“Faced with a Gun, What Can You Do?” War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo

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“Faced with a gun, what can you do?” war and the militarisation of mining in eastern congo

A report by Global Witness JULY 2009 ABOVE: Sifting through cassiterite, Bisie mine, North Kivu, April 2008. © Mark Craemer

FRONT COVER: Soldier of the 85th brigade of the Congolese national army at Bisie cassiterite mine, North Kivu, August 2008. © Johan Spanner Contents

Acronyms ...... 2 11. Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC ...... 59 1. Summary ...... 4 Graphs: Cassiterite, North and South Kivu, 2007 2. Recommendations ...... 9 Main importers by country of registration ...... 60 To the Congolese government ...... 9 Coltan, North and South Kivu, 2007 To Congolese government and military authorities ...... 9 Main importers by country of registration ...... 60 To governments of neighbouring countries Wolframite, North and South Kivu, 2007 and transit countries ...... 10 Main importers by country of registration ...... 60 To foreign governments, including diplomats and mediators Box: AMC and THAISARCO ...... 62 involved in peace talks ...... 10 Responses from companies: no coherent plan to address To MONUC ...... 11 the conflict dimension of the mineral trade ...... 62 To the UN Security Council ...... 12 Trading and processing companies ...... 63 To companies and traders purchasing, handling or trading Mining companies ...... 66 in minerals originating from eastern DRC or Electronics companies ...... 66 neighbouring countries ...... 12 The Afrimex case ...... 68 To governments of home states in which companies are registered ...... 13 12. The role of transit countries ...... 70 To the International Criminal Court ...... 13 Rwanda ...... 70 The growth of Rwanda’s mining sector...... 70 3. Background to the armed conflict Rwanda as a channel for “conflict minerals” in eastern DRC ...... 15 from eastern DRC ...... 71 Box: Which military and other armed groups are plundering the minerals? ...... 18 Burundi ...... 72 Box: Testimonies of human rights abuses ...... 19 The mining sector in Burundi...... 73 “Burundian gold” ...... 74 4. Overview of mining “The pillar of the gold trade”...... 74 The need for action ...... 75 in North and South Kivu ...... 20 Box: Minerals found in North and South Kivu ...... 20 13. Recent international initiatives ...... 76 Map: Main mineral deposits in North Kivu ...... 22 Diplomatic dialogue and mediation efforts ...... 76 Map: Main mineral deposits in South Kivu ...... 23 Initiatives by donors and governments of home states ...... 77 Box: The formal and informal mining sectors ...... 24 The response of the Belgian government ...... 78 The work of the UN Group of Experts ...... 79 5. The Congolese army’s involvement The December 2008 UN Security Council resolutions ...... 80 in the exploitation of minerals ...... 25 MONUC’s revised mandate ...... 80 Bisie: “a state within a state” ...... 27 Sanctions ...... 82 Mineral exploitation by the FARDC in other areas ...... 33 Mineral certification ...... 84 Tubimbi ...... 33 The German proposal ...... 84 Mukungwe ...... 34 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ...... 85 Lemera ...... 36 Certification as a long-term measure ...... 85 The response of the FARDC ...... 36 14. Conclusion ...... 87 6. The FDLR: “les grands commerçants”...... 38 A nnex A ...... 89 7. The relationship between the FDLR Congolese government statistics: mineral exports from and the FARDC ...... 43 North and South Kivu, 2007 and first half of 2008 ...... 89

8. Other armed groups involved Annex B ...... 93 in the mineral trade ...... 48 Comptoirs and destinations of exports The CNDP ...... 48 North Kivu, 2007 ...... 93 ...... 95 PARECO and the mai-mai ...... 49 North Kivu, January to September 2008 ...... 96 The FRF ...... 49 South Kivu, 2007 Ex-combatants ...... 50 Annex C ...... 98 9. The Congolese government’s difficulties Companies which replied to correspondence from Global in controlling the mining sector ...... 51 Witness on trade in minerals from eastern DRC and due diligence policies ...... 98 Box: Congolese civilian government agencies working in the mining sector ..... 51 Endnotes ...... 99 10. The role of the comptoirs ...... 54 A string of excuses: the responses of comptoirs ...... 56

Acronyms

ALIR GeSI Armée pour la libération du Rwanda Global e-Sustainability Initiative (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda) GMB AMC Groupe Minier Bangandula Amalgamated Metal Corporation (Bangandula Mining Group)

CEEC GMC Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification Global Mining Company (Centre for Evaluation, Expertise and Certification) hp CNDP Hewlett-Packard Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People) ICC International Criminal Court CREDDHO Centre de Recherche sur l’Environnement, ICGLR la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Centre for Research on the Environment, Democracy and Human Rights) ITRI International Tin Research Institute DRC Democratic Republic of Congo MHI Mwangachuchu Hizi International EICC Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies en République eiti démocratique du Congo Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) FARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo MPA (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo) Metal Processing Association

FDLR MPC Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda Mining and Processing Congo (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) MSC FEC Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (Federation of Congolese Enterprises) NCP National Contact Point frf Forces républicaines fédéralistes NGO (Federalist Republican Forces) Non-governmental organisation acronyms 3

OCC RCD Office congolais de contrôle Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese Office of Control) (Congolese Rally for Democracy)

OECD RIEPA Organisation for Economic Cooperation Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency and Development SAESSCAM OFIDA Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du small scale mining Office des douanes et accises (Small Scale Mining Assistance and Support Service) (Office of Customs and Excise) THAISARCO OGMR Thailand Smelting and Refining Corporation Office de Géologie et des Mines du Rwanda (Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority) UN United Nations PARECO Patriotes résistants congolais (Congolese Resistance Patriots)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Bangassou SUDAN Uban Juba Bangui gi Zongo DEMOCRATICYaoundé Gbadolite Bondo Faradje U REPUBLIC OF THE Libenge Businga ele Kib Gemena Aketi Buta Isiro Watsa ali CONGO gala Gulu on Lisala Bumba PROVINCE Mungbere Impfondo Imese M Ituri National capital o ORIENTALE UGANDA ng Lake i o pori ruwimi Bunia Lake District capital Ouesso u C Lo Basoko A Albert g Kyoga n Bafwasende City, town a nga Basankusu Banalia b lo u Lu Beni

Major airport O EQUATEUR Yangambi Kisangani Kampala Jinja Libreville Bolomba Butembo Kasese International boundary Ekoli S District boundary CONGO Boende NORD- T Ubundu L s u Lake Liranga Mbandaka h Peneluta N ua L a Edward Main road pa o l L m a KIVU o a b Lubutu Lake L m I Secondary road u e m a i l Ikela i la a Goma Victoria Railroad ka U Punia

( l A

Inongo C in Lake RWANDA d o i Kivu Kigali Bolobo n g 0 100 200 300 km Lac T Butare Kutu o Bukavu Mai-Ndombe ) KASAI Kindu 0 100 200 mi SUD- N Bandundu L ukenie Lodja Bujumbura K Kole Kilembwe Uvira asa KIVU K i ORIENTAL Kibombo U BURUNDI Brazzaville w San Makobola il Ilebo k Kinshasa u u MANIEMA r

Bena O KASAI u SA Bulungu Kasongo A Kenge Mweka Mamba Pointe-Noire INSH Lusambo Kigoma K Tabora BAS-CONGO M Cabinda Kikwit OCCIDENTAL Lubao Kongolo L Mbanza- a (ANGOLA) Boma Matadi uga k

Ngungu k e BANDUNDU Kalemie UNITED Kananga Mbuji-Mayi Kabalo Lu Tshikapa L REPUBLIC

u ATLANTIC Kabinda a K l Mpala OF K a a s b T w a A a a OCEAN a i Moba n TANZANIA N'zeto n Manono g g Mwene-Ditu o a Rukwa Kahemba B Kabamba n L y KATANGA uv i Sumbawanga ua Moliro k Kapanga Pweto a M Kamina Luanda L Mbeya u U l u Lake ANGOLA a Mweru Katanga T DEMOCRATIC Saurimo REPUBLIC OF THE Plateau I CONGO Dilolo Kolwezi M Kasenga ZAMBIA L

k e Likasi Lake e z A be Bangweulu M am Lubumbashi Z L a

Luena l Solwezi Kipushi a A Lobito w

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used W i on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance Sakania

by the United Nations. I Ndola

Map No. 4007 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section 1 Summary

“We are their meat, their animals. We have nothing to say.” Miner from Shabunda (South Kivu), 28 July 2008

The militarisation of mining in eastern Democratic eastern DRC, combined with the breakdown of law and Republic of Congo (DRC) is prolonging the armed order and the devastation caused by the war, has meant conflict which has been tearing the country apart for that these groups have had unrestricted access to these more than 12 years. minerals and have been able to establish lucrative trading networks. The profits they make through this plunder In many parts of the provinces of North and South Kivu, enable some of the most violent armed groups to survive. armed groups and the Congolese national army control the trade in cassiterite (tin ore), gold, columbite-tantalite In their broader struggle to seize economic, political (coltan), wolframite (a source of tungsten) and other and military power, all the main warring partiesi have minerals. The unregulated nature of the mining sector in carried out the most horrific human rights abuses, including widespread killings of unarmed civilians, rape, torture and looting, recruitment of child soldiers to fight in their ranks, and forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The lure of eastern Congo’s mineral riches is one of the factors spurring them on.

By the time these minerals reach their ultimate destinations – the international markets in Europe, Asia, North America and elsewhere – their origin, and the suffering caused by this trade, has long been forgotten.

The illicit exploitation of natural resources is not a new phenomenon in eastern DRC. It has characterised the conflict since it first erupted in 1996 and has been well documented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations Panel of Experts and Group of Experts, journalists and others. Twelve years on, the patterns remain the same, and despite abundant evidence of these activities, no effective action has been taken to stop this murderous trade. On the contrary, the warring

i The term “warring parties” is used throughout this report to denote the range of armed groups operating in eastern DRC, as well as the Congolese army. chapter 1: summary 5

Overview of findings du Rwanda (FDLR), the predominantly Rwandan Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders are alleged to This report documents the militarisation of mining in have participated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC. Its findings and the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and conclusions, summarised below, are based primarily (FARDC), the Congolese national army. The on Global Witness field research in North and South involvement of these two groups in the mineral Kivu in 2008, and in Rwanda and Burundi in 2009. trade is extensive and well-organised.

• All the main warring parties are heavily involved in FDLR the mineral trade in North and South Kivu. This practice is not limited to rebel groups. Soldiers from • The FDLR has a stranglehold on the mineral trade the Congolese national army, and their commanders, in large parts of South Kivu. In some areas, their are also deeply involved in mining in both provinces. economic activities have become so successful that they appear to have become an end in themselves. • In the course of plundering these minerals, rebel Local residents describe them as the “big groups and the Congolese army have used forced businessmen”. labour (often in extremely harsh and dangerous conditions), carried out systematic extortion and • The FDLR sometimes trade openly, selling minerals imposed illegal “taxes” on the civilian population. in markets and towns; on other occasions, they use They have also used violence and intimidation against Congolese civilians as intermediaries. civilians who attempt to resist working for them or handing over the minerals they produce. • The FDLR systematically extort minerals and money from miners, charging a flat fee of 30% on mining • The most detailed information obtained by Global proceeds in some areas and “taxing” minerals at Witness relates to the Forces démocratiques pour la libération roadblocks. © Mark Craemer Cassiterite miner, Bisie, North Kivu, April 2008. Working conditions are dangerous and there are frequent accidents when mineshafts collapse. 6 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

FARDC territory and mining areas through mutual agreement and sometimes sharing the spoils. The FDLR use roads • The most blatant example of FARDC involvement in controlled by the FARDC, and vice versa, without mining is Bisie, the largest cassiterite mine in the difficulty. Minerals produced by the FDLR are sent out region, which accounts for around 80% of cassiterite through local airports controlled by the FARDC in exports from North Kivu. From 2006 to March 2009, South Kivu. Bisie mine was entirely under the control of an army brigade. In 2007 and the first part of 2008, the AF RDC Other armed groups based at Bisie were collecting at least US $120,000 a month by taking a commission of US $0.15 on every • The Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), and kilogramme of cassiterite. various other armed groups such as the mai-mai, have also profited from the mineral trade, particularly • In some mines, a system has been set up in which through their own systems of “taxation”. particular days of the week are allocated for civilian miners to work for individual soldiers or their Smuggling commanders. Soldiers also demand 10% of minerals, as well as cash, at numerous military checkpoints • Provincial government officials struggle to control along the roads. mineral exports across the DRC’s eastern borders. Official declarations and state revenues from exports • Senior officers in the provincial command of the 8th of cassiterite and coltan have increased since 2007, and 10th military regions of the FARDC have been but almost all the gold in North and South Kivu is profiting from this trade. still smuggled out. A Congolese government official told Global Witness that at least 90% of gold exports • Individual commanders or military units “own” were undeclared. particular mineshafts. In Mukungwe, in South Kivu, a mineshaft has been nicknamed “10th military region”. Rwanda and Burundi as transit countries

FARDC/FDLR collaboration • The majority of the minerals produced in North and South Kivu leave the DRC through Rwanda • The FARDC and the FDLR – supposedly battlefield or Burundi. The governments of these countries have enemies – often act in collaboration, carving up effectively provided the warring parties in eastern © iStockphoto.com/webphotographeer © iStockphoto.com/mgkaya © iStockphoto.com/bunhill Metals extracted from coltan, cassiterite and Tungsten derived from wolframite is used in Tin extracted from cassiterite is used in the wolframite are all used in the manufacture of the manufacture of light bulbs. manufacture of cans. electronic goods. chapter 1: summary 7

DRC with access to export routes and international markets. They have failed to acknowledge the fact that these minerals are fuelling the conflict in eastern DRC and have not held to account companies in their country which engage in this trade.

The comptoirs

• Several of the main comptoirs – trading houses based in Goma and Bukavu – buy, sell and export minerals produced by or benefiting the warring parties. They include Groupe Olive, Muyeye, MDM, Panju

and others. © Global Witness AMC’s offices in central London. AMC’s subsidiary, THAISARCO, is among the companies importing minerals from comptoirs whose suppliers have links with armed groups. • The fact that these comptoirs are officially licensed and registered with the Congolese government acts them, without verifying the exact origin of the as a cover for laundering minerals which are fuelling minerals or the identity of intermediaries. In reality, the conflict. some of these “legal” suppliers are among the main facilitators of the illicit trade with armed groups and Foreign companies army units.

• These comptoirs’ customers include European and Asian • Some companies have claimed that the well-being companies, such as the Thailand Smelting and of the Congolese population in mining areas is Refining Corporation (THAISARCO), the world’s dependent on these companies’ continued fifth-largest tin-producing company, owned by involvement in the trade. Such arguments ignore the British metals giant Amalgamated Metal Corporation serious human rights abuses perpetrated against (AMC); British company Afrimex; and several artisanal miners and other civilians by the warring Belgian companies such as Trademet and Traxys. parties who exploit these minerals and with whom These companies sell the minerals on to a range of these companies are prepared to continue trading. processing and manufacturing companies, including firms in the electronics industry. • Correspondence between some of these companies and Global Witness has revealed that despite paying • Economic actors are turning a blind eye to the lip-service to “ethical” principles, trading companies impact of their trade. They continue to plead have no effective monitoring system in place to check ignorance as to the origin of their supplies and hide their supply chain or assess the human rights impact behind a multitude of other excuses for failing to of their trade. implement practices which would exclude from their supply chain minerals which are fuelling the • Correspondence from some of the major electronics armed conflict. companies has shown a greater recognition of the need for due diligence but also a lack of a sense of urgency • Foreign companies use the “legal” status of their and limited commitment to applying checks suppliers as justification for continuing to trade with throughout the entire supply chain. 8 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Foreign governments The findings presented in this report are based on Global Witness interviews with a wide range of eye- • International dialogue and peace talks have not witnesses and other sources in North and South Kivuii tackled the economic dimension of the conflict. in July and August 2008, including miners, individual Global Witness believes that political agreements traders and trading companies, mining companies, which do not address the exploitation of natural government and military officials, members of armed resources as one of the main drivers of the conflict groups, journalists, members of Congolese NGOs, UN are unlikely to lead to lasting peace. staff and foreign diplomats. Global Witness has protected the identity of many interviewees in this • Home governments have failed to show moral report for their own security. Global Witness carried leadership in holding to account companies based out further research in Rwanda and Burundi in March in their countries that engage in trade which benefits 2009. Additional information was obtained through the warring parties and leads to human rights correspondence with companies and other sources in abuses. They have fallen back on voluntary codes late 2008 and early 2009. of conduct and other non-binding guidelines, resisting calls for stronger action to control the Action to break the links between corporate sector. the mineral trade and armed conflict

• Most donor governments have chosen to concentrate This report sets out detailed recommendations for on technical solutions instead of addressing the governments, individuals, organisations and companies fundamental causes of the conflict. Not only has this inside and outside the DRC who have the power the allowed the warring parties, and the companies which break the links between the mineral trade and the do business with them, to continue benefiting from conflict. Foremost among these recommendations are: the mineral trade with impunity, but it has further delayed the implementation of measures which • measures to cut off warring parties’ access to would deprive the warring parties of one of their mining sites in the DRC, as well as international principal sources of finance. trade routes and external networks;

• The inadequacy of the international response to the • ending the impunity protecting those engaged economic dimension of the conflict is obstructing in illicit mineral exploitation and trade, through development efforts. The conflict in eastern DRC actions by the governments of DRC, neighbouring continues to cause deaths, displacement, trauma countries and countries where companies and destruction of livelihoods on a massive scale – are registered; all of which impede development. Donor governments continue to pour vast sums of money • thorough due diligence by all companies trading into the DRC, but this assistance is undermined by in minerals which may originate from eastern their failure to address one of the fundamental DRC and stronger corresponding action by their aspects of the conflict: the warring parties’ access to governments to hold accountable those who continue natural resources. to trade in ways which fuel the conflict.

ii Global Witness did not research the mineral trade in the area known as le Grand Nord (in the northern part of North Kivu) or in the neighbouring province of Maniema. Recommendations 2

To the Congolese government intervene promptly in cases where members of armed groups or the FARDC prevent provincial officials • Set up a tighter control system over the chain of from doing their job. Government and judicial supply of minerals, from the point of extraction to authorities should investigate reports of threats the point of export. Establish a legal requirement that against civilian officials by members of armed groups individuals or companies handling minerals, at every or the FARDC and take action against those stage of the supply chain, produce written, verifiable found responsible. documentation of the exact location from which the minerals originate and the identity of their suppliers To Congolese government and any intermediaries or third parties. Prohibit and military authorities any mineral exports which do not carry such documentation. • Closely monitor the conduct of army brigades deployed in mineral-rich areas; remove, discipline and, • Exercise greater oversight and control over the where appropriate, investigate and initiate activities of comptoirs. Revoke the licences of comptoirs and prosecutions against those found responsible for the négociants (buyers) who persist in trading in minerals illicit exploitation of minerals and for human rights produced by or benefiting the warring parties violations committed in this context. (including those named by the UN Group of Experts) or who fail to produce precise, verifiable • Launch an investigation into reports that the 85th documentation on their chain of supply, as outlined brigade, under the command of Colonel Sammy above. Investigate reports that some comptoirs and Matumo, has been exploiting and trading in négociants are knowingly trading with armed groups or cassiterite in Bisie from 2006 to March 2009. The the FARDC and, where substantial evidence exists, brigade’s redeployment in March 2009 should not initiate prosecutions. serve as a substitute for legal action. If substantial evidence is found, initiate judicial proceedings • Carry out spot checks on the identity of suppliers against Colonel Sammy Matumo and other FARDC to comptoirs exporting minerals from North and South members found responsible for these offences and Kivu and investigate any fresh allegations or suspicions for human rights violations committed in this that some comptoirs may be obtaining supplies from context. Ensure that the FARDC brigade replacing individuals known to be close to armed groups or the 85th brigade is not based in Bisie and does not FARDC units involved in mineral exploitation. engage in mineral exploitation and trade.

• Provide strong political and technical support to • Similarly, remove FARDC units known to be provincial-level government agencies responsible for exploiting minerals in other locations in North controlling the mining sector, exports and border and South Kivu and take action against their controls in North and South Kivu. Senior national- commanders and other FARDC members level government officials should be prepared to found responsible. 10 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

• Launch an independent investigation into allegations • Submit to the UN Sanctions Committee the names that senior FARDC officials, at provincial and of individuals or companies based in their country national level, may be profiting from the trade in whose trade in minerals is helping fund armed minerals in North and South Kivu; ensure that any groups in eastern DRC. individuals found responsible for profiting from this trade or for ordering or sanctioning such behaviour To foreign governments, including by others within the FARDC are brought to justice, diplomats and mediators involved however senior their rank. in peace talks

• Immediately suspend and, where appropriate, initiate • Ensure that foreign policy on the DRC and the prosecutions against FARDC members who have Great Lakes region addresses the economic drivers of collaborated with the FDLR and other armed groups the conflict as one of the central factors behind the responsible for grave human rights abuses, including continuing violence in eastern DRC. through sharing the proceeds of the mineral trade. • Ensure that the question of the economic agendas To governments of neighbouring of the warring parties is discussed explicitly and countries and transit countries frankly in peace talks and other regional and international political dialogue. Make clear that the • Fully implement UN Security Council Resolution exploitation and trade of natural resources by armed 1856 (2008) which requires “all States, especially those groups and army units is not acceptable under any in the region, to take appropriate steps to end the circumstance. Seek agreement among leaders of illicit trade in natural resources, including if necessary armed groups, as well as FARDC and government through judicial means” and report to the UN officials, on measures to halt this illicit trade and Security Council on measures taken. secure their commitment to implementing this agreement within their ranks. Under no • In view of the gravity of the human rights situation in circumstances should negotiations include a division eastern DRC and the fact that the warring parties rely or apportioning of natural resources between the heavily on funds from the mineral trade, carry out warring parties. additional due diligence with a view to stopping imports of minerals which are produced by or benefit • Raise with the Congolese government, at the any of the warring parties. Tighten controls of highest levels, the question of the involvement mineral imports and insist that any minerals of FARDC units and military commanders in the imported from the DRC are accompanied by mineral trade, and press for those responsible to verifiable documentation indicating their precise be brought to justice. origin and the identity of intermediaries. • Urge the Congolese government to implement the • Launch investigations and, if appropriate, other measures listed above; provide assistance and prosecutions against individuals or companies in their support to enable the rapid implementation of these country who are trading in minerals produced by or measures, in particular to strengthen the capacity benefiting any of the warring parties in eastern DRC. and effectiveness of provincial and local government Suspend the trading licences of any such individuals bodies responsible for overseeing the mining sector or companies, pending the outcome of investigations. and controlling exports. chapter 2: recommendations 11

• Ensure that clear guidelines and instructions in mineral-rich areas of North and South Kivu; that prohibiting the illicit exploitation of natural resources these teams report regularly on their findings; and that are included in security sector reform and training these findings are communicated promptly to the UN programmes for the Congolese security forces. Security Council. These efforts should cover the exploitation of natural resources by all the principal • Provide political and technical support to MONUC armed groups. (the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC), as well as assistance in the form of personnel, to enable it to fulfil • In recognition of the fact that MONUC forces its brief to “curtail the provision of support to illegal are severely overstretched, adopt a targeted approach armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural to the strategy to combat illicit natural resource resources”, as provided for in UN Security Council exploitation which can be implemented in the short Resolution 1856 (2008). term. Concentrate monitoring efforts on the principal mining sites known to be supplying armed groups and To MONUC the trade routes known to be used by these groups, with a view to halting this trade. Set up monitoring • Ensure that the task of curtailing the provision and control points at strategic locations such as of support to armed groups through the trade in important mines, key border posts, airstrips and lake natural resources, included in MONUC’s mandate crossings used by armed groups. Carry out this work since December 2008, is fully integrated into the work in close collaboration with Congolese provincial of UN military and civilian teams deployed government authorities. © UN Photo/Marie Frechon MONUC peacekeepers patrolling the road between Sake and Masisi, North Kivu, September 2008. 12 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

To the UN Security Council To companies and traders purchasing, handling or trading in minerals originating • Request regular reports on MONUC’s progress in from eastern DRC or neighbouring countries using “its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups • Exercise stringent due diligence regarding their derived from illicit trade in natural resources”, as mineral supplies:iii find out exactly where the minerals mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1856 were produced (not only the broad geographical area, (2008); propose further actions by MONUC and/or but the precise location and mine), by whom they UN member states, as appropriate, in response to were produced and under what conditions (including MONUC’s reports and findings. use of forced labour, child labour, health and safety and other labour conditions). • Request regular reports from all member states on the implementation of UN Security Council ●• Refuse to buy minerals if the above information is not Resolution 1857 (2008), relating, in particular, to available or if there are indications that the minerals sanctions against individuals or entities in breach have passed through the hands of any of the warring of the arms embargo, including against those who parties, benefited them in other ways, or otherwise support armed groups through the trade in involved human rights abuses. natural resources. ●• Be able to demonstrate, with credible written evidence, • Continue to support the work of the Group of Experts the exact origin of their mineral supplies, the routes and ensure that member states act on its findings. they have taken and the identity of those involved in the chain of custody, including intermediaries or third parties who have handled them.

●• Do not accept oral or vague assurances from suppliers as to the origin of minerals and the identity of their own suppliers. Carry out spot checks to verify the sources and the accuracy of suppliers’ assurances. Require these measures in all circumstances, including in cases where minerals originate from areas which may be remote or difficult to access.

• Commission and publish regular independent third-party audits of their supply chain.

●• Federations and associations of comptoirs and other trade bodies: adopt an explicit policy not to buy or handle minerals which benefit any of the warring parties in © Global Witness Block of cassiterite, Lemera, South Kivu, August 2008. eastern DRC. Require their members to carry out the

iii For a separate briefing and recommendations on due diligence (some of which are also contained in the present report), see Global Witness, “Recommendations on due diligence for buyers and companies trading in minerals from eastern DRC and for their home governments”, November 2008. chapter 2: recommendations 13

above due diligence steps systematically and to Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Reprimand demonstrate precisely where all their supplies come those companies found to be in violation of these from. Set up mechanisms for independently standards and formulate strong recommendations for monitoring and checking whether their members remedying their business practices. are complying with these requirements. • Where there are indications that companies may be To governments of home states trading in ways which are benefiting any of the warring in which companies are registered parties, carry out immediate detailed investigations. If ● credible information confirms this link, officially advise • Provide clear guidance to companies purchasing the companies to cease trading and purchasing from or trading in minerals from eastern DRC or intending that specific area or supplier until the companies can to do so in the future. Publicly warn these companies demonstrate that their trade is not financing any of the that they should proceed with caution, that the warring parties or contributing to human rights abuses. government is monitoring the implications of their In cases where complicity can be demonstrated, initiate activities and that they could face a number of liability prosecutions against companies and individuals. risks if they are found to be assisting or facilitating human rights abuses.iv • Submit to the UN Sanctions Committee the names of individuals or companies registered in their country ●• Insist that companies carry out the highest level of whose trade in minerals is helping fund armed groups due diligence regarding their entire chain of supply, in eastern DRC, in conformity with UN Security as outlined above. Adopt national legislation that Council Resolution 1857 (2008). These should include requires the performance of due diligence extra- companies named in the reports of the Group of territorially (in this case, in the DRC and the Great Experts, such as those registered in the UK and Belgium. Lakes region), identifies specific measures which companies are expected to take and standards they • Do not financially support or invest in companies are expected to meet, and specifies government action whose trading activities benefit groups or individuals which would be triggered by a company’s failure to responsible for serious human rights abuses in eastern take these steps. DRC, for example through export credit agencies or state pension schemes. • Ensure that these steps are taken not only in relation to imports from the DRC, but also from neighbouring To the International Criminal Court (ICC) countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and ● Tanzania, as minerals originating from the DRC may • Recognise the role of economic actors and companies be imported from these countries without being in crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, as set out in the clearly identified as Congolese. Rome Statute.

• In parallel with initiatives to introduce legislation • Investigate individuals – including those heading (as above), effectively monitor companies’ adherence comptoirs and foreign companies buying minerals from to international standards such as the OECD North and South Kivu – who, through their trading

iv For examples of the legal risks faced by companies, see International Alert / Fafo, “Red Flags: liability risks for companies operating in high-risk zones”, 2008, available at www.redflags.info 14 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

practices, are financing armed groups or army units Global Witness is calling for actions targeted specifically responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity. at those parts of the mineral trade which are controlled by Where appropriate, and pursuant to the principle of armed groups or military units and has developed the above complementarity with national jurisdictions, initiate recommendations with this goal in mind. A crackdown on this part of the trade would not have significant negative effects prosecutions of individuals against whom there is on the civilian population in the long term, as the profits evidence of involvement in such crimes. Under the currently derived from it serve primarily to enrich the elite of businessmen, the military and leaders of armed groups. Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction against an individual who “for the purpose of facilitating the Global Witness does not take the position that mining activities in eastern DRC should cease altogether. Nor does commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise it advocate a boycott or embargo of the trade as a whole, as assists in its commission or its attempted commission, such blanket measures would adversely affect the sections including providing the means for its commission”.1 of the mineral trade which are not controlled by any of the warring parties.

• Encourage states to launch their own investigations The aim of Global Witness’s campaign, therefore, is not to stop artisanal miners from trading, nor to close down mines in and, where appropriate, prosecutions of economic eastern DRC, but to exclude the warring parties, and their actors suspected of involvement in crimes within intermediaries, from the supply chain and trading networks, so the ICC’s mandate. Facilitate the work of national that miners are able to sell only to legitimate, civilian buyers who do not have connections with any of the warring parties. law enforcement agencies and monitor the progress Global Witness also aims to highlight, and ultimately stop, the of these investigations and prosecutions in national grave human rights abuses committed by the warring parties involved in the exploitation and trade of minerals. jurisdictions. © Global Witness Sorting cassiterite, Lemera, South Kivu, August 2008. Background to the armed conflict in eastern DRC 3 © Marcus Bleasdale/VII Bodies of two Congolese army soldiers killed in fighting with CNDP forces, several kilometres outside Goma, North Kivu, 12 November 2008.

The fighting in eastern DRC has numerous, complex their successors and opponents are using the same tactics causes, including long-standing political and ethnic to exploit and retain control of mining areas. Whereas in grievances and disputes over land. But there are baser the earlier years of the conflict, armed groups fought for motivations behind this war: greed and the desire to control of the mines,3 these groups have since carved up control eastern DRC’s rich mineral deposits. The minerals the main mining areas, each controlling different scattered all over North and South Kivu have acted as a territories and the corresponding trade networks. magnet for rebel groups and military factions throughout Neighbouring countries, notably Rwanda, Burundi and the last 12 years. Uganda, are also continuing to profit from the chaos on the Congolese side of the border and from the trade Global Witness previously undertook field research on the passing through their countries. cassiterite trade in eastern DRC in 2005.2 Three years later, despite turbulent political developments in the region, the The conflict in the DRC is often described in terms of two practices of the warring parties, and the individuals with wars. The first began in 1996, when the Rwandan army whom they trade, have remained constant. The fortunes invaded eastern DRC, backing rebel leader Laurent-Désiré of some of these groups may have turned – for example, Kabila, who eventually toppled President Mobutu Sese the former rebel group the Rassemblement congolais pour la Seko; the second began in 1998, when Kabila broke with his démocratie (RCD), now a political party, joined the Rwandan allies, and Rwanda, in turn, backed a new rebel government and no longer has its own armed force – but group, the RCD,v to attempt to overthrow Kabila. The five vThe RCD later split into three different factions. 16 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

years of armed conflict that followed split the country overtake political or ethnic grievances as the primary into different zones of control ruled by competing motivation for the conflict. armed groups. The result was devastating for the Congolese civilian population, with massive loss of life, Armed groups in eastern DRC come and go, alliances form internal displacement and a prolonged humanitarian and unravel, and different groups have split along ethnic, crisis. 2003 saw the formation of a transitional political or regional lines. But some have remained more government, based on a power-sharing arrangement or less constant, posing continued threats to security and between the main armed groups, including the RCD. a pretext for their opponents to continue fighting. Among Nevertheless, fighting continued in eastern DRC these is the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda throughout the transitional period (2003 to 2006) and in (FDLR), a predominantly Rwandan Hutu armed group, the years following historic national elections in 2006. some of whose leaders allegedly participated in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Despite various attempts to Prospects for lasting peace in eastern DRC remain dislodge them through military means and a elusive. Despite numerous diplomatic efforts, rebel Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reinsertion groups and the Congolese army are continuing to fight and Reintegration (DDRRR) programme overseen by the an exceptionally brutal war, which escalated sharply in UN, the FDLR have remained active in North and South the second half of 2008. Ceasefires have been broken Kivu, sometimes forming alliances with smaller armed almost as soon as they have been declared; peace groups as well as the Congolese army (see section 7). agreements have been violated repeatedly; and international efforts to broker peace have foundered The presence of the FDLR has been used by the again and again. predominantly Tutsi armed group the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) as a pretext for waging its own war, Many of the armed groups in eastern DRC were created supposedly in order to defend the Congolese Tutsi in response to a set of diverse and complex factors, often population against the threat of the FDLR. Similarly, in rooted in local dynamics. These included perceived previous years, the Rwandan government and army have exclusion on the basis of ethnicity or regional origin, used the presence of the FDLR as justification for sending conflicts over land ownership, absence of security, and their own troops into eastern DRC. the inability of government institutions to ensure the rule of law. Over time, some of these armed groups In addition to fighting the FDLR, the CNDP had several became diverted from their original objectives through other objectives revolving around political and social a combination of corruption and political and economic representation of the Tutsi, as well as securing the return opportunism. Finding it relatively easy to seize territory of Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda. Some of their through the use of violence, they attempted to replace grievances struck a chord among sections of the or take over state structures and reap the benefits of the population, and support for the CNDP increased mineral wealth which they found in the areas under significantly after the RCD was wiped off the political map their control. As the profits from this trade became in the 2006 elections. However, the tactics the CNDP used increasingly important to their survival, some of the to further its aims – particularly the extreme violence and armed groups switched their attention and resources to suffering inflicted on the civilian population – ended up further developing these activities. In some cases, the alienating many of its former or potential supporters. financial profits from the mineral trade or from the “taxes” they extorted from the local population became In reality, these various armed groups’ political posturing so attractive that this economic agenda seemed to and their claims to protect particular sections of the chapter 3: background to the armed conflict in eastern DRC 17 © Marcus Bleasdale/VII Camp for internally displaced persons, forced to flee their villages of Karuba and Mushake because of fighting between Congolese government forces, CNDP troops and the FDLR. Goma, North Kivu, 17 October 2007. population have often acted as facades for an altogether In January 2009, a new scenario began unfolding, with a more crude, self-serving agenda: use violence as a means rare military collaboration between the DRC and to secure a place at the political table, to obtain senior Rwanda to disband the FDLR and the reported arrest of positions in the army, and, critically, to gain control of Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the CNDP, in Rwanda on territory and the natural resources which come with it. 22 January.vi On the surface, these events may signal a short-term resolution of some of the more intractable This strategy has been used, time and again, by various obstacles which have characterised the conflict to date armed groups in eastern DRC with considerable success: – in particular, the fierce enmity between Congo and some of the militias responsible for the worst atrocities Rwanda – but reports from human rights groups have transformed themselves into political parties indicate that they are already bringing a further wave of overnight and their leaders have been rewarded with human rights abuses and displacement in their wake.4 military or political positions in national institutions, with Most importantly, the underlying causes of the conflict, little protest by international actors. Impunity has been and the many challenges on the road to long-term the rule: there have been very few cases of successful peace, have yet to be addressed. prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity or other grave human rights abuses against civilians carried The deals secured behind the scenes in the run-up to out during the conflict. The result has been the formation the events of January 2009 have also resulted in some of an army, and branches of the government, composed shocking developments: following an internal split of individuals responsible for overseeing or carrying out within the CNDP, Bosco Ntaganda replaced Laurent some of the most serious crimes. Furthermore, many of Nkunda as its military leader and announced that the the combatants from former rebel groups which have CNDP would join the Congolese army to fight against the been integrated into the national army retain their former FDLR. Ntaganda thus effectively became one of the main ethnic or regional allegiances. interlocutors in attempts to resolve the conflict, despite

viThe Rwandan authorities are not known to have formally arrested Laurent Nkunda or charged him with a criminal offence; nor have they begun judicial proceedings against him. He is believed to be under a form of house arrest. In an interview with the BBC, Rwandan President Paul Kagame described Nkunda as Rwanda’s “guest” (BBC, Hard Talk, 17 March 2009). The Congolese authorities have requested Nkunda’s extradition to the DRC to face prosecution there. 18 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

the fact that he is wanted by the International Criminal depriving victims of the prospect of justice or redress. Court (ICC) for war crimes committed in Ituri (Province In April 2009, it was reported that Ntaganda was to play Orientale). In a further blow to the search for justice, a prominent role in further FARDC operations against senior Congolese government figures, including the FDLR.6 President Joseph Kabila himself and Information Minister Lambert Mende, have indicated publicly that In March 2009, the CNDP and the Congolese they are unlikely to hand Ntaganda over to the ICC in government signed an agreement in which, among the near future, prioritising “security and peace” over other things, the CNDP announced that its forces would justice.5 This position reinforces the culture of be integrated into the national police and army and that impunity in the DRC, effectively rewarding the it would become a political party.7 The process of the perpetrators of some of the worst human rights abuses CNDP’s “accelerated integration” into the national army and encouraging others to follow in their steps. As began even before the agreement was signed, raising events in eastern DRC since 1996 have amply renewed concerns about impunity and the future of a demonstrated, impunity has severely undermined peace national army made up of warlords and rebel fighters efforts and served to prolong the conflict, while responsible for grave human rights abuses.

Which military and other armed groups are plundering the minerals?

• Forces démocratiques pour la libération du • Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO), Rwanda (FDLR), a predominantly Rwandan Hutu a group loosely allied with the FDLR, and sometimes armed group, some of whose leaders allegedly with Congolese government forces, in their battles participated in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. against the CNDP. In January 2009, PARECO followed Many of the FDLR fled from Rwanda to the DRC the CNDP in announcing that it too would cease in the aftermath of the genocide in 1994 and have hostilities and join the ranks of the national army. remained there ever since. Initially made up, in part, of members of the former Rwandan army and • Various mai-mai groups in North and South Kivu, interahamwe militia who played a central role in often divided along ethnic lines. Originally local carrying out the Rwandan genocide, it later gained self-defence groups, mai-mai in different parts of new recruits. Many of its current members are too eastern DRC have become increasingly involved in young to have participated in the genocide. The the armed conflict over the last ten years, sometimes movement went through several name changes; fighting alongside the Congolese army against the known as Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR) CNDP or other Rwandan-backed groups, and from around 1998, it renamed itself the FDLR in 2000. sometimes fighting each other. The FDLR are spread across North and South Kivu, with a more established presence and greater involvement • Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF), in mining in South Kivu. sometimes known as Groupe de 47, a small Tutsi armed group active in the Haut Plateau area of • Congrès national pour la défense du peuple South Kivu. (CNDP), a Tutsi-led rebel group backed by Rwanda. Active in North Kivu, particularly in Rutshuru and Masisi. • Forces armées de la République démocratique du The CNDP was headed by Laurent Nkunda until January Congo (FARDC), the Congolese national army. North 2009. At the time of writing, its political leader is Désiré Kivu is under the command of the 8th military region. Kamanzi and its de facto military leader is Bosco South Kivu is under the command of the 10th military Ntaganda, who is wanted for war crimes by the region. Various FARDC units and commanders from International Criminal Court. In February 2009, the these two military regions are involved in mining, in CNDP announced that it was to become a political many locations in North and South Kivu. party and that its forces would be integrated into the national Congolese army; this was formalised in an • Demobilised combatants, particularly former agreement signed with the Congolese government mai-mai, in North and South Kivu, some of whom in March 2009. have retained their weapons. chapter 3: background to the armed conflict in eastern DRC 19

Testimonies of human rights abuses (All information and testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch and reprinted with its permission.)

All the main warring parties involved in mineral exploitation and trade in eastern DRC have committed grave human rights abuses.

Witness of summary executions by the CNDP in Kiwanja (North Kivu), November 2008:

On 4-5 November 2008, around 150 people were killed in the town of Kiwanja. Most of them were killed by CNDP forces. Others died during fighting between the CNDP and themai-mai.

“I could not flee Kiwanja after the CNDP told everyone to leave because my wife was pregnant. I live close to where the CNDP had their camp, and I heard them say anyone leaving their house was suspect and that anyone poking their head out of a window should be shot. After a day hiding in our houses, I heard my neighbour say she had desperately to go to the toilet and she left her house. A soldier asked her where she was going, and when she told him she was going to the toilet, he shot her. Then her husband opened the door to see what had happened and they shot him dead as well. They were both about 60 years old. They were not Mai Mai. They were just an old couple who could not run away.”8

Victim of rape by the FDLR near Ngungu, Masisi (North Kivu), December 2006:

A woman was assisting a victim of rape, whom she found tied to a tree, when she was followed and raped by FDLR combatants.

“There was a piece of wood inserted into her [the other woman’s] vagina. I pulled it out, and I put the victim on my back. I carried her for about two miles and the victim then died on my back. She just passed away. All the time we were being followed by [FDLR] combatants [...] When I finished [burying the victim] they said they would rape me. I told them, if you want to rape me, let me first pray. There were eight of them. I prayed. When I stopped praying, four refused to rape me, but the other four said that they would not leave without raping me. They raped me, they hit me, for six hours, from 10am to 4pm. When they finished their dirty task they fled into the bush, firing shots. I was left there naked, beaten. I couldn’t move.”9

Victim of rape by FARDC soldiers, Goma, October 2008:

In late October 2008, in the face of an advance by CNDP troops towards Goma, Congolese army soldiers panicked and fled, creating chaos in their wake. They rampaged through Goma, killing at least 20 civilians, including five children, and injuring more than a dozen others. They raped over a dozen women and girls. A 20-year-old woman was among the victims.

“Two soldiers came up to me and asked me to give them my goats. I said I didn’t have any. They then asked for my pigs. Again, I said I didn’t have any. They turned to another woman and asked her for her beans and bananas. She gave what she had, and the soldiers told me to carry the bananas for them into the hills. When we got to the hill, one of the soldiers pushed me to the ground. He put the blunt side of his machete on my neck and the handle of his rifle on my chest. Then he raped me. When he was finished, he called the other soldier and he raped me too. Then they told me I could go. As I fled, they shot their rifles into the banana plantation. I fell to the ground, pretending I was dead.” © Kate Holt

A man looks over the bodies of civilians killed during clashes Hours later, the woman’s 57-year-old grandmother was also between CNDP troops and mai-mai, Kiwanja, North Kivu, 10 6 November 2008. raped by a man in Congolese army uniform. Overview of mining 4 in North and South Kivu

Minerals found in North and South Kivu

The main minerals in North and South Kivu are:

Cassiterite (tin ore) Gold

Currently the most important mineral in terms of Found in North Kivu and South Kivu, with the most quantity and price. Found in numerous locations in significant deposits in South Kivu. (Gold produced in the North and South Kivu. It has many uses, including as Ituri district of Province Orientale, to the north, is also a component in the production of solders, tin plating traded and exported through towns such as Beni and and alloys. These are used, among other things, in the Butembo, in North Kivu.) Almost all gold exports are illicit electronics industry (electronic solders alone accounted and undeclared; only a tiny proportion is produced and for over 44% of all refined tin usage in 200711) and for exported officially. No reliable statistics are available. the production of tin cans. Coltan

Found in many of the same locations as cassiterite, in North and South Kivu. “Coltan” is an abbreviation of columbite- tantalite, a mineral concentrate containing the metals niobium (also known as columbium) and tantalum.

Coltan from the DRC is mostly used as a source of tantalum. Tantalum is used as a component in electronic goods, such as circuits in mobile telephones, laptop computers, airbag protection systems, playstations, video cameras and digital cameras.

Coltan was the most important mineral in the earlier phases of the war in the DRC, with its price peaking in around 2000 in response to rising demand. Coltan has become much less significant since its price dropped from 2001 onwards. It has © iStockphoto.com/Andreas Reh Soldering a circuit board. The production of solders is one of the since been overtaken in importance by cassiterite. main uses of tin. According to official In 2007 and 2008, the DRC accounted for around 4% government statistics from to 5% of the global production of tin ore.12 According North and South Kivu, 428.4 to official government statistics from North and South tonnes of coltan were Kivu, 14,905.9 tonnes of cassiterite were exported in exported in 2007 and at 2007 and at least 13,782.74 tonnes from January to least 270.79 tonnes in the September 2008.13 In comparison, China and Indonesia first half of 2008.18 – the world’s two largest producers – produced 118,300 tonnes and 103,100 tonnes respectively in 2007.14 Metals derived from coltan Other cassiterite-producing countries include Peru and cassiterite are used in (39,019 tonnes),15 Bolivia (15,972 tonnes)16 the manufacture of electronic 17 and Brazil (12,596 tonnes). goods such as MP3 players. © iStockphoto.com/largeformat4x5 chapter 4: overview of mining in north and south kivu 21

alloys and steels, as well as in the vibration alert function in mobile telephones.23

According to official government statistics from North and South Kivu, 1,222.1 tonnes of wolframite were exported in 2007 and at least 443.92 tonnes in the first half of 2008.24 The 1,222.1 tonnes of wolframite produced in 2007 had the potential to yield an estimated 635 tonnes of tungsten.25 As a comparison, China, the world’s largest producer of tungsten, produced 41,000 tonnes of tungsten in 2007; other major producers include Russia (3,200 tonnes), Canada (2,700 tonnes) and Austria 26

The 428.4 tonnes of coltan produced in 2007 had the A rare mineral, found in Lueshe, in the territoire of potential to yield an estimated 116 tonnes of tantalum.19 In Rutshuru (North Kivu), in an area under CNDP control global terms, this is a significant amount: Australia and in 2008. Pyrochlore is the main mineral from which Brazil, which are among the world’s largest tantalum niobium is obtained. The main use of the niobium found producers, produced 435 and 180 tonnes of tantalum in in pyrochlore is as an additive in the production of steel. 2007 respectively.20 Other tantalum-producing countries Lueshe mine has been officially closed since 2004, in include Canada, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Mozambique. part because of an unresolved legal dispute over the rights to control it.27 No government exports of pyrochlore The amount of niobium extracted from coltan in the DRC are recorded for 2007 or the first half of 2008; some is minimal in global terms. The 428.4 tonnes of coltan exports are recorded for 2006.28 Production reportedly produced in North and South Kivu in 2007 had the resumed in 2008 and stock was delivered to warehouses potential to yield an estimated 99 tonnes of niobium.21 In in Goma in preparation for export in late 2008, but the comparison, Brazil, the world’s largest producer of niobium, government blocked these exports due to the continuing produced 57,300 tonnes in 2007; Canada, the second- legal dispute over the ownership of the mine.29 Niobium largest producer, produced 3,000 tonnes in 2007.22 is also obtained from coltan (see above).

Wolframite Various precious and semi-precious stones, including diamonds, amethysts Found in North and South Kivu. Wolframite, sometimes and tourmaline. referred to as wolfram, is an ore used as a source of tungsten. Tungsten is used in the production of hard Small quantities found primarily in South Kivu. metals (or cemented carbides), which are used in heavy industry, particularly to manufacture metal and stone cutting tools, mining tools and other machinery components. Tungsten is also used in incandescent lamps, 22 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

main mineral deposits in north kivu Main mineral deposits in North Kivu

Mambasa Province Orientale Bafwasende

Key Provincial capital Territory capital Beni Other town/village

Butembo Aerodrome Lake National park Lubero State border Province Lake Edward Territory

Virunga National Park Mineral deposits North Kivu Cassiterite Maniema Uganda Coltan Wolframite Lueshe Gold Bisie Pyrochlore Rutshuru

Bunagana Walikale Masisi

Goma Gisenyi

Kigali Kahuzi-Biega National Park Lake Kivu Kalehe Rwanda

Lulingu Kabare South Kivu Walungu Bukavu Burundi Shabunda Nzovu Burundi

0 25 50 100 KM

Source: International Peace Information Service (IPIS), http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php?&lang=en chapter 4: overview of mining in north and south kivu 23

main mineral deposits in south kivu Main mineral deposits in South Kivu

Walikale Virunga National Park Masisi Goma North Kivu Gisenyi

Kahuzi-Biega National Park Lake Kivu Kalehe Key

Rwanda Provincial capital Lulingu Kabare Territory capital Bukavu Other town/village Nzovu Shabunda Walungu Aerodrome Tubimbi Mukungwe Lake

Burundi National park Mwenga Protected natural reserve Lemera Kamituga State border South Kivu Bujumbura Province Uvira Itombwe Forest Territory

Mineral deposits Cassiterite Coltan Haut Plateau Minembwe Wolframite Kilembwe Moyen Plateau Gold Baraka Maniema Fizi

Lake Tanganyika

Katanga

0 25 50 100 KM

Source: International Peace Information Service (IPIS), http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php?&lang=en 24 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

The formal and informal mining sectors

All the mining in North and South Kivu takes place in the Metal Processing Association (MPA), its counterpart informal sector. The minerals are dug by hand, or with in Rwanda. MPA has a factory in Gisenyi, north-western very basic tools, by civilians known as artisanal miners. Rwanda (just across the border from Goma), which used These miners work in extremely harsh conditions, without to process Congolese minerals. However, in 2008, the training, equipment or protection; fatal accidents and factory was no longer fully operational.31 Since 2007, serious injuries occur regularly. Officials of the Division MPA has been involved in cassiterite and coltan des Mines (the provincial representation of the Ministry exploration in Rwanda, after forming a joint-venture of Mines) are able to record only a small fraction of the company with the Rwandan government (Gatumba number of accidents; the vast majority go unreported. Mining Concession). Tens of thousands of people, including children, work as artisanal miners in the two provinces. It is impossible to Banro, a company with headquarters in Canada, publicly know the exact number, as they are not registered. In listed on the Toronto and New York Stock Alternextvii stock theory, miners are supposed to obtain a card from the exchanges. Banro holds exploration titles in three gold authorities (“carte de creuseur”) before they can operate mining areas in South Kivu (Twangiza, Lugushwa, legally, but very few do, partly because of the cost and Kamituga) and one in the neighbouring province of partly because the regulation is not enforced. Miners also Maniema (Namoya). Banro started working in the area move from mine to mine, according to opportunities and in 1997 after it took over gold mining rights from the new discoveries of minerals. Work may be irregular and now defunct state mining company SOMINKI, but had has been disrupted, among other things, by population to interrupt its work because of the war. It resumed displacement resulting from the conflict. exploration from 2004.32

There are few foreign or multinational mining companies Canadian-registered Shamika, a relative newcomer in operating in North or South Kivu. Those which are the region, which holds 15 exploration titles for cassiterite, present are at the early stages of exploration and have not gold and other minerals in South Kivu, the neighbouring begun extracting minerals. Some of their exploration province of Maniema and the northern part of Katanga programmes have run into serious problems because of province. Most of these titles were obtained in 2007, the widespread presence of armed groups and military in some in 2008. the mines; local disputes over control of resources; and tensions between the companies and local populations, Transafrika, a Mauritius-registered company with sometimes resulting in violence. Mining companies predominantly South African interests, which holds continue to face particular challenges arising from the exploration titles to four gold mining areas in the volatile environment and the general context of southern part of South Kivu. One of the senior lawlessness. managers of Transafrika is Thomas Nziratimana, former deputy governor of South Kivu during the period that In 2008, these companies included: the RCD-Goma was in power.

Mining and Processing Congo (MPC), a subsidiary of Canadian-registered Loncor, which has a number of gold South African-owned Kivu Resources, registered in exploration permits in North Kivu, mostly in Lubero, but Mauritius. MPC, which was established in the DRC in also in Walikale and Rutshuru. December 2002, holds exploration titles to 14 concessions in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and A number of other companies – some Congolese, some Katanga provinces.30 These include exploration rights for foreign – have also been granted exploration rights to Bisie, the largest cassiterite mine, and three other mines in North and South Kivu. Many of them have not cassiterite mines in Walikale (North Kivu). MPC also yet begun operations. They include some companies has its own comptoir, registered in North and South Kivu, already operating as comptoirs (see section 10), such which buys and exports Congolese cassiterite through as Sodexmines and Groupe Olive.33

viiAlternext is a market for small and medium-sized companies within the New York Stock Exchange. The Congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 5

“Please tell the government to tell the military to stop this. The population is suffering.” Miner in Tubimbi (South Kivu), 29 July 2008 © Kate Holt Congolese army soldiers at a military base 12 km north of Goma, North Kivu, 8 November 2008.

Global Witness collected numerous testimonies of the both from Congolese and international sources – involvement of the FARDC in mineral exploitation in that senior military and political officials in the capital, both North Kivu and South Kivu. Contrary to the Kinshasa, are implicated. A UN source told Global claims of some military officials, this practice is not Witness: “If a person has a rank in the army, he has limited to a few low-ranking soldiers trying to top up access to natural resources.”34 their meagre salaries. It is widespread, across both provinces, and the system of financial rewards is The extent of mineral exploitation by the military, and well-organised: commanders are directly involved and the impunity which protects those responsible, are the profits are channelled back up the military illustrative of the deeper problems which characterise hierarchy. Those profiting include senior officers in the the Congolese army, and the country’s governing provincial command in the 8th military region (North institutions as a whole. Corruption is widespread Kivu) and the 10th military region (South Kivu). There throughout the DRC and affects government agencies are also frequent reports from North and South Kivu – and the security forces at all levels. Corrupt practices 26 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

and systems of patronage are especially prevalent in the Mukungwe below] [...] Everyone knows what is happening mining sector, in which senior political and military but no one dares to say it.”36 figures have accumulated vast wealth to the detriment of the local population. In the east, the anarchy brought In some cases, FARDC soldiers dig for minerals about by the war has created even greater opportunities themselves,37 viii but most often, they use the civilian for the military to plunder these riches. The involvement population to dig for them. The FARDC effectively of senior commanders has meant that it has been inherited a whole workforce of civilian artisanal miners extremely difficult to challenge this behaviour. The when they took over these areas. As artisanal mining weakness of the judiciary, whose officials are regularly is unregulated, and the government does not have a subjected to threats, intimidation and interference when permanent presence in the mines, artisanal miners are they attempt to investigate or prosecute crimes extremely vulnerable to exploitation and have little committed by the military, has meant that these crimes choice but to comply with what the FARDC ask of them. have gone unpunished. Fear of violence by the FARDC, who are notorious for committing human rights abuses, is such that few Over the last few years, FARDC troops have been deployed civilians even think of withdrawing their labour; they in North and South Kivu in greater numbers. A miner in opt instead for a form of passive cooperation for the sake South Kivu told Global Witness that the FARDC had of their own security. started exploiting minerals ever since they were deployed in the region in 2006, after the elections won by President Local human rights organisations have reported cases Joseph Kabila.35 Some of these areas were previously where civilians have been arrested and tortured for not controlled by armed groups, but for the civilian complying with soldiers’ orders to work for them, for population, the arrival of the FARDC has made little not satisfying their military “bosses”, or for denouncing difference. Local residents and members of local NGOs extortion, theft of minerals and other abuses by the told Global Witness that the FARDC and the armed military.38 In one instance, in early August 2008, FARDC groups behaved in very similar ways. soldiers beat three civilian miners because one of them had lost a hammer he was using to dig for cassiterite in Once they find themselves posted in mineral-rich areas, a mineshaft controlled by a FARDC official at Musholo, the FARDC soldiers and their commanders are reluctant near Lemera (South Kivu). The soldiers then made the to move and jealously guard their positions. To do so, they three miners work for them for ten days without pay.39 are dependent on the protection of their superiors at provincial level. A source in Bukavu told Global Witness The relationship between the FARDC and artisanal miners that when one FARDC brigade was due to replace another, takes various forms. Forced labour occurs in some cases; in “they don’t want to leave because of the minerals [...] all others, the miners, who would be working in these the commanders send money back from the minerals to locations anyway, resign themselves to the fact that they the provincial commander in Bukavu. Who is deployed will have to hand over a proportion of what they produce where depends on the personal relationship with the to the military. In some locations, the FARDC may seize a commander of the 10th military region in Bukavu miner’s entire production of minerals, but more typically, [General Pacifique Masunzu]. Those deployed in Mwenga they will take a share, allowing the miner to keep the rest and Shabunda are the favourites of the commander, for as a form of payment. The exploitation is organised along example Nakabaka’s people in Mukungwe [see section on different models: in some mines, a system has been set up

viii In several cases, the bodies of FARDC soldiers have been found among the victims of accidents when mineshafts have collapsed. chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 27

in which particular days of the week are allocated for captains. It’s always the same ones. Some of the working for the soldiers. This is sometimes referred to soldiers are young, 15 or 17 years old. They ask as salongo (a term normally used to describe compulsory for 10% of gold or cassiterite. Whatever community work by the general public). An activist from happens, you have to give it.”41 South Kivu said: “In Shabunda, Mwenga and Kamituga, specific days are designated. For example, every Saturday, Bisie: “a state within a state”42 people go to work in a particular commander’s plot. It is like salongo. It is well-known. The workers are not paid.”40 The most blatant example of FARDC involvement in Other days are dedicated to working for local authorities mining is the Bisie mine, in Walikale, North Kivu. The or traditional chiefs, as some of these civilian officials also largest cassiterite mine in the whole area, it accounts for take a cut of the mineral production. an estimated 80% of cassiterite exports from North Kivu43 and is thought to produce between 800 and 1,000 In many mines under FARDC control, specific mineshafts tonnes a month,44 selling at between US $8.5 and $9 per or areas are known to “belong” to particular provincial or kg at the comptoirs in Goma in mid-2008.45 local military officials (though not through any formal process of allocation). The production from these Cassiterite was discovered in Bisie several years ago, but mineshafts is collected and sold by agents acting on behalf until around 2003, it did not attract much attention as of these FARDC officials. Local miners get to know these the price of tin was low. Mining in Bisie only took off in agents and for whom they are working. The agents, who a significant way in 2004, when the price of tin rose.46 are usually civilians, are often present at the mines to supervise and control production. With a few exceptions, For three years – from 2006 to March 2009 – Bisie was the military “owners” of the mineshafts, especially the entirely under the control of the 85th brigade of the more senior ones, are seldom seen on site. However, they FARDC, headed by Colonel Sammy Matumo, a former sometimes post their soldiers – who may be armed and in uniform – at the mines to ensure that the miners are working for them.

In addition to their direct involvement in mining, FARDC soldiers routinely extort minerals and money from civilians at military checkpoints along the roads. A miner from Shabunda (South Kivu) described five FARDC roadblocks on a road leading from a mine at Kibila to Shabunda town:

“They ask for money: sometimes 1,000 francs, sometimes 1,200 francs, 600 francs or 500 francs [between approximately US $0.90 and 2.20]. Once, in around March 2008, they asked me for 2 kg of cassiterite. I had to give it. When you’re faced with a gun, what can you do, as a simple © Private civilian? At each barrier, there are between four Colonel Sammy Matumo of the 85th brigade of the FARDC, which controlled Bisie cassiterite mine until March 2009. Walikale, and seven military, all well-armed. There are February 2009. 28 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

mai-mai. Unlike other mines under FARDC control, military have exerted on miners to maximise where the military presence is not always easily visible, production, as illustrated by the case below. soldiers of the 85th brigade, including Sammy Matumo himself, were physically present at Bisie. They operated In one of the most serious incidents, several people openly, digging for minerals themselves, with Sammy were killed and many more injured when a mineshaft Matumo personally overseeing the activities.47 An collapsed on 15 November 2007. According to an estimated 200 to 350 military were present at the mine investigation by local government officials, two days in mid-2008.48 before the accident, dangerous conditions had been reported after rocks began falling and two people were As the largest and most productive cassiterite mine in injured. Despite this, the military present at the site the area, Bisie has attracted thousands of civilian miners ordered miners to continue digging and forced them to and other men, women and children in search of work. enter the mineshaft, precipitating a second accident.49 Some people describe it as a big village. Local sources Officials recorded four deaths and 11 injuries, though estimated that in mid-2008, between 10,000 and 15,000 the real number is almost certainly higher, as not all people worked in and around Bisie, some as miners, the bodies were retrieved. The report of the others as transporters, and some trading in other goods investigation notes that two soldiers of the 85th brigade in or around the mine. may have been among the victims and that military uniforms and weapons were found in the mineshaft. As in other mines, health and safety standards are It also states that a FARDC major of the 85th brigade, completely ignored in Bisie, both by the authorities and Major Ilunga, had used his own workers to dig in the by the miners themselves. Accidents are common. The mineshaft. The report complains that Major Ilunga situation has been aggravated by the pressure which the blocked efforts to clear out the debris to try to retrieve © Mark Craemer The “village” where miners have settled above Bisie cassiterite mine, North Kivu, April 2008. chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 29 © Johan Spanner

Porters carrying sacks of cassiterite between Bisie and Njingala, the closest town to the mine, August 2008. They walk a distance of more than 45 km, sometimes spending the night in the bush along the way. the bodies of victims; it alleges that he was trying to stifle minimum of 800 tonnes a month (as indicated above), the truth as to the number of victims and their identities the FARDC based there would have been collecting at (whether civilians or military) and that he hoped to least US $120,000 each month. appropriate the cassiterite contained in the falling rocks.50 In February 2007, the civilian authority, the In addition to controlling the mineral production, the administrateur du territoire, had issued a directive prohibiting FARDC based at Bisie extorted money, goods and other mining in ten of the deepest and most dangerous services from the vast population which has built up mineshafts.51 Despite this, mining had continued in around the mine, including by imposing “taxes” at Bisie these mineshafts, illustrating the incapacity of the itself and at the numerous checkpoints along the road civilian authorities to exercise control over mines run leading to the mine. In 2008, there were at least eight by the military. military checkpoints between Njingala and Bisie. These included two main barriers: one at Njingala – the entrance Different FARDC officials each had “their own” and exit point for Bisie – and one at Bisie itself, and other, mineshafts and workers at Bisie. Soldiers stood outside improvised barriers in between. At each of the first two every mineshaft, taking a cut of all production. The barriers, people were made to hand over 10% of any FARDC sometimes asked the civilian miners which manufactured goods they happened to be carrying; at each mineshafts produced the most minerals, or watched of the following two barriers, they were made to pay 10% of them work to find out which were the most productive; the cassiterite they were carrying.53 A local traditional chief they then moved the miners off and took over by force. estimated that more than 1,000 people went in and out of Some mineshafts can produce up to four tonnes a day, Bisie every day, of whom around 700 or 800 left with with 20 to 30 miners, porters and other workers at each cassiterite; he said that they were made to pay 3,500 one. Throughout 2007 and the first part of 2008, the Congolese francs (around US $6.35) for each bag of FARDC were taking a commission of US $0.15 on every cassiterite at the military checkpoint at Njingala. Every kg of cassiterite traded in Bisie.52 If Bisie produced a evening, the military divided up the money, giving a share 30 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

to some of the civilian authorities.54 People carrying food and drink to Bisie were also “taxed”, usually in kind, and were asked for various sums of money, both on the way in and on the way out.55 In 2008, it was estimated that the military typically collected more than US $100,000 through “taxes” in this way every month.56

Due to the poor condition of the roads, most of the

cassiterite from Bisie is flown out by plane. It is first © Mark Craemer A plane delivers supplies for the population at Bisie; it will return transported from Bisie to Njingala – painful physical loaded with cassiterite. Kilambo, North Kivu, April 2008. labour as porters carry sacks of 50 kg of cassiterite on foot, for one or two days. Children are sometimes used as porters, splitting the 50-kg sacks between two of them.57 The sacks of cassiterite are then loaded on to planes at Kilambo. Kilambo does not even have an airstrip: planes land and take off on the road. In mid-2008, between ten and 20 flights were leaving Kilambo for Goma every day, each carrying up to two tonnes of cassiterite. A man working in Walikale described the airstrip: “There are about 20 return flights a day. The airstrip at Kilambo is nicknamed Roissy Charles de Gaulle [after the airport in Paris]. The military rush around whenever there’s a plane. They don’t let civilians through until the planes have left. The airstrip is completely controlled by FARDC. Bags of cassiterite are spread out on the road… About 80% of the minerals flying out from there are from Bisie. Others are from Kalayi Boeing, another mine also controlled by the 85th brigade, about one and a half to two hours from Bisie.”58 On one occasion in 2007, researchers for a © Mark Craemer Congolese human rights organisation counted as many Sacks of cassiterite from Bisie arrive on a truck to be loaded on to a plane as 32 return flights in one day.59 at Kilambo, North Kivu, April 2008.

Each plane has to pay a tax of around US $200 to the local government of the territoire of Walikale, but only a small proportion of this tax goes to the treasury; the rest is shared between military and civilian officials.60

When Global Witness researchers visited North Kivu in mid-2008, the 85th brigade had not yet been sent to brassage, the process through which previously hostile armed groups are integrated and trained into a unified national army. © Mark Craemer Plane loaded with sacks of cassiterite from Bisie, Kilambo, North Kivu, Global Witness asked General Vainqueur Mayala, the April 2008. chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 31

commander of the 8th military region (which has chain Bindu nor Sammy Matumo had been held to account, he of command responsibility over the 85th brigade), why the argued that if Bindu were arrested, the 85th brigade would 85th brigade had been allowed to remain in control of Bisie. never go to brassage; he claimed that Bindu’s misdeeds were He initially replied: “We have nothing to do with Bisie.” being noted and that the military authorities may take He claimed that strictly speaking, the 85th brigade was not action against him “later”.63 part of the FARDC, as it had not been trained and integrated into the army, “but we can’t fight a war against Etienne Bindu is reportedly involved in mineral them. They started these activities long ago. What they’re exploitation in other parts of Walikale too, as well as other doing is illegal.” He said he was worried about the situation forms of trade.64 A local source described him as more of in Bisie and complained that the 85th brigade was a businessman than an army man.65 undisciplined and refused to obey orders. He claimed that the 85th brigade was about to be moved and that they were Several people interviewed by Global Witness claimed that simply waiting for vehicles to transport them to the brassage the profits from the cassiterite in Bisie, and possibly other centre.61 He did not explain how this situation had been areas, were shared not only with FARDC officials at allowed to prevail for more than two years without anyone provincial level but with senior national military and challenging the brigade’s control of the mine. government officials in the capital, Kinshasa. They pointed the finger, among others, at General GabrielA misi, The explanation may lie in the fact that the status quo in nicknamed “Tango Four”, chief-of-staff of the FARDC Bisie served the interests of the military hierarchy. Several ground forces at the national level and former commander independent sources confirmed to Global Witness that of the 8th military region in North Kivu province. Sammy Colonel Sammy Matumo and the 85th brigade shared the Matumo is reported to be in frequent telephone proceeds from the Bisie mine with senior officers in the communication with Amisi and, more generally, to provincial FARDC command in Goma. In particular, Etienne Bindu, chief-of-staff of the 8th military region and fourth in command in the province of North Kivu, was cited as one of the key individuals behind the 85th brigade’s control of Bisie. A journalist who visited Bisie in 2008 was shown the mineshafts which “belonged” to Bindu, as well as a whole ridge of the mine which had been set aside for military commanders: some of the mineshafts were for Bindu, some for Sammy Matumo, and some for other commanders.62

Bindu, himself a former mai-mai, originally from Walikale, is based in Goma but has often been seen at Bisie. He allegedly not only benefits personally from the cassiterite from Bisie but was instrumental in ensuring that Colonel Sammy Matumo remained in place there. Even a senior FARDC official of the 8th military region confirmed that Bindu had instigated “the mess in Bisie. He manipulates the

85th brigade. It is not a secret.” When Global Witness © Kate Holt A porter carrying a 50 kg bag of cassiterite, Walikale, North Kivu, representatives asked this official why neither Etienne August 2007. 32 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?” © Johann Spanner Open pit at one of the main cassiterite mining sites at Bisie, North Kivu, April 2008. Several thousand artisanal miners work at Bisie.

maintain good relations with the military hierarchy in complained to the military authorities about Colonel Kinshasa.66 A close ally of Amisi, Adjudant Ciza, has Sammy Matumo, several other FARDC and members of been seen at Bisie since around 2006.67 Other Kinshasa- GMB, including Alexis Makabuza, for alleged offences based FARDC officials are also reported to have their including extortion through the imposition of illegal “agents” or “delegates” representing their interests taxes, intimidation, death threats and attempted at Bisie.68 assassination.70 The company alleged that the military and GMB were forcing miners to work like slaves and In 2006, Mining and Processing Congo (MPC), a division concluded that “at the very least GMB and the DRC of South African company Kivu Resources, was granted military were operating together to extort benefit from exploration rights to Bisie by the government in the small scale miners at Bisie. At worst, they were Kinshasa. The company has faced numerous problems directly in control of the majority of the illegal and in carrying out its work in Bisie, ranging from serious inhumane activities on MPC’s property.”71 Eventually, assaults on its staff to a protracted dispute between MPC decided it could not operate in such circumstances; different groups of civilians competing for control of the it suspended its operations at Bisie until law and order mine, each of which has set up a rival cooperative. One were restored in the mine and applied for force majeure.72 of the cooperatives, COMIMPA, is backed by the company Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB), headed by SAESSCAM, the government body responsible for prominent Goma businessman Alexis Makabuza, and overseeing artisanal mining across the DRC, has also has come into conflict with MPC on several occasions.69 been unable to work in Bisie or even set up a presence The control of Bisie by the FARDC presented an there. Its officials have been repeatedly blocked by additional hurdle for MPC, not least because members FARDC soldiers posted at the entrance and exit of the of the 85th brigade, including Colonel Sammy Matumo mine. A SAESSCAM official was assaulted by a soldier at himself, repeatedly threatened MPC staff. MPC formally a military roadblock, and in May 2008, soldiers prevented chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 33

SAESSCAM from carrying out a registration process in practices were particularly common at a cassiterite mine at Bisie to establish a record of the miners working there.73 ix Karhembu and a gold mine at Mufa. In Karhembu, every Thursday’s production is to be handed over to the FARDC In March 2009, the 85th brigade was finally redeployed. responsible for intelligence at provincial level (known as Sammy Matumo was briefly put under house arrest, then T2), while Saturday’s production goes to the local FARDC ordered to leave the area; he was posted to Beni. Global based in Tubimbi. At Mufa, specific commanders, including Witness is not aware that he is facing any charges in the commander based in Tubimbi, have “their own” relation to illegal exploitation of minerals or human rights mineshafts or “drains”. Typically, as in other locations, the abuses committed during his three years in Bisie. The 85th FARDC do not mine themselves but send civilian agents, brigade has been replaced by a newly integrated brigade, sometimes known as managers, to the mines. Through headed by a former CNDP officer and made up in part of these or other intermediaries, the military sell the minerals former CNDP combatants. to négociants (buyers) who come to the mines.76

The provincial FARDC command had previously given its A local source in Tubimbi explained how the system undertaking that the new brigade would not be based in worked: “The commander of the battalion from Mwenga Bisie itself;74 Global Witness has not been able to confirm [the neighbouring territoire] takes his share. The militaire whether this commitment has been respected or whether délégué [the representative of the commander] sells the the new brigade has entered the mine. However, soon minerals locally in Tubimbi and goes once a month to after their deployment in March 2009, there were reports hand over the money to the military chief in Mwenga. that soldiers of the new brigade had taken over some of The managers go to the mines. They buy small quantities the checkpoints and were already taxing miners.75 of gold or cassiterite, collect it and sell it to big buyers in Bukavu. Some of the managers are local; others are from Mineral exploitation by elsewhere. The military tell me this themselves.”77 the FARDC in other areas In mid-July 2008, an incident occurred in Tubimbi in which Global Witness gathered information about FARDC two groups of FARDC clashed, apparently over control of involvement in mining in many other locations in North a cassiterite mine. A few days later, the commander of the and South Kivu. Unlike the 85th brigade at Bisie, most of battalion went to the site, ostensibly to resolve the dispute. these military units have been through the brassage process, “On that day,” a local source told Global Witness, “the have undergone training and have been integrated into the commander himself asked for that day’s production of national army. cassiterite to be given to him. Then the situation calmed down. These disagreements are not in their interests.”78 Tubimbi Global Witness raised these allegations with Captain Musa Military from the 12th integrated battalion of the FARDC Kyabele Freddy, commander of the 2nd company of the have been systematically exploiting cassiterite and gold and 12th integrated FARDC battalion, based in Tubimbi. extorting money and minerals from the local population in Captain Musa was cited by several local sources as being Tubimbi, located in the territoire of Walungu (South Kivu). personally involved in the mineral exploitation in the Residents of Tubimbi told Global Witness that these area.79 He denied categorically that he or any other

ixThe 2007 Annual Report of the Division des Mines for North Kivu states that SAESSCAM has been unable to establish a presence in Bisie “due to multiple blockages on the part of military and certain politico-administrative authorities”. 34 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?” © Global Witness The village of Tubimbi, South Kivu, where FARDC soldiers have been exploiting gold and cassiterite.

FARDC were involved in mineral exploitation in the ownership was in dispute. One of the most striking three months that he had been in post in Tubimbi, examples is that of a gold mining area known as Maroc, stating: “Soldiers never mine [...] It is not possible [...] in Mukungwe, in the groupement of Mushinga, territoire of The problem of military exploiting mines doesn’t exist Walungu (South Kivu).82 Composed of two large hills any more [...] The military have good relations with the known as Kalanga and Kalazi, Mukungwe has a total of population. I’ve never had any complaints.” He denied 28 mineshafts. The current level of production of the any knowledge of the July 2008 clashes between two mines is not confirmed, but in around 2006-2007, the groups of soldiers at Tubimbi.80 total production from Kalazi was bringing in about US $2,000 a day and production from Kalanga at least US Global Witness also raised the case of Tubimbi with the $5,000 a day.83 FARDC commander of the 10th military region in Bukavu, General Pacifique Masunzu. He said he was not Two groups of civilians, broadly affiliated with two informed about the case and had not received any local families, the Kurhengamuzimu and Chunu complaints about the military in Tubimbi.81 families,x were involved in a dispute over the rights to the gold mine. The Chunu family won a court case Mukungwe asserting its ownership rights in the area, but in 2006, the Kurhengamuzimu family obtained an exploration In a number of locations, military called in to defuse permit from the Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa, in the tensions between groups of civilians have ended up name of SAMIKI, a company it had created for this taking over the very mines over which control or purpose. The dispute then escalated into violent

xSome sources also referred to the Rubango family, claiming that it had replaced the Chunu family in the area and was effectively acting on its behalf. chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 35

confrontations, both sides reportedly using demobilised very, very careful,” the letter instructs the commander or dissident fighters, including former members of the to allow civilians to mine there, not to let the military go armed group known as Mudundu 40.xi into the mines, but to collect a percentage of mineral production for the 10th military region. This letter, as well The FARDC were called to restore order and were as other correspondence relating to Mukungwe, is also deployed to Mukungwe in mid-March 2008.84 xii The quoted in a letter by a police officer addressed to the soldiers then proceeded to take over the mine and start commander of the 10th military region,89 denouncing mining themselves. Local researchers who visited the area the behaviour of the FARDC in Mukungwe.90 reported seeing representatives of five different military groups at the mine, in military uniform.85 In June 2008, One of the FARDC names cited most often in connection the tension between the two families culminated in with mineral exploitation in Mukungwe was that of violent clashes, resulting in at least one death and one Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, deputy commander of the serious injury, widespread destruction, looting of property 10th military region, based in Bukavu. Colonel Nakabaka and burning of houses; it is alleged that soldiers were was allegedly seen at the mine, in the company of the present when the worst episode of violence occurred, on soldiers who were initially sent there to restore order. Just 26 June.86 In July, military reinforcements were sent from before the violent clashes in June 2008, he reportedly sent the 12th integrated battalion, based in Mwenga, on the two FARDC soldiers to oversee the mining and represent orders of the 10th military region in Bukavu. The his interests at the mine; one of them, Lieutenant Eric reinforcements included soldiers from the 2nd company Mudemi, was mentioned by several people as often present of Captain Musa Kyabele Freddy – the same company in Mukungwe.91 Local sources mentioned the names of reported to be involved in mineral exploitation in Tubimbi several other FARDC military, of various ranks, who (see above).87 allegedly “owned” mineshafts at Mukungwe, sent representatives there to act on their behalf and made large By August 2008, the violence at Mukungwe had stopped profits from the gold trade.92 but the situation remained tense. In early 2009, the FARDC were still in control of the mine. Global Witness representatives met Colonel Nakabaka, along with his superior, the commander of the 10th Local sources, including activists who investigated the case, military region, General Pacifique Masunzu, and raised stated that senior FARDC provincial-level officials from the case of Mukungwe. Colonel Nakabaka himself did the 10th military region were involved in gold mining at not comment or respond. General Masunzu denied that Mukungwe. One of them told Global Witness that there the FARDC were involved in mineral exploitation in was even a mineshaft nicknamed “10th military region”, Mukungwe – or, for that matter, anywhere else – and which, he said, no one else could touch.88 Global Witness stated that soldiers had been sent there solely to end the has a copy of a letter dated 19 March 2008, signed by a fighting between the two families.93 FARDC captain responsible for intelligence for the 10th military region, addressed to the FARDC commander The gold mine at Mukungwe is located in a concession to based in Mukungwe. Beginning with the sentence “There which the Canadian company Banro has exploration is too much noise coming from Mukungwe (Maroc), be rights. Inevitably, Banro has been dragged into the xiMudundu 40 is a militia group associated with the mai-mai and primarily made up of members of the Bashi ethnic group. xiiGlobal Witness received contradictory information about whether the FARDC sided with one side or the other in the dispute. The Kurhengamuzimu family accused the FARDC of acting on behalf of the Rubango family and filed a formal complaint with the provincial and national authorities to this effect. However, an NGO source told Global Witness that the FARDC helped whichever side asked them to and that both families manipulated the FARDC by paying them. 36 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

dispute, and each side has accused Banro of supporting the other. When Global Witness met Banro’s representatives in Bukavu in August 2008, they claimed to be handling the situation in an even-handed way and trying to resolve the conflict peacefully. The provincial government had become involved and organised a number of meetings and visits to the site; Banro said it would resume activities if the government could guarantee a return to order.94

Lemera

The FARDC have been heavily involved in cassiterite mining in and around the town of Lemera, in South Kivu.

Among the names cited to Global Witness in this © Global Witness Entrance to a makeshift tunnel for digging cassiterite, on the road connection in 2008 was that of Colonel Biau Futi, outside Lemera, South Kivu, August 2007. nicknamed “Magie”. Based in Lemera since 2007, Colonel Magie was reportedly taking a proportion of the cassiterite The response of the FARDC from each tunnel at the main cassiterite mine at Lemera. One local source told Global Witness: “He gives his bag to The involvement of the FARDC in the exploitation and a military there who gives it to the miners. The colonel’s trade of minerals is in direct contravention of Congolese bag goes down as soon as a tunnel starts producing. Magie legislation, in particular the Mining Code, which prohibits personally goes to the mine every day. I’ve seen him members of the armed forces from trading in minerals.98 several times. People have accepted this as normal, but it’s The FARDC officials whom Global Witness interviewed, collected by force. He takes a share of every production. including the provincial commanders of North and South They sell it in Lemera.”95 Another said he had seen Kivu, did not attempt to justify this behaviour. On the Colonel Magie visiting the mine in late 2007: “Magie used contrary, they denied it and claimed that if it were to to come to the mine with his jeep and ask the president of occur, or in the few cases where it did occur, those the committee in charge of the mine to give him responsible would be brought to justice. cassiterite, and they would give him two or three bags [...] I have seen four military in the mine, in military uniform. Despite overwhelming evidence of the impunity which The military don’t dig themselves but go down into protects the FARDC, the commander of the 8th military the holes to ask for minerals.”96 During 2007, FARDC region in North Kivu, General Vainqueur Mayala, claimed soldiers often stole minerals from the mine at Lemera, that there were “many FARDC soldiers in prison, and there were sometimes clashes between soldiers and including for the illegal exploitation of natural resources”. civilians when soldiers tried to seize cassiterite which the He said that the military prosecutor’s office was civilians had produced.97 investigating the involvement of high level military in mining and stated: “We cannot accept that officers are Lemera is also a centre where minerals from other involved in mining”.99 He and his deputy provided locations are traded. Many minerals bought and sold information on the case of a senior officer, Lieutenant there are produced not by the FARDC but by the FDLR, Colonel Mawa Hans Andomba, who was suspended on 29 notably from the Itombwe forest (see section 6). July 2008, on the orders of General Mayala, after his vehicle chapter 5: the congolese army’s involvement in the exploitation of minerals 37

was intercepted carrying around 700 kg of cassiterite. The told how on one occasion, in August 2008, he and other military disciplinary council concluded that he had used officials stopped a truck carrying ten tonnes of cassiterite military vehicles abusively for private ends and had taken at the road toll at Baraka because it did not have the part in commercial activities which were not allowed necessary paperwork: “We stopped it because it didn’t within the FARDC and were incompatible with his have the right documents for South Kivu. Then the 10th responsibilities as an officer.100 The case was transferred to military region called us and told us to let it through. the chief-of-staff of the army in Kinshasa, who had to They intimidated us. The general of the 10th region called decide whether to refer it to the military justice system. the Bureau 2 (security agents) and ordered them to let the Three other military, including the driver of the vehicle truck through to Bukavu. He said ‘do this, do that’. I was which was transporting the cassiterite and other members obliged to let it through.”102 of his escort, were let off on the basis that they were just executing orders.101 Global Witness was informed of a small number of cases where the military responsible for trading in minerals, or This is one of the very few cases where action has been more often the lower-ranking soldiers acting on their taken against a senior FARDC officer for illegal mining or behalf, were arrested, but released within a short time, mineral trading activities. Global Witness has not been able again on the orders of their superiors, and no charges to confirm whether it resulted in prosecution. In a brought. However, in the vast majority of instances, no number of other cases, bags of minerals belonging to action whatsoever is taken against FARDC soldiers and FARDC officials, or transported in their vehicles, have their commanders involved in trading in minerals. been intercepted, but released following interventions by Global Witness is not aware of any case where a FARDC more senior members of the military hierarchy. In a official has been successfully prosecuted for the illegal typical example, a local official of the Division des Mines exploitation or trade in minerals in North or South Kivu. © Mark Craemer Extortion by FARDC soldiers is rampant. Bisie cassiterite mine, North Kivu, April 2008. 6 The FDLR: “les grands commerçants”

“They don’t want to leave because of the natural wealth. They are like bees swarming on honey. They prefer to die there.” Resident of Bukavu, 26 July 2008 © Finbarr O’Reilly/Reuters/Corbis FDLR fighter stands lookout in the bush near the village of Mikingiro Kasum, about 9 km from the town of Pinga, North Kivu, February 2009.

The FDLR’s stranglehold on the mineral trade in parts of South Kivu proved to be irresistible. As time went on, the eastern DRC, particularly in South Kivu, provides a FDLR’s economic activities became increasingly important, textbook example of the consequences of allowing an and the profits increasingly significant. The UN Group of armed group to exploit natural resources unchallenged Experts estimated that the FDLR were making profits over a prolonged period. A human rights activist from “possibly worth millions of dollars a year from the trade Walungu (South Kivu) told Global Witness: “The of minerals” and described the minerals business as “a Congolese can’t set up business in competition with the high priority for FDLR”.104 FDLR. They may just sell minerals which belong to the FDLR. The FDLR are becoming very rich. They have been Thanks to these profits, the FDLR have set up efficient and sitting on these minerals for 14 years.”103 extensive business networks and are able to obtain many other supplies, including weapons, without difficulty. In Although the exploitation of natural resources was not the some areas, they have also set up political, economic and main raison d’être of the FDLR when it was first formed, the social structures and administration, including, for opportunities which presented themselves in North and example, their own parallel justice system.105 In some cases, chapter 6: The FDLR: “les grands commerçants” 39

the FDLR live and work alongside the Congolese captain going to the market at Rusamambo, in groupement population (there are inter-marriages between the FDLR Ikobo, with large milk tins filled with gold.108 and Congolese civilians) – a relationship on which they depend for their economic survival; in other cases, their The FDLR go to great lengths to buy and sell goods, often structures and modes of operation remain quite separate. travelling for several days on foot from the forested areas The FDLR have become so well-established in some where they live to reach the nearest trading centre. In locations that the local population treats them as if they South Kivu, they have bases in several locations. Among were state authorities, but in an atmosphere of fear, as the these are the Itombwe forest, in the territoire of Mwenga; FDLR imposed itself through violence and extreme parts of the area known as the Moyen Plateau, near brutality. For example, in the context of a dispute between Minembwe, in the territoire of Fizi; the areas around Lulingu two traditional leaders over rights to exploit newly and Nzovu, in Shabunda; and the western and northern discovered cassiterite at Lwindi, in Mwenga, one of the parts of the Kahuzi Biega Park. A young Rwandan man, traditional chiefs reportedly approached the FDLR and believed to be a FDLR member, told Global Witness that asked for their “protection and support” (against potential he, together with a number of people he described as rivals) in exchange for half the mineral production.106 This traders, had walked for four days from Kitopo, in the mirrors the way communities approach the FARDC for Itombwe forest, where he lived, to the town of Lemera to support, in exchange for a cut of mineral production, in try to sell 40 kg of cassiterite. Another, who had made the areas under government control. same journey, said he had 300 kg of cassiterite “stocked somewhere else”. They were expecting to sell their In South Kivu, the FDLR’s trading activity appears to have cassiterite at Lemera for US $7.5 a kg.109 become an end in itself, and minerals form the backbone of that activity. The FDLR have become very well- A local researcher described how the FDLR travelled and entrenched in parts of the territoires of Shabunda, Mwenga, traded in parts of South Kivu: Walungu, Uvira and Fizi – all of which contain gold or cassiterite mines – and have tended to settle in areas which “Towards Mwenga and Kamituga, you see are rich in minerals. As an illustration, one source FDLR with their families and children. I have explained that in the local area known as the collectivité- seen them: the men are armed and move like chefferie of Burhinyi (in Walungu), the FDLR controlled a column. At the market, the men stay one km nine out of 18 groupements, all in Bas-Burhinyi; these include outside and send their families in. The FDLR areas rich in minerals, forests and agricultural land. The have agreed with the FARDC not to enter the FDLR sell their products in the nearby markets.107 market with arms. Women go into the market, buy and sell things including minerals, then go Many Congolese interviewed by Global Witness described back to the men and they all go back into the the FDLR as “les grands commerçants” (the big businessmen). forest together. Some women are in uniforms. They conduct their business openly, unchallenged, Occasionally the men go into the markets but wandering around in towns and villages with or without without arms. their arms. For example, Global Witness researchers saw and spoke to FDLR members selling cassiterite in Lemera, The big markets have become big meeting a small market town in South Kivu, in August 2008. places. The FDLR order things, send a column Similar patterns are observed in North Kivu, especially in of people to go and buy them and return to the Walikale. A member of an NGO from Walikale told Global forest. I have seen this in Kasika. They walk Witness that in December 2006, he had seen a FDLR from the forest for about six hours – groups of 40 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

about 20 people with about four armed men the part of the civilian population which has effectively in front, behind and in the middle. They have been taken hostage. According to a member of a local AK-47s, guns, rocket-launchers, chains of NGO, “if a mine is discovered by the population, the FDLR bullets and submachine-guns. In Mwenga come and take it over [...] No one can stop them. People just and Kasika, I saw six or seven groups, each observe.”112 The threat of violence always looms large over with about 20 people, and even more before the relationship between the FDLR and Congolese civilians; and after. one activist said “people simply can’t refuse to work for them”.113 Eventually, in some locations, the population has They use the local population to support them, reached an uneasy form of cohabitation with the FDLR, to collect their loot and ensure transport, though privately they express frustration and resentment. accompanied by one or two FDLR soldiers. In Kisimba nord, in Walikale (North Kivu), in a gold mine They go through FARDC barriers without any known as “mali mingi” (“lots of wealth”), the FDLR pay the problems.”110 miners to dig for them but give them a deadline by which they are expected to produce a certain amount. “If they Like the FARDC, the FDLR use the local population to don’t deliver the gold by that date, they have problems.”114 dig and work for them. They rarely dig in the mines They also sometimes use civilians as porters to carry themselves. A man believed to be an FDLR member told minerals from one site to another – a practice used, for Global Witness: “The Hutu don’t exploit. The Bashi and example, in the village of Lutika, 180 km north-east of Babembe [two other Congolese ethnic groups] exploit and Shabunda, where Congolese porters bring out wolframite, the Hutu buy.”111 gold and cassiterite produced by the FDLR.115

As with the FARDC, there are instances of forced labour by In many locations, the imposition of “taxes” has taken the the FDLR, as well as a more passive form of cooperation on place of forced labour. In Kalehe and Mwenga, the FDLR © Finbarr O’Reilly/Reuters/Corbis FDLR fighter in the forest near the village of Mikingiro Kasum, about 9 km from the town of Pinga, North Kivu, February 2009. chapter 6: The FDLR: “les grands commerçants” 41

charge miners a flat fee of 30% on mining proceeds in intermediaries buy other goods for the FDLR from towns exchange for “protection and support”.116 In Shabunda, such as Bukavu with the money made from the sales of the FDLR were collecting 2 kg of coltan or cassiterite every minerals. Sometimes they are literally given a shopping week from each mining site (there are at least 250 mining list. One source told Global Witness: “The FDLR relay sites in the FDLR-controlled areas of Shabunda)117 and a through Congolese. The Congolese transport the minerals minimum of one gramme of gold (or its equivalent) from from the forests and sell them to exporters. They then take each mineshaft (each mining site has several mineshafts).118 other goods back to supply the FDLR in the forests. When In other parts of Shabunda, the FDLR were collecting the FDLR sell cassiterite, they specify what they want in “taxes” in cash: US $1 for every 30 kg of cassiterite. The exchange.”123 According to another source, these money quickly adds up: for example, in 2008, there were at intermediaries’ families are kept under close watch to least seven FDLR roadblocks on the road from Kigulube to make sure that the intermediaries return and do not run Bukavu, passing through Walungu.119 A UN source off with the money from the mineral sales.124 estimated that between Shabunda and Bukavu, there were 14 barriers, around nine of which were controlled by the In the southern part of South Kivu – for example the areas FDLR and around five by the AF RDC. People travelling around Minembwe in the territoire of Fizi – the FDLR, as along this road each had to pay a total of about US $20 for well as some mai-mai and smaller armed groups, have been every journey.120 able to control mines with even less interference than elsewhere. Parts of this region are remote and heavily A miner from Shabunda was regularly subjected to forested, making access and oversight very difficult. The extortion at FDLR roadblocks as he made the 340-km trek main mineral found in these areas is gold; there are also from Shabunda to Bukavu on foot: “It took me one week. some cassiterite and coltan deposits and precious stones. It is dangerous. There are Hutu military [FDLR] on the road at Kigulube, Mitala, Nyalubemba, Lubimbe, Kishatu, With bases in Kilembwe and Kingizi, the FDLR have a Chulwe, Kisuku. There are 12 barriers on the roads from near-monopoly on gold mining in this area. Kingizi, in Shabunda, all controlled by Hutu. They ask for money particular, is a strategically important base which they use [different amounts]. The total is US $40. They are well- to stock up on minerals, food and other goods and supply armed [...] We are their meat, their animals. We have their troops in other locations. Local residents sometimes nothing to say.”121 see them carrying these goods on foot to their command post at Kilembwe.125 At the local level, the FDLR often sell the minerals themselves, sometimes at the mines, sometimes in nearby A mineral trader from Fizi told Global Witness: locations. Once the minerals reach the larger towns, they are usually handled by Congolese civilians acting or “The FDLR buy minerals at the mines. I’ve seen trading on their behalf. The ranks of the FDLR are them often, for example at Make Makilu, primarily made up of Rwandans, but they depend heavily Kachoka, Ndolo and Kitumba, towards Nganja on the Congolese population for their business dealings. Milima. We know them. They wander around These intermediaries, described by an activist as “the with arms. They tie their guns to their bicycles. economic axis of the FDLR”,122 are an important link in the They buy gold especially. They take it on chain. The system is highly organised. Although there are motorised wooden boats across the lake. occasions when members of the FDLR are seen openly trading minerals, the more substantial sales are conducted Kingizi is their base, on the shore. They can cross through their Congolese intermediaries. These easily and go in and out. They have a short-cut 42 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

from there to the mines, without going in, the FDLR have become increasingly violent, killing through the towns. They buy fish and take and raping civilians in a bid to hold on to their territory.129 it to the mines where they sell it and buy minerals in exchange. They are big traders The FDLR have categorically rejected all allegations that and buyers.”126 they are involved in the mineral trade. The commander of an FDLR brigade in South Kivu told Global Witness: The minerals exploited in this area are exported by road “No FDLR military can go into the mines or do business or by lake to Burundi or across Lake Tanganyika into […] We are only involved in agricultural activities […] It is Tanzania, on canoes or small motorised boats. A number totally false that the FDLR are involved in mining in this of gold traders based in the town of Uvira sell their gold to area. All we do is buy things like soap […] We are just buyers in the Burundian capital, Bujumbura. passing through. We don’t control territory.”130 Reacting to Global Witness’s press release of 10 September 2008, While the FDLR dominance of the mining trade is which denounced the FDLR’s extensive involvement in stronger in South Kivu, they also control mining areas mining, the FDLR issued a statement claiming: “We do and trade routes in North Kivu, for example in parts of not need to get involved in activities or exploitation or Walikale. A provincial government official estimated that traffic of gold to attain our noble objective, the liberation around 60% of cassiterite production in the territoire of of our country.”131 Likewise, in a response to the report of Walikale was produced, directly or indirectly, by the the Group of Experts, they stated: “The FDLR have never FDLR. He described them as “strong and better organised financed their activities with revenues from any illegal than the local population”.127 The FDLR’s presence in trade of mining resources of the DRC.”132 North Kivu is also important for maximising its profits from mineral production in South Kivu. There are many commercial links between the two provinces and some of the minerals produced by the FDLR in South Kivu are sold to comptoirs in Goma, in North Kivu, and exported from there.

Overall, the FDLR’s control of the mineral trade in large swathes of both provinces has presented a significant challenge to initiatives to dislodge them. Having established long-term economic bases, they are extremely reluctant to move away from these locations. At different times, the FDLR have apparently foreseen and anticipated operations planned against them. A source in Bukavu told Global Witness: “When the Nairobi and Goma accords were signed [in November 2007 and January 2008], the FDLR here reorganised and retrained and intensified their supplies. Their headquarters are mobile.”128 More recently, since January 2009, one of the FDLR’s responses to the Rwandan and Congolese joint military operation against them has been to turn against the local civilian © SIPA Press/Rex Features © SIPA population, accusing them of betrayal. As they have dug FDLR fighter at Kilungutwe, South Kivu, August 2009. The relationship between the FDLR and the FARDC 7

“The collaboration is quasi-official.” Human rights activist, Goma, 8 August 2008

Although the FARDC have been deployed to areas where identifying with their demands, in particular for political the FDLR operate, their presence has not had any effect in dialogue with the Rwandan government. One senior curbing the FDLR’s exploitation of minerals or other FARDC official, speaking in a personal capacity, told Global activities. On the contrary, through mutual agreement, Witness: “They [the FDLR] just want guarantees of security the FARDC and the FDLR have operated side by side, [...] You have to get to know them and get to know their granting each other freedom of movement through each reality here [...] The FDLR survive from natural resources other’s territories and allowing each other to trade because they have no money or help. God did this – made without interference. for them to be in an area where there are natural resources. Otherwise [...] people would have died.”134 The relationship between the FDLR and the FARDC is rooted in the earlier years of the war, when the two Congolese civilians interviewed by Global Witness in groups collaborated against a common enemy: Rwanda. North and South Kivu described a happy co-existence The FDLR, allied with the Congolese national army, between the FARDC and the FDLR in certain areas. For fought Rwandan troops and their allies, the RCD-Goma. example, one man said that the FDLR and FARDC were The RCD seized control of large parts of eastern DRC sometimes seen fraternising in a market at Birhala, in from 1998 and remained in a position of power in the Haut-Burhinyi (Walungu, South Kivu), an area nominally Kivus until it eventually joined the transitional under FARDC control.135 In parts of North Kivu, the government in 2003. Following the demise of the RCD, system is slightly more formalised, with the FDLR and the which suffered a heavy defeat in the 2006 elections, a new FARDC having to obtain advance permission to travel Tutsi-dominated rebel movement was formed, the CNDP, into each other’s areas. The FDLR then use roads some of whose leaders had previously been members or controlled by the FARDC, and vice versa, without sympathisers of the RCD. In particular, Laurent Nkunda, difficulty. H owever, this apparent harmony between the the CNDP’s leader until January 2009, had a long history two groups can be misleading: many Congolese civilians, of fighting alongside the Rwandan army and with the including local authorities and community leaders, RCD. Many among the senior ranks of the FARDC describe a brutal forced cohabitation with the FDLR, in therefore still feel sympathy for the FDLR, despite their which they have no choice but to submit to the FDLR’s history of extreme violence in both Congo and Rwanda. military and administrative control. There are frequent reports that members of the FARDC supply the FDLR with arms, ammunition and uniforms.133 A human rights activist explained that the proximity of the relationship between the FDLR and the FARDC Global Witness researchers met senior FARDC sometimes depended on external developments: “In commanders who did not attempt to conceal these North Kivu, the FARDC and FDLR are sometimes close, sympathies. They used the term “we” when referring to sometimes separate. But they don’t attack each other. the FDLR, describing them as “our brothers” and Where both are present, they share the spoils and both 44 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

extort from the population. When there is a Rwandan highly beneficial for both parties. Some sources allege or CNDP presence, they get closer together.”136 a more active form of collaboration; for example, Global Witness was informed that the FDLR sometimes give These dynamics may change in 2009 following the joint money to FARDC officers to buy cassiterite in Walikale Congolese and Rwandan military operation to dislodge and sell it in Goma.139 There are also frequent reports of the FDLR. At the time of writing, it is too early to assess FARDC and FDLR dividing up the “taxes” they collect the lasting impact of this operation – a new from the civilian population at roadblocks. Along some collaboration between two armies which have been roads in South Kivu, there may be successive FDLR and sworn enemies for more than ten years. The joint FARDC roadblocks. According to a source from operation could have tested the resolve of the FARDC to Shabunda, in some locations, the FDLR and the FARDC tackle the presence of the FDLR; in practice, it appears are both present at the same roadblock; this was the that the FARDC left most of the implementation of the case, for example, at Nyalubemba, a location where operation to the better-trained and better-motivated minerals are traded, about 100km from Bukavu.140 Rwandan forces. A researcher explained the arrangements between In the second half of 2008, local sources reported that the FARDC and the FDLR in strategic locations in the FARDC rarely challenged the FDLR, and that if the territoire of Shabunda: anything, the FDLR had the upper hand in terms of military strength. It is an uneven balance of power, as “The groupement Bamuguba Sud used to be despite foreign training and attempted reform entirely controlled by the FDLR, from the programmes, the FARDC remains a disorganised and border with Walungu territoire. Since the end of ill-disciplined army. An NGO representative in Goma 2007, the FARDC have been deployed there. told Global Witness: “Around Walikale, the FDLR are in The headquarters of the FARDC is Kigulube, control even when the FARDC are there. They are a big mining centre. The aerodrome is at stronger and more numerous than the FARDC. They Nzovu, another mining centre […] Yet the are experienced soldiers, much more experienced than FDLR are still there too. They have divided up the mai-mai or the FARDC. They are masters of the the zones. They have contact with each other. place.”137 A similar situation prevailed in South Kivu. More than 70% of zones in this area are A source in Bukavu described seeing a group of around controlled by the FDLR. FARDC have to go 20 or 30 FDLR, wearing new FARDC uniforms, carrying through FDLR areas. They negotiate with new weapons, radios and other equipment. Soldiers each other. They agree not to attack each from a nearby FARDC camp said that they had seen other. They respect each other’s zones. They the FDLR column, but had not reacted as they had each administer their own zones and collect not received orders to do anything about it; and that ‘taxes’. In this groupement, it is mostly cassiterite, anyway, they had neither the transport nor other especially in Nzovu and Kigulube [...] means to block an armed FDLR battalion.138 Before 2007, all the centres were controlled by It is not clear to what extent the FDLR and the FARDC the FDLR. When the FARDC came, they systematically share the proceeds of mining. Overall, it agreed that the FDLR would liberate the appears that they each exploit the mines in the areas commercial centres. These came under the they control, independently of each other but with control of the FARDC but other areas are still mutual consent – an arrangement which has proved under the control of the FDLR.”141 chapter 7: The relationship between the FDLR and the FARDC 45 © Kate Holt FARDC soldiers at an army post 12 km north of Goma, November 2008. © SIPA Press/Rex Features © SIPA FDLR members at their camp in Kilungutwe, South Kivu, August 2007. 46 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

The situation in Shabunda illustrates the extent of airport. They use civilians to export their collaboration between the FARDC and the FDLR. The minerals for them, using civilian names. FDLR control large parts of Shabunda and the mineral The commanders are big traders but they production there. In order to transport their minerals don’t show themselves. Their wives or out of Shabunda, they are dependent on the cooperation commissionnaires sell it and travel for them. of the FARDC, who control the local airports. Thus Commanders feel lucky to be posted there. minerals produced and sold by the FDLR are All fines, bribes, etc are paid in cassiterite.”147 accompanied to the planes by FARDC soldiers; from the local airstrips in Shabunda, the minerals are then flown Officially, the AF RDC, and the Congolese government, to Bukavu or Goma.142 Although the airstrips are under deny collaborating with the FDLR. The commander of FARDC control, a miner from Shabunda reported seeing the 10th military region in Bukavu, General Pacifique some FDLR members at Nzovu airstrip in early 2008.143 Masunzu, told Global Witness: “There are no places Another local source reported that in 2007, a FARDC where the FDLR and FARDC are together [...] It is not colonel used to personally take the FDLR’s cargo to true that the FDLR and FARDC have relations or share Lulingu aerodrome.144 minerals. We are not allowed to collaborate with foreign armed groups. There are directives from our hierarchy. The collaboration between the FARDC and the FDLR We respect them at the level of our units. There is no case is particularly significant at Lulingu, one of the main of military collaboration with the FDLR.” He confirmed aerodromes from which minerals produced by the FDLR that FARDC military were present at Shabunda, Lulingu are flown out to Bukavu or Goma.xiii The Group of and Nzovu airports “for security” but denied that the Experts reported that more than 90% of minerals arriving FDLR sent their goods out through Shabunda or came to at the airstrip at Lulingu come from FDLR-controlled the airports themselves. 148 areas.145 The FDLR regularly sell their minerals to traders in Lulingu, apparently in full view of local civilian and The FDLR have also vehemently denied any form of military authorities, without anyone challenging them.146 collaboration with the FARDC.149

The FARDC based at Lulingu profit directly, both from In practical terms, the close ties felt by many FARDC their own trade and that of the FDLR. A local researcher towards the FDLR pose a serious challenge for the told Global Witness: broader strategy to disarm and disband the FDLR. In November 2007, as a result of the Nairobi agreement “Minerals leave from there [Lulingu] in big signed between the Congolese and Rwandan quantities. The centre is built on cassiterite. governments, MONUC developed plans to work It is controlled by FARDC. Minerals go out by alongside the FARDC in a series of joint operations plane from Lulingu to either Kavumu against the FDLR. One of the elements of this strategy (Bukavu) or Goma. They use Antonovs or was to take steps to cut off the FDLR’s economic bases, other planes. They go out with cassiterite and including by reducing the FDLR’s ability to control mines come back with oil. The airport is controlled in four designated areas – two in North Kivu and two in by FARDC for ‘official’ traffic. State agents are South Kivu. The FARDC, with MONUC support, were there and tax it. The FARDC don’t tax at the also supposed to search aircraft and deploy in markets,

xiiiThere are eight airstrips in Shabunda. The main ones are Lulingu, Shabunda, and Nzovu. The others, which are apparently used less regularly, are Mulungu, Kama, Nyalukungu, Katanti and Kachungu. chapter 7: The relationship between the FDLR and the FARDC 47

trading centres and trafficking routes.150 However, when Rwanda and Congo launched their own joint military Global Witness met MONUC military officials in Goma in operation against the FDLR in North Kivu, in which July and August 2008, just before this phase of the MONUC was not directly involved.154 The Rwandan operation was scheduled to begin, it was apparent that the troops officially withdrew at the end of February 2009, impact of the relationship between the FDLR and the with Rwandan and Congolese officials declaring “success” FARDC on these plans had not yet been addressed.151 Yet in breaking some of the key FDLR command structures.155 senior MONUC personnel were clearly aware of the challenge it would pose. One MONUC official told In February 2009, the Congolese government announced Global Witness: “There is informal, unofficial collusion that further FARDC operations against the FDLR, with between FARDC and FDLR. It is not necessarily MONUC support, were planned for South Kivu.156 The structural. The government denies it but we see it. There status of these operations remained unclear for several are local relationships but also at some senior levels. This weeks. Eventually, on 28 April, Minister of Defence makes it difficult for our operations as the AF RDC are not Charles Mwando Nsimba announced publicly that the necessarily committed.”152 operation would be launched around ten days later and would last three months.157 In the meantime, the March This phase of MONUC’s operations was due to begin in 2009 report of the UN Secretary-General had noted that September 2008, but was delayed by the resurgence of “the continued presence of the FDLR in key areas fighting in North Kivu between the CNDP and the remained a source of concern [...] FDLR elements are FARDC. Ten FARDC battalions which were supposed to present in Mwenga territory [South Kivu] and control be deployed in operations against the FDLR were diverted the area both militarily and economically. The FDLR to fight the CNDP.153 MONUC was planning to resume also controls the mines and collects ‘taxes’ from civilians these operations in December 2008, but in January 2009, in the territory.”158 © Finbarr O’Reilly/Reuters/Corbis Rwandan soldiers prior to their withdrawal from North Kivu, February 2009. Other armed groups involved 8 in the mineral trade © Kate Holt Scores of civilians were killed by the CNDP and the mai-mai during fighting in Kiwanja, North Kivu, November 2008.

The CNDP The CNDP controls some areas where mineral deposits are found. These include a coltan mine The CNDP has not relied as heavily on the mineral at Bibatama, for which Senator Edouard trade as the FDLR, as the territories under its Mwangachuchu holds the mining rights, through his control, in North Kivu, tend to contain fewer large company Mwangachuchu Hizi International (MHI); deposits of minerals. Primarily for this reason, a wolframite mine at Bishasha; and cassiterite Global Witness did not carry out detailed first-hand deposits in other locations.159 investigations into the CNDP’s involvement in the mineral trade and did not visit areas under its Like other armed groups, the CNDP has relied on control. However, several sources provided the civilian population to dig for minerals and taken information to Global Witness on the CNDP’s a proportion of the production. More significantly, operations and activities and described ways in which CNDP troops have found other ways of cashing in it benefited from the mineral trade, in particular on the mineral trade, through extortion and the through an efficient system of “taxation”. imposition of “taxes” – which they collect in cash or chapter 8: Other armed groups involved in the mineral trade 49

in kind – along the roads, at checkpoints and at traditional chiefs who “own” certain mines, border crossings. A particularly lucrative source ensuring that each profit from the production of revenue for the CNDP has been the crossing of artisanal miners. at Bunagana, at the DRC-Uganda border.160 CNDP troops have also been involved in the charcoal trade The FRF from the Virunga national park and collect significant sums from “taxing” it.161 Global Witness received reports that the FRF, a Tutsi armed group active in the southern part of South Kivu, The CNDP has derived most of its support from in the area known as the Haut Plateau near Rwanda and from other Tutsi individuals in the Minembwe, is present in some gold mining areas DRC, in Rwanda and elsewhere in the diaspora.162 It has also enjoyed political and financial backing from businesses in these and other locations. A number of businessmen voluntarily donate to the CNDP; they reportedly include individuals or companies active in the mineral trade.163

At the time of writing, CNDP troops are going through a process of integration into the FARDC. There is a strong likelihood that they will continue to exploit minerals or derive benefits from the trade in the areas where they are deployed, alongside or in parallel with their FARDC colleagues.

PARECO and the mai-mai

Other armed groups, such as PARECO and different mai-mai groups in North and South Kivu, are sometimes involved in mining too, but in an opportunistic way rather than as part of a well- organised strategy. This reflects the nature of these groups, which tend to be less homogenous than some of their counterparts and have a less well- defined political or economic agenda. Members of the mai-mai Yakutumba group, for example, exploit gold in parts of the territoire of Fizi, in South Kivu; they dig alongside the civilian population and extort “taxes”. In North Kivu, other mai-mai exploit gold, cassiterite and coltan in locations such as Munjuli and Usala (Walikale) and Mahanga (Masisi), sometimes in collaboration with the FDLR. © Kate Holt A soldier stands guard in Rutshuru, North Kivu, an area that saw fierce The mai-mai also make arrangements with local fighting between the FARDC and the CNDP. November 2008. 50 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

and may be profiting from the trade there.164 Global ex-FARDC. Some have weapons but don’t take Witness has been unable to verify these reports. them into the mines.” He attributed this phenomenon to the failures of the demobilisation Ex-combatants programme, which, he said, had abandoned many former combatants without any training, social Demobilised mai-mai and other former combatants who or economic prospects.165 Some of these have been unable to find employment sometimes turn demobilised combatants have retained their to mining, both in North Kivu (particularly around weapons; others have handed them in, but the Walikale) and South Kivu. Some have been responsible proliferation of small arms means that it is very for incidents of violence and intimidation. A miner, easy for them to acquire new ones. A local himself a former mai-mai, who worked in a gold mine development worker said that mai-mai were involved at Kasonge, in Basimukuma Sud, collectivité Mutambala, in gold mining in Mukera, about 21 km from Fizi: in the territoire of Fizi, said there were many former “The mai-mai dig there. Sometimes they are in combatants in this and other mines in the area. He civilian clothes but still carry arms. I’ve seen them. told Global Witness: “The ex-combatants in the mines There is ‘community work’. They extort from behave like military… They come into the concession. people if they don’t participate. They sometimes They dig, but if they don’t produce enough, they use the population as hostages to dig in their try to ‘judge’ and collect ‘fines’. They have their mineshafts. The mai-mai take everything. They own mineshafts. There are ex-mai-mai, ex-RCD, don’t give anything to the miners.”166 © Marcus Bleasdale/VII Mai-mai child soldier, awaiting an advance by CNDP troops, Kanyabayonga, North Kivu, November 2008. The Congolese government’s difficulties in controlling the mining sector 9

“The state itself has destroyed all the structures of the state.” Senior civil servant, Bukavu, 28 July 2008

Faced with successive rebellions, the Congolese for the incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, the government has failed to control the eastern provinces government’s political control over this region has for most of the last ten years. Located on the opposite remained tenuous. side of this huge country from the capital, Kinshasa, more than 1,000 km away, the provinces of North and The result is that provincial government officials find South Kivu have retained a distinct identity and are it extremely difficult to enforce the law. Not only more closely bound up with events in neighbouring does the Kinshasa government lack authority in the countries to the east – Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda east, depriving them of meaningful political support, – than with Kinshasa. Despite nationwide elections in but the area has become so heavily militarised that 2006, in which the majority of people in the east voted many civilian officials are powerless to do their jobs. The challenge is particularly striking in the mining sector. Global Witness met several provincial officials Congolese civilian government who were concerned about the illicit exploitation and agencies working in the mining sector exports of minerals and who were trying, to the best of their ability, to curb these practices, but were Division des Mines: the provincial representation unable to exercise their authority in the face of the of the Ministry of Mines. Responsible for overseeing the mining sector. threat of violence by armed groups or their own national army. In response to the military presence Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du small scale mining (SAESSCAM): government agency, within at the mine in Mukungwe, for example (see section the Ministry of Mines, responsible for overseeing and 5), the head of the Division des Mines wrote to the regulating the artisanal mining sector. Governor of South Kivu in March 2008 asking for the

167 Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification military to be removed from the mine. The Vice- (CEEC): government agency, within the Ministry of Mines, Governor supported this request and wrote to the responsible for certifying minerals. Originally set up to certify diamonds as part of the Kimberley Process, the commander of the 10th military region, asking him CEEC has since extended its work to other minerals to withdraw all his military from Mukungwe as well including gold, cassiterite, coltan and wolframite. It also as from all other mining sites in South Kivu.168 collects data on mineral production, purchases by comptoirs and exports. Several months later, no action had been taken. The military were still present in Mukungwe and, if Office congolais de contrôle (OCC): national government agency responsible for controlling the quality, anything, had reinforced their control of the mine. quantity and conformity of exports. FARDC mining at other sites in South Kivu continued unabated. Office des douanes et accises (OFIDA): national customs agency responsible, among other things, for controlling exports. At times, provincial government officials in North and South Kivu, for example in the Division des 52 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Mines, have tried to implement measures to limit particular from the Bishasa mine in Masisi and the illicit exports and tighten regulations. Some of these island of Idjwi in South Kivu; and more favourable measures have had a positive effect in improving the tax rates in neighbouring countries.170 accuracy of statistics and in raising the level of officially declared exports and revenues, especially Smuggling of gold is especially rife. Officials from since 2007. However, smuggling and fraud are still several agencies responsible for export statistics told commonplace. The situation is aggravated by Global Witness that they did not have any figures pervasive corruption within the government’s own for gold exports at all. They attributed this in part ranks, hindering efforts by well-intentioned officials to the high rate of taxation in the DRC and in part to clean up the sector.169 to the fact that gold is easier to smuggle than cassiterite.171 The head of the Division des Mines In its 2007 annual report, the Division des Mines in in South Kivu estimated that at least 90% of gold North Kivu noted that fraud had gone down exports were not declared. Only 20 kg a month was considerably since 2006 but had not been totally officially recorded, whereas gold production for the eradicated. It identified some of the likely causes of province was estimated, on average, at 300 to 400 kg fraud and of the unreliability of the government’s a month.172 own statistics, including the absence of statistics on minerals transported by road, for example between Government systems for recording mineral Goma and Bukavu and between Walikale and Goma; production and exports still do not provide imperfect procedures and negligence on the part of sufficiently precise information to ascertain whether, some officials in the collection of statistics; and which, minerals may have passed through the unrecorded consignments of wolframite, in hands of armed groups. The Division des Mines in © Private Lake Kivu, seen from Goma. Minerals are often smuggled across the lake. chapter 9: The Congolese government’s difficulties in controlling the mining sector 53

North Kivu told Global Witness that they were making More broadly, provincial government officials admit greater efforts to trace the origins of minerals.173 Such that they struggle to control their frontiers, even those initiatives are to be encouraged. However, in order to where there are official border crossings and customs be used effectively, these systems will need to be posts. Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika are among the accompanied by much stronger law enforcement easiest routes for smuggling goods out of the country, measures. The collection of information alone will especially at night, as there are no controls there at all. not succeed in stamping out the illicit trade. The Vice-Governor of South Kivu described the houses on the shores of Lake Kivu as “nocturnal ports”; small Indeed, none of the measures set up by the motorised boats, carrying minerals and other goods, government so far has affected the capacity of armed cross the lake several times a night.177 groups or the FARDC to continue trading in minerals. While some of the problems stem from administrative At the national level, the government in Kinshasa and bureaucratic obstacles – for example provincial has failed to take effective action to demilitarise the mining inspectors may have to wait several months mining sector in North and South Kivu. On several for authorisation to visit mines – others are a direct occasions, the Ministry of Mines has announced its consequence of the militarisation of mining across intention to crack down on the illegal trade and on the region, with members of the FARDC or armed companies buying minerals produced by armed groups actively blocking civilian authorities from groups. However, to date, these promises have not doing their work. This has been the case with Bisie materialised. Through a combination of inability and mine, for example, where the FARDC have lack of political will to confront the military, the prevented SAESSCAM from operating (see section government has also allowed senior FARDC officers, on Bisie above). and those under their command, to continue profiting from the trade with impunity. Some mining inspectors and other civil servants have become so afraid of the actions of FARDC soldiers or One of the more radical measures imposed by the armed groups that they no longer dare to visit the Minister of Mines in Kinshasa was a temporary mines or even complain about the presence of these suspension of mining in Walikale in February 2008, groups there.174 Other officials have simply given up supposedly to stop illicit movements of minerals and, trying to report abuses or to control what is clearly more specifically, to address the situation at Bisie. The uncontrollable. A senior official stated that the AF RDC measure was short-lived: after a few weeks, following were systematically involved in instances of fraud, intensive lobbying by traders, as well as by the local even for minerals that they had not produced population who complained that the planes which used themselves: “You can’t export fraudulently if you to fly out with cassiterite were no longer bringing food don’t have the support of the army [...] The state itself and other supplies into Bisie, the Governor of North has destroyed all the structures of the state [...] Fraud is Kivu lifted the suspension in April 2008, and the the rule.”175 A provincial customs official complained transport of minerals from Walikale resumed. Even that at Kiliba, near the border with Burundi, and during the period of the suspension, mining did not Baraka (both in South Kivu), the FDLR intimidated stop: buyers and traders simply switched to other routes and blocked the work of customs agents in order to to export their minerals, for example via Bukavu in force their products through; economic operators South Kivu. This example is typical of the way in which were having to pay “taxes” to armed groups in front decisions made in Kinshasa are quickly over-ruled by of customs officials.176 local interests. 10 The role of the comptoirs

“We all end up buying minerals which, in some way, have been produced illegally. You can’t just ask us to stop. We have no alternatives other than closing.”

Representative of a c o m p t o i r speaking to Global Witness, Goma, 9 August 2008 © Mark Craemer Traders set the price for cassiterite, Bisie, North Kivu, April 2008.

The comptoirs – trading houses based in the towns of markets. The South Kivu branch of the Fédération des Goma and Bukavuxiv – are a critical point in the chain Entreprises du Congo (FEC), the federation of Congolese of supply and export of minerals from eastern DRC. businesses to which most of the main comptoirs are The comptoirs buy minerals from all over North and affiliated, estimated that in 2007, official comptoirs in South South Kivu (as well as other locations), including Kivu exported each month an average of 450 tonnes of those produced by and benefiting armed groups and cassiterite, 45 tonnes of wolframite, 16 tonnes of coltan the FARDC, then sell them on, primarily to foreign and 10 kg of gold.178 companies. This trade accounts for the majority of exports from the two provinces, with the comptoirs Officially registered comptoirs are required to obtain a effectively acting as a gateway to the international licence from the Ministry of Mines. Thereafter, they are

xivOther unofficial trading companies and buyers, sometimes calling themselves comptoirs too, operate in smaller towns and other locations in North and South Kivu. chapter 10: The role of the comptoirs 55

operating “legally”, at least from a technical point of inside the DRC and in neighbouring countries. Among view. Likewise, the négociants who supply them with them are Mudekereza Namegabe, who heads the minerals are also required to register with the comptoirs Groupe Olive and MDM, and is president of the authorities and obtain a licence. South Kivu branch of the FEC; Muyeye Byaboshi, who runs Etablissement Muyeye, another prominent comptoir The comptoirs’ official status has allowed them to claim a in Bukavu; and Alexis Makabuza, a businessman in certain legitimacy. This in turn has enabled the foreign Goma who heads Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB), a purchasers who buy minerals from them to claim that company which has been in conflict with MPC over they buy only from “legal” sources. In reality, several rights to mine cassiterite at Bisie. GMB controls mining of these comptoirs and foreign purchasing companies are areas adjacent to Bisie. Alexis Makabuza also works for buying and selling minerals produced by armed groups Global Mining Company (GMC), another mineral or FARDC units entirely illegally. comptoir in Goma. In August 2008, he informed Global Witness that GMC had hired him as a consultant, to set In 2008, there were approximately 40 licensed comptoirs up the company’s mineral treatment factory; he in North and South Kivu.179 Many of these comptoirs are stressed that he did not own shares in the company.180 run by individuals who have been buying and selling minerals throughout the war. Their businesses have Several of these comptoirs, and the individuals running survived, or even thrived, as they have been willing them, have been named by the Group of Experts as to trade with armed groups, directly or indirectly, trading in minerals produced by armed groups. In regardless of their record of violence and human particular, Groupe Olive, Muyeye, MDM, WMC, Panju rights abuse. and Namukaya (all major comptoirs in South Kivu) are cited as knowingly trading in minerals produced or Some of these individuals are powerful businessmen in handled by the FDLR, notably through pre-financing Goma or Bukavu, with strong political connections négociants who work closely with the FDLR.181 The comptoir © Mark Craemer Barrels of cassiterite being prepared for export at a comptoir in Goma, North Kivu, April 2008. 56 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Munsad is cited as buying coltan from the Bibatama were not purchasing minerals from armed groups or mine, under CNDP control.182 military units and that their trade was not fuelling the conflict. Representatives of several comptoirs claimed Groupe Olive has been granted exploration permits for that they could not know exactly where the minerals cassiterite mines at Lemera,183 an area used both by the came from, as it was not possible to distinguish FARDC and the FDLR to trade in minerals (see sections minerals from different sites, and that minerals from 5 and 6). different locations were often mixed together before reaching them.186 The comptoirs buy from the FDLR and the FARDC through intermediaries, who, according to local sources, These claims do not stand up to scrutiny when are well-known to everyone in the trade. They also buy confronted with the reality on the ground. The minerals through official négociants, with whom they individuals running the main comptoirs are, for the most have built close and sustained relationships; some of part, Congolese businessmen from the region with these négociants have connections with armed groups.184 many years’ experience in trading in minerals. They One source told Global Witness: have extensive networks of contacts in the mining areas of both provinces and use local agents to visit mining “Everyone knows who the FDLR sites and trading centres on their behalf; some of them intermediaries are but they won’t say in case it reportedly even visit these sites themselves. A implicates them. The FARDC are also humanitarian source from Walikale told Global Witness: involved. Everyone, including the authorities, “The comptoirs are seen everywhere around the mines”.187 is involved [...] They all know each other but A local buyer in Uvira claimed that all the main comptoirs won’t say [their names]. But we know which based in Bukavu know exactly where their supplies comptoirs they sell to in Bukavu [...] Muyeye, originate from: they usually ask the négociants for MDM. They buy cassiterite, coltan and gold information about the origin of the minerals as the from Shabunda, Mwenga, Hombo and quality varies from mine to mine.188 Thus statements by Bunyakiri, either from FDLR areas or through Mudekereza Namegabe that “comptoirs find it difficult to the civilian population used by the FDLR. know what’s happening in the mines and who’s The intermediaries then send the minerals by exploiting what”189 or by Alexis Makabuza that négociants plane or trucks to Bukavu. They sell to those could deceive comptoirs about the origin of minerals190 particular comptoirs. Everyone knows what’s seem implausible. going on but the authorities don’t control the situation.”185 More generally, within North and South Kivu, the fact that certain territories and mines are controlled by A string of excuses: particular armed groups or army units is common the responses of comptoirs knowledge. A range of different people interviewed by Global Witness within a period of just a few weeks were Global Witness met representatives of many of the able to provide precise local information to this effect. It main comptoirs in Goma and Bukavu in July and August is therefore highly unlikely that well-placed individuals 2008, as well as the presidents of the FEC in North and involved in the mineral trade and based in the heart of South Kivu and the chairman of the association of the region would not have access to this information. comptoirs in North Kivu. Global Witness asked them Even if some did not, they have a duty to obtain it and what measures they were taking to ensure that they the means to do so. chapter 10: The role of the comptoirs 57

Independently, the Group of Experts reached a similar cassiterite to Belgium (see section 11).194 Sodexmines is conclusion: “it is clear that the traders named below one of the largest comptoirs in North Kivu. [in the section of its report on the FDLR’s financing through natural resources] are aware of the profits Since mid 2008, the comptoirs in Goma and Bukavu have these [armed] groups derive from this trade, and that been coming under increasing pressure to exercise they are not vigilant enough in the sourcing of minerals greater care in verifying the origin of their purchases. they purchase”.191 Some have reacted defensively to allegations that they may be trading in minerals produced by armed groups. In a meeting with Global Witness, representatives of In December 2008, FEC North Kivu wrote a letter to the several comptoirs affirmed that none of them bought Minister of Mines in Kinshasa complaining that the minerals from the FARDC.192 Yet at least one comptoirs were coming under attack by the Group of subsequently informed Global Witness that it Experts and NGOs.195 purchased and sold minerals from mines widely known to be under the control of the FARDC. In response to a In meetings and correspondence with Global Witness, letter from Global Witness about due diligence policies, representatives of comptoirs stressed that they were not the comptoir Pan African Business Group stated that it knowingly doing business with armed groups. Muyeye bought cassiterite from Bisie and Njingala in Walikale Byaboshi – whose comptoir is named by the Group of (as well as mines in Maniema province) and that it had Experts as buying minerals produced by the FDLR – representatives on site in these locations.193 Other minimised the involvement of the FDLR in the mineral sources informed Global Witness that the comptoirs trade. He denied that there was any link between Sodexmines and Amur were among the biggest buyers artisanal mining and the FDLR and claimed that the of cassiterite from Bisie, with Sodexmines exporting FDLR did not exploit gold, or only a very small around seven containers a week (each container amount.196 The Director of Pan African Business Group carrying 22-24 tonnes); both comptoirs export the said his comptoir only bought cassiterite originating from © Private

Workers at the Pan African Business Group, Goma. The Pan African Business Group was one of the comptoirs buying cassiterite from Bisie when it was under the control of the 85th brigade of the FARDC. 58 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?” © Mark Craemer Crushing cassiterite at a comptoir in Goma, North Kivu, April 2008.

government-controlled zones; he did not comment on address the question of their own responsibility to the fact that the profits from minerals in these zones exercise due diligence.202 They have also shifted the often go straight into the pockets of the FARDC.197 focus of the discussion on to what might happen if mining in eastern DRC were stopped altogether, Some comptoirs stated that they were adopting new justifying their activities on the basis that a large ethical policies.198 In correspondence with Global proportion of the population in eastern DRC would be Witness, Pan African Business Group stated that it had left without any source of income if the trade were shut set up a system whereby its representatives would check down. The FEC in South Kivu described international the origin of all minerals from the négociants who campaigns linking the ongoing conflict with the supplied them.199 Zulfikarali Panju, head of Panju mineral trade as “a plot against the Congolese comptoir, claimed that before any purchase, he sought population with a view to making them ever poorer”.203 as much information as possible about the identity of In early 2009, several mineral comptoirs in South Kivu the supplier and the origin of minerals; he had claimed to have suspended their activities in response to concluded that most of the minerals purchased came allegations that they were fuelling the conflict.204 from the provinces of Maniema or northern Katanga.200 Yet the Group of Experts names Panju as one of the Global Witness would welcome measures by the comptoirs which are directly complicit in pre-financing comptoirs to adopt ethical policies as a first step towards négociants who work closely with the FDLR and are aware ensuring that their trade is not contributing to the that some of the mines they buy from are controlled by conflict. However, until such policies are implemented, the FDLR.201 and for as long as these comptoirs continue to purchase and sell minerals which have passed through the hands The comptoirs have tended to blame the Congolese state of armed groups or FARDC units, their promises for its failure to control the mining sector rather than remain hollow. Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 11

Foreign companies who buy minerals from North and For coltan, the largest importers in 2007 were Traxys, South Kivu also have a responsibility to ensure that their THAISARCO and companies based in Hong Kong and trade is not benefiting any of the warring parties. Yet South Africa.212 some of these companies, based in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, have been buying minerals from comptoirs For wolframite, Belgian companies (Trademet and known to be trading with armed groups for several Specialty Metals) were once again the largest buyers in years, apparently without adjusting their practices in 2007. Other buyers included Afrimex, THAISARCO and light of the conflict or carrying out sufficient due companies registered in the Netherlands, China, Austria, diligence to ensure that their trade is not fuelling United Arab Emirates and Russia.213 the violence. There are no reliable statistics for gold exports from According to Congolese government statistics, North or South Kivu. Even for cassiterite, wolframite companies registered in Belgium accounted for the and coltan, Congolese government statistics are largest proportion of cassiterite, wolframite and coltan incomplete, and there are large discrepancies with imports from North and South Kivu in 2007 and from corresponding statistics from importing countries. For North Kivu from January to September 2008.205 The main example, statistics from Thailand and Malaysia report Belgian companies are Trademet, Traxys, SDE, STI and much higher figures for cassiterite imports from the Specialty Metals.206 DRC than those cited by the Congolese government.214 There may be a number of explanations for these After these Belgian companies, the largest buyers of discrepancies, including inaccuracy of statistics; cassiterite from North and South Kivu in 2007 were the smuggling and failure to declare a significant proportion Thailand Smelting and Refining Corporation of mineral exports from the DRC; and a common (THAISARCO), the world’s fifth-largest tin-producing practice among exporters of under-declaring both the company207 owned by the large British metals company value and quantity of exports. In addition, Congolese Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC) Group;208 government statistics sometimes list the transport or Afrimex, a UK-registered company (see below); and freight company, rather than the buyer, as the importer. MPA, the Rwanda-based subsidiary of South-African In some cases, this may distort the picture as the owned Kivu Resources. These were followed by the transport company may not be based in the same Malaysian Smelting Corporation Berhad (the world’s country as the buyer. fourth-largest tin-producing company),209 and companies based in China, India, Austria, the Some of the comptoirs provided Global Witness with Netherlands and Russia.210 Four other companies – additional information on their clients. For example, in African Ventures Ltd in China, Met Trade India Ltd in December 2008, the comptoir Pan African Business Group India, Eurosib Logistics JSC in Russia and BEB informed Global Witness that in the 13 months that it Investment Inc. in Canada – accounted for an increasing had been trading, it had bought 850 tonnes of cassiterite proportion of cassiterite imports from North Kivu and that its business partner was a Russian company, between January and September 2008.211 Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works.215 If all or most of 60 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

10,000 9,294 10,000 9,294

8,000 10,0008,000 9,294 Cassiterite, North and South Kivu, 2007 6,0008,0006,000 Main importers by country of registration Source: Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007 4,0006,0004,000

2,135 2,135 Quantity (to nearest tonne) 1,623 Quantity (to nearest tonne) 2,000 1,623 4,0002,000 1,106 1,106 308 187 82 68 52 24 23 2,135 308 187 82 68 52 24 23 Quantity (to nearest tonne) 2,00000 1,623 1,106 iu m ong ) India iu m China China ong ) India Russia United Austria 308 187China 82 68 China 52 24 23Russia United Austria Rwanda Belg ailand Th Malaysia Kingdom Rwanda Belg ailand Th Malaysia 0 Kingdom Netherlands (Hong K Netherlands (Hong K iu m ong ) India China China Russia United Austria Rwanda Belg ailand Th Malaysia Kingdom Netherlands (Hong K

300 300 coltan, North and South Kivu, 2007

227 Main importers by country of registration 300 227 Source: Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 200 Rapport Annuel 2007 200 227

127 200 127

100100 127 61 61 Quantity (to nearest tonne) Quantity (to nearest tonne)

100 13 13 61

Quantity (to nearest tonne) 0 0 BelgiumThailand China (Hong Kong) South Africa BelgiumThailand China (Hong Kong) South Africa 13 0 BelgiumThailand China (Hong Kong) South Africa

800 741 800 741 wolframite, North and South Kivu, 2007

800 741 Main importers by country of registration 600600 Source: Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007 600 400400

200400 Quantity (to nearest tonne) 200

Quantity (to nearest tonne) 113 113 96 89 96 89 75 75 21 20 20 200 21 20 20 Quantity (to nearest tonne) 0 113 0 96 89

iu m 75 ong ) iu m China ong ) Russia United Austria

China 21 20 20 Russia United Austria Belg ailand Th Emirate s Kingdom Belg ailand Th Emirate s 0 Kingdom United Arab Netherlands (Hong K United Arab Netherlands (Hong K iu m ong ) China Russia United Austria Belg ailand Th Emirate s Kingdom United Arab Netherlands (Hong K chapter 11: Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 61 © Gerd Ludwig/Corbis Tin plant at Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works. This Russian company buys cassiterite from the Pan African Business Group comptoir in Goma. the 850 tonnes were sold to this one company, it some of these foreign companies are also using would make it one of the biggest buyers of cassiterite suppliers who buy minerals produced by the FARDC. from the region.xv For example, SDE bought cassiterite from Sodexmines, one of the main buyers of cassiterite from Bisie, when The December 2008 report of the Group of Experts the mine was still under the control of the 85th names Trademet, Traxys, Afrimex and THAISARCO brigade of the FARDC (see section 5).218 as buying from comptoirs which are directly complicit in pre-financing négociants, who in turn work closely SDE and Sodexmines are both part of the Blattner with armed groups.216 Elwyn group,219 a group of companies owned by Elwyn Blattner, an American national who has Previously, Trademet, Specialty Metals, Afrimex, AMC been based in the DRC for many years.220 According and the Malaysian Smelting Corporation were all to the company’s website, the group operates in included in a list of companies considered by the Panel several different sectors in the DRC; apart from its of Experts to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines mineral trading activities through Sodexmines and for Multinational Enterprises in 2002.217 xvi SDE, it works in the agriculture, telecommunications, banking and logistics sectors. Most of the group’s The mandate of the Group of Experts is limited to operations are based in the DRC, but it has also investigating sources of finance for non-state armed operations in Europe, for example in Belgium groups. However, Global Witness has confirmed that and France.221 xvGovernment statistics from North Kivu for January to September 2008 show that Russian company Eurosib Logistics bought 700.59 tonnes of cassiterite from Pan African Business Group. Eurosib Logistics is a transport company, based in Saint Petersburg, Russia, which may be providing a service to cassiterite buyers such as Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works. xviSome companies cited in the Panel of Experts’ October 2002 report as being in breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises claimed to have been subsequently “cleared” by the Panel. However, the process of resolution of these cases was seriously flawed. It left many questions unanswered and gave the impression that certain cases had been satisfactorily resolved when, in fact, many of the specific concerns raised by the Panel had not been addressed. For further details, see Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), “Unanswered Questions: Companies, Conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo”, May 2004, and Global Witness, A“ frimex (UK) – DRC: Complaint to the UK National Contact Point under the Specific Instance Procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, 20 February 2007. 62 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

aMC and THAISARCO222

The Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC) group is a large two of the UK-registered entities within the AMC Group: AMCO international group which trades, distributes and manufactures Investments Ltd and Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC.225 metals, metal products and construction materials. Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC, London, is the group’s Global Witness is concerned that THAISARCO’s trading practices holding company. The AMC Group operates through are fuelling the conflict in eastern DRC. THAISARCO’s main subsidiaries or associates in Europe, North America, Africa, Asia supplier in South Kivu is Panju, one of the comptoirs identified and Australasia. AMC was a founder member of the London by the Group of Experts as complicit in pre-financing Metal Exchange.223 négociants who work closely with the FDLR and are aware that certain mines they buy from are controlled by the FDLR.226 The AMC group includes four UK-based entities: Congolese government statistics show that THAISARCO - AMCO Investments Ltd purchased minerals from Panju in 2007 and 2008.227 The - Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC Group of Experts states that it obtained documents showing - Amalgamated Metal Investment Holdings Ltd that all Panju’s minerals purchases were sold to THAISARCO.228 - British Amalgamated Metal Investments Ltd Global Witness is calling on the UK government to request that These four companies are the principal owners of the Thailand the UN Sanctions Committee add the UK-based entities of Smelting and Refining Corporation (THAISARCO), the AMC and their directors to the list of companies and individuals fifth-largest tin-producing company in the world. AMC PLC’s against whom sanctions should be imposed. UN Security 2007 Annual Report and Accounts refer to THAISARCO as a Council Resolution 1857 (2008) states that “individuals or principal subsidiary and operating unit of AMC PLC and state entities supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern part that AMC PLC owns 75.25% of THAISARCO.224 of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural resources” should be subjected to sanctions, including THAISARCO’s chairman and three of its directors own shares in travel restrictions and an assets freeze.229 © Global Witness AMC’s offices in central London. AMC’s subsidiary, THAISARCO, has purchased minerals from comptoira whose suppliers have close links with the FDLR.

Responses from companies: no coherent manufacturers, major electronics companies and plan to address the conflict dimension of industry bodies in the mining and metals sectors. Some the mineral trade of the replies from companies are quoted below. A full list of the companies which had replied to Global Global Witness wrote to more than 200 companies in Witness by the end of April 2009 is contained in Annex C December 2008 and January 2009 inquiring about their of this report. trade with the DRC and their due diligence policies. The companies, based in a range of countries and Overall, companies’ responses were disappointingly continents, included small and large trading companies, evasive. Few have a coherent or comprehensive plan for processing companies, mining companies, addressing the impact of their trade on the violence and chapter 11: Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 63

human rights abuses in eastern DRC. Some mention observing codes of conduct, will be of limited use if they their intentions to tighten their due diligence procedures, are not accompanied by corresponding steps all along but these rarely go beyond their immediate suppliers and the supply chain. do not provide details of independent verification or checks of the entire chain of supply. Very few companies Another common argument is that companies deal only even mention the specific context of armed conflict in with “legal” or “licensed” traders. As demonstrated eastern DRC or the fact that the warring parties are elsewhere in this report, this argument quickly becomes heavily involved in the mineral trade. irrelevant in the context of eastern DRC, as it is often licensed traders who buy and export minerals produced One of the recurring arguments in companies’ responses by or benefiting the warring parties. Furthermore, by is that it would be extremely difficult or impractical for using this argument, companies are effectively them to track every stage of their supply chain and legitimising suppliers whose trading practices may be obtain information about the suppliers and origin of fuelling the conflict. every single component, in part because of the many sources of supplies and large number of suppliers. Trading and processing companies Global Witness appreciates that this might be an onerous and costly process but believes that companies Most of the letters to Global Witness from trading and have no alternative but to invest in it, and to make such processing companies failed to address the specific a process systematic, if they want to be sure that their question of how they ensure that their trade is not business is not associated with human rights abuses and contributing to the conflict. Many referred to general conflict in eastern DRC. Some of the positive measures standards of corporate social responsibility, but few which companies mention, for example imposing described specific measures they were taking to tighter requirements on their direct suppliers and identify the exact origin of their supplies. © AP/PA Tin smelting. Processing companies have failed to adopt procedures for ensuring that the minerals they handle are not fuelling the conflict in the DRC. 64 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Some companies, such as THAISARCO and its parent company AMC, attempted to create a distance between their trade and the situation in eastern DRC by stating that they do not operate “directly” in the DRC.230 Others replicated arguments used by the comptoirs, relating, in particular, to the “legal” nature of their suppliers. The fact that this “legal” status has been acting as a cover for some of these suppliers to trade with the warring parties in eastern DRC was not acknowledged. For example, Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad (MSC) stated that the tin

concentrates it obtained from the DRC were acquired © Private Tin ingot produced by THAISARCO. “through licensed traders who are authorised to perform the trade. They have also confirmed to us that, as illustrated in this report, the artisanal miners that the material arises from legitimate sources whose interests these companies are claiming to serve recognised by the host government.”231 This would are the first to suffer exploitation and human rights seem to indicate that they are content to do business abuses at the hands of the warring parties and derive with these traders simply on the basis that they are few, if any, benefits from working in these conditions. licensed – a status which does not imply any comment Companies have used the “ethical” argument to on the nature of these traders’ activities or on their distract attention from the profoundly unethical relationships with their own suppliers, some of whom nature of some of the practices underpinning may have links with armed groups. Their response this trade. would also indicate that they accept at face value these traders’ assurances that the minerals come Belgian company Trademet was among those which from “legitimate sources recognised by the host tried to shift the burden of responsibility onto the government”; there is no indication that MSC has Congolese government. It claimed to be asking its attempted to verify these assurances or find out suppliers to confirm the origin of their purchases in exactly what these “legitimate sources” are. writing, yet described Global Witness’s recommendation that companies verify “the exact Like the comptoirs – and many other foreign companies origin of every kilo of exported material” as who replied to Global Witness’s letter – MSC stated: “inappropriate in the current context in Congo”, “We consider total disengagement not to be an ethical stating that this was the exclusive responsibility of option as this would deprive those dependent on the Congolese state, not that of companies like artisanal cassiterite production of their only Trademet.234 livelihood.”232 THAISARCO made a similar argument, claiming that “most parties and commentators appear Some of the companies which replied to Global to be in agreement that the continued trade in Witness stated that they were committed to minerals from DRC is fundamental to the well being upholding and improving due diligence policies. of the artisanal mining communities”.233 Apart from However, the policies or internal codes of conduct the fact that Global Witness has not called for total they refer to are fairly general and do not include disengagement or a complete ban on the trade (see specific safeguards against the mineral trade fuelling section 2), these arguments fail to take into account armed conflict. For example, AMC, MSC, chapter 11: Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 65

THAISARCO and Trademet refer to the policies of the adoption of appropriate due diligence procedures tin industry body, ITRI.235 The main document to throughout the supply chain in that region”. Among which they refer is ITRI’s Artisanal and Small Scale these steps is an action plan which is to consider “options Mining Policy; this policy covers a number of issues for extending due diligence procedures [...] as well as the relating to artisanal mining and corporate social longer-term possibility of industry self-declaration and responsibility, but does not include specific measures for audited certification”. H owever, the statement notes that ensuring that its members’ trade does not contribute to “while significant efforts will be made to identify the financing armed groups in the DRC or elsewhere.236 source of materials from the DRC it may remain impossible to demonstrate exactly what taxes or informal More recently, ITRI posted a document on its website payments may have been made during transportation of entitled “Progress report: towards a responsible cassiterite that material. In light of this, provision of definitive supply chain”, which appears to be a more tailored evidence proving no unofficial payments across the entire response to some of the questions arising specifically from supply chain may therefore be considered impractical the trade in cassiterite from the DRC. However, even this under circumstances currently prevailing in the DRC.”237 document does not explicitly refer to the risks of trading in minerals produced by the warring parties. Instead, it Global Witness welcomes ITRI’s commitment to uses general phrases such as “concern [...] regarding the extending due diligence procedures. However, the circumstances surrounding cassiterite production and examples of information which ITRI will ask suppliers to trade in, and from, the Democratic Republic of Congo”. provide, cited in the progress report, still do not address The document states that ITRI and its members “have the involvement of the warring parties in the mineral committed to take steps to improve and encourage the trade. ITRI states that the information requirements will cover aspects such as “whether suppliers are officially recognised organisations with appropriate local authorisation to carry out the activities in which they are engaged; whether locally required operating and export licences are held” and “whether appropriate taxes and other royalties have been paid only to the appropriate bodies”.238 As explained above, in the current context of eastern DRC, these criteria do not provide any guarantee that suppliers are ensuring that their minerals are “conflict free”. On the contrary, as illustrated by the behaviour of some of the main comptoirs, suppliers can meet all these conditions of “legality”, yet continue to deal in minerals produced by armed groups or the military. A system of due diligence based solely on this type of information would not suceed in excluding such sources from the supply chain.

Furthermore, ITRI’s statement that it may be “impractical” to demonstrate that no unofficial payments

© Global Witness have been made along the supply chain could discourage The London Metal Exchange is the world’s leading metals market. Its prices for tin and other metals are used as a global reference. companies from performing careful due diligence. ITRI 66 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

and other industry bodies should be encouraging the mineral concentrates.” The measures which the company opposite attitude among their members and urging them would take “to avoid contributing to the conflict or to uphold the highest standards at all times. The benefiting armed groups or the DRC army” include “not circumstances which make it difficult to operate in purchasing material from such an area, notwithstanding eastern DRC are precisely those which require an even the significant profits that could be made from such higher level of due diligence than companies might activities”.240 In February 2009, MPC informed Global perform in a more stable environment. Standards should Witness that for the past three years, it had only not be set on the basis of what is practical. Companies purchased minerals from Maniema and Katanga have a responsibility to ensure that their trading practices provinces on the basis that these areas were “not the are not causing human rights abuses, directly or subject of control by any renegade military group”.241 indirectly, or supporting groups responsible for human rights abuses. Similarly, Banro, a gold mining company present in South Kivu, stated to Global Witness that its company, Mining companies employees, contractors and consultants “are expressively [sic] prohibited from any dealings with illegal armed Not surprisingly, the few companies which did specifically groups”. However, it claimed that “the movement or address the question of the presence of armed or military presence of armed militia groups at or near our projects in groups in their correspondence with Global Witness are the DRC has not been a pressing issue for the Company, mining companies which have several years’ first-hand as any such presence has been peripheral and very rare. experience of the situation in the DRC. On those rare occasions when a militia group has been in the vicinity of our operations, we have withdrawn our MPC formulates a clear position on ensuring that its people from that particular locale and waited for the activities do not contribute to the conflict, although the armed group to leave before resuming our activities.”242 company does not have a formal due diligence policy.239 This does not correspond to information gathered by Its sensitivity to this question may have been brought Global Witness in South Kivu indicating that the presence about by its negative experiences at Bisie, where it has of armed groups had been widespread for several years in been unable to operate due to obstruction by FARDC areas where Banro’s concessions are located. soldiers and confrontations with GMB and the COMIMPA cooperative (see section 5). In a letter to Global Witness, Electronics companies MPC’s parent company, Kivu Resources, states that MPC “applies significant emphasis on understanding the origin In their letters to Global Witness, several of the large of the material purchased [...] and if there is any military electronics companies, including HP, Nokia, Dell and involvement in the mining, or logistics of the material Motorola, refer to their involvement in the offered for purchase”. The letter explains that MPC Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) or follows a procedure of physically visiting its properties and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI), and a reporting any instances of military presence. It states: report prepared for the EICC and GeSI entitled “Where there is any doubt as to the security of the “Social and Environmental Responsibility in Metals company personnel, or as to the involvement of the Supply to the Electronic Industry”.243 The report is a military in any small scale mining that may be taking desk-based study of how the trade in certain metals place [...] appropriate action [is] taken to reschedule or (including tin) is structured and how these metals are discontinue exploration activities. In such cases MPC used in electronic products. It provides an overview would treat this area as a ‘no go’ area for the purchase of of some of the social and environmental issues chapter 11: Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 67

Prior to commissioning this study, the EICC adopted an Electronic Industry Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct includes provisions on labour conditions, health and safety and the environment, most of them based on international standards. The introduction states: “For the code to be successful, it is acknowledged the Participants should regard the code as a total supply chain initiative. At a minimum, Participants shall require its next tier suppliers to acknowledge and implement the Code.”245

The response by Hewlett-Packard (HP) to Global © Global Witness

The electronics industry accounts for a large proportion of the use of Witness is one of the few that refers specifically to metals derived from minerals in eastern DRC, yet electronics companies still do not apply checks throughout their entire supply chain. efforts to “minimize the risk that electronics manufacturing is supporting the parties responsible associated with this trade across the world, as well as for violence in the eastern DRC.” It mentions the recommendations “on whether and how the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct and the members of these organizations [GeSI and EICC] can company’s own efforts to ensure that its suppliers effectively influence social and environmental issues respect it, including through “onsite supplier audits associated with production of metals used in to ensure suppliers understand our expectations and electronic products”. It touches on some of the have defined corrective actions where needed to meet difficulties electronics companies might face in them”. HP states: “We have focused on our first tier tracing the sources of metals, due, for example, to suppliers, where we think we have the most the fact that supplies of many different origins are influence. HP has also been successful in reaching often mixed together long before they reach the down to the second tier through many of our first electronics companies. tier suppliers.” However, it points to some of its limitations in engaging directly with all its suppliers Although the report is more than 80 pages long, it beyond the first tier, stating: “It is the responsibility of contains only three, short recommendations, which our first tier suppliers to require the EICC to be are very weak and general and provide no precise followed by their suppliers, and so on down the guidance. With regard to social and environmental supply chain. An increasing number of our suppliers responsibility (one of the main themes of the have active programs to do so.”246 There are a number report), the report simply recommends that the of inconsistencies in the response: for example, on the electronics industry engage with appropriate existing one hand, the company declares its intention to “map initiatives and stakeholders to strengthen efforts and the supply chain down to the extractives level”, reduce proliferation of overlapping initiatives. With beyond the first and even second tiers of suppliers, yet regard to chain of supply, it recommends that it seems reluctant to take responsibility for the electronics companies further characterise special practices of its suppliers further down the chain. metal content and use in electronic products which would support the tracking of metals used in Nokia’s response is less detailed but accepts that the electronics and help trace sources of materials.244 company has “the responsibility over everything that 68 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

goes into making a Nokia product. We exercise this The Afrimex case responsibility by a stringent supplier selection and monitoring process.” It states that all its suppliers In February 2007, Global Witness filed a complaint are contractually obliged to follow a set of specific against Afrimex for breaches of the OECD Guidelines requirements which are systematically monitored; for Multinational Enterprises, in connection with its it does not provide details on how this monitoring trade in minerals during the war from 1998.249 is conducted or by whom. Nokia has its own Code Afrimex is a UK-registered company which operates of Conduct, which contains guidance on human in eastern DRC through the Congolese registered rights, anti-corruption measures and other ethical companies Société Kotecha and SOCOMI, both based questions.247 In its letter to Global Witness, the in Bukavu. The UK Government’s National Contact company states: “We absolutely do not accept or Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines investigated support any illegal activity or abuse of human the case and, in August 2008, published its final rights. We require all of our suppliers to only use statement, upholding the majority of Global legal sources of materials.” It does not question Witness’s allegations. It concluded that Afrimex whether some of these “legal” sources may in fact had failed to ensure that its trading activities did be sourcing their products from warring parties. not support armed conflict and forced labour. It simply states that “the current situation with the A significant part of its conclusions rested upon supply chain of metals and other minerals from war the fact that Afrimex had not exercised sufficient zones such as Congo is [not] acceptable” and refers due diligence with regard to its supply chain, and to efforts to explore ways of tracing metals along that some of its suppliers – which included the the supply chain.248 comptoirs Etablissement Muyeye and Groupe Olive – © Global Witness SOCOMI, mineral comptoir in Bukavu associated with Afrimex. chapter 11: Foreign companies buying or handling minerals from eastern DRC 69

would have made payments to rebel groups (at that to the NCP, with a copy to Global Witness, stating time, the RCD-Goma), thus contributing to the that it had stopped trading in minerals and that its conflict.250 last shipment of minerals left the DRC in around the first week of September 2008.256 Global Witness The NCP made a number of recommendations to is urging the UK government to carry out an Afrimex, relating, among other things, to the independent verification of Afrimex’s claim that formulation, implementation and periodic review of it has ceased trading in minerals. a corporate responsibility policy which should take into account the human rights impact of the Global Witness welcomes the UK National Contact company’s activities. By February 2009, almost six Point’s final statement on the Afrimex case and months after its final statement, the NCP had not supports many of its recommendations. However, received any information from Afrimex about the the case illustrates the severe limitations of relying implementation of its recommendations. on voluntary guidelines to hold companies to account. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Information gathered by Global Witness confirms Enterprises remain a weak, non-binding mechanism. that Afrimex continued to trade in minerals from The NCP does not have the legal powers to enforce eastern DRC after the complaint was filed in decisions arising from its conclusions and there is February 2007, albeit not on as large a scale as during no in-built mechanism for following up its the earlier years of the war. One of its suppliers in recommendations. The UK government will have to 2007 and 2008 was Muyeye, named by the Group of take further action to ensure that the investigation Experts as buying minerals produced by the FDLR. and conclusions of the NCP are more than just a Congolese government statistics list Afrimex as theoretical exercise. having imported 382.5 tonnes of cassiterite from Goma and 1,102.5 tonnes of cassiterite and 112.5 The UK government, at a senior political level, tonnes of wolframite from the comptoirs Muyeye and should send a clear signal to Afrimex and other Bakulikira in South Kivu in 2007.251 A sample of the UK-registered companies that it expects them to CEEC’s monthly reports for 2008 shows Afrimex as carry out careful due diligence to ensure that their having imported 22.5 tonnes of cassiterite from trade is not funding any of the warring parties in the Muyeye on 27 May 2008 and 45 tonnes from DRC, and that this is not an optional extra. One Bakulikira and 90 tonnes from Muyeye in June way of doing this would be for the UK government 2008.252 Afrimex’s mineral comptoir, SOCOMI, is listed to recommend to the UN Sanctions Committee that as an officially licensed comptoir for cassiterite in Afrimex, and any other UK-registered companies South Kivu, having paid its licence fee of US $9,000 found to be trading in minerals produced by armed for 2008.253 Several other sources interviewed by groups, be included in the list of companies and Global Witness in mid-2008 confirmed that SOCOMI individuals against whom sanctions should be and Société Kotecha were still operating and imposed (see section 13).257 handling minerals.254 If backed up with strong political support, the UK In February 2009, Global Witness wrote to Afrimex government’s findings on the Afrimex case could asking, among other things, for an update on the set an important precedent in holding companies company’s progress in implementing the NCP’s accountable for their activities in conflict zones recommendations.255 In March 2009, Afrimex replied and could set an example for other governments. 12 The role of transit countries

Minerals from North and South Kivu are first officials took advantage of the chaos to plunder the transported to neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi or DRC’s resources and to enrich themselves.259 In more Uganda, usually by road.xvii Once they have transited recent years, Rwandan government and military through these countries, the minerals usually leave involvement in mineral exploitation in the DRC has Africa through the ports of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) been less visible, but the political and business elite or Mombasa (Kenya).258 has continued to profit through Congolese armed groups which the Rwandan government has backed Some of the minerals produced in South Kivu are – such as the CNDP and previously the RCD-Goma – transported to North Kivu and exported from there, and through Congolese businessmen who maintain as the town of Goma is a larger commercial hub than close personal and business links with Rwanda. Bukavu and has better transport and connections with Rwanda. Rwanda has its own mineral deposits, and a developing domestic mining sector which accounts Rwanda for an increasing proportion of its exports, but it continues to import and re-export significant Rwanda has long been one of the main routes amounts of minerals from eastern DRC. Congolese through which minerals leave eastern DRC. Weak minerals exported from Rwanda are not always controls on the Congolese side of the border have distinguished from minerals produced in Rwanda.260 been compounded by Rwanda’s unwillingness to ensure that the minerals it imports have not been The growth of Rwanda’s mining sector produced by or benefited any of the warring parties in the DRC. These factors have meant that Rwanda has Rwanda’s mining sector has grown steadily since effectively provided these warring parties with access around 2005. The value of its mineral exports to export routes and international markets. The increased from US $38m in 2005 to US $130m in armed groups profiting from the trade with or 2008.261 The continuing rise in production has been through Rwanda have included not only those due in large part to an influx of foreign investment actively supported by Rwanda, such as the CNDP, but from 2006, which allowed the privatisation of 20 even the FDLR, Rwanda’s fiercest enemy. concessions previously managed by REDEMI, Rwanda’s now defunct state-owned mining During the earlier phases of the war, from 1998 company.262 onwards, when Rwandan troops were present in the DRC, the Rwandan government and army profited Artisanal and small-scale mining accounted for directly from illicit mineral exploitation in North and over half Rwanda’s domestic mineral production in South Kivu. Rwandan government and military 2008; 263 artisanal mining cooperatives sell their goods

xviiMost of the minerals produced in the areas of North and South Kivu covered by this report leave the DRC through Rwanda or Burundi. Minerals produced in the northern parts of North Kivu are more likely to be exported through Uganda or Rwanda. Global Witness did not carry out research for this report in the northern part of North Kivu or in Uganda. chapter 12: the role of transit countries 71

to larger mining companies or to traders based in that Rwanda is one of the main conduits for minerals the capital, Kigali.264 According to documents which leaving North and South Kivu. Rwanda’s government the Rwandan Minister of Mines provided to Global agencies and border controls are better organised than Witness in March 2009, there are seven foreign those of the DRC. In theory, Rwandan customs officials companies mining cassiterite, coltan and wolframite check the paperwork accompanying all consignments on ex-REDEMI concessions.265 An article published from the DRC, but the government has not been in 2008 by the Rwanda Investment and Export pro-active in delving deeper into the origins of the Promotion Agency (RIEPA) – a body set up by the minerals transported across the border. Neither the government – states that 36 private mineral firms are Rwandan government nor mineral trading companies operational in Rwanda; most of these are involved operating in Rwanda are conducting careful due in trading rather than mineral extraction.266 diligence to ensure that this trade is not benefiting any of the warring parties in eastern DRC. In addition to fostering the growth of its own mineral production, Rwanda has the potential to develop Global Witness researchers who visited Rwanda in mineral-processing facilities, which could be beneficial March 2009 found that there was widespread for neighbouring countries, such as the DRC. The acknowledgement in Rwanda that minerals from Rwandan government is planning to improve its energy eastern DRC pass through the country, either in supply and encourage further foreign investment. transit or as goods to be traded and processed domestically prior to export. The Minister of Mines Rwanda as a channel for told Global Witness that approximately a quarter of “conflict minerals” from eastern DRC Rwanda’s mineral exports in 2008 originated from the DRC.267 Statistics from the Office de Géologie et des Mines du Rwanda (OGMR), the Rwanda Geology and “How can you ask a trader, Mines Authority, indicate that the proportion may be a mining company, a [...] smuggler even higher: figures based on customs declarations to track where the minerals they show that in 2008, nearly half the minerals exported buy are coming from? Put yourself (by weight) from Rwanda were re-exports, therefore in their shoes.” not of Rwandan origin.268 The RIEPA article mentioned above states that “a large proportion of [Rwandan Rwandan Minister of Mines Vincent Karega to Global Witness, Kigali, 6 March 2009 mineral] exports are simply minerals transiting Rwanda” and goes on to say that only 20% of Rwanda’s coltan and wolframite exports is produced The expansion of Rwanda’s mining sector and domestically.269 In view of regional production and processing capacity may prove positive for Rwanda’s trade patterns, the remaining proportion is almost economy, but doubts will continue to be cast on the certainly Congolese. Other sources working in the origin of these minerals for as long as the mining sector in Rwanda confirmed that although government fails to address the role of Rwanda as a Rwanda’s domestic production has increased, most channel and trading post for products which are of the minerals traded in Rwanda in early 2009 still benefiting the warring parties in eastern DRC. originate from the DRC.270

Congolese government statistics and reports by the In discussions with Global Witness, the Rwandan Group of Experts and NGOs have all demonstrated Minister of Mines, Vincent Karega, did not appear to 72 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

consider Rwanda’s trade in Congolese minerals to be from outside. Concrete measures, such as tightening problematic. He explained that raw materials from controls and performing thorough checks of mineral the DRC come through Rwanda because Rwanda has imports at the borders with the DRC, are not a greater processing capacity than the DRC. He stated dependent on the input of NGOs and should be that the Rwandan government had no objection to implemented without delay. this trade or to mineral traders from eastern DRC holding bank accounts in Rwanda.271 He did not Companies and traders operating in Rwanda have address the fact that a significant proportion of the shown little commitment to exercising control over Congolese minerals entering Rwanda may be their supply chain and have failed to put in place benefiting parties responsible for grave human rights procedures which would ensure that the minerals abuses in eastern DRC and that the ease with which they are purchasing are not benefiting any of the these minerals can cross the border is helping to fuel warring parties in eastern DRC. A mineral trader in the conflict. Kigali told Global Witness that 40% of his supplies came from the DRC. He explained that he bought Global Witness representatives raised with the these goods from a middleman who brought them Minister of Mines the particular responsibility of over the border. He claimed to “know his suppliers” neighbouring states to ensure that minerals produced well enough to be “fairly certain” that the majority by or benefiting the warring parties in eastern DRC of his supplies from the DRC did not come from do not enter the supply chain. This responsibility is mines controlled by armed groups, but did not reiterated in UN Security Council Resolution 1856 explain on what basis he made this assertion. (2008) which requires “all States, especially those in However, he also said that if he were to ask questions the region, to take appropriate steps to end the illicit of his suppliers, “they will go somewhere else”.273 trade in natural resources, including if necessary through judicial means”. The Minister of Mines Given Rwanda’s proximity to eastern DRC, and the acknowledged that private companies have a moral close business links between the two countries, it responsibility that comes with buying minerals from would not be difficult for traders and companies or near a war zone, but considered that due diligence based in Rwanda to check the origin of their mineral measures would simply “discourage traders from supplies. The Rwandan government should work coming into Rwanda”. He claimed that the volume with these traders and companies to develop due of trade coming into Rwanda from the DRC was too diligence procedures regarding their supply chain. small to justify setting up an elaborate system of due The gravity of the human rights situation in eastern diligence, despite stating himself that around 25% of DRC and the continuing violence by armed groups Rwanda’s mineral exports in 2008 originated from the who are benefiting from the mineral trade should DRC. Nevertheless, he indicated that if an make this a priority for the Rwandan government. organisation such as Global Witness presented him with “a budget and a plan”, he would be prepared to Burundi start developing due diligence procedures.272 Burundi is one of the main conduits for minerals Global Witness would be interested in pursuing these produced in South Kivu, especially gold. A former discussions with the Rwandan authorities, but it is member of the Burundian National Assembly told the responsibility of the government itself to take the Global Witness: “Burundi is like a transfer hub for lead in such initiatives, without waiting for plans minerals from Congo.”274 As documented in this chapter 12: the role of transit countries 73

Government statistics claim that in 2007, Burundi produced 50.6 tonnes of cassiterite, 51.5 tonnes of coltan, 443.4 tonnes of wolframite and 2,422.75 kg of gold. Between January and September 2008, it produced 33 tonnes of cassiterite, 91.28 tonnes of coltan, 342.27 tonnes of wolframite and 1,826.85 kg of gold.277 However, the director of the Burundian Mines Directorate explained that these figures were collected at the point of export and therefore refer to Burundi’s mineral exports rather than its domestic production.278 Global Witness also obtained extracts of export statistics collected by the Burundian customs authorities, which

© Gustavo Carvalho provide different figures for mineral exports; in some The Burundian capital, Bujumbura, and Lake Tanganyika. Gold is often smuggled from South Kivu into Burundi across Lake Tanganyika. cases, these are higher, in others, lower than those collected by the Ministry of Mines. The discrepancies report, a significant proportion of the gold mined in could be explained in part by a high level of fraud. The South Kivu is controlled by armed groups (notably government’s own report on the mining sector states: the FDLR) or by the FARDC. Burundi offers an easy “Fraud is so intense that the production recorded by exit route for minerals produced by these groups. state agencies only represents a tiny part of the reality.”279 Burundian customs controls are extremely weak – The report states that cross-border trade between sometimes non-existent – and customs officials may Burundi and the DRC has always existed and that be complicit in facilitating illegal imports from minerals originating from the DRC, such as gold, eastern DRC. cassiterite and coltan, transit through the port and airport in Bujumbura before being exported further From the southern part of South Kivu, gold is often afield. It does not provide any figures or indication smuggled into Burundi across Lake Tanganyika – a route of the proportion of Congolese minerals passing favoured by the FDLR – or through the many informal through Burundi. crossing points along the Ruzizi river that marks the Burundi-DRC border north of the lake.275 The gold is Global Witness also contacted the Institute for then sold to traders in the capital, Bujumbura, and Statistics and the Ministry of Commerce to try to exported from there. The international airport in obtain official production and export statistics. Bujumbura is one of the most direct routes through which gold from South Kivu leaves the region and reaches world markets.

The mining sector in Burundi

Burundi’s domestic mineral output is not globally significant. Gold, cassiterite, coltan and wolframite are exploited by around 100,000 artisanal miners,276 but quantities are difficult to ascertain in the absence of © Nanette Hatzes Bujumbura airport, an important exit route for minerals produced in reliable production statistics. South Kivu. 74 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

The latest figures available from both offices dated The Burundian government does not appear willing from 2006; no figures were available for 2007 or 2008. to acknowledge that a significant proportion of the gold exported from Burundi originates from the The director of the Burundian Mines Directorate DRC, nor that some of this gold has been produced informed Global Witness that in March 2009, there or sold by Congolese armed groups or military were 64 officially registered comptoirs in Burundi. units. The director of the Burundian Mines Most of these sold wolframite; some sold cassiterite Directorate denied that any Congolese gold comes and coltan. There was only one licensed gold comptoir across the border, although he admitted that it is (see below). Global Witness asked him for a list of difficult to differentiate Congolese gold from the licensed comptoirs and information about Burundian gold.284 export destinations. He was not forthcoming with information; he told Global Witness he did “The pillar of the gold trade” not know about the export destinations and was not interested.280 The Group of Experts’ December 2008 report names two companies in Burundi involved in the trade in “Burundian gold” Congolese gold: Farrel Trade and Investment Corporation (which appeared to have closed by early 2009) and Gold Link Burundi Trading, run by “Why are you talking to me about Mutoka Ruganyira. The director of the Burundian Congo when we are in Burundi?” Mines Directorate confirmed to Global Witness that Mutoka Ruganyira’s company was the only licensed Director of the Burundian Mines Directorate to Global Witness, Bujumbura, 12 March 2009 gold trading and exporting comptoir operating in Burundi in early 2009; it changed its name to Berkenrode in mid-2008.285 Mutoka Ruganyira Gold produced in South Kivu is exported from admitted to the Group of Experts that he purchased Burundi and passed off as Burundian gold. The fact Congolese gold.286 that only a tiny proportion of gold exports from the DRC are officially declared means that it is easy for Mutoka Ruganyira is referred to in Burundi as “one the Burundian government to claim that these of the pillars of the gold trade”, “the boss of gold exports are part of their country’s domestic trafficking in Burundi” and “a financial heavy- production. weight”.287 Several different sources told Global Witness that he enjoys the protection of the security A Burundian businessman, who is an economic forces of the ruling party (the CNDD-FDD) and adviser to Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza, high ranking officials in the Burundian told Global Witness that 75% of gold available in government.288 Jewellers and others involved in the Burundi comes from the DRC and that “to get gold, gold trade explained to Global Witness that Mutoka you need to have contacts, that’s all”.281 Several Ruganyira buys almost all the gold which comes jewellers in Bujumbura also said that they had no through Bujumbura, including gold from the DRC difficulty obtaining regular supplies of gold, either which is brought to him by intermediaries. from Burundi or from the DRC.282 A Rwandan President Nkurunziza’s economic adviser, who is diplomat told Global Witness that the FDLR come also the director of the Burundi subsidiary of an to Bujumbura to sell their gold there.283 international mining company, told Global Witness chapter 12: the role of transit countries 75

that whenever people come to him with gold from traders who are well-known to the authorities. the DRC, he directs them to Mutoka Ruganyira.289 Yet the Burundian government has shown little interest in cracking down on this trade. Likewise, Global Witness researchers repeatedly tried to companies and traders based in Burundi have not contact Mutoka Ruganyira during their visit to taken any action to ensure that their trade is not Burundi, but he was unreachable; he was apparently fuelling the conflict in eastern DRC, safe in the travelling outside the country. Several individuals knowledge that they have little to fear in terms who knew him personally said he often travelled of government checks or controls. The Burundian for business, particularly to Dubai and sometimes government should address this situation to the DRC.290 urgently by tightening its border controls and exercising oversight over companies and traders The need for action who are importing and exporting minerals. These companies should put in place due diligence The fact that Congolese minerals are transiting measures to ascertain the origin of the goods through Burundi and that some of these may have they buy and to ensure that their purchases are not been produced by the warring parties in eastern fuelling conflict in the DRC. The government DRC is common knowledge in Burundi. Burundi is should demonstrate a commitment to holding to a small country, with a small number of mineral account companies and individuals who fail to do so. © Reuters/Arnd Wiegmann Gold smelting. Almost all gold exports from North and South Kivu are undeclared. Many gold mines are under the control of FDLR or FARDC troops. 13 Recent international initiatives

“Natural resources are not on the table of topics in peace talks. Almost every other issue is. Yet it’s one of the keys to resolution of the conflict.”

UN official, Goma, 22 July 2008

Diplomatic dialogue and mediation efforts Successive rounds of peace talks and bilateral dialogues with governments of the Great Lakes region have failed to At the diplomatic level, there has been increasing address this question in an explicit way. Neither of the recognition of the role natural resources continue to two main initiatives launched in late 2007 and early 2008 – play in fuelling the conflict in eastern DRC, but little the Nairobi communiqué of November 2007 and the corresponding action to tackle the problem. Rather Amani Programme arising from the Goma agreement of than using their influence to break the links between January 2008xviii – included concrete actions to stop the mineral exploitation and the armed conflict, involvement of the warring parties in the natural resource governments and other international players have trade. The question was raised in a number of discussions concentrated on the search for short-term political as part of the Amani Programme, and parties agreed that gains or technical solutions. the issue should be tackled but limited themselves to

(left to right) Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza, former Nigerian President and mediator in the DRC conflict Olusegun Obasanjo, and Congolese President Joseph Kabila, at the opening session of a summit on the crisis in eastern DRC, Nairobi (Kenya), 7 November 2008. © Reuters/Thomas Mukoya © Reuters/Thomas

xviiiThe Nairobi communiqué, signed by the Congolese and Rwandan governments in November 2007, was aimed primarily at addressing the threat posed by the FDLR. The Goma agreement, signed by the Congolese government and 22 armed groups in North and South Kivu in January 2008, led to the Amani Programme, a wide-ranging programme of talks between these groups. Both these initiatives were set back by the resurgence of fighting between the CNDP, the Congolese army and mai-mai groups in North Kivu in the second half of 2008. chapter 13: recent international initiatives 77

general statements of intent. Following the upsurge in Initiatives by donors and fighting between the CNDP and the FARDC in the second governments of home states half of 2008, further peace talks and mediation meetings took place, but the primary emphasis was on securing a ceasefire and limiting the immediate humanitarian crisis. “We need to see more action to tackle and prevent conflict. Because conflict A number of Western diplomats admitted to Global not only ruins lives – it chokes Witness that they and others had not discussed the development.” issue of natural resources with the governments of Douglas Alexander, UK Secretary of State for DRC, Rwanda and other neighbouring countries International Development, in a speech to the British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), 291 because they judged it too sensitive. A UN source Annual General Meeting, 24 October 2007293 said: “Natural resources are not on the table of topics in peace talks. Almost every other issue is. Yet it’s one of the keys to resolution of the conflict. The peace A number of governments, including those of the talks discussed the framework for the army, brassage, United Kingdom, Belgium and France, as well as the demobilisation, etc but not natural resources. Yet European Commission, have commissioned studies and the armed groups are not prepared to leave the initiated discussions on the question of natural resource resources behind.”292 exploitation in the DRC through their ministries of foreign affairs or development. Most of these have Global Witness believes that agreements reached tended to avoid the politically sensitive issues – such as without addressing the fundamental dynamics of the the involvement of senior political or military figures in conflict – in this instance, the warring parties’ economic the mineral trade – focusing instead on technical agendas – are unlikely to produce lasting results. Some measures such as the harmonisation of tax systems in of the armed groups may be willing to make political the region or the development of mineral certification compromises, but they are unlikely to give up the schemes (see below). Such measures could lead to wealth derived from the mineral trade of their own improvements in the long term, if they are backed up by accord. Indeed, while peace talks and mediation efforts strong political commitment, but the gravity of the have been ongoing, armed groups and the Congolese conflict and the level of human rights abuse in eastern army alike have continued to loot eastern DRC’s natural DRC call for more immediate and harder-hitting resources with impunity, and neighbouring countries actions. The impact of strategies which do not address have continued to facilitate this illicit trade without fear the high-level involvement of all the parties in the of international scrutiny. Failure to take this dimension mineral trade – including the Congolese army – and of the conflict into account could undermine peace which do not seek to end the impunity protecting the agreements and create a misleading outcome: perpetrators is likely to be limited. Ultimately, technical combatants could go through the motions of solutions will not succeed in resolving political disarmament and demobilisation while retaining the problems. On the contrary, they may prove to be a economic means to go back to war, or threaten to do so distraction. as soon as they perceive it to be in their interests. Given the frequent recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC, this The weakness of donor governments’ approach to the is not an abstract risk but an immediate threat. question of natural resource exploitation by the warring Concerted action will be needed at the international parties also undermines these governments’ aid level to break these patterns. programmes in the DRC. Western governments, in 78 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

particular, have been pouring huge sums of money into in an initiative arising from the Great Lakes Contact the reconstruction and development of the DRC, but Group, members of donor and other governments set the effectiveness of this assistance has been severely up a taskforce to discuss natural resource exploitation hampered by the continuing violence in the east. There in the DRC and to pursue, in a more concerted way, is broad international consensus that conflict is one of various ideas already under consideration by individual the greatest obstacles to development. Yet donors have governments. failed to tackle directly one of the main factors prolonging the conflict in eastern DRC: the warring Global Witness welcomes this heightened interest. Yet parties’ access to natural resources. there are a number of contradictions in the international approach, as some of the same governments which have In recognition of the urgency of the situation, started exploring ways of halting the illicit trade – for governments should agree on actions which can be example the UK and Belgium – have shown a reluctance implemented without delay to cut off the finances to hold to account companies registered in their own which the warring parties in eastern DRC derive from countries who are fuelling this trade. the mineral trade. These could include supporting MONUC’s efforts to curtail this trade; applying Overall, governments have tended to adopt a timid line sanctions against individuals and companies knowingly with regard to the role of economic actors. Some have trading with armed groups; and investigating and, engaged in dialogue with companies, and even with where appropriate, prosecuting such individuals or some of the comptoirs based in the DRC, for example on companies. In parallel, donor governments should the adoption of codes of conduct, but have rarely pursue the longer-term goal of developing and challenged companies’ excuses or justification for their reinforcing the Congolese government’s ability to trading practices (see section 11). Voluntary standards, control and regulate the mining sector. such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and industry codes of conduct can be useful Governments and inter-governmental organisations tools, but they have so far failed to change companies’ should ensure that any measures they adopt apply not behaviour, as they rely entirely on the goodwill of only to armed groups but also to army units engaged in companies themselves to uphold certain principles. the illicit exploitation of natural resources. Until now, This highlights the need for stronger enforcement international attention on the mineral trade in eastern measures by home states, for example the adoption DRC has focused almost exclusively on the role of of legislation which requires companies to carry out non-state armed groups, in line with the UN arms thorough due diligence and imposes penalties on those embargo and the mandate of the Group of Experts (see who fail to do so. below). Yet, as illustrated in this report, the FARDC are at least as involved as other armed groups in the mineral The response of the Belgian government trade, and their close alliances with some of the groups which are the focus of the arms embargo – for example In view of the fact that Belgian-registered companies the FDLR – make it even more pressing to address their account for the largest proportion of mineral imports involvement. from North and South Kivu, the Belgian government has a particular responsibility to provide firm guidance In more recent months, some governments have to companies and make clear its resolve to put an end engaged more actively in debating ways of curbing the to trading practices which are fuelling armed conflict illicit exploitation of natural resources. In February 2009, and grave human rights abuses. chapter 13: recent international initiatives 79

In January 2009, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Belgian government’s response on this issue is all the called meetings with Trademet and Traxys, two of the more surprising given the laudable role Belgium has Belgian companies cited in the December 2008 report of played in raising the issue of natural resources and conflict the Group of Experts. Belgian government officials told at the UN over the past two years. Belgium has been one Global Witness that they reminded these companies of of the leading governments behind international moves the importance of respecting the OECD Guidelines for to attach a higher importance to the role of natural Multinational Enterprises and offered to facilitate contacts resources in fuelling the conflict in the DRC and was between the companies and the Group of Experts, with a instrumental in ensuring that measures on the illicit view to “avoid being named in future reports”.294 They natural resource trade were included in UN Security encouraged the companies to tighten their due diligence Council resolutions 1856 and 1857 (2008) (see below). In procedures. The companies told them that they believed November 2008, Global Witness had a positive meeting the Group of Experts’ due diligence recommendations with Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Karel de Gucht, who – which are very similar to Global Witness’s – were too has shown a strong personal commitment to these issues; far-reaching and unrealistic. The Belgian National he promised to look into the role of Belgian companies Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines then also wrote buying minerals from eastern DRC.297 The Belgian to Trademet and Traxys asking for a meeting.295 government’s subsequent contacts with two of these companies were positive steps, but if these companies are The Belgian government’s initiative to meet these to alter their trading practices in a meaningful way, the companies is a welcome first step. However, Foreign government will need to send a much clearer message to Ministry officials indicated to Global Witness that they them than that expressed by the officials who spoke to were not envisaging stronger action – despite evidence in Global Witness in April 2009. the Group of Experts’ report that these companies are buying from comptoirs which handle minerals produced by The work of the UN Group of Experts armed groups. The priority of the Belgian government appears to be to engage in dialogue with these companies The Group of Experts set up by the UN Security Council and “find workable solutions with them”. Belgian in 2004 to monitor the arms embargo against armed government officials described this strategy as “much groups in eastern DRC (in force since 2003) has continued more forward looking than holding them to account”. to investigate the natural resource trade as a source of They expressed fears that if these companies stopped finance for these groups. Its December 2008 report trading with the DRC, they would be replaced by other contained detailed information about the mineral trade, companies which it might be more difficult to influence, particularly the relationships between armed groups, and added that they did not want the situation to “revert comptoirs and other buyers.298 The Group of Experts to the black market”. This strategy does not appear to recommended that UN member states “take appropriate take into account the fact that the Belgian companies in measures to ensure that exporters and consumers of question have not taken responsibility for breaking the Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction links between their trade and the armed conflict and have conduct due diligence on their suppliers and not accept continued trading with comptoirs which deal with groups verbal assurances from buyers regarding the origin of responsible for grave human rights abuses. Most their product”.299 The previous report of the Group of disappointingly, the Belgian officials stated that the Experts, published in February 2008, had also stressed the Belgian government “did not want to take sides”, importance of due diligence and concluded that preferring not to be “directly engaged on this issue” individuals or companies failing to carry out basic due and “to stay on the margins”.296 diligence steps to ensure that their purchases were not 80 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

providing assistance to armed groups could be considered The December 2008 UN to be in violation of the arms embargo for provision of Security Council resolutions assistance to armed groups.300 On 22 December 2008, ten days after the publication of The work of the Group of Experts has been important in the Group of Experts’ report, the UN Security Council highlighting the role of the illicit natural resource trade in adopted two resolutions containing measures to address financing armed groups and fuelling the conflict in eastern the natural resource dimension of the conflict. Both DRC. However, its reports alone will not achieve real resolutions recognise “the link between the illegal change unless governments take concrete action on the exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in such basis of their findings and recommendations, including resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as against the individuals and companies recommended for one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts sanctions.301 Numerous reports, reaching similar in the Great Lakes region”.302 Global Witness welcomes the conclusions, have been issued since 2001. Before the current commitment to curbing the illicit trade in natural Group of Experts, a Panel of Experts on the Illegal resources contained in these two resolutions and urges UN Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of member states to ensure that these measures are applied Wealth of the DRC had produced several reports between promptly and comprehensively. 2001 and 2003, describing the illicit natural resource trade in the earlier phases of the conflict and identifying a number MONUC’s revised mandate of companies and individuals involved. Disappointingly, governments took little action in relation to its findings. Resolution 1856 (2008) extends and strengthens the Global Witness urges UN member states to ensure that the mandate of MONUC. Included in MONUC’s mandate, work of the Group of Experts is followed up in a more for the first time, is an explicit reference to using “its effective way. monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the © Kate Holt

MONUC peacekeepers on the road between Rutshuru and Goma, North Kivu, during a period of intense fighting between CNDP and FARDC troops, November 2008. chapter 13: recent international initiatives 81 © Kate Holt A UN peacekeeper walks past the body of a victim killed in Rutshuru, North Kivu, 6 November 2008. MONUC has struggled to ensure the protection of civilians in eastern DRC. provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from Security Council. Until 2008, efforts by MONUC illicit trade in natural resources” and to coordinating and to address the natural resource dimension of the supporting operations with the FARDC with a view conflict have been almost entirely dependent on the to, among other things, “preventing the provision personal interest and motivation of a small number of support to illegal armed groups, including support of staff members within MONUC. These individuals derived from illicit economic activities”. The have carried out detailed monitoring and reporting resolution urges “all States, especially those in the of natural resource exploitation by armed groups in region, to take appropriate steps to end the illicit certain areas, but there has been little capacity or trade in natural resources, including if necessary will to act on their findings in a concerted way. through judicial means” and encourages the The explicit inclusion of these measures in MONUC’s Congolese government to “establish a plan for an renewed mandate should mark a significant change effective and transparent control over the in the way this issue is tackled. exploitation of natural resources”.303 On 12 January 2009, Alan Doss, Special Representative The inclusion of these measures in MONUC’s of the Secretary-General for the DRC, wrote to mandate is welcome, even though they only address Global Witness in connection with this aspect of the exploitation of resources by non-state armed MONUC’s mandate. He stated that MONUC would groups, not the FARDC. However, their effective continue to do its best within the limits of its implementation will require strong commitment and capacity, but reiterated that the protection of civilians resolve, not only on the part of MONUC personnel in remained MONUC’s top priority. He highlighted the North and South Kivu, but on the part of the UN primary responsibility of the government of the DRC, hierarchy in Kinshasa and in New York and the UN as well as those of neighbouring states, to stem the 82 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

natural resource trade which sustains armed mining sector, MONUC would be making a groups.304 significant, longer-term contribution to cutting off one of the principal sources of funding of the In a second, more detailed letter, dated 16 February armed groups. 2009, Alan Doss reiterated that in 2008, MONUC had been planning operations with the FARDC against Sanctions the FDLR and that “disrupting the FDLR’s presence in mining areas and driving them away from their most Resolution 1857 (2008) renews the arms embargo and important trading routes was part and parcel of the travel and financial restrictions on those in breach of plan”. He wrote that MONUC was designing a new the embargo. It specifies that “individuals or entities training course for military observers and civilian supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern staff including a specific focus on monitoring airports, part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ports, roads and border entry points. He stated that through illicit trade of natural resources” are among MONUC would continue random inspections at the categories of people who can now be subjected to airports and small landing strips during 2009. The targeted sanctions and “encourages Member States to letter refers to discussions between MONUC and submit to the Committee for inclusion on its list of agencies of the Congolese Ministry of Mines to designees, names of individuals or entities who meet explore the possibility of deploying mining inspectors the criteria [...] as well as any entities owned or from the Ministry of Mines to important mining sites controlled, directly or indirectly, by the submitted and trading centres.305 individuals or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the submitted entities”. Echoing the Global Witness recognises that MONUC faces an recommendations of the Group of Experts and Global extremely difficult task in the DRC, that it remains Witness, the resolution also “encourages Member severely overstretched and that it is struggling to States to take measures, as they deem appropriate, cope with many pressing demands. The security and to ensure that importers, processing industries and protection of the civilian population must remain the consumers of Congolese mineral products under their top priority. However, the need to tackle the jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers economic dimension of the conflict should not be and on the origin of the minerals they purchase”.306 seen as a separate task from ensuring protection for the civilian population. On the contrary, profits In late January 2009, Global Witness wrote to the derived from the mineral trade are one of the main governments of 30 UN member states, asking what sources of funding which has enabled armed groups actions they were taking to implement resolutions to survive and to continue committing grave abuses. 1856 and 1857. The letter reminded them of the 45-day From a strategic perspective, it is therefore integral to deadline by which they were called upon to report to the protection of civilians. In this respect, Global the UN Sanctions Committee on actions they had Witness welcomes the commitment by the Special taken to implement Resolution 1857, including those Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure relating to sanctions against parties involved in the that actions to stem the illicit exploitation of natural illicit trade in natural resources. resources are integrated into the work of MONUC teams deployed in the east. By implementing these By April 2009, Global Witness had received replies plans, and by working alongside Congolese from the governments of Austria, Canada, Germany, government agencies responsible for overseeing the Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and chapter 13: recent international initiatives 83 © UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz The UN Security Council votes to extend the arms embargo and the mandate of the Group of Experts on the DRC, New York, 22 December 2008. This resolution provides for sanctions against individuals or entities supporting armed groups through the natural resource trade. Yet to date, UN member states have not put forward the names of any such companies or individuals to the UN Sanctions Committee. a brief reply from the US Department of Commerce situation in conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC.xix referring the matter to the Department of State. The German government also refers to plans to Most of these replies limit themselves to references develop a certification system for natural resources to states’ minimum obligations regarding the in eastern DRC (see below).308 implementation of UN sanctions and corresponding national or European legislation and regulations (see The Dutch government has been more active in below). The UK government claims to have “actively engaging companies on the question of responsible supported the application of UN sanctions against sourcing. In line with Resolution 1857, which businesses whose activities supported illegal militias encourages member states to ensure that companies in DRC and [...] will continue to do so where under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence, the sufficient evidence is placed before the Sanctions Dutch ministers for trade and for development Committee”. It does not provide information on any cooperation met companies to discuss possible links specific actions it has taken in this respect.307 between coltan used in mobile telephones sold in the Netherlands and the illegal trade in these minerals in The UK, German and Swedish governments refer to the DRC.309 their support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary In terms of the formal process of reporting back to mechanism which has little bearing on the current the UN Security Council, by the end of February

xixEITI is a voluntary process which brings together governments, extractive companies and civil society organisations to develop a framework for companies to publish what they pay and for governments to disclose what they receive in countries that are dependent on natural resource revenues. For further information, see http://eitransparency.org/eiti 84 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

2009, the governments of Belgium, France, Serbia, named in the December 2008 report of the Group Switzerland and the UK had filed reports on the of Experts. implementation of Resolution 1857. With the exception of Switzerland, most simply mentioned Mineral certification existing national and/or European Union legislation, regulations and other measures already in place in The German proposal their country to apply the sanctions on listed individuals; some also referred to domestic One of the proposals put forward to address the legislation regulating arms transfers.310 In its report, problems in the mining sector in eastern DRC is a the Swiss government published recommendations certification scheme developed by the German for Swiss economic actors on ways of avoiding Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural violations of the sanctions in connection with the Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, purchase of, trade in or processing of minerals from BGR) with funding from the German government.313 the DRC. These recommendations quote those The project has been under discussion since around formulated by the Group of Experts in its February 2007. The BGR signed a memorandum of under- 2008 report, setting out basic due diligence steps to standing with the Congolese Ministry of Mines in determine the exact origin of the minerals and April 2008314 and the first phase of the project was whether the mines are controlled or taxed by armed intended to run from 2009 to 2011. However, in early groups.311 Global Witness welcomes these 2009, it had not yet been set up. Originally conceived recommendations by the Swiss government and as a pilot project in South Kivu, the project would urges other governments to promote due diligence aim to certify minerals by specifying their origin and procedures with companies and traders based in the conditions in which they are produced. At the their countries. time of writing, the precise focus of the certification, the standards to be used and the methodology and As illustrated above, most governments’ responses to timetable have not been finalised. From discussions Resolution 1857 to date have been fairly passive. UN to date, it would seem that issues such as labour member states should go beyond the minimum standards, fair trade terms for artisanal miners and interpretation of the implementation of Resolution environmental considerations may form the primary 1857 and take additional steps to break the links basis for the certification. It is not yet clear how it between the mineral trade and the armed conflict in would address directly the question of armed groups eastern DRC. In particular, they should submit to or military control of the mineral trade.315 the UN Sanctions Committee the names of individuals or companies registered in their country The project, which would be fairly limited in scope, who are known to be trading in natural resources focusing initially on coltan, would not provide a fully produced by or benefiting armed groups. Resolution fledged, comprehensive certification process for all 1857 “encourages Member States to provide any minerals produced in North and South Kivu, at least additional information whenever such information not for several years. If indeed such a process were to becomes available”,312 yet by the end of March 2009, be set up in the longer term, it would require no state had submitted to the UN Sanctions significant financial investment and would be Committee the names of individuals or entities dependent on Congolese government agencies which met the criteria for sanctions in connection themselves exercising greater control, oversight and with the natural resources trade, not even those enforcement over mineral production and exports. chapter 13: recent international initiatives 85

The International Conference submit their production and trade statistics to the on the Great Lakes Region ICGLR Executive Secretariat for a centralised overview of the natural resource trade in the region. In parallel, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) intends to develop a broader If actively pursued by member states, these steps certification scheme which could apply to all minerals could lead to positive developments such as increased and timber produced in the Great Lakes region. In institutional capacity, greater transparency in the 2006, the 11 member states of the ICGLR (Angola, natural resource sector, and improved statistical Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, reporting and information sharing among countries in DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the region. However, the proposal does not specifically Zambia) signed a Pact on Security, Stability and address the ongoing insecurity in eastern DRC and the Development, which includes a Protocol against the continuing problem of the trade in natural resources Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. Among providing funding to warring parties. other things, the Protocol calls on members to establish a regional Mechanism for the Certification of Although most members of the ICGLR agree that Natural Resources. It also includes measures relating greater regulation of the trade in natural resources will to protection of human rights, combating impunity, serve their national and regional interests, incentives to criminalisation of the illegal exploitation of natural establish a certification scheme or to implement resources and sanctions. 316 concrete measures to control the trade are not always strong. For some states in the region, there are A stocktaking mission to identify relevant programmes powerful vested interests in maintaining the status and initiatives already in place in ICGLR member states quo. These may explain in part the lack of progress in was carried out in 2008. A proposal for the regional implementing the Protocol since its adoption more implementation of the Protocol on natural resources than two years ago and regional states’ failure to curb was submitted to members for consideration; it the continuing illicit exploitation and trade of natural suggests numerous actions ranging from legal and resources. As illustrated in this report, and in UN Panel institutional reform to strengthening border controls and NGO reports on the earlier phases of the conflict and harmonising regional trade. in the DRC, political and military elites of countries in the Great Lakes region have benefited directly from the The first expert meeting of the Regional Initiative absence of control or regulation of the natural against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources resource trade. The implementation of actions by the was held on 2-3 April 2009 in Bujumbura. Member ICGLR to halt illicit natural resource exploitation will states reiterated the commitments they had made in require genuine commitment and resolve, on the part 2006, stating that “setting up a regional certification of all parties, to break the patterns of the past. mechanism should be the utmost concern in the coming months”.317 They did not reach a decision on Certification as a long-term measure the type of certification or on concrete steps for implementation. The ICGLR Executive Secretariat has In the long term, an international system of been tasked with the development of a certification certification of minerals could provide benefits and a manual; this is not expected to be finalised and framework for tighter control of the trade. Any such published until 2010 at the earliest. At the April 2009 system should be designed both to strengthen the Bujumbura meeting, member states also agreed to capacity of the Congolese authorities to better 86 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

control the mining sector and to tighten which will take considerable time and resources. requirements on companies at the international The development of such systems should not be level. The certification mechanism should be built prioritised over actions which can have a more around certain minimum conditions, including: immediate impact. Nor should it delay the implementation of measures by the DRC and other • transparency at all stages of the process; governments specifically targeted at excluding the warring parties from the mining sector, such as • clear agreement on common definitions, those recommended in this report. standards and reporting requirements; Likewise, international assistance to strengthen • the creation of coordinated structures for Congolese government capacity and performance exchanging information; in the mining sector should not be limited to the development of a certification scheme. The DRC • audited chain-of-custody arrangements, with already has a set of laws and regulations governing third-party certification and credible audit the mining sector and government agencies whose procedures; job it is to enforce them. At present, these laws and regulations are not being properly enforced, for a • effective complaint and enforcement measures, multiplicity of reasons described in this report. at national and international levels; Donors should concentrate on developing the ability and capacity of government departments • the continuation of capacity-building to enforce these laws, especially at provincial and programmes to assist the authorities of the DRC local levels, as well as controlling the practices and neighbouring countries in implementing the of their own domestic companies (as explained system.318 above). Strengthening provincial and local oversight will represent a significant investment However, Global Witness believes that in view of the for the DRC and should eventually enable the urgency of the current situation in eastern DRC, Congolese authorities to be less dependent on governments should not pin all their hopes on the international interventions to manage the development of international certification systems, country’s natural resources. Conclusion 14 © Mark Craemer

Miner digging a pit, Bisie cassiterite mine, North Kivu, April 2008. Companies could be supporting forced labour and other human rights abuses by failing to check the source of their supplies.

The combination of recent political events in eastern 2008 and the apparent will on the part of certain DRC, a greater international interest in tackling the governments and UN bodies to take firmer action. resource dimension of the conflict and increased Certain companies’ promises to develop due diligence sensitivity to criticism on the part of companies and procedures may also have a positive effect if they are traders may provide a long-awaited opportunity for applied stringently and without delay. However, given more effective action to break the links between the the complexity of the situation in eastern DRC and the mineral trade and armed conflict in North and South international networks involved in the mineral trade, Kivu. However, the momentum will need to be one or two actors alone cannot be relied upon to sustained to ensure that the issue does not fall off achieve change. There needs to be a level playing field the agenda in the rush to find short-term solutions in which companies which are prepared to perform all to the crisis. the necessary checks to ensure that their trade is not fuelling the conflict are not disadvantaged by those Global Witness welcomes the increased international which are not. The highest standards of due diligence attention to the mineral trade in eastern DRC since should become the norm. In order to prevent 88 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

revenues from the mineral trade from prolonging the The complex and shifting relationships between violence, all political and economic actors need to play the warring parties also have to be taken into their part, inside and outside the DRC: from the account. In addition to the collusion between the provinces of North and South Kivu, through to the FARDC and the FDLR, the recent integration of the transit countries and the final destinations of the CNDP into the FARDC, like other rebel groups before minerals. it, presents a further risk. Former CNDP commanders and their troops may now have even The stakes are high, and those benefiting from the easier access to the mines in their new army illicit exploitation of resources will not be willing to uniforms. give up these riches easily. As evidenced by the patterns of the last 12 years, it is in the interests of all sides in Global Witness concurs with the view expressed by the conflict, as well as unscrupulous businessmen, to the Group of Experts that “it is not in the interest of prolong the anarchy, as it delivers financial benefits certain FARDC commanders to end the conflict in without accountability. Any lasting solution to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as long as problem has to be centred on restoring law and order their units are able to deploy to, and profit from, and in bringing those responsible to justice – be it rebel mining areas. Preventing illegal exploitation of leaders, army officers, companies or traders. minerals is inextricably linked to security sector reform, given the deeply rooted corruption and Action to stop the illicit trade should pay particular divided loyalties within FARDC that lends itself to attention to the role of the FARDC. Efforts to dislodge deal-making with non-State armed groups.”319 rebel groups from certain mines may succeed, but safeguards are needed to prevent the FARDC from At the international level, bolder action is needed to taking over their role and their trade networks – a translate the discourse of concern into reality. This pattern which has already been repeated numerous will require a willingness on the part of governments times as the FARDC have been deployed to areas to broach these issues explicitly with government and previously held by rebel groups. military authorities in the Great Lakes region, at the highest levels, and for home states to exercise their An end to hostilities would not automatically responsibility over companies which continue to signal an end to the militarisation of the mineral trade. ignore the human rights impact of their trade. If If anything, the FARDC – and combatants of former eastern DRC’s natural resources are to turn into a rebel groups within their ranks – may well source of wealth and development for the try to strengthen their hold on the trade unless a clear population, governments will have to have the signal is given that such behaviour will not courage to confront those on all sides who have been be tolerated. plundering the country and hold them to account. Annex A

Congolese government statistics Mineral exports from North and South Kivu, 2007 and first half of 2008

Cassiterite (2007)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 10,175.2 4,730.7 14,905.90 $27,566,421.39 N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 8,599.05 4,799.2 13,398.25 $23,369,797.97 $18,741,206 $42,111,003.97 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 4,762.23 N/A N/A $17,156,668 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 4,371.5 N/A N/A $16,013,940 N/A Certification (CEEC)

Cassiterite (first half of 2008)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 10,902.71I 2,880.03 13,782.74 N/A N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 14,114.5 1,224.88II 15,339.38 $27,170,766.46 $12,456,880III $39,627,646.46 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 2,588.86 N/A N/A $15,738,972 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 1,404.38 N/A N/A $9,634,840 N/A Certification (CEEC)IV

I Division des Mines North Kivu statistics, made available to Global Witness, cover January to September 2008. IIOCC South Kivu statistics by weight, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to March 2008. IIIOCC South Kivu statistics by value, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to May 2008. IVCEEC statistics made available to Global Witness cover only April to June 2008. 90 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Coltan (2007)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 74.2 354.20 428.40 $531,760 N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 77.4 348.62 426.02 $548,193 $3,436,423 $3,984,616 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 335.89 N/A N/A $3,217,151 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 587.52 N/A N/A $3,370,714 N/A Certification (CEEC)

Coltan (first half of 2008)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 25v 245.79 270.79 N/A N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 17.41 369.44VI 391.65 $158,394 $2,712,747VII $2,871,141 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 250.66 N/A N/A $3,005,340 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 106.43 N/A N/A $1,425,879 N/A Certification (CEEC)

VDivision des Mines North Kivu statistics, made available to Global Witness, cover January to September 2008. VIOCC South Kivu statistics by weight, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to March 2008. VIIOCC South Kivu statistics by value, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to May 2008. Annex A 91

Gold (2007)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in grammes) in grammes) in grammes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 11,559 105,726.15 117,285.15 $182,735 N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 11,560 N/A N/A $182,740 N/A N/A Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 98,275.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 105,862.86 N/A N/A $1,837,501.36 N/A Certification (CEEC)

Gold (first half of 2008)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in grammes) in grammes) in grammes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines N/A 22,398.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Office Congolais de N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 38,589 N/A N/A N/A N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 24,398 N/A N/A $450,053 N/A Certification (CEEC) 92 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

Wolframite (2007)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 767.1 455 1,222.10 $2,811,955.7 N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 870.97 387.5 1,258.47 $3,177,654 $1,371,100 $4,548,754 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 410 N/A N/A $1,605,800 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 485.70 N/A N/A $1,823,787.44 N/A Certification (CEEC)

Wolframite (first half of 2008)

North South Total North South Total Kivu Kivu Kivu Kivu

(weight (weight (weight (value in US$ (value in US$ (value in US$ in tonnes) in tonnes) in tonnes) at export) at export) at export)

Division des Mines 324.42VIII 119.5 443.92 N/A N/A N/A

Office Congolais de 231.33 59.5IX 290.83 $1,627,632.20 $638,400X $2,266,032.2 Contrôle (OCC)

Office des Douanes et N/A 119 N/A N/A $867,900 N/A Accises (OFIDA)

Centre d’Évaluation, d’Expertise et de N/A 59.5 N/A N/A $420,000 N/A Certification (CEEC)

VIIIDivision des Mines North Kivu statistics, made available to Global Witness, cover January to September 2008. IXOCC Bukavu statistics on weight, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to March 2008. XOCC Bukavu statistics on value, made available to Global Witness, cover only January to May 2008. Annex B

Comptoirs and destinations of exports

North Kivu 2007

Importer’s Quantity Value Comptoir Mineral Importer country of (in tonnes) (in US$) registration

Cassiterite 2,500.5 Amur Slag 20.0 6,778,751.70 Trademet Belgium Wolframite 418.2

Avisam Trading Cassiterite 278.5 752,176.76 Trademet Belgium

Unnamed company United Kingdom Bakulikira Nguma Cassiterite 382.5 996,750.00 Malaysia Smelting Malaysia Corporation Berhad

Bulongo Gems Wolframite 20.0 N/A Wolfram JSC Russia

CLEPAD Cassiterite 539.1 1,523,967.10 Trademet Belgium

Malaysia Smelting Eurotrade Int. Cassiterite 23.0 55,089.60 Malaysia Corporation Berhad

GEMICO Cassiterite 40.0 116,065.25 Traxys Belgium

GMC Cassiterite 68.0 197,200.00 B.E.B Investment Inc Canada

STI Belgium Hill Side Cassiterite 234.0 641,600.00 AMC United Kingdom

Traxys Belgium Hua Ying Cassiterite 89.3 957,921.20 Trademet Belgium

Traxys Belgium

Fogang China

JMT Cassiterite 343.0 994,700.00 Jiata Mettrade India

Thailand Smelting Thailand and Refining Co

La Comete Cassiterite 48.3 115,989.50 Trademet Belgium 94 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

North Kivu 2007 continued

Importer’s Quantity Value Comptoir Mineral Importer country of (in tonnes) (in US$) registration

Laxmi Wolframite 21.0 N/A Aniha Exim FZC United Arab Emirates

Traxys Belgium

Cassiterite 286.7 Trademet Belgium METACHEM 766,653.00 Slag 10.0 Thailand Smelting Thailand and Refining Co

Hong Kong Fortune China (Hong Kong) Cassiterite 6.0 Trading MHI 14,400.00 Coltan 74.2 Unnamed company South Africa (Johannesburg / Pretoria)

MIM Cassiterite 21.5 62,410.00 N/A N/A

MPC Cassiterite 1,068.3 2,885,120.00 MPA Gisenyi Rwanda

Cassiterite 315.0 Munsad 811,000.00 Trademet Belgium Slag 25.0

PABG Cassiterite 23.0 66,591.25 JSC Transcon Russia

Cassiterite 186.6 SODEEM 541,312.55 African Venture Ltd China (Hong Kong) Wolframite 89.3

Sodexmines Cassiterite 2,974.0 8,099,380.60 SDE Belgium

Starfield Austria

Cassiterite 92.2 Tengen Metals British Virgin Islands / Starfield 126,128.00 Wolframite 170.2 Malaysia Starfield Netherlands

British Virgin Islands / Tengen Metals Cassiterite 23.2 67,365.55 Tengen Metals Malaysia

WMC Cassiterite 162.5 448,056.30 Traxys Belgium

Cassiterite 10,172.1

Wolframite 718.7 Total 27,018,628.39 Slag 152.0

Coltan 74.2

Source: Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007 annex B 95

North Kivu, January to September 2008

Quantity Importer’s country Comptoir Mineral Importer (in tonnes) of registration

AFROMET / Cassiterite 856.00 MET Trade India India METACHEM

Cassiterite 1,774.20 Amur Trademet Belgium Wolframite 219.12

Unnamed company Malaysia Bakulikira Cassiterite 45.00 Afrimex United Kingdom

CLEPAD Cassiterite 932.10 Trademet Belgium

GEMICO Cassiterite 39.80 Traxys Belgium

GMC Cassiterite 463.79 B.E.B Investment Inc Canada Canada

Cassiterite 110.90 Hill Side Trademet Belgium Wolframite 15.30

Hua Ying Cassiterite 1,148.90 Traxys Belgium

Cassiterite 769.90 Thailand Smelting JMT Thailand Slag 25.00 and Refining Co

Kivu Metal Coltan 5.04 Traxys Belgium

Mudenge Th. Cassiterite 38.00 Trademet Belgium

MHI Coltan 18.41 African Venture China (Hong Kong)

MIM Cassiterite 64.47 Trademet Belgium

MPC Cassiterite 972.00 MPA Gisenyi Rwanda

Cassiterite 212.00 Munsad Trademet Belgium Coltan 8.00

JSC Company “Eurosib-Logistics” Russia PABG Cassiterite 700.59 Transcon

Cassiterite 833.90 SODEEM Africa Venture Ltd China (Hong Kong) Wolframite 66.00 96 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

North Kivu, January to September 2008 continued

Quantity Importer’s country Comptoir Mineral Importer (in tonnes) of registration

Sodexmines Cassiterite 2,103.10 SDE Belgium

Cassiterite 144.00 Starfield Skapa Mining & GmbHR Austria Wolframite 24.00

Tengen Cassiterite 132.06 Tengen Metals Ltd British Virgin Islands/ Malaysia

WMC Cassiterite 162.00 Traxys Belgium

Cassiterite 10,902.71

Wolframite 324.42 Total Coltan 31.45

Slag 25.00

Source: Division des Mines Nord-Kivu

South Kivu, 2007

Gold

Quantity Importer’s country Comptoir Mineral Importer (in grammes) of registration

AUREX Gold 7,503.85 Aurex Mana. Investi. Switzerland

COTRACOM Gold 7,505.80 N/A N/A

Namukaya Gold 90,716.00 Liongola Guy EP Belgium

Total 105,725.65

Source: Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007 annex B 97

South Kivu, 2007 continued

Cassiterite, coltan and wolframite

Quantity Importer’s country Comptoir Mineral Importer (in tonnes) of registration

Amur Wolframite 50.00 Trademet Belgium

(B.NGU.M) Cassiterite 270.00 Afrimex (UK) United Kingdom Bakulikira

Groupe Olive Cassiterite 270.00 Traxys Belgium

Kaferege Cassiterite 12.00 Niotand Ltd China (Hong Kong)

MDM Cassiterite 232.20 Traxys Belgium

MPC Cassiterite 37.50 MPA Gisenyi Rwanda

Cassiterite 832.50 Afrimex (UK) United Kingdom

Muyeye Coltan 136.86 Traxys Belgium

Wolframite 112.50 Afrimex (UK) United Kingdom

Cassiterite 1,945.20 Thailand Smelting Panju Coltan 127.34 Thailand and Refining Co Wolframite 19.50

Cassiterite 1,131.30 Traxys

WMC Coltan 90.00 Traxys Belgium

Wolframite 273.00 Specialty Metals Trading

Cassiterite 4,730.70

Total Wolframite 455.00

Coltan 354.20

Source: Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007 Annex C

companies which replied to correspondence from Global Witness on trade in minerals from eastern DRC and due diligence policies April 2009

Comptoirs based in eastern DRC

Name of company Date of reply

Afromet (holding reply) 11 December 2008 Mining Processing Congo 17 February 2009 Pan African Business Group 16 December 2008 Panju 11 December 2008

Companies based outside the DRC

Name of company Date of reply

Alfred H Knight 9 January 2009 Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC 19 January 2009 Apple (standard reply) 23 December 2008 Banro 19 December 2008 Dell 28 January 2009 DM Chemi-Net Ltd 16 December 2008 Emirates Gold DMCC 28 February 2009 Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold 16 February 2009 Global Metals and Mining 14 February 2009 Hewlett-Packard 4 February 2009 International Tin Research Institute 22 December 2008 and 5 March 2009 Kemet 16 January 2009 Kivu Resources 18 February 2009 Kuala Lumpur Tin Market 6 April 2009 Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad 16 January 2009 Motorola 12 February 2009 Nokia 16 January 2009 North American Tungsten Corporation 11 January 2009 PT Timah 3 February 2009 Shamika 15 January 2009 Simmonds Metals 24 December 2008 Talison Minerals 18 December 2008 Thailand Smelting and Refining Co Ltd. 20 January 2009 and 18 March 2009 Trademet 22 January 2009 Treibacher Industries AG 14 January 2009 White Solder 23 January 2009 Endnotes

1 Article 25, 3(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 17 Brazilian national department of mining production, http://www. dnpm.gov.br/assets/galeriaDocumento/SumarioMineral2008/estanho. 2 For details, see Global Witness report “Under-mining peace – Tin: the pdf, accessed on 9 April 2009. explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC”, June 2005. 18 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 3 See Global Witness report “Under-mining peace – Tin: the explosive Rapport Annuel 2007; Division des Mines Nord-Kivu statistics for trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC”, June 2005; Report of the Panel of January to September 2008; Division des Mines Sud-Kivu statistics for January to June 2008. For a more detailed breakdown of statistics, see Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Annex A of the present report. Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001, and Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 19 Global Witness estimate based on United States Geological Survey Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2002/565, 22 May 2002. (USGS) Mineral Commodity Summaries and telephone interview with USGS country specialist, 7 April 2009. 4 See, for example, Human Rights Watch press release “DR Congo: Rwandan rebels slaughter over 100 civilians”, 13 February 2009. 20 2009 USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, available at http:// minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/niobium/mcs-2009-tanta. pdf, accessed on 9 April 2009. 5 See President Joseph Kabila quoted in Radio Okapi, “Joseph Kabila à la presse : ‘L’opération conjointe FARDC-Armée rwandaise n’ira pas au delà de février’”, 1 February 2009, and Information Minister Lambert 21 Global Witness estimate based on USGS Mineral Commodity Mende quoted in Radio Okapi, “Kinshasa : Human Rights Watch Summaries and telephone interview with USGS country specialist, demande à Joseph Kabila de livrer Bosco Ntaganda à la CPI”, 7 April 2009. 3 February 2009. 22 2009 USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, available at http:// 6 Reuters, “ICC-wanted warlord in UN-backed Congo offensive”, minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/niobium/mcs-2009-niobi. 29 April 2009. pdf, accessed on 9 April 2009.

7 Accord de paix entre le gouvernement et le Congrès national pour la 23 International Tungsten Industry Association Newsletter, December 2007. défense du peuple (CNDP), Goma, 23 March 2009. 24 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 8 human Rights Watch, “Killings in Kiwanja: the UN’s inability to Rapport Annuel 2007; Division des Mines Nord-Kivu statistics for protect civilians”, December 2008. January to September 2008; Division des Mines Sud-Kivu statistics for January to June 2008. For a more detailed breakdown of statistics, see Annex A of the present report. 9 human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: peace accord fails to end killing of civilians”, 17 July 2008. 25 Global Witness estimate based on USGS Mineral Commodity

10 Summaries and telephone interview with USGS country specialist, human Rights Watch, “Victim statements from eastern Democratic 7 April 2009. Republic of Congo”, 4 December 2008.

26 11 2009 USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, available at http:// http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_TECHART/view.asp?Q=BF_ minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/tungsten/mcs-2009- TECHART_309008, accessed on 27 March 2009. tungs.pdf, accessed on 9 April 2009.

12 See www.itri.co.uk. The overall percentage is not broken down by 27 For information on the uses of pyrochlore and background on the province, but can be assumed to include tin ore from North Kivu, Lueshe mine, see Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007; South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga. Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2006/53, 27 January 2006, paragraphs 96-105; and Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, 13 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, S/2006/525,18 July 2006, paragraphs 137-144. Rapport Annuel 2007; Division des Mines Nord-Kivu statistics for January to September 2008; Division des Mines Sud-Kivu statistics for 28 2006 Congolese government statistics quoted in Pole Institute, January to June 2008. At least four different Congolese government “Ressources naturelles et flux du commerce transfrontalier dans agencies produce export statistics, but their figures do not always tally. la région des Grands Lacs”, July 2007. These exports in 2006 were For a more detailed breakdown of statistics from the different agencies, reportedly from old stock. See IPIS “Mapping conflict motives: eastern see Annex A of the present report. DRC”, March 2008.

14 See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ay2vuc 29 Global Witness e-mail correspondence, 13 February 2009. KIc4PI&refer=home, accessed on 14 April 2009. 30 Letter to Global Witness from MPC Managing Director Brian 15 Peruvian Ministry of Mines and Energy, http://www.minem.gob.pe/ Christophers, 17 February 2009. archivos/dgm/publicaciones/ANUARIOS/ANUARIO2007/ ANUARIO%202.pdf, accessed on 9 April 2009. 31 Global Witness interview with MPC representatives, Goma, 8 August 2008.

16 See ITRI website, http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_NEWSART/ 32 view.asp?Q=BF_NEWSART_310938, accessed on 14 April 2009. For background information on Banro’s presence in South Kivu prior to 2004, see Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, “’Divisé en 100 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

deux’: Or et identité sociale à Kamituga (Sud-Kivu)”, in L’Afrique des 2008. See also Lydia Polgreen, “Congo’s riches, looted by renegade Grands Lacs, annuaire 2003-2004. troops”, The New York Times, 16 November 2008.

33 See Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 54 Global Witness interview with traditional chief from Walikale, Goma, Rapport Annuel 2007. 10 August 2008. Global Witness received several other testimonies about local civilian authorities benefiting, directly or indirectly, from 34 Global Witness interview with MONUC official, Goma, 22 July 2008. extortion by the FARDC at Bisie and other mines. For further information on the role of civilian authorities and the imposition of “taxes” in Bisie, see CREDDHO, “Rapport sur l’exploitation et 35 Global Witness interview with miner, Tubimbi, 29 July 2008. l’exportation de la cassitérite et du coltan en province du Nord-Kivu”, Goma, October 2007. 36 Global Witness interview, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 55 Global Witness interview with representatives of local development 37 Global Witness interviews with Division des Mines, Goma, 22 July organisation, Goma, 9 August 2008. 2008, and other sources in North and South Kivu, July and August 2008. See also CREDDHO, “Rapport sur l’exploitation et 56 Global Witness interview, Kinshasa, 12 May 2008, and telephone l’exportation de la cassitérite et du coltan en province du Nord-Kivu”, interview with journalist, 19 September 2008. Goma, October 2007.

57 Global Witness interview with CREDDHO, Goma, 8 August 2008. 38 Global Witness interviews with members of Congolese human rights See also CREDDHO, “Rapport sur l’exploitation et l’exportation de la organisations, Bukavu, 24 July 2008, and Lemera, 3 August 2008. cassitérite et du coltan en province du Nord-Kivu”, Goma, October 2007.

39 Global Witness interview, Lemera, 3 August 2008. 58 Global Witness interview, Goma, 7 August 2008.

40 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 24 July 2008. 59 Global Witness interview with CREDDHO, Goma, 8 August 2008.

41 Global Witness interview with miner, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 60 Global Witness interview, Goma, 7 August 2008.

42 Global Witness interview with NGO representative, Goma, 21 July 2008. 61 Global Witness interview with General Vainqueur Mayala, commander of the 8th military region, and other senior FARDC officials, Goma, 43 Global Witness interview, Division des Mines, Goma, 22 July 2008. This 11 August 2008. estimate was backed up by a mineral trader in Goma who told Global

Witness that he believed Bisie accounted for 60-70% of all exports from 62 Goma and around 80% of all mineral exports from North and South Global Witness telephone interview with journalist, 19 September 2008. Kivu (Global Witness interview, Goma, 8 August 2008). 63 Global Witness interview with senior FARDC official from the 8th 44 Global Witness interviews with SAESSCAM official, Goma, 23 July 2008, military region, Goma, 11 August 2008. and mining company representative, Goma, 7 August 2008. See also Pole Institute, “Ressources naturelles et flux du commerce 64 Global Witness interviews, Goma, 7 and 10 August 2008. transfrontalier dans la région des Grands Lacs”, July 2007. 65 Global Witness interview with former member of an armed group, 45 Global Witness interview with mining company representative, Goma, Goma, 9 August 2008. 7 August 2008. 66 Global Witness interviews with UN source, civilian government official, 46 Global Witness interview with Division des Mines, Goma, 22 July 2008. industry and humanitarian sources, Goma, July and August 2008; telephone interview with journalist, 19 September 2008. 47 Global Witness interviews, Goma, 7 and 8 August 2008, and telephone interview with journalist, 10 September 2008. See also Lydia Polgreen, 67 Global Witness interviews, Goma, 7 and 10 August 2008. “Congo’s riches, looted by renegade troops”, The New York Times, 16 November 2008. 68 Global Witness interviews with UN personnel, sources in the mining sector and Congolese human rights activists, Goma, August 2008. 48 Global Witness interviews, Goma, 7 and 8 August 2008. 69 Global Witness interviews, Kinshasa, 12 May 2008, and Goma, 7 and 49 “Rapport d’enquête sur la mort d’hommes par éboulement dans le 8 August 2008. GMB and Alexis Makabuza are also cited in the Final puits Safina du carré minier Bisie/Mpama le jeudi 15/11/2007, carré situé report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2007/423, 16 July 2007. en groupement Wassa, secteur des Wanianga”, Province du Nord-Kivu, For further background on the conflict in Bisie, see Pole Institute, Territoire de Walikale, 30 November 2007. The report names the two “Ressources naturelles et flux du commerce transfrontalier dans la FARDC second lieutenants who ordered mining to continue on 14 and région des Grands Lacs”, July 2007, and CREDDHO, “Rapport sur 15 November as Asani and Asimbo Sileki Rasta. l’exploitation et l’exportation de la cassitérite et du coltan en province du Nord-Kivu”, Goma, October 2008. 50 Ibid. 70 Global Witness interviews with MPC representatives, Goma, 7 and 51 Décision no. 5072/002/TW/Y6/2007 du 10/02.2007 portant interdiction de 8 August 2008; MPC letter to the military prosecutor in Kinshasa, dated l’exploitation des minerais dans des puits dangereux à la carrière Bisie/ 11 December 2006. MPC also presented a detailed account of events in Mpama, Dieudonné Tshishiku Mutoke, Administrateur du territoire de Bisie in a letter to Global Witness dated 17 February 2009. Walikale, 10 February 2007. 71 MPC letter to Global Witness, 17 February 2009. 52 Global Witness interview, Kinshasa, 12 May 2008. 72 Global Witness interview with MPC representatives, Goma, 7 August 53 Global Witness interviews, Kinshasa, 12 May 2008 and Goma, 7 August 2008, and telephone interview, 18 March 2009. endnotes 101

73 Global Witness interviews with Division des Mines, Goma, 22 July 2008, logistics, Bukavu, 30 July 2008. and SAESSCAM, Goma, 23 July 2008. 94 Global Witness interview with representatives of Banro, Bukavu, 74 Global Witness interview with General Vainqueur Mayala, 4 August 2008. commander of the 8th military region, and other senior FARDC officials, Goma, 11 August 2008; telephone interview with MPC 95 Global Witness interview, Lemera, 1 August 2008. representative, 18 March 2009.

96 Global Witness interview, Sange, 2 August 2008. 75 Global Witness e-mail correspondence, 19 and 25 March 2009.

97 Global Witness interview, Sange, 2 August 2008. 76 Global Witness interviews with local residents, Tubimbi, 29 July 2008.

98 Article 27 of the Mining Code specifies that members of the armed 77 Global Witness interview, Tubimbi, 29 July 2008. forces may not request or obtain mining rights, artisanal mining or trading cards or constitute themselves as comptoirs for the sale and 78 Global Witness interview, Tubimbi, 29 July 2008. purchase of artisanally produced minerals. Loi no.007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code Minier. 79 Global Witness interviews with local residents, Tubimbi, 29 July 2008. 99 Global Witness interview with General Vainqueur Mayala, commander 80 Global Witness interview with Captain Musa Kyabele Freddy, Tubimbi, of the 8th military region, and Colonel Delphin Kahimbi, deputy 29 July 2008. commander responsible for operations and military intelligence, Goma, 11 August 2008. 81 Global Witness interview with General Pacifique Masunzu, commander 100 of the 10th military region, Bukavu, 30 July 2008. Letter from disciplinary council to the commander of the 8th military region, 15 July 2008. 82 The description of events in Mukungwe in this section is based on 101 Global Witness interviews in July and August 2008 with a range of Global Witness interview with General Vainqueur Mayala, conmander sources in South Kivu, including provincial and local government and of the 8th military region, and Colonel Delphin Kahimbi, deputy military officials, human rights activists, a member of the commander responsible for operations and military intelligence, Goma, Kurhengamuzimu family and representatives of Banro; correspondence 11 August 2008. by parties to the conflict and civilian, police and military authorities; and reports by local civil society organisations. 102 Global Witness interview with official of the Division des Mines, Baraka, 2 August 2008. 83 Global Witness interview with local civilian official, Bukavu, 27 July 2008. 103 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 84 See letter from SAMIKI, signed by its managing director, Pasteur 25 July 2008. Byamungu Kurhengamuzimu, addressed to the Minister of Defence, entitled “Occupation illégale par des militaires de la 10e reg.mil.du 104 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, carré minier de Mukungwe accompagné d’exactions contre la 10 December 2008, paragraphs 73 and 77. Section IV, B of the report population civile” (Illegal occupation of the mining site of Mukungwe (paragraphs 72-101) describes the way in which the FDLR use the by military from the 10th military region, along with abuses against the natural resource trade as a source of finance. civilian population), Kinshasa, 22 May 2008; Global Witness interviews, Bukavu, July and August 2008. 105 For background information on the structures of the FDLR in North and South Kivu, see Pole Institute, “La conférence de Goma et la 85 Global Witness interview with NGO representatives, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. question des FDLR au Nord et au Sud-Kivu”, Goma, June 2008.

86 Global Witness interviews, Bukavu, 27 July and 4 August 2008. 106 Internal MONUC report, 28 May 2008.

87 Global Witness interview with Captain Musa Kyabele Freddy, Tubimbi, 107 Global Witness interview with member of an NGO, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. 29 July 2008. 108 Global Witness meeting with members of civil society from North and 88 Global Witness interview with member of an NGO, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. South Kivu, Goma, 22 July 2008.

89 Letter from FARDC intelligence officer of the 10th military region, 109 Global Witness interviews, Lemera, 1 August 2008. The Group of Bukavu, addressed to the commander in Mukungwe, 19 March 2008. Experts also found that the FDLR were bringing minerals to Lemera to sell them to traders there (see Final report of the Group of Experts on 90 Letter from a police inspector, South Kivu, addressed to the the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, paragraph 85). commander of the 10th military region, entitled “Dénonciation mauvais comportement des Mil dans le carré minier de Mukungwe” 110 Global Witness interview with NGO researcher, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. (denunciation of bad behaviour by the military in the mining site of Mukungwe), 11 April 2008. 111 Global Witness interview, Lemera, 1 August 2008. 91 Global Witness interviews with members of NGOs, Bukavu, 112 24-26 July 2008. Global Witness meeting with members of civil society from North and South Kivu, Goma, 22 July 2008. 92 Global Witness interviews, Bukavu, July 2008. Global Witness was not 113 able to verify the involvement of all these officials. Ibid.

114 93 Global Witness interview with General Pacifique Masunzu, Global Witness meeting with human rights activist, Bukavu, 24 July 2008. commander of the 10th military region, and Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, 2nd commander responsible for administration and 115 Global Witness interview with miner, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 102 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

116 Internal MONUC memo, 2 January 2008, and draft report, 6 May 2008. 139 Global Witness interview with humanitarian source from Walikale, A breakdown of FDLR “taxes” in mines in Mwenga is also provided in Goma, 7 August 2008. Pole Institute, “La conférence de Goma et la question des FDLR au Nord et au Sud-Kivu”, Goma, June 2008. 140 Global Witness interview with member of civil society from Shabunda, Bukavu, 24 July 2008. 117 Note on FDLR deployment in Shabunda by a local NGO, Bukavu, 3 November 2007. 141 Global Witness interview with researcher from Shabunda, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. 118 Internal MONUC report, 28 May 2008. 142 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 119 Global Witness interview with researcher from Shabunda, Bukavu, 24 July 2008. 25 July 2008. 143 Global Witness interview with miner from Shabunda, Bukavu, 120 Global Witness interview with MONUC official, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 28 July 2008.

144 121 Global Witness interview with miner, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. The colonel has since been sent to brassage and moved to another area. Global Witness interview, Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

122 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 145 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 27 July 2008. 10 December 2008, paragraph 86 and Annex 14.

123 Global Witness interview, Bukavu, 26 July 2008. 146 Internal MONUC report, 6 June 2008.

124 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 147 Global Witness interview with local researcher, Bukavu, 25 July 2008. 24 July 2008.

148 125 Global Witness interview with General Pacifique Masunzu, commander Global Witness interview with human rights researcher, Baraka, of the 10th military region, Bukavu, 30 July 2008. 2 August 2008 149 See, for example, FDLR press release 02/CD/December 2008, “FDLR 126 Global Witness interview with mineral trader, Baraka, 2 August 2008. reaction to the final report of the Panel of UN Experts on the DRC”, 15 December 2008. 127 Global Witness interview with provincial government official, Goma, 23 July 2008. 150 Global Witness interviews with MONUC military personnel and Western diplomat, Goma, 22 and 23 July 2008; letter from Alan Doss, Special 128 Global Witness interview, Bukavu, 26 July 2008. Representative of the Secretary-General, to Global Witness, 16 February 2009. See also “Background briefing: UN support for security and stabilization of eastern DRC”, February 2008, and Fourth special report of 129 See Human Rights Watch press releases “DR Congo: Brutal rapes by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the rebels and army”, 9 April 2009, and “DR Congo: Rwandan rebels Democratic Republic of Congo, 21 November 2008. slaughter over 100 civilians”, 13 February 2009; Twenty-seventh report

of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission 151 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2009/160, 27 March 2009; and Global Witness interviews with MONUC military personnel, Goma, 23 July and 11 August 2008. MONUC information note, “MONUC condemns exactions and threats on Congolese civilian populations by the FLDR”, 18 February 2009. 152 Global Witness interview with MONUC military official, Goma, 23 July 2008. 130 Global Witness interview with FDLR members, Luvungi (South Kivu), 31 July 2008. 153 See Fourth special report of the Secretary General on the United

131 Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Declaration of the FDLR 03/CD/September 2008: “The FDLR 21 November 2008, paragraph 23. The paragraph also notes that “there categorically deny false and absolutely baseless accusations propagated continue to be allegations of military and economic collusion by by the British organization Global Witness that they have been involved FARDC with FDLR”. See also letter from Alan Doss, Special in activities of mining tin and gold in the DRC”. Representative of the Secretary-General, to Global Witness, 16 February 2009. 132 Declaration of the FDLR 02/CD/December 2008: “FDLR reaction to the final report of the Panel of UN Experts on the Democratic Republic of 154 Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Congo (DRC)”. Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2009/160, 27 March 2009. 133 For further details on military and other forms of collaboration between the FDLR and the FARDC, see Final report of the Group 155 See AFP, “RDC : départ des troupes rwandaises à partir du 25 février”, of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, section IV, C. 23 February 2009, and BBC News, “Rwanda troops withdraw from Congo”, 25 February 2009. 134 Global Witness interview with FARDC official, Bukavu, 30 July 2008. 156 See Reuters, “Congo, UN to step up ops against Rwandan rebels”, 23 February 2009. 135 Global Witness interview with member of an NGO, Bukavu, 25 July 2008.

157 Radio Okapi, “Sud Kivu : traque des FDLR, Charles Mwando annonce 136 Global Witness interview with human rights activist, Bukavu, 27 July 2008. le lancement de l’opération ‘Kimya II’”, 29 April 2009.

137 Global Witness interview with NGO representative, Goma, 21 July 2008. 158 Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2009/160, 138 Global Witness interview with UN source, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 27 March 2009. endnotes 103

159 Global Witness interviews, Kinshasa, 8 and 12 May 2008, and Division 24 August 2008. These figures differ from official government statistics des Mines, Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007. See also IPIS, “Mapping (see Annex A of the present report). conflict motives”, March 2008. For further information on the Bibatama mine, see Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 179 Global Witness interviews with and official documents from Division 10 December 2008, section III, F. des Mines, North and South Kivu, July 2008, and interviews with comptoirs in Goma and Bukavu, July and August 2008. 160 For details of the CNDP’s control of Bunagana and the revenues it collects there, see Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, 180 Global Witness interview with Alexis Makabuza, Goma, 10 August 2008. S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, paragraphs 35-47.

181 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 161 Global Witness interviews with MONUC staff, Goma, 22 July 2008 and 10 December 2008, section IV, B. 9 August 2008, and Kinshasa, 8 May 2008. The CNDP’s system of “tax” collection, including from the charcoal trade, is also described in the Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 182 Ibid, paragraphs 57-60. 10 December 2008, paragraph 33. 183 Ibid, paragraph 85; Global Witness e-mail correspondence, 13 February 2009. 162 See Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, in particular section III, G. For details of Rwanda’s 184 Global Witness did not research in detail the identity and networks of support to Laurent Nkunda and his associates before the CNDP was négociants. More information on their role, particularly in relation to the formed, see Report of the Group of Experts, S/2004/551, 15 July 2004. FDLR, can be found in the Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008. 163 Global Witness interviews, Goma and Bukavu, August 2008. See also Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 185 Global Witness interview, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 10 December 2008, section III.

186 164 For example, Global Witness interview with Mudekereza Namegabe, Global Witness interviews, Bukavu, 25 July 2008 and Baraka, Groupe Olive and President of FEC South Kivu, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 2 August 2008.

187 Global Witness interview, Goma, 7 August 2008. 165 Global Witness interview with miner, Baraka, 2 August 2008.

188 Global Witness e-mail correspondence, 1 September 2008. 166 Global Witness interview with member of a local human rights and development organisation, Baraka, 2 August 2008. 189 Global Witness interview with Mudekereza Namegabe, Groupe Olive and President of FEC South Kivu, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 167 Letter from the Chef de Division des Mines to the Governor of South Kivu, entitled “Occupation illégale du carré minier de Mukungwe : demande évacuation des militaires” (Illegal occupation of the mining 190 Global Witness meeting with comptoirs, Goma, 9 August 2008. site at Mukungwe: request for the evacuation of the military), Bukavu, 28 March 2008. 191 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, paragraph 72. 168 Letter from Vice-Governor of South Kivu to the commander of the 10th military region, entitled “Evacuation des militaires dans le carré 192 Global Witness meeting with 18 representatives of comptoirs, Goma, minier de Mukungwe” (Evacuation of military from the mining site at 9 August 2008. Mukungwe), Bukavu, 31 March 2008. 193 Letter from Thierry Kituli Kaoma, General Director of Pan African 169 For further information on the phenomenon of fraud in this context, Business Group, sent to Global Witness by e-mail on 16 December 2008. see Pole Institute, “Ressources naturelles et flux du commerce transfrontalier dans la région des Grands Lacs”, July 2007. 194 Global Witness interviews, Goma, 22 July and 7 August 2008; telephone interview with journalist, 19 September 2008; Division des Mines 170 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007. Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007. See also IPIS, “Culprits or scapegoats? Revisiting the role of Belgian mineral traders in eastern DRC”, May 2009. 171 Global Witness interviews with OCC staff, Bukavu, 28 July and 4 August 2008, OFIDA staff, Bukavu, 30 July 2008, and Division des Mines, 195 Letter from FEC North Kivu to the Minister of Mines in Kinshasa, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. entitled “Dénonciation des accusations des ONG et le Panel des Nations Unies de l’embargo sur les armes en RDC”, 11 December 2008. 172 Global Witness interview with Division des Mines, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. 196 Global Witness interview with Muyeye Byaboshi, Bukavu, 5 August 2008. 173 Global Witness intervew with Division des Mines, Goma, 22 July 2008. 197 Letter from Thierry Kituli Kaoma, General Director of Pan African 174 Global Witness interviews with Division des Mines, Bukavu, 28 July 2008 Business Group, sent to Global Witness by e-mail on 16 December 2008. and SAESSCAM, Goma, 23 July 2008. 198 Global Witness interview with Mudekereza Namegabe, Groupe Olive 175 Global Witness interview with senior civil servant, Bukavu, 28 July 2008. and President of FEC South Kivu, Bukavu, 28 July 2008; Global Witness meeting with comptoirs, Goma, 9 August 2008. 176 Global Witness interview with OFIDA officials, Bukavu, 30 July 2008. 199 Letter from Thierry Kituli Kaoma, General Director of Pan African 177 Global Witness interview with Jean-Claude Kibala, Vice-Governor of Business Group, sent to Global Witness by e-mail on 16 December 2008. South Kivu, Bukavu, 5 August 2008. 200 E-mail from Zulfikarali Panju to Global Witness, 19 December 2008. 178 “Réflexion de la Fédération des Entreprises du Congo sur l’exploitation des minerais au Kivu : ses impacts sur la situation socio économique et 201 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, la recherche commune des pistes de solutions durables”, Bukavu, 10 December 2008, paragraphs 78 and 79. 104 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

202 Global Witness interview with Mudekereza Namegabe, Groupe Olive 224 Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC Annual Report and Accounts and President of FEC South Kivu, Bukavu, 28 July 2008; Global Witness 2007. meeting with comptoirs, Goma, 9 August 2008; and letter from FEC North Kivu to the Minister of Mines, 11 December 2008. 225 AMCO Investments Limited, Annual Return, period ending 7 July 2008; Amalgamated Metal Corporation PLC, Annual Return, period ending 203 Speech by Mudekereza Namegabe, President of FEC South Kivu, quoted 30 April 2008. in “Réflexion de la Fédération des Entreprises du Congo sur l’exploitation des minerais au Kivu : ses impacts sur la situation socio 226 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, économique et la recherche commune des pistes de solutions durables”, 10 December 2008, paragraphs 78 and 79. Bukavu, 24 August 2008.

227 204 In 2007, THAISARCO purchased 1,945 tonnes of cassiterite, 127.34 See, for example, Radio Okapi, “Bukavu : accusés de financer la guerre tonnes of coltan and 19.5 tonnes of wolframite from Panju (see Division à l’Est, les comptoirs miniers ferment”, 8 January 2009. des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007) and continued buying minerals from Panju in 2008 (see, for example, CEEC, Rapport mensuel 205 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Rapport d’activités, mois d’avril 2008, mois de mai 2008 et mois de juin 2008, Annuel 2007; Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, statistics for January to Antenne de Bukavu, Sud-Kivu.). September 2008. See Annex B of the present report. 228 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 206 For background information on these companies, see IPIS, “Culprits or 10 December 2008, paragraph 88. scapegoats? Revisiting the role of Belgian mineral traders in eastern DRC”, May 2009. The report also documents the trading relationships 229 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1857 (2008), 22 December 2008. between some of these companies; it states that SDE has supplied Traxys with minerals while STI has supplied Trademet. 230 Letters to Global Witness from D.M. Spratt, Managing Director,

207 THAISARCO, 20 January 2009, and from V.H.Sher, Chief Executive http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_TECHART/view.asp?Q=BF_ of AMC, 19 January 2009. TECHART_285697

231 208 Letter to Global Witness from Lai Fook Hoy, Group Chief Operating See www.thaisarco.com Officer of Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad, 16 January 2009.

209 http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_TECHART/view.asp?Q=BF_ 232 Ibid. TECHART_285697

233 210 Letter to Global Witness from D.M. Spratt, Managing Director, Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, THAISARCO, 20 January 2009. Rapport Annuel 2007. See Annex B of the present report.

234 Letter to Global Witness from F. Muylaert, Trademet, 22 January 2009. 211 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, statistics for January to September 2008.

235 212 Letters to Global Witness from AMC, 19 January 2009; Malaysia Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, Smelting Corporation, 16 January 2009; THAISARCO, 20 January 2009; Rapport Annuel 2007. See Annex B of the present report. and Trademet, 22 January 2009.

213 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 236 ITRI Artisanal and Small Scale Mining Policy, 15 October 2008, available Rapport Annuel 2007. See Annex B of the present report. at www.itri.co.uk.

214 United Nations Commodity Trade statistics database; Thailand customs 237 ”Progress report: towards a responsible cassiterite supply chain”, statistics accessed at http:/www.customs.go.th on 2 December 2008. 12 February 2009, available at www.itri.co.uk.

215 Letter from Thierry Kituli Kaoma, General Director of Pan African 238 Ibid. Business Group, sent to Global Witness by e-mail on 16 December 2008.

239 216 Letter to Global Witness from Brian Christophers, Managing Director, Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, MPC, 17 February 2009. 10 December 2008.

240 217 Letter to Global Witness from Alan G. Smith, Chief Executive Officer, See Annex III of the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Kivu Resources, 18 February 2009. Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, S/2002/1146, 15 October 2002. 241 Letter to Global Witness from Brian Christophers, Managing Director, MPC, 17 February 2009. 218 See, for example, Division des Mines Nord-Kivu, Rapport Annuel 2007.

242 219 Letter to Global Witness from Michael Prinsloo, President and CEO, See www.sdee.be and www.gbedrc.com Banro, 19 December 2008.

220 See The New York Times, “Kinshasa journal – getting rich in Zaire: 243 “Social and Environmental Responsibility in Metals Supply to the An American, 33, tells how”, 20 December 1989. Electronic Industry”, prepared for EICC and GeSI by GHGm, 20 June 2008. 221 See www.gbedrc.com 244 Ibid. 222 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section is drawn from documents obtained from UK Companies House and from 245 Electronic Industry Code of Conduct, adopted in October 2004 and THAISARCO’s website, www.thaisarco.com, accessed on 20 March 2009. subsequently revised. The version consulted by Global Witness, dated October 2007, was downloaded from Hewlett-Packard’s website at www. 223 See http://www.amcgroup.com/about.html, accessed on 3 April 2009. hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supcode.pdf endnotes 105

246 Letter to Global Witness from Bonnie Nixon, Director of Environmental 265 “Mining and geological status”, Ministry of Natural Resources, Kigali, Sustainability, Hewlett-Packard, received on 4 February 2009. given to Global Witness by the Ministry of Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009.

247 See http://www.nokia.com/corporate-responsibility/ethics/tools/ 266 Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency, “The Wealth of the code-of-conduct Land: Rwanda Minerals, Invest in Rwanda; A New Frontier of Opportunity”, 2008, page 44. 248 Letter to Global Witness from Pekka Isosomppi, Director of Corporate Social Responsibility, Nokia Corporation, 16 January 2009. 267 Global Witness interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of State in charge of Environment and Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009. 249 Global Witness, “Afrimex (UK) – DRC: Complaint to the UK National Contact Point under the Specific Instance Procedure of the OECD 268 Déclarations douanières d’exportation, “Exportations et ré-exportations Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, 20 February 2007. mensuelles des minerais”, 2008, given to Global Witness by the OGMR, Kigali, 4 March 2009. 250 Final statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD 269 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) Ltd, 28 August Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency, “The Wealth of the 2008; Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Land: Rwanda Minerals, Invest in Rwanda; A New Frontier of (BERR) press release “Mineral trade helped fund rebels”, 28 August 2008. Opportunity”, 2008, page 44.

270 251 Division des Mines Nord-Kivu and Division des Mines Sud-Kivu Global Witness interviews, Kigali, March 2009. Rapport Annuel 2007. 271 Global Witness interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of State in 252 CEEC, Rapport mensuel d’activités, mois de mai 2008 et mois de juin charge of Environment and Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009. 2008, Antenne de Bukavu, Sud-Kivu. 272 Ibid. 253 Performances des comptoirs du Sud-Kivu en 2008, Division des Mines Sud-Kivu, 19 July 2008. 273 Global Witness interview with director of mineral trading company, Kigali, 4 March 2009. 254 Global Witness interviews in Bukavu, 28 July and 3 August, and in Goma, 7 and 8 August 2008; report by a Uvira-based human rights 274 Global Witness interview with former member of the Burundian organisation on illicit exploitation of minerals in the territoires of Uvira National Assembly, Bujumbura, 11 March 2009. and Fizi, January-July 2008. For an explanation of the relationship between Afrimex, Société Kotecha and SOCOMI, see Final statement by 275 Global Witness interviews with jewellers, journalists, members of NGOs the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for and foreign diplomats, Bujumbura, March 2009, and with a range of Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) Ltd, 28 August 2008. sources in South Kivu, July and August 2008.

255 Global Witness letter to Afrimex, 6 February 2009. 276 Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, “Production minière du Burundi”, September 2008; Global Witness interview with Damien 256 E-mail from Ketan Kotecha, director of Afrimex, to Margaret Mbonicuye, Director, Direction des Mines et Carrières, Ministry of Sutherland, NCP, copied to Global Witness, 2 March 2009. Water, Energy and Mines, Bujumbura, 12 March 2009.

277 257 For further details, see UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1857 Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, “Production minière du (2008), 22 December 2008. Burundi”, September 2008.

278 258 For further details on regional trade routes, see INICA, “Natural Global Witness interview with Damien Mbonicuye, Director, Direction resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes region”, 2007. des Mines et Carrières, Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, Bujumbura, 12 March 2009.

259 See, for example, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 279 Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, “Production minière du DRC, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001; Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Burundi”, September 2008. the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, S/2002/1146, 15 October 2002; Amnesty 280 Global Witness interview with Damien Mbonicuye, Director, Direction International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: our brothers who help des Mines et Carrières, Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, kill us”, April 2003; and Global Witness, “Under-mining peace – Tin: Bujumbura, 12 March 2009. the explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC”, June 2005. 281 Global Witness interview with Burundian businessman and presidential 260 For further information, see Global Witness, “Under-mining peace adviser, Bujumbura, 11 March 2009. – Tin: the explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC”, June 2005. 282 Global Witness interviews with jewellers, Bujumbura, 14 March 2009. 261 Mining Export Statistics, Banque nationale du Rwanda (BNR), given to Global Witness by the Ministry of Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009. 283 Global Witness interview with senior Rwandan diplomat, Bujumbura, 10 March 2009. 262 Global Witness interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of State in charge of Environment and Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009. 284 Global Witness interview with Damien Mbonicuye, Director, Direction des Mines et Carrières, Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines, 263 Rwandan government draft document (unpublished) on the mining Bujumbura, 12 March 2009. sector, November 2008; Global Witness interviews with mining companies, Kigali, March 2009. 285 Ibid.

264 Global Witness interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of State in 286 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, charge of Environment and Mines, Kigali, 6 March 2009. 10 December 2008, paragraphs 90-93. 106 ”Faced with a gun, what can you do?”

287 Global Witness interviews with jewellers, journalists, members of NGOs 305 Letter from Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and foreign diplomats, Bujumbura, March 2009. to Global Witness, 16 February 2009.

288 Global Witness interviews with foreign diplomat, NGO 306 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1857 (2008), 22 December 2008. representative, journalists and representatives of political parties, Bujumbura, March 2009. 307 Letter to Global Witness from UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 April 2009. 289 Global Witness interview with Burundian businessman and presidential adviser, Bujumbura, 11 March 2009. 308 Letter to Global Witness from the German Federal Foreign Office, 31 March 2009. 290 Global Witness interviews, Bujumbura, March 2009. 309 Letter to Global Witness from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 291 Global Witness interviews with Western diplomat, Goma, 22 July 2008, 2 April 2009. and US government officials, Washington DC, 24 July 2007. 310 See notes verbales of the permanent missions of these countries to 292 Global Witness interview with MONUC official, Goma, 22 July 2008. the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, S/AC.43/2009/2 (Belgium), S/AC.43/2009/3 (France), S/AC.43/2009/4 (Serbia) and 293 http://www.concernuniversal.org/index.php?/article/_news/ S/AC.43/2009/5 (UK). concern_univeral’s_work_recently_acknowledged_by_uk_secretary_ of_state/18.htm 311 Report prepared by Switzerland pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008) and attached recommendations, 5 February 2009, 294 Global Witness meeting with officials from the Belgian Ministry of S/AC.43/2009/1. Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 8 April 2009. 312 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1857 (2008), 22 December 2008, 295 Ibid. paragraph 6 (a).

313 296 Ibid. For a brief outline of the project, see “Technische Zusammenarbeit mit des Demokratischen Republik Kongo” (Technical Cooperation with the DRC) available at www.bgr.bund.de 297 Global Witness meeting with Karel de Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, 25 November 2008. 314 See DRC government press release “DRC Ministry of Mines and Germany’s Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources sign 298 Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the memorandum of understanding”, 11 April 2008. Congo, S/2008/773, 12 December 2008. 315 Global Witness telephone conversations with representatives of BGR, 299 Ibid, paragraph XII, 14. 22 May 2008 and 28 January 2009.

300 Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 316 Protocol on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, International Congo, S/2008/43, 13 February 2008, paragraph 85. Conference for the Great Lakes Region, 30 November 2006.

301 These were contained in a confidential annex to the Final report of the 317 International Conference for the Great Lakes Region, press statement, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2008/773, Bujumbura, 7 April 2009. 12 December 2008. 318 For further details of these conditions and other considerations in 302 UN Security Council resolutions S/RES/1856 (2008) and S/RES/1857 developing a certification system, see Corene Crossin, Gavin Hayman (2008), 22 December 2008. and Simon Taylor, “Where did it come from? Commodity tracking systems”, in “Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and 303 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1856 (2008), 22 December 2008. actions”, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds.), World Bank, 2003.

319 304 Letter from Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, to Global Witness, 12 January 2009. 12 December 2008, paragraph 135. Global Witness Limited is a non-profit company limited by guarantee and incorporated in England (Company No. 2871809). Global Witness Limited exposes and breaks the links between the exploitation of natural resources and the funding of conflict, corruption and human rights abuses. Global Witness Limited carries out investigations in countries devastated by conflict, corruption and poverty and our findings from these investigations are used to brief governments, intergovernmental organisations, civil society and the media. Global Witness Limited is recognised as the equivalent of a US public charity as described in section 509(a)(1) of the US Internal Revenue Service Code 1986.

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