO Club. This project, officially owned by radical pro-Kremlin activist Yuri Alexeyev of Latvia, has been in operation since The Baltic security April 2011. Building on its success in Latvia since September 2015, IMHO services point to the Club has expanded its activities to Belarus and is planning to continue growing importance its expansion into Ukraine of blogging and other countries.8 Narratives most widespread in platforms. the media The most important and universal Sapoznikova, who received the status dimension of Russian propaganda of persona non grata in Lithuania. The in the Baltic states is the proliferation actions of Baltnews does not escape of a negative image of the West – the the attention of local authorities – in European Union and NATO. Entire August 2016, the head of the Estonian series of articles on this subject appear Baltnews was arrested on charges of in Sputnik and Baltnews, while financial fraud and tax evasion.6 Rubaltic even has separate sections Some of the websites, being entitled: “Baltic States in NATO” and distribution channels for the Kremlin “Russophobia”. These broad subjects narrative, are devoted exclusively to are then broken down into smaller local markets, e.g. Vesti.lv, but most of narratives, supported by one-sided them are Baltic-wide (if not broader). “analyses” and statements by “experts,” One such site is Rubaltic, registered often containing transparent lies. in Kaliningrad, which publishes They usually refer to the political information on the countries of the system and economic situation of EU Baltic Sea region.7 countries, and the main objective is to convince the public that EU and The targets for propaganda and NATO membership does them more disinformation aren’t always specific harm than good. These manipulations ethnic groups, but rather an audience are used to influence public opinion, of people seeking information cause fear and social dissatisfaction. from “alternative” sources to the mainstream media. The Baltic The oldest Kremlin lie spread about security services point to the growing the Baltic states is concerned with deep-seated national minority 6 D. Cavegan, Police arrest Kremlin propagandist, problems in the region. Russia news.err.ee, August 17, 2016; http://news.err. ee/118794/police-arrest-kremlin-propagandist. exaggerates existing problems by 7 Official website of Rubaltic portal, http://www. rubaltic.ru/edition/. 8 Blogging platform https://imhoclub.lv/ru/page/62.

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organizing various conferences and they had been an integral part of the using PR agency support, and is Soviet planned economy. Lithuania, attempting to create an anti-European Latvia and Estonia abandoned some image of the Baltic States as violators branches of the economy inherited of fundamental human rights. Some from the USSR, investing in new, publicists have even described the more growth-oriented sectors. Baltic States as neo-fascist creations. The argument of the economic or demographic decline of the Baltic The argument States is largely based on internal perspectives in Russia. As the Estonian of the economic journalist Argo Ideon describes it, “since Estonia succeeded in achieving or demographic decline what was unsuccessful in Russia, then the message of Estonia’s success can’t of the Baltic States be allowed to spread, and because of this, Estonia will remain the target of is largely based on attacks in Russian propaganda for a long time to come.”11 Typically, articles internal perspectives and books promoting the Russian narrative describe the period of Soviet in Russia. occupation positively, and whitewash Stalinist crimes against the inhabitants of the Baltic states. History has also been manipulated for a long time, especially by glorifying The third way in which history is the Soviet past of Lithuania, Latvia manipulated to compromise the Baltic and Estonia.9 These representations States is to portray the struggle for often focus on the economy, for Baltic independence not as the rightful example presenting the region as a pursuit of nations to regain their “Soviet Silicon Valley”, which, in the sovereignty, but merely as the result process of integration with the West, of the intrigues of Western politicians lost its “highly developed” industry.10 in their scheming against Russia. For In reality, the post-Soviet industrial years, the Kremlin used similar tactics plants in question were outdated and against Ukraine, addressing a specially without significant technological crafted message for the Russian- investment, and would never have -speaking part of society, when, by been able to compete with the West. manipulating history, it undermined After breaking economic ties with the achievements of Ukraine’s their eastern neighbors, a lot of independent statehood and created these companies became useless as a vision of exaggerated economic difficulties.12 9 Annual report of the Latvian Bureau of Constitutional Protection 2011, sab.gov.lv, http:// 11 D. Cavegin, Opinion digest: The beginning of the end www.sab.gov.lv/?a=s&id=17&pgoffset=4&jid=10. for the Baltic states, news.err.ee, July 18, 2017, http:// 10 А. Носович, Как Беларусь и Прибалтика news.err.ee/608070/opinion-digest-the-beginning- распорядились промышленным наследием СССР, of-the-end-for-the-baltic-states. rubaltic.ru, July 10, 2017; http: //www.rubaltic.ru/ 12 Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against article/ekonomika-i-biznes/10072017-kak-belarus-i- Ukraine, StratCom CoE, http://www.stratcomcoe. pribaltika -rasporyadilis-promyshlennym-Nasledie- org/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against- SSSR /. ukraine.

60 The Warsaw Institute Review Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic States...

The Russian information strategic, economic nature.15 Baltic manipulation that poses the greatest researchers on the subject of Russian threat concerns security issues – not propaganda and disinformation only military but also economic, at the emphasize that the effectiveness of regional and European level. Examples propaganda does not depend solely on of this are the Russian information the ethnic origin of the recipient, but attacks on NATO contingents in the also on their social status and income. Baltic states. The Russian media write The greatest influence of the Kremlin’s about the alleged irresponsibility of NATO soldiers and their propensity to start alcohol-fueled fights. One of the most glaring cases was the alleged Attacks are directed rape of Lithuanian women by German soldiers, which turned out to be a lie.13 at regional projects The purpose of this type of deception is to arouse the opposition of the of a strategic, local population against the presence of NATO forces in the region. At economic nature. the same time, Russian propaganda presents allied military forces as inept or even as a threat to the functioning information warfare is achieved in of the state. In disinformation the regions where there is both a large activities against NATO soldiers, concentration of Russian-speakers as Russia not only uses media channels well as the poorest populations. it has under its control, but also uses This results in a deeper intensification cyber attacks, trying to attribute its of the process where growing propaganda to respected regional frustration within society increases and national media. As a result of the propensity for pro-Russian one such attack on the Baltic BNS attitudes. From their perspective, information agency, false information Vladimir Putin and the Russian was published about the poisoning of Federation appear to be the only hope NATO troops in Latvia by mustard for a chance to improve their own gas, the kind used in World War I. situations, which they themselves Such hybrid operations show that cannot change.16 Russia is also capable of actively manipulating societies.14 Aleksander Król The military cooperation of Baltic July 20, 2017 countries with the West is not the only target of Russian propaganda. Attacks are directed at regional projects of a 15 Attacks in the information space for infrastructure projects or investments in energy projects are more broadly approximated in the text, Information 13 Lithuania looking for source of false accusation Warfare against Strategic Investments in the Baltic of German troops, reuters.com, January 17, 2017, States and Poland. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-nato- 16 J. Dougherty, R. Kaljurand, Estonia’s Virtual idUSKBN15W1JO. Russian World: The Influence of Russian Media on 14 BNS, Įsilaužimas: į BNS sistemą įkelta melaginga Estonia’s Russian Speakers, icds.ee, October 2015, žinia, delfi.lt, April 12, 2017; http://www.delfi.lt/ https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/ failid news/daily/demaskuok/isilauzimas-i-bns-sistema- / Jill_Dougherty__Riina_Kaljurand _-_ Estonia_s__ ikelta-melaginga-zinia.d?id=74346612. Virtual_Russian_World_.pdf.

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Information Warfare against Strategic Investments in the Baltic States and Poland Aleksander Król The Soviet Union’s cooperation with environmental organizations in the West has a long tradition going back to the Cold War, when young, often unwitting enthusiasts, were used by the USSR as a tool against other countries.1

n the Baltic States, environmental of the 1980s, environmental movements movements were created in the were able to effectively mobilize the part late 1980s, during the Soviet of society which did not want to directly occupation, as a force meant associate with the Communists, around to support the reformist wing of the the slogans of perestroika. I 2 Communist Party. In the second half Although today’s Russia does not 1 Soviet Active Measures Forgery, Disinformation, seem to be a country seeking the Political Operations United States Department of most environmentally-friendly State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. August 1987; http://insidethecoldwar.org/sites/ solutions in the international 3 default/files/documents/Soviet%20Active%20 arena, Russian media, however, Measures%20Forgery,%20Disinformation,%20 Political%20Operations%20October%201981.pdf, 3 Działaczka ekologiczna uciekła z Rosji bojąc July 19, 2017. się o swoje dzieci, wp.pl, April 20, 2015, https:// 2 J. Targalski, Służby specjalne i pierestrojka, t.1, wiadomosci.wp.pl/dzialaczka-ekologiczna-uciekla-z- Wydawnictwo Antyk, Warszawa 2017, s. 264–268. rosji-bojac-sie-o-swoje-dzieci-6025269108454529a.

62 The Warsaw Institute Review Zwalczanie strategicznych inwestycji za pomocą informacji... © VALDA KALNINA (PAP/EPA) Riga, Lativia, January 13, 2012. A protestor in white 'protective' appears to be exceptionally active on clothing stands alongside barrels environmental issues in neighboring with the nuclear symbol outside the house of the Cabinet of Ministers countries. Their level of “concern” is in Riga as part of a protest against increasing, specifically targeting the Latvia's involvement in Lithuania's strategic infrastructure projects that nuclear power plant (NPP) project. are aimed at strengthening the Baltic region’s integration with the rest of From 2009–2012, international the European Union, or which could negotiations took place between provide the Baltic countries with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland alternative sources of energy. and Japan’s Hitachi Group. Although In the last decade, several major the negotiations on the construction investments in the region drew the of the power plant were already in attention of both environmental advanced stages, the project was activists and the Russian-manipulated blocked. As a result of numerous media. It’s worth looking at the most protests by environmentalists in prominent cases linking Russian Lithuania, a referendum was held strategic interests with the activities in which 65% of voters came out of environmental movements. against the investment. Although the referendum was only advisory Blocking the Lithuanian and non-binding, the project nuclear power plant project was suspended. The idea of ​​building a new nuclear Environmental organizations and power plant in Lithuania has been in “green” groups from the whole the works since 2004, when Unit 1 region protested against the of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant creation of the Baltic nuclear power was closed. The decision to close the plant in Lithuania. In addition to power plant was one of the conditions representatives of local organizations, for Lithuania’s accession into the groups from the Russian Federation European Union. In deciding to meet and Belarus came to Vilnius. Protests EU expectations, Lithuania thus were jointly organized by the two ceased to be an exporter of electricity Lithuanian green parties, the Lietuvos and instead became an importer. Žaliųjų Sąjūdis (Lithuanian Green

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Party, currently Lietuvos Žaliųjų Oblast of Russia, also participated Partija) and the Lietuvos Valstiečių in the protests. Each of these groups ir Žaliųjų Sąjunga (Lithuanian has been historically active against Peasants’ and Green Union), the nuclear power in the region. It’s worth social organization Atgaja, the ŽALI. noting that in their countries of LT (Greens.LT) association and the origin — Belarus and Russia — these social organization Žaliosios Politikos organizations have been unsuccessful Institutas (Institute of Green Policy). in opposing nuclear power projects.6 The Belarusian organization EkoDom Environmental groups were not the (EcoHome),4 and EkoZaszczita only organizations who fought against (EcoDefense)5 from the Kaliningrad the Baltic nuclear power plant project. Russian activity in the information 4 See EkoDom website: http://ecohome-ngo. by/; Gytis Kapsevičius, Diskusijoje apie atominę space associated with the Lithuanian energetija regione aiškintasi, kiet Lietuvoje yra nuclear project was also noticed in Baltarusijos, bernardinai.lt, October 4, 2012, Latvia by the Latvian special services. http://www.bernardinai.lt/straipsnis/2012-10- 04-gytis-kapsevicius-diskusijoje-apie-atomine- Energy and infrastructure projects energetika-regione-aiskintasi-kiek-lietuvoje- were already objects of interest yra-baltarusijos/88874 and T. Novikova, Lietuva neįleisti Baltarusių aktyvistai ketina skųstis to Russian intelligence, while in teismui, alfa.lt, October 3, 2012, http://www.alfa.lt/ the case of the new nuclear power straipsnis/15059445/i-lietuva-neileisti-baltarusiu- aktyvistai-ketina-skustis-teismui. 5 ELTA, Protestuota prieš naujų černobylių kūrimą nauju-cernobyliu-kurima-lietuvoje-ir-greta- Lietuvoje ir greta jos, delfi.lt, April 26, 2010, http:// jos.d?id=31533829. www.delfi.lt/verslas/energetika/protestuota-pries- 6 See website: https://ecodefense.ru/page/3/.

64 The Warsaw Institute Review Information Warfare against Strategic Investments... plant in Lithuania in 2011–2012, an information offensive was suspected. In the annual report of the Latvian Energy and infrastructure Constitution Protection Bureau (Satversmes Aizsardzības Birojs) projects were already an active disinformation campaign from 2011 was described, when the objects of interest to Russian media presented the project of the Lithuanian Visaginas Nuclear Russian intelligence, Power Plant negatively, in contrast to the much-praised, parallel project while in the case of the to build a reactor in Kaliningrad. Particularly active in this field was new nuclear power plant (and remains) the Russian REGNUM News Agency, which before Sputnik, in Lithuania in 2011– was the main Internet channel of Russian information policy in the –2012, an information Baltic region. The way in which this type of offensive was suspected. operation works is to lay the appropriate information foundation Jurijs Zaicevs, who worked with the by selecting a group of “experts” who then editor of REGNUM, and Modest advocate views that match the current Kolerov, also recognized as a persona message.7 One of the organizations non grata in Latvia.9 that persistently organized protests The account of the activities of against the Lithuanian nuclear environmentalists and pro-Russian plant construction project was the circles in Lithuania around the nuclear Russo-Baltic Media Center, a public project was very skillfully tied to other relations agency. The director of this world events, creating the perception agency, Igor Pavlovski, was on the list in the media desired by the Kremlin. of people forbidden from entering The referendum on the construction Latvia.8 According to Lithuanian of a nuclear plant in Lithuania was state television (LRT) sources, actions held against the backdrop of the against Visaginas in Latvia were Japanese nuclear power plant disaster coordinated by neo-communist in Fukushima in 2011, which was Algirdas Paleckis, members of the most notorious environmental the Latvian organization Kislorod crisis of its kind in recent years. In (Oxygen), city councilman Daugavpils Lithuania, Russian media published articles which showed the economic 7 Report of the Constitution Protection baselessness of building a new nuclear Bureau: SAB 2011. GADA DARBĪBAS power plant.10 Another narrative PĀRSKATS, sab.gov.lv, http://www.sab.gov. lv/?a=s&id=17&pgoffset=4&jid=10 and Проект promoted by Russian media was the Белорусской АЭС более безопасен, чем проект Висагинской АЭС: эксперт, regnum.ru, November 11, 2011, https://regnum.ru/news/economy/1466373. 9 Tikslas - paralyžiuoti valdžią Baltijos šalyse, lrt. html. lt, November 3, 2013, http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/ 8 SAB: Vienna no Krievijas specdienestu lietuvoje/2/28677. mērķauditorijām ir Latvijas jaunieši, delfi.lv, June 9, 10 А. Емельяненков, Когда политика превыше 2014,http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sab- экономики, Российская газета - Федеральный viena-no-krievijas-specdienestu-merkauditorijam-ir- выпуск №5833 (160) rg.ru, July 16, 2012, https:// latvijas-jauniesi.d?id=44596606. rg.ru/2012/07/15/voprosy-site.html.

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The railway station of Tallinn, Estonia. © Andreas Gebert ( PAP/DPA)

threat that Visaginas might pose. is undoubtedly such a strategic The structural similarity of the project, a railway connection with reactor to Fukushima’s and the risk a European track gauge (1435 mm), of transporting its components to originally planned from Tallinn to Lithuania was used as a scare tactic.11 Warsaw, and ultimately, from Berlin to Helsinki. The implementation Protests against the of this project will be crucial for construction of Rail Baltica the economies of the region: the Creating large strategic infrastructure investment will significantly accelerate projects not only requires huge the flow of people and goods, thus financial resources, but also a improving the logistical integration consistent political determination of the northeastern EU countries in partner countries. In such a huge with the rest of the Union. and complex undertaking, the role For this reason, the project has been of politicians is crucial, as they must criticized in Russian media for years. adequately justify to their citizens The Sputnik platform is closely the need for them to bear the costs following the project, publishing when such projects involve negative articles, not only in Russian, a heavy burden on the budgets of the but in many other languages.12 countries involved. Rail Baltica The rail construction is presented as economically unviable and only 11 Российские СМИ уверены, Висагинская intended to meet NATO’s military АЭС экономически невыгодна, а референдум needs.13 In 2015, the Latvian Security бы провалился, 15min.lt, July 16, 2012, https:// www.15min.lt/ru/article/vesti/rossijskie-smi- 12 uvereny-visaginskaja-aes-ekonomicheski- Polska sabotuje projekt Rail Baltica, Sputnik nevygodna-a-referendum-by-provalilsja-504-234129 Poland, October 22, 2015, https://pl.sputniknews. and Висагинская АЭС в Литве будет иметь com/polska/201510221278555/ and Kaslaukia кипящий ядерный реактор типа реактора ūkininkų ‘RailBaltica’ statybų metu, Sputnik японской АЭС Фукусима-1 energobelarus.by, Lietuva, February 13, 2017, http://sputniknews.lt/ November 10, 2011. https://energobelarus.by/ economics/20170213/2202421/zemes-ukinikai- news/V_mire/visaginskaya_aes_v_litve_budet_ rupinasi-del-rail-baltica-statybos.html. imet_kipyashchiy_yadernyy_reaktor_tipa_reaktora_ 13 А. Куркин, Rail Baltica: военная железная yaponskoy_aes_quot_fukusima_1_quot_/. дорога НАТО ведёт прямо к Санкт-Петербургу,

66 The Warsaw Institute Review Information Warfare against Strategic Investments...

Police determined that topics related to the construction of Rail Baltica in the Latvian media had been targeted The implementation by Russian “troll factories.”14 Due to the great distrust of people in the of this project will Baltic countries towards openly pro- -Russian broadcasts, aimed at be crucial for the blocking or delaying the project, an effective method of inducing strong economies of the region: opposition was sought in one of the countries participating in this the investment will international project. As favorable circumstances would have it, the significantly accelerate Rail Baltica project had created the largest social debate in Estonia, the flow of people and which was they were able to exploit. Strong opposition groups in the goods, thus improving partner countries were created, which allowed the media to present the logistical integration the protests as “international”. This was also the case for the Lithuanian of the northeastern EU and Latvian social organizations that were formed in the summer of countries with the rest 2016, solely to support the message of Estonian activists.15 Meanwhile in of the Union. Estonia, environmental organizations managed to mobilize local Estonian- -speaking communities for sizeable environmental and economic protests. An event organized by the harmfulness of the project, did not organization Avalikult Rail Balticust disclose to the public details of their (For an Open Rail Baltic) in January funding sources, claiming that the 2017, was attended by about 300 campaign was financed solely by participants. For comparison, it volunteer forces, or, as one of the should be noted that anti-NATO leading activists, Maarja Lõhmus put protests in Tallinn usually total from it, “with the help of 101 friends.”16 5 to 10 people. Interestingly, the Protests were also spurred on in both organizers of rallies and publishers the Estonian and Russian versions of information about the alleged of Sputnik, where information on planned rallies and reporting 11.07.2016; https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2155345. on events was provided. In both html. language versions of Sputnik Estonia, 14 L. Barisa-Sermule, Interneta «troļļus» interesē arī «Rail Baltica», lsm.lv, August 9, 2015, http://www. articles on Rail Baltica topics are lsm.lv/lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/interneta-trollus- published under a special heading, interese-ari-rail-baltica.a140851/. “Tracks of Discord.”17 15 Baltijas valstu nevalstiskās organizācijas vāc parakstus petīcijai pret sasteigtu Rail Baltica līguma parakstīšanu, diena.lv, January 26, 2016, http:// 16 www.diena.lv/raksts/pasaule/baltijas-valstis/baltijas- See website of the association: avalikeesti.ee, http:// valstu-nevalstiskas-organizacijas-vac-parakstus- www.avalikeesti.ee/. peticijai-pret-sasteigtu-_rail-baltica_-liguma- 17 RailBaltic – рельсы раздора, https://ru.sputnik- parakstisanu-14164658. news.ee/trend/rail_baltic/.

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Information war against the the case of Rail Baltica, the high-cost Polish channel construction and lack of economic justification project across the Vistula for the project, the possibility of Spit environmental catastrophe as a result Another infrastructure project that of the excavation of the Vistula Spit, sparked a sharp and coordinated the threat of losses incurred by Poles response in the main Russian media (“concern” for the Krynica Morska outlets distributing propaganda in population) and Russian fishermen, the northeastern Baltic region, is the and, the main argument — that the Polish plan to create a canal through whole project is created “to spite the Vistula Spit. This topic has been Russia.” present in the mainstream media As in previous cases, to make the since 2004.18 However, a broader message credible, the international campaign began in 2016, after Poland character of protests and critical declared its intent to return to the opinions was emphasized. For canal construction plans. Sputnik example, the “expert” opinions of an again became the main transmission activist were used from the Latvian belt for the dissemination of ideas Green Cross,21 which has been on the allegedly ecologically- registered since 2002, but has thus far -harmful, economically-unviable, engaged in no activity. Interestingly, and militarily-aggressive project. This the Lithuanian government in Vilnius information was passed on to vesti. does not oppose the initiative of lv,19 a site known for its radically the Polish government, and in the pro-Russian views, addressed to the Lithuanian media there are no strong Russian-speaking minority in Latvia, negative narratives about the plans for and also appeared on the pro- the excavation. Among the “experts” -Russian blogging platform in Belarus, expressing indignation, there are no imhoclub.by.20 The most commonly Lithuanians. Even the Lithuanian- disseminated arguments are, as in -language version of Sputnik has devoted only one item to the subject — an infographic showing the canal 22 The main argument – route. that the whole project *** Examples of coordinated information is created “to spite activities, directed against key energy security and economic development Russia”. projects, show that Russia is making good use of all its resources and 18 А. Рябушев Остров невезени, я, ng.ru, August channels of misinformation in the 16, 2004, http://www.ng.ru/events/2004-08-16/7_ countries in its orbit of interests. kaliningrad.html. 19 Т. Пушкарев, Поляки будут рыть канал через 21 Polijaspolitiskā reitinga celšana uz ekoloģijas rēķina, косу «назло» России, vesti.lv, April 19, 2017, http:// Sputnik latvija, March 6, 2017, https://sputniknewslv. vesti.lv/news/polyaki-budut-ryty-kanal-cherez-kosu- com/world/20170306/4086544/polija-kanls-baltijas- nazlo-rossii. strele.html. 20 А. Шпаковский, Зачем Польша разрубает 22 Infographics from the Lithuanian-language Балтийскую косу?, imhoclub.by, April 28, 2017, version of the Sputnik platform http://sputniknews. https://imhoclub.by/ru/material/zachem_polsha_ lt/infographics/20170308/2391761/kanalas-per- razrubaet_baltijskuju_kosu. aitsmares.html.

68 The Warsaw Institute Review Information Warfare against Strategic Investments... © Tomasz Waszczuk (PAP) Elbląg, Poland, October 12, 2016. Residents of Krynica Morska protest against the digging of the Vistula Spit in the Elbląg port, near a ship of politicians and officials which was sailing into the Vistula Lagoon, October 12. Earlier on this day, a project for the construction of a shipping channel through the Vistula Spit was presented. The 1.3 km long channel will link Gdańsk Bay to the Vistula Lagoon. Its construction is set to cost 880 million PLN.

The manipulation techniques used development can be effectively by the Kremlin date back to the sabotaged by skillfully coordinated Soviet era, as exemplified by the information attacks. The protection instrumentalization of ideologically of information related to strategic active organizations — in this case businesses and industries becomes those fighting for the environment. highly relevant. Care must be taken On the side that is under attack, to ensure that European companies do there is still a lack of a common front not become victims of disinformation, operating in the information space for example through financial — there is no force distinguishing involvement in projects inspired by between legitimate media and the Kremlin, which may be devastating information warfare tools.23 Increased to their brands and reputations. In media literacy could prevent media this situation, it is necessary to work consumers from becoming casualties at the point of contact between state of information campaigns conducted and business, in order to protect the by Russia. interests of both parties and ensure an Based on these examples, it can be adequate flow of accurate information determined that the people operating to the public. It is also important to in the economic and political spheres have a high level of training and an of our region need to be aware appropriate civic attitude among those that projects crucial for industrial working in the media.

23 L. Sigan, Marszałek Struk: kanał przez Mierzeję Wiślaną to nonsensowny projekt, Sputnik Polska, October 26, 2016, https://pl.sputniknews.com/ Aleksander Król polska/201610264135923-kanal-mierzeja-wislana/. July 19, 2017

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Poland through Eurasian Eyes: Russian Propaganda Messages in the Media Joanna Kwiecień

Characteristics of Russian and ready for dialogue between activities and their objectives civilizations. Contrary to the popular belief that Russia witnessed an ideological Against this backdrop, Eurasian vacuum in the wake of the fall of the theories find fertile ground, which Soviet Union, there was a conscious serve as convenient propaganda decision by elites to redefine the tools aimed at both Russians “Russian idea.” It appeals to universal and Western societies, including key concepts and codes, and is based Poland. They legitimize Russia’s on emotions, which, depending place in the new geopolitical order. on current political needs, can be They promote an aversion to U.S. endowed with the right narrative. domination in the world and to the These are: Western model of democracy and - geopolitics justifying the liberal values, ​​and affirm imperial continuity of imperial Russia Russian aspirations. The direct (Holy Russia – Russian Empire – promoters of Eurasian views are USSR – Russian Federation) and pseudo-analytical research centers, - conservatism, which “anoints” where personal connections support Orthodox Russia as an alternative their contacts with the Kremlin. to the modern world, a country The Russian Institute for Strategic resisting Western unification, Studies serves the needs of the one that is peaceful, democratic, Russian presidential administration

70 The Warsaw Institute Review Polska widziana oczyma eurazjatów. Rosyjskie tezy...

Warsaw, Poland, Embassy of the Russian Federation. © Leszek Szymanski (PAP) and other governmental institutions. Sawin, a member of the Eurasian It is headed by Mikhail Fradkov, Youth Union, cooperates with previously associated with the Foreign Alexander Dugin as the main editor Intelligence Service of Russia. of the Geopolitica.ru opinion outlet. The Katehon think tank is directed by Alexander Dugin, also an A characteristic feature of Russian important figure of the international activities in Europe is the ability to Eurasian movement. The center was adapt propaganda and its tools to the founded by Konstantin Malofeev, specific character of a country. They the chief lobbyist for Russian interests reach their audience through a variety in the West’s nationalist of channels. These are the mass media, and conservative circles. Leonid international peace and charitable

3/2017 71 Report on Geopolitics Lech Muszyński (PAP) Muszyński © Lech

Żagań, Poland, September 29, 2017. Celebration of the first exchange of ABCT units on September 29 in Żagań, as part of the rotational stay of U.S. troops in Poland.

activities, the pro-life movement, it is building an anti-German bloc to and initiatives to defend traditional create antagonism between the New value systems. These are supported by Europe and Old Europe. It sabotages governmental and non-governmental all the European Union’s aspirations organizations, think tanks, the to deepen continental integration, with Orthodox Church, part of the Russian consideration for Russia. It supports and Russian-speaking communities a transatlantic vision. The concept of living abroad, and far right-wing or “Intermarium,” popular in Poland, is a extremist groups who see Vladimir counterpoint to the political concept of Putin, Russian Eurasianism and the European Union. Poland’s goal is to Orthodoxy, as the salvation for Europe. gather up the lands from the Baltic Sea The perception of Russia in Europe is to the Black Sea, including Ukrainian also influenced by “Trojan horses” — territory, and, in agreement with the agents of influence or “useful idiots,” United States, allow for the placement of i.e. intellectuals, academics, journalists, American military bases. This will allow artists, politicians and businessmen the U.S. to dictate its EU policy. who shape public opinion and the attitude of societies towards Russia. A set of propaganda messages aimed at influencing Poles and Propagandistic vision foreign audiences: of Poland presented by Eurasians 1. Poland – USA The integral element of the Eurasian • Poland is under the influence of the concept is the constant emphasis that United States. Poland is under the heavy influence • Washington wants to use Poland as of the United States of America its agent in the EU and as cannon and is its “Trojan horse” in Europe. fodder in conflict with Russia.1 Poland is therefore used to counter Germany in the European Union. 1 See: https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/poland-us- With the help of the Visegrad Group, trojan-horse.

72 The Warsaw Institute Review Poland through Eurasian Eyes: Russian Propaganda...

2. Poland – EU 4. Poland – NATO • Poland is against further EU • Membership in NATO raises integration. As a pro-American ally, questions about national it opposes the creation of European sovereignty, represents voluntary armed forces. colonization and draws Poland into • Poland is a buffer between the EU its struggles and conflicts. and Russia. Its purpose is to hinder • Poland supports all aggressive EU cooperation with Russia in NATO initiatives, especially against support of American interests. Russia. • Poland strikes at the German- • Poland has adopted a law -Francophone core to kindle authorizing the stationing of internal conflicts within the EU to foreign troops on Polish territory weaken it, so that it does not grow and demands the growth of NATO into a geopolitical rival of the U.S. forces. • Poland wants to put elements 3. Poland is baselessly Russophobic of a missile defense system on by nature its territory that can be used not • Poles have an anti-Russian only for nuclear attack protection, complex. Without Russia there but also to deploy nuclear-tipped would be no Polish patriotism, missiles. which is based on anti-Russian • Subversion techniques against uprisings from the nineteenth Russia are ongoing in Poland. century. Training camps for radical • Russia is a useful litmus test in nationalists from Germany and Poland. The ruling class uses it to Ukraine prepare them to be sent to scare Poles to cover up internal the Donbass region. struggles and to play with • Poles are victimizing NATO’s their emotions. enemies – Mateusz Piskorski is • Poland, together with the United being held as a political prisoner Kingdom, the Baltic States and (a member of the pro-Russian Sweden, is creating a “sect” in favor “Change” party, who was arrested of sanctions against Russia. in 2016 by the Polish Internal • Poland is ungrateful and cannot Security Agency under suspicion appreciate “fraternal” help – of spying – author’s note). Russia’s contribution to “liberating” it from the German occupation 5. Poland – Ukraine during World War II (which in Appealing to historical and economic fact meant the political subjugation issues, resentments, and the current of Poland by the USSR and a political situation. It’s a two-pronged battle against the anti-communist narrative that aims to antagonize Poles underground – author’s note). and Ukrainians. There is a distinction between On the one hand, it deprecates the Russophobic decision makers, who Ukrainians and uses them to scare make the laws decommunizing Poles: street names and removing • Ukraine disavows the massacres monuments – and the Polish of Poles in Volhynia during World people, distanced from these War II, appealing to the symbolism activities. of the Banderivstsi (followers

3/2017 73 special edition: disinformation

of Ukrainian nationalist Stepan • Poland’s active eastern policy is Bandera) and does not want to being pursued in order to intensify commemorate the victims. the conflict with Russia. • Ukrainians take Polish jobs, do not integrate into society, take things The Specifics of Poland for granted, and their numbers lead The hermetic nature of the Polish them to create closed communities. media space, traumatic historical What happened in Volhynia could experiences and the relatively happen again in the future. high resistance of Polish society On the other hand, Poles are presented to Russian disinformation, means as despising Ukraine, and wanting to that classic media in the form of a take advantage of Ukraine’s status as nationwide television channel or a fallen state: Internet portal, have no need to exist • Poland treats Ukrainians as inferior based on Russian pressure. Sputnik people. It indifferently uses them is a marginal outlet in Poland, as a cheap labor force. influencing a narrow audience. • Ukraine is a pawn in the Polish That is why the goal is to reach the concept of the Intermarium, which individual recipient, and influence aims to create Great Poland “from small, ideological groups and closed sea to sea.” The goal of Poland is to environments. New followers of recover assets in western Ukraine Eurasian theories are gained through (houses, land), which Poland the use of websites and blogs will claim the moment Ukraine publishing “alternative information” collapses. based on conspiracy theories, anti- • Poland will utilize its national Ukrainian sentiment, anti-Semitism, minority to increase its influence anti-globalism, Euroscepticism in Ukraine (using the Polish Card, and anti-Americanism, on fear and confirming allegiance to “the Polish phobias, or conversely – by appealing Nation”). Poland is also ready to goodwill, concern for the common to sacrifice its minority (it does good, patriotism and the desire to not care about persecuted Poles) fight for Christian values. In Poland, for American interests in this part we can point out several groups of of Europe. recipients:

6. Poland – its internal affairs • Communities interested in • Polish authorities have autocratic alternative spirituality, paranormal impulses. activity, healthy lifestyle, a return to • Law and Justice is a Eurosceptic nature, extreme survivalism. party, typical of national-populist, Propaganda of this type presents East European parties. Polish an alternative reality, suggests Euroscepticism is part of the trend a monopoly on truth, and of hostility towards European unity undermines commonly accepted in the name of American interests, beliefs. Following the trail of unlike continental Euroscepticism, conspiracy theories arouses distrust which seeks to achieve Europe’s in the reader and encourages their independence from the U.S. in the questioning of everything. This is name of a multipolar order. the “Epimenides paradox.” The goal • Poland does not have a Western is to confuse the recipient and show European democratic tradition. that nothing in this world is true.

74 The Warsaw Institute Review Polska widziana oczyma eurazjatów. Rosyjskie tezy...

Warsaw, April 13, 2017. Head of the Armed Forces of Poland, President Andrzej Duda (R) and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti (L) at a press © Lech Muszyński (PAP) conference during a meeting at the Presidential Palace.

• Slavophile and Neopagan groups. The propaganda appeals to a New followers of common Slavic heritage. Slavicity is unique and cannot be subject to Eurasian theories are any other culture-forming matrix. The aim is to unite the Slavs and gained through the use to oppose aggressive and alien of websites and blogs Westernization. Poland and other representatives of the Western publishing “alternative Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks), should feel information” based on the need to work with Russia – the representative of the Eastern Slavs. conspiracy theories, anti-

• Conservative circles. -Ukrainian sentiment, Propaganda appeals to the global anti-Semitism, anti- fight for universal values (family, the right to life, opposition to -globalism, Euroscepticism abortion, gender ideology, and and anti-Americanism. homosexuality) in opposition to the liberal West. Polish society, attached to a traditional value is tempting the conservatives to system, seeing Western European a joint offensive against the liberal nihilism, legitimization of West, where Russia is ready to same-sex marriage, the fiasco of confront the current secularization multiculturalism, and ignoring the and dechristianization of Europe. rights of the majority, naturally • Far right-wing, nationalist, anti- seeks allies. Alexander Dugin -Semitic and borderland groups.

3/2017 75 special edition: disinformation

Propaganda is based on fear of Platform). The aim is to present other nations. Poland’s alliances Poland as a lawless country, where and membership in the EU the principles of democracy and tripartite separation of powers are disregarded. The alleged In Poland, the outlets Euroscepticism of the ruling class and the failure to meet most vulnerable to EU requirements (the question of the Constitutional Tribunal propaganda are of and the opposition to accepting migrants) will cause Poland to a conservative-nationalist become an outcast of the European community. On the other hand, character, propagating propaganda presents the rulers as a Russophobic, national-conservative “new economics,” party that wants to introduce a alternative sources complete ban on abortion. of energy, esotericism, Resonance of Russian propaganda messages in and debunking conspiracy Poland The environment most susceptible theories. to disinformation is the Internet. The “snowball effect” prevails there, relying and NATO are questioned and on rapidly flooding the consciousness presented as a form of dependence of the user with “fake news.” In and subordination. It is based Poland, the outlets most vulnerable on chauvinism, Euroscepticism, to propaganda are of a conservative- anti-Americanism, anti-Ukrainian nationalist character, propagating sentiment and anti-Semitism. “new economics,” alternative The aim is to challenge existing sources of energy, esotericism, and alliances, to build a confrontational debunking conspiracy theories. A approach to the international characteristic of such sites, from the environment (especially against very beginning of the presentation Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine), of the information, is the title, often to treat Russia and the Eurasian an appeal to independence and truth Union as an alternative geopolitical that was deliberately hidden from alliance. The Polish right is tempted society by the ruling elites and a world by a common mission against conspiracy (Jews, Masons, globalists, liberals, globalists, transnational big corporations). These sites are corporations and postmodernists. either a Polish-language version of Poland, with the support of Russia, foreign disinformation pages or native will again be the bulwark of Europe creations. Blogs are also important, and will stop Islamic immigration. aimed at mocking, ridiculing, criticizing • Liberal circles. and repeating convenient arguments Propaganda refers to the internal depending on the situation. Propaganda situation in the country, especially messages are spread not only by the political divisions of PiS- users with fanatical views, but also -PO (Law and Justice vs. Civic by “ordinary users” who are searching

76 The Warsaw Institute Review Poland through Eurasian Eyes: Russian Propaganda... for the truth online. Disinformation is simple in its message, often triggering extreme emotions and simplifying Its effectiveness is due contexts, making it easily digestible and very effective. to the fact that in many

Conclusions Western countries, Russia is ably playing its game on the the strength of Russian awareness of Western societies, basing it on deficits, conflicts and animosities statehood is often in communities, while on the other hand, on the good will and the desire mistakenly judged by the to build an alternative, peaceful world. Its effectiveness is due to the fact that in degree of its economic many Western countries, the strength of Russian statehood is often mistakenly development, on utilitarian judged by the degree of its economic development, on utilitarian economic economic benefits, based benefits, based on the assessment of the on the assessment of armed forces or its peripheral location. Meanwhile, Russia is not standing in the armed forces or its place and uses every opportunity to shake the balance of power in Europe to peripheral location. its advantage. Such actions are foreseen as long-term operations and are aimed at undermining the Euro-Atlantic value undermining of trust in society towards system and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, its leaders, striking at the legitimacy of fueling conflicts between EU states and the governing authorities. justifying Russia’s right to build its own sphere of influence in Europe. Worldviews become another battlefield. In Poland, this opens the door to On a smaller, local scale, relating Russian action through the tactics to Polish realities, the purpose of of a common front in defense of disinformation is to divide Polish values. The goal is to divide society by society. The North Atlantic Alliance exacerbating narratives and actions that, and EU membership, which are of for example, are aimed at defending great strategic importance to Poland, life at conception and traditional could be subject to attack by attempts values, and that will simultaneously to organize a social movement of the discredit the community of believers discontented. Causing conflict on the as uncompromising fundamentalists, Polish right, whose factions will drift in imposing their vision on the country. different directions (pro-life movement, As a consequence, such actions favor pro-national movement), could lead the creation of radical opposition to to the paralysis of the government. the government, which is seen as an Creating chaos, playing on emotions, advocate of extremists, legitimizing especially feelings of injustice (after attacks by liberals and leftists. each election a part of society feels omitted and excluded, depending on the Joanna Kwiecień winning coalition), results in the general June 18, 2017

3/2017 77 Russia Monitor offers:

• Analysis of forces in the ruling elite of Russia • Analysis of connections between business circles and policy makers • Forecasts of political developments in Russia • Assessment of the risks associated with • Assessments of Moscow’s moves on the Russia’s energy expansion international scene and their impact on Russia’s economic policy • Information about the situation in Russia’s security apparatus

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