Power Relations and Good Governance: a Social Network Analysis of the Evolution of the Integrity in Public Office Act in the Commonwealth of Dominica

POWER RELATIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC OFFICE ACT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA

Thèse

Gérard JEAN-JACQUES

Doctorat en science politique Philosophiae doctor (Ph.D)

Québec, Canada

POWER RELATIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC OFFICE ACT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA

Thèse

Gérard JEAN-JACQUES

Sous la direction de:

Louis IMBEAU, directeur de recherche Mathieu OUIMET, codirecteur de recherche

RÉSUMÉ: La Banque mondiale propose la bonne gouvernance comme la stratégie visant à corriger les maux de la mauvaise gouvernance et de faciliter le développement dans les pays en développement (Carayannis, Pirzadeh, Popescu & 2012; & Hilyard Wilks 1998; Leftwich 1993; Banque mondiale, 1989). Dans cette perspective, la réforme institutionnelle et une arène de la politique publique plus inclusive sont deux stratégies critiques qui visent à établir la bonne gouvernance, selon la Banque et d'autres institutions de Bretton Woods. Le problème, c’est que beaucoup de ces pays en voie de développement ne possèdent pas l'architecture institutionnelle préalable à ces nouvelles mesures. Cette thèse étudie et explique comment un état en voie de développement, le Commonwealth de la Dominique, s’est lancé dans un projet de loi visant l'intégrité dans la fonction publique. Cette loi, la Loi sur l'intégrité dans la fonction publique (IPO) a été adoptée en 2003 et mis en œuvre en 2008. Cette thèse analyse les relations de pouvoir entre les acteurs dominants autour de évolution de la loi et donc, elle emploie une combinaison de technique de l'analyse des réseaux sociaux et de la recherche qualitative pour répondre à la question principale: Pourquoi l'État a-t-il développé et mis en œuvre la conception actuelle de la IPO (2003)? Cette question est d'autant plus significative quand nous considérons que contrairement à la recherche existante sur le sujet, l'IPO dominiquaise diverge considérablement dans la structure du l'IPO type idéal. Nous affirmons que les acteurs "rationnels," conscients de leur position structurelle dans un réseau d'acteurs, ont utilisé leurs ressources de pouvoir pour façonner l'institution afin qu'elle serve leurs intérêts et ceux et leurs alliés. De plus, nous émettons l'hypothèse que: d'abord, le choix d'une agence spécialisée contre la corruption et la conception ultérieure de cette institution reflètent les préférences des acteurs dominants qui ont participé à la création de ladite institution et la seconde, notre hypothèse rivale, les caractéristiques des modèles alternatifs d'institutions de l'intégrité publique sont celles des acteurs non dominants. Nos résultats sont mitigés. Le jeu de pouvoir a été limité à un petit groupe d’acteurs dominants qui ont cherché à utiliser la création de la loi pour assurer leur légitimité et la survie politique. Sans surprise, aucun acteur n’a avancé un modèle alternatif. Nous avons conclu donc que la loi est la conséquence d’un jeu de pouvoir partisan. Cette recherche répond à la pénurie de recherche sur la conception des institutions de l'intégrité publique, qui semblent privilégier en grande partie un biais organisationnel et structurel. De plus, en étudiant le sujet du point de vue des relations de pouvoir (le pouvoir, lui-même, vu sous l’angle actanciel et structurel), la thèse apporte de la rigueur conceptuelle, méthodologique, et analytique au discours sur la création de ces institutions par l’étude de leur genèse des perspectives tant actancielles que structurelles. En outre, les résultats renforcent notre

iii capacité de prédire quand et avec quelle intensité un acteur déploierait ses ressources de pouvoir.

ABSTRACT: The World Bank proposes good governance as the strategy to correcting the evils of bad governance and to facilitate development in developing states (Carayannis, Pirzadeh, & Popescu 2012; Hilyard & Wilks 1998; Leftwich 1993; World Bank 1989). From this perspective, institutional reform and a more inclusive public policy arena are two critical strategies that will likely lead to good governance, according to the Bank and other Bretton Woods institutions. The problem is that many of these states do not have the pre-requisite institutional architecture to accommodate such measures. This thesis studies and discusses how one developing state, the Commonwealth of Dominica, approached the development of an institution to oversee integrity in public office. This Act, the Integrity in Public Office Act (IPO) was passed in 2003 and implemented in 2008. The focus in the thesis is on power relations among dominant actors surrounding the IPO consequently, it employs a combination of social network analysis and qualitative research techniques to answer the principal question: Why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003)? This question is all the more significant when we consider that contrary to existing research on the subject, the Dominican IPO diverges considerably in structure from the ideal-type IPO. We argue that “rational” actors, cognizant of their structural position in a network of actors, have used their power resources to shape the institution so that it serves them and their allies. We hypothesized that: First, the choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of the IPO and second, our rival hypothesis, the characteristics of alternative options and models of public integrity institutions are those of the non-dominant actors. Our results are mixed. Power play was limited among a small group of dominant actors who sought to use the creation of the Act as an opportunity for political legitimacy and survival. Not surprisingly, there was no alternative model advanced. We concluded therefore that the Act resulted from a purely partisan agenda. This research responds to the paucity of studies on the design of institutions of public integrity, which largely seem to have an organisational and structural bias. In addition, by embracing the topic from the perspective of power relations, the thesis adds conceptual, methodological, and analytical rigour to discourses on the creation of such institutions by studying their evolution from both agential and structural perspectives. Finally, the results offer us an opportunity to predict when and in what intensity actors will deploy their power resources.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RÉSUMÉ ...... III ABSTRACT ...... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... VI LIST OF TABLES ...... IX LIST OF FIGURES ...... X REMERCIEMENTS ...... XI

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 The Commonwealth of Dominica ...... 6 Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) ...... 9 Structure of the IPO ...... 12 Purpose, Research Question, and Thesis Statement ...... 14 Justification for the Research ...... 15 Summary ...... 17 Structure of the Thesis ...... 18 Summary of the Introduction ...... 19

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISATION ...... 20 1.1 Public Integrity ...... 20 1.2 Institutions: Choice and Design ...... 23 1.3 Purpose of Integrity Bodies...... 24 1.4 Typology of IPOs ...... 26 1.5 Ideal-Type ...... 30 1.6 Summary to Chapter 1 ...... 32

CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING CHOICE: THEORIZING ABOUT CREATING THE IPO ...... 33 2.1 Theorizing about Integrity Management ...... 39 2.2 Structure – Agency ...... 40 2.3 Power ...... 42 2.4 Theories of Power in Networks of Actors ...... 44 2.5 Strong and Weak Ties ...... 44 2.6 Centrality ...... 45 2.7 Typology of Power Resources ...... 48 2.8 Summary of Our Theory: Power and Integrity Management ...... 50 2.9 Summary of Chapter 2 ...... 52

CHAPTER 3: METHOD ...... 55 3.1 Research Questions and Key Concepts ...... 56 3.2 Hypotheses ...... 57 3.2.1 Hypothesis #1: Theoretical Foundations ...... 58 3.2.2 Hypothesis #2: Theoretical Foundations ...... 61 3.3 Data Collection and Analysis ...... 63 3.4 Data Sources ...... 64 3.5 Data Collection ...... 64 3.6 Document Search ...... 64 3.9 Summary of Document Analysis ...... 69 3.10 Interaction with Participants ...... 69 3.11 Social Network Analysis (SNA) ...... 70 3.12 Data Collection and Analysis in SNA ...... 75

3.13 Semi-Structured Interviews ...... 75 3.14 Validating Data ...... 76 3.15 Jaccard Similarity Coefficient ...... 77 3.16 Questionnaires ...... 77 3.17 Triangulation of Sources ...... 78 3.18 Analysing Power Relations ...... 78 3.18.1 UCINET ...... 79 3.18.2 Connections among Actors ...... 82 3.18.3 Actor Centrality ...... 82 3.19 Summary of Chapter 3 ...... 84 3.20 Anticipated Conclusions...... 85

CHAPTER 4: THE RESULTS ...... 87 4.1 Overview ...... 88 4.1.1 Key Concepts ...... 88 4.1.2 Pre and Post Phases ...... 88 4.2 Results for question #1 ...... 90 4.2.1 Egonets ...... 94 4.2.2 Degree Centrality Scores ...... 109 4.3 Results for question #2 ...... 110 4.4 Results for question #3 ...... 114 4.5 Results for question # 4 ...... 116 4.6 Results for question # 5 ...... 120 4.6.1 Results for sub-questions #1 and #1.1 ...... 122 4.6.2 Results for sub-question #2 ...... 124 4.6.3 Results for sub-question #3 ...... 126 4.7 Results for question #6 ...... 131 4.7.1 Urgency ...... 135 4.7.2 Structurally ...... 137 4.7.3 Composition of the Coalitions/Pre and Post-Transitions ...... 137 4.8 Summary to Chapter 4 ...... 138

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION ...... 140 5.1 Review ...... 140 5.2 The Anatomy of a Centralised IPO ...... 143 5.3 Part I: Institutional Divergence ...... 147 5.3.1 A Multi-Purpose Tool ...... 147 5.3.2 Clanification and the Bear Syndrome ...... 149 5.3.3 Talk, and More Talk ...... 154 5.3.4 Political Survival ...... 155 5.3.5 Defensive Democratization ...... 156 5.3.6 Fluctuating Investments ...... 159 5.3.7 International Pressure ...... 160 5.3.8 Unexpected Findings ...... 161 5.3.9 Summary ...... 162 5.4 PART II: Explaining the Choice of the Dominican Model ...... 163 5.4.1 Isomorphism ...... 164 5.5 Part III: Validating Hypotheses ...... 167 5.6 Summary to Chapter 5 ...... 171

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS ...... 173 6.1 Review ...... 173 6.2 Implications ...... 176 6.2.1 Power as a Language ...... 176

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6.2.2 Dobel Triangle, Policy Networks, and Public Integrity ...... 178 6.2.3 Reconceptualisation of Public Integrity and Political Transparency ...... 179 6.2.4 Conflict Zone ...... 181 6.2.5 Summary ...... 183 6.3 Challenges ...... 183 6.4 Areas for Further Study ...... 184 6.4.1 Measuring Power...... 184 6.4.2 Democracy and Public Integrity: The Conundrum ...... 185 6.4.3 The Centralised Model Vs the Ideal Type ...... 186 6.5 Concluding Comments ...... 187

REFERENCES ...... 188

APPENDICES ...... 200 Appendix 1: Example of Matrix used for Analysing Documents ...... 200 Appendix 2: List of all Actors ...... 205 Appendix 3: Matrices Showing UCINET Ties Among Actors ...... 207 Appendix 3.1: Pre-Transition Ties ...... 207 Appendix 3.2: Post-Transition Ties ...... 209 Appendix 4: Questionnaire and Interview Schedule Intended for used in the Data Collection ...... 211 Appendix 4.1: Questionnaire on the Creation of the Dominica Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) ...... 211 Appendix 4.2: Interview Guide ...... 221 APPENDIX 5: Egonets in the Pre and Post-Transition Phases ...... 227 Appendix 5.1: Adjacent Matrices Showing Egonet for Top Five Egos and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 227 Appendix 5.2: Adjacent Matrices Showing Egonet for Top Five Egos and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 229 Appendix 5.3: Egonet for PRI1 and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 231 Appendix 5.4: Egonet for PRI1 and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 231 Appendix 5.5: Egonet for PU1 and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 232 Appendix 5.6: Egonet for PU1 and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 233 Appendix 5.7: Egonet for PRI2 and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 234 Appendix 5.8: Egonet for PRI2 and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 234 Appendix 5.9: Egonet for PU2 and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 235 Appendix 5.10: Egonet for PU2 and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 236 Appendix 5.11: Egonet for PU3 and Ties among Alters in Pre-Transition ...... 237 Appendix 5.12: Egonet for PU3 and Ties among Alters in Post-Transition ...... 237 Appendix 6: Actors and Their Ranked Power Resources ...... 239 Appendix 6.2: The Alters and Their Ranked Power Resources in the Pre and Post- Transition Phases ...... 239 Appendix 7: Showing Degree Centrality Scores in Both Phases ...... 241 Appendix 7.1: Degree Centrality Measures. Pre-Transition...... 241 Appendix 7.2: Degree Centrality Measures. Post-Transition...... 242

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List of Tables

Table 1: Relationship between Hypotheses and Research Questions ...... 63 Table 2: Results of Theme Analysis of Interviews and Frequency of Actors’ Names ...... 91 Table 3: Summary of Size of Egonets of Dominant Actors ...... 95 Table 4: Summary of Composition of Egonets of Dominant Actors ...... 96 Table 5: Principal Concerns of Parliamentarians who Contributed to the Debate in the House on the Creation of the IPO (2003) ...... 117 Table 6: Distribution of Power Resources among the Four Different Categories of Actors in the Pre and Post-Transition Phases ...... 124 Table 7: Key Activities Surrounding the Evolution of the IPO (2003), Classified According to Power Relation Type...... 127 Table 8: Social Power Relations Surrounding the Creation of the IPO (2003) ...... 129 Table 9: Instrumental Power Surrounding the Creation of the IPO (2003) ...... 130 Table 10: Key Activities on the Creation of the IPO, Resultant Power Relations, and the Conditions Under Which the Activities and Relations Occurred...... 132 Table 11: Key Activities on the Creation of the IPO, Resultant Power Relations, and the Conditions Under Which the Activities and Relations Occurred. (Continued.) ...... 134

List of Figures

Figure 1: Depicting Dobel (1999) Triangle of Judgment ...... 22 Figure 2: Depicting Power Theory on IPO Construction ...... 52 Figure 3: Example of Incident Matrix ...... 80 Figure 4: Example of Asymmetric Adjacent Matrix ...... 80 Figure 5: Example of Symmetric Adjacent Matrix ...... 80 Figure 6: Netdraw Graph Displaying Pre-Transition Ties Among Actors ...... 97 Figure 7: Netdraw Graph Displaying Post-Transition Ties Among Actors ...... 98 Figure 8: Pre-Transition PRI 1 and Alters ...... 99 Figure 9: Post-Transition PRI 1 and Alters ...... 100 Figure 10: Pre-Transition PRI 2 and Alters ...... 101 Figure 11: Post-Transition PRI 2 and Alters ...... 102 Figure 12: Pre-Transition PU 1 and Alters ...... 103 Figure 13: Post-Transition PU 1 and Alters ...... 104 Figure 14: Pre-Transition PU 2 and Alters ...... 105 Figure 15: Post-Transition PU 2 and Alters ...... 106 Figure 16: Pre-Transition PU 3 and Alters ...... 107 Figure 17: Post-Transition PU 3 and Alters ...... 108

REMERCIEMENTS Ce projet de recherche doctorale me signifie beaucoup. Il a été engendré par ma soif naturelle de nouveaux défis et nouvelles connaissances. Cependant, il a été alimenté par le désir intense de construire un monument pour célébrer l’esprit infatigable de mes parents et d’inspirer mon fils à être suffisamment ambitieux pour pousser continuellement au-delà des plafonds et des murs construits socialement, persévérant surtout dans l'adversité. Je dédie donc cette thèse à la mémoire de mon père défunt, Hubert Jean-Jacques, pour sa discipline et son amour; à ma mère, Ruthine James, pour son soutien et son inspiration; à mon fils, Kodie Jean-Jacques, pour son encouragement, son admiration, et son amour; et à ma «deuxième maman,» Myrtle, pour son amour et son soutien inlassable. Certes, il y avait d'autres dans mon coin et je dois les saluer. A mon ami, Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur Aaron, je te dis un grand merci pour ton soutien sincère et généreux et à ma partenaire, Stéphanie, ton amour et ta patience m’ont beaucoup motivé. Merci Stephanie! À Laval, je me souviens de la première réunion (et des suivantes) avec mon Directeur de thèse, le Professeur Louis Imbeau. Le défi a toujours été de travailler assidûment, mais d'exceller en le faisant. Il a compris ma passion et il a été un guide et une inspiration. Merci, Professeur Imbeau. Professeurs Mathieu Ouimet (mon Co-Directeur), Jean Crête, Marc André Bodet, Éric Montigny, Thierry Rodon, Raymond Hudon, vous aussi, avez compris ma passion et vous avez été généreux au maximum dans votre direction. Je me suis toujours vraiment senti supporté quand j'ai parlé avec n'importe lequel d'entre vous. Votre magnanimité restera donc, pour toujours gravée dans mon esprit. Merci. Merci également au Professeur Jonathan Paquin, à l’équipe accueillante à la salle de musculation de PEPS et celle à la bibliothèque, à mes collègues, à mes amis, à mes fans et à mes proches. Votre chaleur a contribué sans doute à faire de mon expérience à Laval l’une des plus mémorables. Merci! Il est clair que je n'ai pas fait ce voyage seul. Cette partie de mon voyage personnel a aussi été très spirituelle. Elle a renforcé ma conviction profonde qu'il y a une force suprême qui nous guide et nous protège. Grâce à elle, je me suis rapproché davantage à cette force pendant mon séjour au Québec, et je ne craignais point. Je n’ai jamais oublié que je n’étais pas arrivé à Laval uniquement sur ma propre volonté. «Le Créateur est avec moi,» je disais souvent. Je ne peux donc terminer cette étape de mon voyage sans reconnaitre et louer l'omniprésence du Créateur, le Tout-Puissant. J’espère que vous le retrouverez de nouveau, comme je l’ai fait. Chapeaux à tous! Merci maman. Merci papa d’être mon ange. Merci Kodie.

Acknowledgements This doctoral research project means a number of things to me. It began out of my natural thirst for new challenges and for knowledge. However, it has been fuelled by the intense desire to build a monument to celebrate the efforts of my indefatigable parents and to inspire my son to be ambitious enough to continually push beyond ceilings and socially- constructed walls, persevering especially in the face of adversity. I therefore dedicate this thesis to the discipline and memory of my deceased dad, Hubert Jean-Jacques; to the support and example of my mom, Ruthine James; to the encouragement, admiration, and love of my son, Kodie Jean-Jacques; and to the love and tireless support of my “second mom,” Myrtle. Of course, there were others in my corner and I must salute them. To my friend, His Excellency Ambassador Aaron, big thanks to you for your sincere and generous support and to my partner, Stephanie, your love and patience have further motivated me. Thank you Stephanie. At Laval, I recall my first and subsequent meetings with my Director, Prof. Louis Imbeau. The challenge was always to work hard but to excel in doing so. He understood my passion and he has been a guide and an inspiration. Thank you, Prof. Imbeau. Professors Mathieu Ouimet (my second Director), Jean Crête, Marc André Bodet, Éric Montigny, Thierry Rodon, Raymond Hudon, you too, understood my passion and you have been most generous in your guidance. I always truly felt supported whenever I spoke with any of you. Your magnanimity will remain forever etched in my mind. Thank you. Thank you also to Prof. Jonathan Paquin, the faces at the PEPS weight room and at the library, my colleagues, my friends, my fans, and my loved ones. Your warmth helped made the Laval experience a most memorable one. Thank you! It is clear that I did not do this alone. This portion of my personal journey has also been a very spiritual one. It has reinforced my strong conviction that there is a supreme force that guides and protects us. I re- connected with that force while in Quebec and I never feared; especially when I was down. I remembered that I did not arrive at Laval solely on my own volition. “The Creator is with me,” I often said. I therefore, cannot end this leg of my journey without acknowledging the omnipresence of the all-powerful Creator. I hope you will connect with the Creator as I did. Hats off to all! Thank you mammie. Thank you daddy for being my angel. Thank you Kodie.

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INTRODUCTION During the 1970’s individual members of the government of former Prime Minister (PM) Patrick John were accused by opposition parliamentarians and civic-minded citizens of conspiring with unsavoury foreign elements to use the Caribbean island of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica, from henceforth) as their personal fiefdom. For example, it has been revealed that towards mid 1970’s, the PM had entered into a “pact with a Texas businessman named Don Pierson that would have given close to one-tenth of the island over to a foreign company for just $100 a year” (Bell 2008:33) ostensibly to set up a free port on the island. PM John was also accused of entering into other arrangements with foreign leaders that were not open to the scrutiny of parliamentarians. Indeed, writing on the history of the Commonwealth of Dominica, the Encyclopaedia Britannica observes: “John’s government was implicated in a number of questionable dealings, including a scheme to lease land to a firm allegedly planning to supply petroleum illegally to South Africa, which was then under an international trade embargo because of its government’s apartheid policy” (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online n.d.).

Of further relevance to our present document is the work of renowned Dominican historian Dr. Lennox Honychurch (PhD) on that period in the history of the island. In chronicling the political career of former PM of Dominica, Patrick Roland John, Dr. Honychurch writes:

In 1979, heavily influenced by the Attorney General Leo Austin, the DLP [Dominica Labour Party] engaged in deals and took legislative action that stirred up the population in violent response. On 29 May 1979 demonstrators outside the House of Assembly were shot at by the DDF [Dominica Defence Force], several were injured and one youth was killed. Representatives of civil society gathered under the leadership of the Committee for National Salvation (CNS) and called for the resignation of the government. John and Finance Minister Victor Riviere did not resign … (Honychurch n.d.)

Mr. John was subsequently overthrown by an angry mob. As a related side note, Patrick John was later found guilty and jailed in Dominica for conspiring with a motley crew of Ku Klux Klan militants (an extreme racist and xenophobic entity in the U.S) and international mercenaries such as the Canadians Wolfgang Walter Droege and Larry Lloyd Jacklin for conspiring to overthrow the elected government and use Dominica as a base for their criminal enterprise. Stewart Bell writes extensively on that chapter in Dominica’s history in his book, Bayou of Pigs (Bell 2008).

The 1980 elections that followed the political demise of Prime Minister John saw the genesis of 15 years in power by the Dame Eugenia Charles (1919 – 2005), a former leader of the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) and staunch ally of Ronald Reagan. Once in office, as it was in the case while in opposition, the Dame continued to promote integrity and good governance in government; once, reportedly dismissing a minister because he had ordered the use of a public excavator to work on his private driveway. Integrity in public office had therefore been a political issue for Dominica since the 1970’s; its emergence coinciding with increased global sensitivities regarding public management.

Elsewhere, during the 1980’s and 1990’s, notably in Britain and the US, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had launched a campaign for what has been suggested as a re-conceptualization of and revolution in the way we manage the production of public goods and services. New Public Management it was coined. New Public Management (NPM) was not about integrity building per se, but it promoted a more inclusive political landscape, political accountability, and the rule of law. One of its principles was that the citizen, the client, was entitled to effective and efficient service and honest leadership from his leaders (Dunleavy 1994; Eliassen & Sitter 2008; Hood 1991). The rise of the NPM agenda

2 therefore coincided with the rise of discourses in Dominica about integrity and good governance in public office.

Equally significant is that during the rule of the United Workers Party (UWP) in Dominica, 1995 to 1999, the UWP government was accused repeatedly by the Opposition Dominica Labour Party (DLP) and private citizens of impropriety and mismanagement in office: graft, nepotism, blatant patronage, and waste. In fact, it was during its 4-year reign that Dominica saw the evolution of two civic-minded groups for the promotion of good governance: Transparency International (Dominican Chapter) and the Organisation for Good and Accountable Government. The political landscape had become more crowded and noisier with new actors using their resources to force the government to comply with existing laws and with international standards of good governance. Accordingly, during the election campaign of December 1999, the DLP then promised that once in government it would implement integrity legislation; that is, it promised that for the first time in Dominica’s history, the discourses for integrity in public management would have been institutionalized.

The Dominica Labour Party subsequently won the 1999 election campaign largely, it would seem, on a platform of anti-corruption and responsibility in public office. However, in resisting a petition demanding that the government in which he served implement integrity in public office legislation, Julius Timothy, a former Minister of Finance in the Commonwealth of Dominica lamented in 2008: “’The country was in the middle of an austerity programme and we were presenting to the Parliament an integrity legislation that would cost us in the region of 1.2 million dollars to operate on an annual basis…We are in a third world country, this is first world legislation’” (Dominica News Online April 2008). Several years later, February 14, 2013, Silvio Berlusconi, the

3 former Italian president advised his countrymen: “Bribes are a phenomenon that exists and it’s useless to deny the existence of these necessary situations …These are not crimes. We’re talking about paying a commission to someone in that country. Why? Because those are the rules in that country.” He further described Italian condemnation of bribery in non-Western countries as, “absurd moralisms … If you want to make moralisms like that, you can’t be an entrepreneur on a global scale” (Frye 2013). Berlusconi was referring to the arrest by Italian prosecutors of a former Chief Executive of the defence technology giant Finmeccanica SPA on charges of illegal payments surrounding a helicopter deal with India.

These two positions are revealing. Berlusconi’s remarks reinforce the widely held view that developing countries facilitate, even institutionalize, corruption. However, what they both share in common is the perception that the political context in a developing country is manifestly different from what occurs in a developed country. In the former, there are cultural, institutional, and material phenomena that seem to frustrate the development of good governance principles.

In fact, it is this realisation that had prompted the World Bank to advance its good governance project. Moved by the failures of structural adjustment measures in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Bank concluded that the main reason for those failures was not that the reforms were bad political choices but that Sub-Saharan Africa suffered from bad governance (Carayannis, Pirzadeh, & Popescu 2012; Hilyard & Wilks 1998; Leftwich 1993; World Bank 1989). Good governance was therefore proffered as the best response to the development challenges that plagued Sub-Saharan Africa, indeed the developing world. The thrust of this agenda was, and still remains, the construction of an “enabling environment” for Western-style development (Kapoor 2008). This

4 environment entails wide ranging economic, institutional, political, and social reforms. It is possible to summarize the Bank’s good governance prescription as a recipe for development. Its main pillars are: efficiency in the public sector, the rule of law, transparency and accountability, and inclusion of civil society in the policy process (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre 2003; Kapoor 2008; World Bank 1989).

It must be noted therefore, that although the distinction is not often made, the Bank’s good governance project is functionally different from good governance as we know it in the West. In both contexts, the concepts are the same, mostly: thriving civil society, institutions of transparency and integrity, and the rule of law, and an efficient public sector, etc. However, both the goals and function differ. In the West, the pursuit of good governance assumes that development has already been achieved and therefore, good governance is simply a strategy to maintain the gains made. However, in the developing world, good governance has the inherent assumption that the target destinations do not have the requisite capacity for development and therefore, the creation of this capacity is a primary conduit leading to development. The Bank’s good governance recipe is meant to facilitate this capacity, irrespective of the socio-political context.

The recipe is consequently, a logocentric approach (Hollinger 1994) that seems to ignore the heterogeneity of the world political contexts. Hence, its implementation usually comes up against resistance or creates complications for local communities (Hilyard & Wilks 1998). This complication can be examined on two levels. First, good governance structures cannot be imposed in contexts of incompatible institutional and sociological superstructures. Second, the recipe assumes that more democracy will naturally lead to reduced conflict, less corruption, and better governance. Mohtadi and Roe (2003) and Rock (2007) assert that

5 the relationship is not as direct and sustaining. A broadened political space in which the policy process is opened so that a multiplicity of actors can participate in the process simply creates more entry points for actors to interact with policymakers. In contexts deprived of the requisite institutional filters to manage this access, political inclusion could simply facilitate the type of bad governance that the good governance recipe seeks to avoid: Corruption and the subversion of the policy process by elites. The good governance model is therefore problematic for some countries. Yet, it is strongly recommended, indeed imposed, by the World Bank and its Bretton Woods partners. For the purpose of this thesis document, let us examine more closely the Dominican context and a brief overview of salient features of the Act in question.

The Commonwealth of Dominica The Commonwealth of Dominica has been a parliamentary democracy since its independence from Britain on November 3, 1978. As per the Constitution, elections are due every five years. As in Canada, the Prime Minister is the head of government. In 2015, this head is the Honourable Roosevelt Skerrit. There is a President, but his role is largely symbolic – much as the Governor General’s position in Canada. In the last general elections (December 8, 2014), PM Skerrit’s party, the Dominica Labour Party (DLP), won 15 of the 21 constituencies on the island. Indeed, the party has been in power since 2000, having defeated the incumbent United Workers Party (UWP) in 1999, less than 5 years after the latter got into power. It is noteworthy that the United Workers Party has never conceded defeat after an election and, equally significant, is that the party has never stopped campaigning since the 1999 General Election. In that election, one principal issue was a claim by the Opposition, the Dominica Labour Party, of corruption in the UWP government. These claims have remained unproven although the DLP will point to examples of impropriety in the UWP government. There are three major political

6 parties: The Dominica Labour Party, the Dominica Freedom Party, and the United Workers Party. The latter is, in 2015, the official opposition.

On the international level, the foreign policy of the government has been characterised by efforts to create or deepen ties with non-traditional allies that share socio-political and economic histories. Consequently, Dominica is part of the Commonwealth, the Organization of the Americas, and the Francophonie. However, she has been nurturing her relations with the countries of Latin America, especially Venezuela, (for example, Dominica is an active member of the ALBA; a grouping of Latin American and Caribbean states that pursues a regional brand of social democracy that focuses on social and economic development) (ALBA-TCP n.d). In addition, in the last decade, the Roosevelt Skeritt administration has maintained or developed relations with China, the European Union, Cuba, Russia, India, and Morocco. Venezuela, China, and Cuba are Dominica’s “favourite friends” (DNO March 2012).

This decision to court non-traditional allies developed circa 2000 when Dominica had an IMF structural adjustment programme. As in the case of similar measures, the state was limited in its ability to finance public projects. The government's strategy was therefore to adhere to the agreement with the IMF while being sufficiently flexible and skilled internationally in order to attract foreign direct investment (DNO March 2012). One result of this strategy saw Dominica’s GDP of USD $ 0.324 billion in 2000 to USD $0.477 billion in 2011. In 2013, that figure was USD$0.517 billion. The rise is projected to continue to 0.533 billion in 2014 (Economywatch n.d).

Dominica’s economy is largely dependent on fragile industries, agriculture and tourism (especially eco-tourism), despite moves towards the service sector, including offshore banking and the supply of labour

7 for companies that outsource their operations. However, in 2015, the government is on a drive to develop the island’s geothermal potential so that it may export surplus energy to neighbouring islands. The projection is that by 2017, the island should have a fully operational geothermal plan that will provide the island with all its energy needs as well as allow for surplus electricity to be sold to the neighbouring French islands. Additionally, Dominica offers a legitimate and secure citizenship by investment programme.

A combination of a hostile global economic climate, natural disasters, and, arguably, bad governance meant that circa 2000 Dominica entered into an IMF structural adjustment programme. In addition, the IMF has recorded a deleterious effect of the recent fiscal crisis on the Dominican economy. However, reports and forecasts from the IMF and Economy Watch are favourable (Economywatch n.d., IMF 2013). Furthermore, according to Senior Energy Specialist at the World Bank, Miagara Jaywardena, speaking in Roseau in March 2013, the deficit has been declining (although public debt remains steady at 70% of GDP) (Dominica News Online March 2013).

The island’s administrative structure is modelled on that of the British. The Minister is the head of his ministry, but his work is facilitated by a permanent secretary (the Canadian equivalent would be “deputy minister“). There is no position of Assistant Deputy Minister. In the last ten years, Dominica has adopted several structures that are supposed to foster its development and its integration into the world, for example the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering (2000, updated in 2011) and the Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) (Integrity Commission n.d).

Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) The Integrity in Public Office Act is Dominica’s first publicly known effort at institutionalising probity and integrity in the governance of the state. During the 1999 election campaign, the DLP Opposition promised the electorate that once in office it would create legislation that would oversee integrity in public management. This promise followed a series of allegations of impropriety in office against the UWP government of 1995 to 1999 by the then Opposition DLP. Indeed, following the 1999 General Elections, the Dominica Labour Party completed an inquiry into those allegations of corruption and subsequently tabled a report in parliament. However, this report has not resulted in the prosecution of a public official. The official explanation, as offered by sources close to the DLP, is that the PM at that time, Pierre Charles (1954 – 2004), thought that the cost of pursuing the alleged wrongdoers was prohibitive and consequently, the State had to abbreviate its anti-corruption agenda. The Dominica IPO emerged therefore, in a climate of conflict.

Yet, the Act may have had an even more complex genesis. Dominica had also found itself incapable of resisting exhortations and pressure from international partners to implement legislation that would improve the governance of the island.

Circa 2001, Dominica deepened its relationship with the IMF by adopting structural adjustment measures recommended by the organisation. This meant that the management of its finances came under heavy scrutiny by the organisation. There are no specific requests for integrity legislation made. However, working in consultation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the IMF did urge the Skerrit government to ensure greater accountability and transparency in financial laws.

The FATF was originally set up by the G-7 countries to combat money laundering. It has since broadened its mandate to include efforts against financing terrorism. Most of its members are also members of the OECD. The IMF, the UN, the Organisation of American States, and the World Bank all have observer status in the FATF. Dominica is not a member of the Force, but it would seem that it has been a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), itself, an Associate member of the FATF, since the creation of the CFATF in 1992. Hence, fearing that international governments and agencies would not help finance its projects and lift it out of its economic woes, the island logically complied with the demands of the Force.

In addition, the island, as a member of the Commonwealth, also felt obligated to design and implement public integrity legislation in light of the various declarations made by the Commonwealth of Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) directly or through their affiliate organs, such as the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meetings. In fact, the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 20 October 1991, which was issued by Heads of Government in Harare, Zimbabwe, specifically reaffirmed the principles of “democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004).

Indeed, the 1996 Commonwealth Law Ministers Meetings also listed efforts to maintain public integrity and “promote honest and accountable government” as an issue of “primary concern” (Commonwealth Secretariat 1996). For example, in 1996 the ministers supported the FATF forty recommendations (drawn up in 1990) and called on members to implement them. These recommendations are a package of structures designed to combat money laundering, increase accountability,

efficiency, and transparency in financial transactions globally, across borders and within borders. Consequently, when the Commonwealth of Heads of Government (CHOGM) met in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1997 they strongly urged that all member participants do more to enact anti- corruption and pro-integrity in public office legislation. Dominica participated at that meeting. The imperatives for placing public integrity legislation top on the political agenda of Dominican governments were therefore locally made and internationally relevant.

Logically therefore, once in office in 2000, the DLP government, led by Hon. Roosevelt “Rosie” Douglas (1941 – 2000), carved the IPO out of several existing integrity in public office acts from England, Trinidad, Barbados, Bermuda, St. Lucia; namely that of Trinidad. In 2000 Hon. Pierre Charles took over the reins of government and he, too, seemed determined to pass the Act. Consequently, in 2001, a first version of the bill was introduced in parliament by the then Attorney General, Mr. Bernard Wiltshire. It was a formal indication that the government intended to pass the Act. On April 30 2003, under the new leadership of Pierre Charles, the current version of the Act was debated and passed in parliament. Both sides of the House supported it.

However, the Act was not implemented in 2003. Hon. Roosevelt Skerrit was sworn in as PM January 8, 2004 following the sudden departure of his predecessor PM Pierre Charles. Two reasons are given for the delay. First, Dominica was still under IMF austerity programme and the island could not afford the implementation of the Act. Second, the Skerrit-led DLP administration thought that the 2003 legislation needed improvements before implementation. Hence, the Act remained unimplemented from 2003.

Structure of the IPO The objective of this Act is to establish "probity, integrity, and accountability in public life and for related matters" (IPO 2003: 1). It targets parliamentarians, senior civil servants, and other persons who may be in private life but are members of governing boards of state or quasi-state institutions. The Act has several important features. First, the principal implementing organ is a commission called The Integrity in Public Office Commission, henceforth referred to as “the Commission” or “the IPO Commission.” The Commission is a semi-autonomous body. It is not answerable to the Cabinet, but its budget is determined by the Cabinet. It comprises seven members: A Chair, “who shall be a former Judge of the High Court, an attorney-at-law of fifteen years standing at the Bar or a former Chief Magistrate, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister” (IPO 2003) after the latter has consulted with the Leader of the Opposition. The Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition must each nominate two members who will be appointed by the president, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Dominica or a similar body is empowered to also nominate a certified or chartered accountant, and the Dominica Bar Association must also recommend an attorney-at-law.

Second, the Act has limited investigative powers. It does not have prosecutorial authority. Investigations can only be launched upon formal complaints by an interested party. However, such complaints must pertain to named breaches of conduct by public officers within the jurisdiction of the Act. In addition, if the complaint is proven to be unjustified, the accused can take legal action against the complainant. If an inquiry indicates that an official is potentially liable under the Act, the Commission can then forward the file to the Prosecutor General for consideration.

A third feature of the Act is the requirement that public officials declare their assets and liabilities under confidential cover to the Commission. This must be done at the beginning of the official’s tenure and repeated annually. Indeed, in 2011, the Commission asked the Attorney General, in accordance with the IPO, to pursue certain policy makers and officials who had not submitted their application before the deadline.

The Act’s dormancy eventually became political ammunition for many, who suspected the Dominica Labour Party administration of delaying its implementation in order to first clean up traces of its corrupt acts prior to implementing the Act. Consequently, from 2006 the opposition, i.e. the UWP leadership and other actors who were not necessarily formal members of the UWP, embarked on a campaign to force the implementation of the Act. There were at least 3 groups of actors exerting pressure: the UWP leaders; a self-described non-partisan Citizens Forum for Good Governance; and some leaders of a US-based Dominican Diaspora community called the Dominica Academy of Arts and Science (DAAS). The Citizens forum subsequently formed a coalition with the UWP, a US-based pressure group, and individual citizens who were concerned about perceived bad governance of the state under the umbrella the Fund for the Defence of Democracy in Dominica. This Fund was active in seeking the implementation of the Act but its activities went beyond the mere implementation of the Act. The group targeted a broader agenda of good governance in Dominica and also participated in efforts to force the government to implement the IPO. Many of the members of the Citizens Forum for Good Governance were actually former senior members of the DLP, e.g. the Attorney General (AG) who had first tabled the IPO in the parliament, a former government minister, and a former senior party member.

For a while, the Skerrit administration resisted but the opposition persisted and succeeded in returning the IPO on the political agenda. They never stopped campaigning for the adoption of the law until the Prime Minister ceded. Five years after it was debated and consented to by parliamentarians, the President assented to the Integrity in Public Office Act on August 5, 2008 and it became operational as of September 1, 2008.

Not surprisingly, however, opposition politicians insist that the Prime Minister and his cabinet have manipulated the date of entry into force of the IPO - September 2008 - in order to protect himself and his colleagues from examination for certain illegal acts they would have had committed prior to September 2008.

Purpose, Research Question, and Thesis Statement This thesis studies and discusses how one developing state, the Commonwealth of Dominica, approached the development of an act to oversee integrity in public office, the Integrity in Public Office Act (IPO). In light of the context of political conflict and mobilization in which it evolved, the thesis focuses on power relations surrounding the developing of this Act. It aims to understand and explain how structural and agential factors have resulted in the creation of this Act. We assume that a context of institutional deficiency but with political openness presented special opportunities for studying power relations among actors. The principal guiding question is therefore: Why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). Our central premise is that “rational” actors, cognizant of their structural position in a network of actors, have used their power resources to choose and model an institution so that it serves them and their allies. Their power and their behaviours are consequently, a reflection of their understanding of their position in a network of actors. Indeed, we define

“rational actors” as those actors who deliberate and strategize to advance their interests. Manifestly, such actors engage in self-maximizing behaviour.

Justification for the Research Through an examination of this power play among rational actors, this thesis aims broadly to contribute to the discourse on building democratic institutions. We can discuss some more specific benefits to political science; theoretically, methodologically, and empirically.

Theoretically, first, this research attempts to respond to the paucity of studies on the design of institutions of public integrity. The conventional approach to the choice and design of institutions of integrity is holistic, incorporating all facets of society (including the private sector). However, research into such institutions has been limited to conceptual and organizational themes (Coghill 2004; Roberts et al. 1992). Additionally, there remains a dearth of studies on the role of networks on the choice and design of public integrity institutions. There is even less empirical evidence regarding how informal networks are used to influence formal ones (Donnet 2012). This study therefore adds to the literature on institutional choice and design of integrity oversight bodies.

Indeed, a critical component of the processes involved in creating an institution to oversee public integrity is the role of networks of actors in the policy process (politicians, senior bureaucrats, technical experts, media, etc.). A second achievement of this study is therefore, the enrichment of the literature on the evolution of a public institution through a study of both structural and agential features of such networks. Political Science accepts that actors use their power resources to advance their interests and therefore, institutional design can be understood as the result of deliberate political action, or non-action. We

15 believe that it is not enough to merely acknowledge that actors use their power to their own ends. This study offers insight into how rational actors deploy their power resources, i.e. what power resources they use, against which actors they use these resources, and what determines how much of their power they use. It therefore goes beyond merely using network analysis techniques to study a theme. It embraces a theory that acknowledges both structural and agential explanations of institutional design.

Third, by studying the choice and design of institutions of public integrity from the perspective of power relations among actors, we introduce a perspective that allows integrity and anti-corruption reformers to correctly target the interstices and structures that facilitate corruption or hinder the system-wide development of integrity and probity in public governance. Typically, challenges to public integrity are seen as a management issue. Solutions are therefore, studied from an institutional perspective: Build more institutions and the problems will be corrected. This study highlights the deficiencies with this logic and suggests that understating public integrity from a power perspective is likely to lead to more realistic and context-appropriate strategies at creating institutions of public integrity. Reformers could then use appropriate mechanisms (legislation, counter-information or propaganda, or public activism, etc.) to thwart attempts at subjugation of integrity networks. Moreover, our effort in Chapters 4 and 5 to measure and discuss specific degrees of power employed by actors and to record the conditions in which these degrees are exercised advances our understanding of actor behaviour in the policy process and enhance our capacity to predict structural conditions that will engender in certain types of actor behaviour. Hence, by shifting the focus from largely organizational variables to the interplay among actors, this study adds theoretical insight into a critical dimension of creating institutions of

public integrity, that of actor behaviour vis à vis integrity reforms; especially as this behaviour pertains to contexts of embryonic democracy and weak institutional support.

We also see methodological advancements in this study. In Chapter 3, we explain that we used social network analysis (SNA) techniques in this study. SNA emphasises power as a result of network centrality. Yet, there has been little work done on the conditions, structural and attributes, that determine how actors actually deploy their resources to effect a desired change. This study advances work towards filling this gap. Structural positions, the study shows, interrelate with agential considerations, viz the actor’s selection and intensity of power resources. A case study of Dominica’s IPO that focuses on both agential and structural features of power relations adds clarity and precision to the literature and permits comparisons between similar studies in similar contexts. Methodologically, this study can claim to be unique.

Finally, empirically, the study advances the literature on how actors in developing countries and contexts of burgeoning democracy use their power within informal networks and across informal and formal ties. Additionally, Dominica’s IPO is unexamined in the published literature. The study therefore, offers the Dominican public a record of the process that preceded the IPO, an analysis of the power structure involved in the governance of the island, and a vision for improving the policy process so that its outcomes are representative of the will of the majority. This study therefore, has much empirical value to political science.

Summary We reiterate that the underlying problem that has triggered this study is the observation that current efforts creating democratic structures appear to create new opportunities for political conflict that are not easily

17 resolved in contexts that have a deficient institutional infrastructure. Societies that seem to lack certain support structures and a reservoir of democratic support (Dalton 1999; Mcallister 1999; Norris 1999), “reservoir of democratic capital” (Dalton 2004:1999) as in the case of Dominica (only receiving suffrage in 1941, e.g.), appear most at risk. In such contexts, we believe, powerful political actors appear to engage in a power play that goes unchecked and that results in policies that reflect the interests of a dominant actor. This original research therefore examines how actors use their power resources to advance their interests as a result of their understanding of their position in a network of actors. In the next chapter we will discuss the conceptual framework of this thesis.

Structure of the Thesis In order to explore this thesis, this document has been divided into 5 chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion. Each chapter is further sub-divided into subsections where necessary in order to facilitate reading. The first two chapters lay out the theoretical frame of the thesis. The third describes the method used to search for responses to the research question. Chapters 4 and 5 deal exclusively with the data obtained. In Chapter 1, we conceptualize public integrity and discuss some concepts that are central to this thesis. This discussion is important because it describes common approaches to the design of institutions of public integrity and concludes with a typology of such institutions. In Chapter 2, we explain our theory on the design choice of the Dominican IPO. To do this, we discuss theories that are central to our thesis; namely, the structure and agency debate, power, and power in social networks. In Chapter 3, we detail our methodological approach to the problem. At the core is the use of social network analysis (SNA) and qualitative techniques. Methodologically, therefore, this study takes on a micro view of the development of the Act by studying principal

18 actors and on a lower level, their alters. Chapter 4 offers a detailed description of the results. Having laid out the theoretical framework of the thesis that clearly describes situates the Dominican IPO and described the results that emanated from our research, we proceed in Chapter 5 to discuss the results and explain how and why the current model of the Integrity in Public Office Act was created. The thesis ends with concluding statements pertaining to the research question and hypotheses. Throughout the text the masculine form is used in a generic manner.

Summary of the Introduction Having thus described the contextual background, the structure of the thesis, and the major contributions of this thesis to political science, we now turn to its theoretical framework, which we elaborate in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISATION We recall that the central question in this dissertation is, why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). The aim of this chapter is to create a reference frame in which we can situate the Dominican IPO so that we may better understand its design and subsequently, how this design may be a direct result of calculated actor behaviour. The effort to create this frame is organized into four principal sub-sections. First, we define and discuss public integrity as a central concept of this study. Second, we discuss various types of institutions employed to oversee public integrity. This discussion is very important because embedded in the principal question guiding this study is the issue of the choice of institution to address perceived deficiencies in public integrity. Third, choice and design are closely related to the functions of the institutions. Consequently, we briefly discuss the various functions of public integrity oversight bodies. Fourth, we offer a typology of institutions that are created to oversee public integrity.

1.1 Public Integrity The dictionary’s conceptual definition for “integrity” does not differ from that which writers in academia seem to have attributed to the concept; that of wholeness or coherence among different parts (Hamlin 1999; McFall 1987; van Luijk 2004). This coherence is manifested in at least two different dimensions. First, integrity is the coherence between the values of an actor and his behaviour. It pertains to: “the state of being ‘undivided’; an integral whole….Integrity requires ‘sticking to one's principles’, moral or otherwise, in the face of temptation, including the temptation to re-description” McFall (1987:4). For McFall, integrity is clearly a concept that speaks of the individual being one with himself, displaying a seamless rapport between his values and personal conduct; doing as he preaches, as it were. Second, integrity is also the fit between an actor’s standards (internal moral compass) and those of another

(Hamlin 1999; McFall 1987; van Luijk 2004). It speaks of the coherence between the actor’s personal values and those of the environment in which he exists. It describes the harmony between societal demands and agential preferences. In either dimension, the key concept is consequently, “coherence” or “wholenesss;” wholeness between an actor’s values and his behaviour or an actor’s values and those of the structures in his environment.

It is the second conceptualisation of integrity however, that is most relevant to our research because it addresses the juxtaposition between agential attributes and structural forces. In addition, this conceptualisation already suggests the potential for conflict between the actor’s values and those emanating from the structures around him. If integrity pertains to coherency and wholeness between one’s standards and those of society, public integrity can be defined as the fit between personal and public values; that is, public integrity emerges as achieved equilibrium between structure and agency. It is “achieved,” we believe, because the actor has to work at building this equilibrium, it does not occur naturally.

Dobel (1999) develops a triangle of judgment that elucidates this perspective of conflict in the search of coherence. In the author’s view, public integrity is “an iterative process among three mutually supporting domains of judgment – obligations of office, personal commitment and capacity, and prudence” (20). Office obligations pertain to the formal obligations of the actor’s job. However, the individual is not without personal moral attachments that interact with his formal obligations. Prudence therefore, is the intervening grey area in which the official connects his commitment to his job and his moral values so that the policy outcome serves the society that he is appointed or elected to serve. The actor who shows public integrity is consequently, the one who can

accurately relate the three points of the triangle so that some harmony is achieved among them. Figure 1 below offers a graphic representation of the triangle.

Figure 1: Depicting Dobel (1999) Triangle of Judgment

Personal capacity and commitments

Legal obligations of office Prudence and effectiveness

We find Dobel’s (1999) analysis of the concept apt to our study because it highlights accurately the interplay between agency and structure, which appears fundamental to the development of institutions that are intended to oversee integrity in public office, such as the Dominican IPO. Integrity in Dobel’s view, is not simply the coherence between the actor’s values and his behaviour. The concept of wholeness transcends the actor and describes the equilibrium among three key variables: the actor’s values, those of society, and his behaviour.

In summary, we conceptualize public integrity as an equilibrium between an actor’s personal values, public obligations, and public values. It is an equilibrium that is borne out of the fit among the above three variables. However, we argue that this equilibrium is likely the result of a struggle as the actor seeks to create the “wholeness” among parts that may be in conflict with each other. Measures to oversee public integrity are therefore, an arena for potential conflict because each actor is constantly seeking that balance among the three points in the triangle, which all exert varying degrees of pressure on him. Having conceptualized public

22 integrity building through this lens, of conflict, we can logically perceive the choice and design of the IPO Act (2003) as a theme to be studied from a power perspective as opposed to an institutional concern.

1.2 Institutions: Choice and Design Indeed, there are a number of different institutions that are used to oversee public integrity in democracies (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst 2008; Stapenhurst et al. 2008); that fit between actor values, societal values, and actor behaviour. They may differ in their institutional location and their principal focus. However, they all seek to facilitate the seamless relationship among three principal variables as suggested by Dobel (1999) above: Actor values, structural considerations, and actor behaviour. Let us briefly examine a few here in an effort to begin situating the Dominican IPO; an exercise that is critical if we are to better understand the evolution of that institution and to lend theoretical and conceptual clarity to our research.

Common examples of public integrity oversight institutions are the offices of the auditor general and the inspector general (in the U.S) that oversee public expenditure and investigate breaches of public finance management. Similarly, some jurisdictions have a Public Accounts Committee. Usually headed by the Leader of the Opposition, the committee has the authority to summon any public official (functionary or politician) to answer questions it may deem necessary, to examine the public accounts, and to investigate and examine all the issues that are referred to it by parliament. Additionally, there is a parliamentary Ombudsman that exists in some jurisdictions and is largely responsible for investigating complaints by citizens regarding public administration. A customary feature of institutions of public integrity is that they usually emerge following reports of scandalous behaviour by public officials. Hence, governments sometimes institute commissions of inquiry. These

23 have a limited lifespan but they are meant to shed light on perceived scandalous behaviour in public management. Another common practice is to establish certain legislative or extra-parliamentary oversight committees (Stapenhurst et al. 2008) to investigate specific perceived breaches. Finally, the literature also describes various specialised anti- corruption agencies (ACAs). Unlike other institutions mentioned above, such agencies are created with the expressed objective of combating corruption and/or promoting public integrity. Integrity commissions are one such anti-corruption agency. The choice of an institution for overseeing public integrity is therefore contingent on the purpose for which this institution is created. Let us advance our understating of the Dominican IPO by examining more closely the myriad functions of different ACAs.

1.3 Purpose of Integrity Bodies Integrity oversight bodies seem to have at least four main functions: prevention of corruption, build public trust, education, and to guard the public interest (Doig 1995; Gilman & Stout 2005; OECD 2013; Pope 2000). The emergence of such bodies usually follows public scandals or rumours of scandalous behavior by public officials. Consequently, some are meant to appease the public, keep public officials in line, and maintain social order. Oversight is seen therefore as also a strategy for managing the behaviour of public officials (Verhezen 2008), a “tool for checking the behaviour of the system’s single most powerful political actor” (Stapenhurst et al. 2008: 18). Thus, some oversight bodies have the authority to initiate investigations and prosecute or recommend the prosecution of those perceived to be guilty (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst 2008); all this in an effort to positively influence the behaviour of public officials.

The trust-building function of public oversight bodies suggests that if a citizenry perceives public officials to be of high integrity, i.e. if it is

perceived that there is coherence between the values and behaviour of those officials and the values of the society, they are more likely to support their decisions. In turn, this support will consolidate the legitimacy of the institutions and the individual actors who head them. Nevertheless, as Nieuwenburg (2007) concludes, using public trust as a goal of integrity agencies is a paradox because “one cannot use the trust argument to justify a commitment to integrity in conditions of declining trust” (217). Notwithstanding their trust-building potential, integrity bodies as trust building institutions must evolve in a broader context that aims at building trust and can hardly be seen as simply an ad-hoc reaction to crises.

Consequently, oversight bodies have a broader educative role (Corruption Research Centre 2000; de Sousa 2010; Doig & McIvor 2003; Pope 1999, 2000). Such institutions recognize public integrity as embedded in a wider environment of actors and consequently, seek to establish integrity and fight corruption through wider public sensitization programmes.

A final group of oversight bodies has a largely paternalistic role. This is the case with many regulatory agencies, e.g. the U.S Food and Drug Agency and Environmental Protection Agency (Uchtmann & Nelson 2000) and Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate in Canada. Such agencies employ various strategies of regulation and accountability to ensure that the regulated industry complies with a standardised mode of conduct and does not comprise the security, physical or health, of the wider public (May 2007). In addition, some other agencies also pursue a largely performance-monitoring role, but still within the framework of aligning private interest with public expectations and norms; e.g. Uganda’s National Water and Sewerage Corporation’s (NWSC), which focuses on the quality of technical and managerial inputs into the provision and management of water resources (Mugisha 2008). All of

these differ in focus from the oversight bodies, but they all exist to ensure that certain norms and standards are upheld by the public official.

Public integrity oversight bodies therefore, vary in their function but it is clear that they all have at their core the institutionalisation of conduct by public officials that is in line with what is perceived to be societal norms and expectations. Similarly, such institutions also create structures that seek to deter, report, and even prosecute behaviour that may depart from that which is sociologically palatable. Above, we did explain that an institution that oversees integrity in public office is a specialised anti- corruption agency. In order to advance our understanding therefore of the Dominican IPO, in the next section, we examine the question of the institutional design of an integrity in public office act more closely through a typology of models of specialised anti-corruption agencies (ACAs).

1.4 Typology of IPOs We recall that public integrity is the equilibrium between three main variables; notably, the agential attributes, structural characteristics, and agential action (or non-action). The raison d’être of such ACAs is consequently, to facilitate this equilibrium. Thus far, we have shown that there are different types of institutions pursuing this equilibrium. The literature however, is weak on an ideal-type among these. Yet, the establishment of an ideal-type is significant to our thesis because it allows us to better examine and discuss the evolution of the Dominican IPO. An ideal-type IPO therefore, adds analytical rigour to our thesis.

Dunga (2010) and the OECD (2013) offer one classification that could begin to illuminate this area of interest to us. Their typology identifies three broad categories of institutions: Multi-purpose bodies (with law

26 enforcement powers); Law enforcement bodies (police and/or prosecutors); and those that focus largely on preventive measures. Multi- purpose bodies owe their nomenclature to the fact that they take on at least three principal activities: prevent, educate, and investigate. This model is usually cited as the most comprehensive and most ideal-type available. The Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption (a frequently cited exemplar of effective and comprehensive ACA, never mind the fact that it is the Chief Executive, alone, who appoints commissioners) and the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau fall within this category. Law enforcement bodies take on one or all of at least three activities: detection, investigation, and prosecution bodies. Two examples are the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime and the Belgian Central Office for the Repression of Corruption. For their part, prevention agencies are very diverse but their activities remain focused on public education in order to discourage corruption. The OECD typology could help us situate the Dominican IPO. However, it focuses a lot on the functions of ACA’s and ignores other salient features of such agencies (e.g. its location, composition, etc.) and it is therefore, incomplete. In fact, even its ideal-type, which in the literature, appears to be embraced by many, appears to be weak on autonomy. We therefore find ourselves with a few suggested key features for an ideal-type but without an actual example that satisfies our barometer for autonomy.

Consequently, we refer to the review of the literature in order to design the type of institution that can ideally pursue the equilibrium among three variables of which we spoke above. Several writers suggest that there are six themes that are central to such institutions, each comprising two dimensions (Brown & Uhr 2004; Coghill 2004; Doig 1995; Head 2012; Langseth et al. 1997; Pope 1999):

1. Composition - partisan Vs non-partisan. The membership of the agency, or the Commission, could be decided in a partisan or non- partisan manner. 2. Location – centralised Vs decentralised. The decisions and staff appointments of the Commission may be subjected to control from the Executive either directly or indirectly, as in through a minister or some other organ that serves the Executive, in which case it would be of a centralised type. Alternatively, it could be answerable to or subject to the control of the parliament or an extra- parliament body. It would therefore be of a decentralised type. 3. Political support - executive Vs parliament. Here, we pertain to the process by which the agency must source the resources for its operation. Many agencies rely on central government for financing, either in part or whole. This dependence exposes the agency to the whims and fancies of agents of the Executive. Some, in presidential systems where the budget is of a non-Executive nature, i.e. where the preparation of the budget is beyond the control of a single entity, e.g. the Executive (Stapenhurst et al. 2008), pro-public integrity agencies theoretically are subjected to less political control from actors from any particular side of the legislature. Additionally, some agencies may receive support from international entities, e.g. Transparency International. Such agencies therefore, do not rely on the approval of the Executive for its budget and logically, can have greater room to manoeuvre. 4. Scope of its mandate - public officials Vs public and private. Here, we focus on the actors who are involved. Some agencies focus solely on public officials while others also target non-public officials. Even among those that oversee public officials, some only target few senior officials. The Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption is an example of an agency that

goes beyond the senior politician. Its scope is consequently, far reaching. 5. Mission - investigate, prosecute, and educate Vs investigate and educate. As noted by the OECD (2013) above, different agencies take on different missions. 6. Institutional environment -part of national integrity system (e.g. related institutions, broad strategy) Vs stand-alone or ad- hoc. Various writers (De Sousa 2010; Doig & McIvor 2003; Langseth et al. 1997) speak against stand-alone institutions that are not part of a national grid of institutions that are meant to fight corruption and promote public integrity. In some cases, related institutions may exist but the institutional infrastructure does not allow for cross-organisational support; subsequently, weakening the impact of a member of the national integrity network. We are convinced that cumulatively, these six themes represent the essence of an institution that is meant to combat corruption in public office or to oversee public integrity. The first three refer directly to the independence of such an institution. The fourth speaks of the object of the institution’s work and informs of how determined and comprehensive the effort at engendering and monitoring public integrity really is. However, equally significant is that this fourth theme gives an indication of the intended outcome of the institution. For example, an institution whose mandate extends to a wide range of actors could appear to be less about curbing the influence of private interests and more about ensuring the wholeness with societal values than one that is much more limited. Similarly, such an institution could be said to be aimed at engendering greater coherency among a wider range of actors than one with much a limited scope. Theme five also allows us to examine the breadth of the institution. Some may have a limited mandate of investigation only. We assume that an institution with such a limited mandate is not likely to be as effective in nurturing an equilibrium in the triangle as one that has

a broader mandate. This argument is also supported by the reported success of the Hong Kong Independent Commission, which goes well beyond merely investigating possible incidences of inappropriate conduct by public officials. Theme six, like the fourth, informs of the commitment to pursue public integrity, but it could actually add theoretical strength to our analysis. An ad-hoc institution could be indicative of the amount of political commitment invested in the anti-corruption effort. It is conceivable that in contexts where leaders are not too enthusiastic about establishing institutions for public integrity they will seek to create a stand-alone institution because of the perception that doing so may earn them political capital. Consequently, the discussion on these themes appears to be most relevant to our study.

1.5 Ideal-Type Collapsing these six themes leads us to three broad classifications: IPOs with centralised/decentralised features, those with a limited/broad scope and mandate, and those that are part of a national framework (NIS)/those that are ad-hoc. Further dissecting these themes allows us eight sub-types of IPOs: 1. Centralised-limited (in scope and mandate) – ad-hoc 2. centralised-broad- ad-hoc 3. centralised-limited -NIS 4. centralised-broad- NIS 5. decentralised- limited – ad-hoc 6. decentralised-broad- ad-hoc 7. decentralised-limited -NIS 8. decentralised-broad- NIS. The literature suggests that our ideal-type IPO is the decentralised- broad- NIS type; the model that many believe is manifested in the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption.

Dominica’s IPO is of the centralised-limited – ad-hoc type. We shall discuss this observation in detail in Chapter 5. However, we can offer some preliminary explanations here. Although it is not answerable to the Executive, its source of resources is the Executive. Additionally, of the seven members of the implementing Commission, three (including the Chairman) are appointed upon the advice of the Executive. A quorum comprises any four members. Moreover, the institution’s scope does not go beyond the financial matters of selected senior public officials and it does not have the authority to initiate investigations against these officials. It certainly does not take on a prosecutorial or educative role. Finally, the Dominican IPO is the only institution of its type on the island. This is not to say that there are no other structures that are meant to oversee conduct among public officers (the Director of Audit, the Public Accounts Committee, the Police, and the Director of Public Prosecutions are all examples). However, the IPO is the only institution expressly concerned about anti-corruption and pro public integrity. It is therefore, a stand-alone creation.

In summary, our discussion on the choice and models of IPOs logically leads us to an extension of our primary research question, why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). These extensions are: First, why did the Dominican decision-makers opt for a specialised anti-corruption agency to address perceived breaches of governance? Second, why was that choice, the Dominican IPO, so designed as to be only remotely related to the ideal-type institution? We argue that the answers to these two questions lie in the motivations and strategies of dominant actors on the IPO, which have been shaped by structural forces. In the Chapter 2, we explore this position by discussing literature that explains actor behaviour regarding the choice and design of the Dominican IPO.

1.6 Summary to Chapter 1 Our goal when we began this chapter was to create a frame within which we would be able to situate the Dominican IPO. At the core of this frame, is our conceptualization of public integrity as a balance achieved by public officials among three sets of sometimes conflicting variables; agential attributes, structural phenomena, and agential action/non- action. It follows that our perspective of the construction of institutions of public integrity, such as the Dominican IPO, embraces both the structural and agential realms.

Unfortunately, much of the research in institutions of public integrity largely shows a bias towards structural issues, viz conceptual and organizational issues (Lawton & Doig 2005; Menzel 2005). There is consequently a dearth of research on the design of such institutions. Additionally, both the practitioner and academic fields have focused on the impact of existing models or on conceptual discourse and little focus on phenomena surrounding the design of such institutions, especially not pertaining to power relations among actors at the conception and design stage, which is, ironically, the purpose of the integrity institutions (to regulate the behaviour of individual actors).

This focus on organizational impact highlights a structuralist bias to the construction of institutions of public integrity. In the next chapter, we examine the literature on how actors interact to decide on institutional choice and design. This examination advances our theory on the construction of the Dominican IPO, that rational actors, conscious of their power position, deliberately use their resources to create an IPO that advances their interests.

CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING CHOICE: THEORIZING ABOUT CREATING THE IPO The central argument of this dissertation is that calculated power relations among “rational” actors have resulted in the choice and design of an institution that is responsible for the oversight of public integrity and probity in Dominica. In Chapter 1, we discussed conceptual concerns pertaining to the design of institutions of public integrity and we offered a typology of such institutions. Here, we describe the processes by which actors mobilise in the process of institutional design. First, we briefly discuss the central tenets of one approach to understanding the policy process and some empirical evidence in its favour in order to better position our thesis within the literature on actor behaviour and institutional design. Second, having laid out the broad framework for analysing institutional choice and design, we examine the relevant literature on power resources, allowing sufficient room for a discussion on the structure-agency theme, which is central to this study. Finally, we describe a synthesized view of our theory of power relations on the choice and design of the Dominican IPO.

Among the plethora of theoretical approaches to studying the policy process (Sabatier & Weible 2014), we believe that the networks approach seems to offer some of the most relevant theories to explaining policy outcome through the lens of strategic self-maximization action by actors. The networks framework for understanding public policy, is however, fragmented theoretically (Börzel 1998): Different perspectives exist. A brief discussion of those that may be relevant to our context would suffice.

Policy outcome could be the result of networks of diverse actors who share certain resources. Knoke (1998) defines policy networks as “a heterogeneous set of persons or organizations linked by one or more

33 relationships into an enduring social structure with the potential to influence public policy decisions of interest to the network’s members (3).” As a heterogeneous group, there is much diversity among actors; in their backgrounds, beliefs, and interests it would seem. Börzel (1998) also reinforces the notion that networks are about heterogeneity but he also introduces the concept of working, striving, towards a common goal. He insists:

A policy network includes all actors involved in the formulation and implementation of a policy in a policy sector. They are characterized by predominantly informal interactions between public and private actors with distinctive, but interdependent interests, who strive to solve problems of collective action on a central, non-hierarchical level (8).

In this conceptualization of networks, actors of interdependent but divergent interests seemingly engage in symmetric relations to shape public policy. Policy outcome is consequently a negotiated settlement among a plurality of actors with interdependent but competing interests (Börzel 1998; Pappi & Henning 1998).

Indeed, Donnet (2012) offers empirical evidence of actors working in an informal network to coordinate their efforts and impact decision-making. His research uses qualitative and social network analysis techniques to study how informal networks coalesce to shape formal organizational decision-making in Brisbane (Australia). He asks: “How do actors overcome their strategic interests to make development decisions? Do actors diverge from formal decision-making arrangements to influence decisions, if so, how and why” (317). He concludes that actors overcome their strategic interests by “creating coalitions, and new relationships to reinforce the advocacy of their strategic interests….actors’ interests…when aligned…foster reconfigurations of decision-making networks that benefit efficiency and inclusivity by realigning

34 relationships towards a salient resource-providing actor” (Loc. cit.). To the second question, his study reveals that actors do use informal channels to influence decisions through a process of “(re)negotiate, reiterate, reconfigure, Reinforce, reconstructing” (318) consistent with the conceptualization of policy networks offered by Börzel (1998) above. Donnet’s (2012) study is important for at least two reasons. First, it confirms that there is interaction across domains of networks, informal and formal; an observation that may have been overlooked by Borzel (1998), and second, it also confirms that actors use their resources calculatingly in order to consolidate their resources and influence each other.

Carpenter, D. P., K. M. Esterling, et al. (1998) seem to support the view of actors working in reciprocal relationships to influence policy through their ties to policymakers. They affirm: “What you know depends on who you know and where you are positioned” (1). The authors introduce two new concepts to the discussion on networks: dependency and structural position. Network actors depend on each other for resources but of equal significance to note is that the capacity of an actor to provide resources, to influence the flow of resources, or to receive resources is a direct result of his position in the network structure. One actor who is closely linked to another with many resources will logically have access to those resources. The converse, although not necessarily accurate, is also very feasible, according to Granovetter’s (1973). In his seminal work on network analysis, “the strength of weak ties,” the author affirms that strong ties could provide a wealth of redundant information and therefore, weak ties could in fact, be more beneficial to an actor than strong ones. Networks consequently, are resource-rich arenas in which actors engage in a constant play of acquiring and purveying of resources.

This conceptualization of networks is somewhat dissimilar from the perspective embraced by others. Among variants of the networks thesis, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier 2007) is one of the most widely discussed. For the ACF, belief systems – “sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993:16) are the most important glue that keeps networks together, not shared interests or shared need for resources. This model therefore proposes a shift in focus in analysing policymaking, from actor behaviour in a context of institutional rules to actor belief systems and how these may impact the policy process.

Those who postulate to the ACF model argue that policy change is characterized by three processes, not stages. First, it comprises competing “advocacy coalitions” in a policy subsystem. This subsystem “consists of actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993:5). Additionally, actors in a subsystem often organize themselves in coalitions or alliances if in their calculation such a configuration will advance their opportunity to effect policy change in their favour. Inevitably, when actors mobilize into coalitions, it is conceivable that some may emerge as more critical to the success of the coalition than other actors, hence giving rise to “policy brokers” (Bergeron & Valluy 1998; Dahl 1961; Kingdon 1995; Salisbury 1969). These are usually elected officials and high civil servants who serve as mediators among the competing coalitions, seeking compromise and common ground.

The findings of Anechiarico and Segal (2010) seem to support the notion of an actor emerging as dominant, as a broker, because of his structural

36 position in a network. They describe how actors use organizational techniques to advance the interests of their organizations. Anechiarico and Segal (2010) used in-depth interviews and social network analysis (SNA) to study the impact of inter-connectedness of integrity networks, such as is found among ten inspectors general in the US. Their overall thesis is that there exists a positive connection between sustained coordinated integrity networks and the quality of public integrity. Their results suggest that policy entrepreneurs dominate the policy process through coordination of their resources in order to recruit new partners and consolidate their formal network. This conclusion is instructive.

The second process involves external perturbations. These provide political opportunities or challenges for the competing coalitions to advance their agenda by trying to influence the core of the policy. It is this change of a policy’s core that results in the evolution of a new policy. Those perturbations could be changes in “socioeconomic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, and output from other subsystems that provide opportunities and obstacles to the competing coalitions” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993:5). Third, the social structure, constitutional and institutional rules, imposes constraints or enhances the resources of actors in the subsystem. This structural influence, in turn shapes the motivations and activities of actors. They may decide to create sub-coalitions in order to improve their resource position and influence the policy process, for example. Actor behaviour is therefore, largely influenced by the interaction between structural and agential values. The policy subsystem and the belief systems of actors are consequently, two of the critical analytical components of the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). Indeed, this analytical focus in the ACF differs from the heavy emphasis in the different conceptualizations we have studied earlier.

The network analysis perspective to the policy process therefore has the potential to add theoretical and conceptual richness to our analysis. We have at least two perspectives that greatly influence our perspective of the policy process: One suggests policy change as the result of actor behaviour within a configuration that is built based on dependency and shared interests and another, the ACF, that sees policy change as the result of actor behaviour that has been engendered by the domination of shared values. Both have influenced our understanding of the networks perspective. Although we recognize the theoretical strengths (and deficiencies) in each, we believe that public policy is the result of marriages of convenience: Heterogeneous actors collaborating or in conflict in an effort to advance their interests, often competing but at times similar: “‘Policy is the outcome of the interactions of resourceful and boundedly-rational actors whose capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely, but not completely, shaped by the institutionalized norms within which they interact’” (Scharpf 1997: 195 as quoted in Rhodes 2006:11). The glue that binds them together is not necessarily a stable shared belief system as suggested by the ACF, but the goal to be achieved, the mission. In the process of advancing their interests, actors may form coalitions or alliances. Such configurations are mere strategies, we believe, for achieving their goals. Indeed, our conceptualization of the policy process does not differ significantly from that proffered by the ACF, but it nuances it by seeking to amalgamate the concept of coalitions with that of shared interests and interdependency. We do not entirely dismiss the logic of belief systems espoused by the ACF. Belief systems add depth and longevity to networks. However, we are convinced that unity surrounding a belief system does not adequately explain the more temporal alliances that may evolve surrounding a policy issue. In addition, embracing the concept of actor interest brings greater methodological value to our research

because we can more readily operationalize actor interest-based behaviour than value-based paradigm.

In summary, the networks perspective to the policy process allows us a panoramic view of public policy. It theorises that public policy is the cumulative effect of a number of key agential and structural variables in convergence; notably, the heterogeneous nature of actor interests, the resources of actors in network, the actors’ position vis à vis other actors, the operational rules that shape the activities of the actors in the network, and the socio-political phenomena in the environment. To embrace the policy network perspective therefore, is to acknowledge that the policy process is a conflict zone. This conflict takes place between actor and actor on one hand and actor and structural forces on the other.

2.1 Theorizing about Integrity Management That the policy process is a conflict zone is an observation that is central to our thesis that rational actors have fought to create an institution with oversight for public integrity that advances their interests. This power play for the preferred institution is however, conditioned by structural forces. An actor knows that he is one among many who are all jostling for an advantage in the process of creating that law, that institution. Therefore, he analyses his location in that network, he examines his resource base acquired through agential action or imposed upon him by his structural location, he juxtaposes his condition (location and resource base) vis à vis that of his allies and adversaries, and then, only then, he decides to deploy his power resources accordingly. This perspective suggests that an actor’s motivations, ideas, and preferences have been shaped by the power positions of other actors and his perception of the self-maximization opportunities inherent in the object of his actions. An actor who feels threatened by a particular type of

39 institution or by another actor’s power (or perceived power) will logically choose an institutional design that enhances his position and weakens that of his adversaries. In addition, an actor who feels deprived of political power will use all available power resources and opportunities to produce an institution that will subvert or reduce the political power and the authority of public officials. Likewise, the converse is true. Policy choice is the result of both agential and structural forces.

This discussion on the central theory of our research proposal introduces four new themes that we discuss below because of their fundamental role in explaining our theory on integrity management: the agency-structure divide, Power, social network, and power resources.

2.2 Structure – Agency A dividing line exists between methodological individualists who see power as emanating from agents and those who see it as a force from structures in an actor’s environment (Dessler 1989; Dowding 2008; Wendt 1987). For the former, Man, the biological human, is the only one who decides and acts (Dowding 1991). He may do so cognizant of the rules that impact his behaviour, but it is he who strategizes and engages to influence others. The structuralist position does not deny that the actor acts, but it stresses that he acts as a result of the constraining (Waltz 1979) and enhancing potential of his environment, or of both (Bhaskar 1979; Dessler 1989; Dowding 2008, Giddens 1979). Both sides of the “divide” consequently, acknowledge each other.

Structure, itself, has different definitions and levels. For Parsons (2007), it pertains to the man-made material environmental factors that surround an actor. However, it is possible to posit to a broader view of structure as encompassing other non-physical features of the actor’s environment, such as institutions and their rules, social relations

(Bhaskar 1979; Dessler 1989; Dowding 2008; Giddens 1979; Wendt 1987), and the social arrangements that result from the interaction among actors (Giddens 1979; Waltz 1979). In this wider view, an actor’s power resources are enhanced, shaped, augmented, or nullified by his position in a constellation of actors, i.e. an actor’s network impacts his power position. Fellow actors either agree to enrich him or largely benefit from him directly or through his facilitation of access to others who can. Network position consequently, shapes the actor's behaviours in the construction of the IPO.

Deep structuralism advances the structuralist argument further. It argues that even biological conditions are influenced by the environment (to some degree of accuracy, we believe). Hence, the individual does not truly choose rationally, but he acts because the structure has already programmed him to act in a certain manner. Consequently, the actor is not really rational but is simply an organism whose actions have been pre-determined for him by his environment. However, even deep structuralists are tempered by agency (Dessler 1989).

Indeed, we can examine another perspective of structure that is advanced by Giddens’ structuration theory (1979). At its core, according to Giddens (1979), is a composite definition of structure, which fuses structure and agency: “signification – the meaning and interpretation we place on our behaviour; legitimation – the moral order of ethical norms and so on; and domination – the exercise of power through the control of resources” (Dowding 2008: 29). Structuration theory distinguishes itself from structural theory therefore, by avoiding any precedence to structure or agency. Structure is always intertwined with agential action and reflection (Dowding 2008; Giddens 1979; Wendt 1987).

The discussion on agency and structure is therefore, important to our analysis of the power relations surrounding the creation of the Dominican IPO because it helps us understand how and why actors use their power to create an institution. We acknowledge the conceptual and methodological distinctions between structural and structuration theories, but we also agree with Dowding (2008) that the distinctions do not radically transform the discourse. The conclusion remains: agential and structural features must be considered in explaining power relations and the resultant public policies (Bhaskar 1979; Bourdieu 1977; Dowding 2008; Giddens 1979; Parsons 2007; Wendt 1987). However, we posit to Bhaskar’s (1979) view that “all social action presupposes social structure, and vice versa” (Dessler 1989: 452). Ours is consequently, a structuralist perspective of power relations surrounding the construction of the Dominican Integrity in Public Office Act (2003). We do not give precedence to either agential or structural explanations of power in studying the emergence of the IPO.

2.3 Power Dowding (1991) affirms, “whenever actors produce outcomes then someone is using power” (48). Power is consequently, a central theme to political science. It is at the heart of political mobilization and the authoritative allocation of resources, i.e. decision-making. Manifestly, some of the most commonly cited definitions or descriptions of power take an agent, individualist, perspective. One classical definition conceptualizes it as a force over another that coerces and influences (Dahl 1957). Later precisions offered by writers like Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) seem to build on this definition and view power as a force that influences and moves actors.

Dowding (1991) has nuanced earlier descriptions of power by distinguishing between “outcome power” and “social power.” The former,

42 also termed “power to,” refers to “the ability of an actor to bring about or help bring about outcomes” by acting on events or things (48). Social power, “power over” (Dahl 1957), pertains to “the ability of an actor to change the incentive structures of another actor to bring about or help to bring about outcomes“(Dowding 1991: 55). An actor may use any manner of measures to impact this incentive structure so that the targeted actor will act in a manner consistent with his wishes. Imbeau (2009) refers to Dowding’s outcome power as “instrumental power.” It is the term that we also employ in order to distinguish its power to effect more sharply from the power over of social power.

We understand power as a force that enables an actor to influence another to complete an activity that he would not naturally complete. It is therefore, both kinetic and potential because it exists even without action (Göhler 2009). Let us understand this perspective in two ways. First, power can cause or discourage action. One actor has “power over” another (Dahl 1957), i.e. the capacity to make that other actor act according to his wishes. Second, power is also interactive and symmetric, because the target of the influencing action is himself reacting and responding to the effort. In fact, even when we apply the third face of power of Lukes (1974), in which the actor simply acquiesces in the face of superior power, or the deep structuralist view of relations, the act of acquiescing is in itself, a decision and therefore, we interpret power as an interactive concept. Thus, any decision by an actor to avoid contesting another more powerful competitor in the design of the IPO is considered a response to that other actor, albeit one that may subjugate him.

This second facet of our conceptualization of power introduces a structural element because it confirms the actor as acting or not acting, i.e. engaging in a non-decision, based on his understanding of the force

43 that he faces. Let us examine more closely this structural element by studying how power in understood in networks of actors.

2.4 Theories of Power in Networks of Actors Power in networks is largely considered a result of the structural position of actors within the network. Hence, in social network analysis (SNA), concepts such as the nature of the ties among actors, the centrality of actors, the distance of actors from the central actor, and the alternatives for access to resources feature prominently in discussing power relations in networks (Bonacich 1998; Brass & Burkhardt 1993; Burt 1976; Freeman 1979). Here, we discuss these and related concepts in order to clarify the network view of power.

2.5 Strong and Weak Ties Before we delve deeply into theories of power in networks, we must first understand the concept of “ties” that exist among actors in the network because a core argument in theories of network power is that an actor’s power position evolves as a result of his relation to another. Hence a strong connection, tie, to another actor is assumed to be more enriching to an actor than a weak one. Strong ties are those interactions that have been sustained over time. They are usually rich in information and commitment (Granovetter 1973). Weak ties, on the other hand are loose relations that are characteristics of acquaintances (Carpenter et al.1998). On the surface, it may seem that because of a weak tie between actor A and B, either would not be interested in what the other has to say or offer. However, according to Granovetter (1973) weak ties are most likely to provide a less redundant source of information and therefore, should be most beneficial to an actor. Within the context of our thesis therefore, through a strong tie, an actor can be expected to receive or to transfer power resources in an effort to advance his interests on the issue of constructing the IPO. However, we would also expect a significant investment of resources by an actor in improving a weak tie in order to

44 increase his pool of resources on his side. The nature of the ties among actors is consequently central to the discussion on power and influence in networks. It is through these ties that actors evolve as “dominant,” central, in a network. Let us examine the notion of network centrality as a power concept in SNA.

2.6 Centrality Freeman (1979) offers three concepts to explain power and control in a network through the centrality of an actor: the degree centrality, inbetweenness, and closeness. These three concepts have dominated social network literature and therefore, warrant some attention. Degree centrality pertains to the number of direct connections to other actors in the network. The most central actor is the one who has most connections (Lemieux & Ouimet 2004). He is consequently considered among the most powerful in his network because he has a multitude of opportunities and advantages for accessing resources. Inbetweenness centrality studies the degree to which an actor can act as an intermediary among others because of his strategic location. The more others depend on him as a conduit for exchanges, the more centralised his position appears and the greater his capacity to control and coordinate the exchanges in the network (Freeman 1979; Lemieux & Ouimet 2004). Closeness centrality examines the extent to which an actor is independent from others. It focuses on the length of the shortest route between two actors. The furthest an actor is from another, the greater is his independence from that actor and, conversely, the less the control of that actor over him. Centrality in a network therefore gives an actor a position through which he has access to multiple sources of resources. This access allows him to exercise immense influence and “power over” other actors. Power is therefore understood as a reflection of the actor’s position relative to others.

Szwarcberg (2012) concluded work that illustrates power as a result of network centrality, especially that of inbetweenness. In a study in Argentina, Szwarcberg (2012) hypothesizes that centrality in a political and non-political network increases the actor’s ability to influence network outcomes and therefore, she examined how informal non- political networks affect political networks. Using a closed-question survey of 20 manzaneras (women who assist informally in distributing social assistance), the researcher found that the most dominant and influential actor was the one who offered multiple services (money- lending, home care, political information) to others. However, significantly, she also interpreted that this actor was dominant because of two reasons. Indeed, the first, she could tap into many sources of resources for people. Consequently, she was a central point of supply. Second, ostensibly because of her position in the network, she found herself mid-way between adversarial segments of the network. She was therefore able to capitalize on conflicts between them as each competed to gain her trust. Szwarcberg (2012) therefore, confirms the strength of Freeman’s (1979) inbetweenness as a power position that results in the dominant actor actually dominating the behaviour and results of his network.

Not everyone is convinced that network centrality is a power concept, though. Borgatti et al (2011) have succinctly summarised the paradox in the centrality thesis: “being connected to weak others makes one powerful [because the weak ones depend on you], and being connected to powerful others makes one weak [because the powerful ones do not really need you and your support]” (1173). The position of the non-central actors therefore, is not necessarily as powerful as that of the central ones. In addition, Cook et al. (1983) suggest that centrality as a power concept may not be applicable to all types of networks. It cannot predict power in “negatively connected ex-change networks” (302), i.e. relations

46 where exchanges are contingent on the absence of exchanges in other relations (Cook et al. 1983; Yamagishi et al. 1988). Additionally, Cook et al. (1983) dismiss transitivity in network relations. Transitivity describes the possibility that two actors may be connected to each other because each is strongly connected to actors who, themselves, are strongly connected: “As a result, if A and B have a strong tie, and B and C have a strong tie, the claim is that A and C have an increased chance of having at least a weak tie (e.g., A and C are acquaintances)” (Granovetter 1973:1178).

We believe that the experiments completed by Cook et al. (1983) face challenges for external validity. Indeed, they also acknowledge this limitation. The logic in transitivity is also not spectacularly convincing (that the friend of my friend is also, logically, my friend). It is feasible that, using the example offered above by Granovetter (1973), A and C prefer to have no contact with each other, for multiple reasons. However, our perspective of power as an interactive concept is consistent with network transitivity, notwithstanding its deficiency, because we believe that actors will always seek to maximize their ties in order to improve their power resources. Consequently, we find the conclusion articulated by Cook et al. (1983) to be less convincing than Freeman’s (1979).

In summary, network power is consequently, reflected in the position of the actor within the network, i.e. it is a structural perspective of power. The spatial arrangement of relationships, ties, creates opportunities or challenges for different actors as they seek to use their resources to advance their interests. Yet, on their own, these discussions do not help us understand the conditions that shape an actor’s choice of power resources and the amount of that power he uses. In fact, the social network perspective of power barely considers the individual power

47 attributes of the actor and, when it does, SNA usually seems to describe power resources as informational, knowledge-based.

Our theory on the evolution of the IPO goes beyond a mere recognition of an actor as powerful because he is central in a constellation of actors. We accept the argument that the most powerful actor in a constellation of actors will be the one who is seen to attract most attention by other actors, i.e. he is the most central. However, we argue that the actor is central because he possesses resources that others deem critical to advancing their interests. Consequently, any discussion of power relations in networks surrounding the choice and design of the Dominican IPO must consider how the actor deploys his resources, which could be either knowledge, wealth, or force (Imbeau & Couture 2010) because centrality as an indication of power cannot be divorced from an understanding of the power resources of the actor. We therefore, reconcile the structural view of power and that of power as a product of agent action. In the next section therefore, we explore typologies of resources of power to advance our understanding of agents’ power from a non-structural perspective. We believe that such a discussion will deepen our analysis of power relations within networks surrounding the design of Dominica’s Integrity in Public Office Act (2003).

2.7 Typology of Power Resources In spite of the proliferation of different typologies of resources of power, there is consensus regarding the sources of actors’ power. French and Raven (1959) have been pioneers in defining the different resources of power that actors use. Legitimate power pertains to “formal authority delegated to the holder of the position”; referent power is “power (or ability) of individuals to attract others and build loyalty. Based on the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder;” expert power is an “individual’s power deriving from the skills or expertise of the person

and the organisation’s needs for those skills and expertise;” reward power “depends upon the ability of the power wielder to confer valued material rewards;” coercive power “means the application of negative influences;” and holders of information power: “are well-informed, up-to- date, and also have the ability to persuade others” (898). Narayan (2005) offers a description that is less detailed but one that still embraces social status, moral resources, and political resources. These are: “authority roles that entitle people to claim that they are speaking in the name of the state and can employ whatever resources state institutions possess to enforce decisions” (225). In a later contribution to the topic, Imbeau and Couture (2010) describe three principal power resources: knowledge, wealth, and force. The latter pertains to formal authority to punish or coerce an actor into completing an act.

The common denominators in these typologies are: wealth, formal authority, and control over information. Charisma as a resource is less convincing. It may succeed in influencing behaviour but it’s very subjective nature raises question about its validity as a power resource. We therefore accept the three-item typology offered by Imbeau and Couture (2010).

The typology is critical to our work. In social network analysis, it represents the bundle of tools, the attributes, that make an actor attractive; not necessarily “dominant,” but at least attractive to other actors. Indeed, the actor owes his network centrality in part to the fact that he has an abundance of one or all of the resources. Additionally, this typology allows us to refine our above description of social power into three types based on the source of the power: Economic power if the source if wealth; political power, if formal authority; and preceptoral power, if the source is informational (Imbeau 2012). The work of Imbeau

49 and Couture (2010) on a typology of power resources is therefore central to our dissertation.

We note however, that the literature on power resources does not provide measures for determining how an actor may rank his resources. We do not assume that an actor will have only one source of power or that he will logically use his strongest sources as his first effort in influencing another actor because there is a cost to the actor to use his resources. It is also conceivable that an actor will use a combination of sources. Yet, the typologies do not appear to discuss these issues surrounding the resources. This gap in the literature does not help clarify the conditions under which an actor decides to use his resources and consequently, scholars are unable to predict such conditions and contribute more richly to discourses on the policy process. Chapter 3 suggests how we may correct this deficiency. Our discussion on power thus far leaves us with an ample foundation to summarize our theory of power regarding the choice and design of the Dominican IPO.

2.8 Summary of Our Theory: Power and Integrity Management We recall the principal question that drives this study: Why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). We believe that “rational” actors have created an institution that will serve them. This study will enrich a literature that has used social network analysis to study the design of an institution of public integrity but it proposes to go further by analysing both structural and agential factors to explain actor behaviour and the resulting public policy. These “rational” actors, we believe, are located in networks that provide opportunities and constraints for actors to use their power. We propose consequently to delineate these networks and to illuminate the precise forms of power relations, i.e. the power maximizing behaviour employed by actors. Our theoretical framework indicates that networks of actors are used to

50 impact public policy. Consequently, although our principal focus is informal networks, we expect to study how actors in such networks use their resources to influence formal ties.

In Figure 2 below we re-visit the thesis inherent in the Dobel triangle in order to illustrate our theory of power relations surrounding the construction of the IPO. As noted in Chapter 1, Dobel (1999) conceptualized public integrity as the coherence among three variables: Personal capacity and commitments, legal obligations of office, and prudence and effectiveness. We have modified this theory and argue that public integrity is a state of wholeness, an equilibrium that is achieved among three principal variables: Actor values, structural considerations, and actor behaviour. We further explained that this equilibrium is likely to be preceded by conflict within the actor because these three variables are often in opposition and between the actor and structural phenomena. This definition allows us to assume that actors will use all their resources, i.e. invest heavily, to resist an institution that seeks to constrain their power or do the opposite if the institution, aims to increase their power. We believe that this power play is most dominant in-between the points of the triangle. For example, actor “A” who is being asked to enact pro-integrity legislation may do so within a certain context, faced with multiple structures: Rules and obligations of his job and society, the power of other actors (which can thwart or enhance his efforts), etc. He will therefore, calculate the potential loss to his economic and political power, determine the demands of his formal position vis à vis the request to enact the legislation, analyse his capacity to suppress or influence the Act, and will analyze the prevailing societal and institutional expectations. If he feels that it is politically expedient to enact the legislation, he will do so but not before injecting structures that will either enhance or maintain his power resources. His

conceptualization of prudence is therefore shaped by his perception of the potential impact of the act on his power resource.

Figure 2: Depicting Power Theory on IPO Construction

Actor capacity and values system (preferences, goals, interests, attributes, motivation, etc.) Actor behaviour (action or non‐ action)

Structural phenomena (institutional rules, location in a constellation of actors, resources of other actors, etc.)

We also theorize that actors are motivated by preferences that have been shaped by the power positions of other actors. Therefore, an actor’s investment in the power play is dependent on his perception of the power position of another actor. Actors who feel deprived of political power (parliamentary seats), we believe, e.g. the Opposition, will use all available power resources and network opportunities (weak ties, structural holes, and the privileges of inbetweenness and degree centrality) to produce an institution that will subvert or reduce the political power and the authority of public officials. Likewise, the converse is true, we believe. Motivations are also influenced by societal values, but we believe that they are primarily shaped by an actor’s understanding of his power position relative to that of other actors.

2.9 Summary of Chapter 2 This study focuses on the creation of an institution to oversee public integrity and probity among public officials in the Commonwealth of Dominica. In Chapter 1, we explained that public integrity is a state of equilibrium that is found at the nexus of three key variables: the actor’s

52 values, those of society, and his behaviour. It stands to reason therefore that the creation of an institution for probity and public integrity is a contested policy space. In this space, actors may form alliances, accommodations, and compromises but they will certainly engage in power relations in order to share their resources as they pursue a common goal: An institution that is consistent with their interests. By recognising the impact of both agential and structural forces within the policy arena that either facilitate or frustrate actor behaviour, the policy networks perspective, as we discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is therefore, an apt theoretical framework to study such a contested area. Through this frame of reference, we can more accurately analyze how actors, as “rational” agents, use their power to advance their interests.

Nevertheless, gaps exist in the literature on network actors and their use of power. We believe that the study of the actual use of power resources is neglected. There is some attention on how actors use networks to pursue their interests, but there is little attention to how actors use their power resources to do so. There is even less research on how actors use power resources on the design of an independent anti-corruption agency. Analyses therefore, remain at a broader network level. This study fills such gaps.

The effort to fill this gap is all the more relevant in light of the theoretical underpinnings of the network approach to the policy process that frames this research. Central to network theories of the policy process is the argument that actors collaborate based on shared interests (or belief systems in the ACF) to share resources and advance their interests. In addition, during the process, it is feasible that certain actors may evolve as privileged because of their position in the networks; some may therefore become more dominant than others. A few questions emerge logically from this observation. How does an actor actually broaden his

53 resource base so that he emerges as dominant among others? If that actor is a policy broker, how does he deploy his resources in his brokerage role? Is policy outcome a reflection of the preferences of the actor who emerges as dominant? These questions have formed the bedrock of our analysis of the emergence of the Dominican IPO, inspiring a multitude as well. In the next chapter, we detail our research questions and describe the method by which we sought to answer those questions.

CHAPTER 3: METHOD This thesis studies power relations among actors during the conceptualisation and design of the Dominican Integrity in Public Office Act (2003). In the two preceding chapters, we delineated the literature framework of the thesis. Here, Chapter 3, we examine the operational frame within which we have analysed the relationships surrounding the creation of the Act.

We believe however, that at this point in our document, it is important to re-state the central thesis to our study. We have argued that an Act that was created in the Commonwealth of Dominica to oversee public integrity among parliamentarians, senior functionaries, and persons serving on state or quasi-state boards is largely of the centralised-public model. We therefore sought to understand why political elites chose that particular design of an anti-corruption and pro-public integrity state institution. In fact, we theorize that this institution is a calculated choice; the result of elites’ domination of the process leading to that Act. We theorize that once the actors became aware of the potential of the IPO to thwart or advance their power, they strategically used their resources within a broad constellation of actors to construct an IPO that serves them. We have consequently opted to study why and how those actors have used their power resources in a constellation of actors in order to arrive at their own goals. Chapter 3 describes how we have studied the “why” and “how” regarding the power relations among actors.

There are four principal sections to the chapter. First, we describe the specific research questions that have shaped the study. Second, we describe the hypotheses that have guided the thesis and have permitted us to arrive at valid responses to our research questions. Third, we explain the data collection and analysis methods. Fourth, consistent with

55 an inductive approach to studying the problem identified in the Introduction to our thesis document, we give a clear indication of the conclusions that we anticipated to emanate from this method. We end with an appropriate conclusion.

3.1 Research Questions and Key Concepts The principal question driving the study is: Why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). We believe that the Act is simply the manifestation of the wishes of a select few, for their common interests. They have worked hard at creating an Act that serves them. This theory leads to a few more specific questions; namely: 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters? 2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors? 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution? 4. What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? 5. What power resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? We have used the term “dominant” actor. To us a dominant actor is an actor who has been shown to be a decision maker, an actor (individual or organisation) who owns resources that have been used in advancing the creation of the IPO, or any actor who has been actively involved in the construction of the act or in promoting its implementation. This definition includes senior public servants, politicians, heads of relevant boards, media workers, a manager, a legal expert, etc. In Chapter 4, we give a more precise list of the dominant actors who took part in this study.

The effort to identify the dominant actors on the IPO is an important step in delineating the networks of actors but it will also help to identify and explain motivations and preferences that are in the Act. Now,

56 motivations, preferences, and goals are significant because we assumed that the goals and scope of the IPO would be consistent with those of the owners of the IPO. Hence, “dominant actors,” “motivations,” “goals,’ and “preferences” are central concepts to this thesis. We consequently designed falsifiable hypotheses that will guide the search for answers to all our research questions.

3.2 Hypotheses Our literature framework has allowed us two hypotheses. As a consequence, here, we not only describe these hypotheses but we also explain their theoretical foundations. We hypothesize, first, that the choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO; second, the characteristics of alternative options and models of public integrity institutions are those of the non-dominant actors. This alternative hypothesis is critical because we expected that there would be secondary actors (whom we refer to here as alters) who may have a different view of what the IPO should have resembled. If there is evidence that alternative designs were proposed but that these alternatives were not adopted as the final product, we would have strengthened our theory that the IPO is truly a document of the most dominant, i.e. the most powerful of political actors in Dominica. This rival hypothesis also rejects the zero-sum analysis; that the absence of an alternative model to that advanced by dominant actors logically means consensus and, accordingly, an untestable principal hypothesis. If there were consensus on the first model and we found no evidence of alternatives, this absence would also trigger our curiosity. A logical question could be, “why is it that no one offered alternatives.” We still would not be able to conclude logically that the Act was the result of the most dominant. The rival hypothesis is

57 consequently, a central part of our efforts at testing our hypothesis. We can discuss the precise theoretical orientations of these hypotheses.

3.2.1 Hypothesis #1: Theoretical Foundations The choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO.

In Chapter 2, we described how actors strategize to dominate the public policy process so that it benefits them. The theoretical basis of our first hypothesis is grounded in the literature on the self-maximization behaviour of elites. Roberts and Doss (1992) affirm: “Public organizations, cannot afford to have the legitimacy of their actions tainted by conflict-of-interest allegations involving members of their organizations” (261). Hence, public managers strategize to protect themselves. Similarly, Robinson (1998) describes “defensive democratization” whereby political elites, cognizant of the political and economic power of the electorate, may create institutions to give the illusion of being democratic and responsive to the voices of the electorates. This is purely a survival tactic by the political elites: “uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis, the regime undertook sufficient reform to assure its political longevity, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan. I term this ‘defensive democratization’” (Robinson 1998:387). Defensive democratization, a political tactic, is conceivably a survival tactic and insurance against political risk in the construction of the Dominican IPO.

Maor (2004) seems to offer some evidence to support Robinson‘s theory. The writer has two principal objectives: Understand the implications for public officials when they are subjects of the investigations of anti- corruption agencies and understand the behaviour of those officials to

58 such agencies when they are under investigation. In a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales), he argues, “when investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate”(2). After focusing on evidence of resistance to the institutions by various public officials (legislatures and senior public service officers), Maor (2004) concludes: “The test cases presented so far indicate that anti-corruption instruments are put into place either in response to a public outcry or to media and political pressures” (22).

The study is limited methodologically because it focuses only on an analysis of documents pertaining to these cases. In addition, by focusing on one variable that matches his thesis, the aberrant reaction among officials, the researcher risks bias. However, the value in this study lies in what we can accept as the author’s preliminary conclusion, pending further exploration of the data: Politicians who feel threatened by investigations or calls for investigations seek ways to undermine and shut down the investigating authority.

This conclusion is further supported by Anechiarico and Segal (2010), whose study focuses on the organizational techniques employed by actors to advance the interests of their organizations. They used in-depth interviews and social network analysis to study the impact of inter- connectedness of integrity networks, such as is found among ten inspectors general (IG) in the US. Their overall thesis is that there exists a positive relationship between sustained coordinated integrity networks and the quality of public integrity. They advanced a typology of network connections that exist among inspectors general and other institutions, including the media. Type I (law enforcement networks) has a minimal

59 role for the media but “emphasize[s] connections within and outside the IG’s jurisdiction to enforcement, investigatory, and audit agencies. Outreach is primarily to enforcement-related organizations” (230). Type II (law enforcement and administrative deterrence) regularly interacts with the media, which publish their work, and has strong “enforcement and investigatory connections.” The final category is the Type III (integrated enforcement and administrative assessment). In this final category, the media are embedded and close “cooperation with administrative managers [and inspectors general] focuses on integrity and effectiveness” (230). Their results suggest a central role for the organizational leadership and resource capacity of the organizations: “the size and resource base of an office of inspector general (OIG) influence the development of networks…. With sufficient staffing to exploit opportunities, the larger OIGs can take advantage of jurisdictions rich in potential partners” (336). Therefore, dominant political actors can also dominate the policy process through coordination of their resources in order to recruit new partners and consolidate their formal network.

We also find a strong theoretical base for hypothesis #1 from Christopoulos (2006). The author elaborates on the notion of network centrality and power and supports our position that dominant rational actors strategize to advance their interests. In a study that uses SNA techniques to investigate how entrepreneurial an actor is in order to influence policy. The researcher focuses on examining the actor’s attributes and how they relate to the structure in his network. The study is guided by one hypothesis: “Public entrepreneurs attempt to control the policy cycle by incrementally adjusting their policy positions” and a ‘rival’ hypothesis, “public entrepreneurs attempt to effect policy change by opportunistically intervening in the policy cycle” (766). He offers two conclusions that are of relevance to our study, both of which relate to each of our hypothesis. First, the writer records strong evidence of

60 opportunistic behaviour by entrepreneurs and concludes: “The potential for coalition building and/or commanding support was highest for the most powerful actors, who in this instance are the ones generating most publicity and actively seeking contacts with others” (770). This observation is consistent with our theory that the most dominant Dominican actors have manoeuvred to produce an IPO that serves their partisan or otherwise self-optimizing interests. The second conclusion, we meet below while discussing the alternative hypothesis.

These studies about actor behaviour surrounding the creation and sustainability of institutions are instructive because they support our thesis that elites use their positions to mould the evolution of the Dominican IPO in their favour. Consequently, they form a strong theoretical frame for our first hypothesis. We can now examine the supporting literature for the rival hypothesis.

3.2.2 Hypothesis #2: Theoretical Foundations The characteristics of alternative options and models of the Dominican IPO are those of the non-dominant actors.

This hypothesis is also consistent with literature on the role played by alters in a network. We recall our discussion above on structural roles. According to Burt (1976), alters who find themselves disconnected from each other can and usually seek to create connections with other actors across in order to strengthen their position. The actor who reaches out to make such a connection and bridge the gap is an intermediary who, likely, will flaunt his power resources in order to persuade another alter to provide him with resources (information or money, for example). We conclude therefore that notwithstanding the strength in our first hypothesis, it is feasible that alternative models to the current design have emerged and they were plausibly forwarded by non-dominant

61 actors. These actors would have calculated that they can increase their relevance and power by advancing a design for an IPO that is contrary to what the dominant actors desire.

The same argument exists for actors who feel that their connection to a central actor is so weak that they are better off creating new ties with other actors in order to accentuate their relevance and power, both as an individual agent (because their power resources may have increased) and structurally (because other actors depend on them). Here, Granovetter’s (1973) theory of strong and weak ties meshes with Freeman’s on actor centrality to support our rival hypothesis. It is also here that the second conclusion offered by Christopoulos (2006) seems most relevant because it confirms Freeman’s (1979) thesis on inbetweenness centrality and power, particularly with regards to access and alternatives and, equally important, it supports our rival hypothesis. He suggests: “It seems a legitimate assumption that actors with low political capital can only hope to attain prominence by engaging in high-risk opportunistic actions; while actors with high political capital can be more circumspect and invest their more extensive resources in low-risk incremental ventures” (773). Our rival hypothesis therefore, is strongly rooted in the literature on social network analysis.

In summary, we are satisfied that the two hypotheses that have guided this study are theoretically and empirically sound, falsifiable, and testable. In addition, we have remained parsimonious so as to facilitate comprehension. Table 1 below describes the relationship between the hypotheses and our research questions.

Table 1: Relationship between Hypotheses and Research Questions

Research Question Hypothesis #1 Who are the dominant actors and their alters? The choice of a specialised anti-corruption #2 What were the motivations and goals agency and the subsequent design of that of the dominant actors? agency reflect the preferences of the #3 Who determined the original goals of dominant actors who were involved in the the institution? creation of that agency, the Dominican #5 What power resources did the actors IPO. use to shape the IPO?

#6 What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? #1 What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? #2 Who are the dominant actors and The characteristics of alternative options their alters? and models of the Dominican IPO are #4 What were the motivations and goals those of the non-dominant actors. of the dominant actors? #6 What are the conditions under which the actors use their power?

In the next section, we detail the process through which we sought to test these hypotheses.

3.3 Data Collection and Analysis We recall that the guiding argument of our thesis is that “rational” actors have analysed their network position and acted to increase their power so that they may design an IPO Act that advances their interests. To explore this thesis, we have designed one principal research question (why did the State develop and implement the current design of the IPO), six research questions, and two hypotheses. Our approach to seeking answers to our research questions and testing our hypotheses has therefore been hypothetical-deductive. That is, through our literature review, we deduced hypotheses and subsequently applied scientific research techniques in order to explore our hypotheses using empirical data. These research techniques are a combination of social network analysis and qualitative techniques.

Four themes have guided our search for answers in this study: The actors (individuals, groups, or organisations), their motivations, their actions and non-actions, and power relations. In this section of the chapter, we describe our use of each of the two techniques mentioned above and detail the manner in which we used them to explore these themes. We begin however, with a description of the data sources for this study.

3.4 Data Sources We had two sources of data: documents and human participants. The former were a mix of Hansard reports, reports from the IPO Commission, and others from the private sector (newspaper articles, audio recordings from two private citizens and two radio stations, video recordings from one telecommunications company, and paper documents from two private citizens). Details regarding the process used to receive and treat data received from these sources are presented below.

3.5 Data Collection There were two phases to data collection, the search for documents and interaction with participants. We describe the two in detail below.

3.6 Document Search We entered the field knowing very little about the IPO or the actors involved. Our first goal was consequently to learn about the Act, broadly speaking. We believed that a good starting point would have been any document pertaining to the Act. This very broad search criterion, we believed, would have allowed us a greater opportunity at reaching rich data pertinent to the Act’s evolution and the actors involved. Indeed, Knoke and Yang (1982) affirm: “Archival document data provide useful information for SNA …” because they “may contain high quality longitudinal information when data are maintained over time” (28). We therefore were eager to study all relevant documentation, i.e. all documentation that pertained to the IPO during a given period. We

limited our search to those documents that existed from January 2000 to October 2008. The Act was voted by Parliament in April 2003 and assented to by the President in September 2008. We assumed that documents leading up to the debate in 2003 and the eventual implementation of the Act would have allowed us rich and relevant information on the evolution of the Act; hence, the period 2000 to 2008 was important to our document search.

A second goal in the search for documents was to create a starting point for the delineation of the network of actors on the Act. We intended to use the data gleaned from those documents to provide us with a list of actors who would form the starting core for our data search. A thorough study of documents concerned was therefore, our first activity in data collection.

There were four types of documents: Internet-based, print, audio, and video. All were accessed either through Internet searches or through referrals by sources. We began with Google searches for “Dominica Integrity in Public Office Act.” This search entry was eventually amended to “Dominica IPO,” “IPO Dominica,” “Integrity in Public Office of Dominica,” “OECS IPO,” “Integrity building in Dominica,” “Integrity building in OECS,” “Dominica and integrity in public office,” and “public integrity and Dominica.” Once we retrieved the documents, we then requested the sources to refer us to other potential sources. In so doing, we were able to access documents from multiple sources.

3.6.1 Analysis of documents We employed a theme analysis of pertinent documents to collect data that was relevant to the study. This thesis is about how power relations may have impacted the creation of the IPO in Dominica. We therefore focused on four themes that would provide rich data regarding these

65 relations: the actors involved, their actions and inactions, their motivations, and their power relations. We define power relations as all interactions between actors where one acts to enhance or suppress another actor’s power or, as in the case of instrumental power, an actor acting or possessing the capacity to influence an event or thing. Our treatment of the documents took place in two phases. First, we scanned through them, focusing on the themes. This was essentially a filtering exercise. At that stage, our criteria were discriminatory. Any document that did not reflect one or more of our themes was placed in a separate pile. Once we had shortlisted the relevant documents, we then proceeded to a deliberate and methodical theme analysis. In that analysis, we used codes to indicate each theme once it manifested itself.

We conducted a thematic analysis of Hansard reports, archived media stories, recordings conducted by private citizens, audio and video recordings, and online documents. This analysis involved, principally, reading the documents and extracting excerpts that highlighted the various themes. Regarding the dominant actors, we took note of each actor mentioned and assigned a code. This code reflects the actor’s professional status at the moment that he participated in the advent of the Act and at the time of its debate and the subsequent presidential assent. The code employed was: “PU” for public officials (these are public service officers and members of the Cabinet), “PRI” for private sector actors who were involved in the construction, “POL” actors who were affiliated to a political party but who were not part of the government or a state entity, and “ORG” for organisations. Additionally, each notation was accompanied by an arbitrarily selected and assigned number e.g. “PU 1,” “PU 2,” etc. Each time an actor’s name was repeated, we added a numerical score to his code to indicate the frequency with which his name appeared in data sources, e.g. 1, 2, etc. Consequently, after studying a given type of document, for example, all audio files, the scores

66 were tallied and the names that had the highest scores were considered potentially dominant actors. This notation was therefore, an important starting point for the next phase of data collection, i.e. interacting with the participants. Names that received low scores were not discarded but were, at that phase, considered secondary actors (alters). The latter became more relevant to the data collection process in the second phase of that collection process, i.e. the interaction with participants phase. Most alters (secondary actors) were coded using a similar code, with the exception of adding “0” before each number. Hence, an alter from the private sector was noted as “PRI 01” or “PRI 02,” etc.

In order to record the actions, non-actions and motivations of actors as they were gleaned using the theme analysis, we employed a simple matrix format as is depicted in Tables 2 and 7 below and Appendix 1.

3.6.2 Analysing power relations We recorded and analysed power relations in a more detailed manner, however. The theme is further sub-divided into the sources of the actor’s power, the rankings of his sources of power, the reason for which the power is deployed, and the measure of the power that they used in their relations. We have used a modified version of a code developed by Imbeau (2009) that has five dimensions. Here, we add a 6th and a 7th: 1. type of power (1- instrumental or 2- social); 2. direction of power (1+ increasing the power or 2- restraining the power of another actor); 3. resource of the influencing actor, based on the typology of resources described above (1- force, 2- economic, or 3- information); 4. object of influence of instrumental power (1- distributions of authority, 2- wealth, 3- knowledge, or 4- not applicable);

5. resource of the influenced actor in a social power relation (1- authority, 2- wealth, 3- knowledge, or 4- not applicable); 6. ranking of the power resource/s employed (1 – if the source is the main resource source, 2 – secondary, 3 – tertiary, 4 – eclectic, 5 – if the source is unknown); and 7. strength of the resource used by the influencer (Max, Min). We recall two of our research questions: 1. What resources did the actors use to shape the IPO and 2. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? The objective of the 6th and 7th codes is therefore, to offer as accurate a description as possible of the actor’s decision to use his power. We sought to go beyond merely naming the resource the power used or the situation that is associated with its use. For example, with regards to capturing the “strength of the resource used by the influencer,” our binary code makes a qualitative statement about the intensity of the strength used by an actor; maximal strength, “Max”, or minimal strength, “Min.” We define maximal strength as efforts that are repeated or that are simultaneous or decisive. Minimal strength is defined as efforts that are not repeated, superficial, or whose effects are intended to be minor. Using codes #6 and #7, we can therefore conceivably have an actor who displays maximal eclectic strength (having used at least two sources of power in a repeated, simultaneous, or decisive manner) or minimal eclectic strength. We used the matrices in Appendix 4, which were developed by Imbeau and Couture (2010), to record these power relations themes surrounding the creation of the Dominican IPO. These representations offer a disaggregated view of power relations, focusing both on social power and instrumental power separately.

We believe that the precisions facilitated by the above codes are necessary in order to make accurate statements about the power used by

68 actors. In our view if we can determine the degree of power used to influence an actor, we can then make judgments about the conditions that structure the use of an actor’s power; a use, which we recall, is determined by an actor’s understanding of his position in a network. Our efforts at accurately describing the resources used, and the intensity with which they are used are therefore intended to add operational and theoretical depth to our study.

We reasoned that if an actor uses his main source of power to influence another, we may be able to make inferences about the conditions for the use of this power, e.g. we may conclude that he has done so because he felt threatened by the power position of the other. Hence, we developed a series of codes that attempts to record the calculations of an actor in the deployment of his power resources in as detailed a manner as is possible.

3.9 Summary of Document Analysis In summary, the search for documents pertinent to the IPO’s background had two main objectives: inform the study about the Act and highlight a preliminary list of actors to be reached as a starting point in delineating the network of actors on the background to the IPO. The analysis of these documents was intended to do a lot more. In addition to these two objectives, the analysis has permitted us to elucidate the power relations that led to the construction of the IPO; a central component of our thesis. In the next section, we describe another method that we employed to collect and analyse data pertaining to these relations, and the IPO’s background in general.

3.10 Interaction with Participants Earlier in this chapter, we indicated that there were two principal phases to the collection of data. The first was our search for relevant documentation, which had two objectives: Inform on the Act and develop a preliminary list of actors that could have informed the study. That

69 search led to a list of potentially dominant actors on the creation of the IPO. Our interaction with the participants is the second phase in the collection and analysis of data. This phase is especially significant for our work because it is through this interaction that we sought to conclusively determine the networks surrounding the construction of the IPO. Yet, we recall that a central methodological approach to our thesis is the use of SNA techniques to map and analyse relational data. In this section of Chapter 3, we first describe SNA. This description lays the framework for detailing our discussion on delineating the network boundaries, i.e., reaching all concerned actors on the construction of the IPO. Second, we describe the techniques employed to collect and analyse data from these participants.

3.11 Social Network Analysis (SNA) One implication of our central thesis that dominant actors engaged in power relations that resulted in a particular design of the IPO is absolute need to accurately delineate the network of actors surrounding the design of the IPO. We believe that we cannot begin to understand power relations surrounding the evolution of the IPO Act without first accurately laying out the network of actors around the Act in order to understand and illustrate the connections among them. A key approach to delineating the network is the use of social network analysis (SNA) techniques. Brass et al. (1998) define a social network “as a set of actors and the set of ties representing some relationship or lack of relationship- between the actors” (1169). Social network analysis appears most appropriate to study relational data because it allows us to focus on the relationships that result from the interplay between actor attributes and structural conditions, such as the location of actors in the network (Christopoulos 2006; Lemieux & Ouimet 2004; Scott 1991; Ward et al. 2011), unlike the traditional aggregate data approach to research in social sciences, which entails “strong and restrictive assumptions about

70 interaction processes, assumptions that cannot be tested within the contextual analysis paradigm” (Weatherford 1982:120). SNA therefore offers this study a “vibrant” (Ward et al. 2011) tool with which to study relational data phenomena (Scott 1991).

3.11.1 Levels of analysis and boundary specification Our approach to delineating the networks of individual actors has been egocentric. SNA suggests at least four different levels of network analysis: dyadic, triadic, complete, or egocentric networks (Knoke & Yang 1982; Wasserman & Faust 1994).

Dyadic and Triadic networks can be studied in like ways. For example, in dyadic networks the researcher opts to study the connections and interactions between pairs of actors. One dimension of this focus is often a study of the intermediaries that connect pairs of actors. Likewise, in triadic networks, the researcher focuses on triples of actors and associated ties. We did not feel that a dyadic level analysis was relevant to our study because based on our understanding of networks and the policy process, we expected that multiple actors would be connected together, like satellites around one actor.

In contrast, in a complete network analysis, the researcher takes on a very macro view of a network. The “researchers use the information about every relation among all N actors to represent and explain an entire network’s structural relations” (14). Hence, from the outset, there is a deliberate effort to describe all egonets, that is, each ego and all the members of his network, and to map and study every connection among them. This approach, we thought, was attractive because a complete picture of how the power play among all actors on the IPO may have shaped the IPO would have been the ideal. However, complete network analysis is costly and beyond the means of this study.

The egocentric network analysis however, seemed most attractive because we were keen on the structure of individual egonets. We wanted to learn how the motivations and the behaviour of the main actors may have been structured by the behaviour of other actors (their alters) in their network. Egocentric network analysis favours such a study. In such an analysis, the researcher begins by isolating key figures and then attempt to describe all other actors, “alters,” who are directly connected to him. Only after understanding the nature of the relations between a dominant actor and his alters (and among them) did we attempt to map the relations among all actors in the network of actors on the IPO’s construction. The advantage of this egocentric approach is that we minimized the risk of attempting a large-scale complete network analysis and having few participants, which would reduce the reliability of findings. Additionally, we assumed that a study of egonetworks would enable us to more accurately record all actors involved in the IPO’s evolution and more accurately map the broader network. As a result, we concluded that a network analysis at the egocentric level seemed most advantageous to our study.

Yet, network delimitation is a challenging exercise (Knoke & Kuklinski 1982; Marsden 1990). According to Marsden (1990), “measurements could refer to episodic and transient, even momentary, transactions between pairs of actors in particular behavioral events, or to routinized, recurrent configurations of transactions that involve interdependence and/or mutual orientation on the part of the actors” (437). Mapping the actors’ network is accordingly accepted as a methodological challenge.

To facilitate our efforts at delineating the egonetworks, we referred to Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) and Knoke and Yang (1982) who describe two approaches to boundary specification: the nominalist perspective in

72 which the researcher imposes boundaries based on the needs of his research and the realist approach, where the actors name those who belong to their network. We did employ some measure of the nominalist perspective because our theme analysis of documents did not seem to reveal as detailed a list of dominant actors as we would have liked. Consequently, we relied on the literature on the construction of anti- corruption agencies, which implied that certain senior public officials and political elites would be involved in the choice and design of such institutions because of their position in a network of formal actors. This choice to broaden our search using a nominalist approach for a starting list of actors allowed us five additional dominant actors. The parameters that we imposed for broadening this search included senior public officials who worked during the period 2001 to late 2008, e.g. permanent secretaries, senior administrative officers and senior technical officers, and the Cabinet Secretaries; senior members of the UWP and the DLP (the political parties who debated the Act), the Speaker of the House, Prime Ministers, members of parliament from 2000 to 2008 and the managers of media houses. This gave us a list of potentially dominant actors for the study.

However, our approach to mapping the egonetworks is largely realist. Once our analysis of the documents revealed that actor X was potentially a “dominant actor,” the actor was then approached to provide further information on his alters and other actors, who may also have been dominant actors as well, and the nature of the ties among them.

This approach to reaching participants and defining the networks is called snowballing. Snowballing is a technique by which one actor refers the researcher to others (Patton 2002; Scott 1991). Elsewhere referred to as “reputational snowballing,” it is seen as a very effective technique for reaching the actors on a policy issue: “I argue that the reputational

snowball not only presents a useful tool for identifying micro-level network members, but also provides a means for assessing which members of the policy network are core, and which ones are on the periphery” (Farquharson 2005:1). Indeed, Hanneman and Riddle (2005) affirm “while such an approach will miss most of the community (those who are "isolated" from the elite network), the approach is very likely to capture the elite network quite effectively” (8). We used two versions of snowballing so as to ensure that we reached all members of the networks involved. First, initial participants were asked to indicate a list of persons with whom they have even fleetingly discussed the IPO. Second, the participants were asked to indicate actors who could inform on the IPO Act. We assumed that not every contact with whom a participant has had a conversation on the IPO would have possessed rich information to inform this study. Our criteria for determining which actor could have been “relevant” to our research included those who sought to influence efforts (in whichever manner) to have the Act developed and implemented, those who were instructed by others involved to do or not to do certain acts pertaining to the evolution of the IPO, and those who aided actors who were promoting the Act.

One other central activity to boundary specification is the establishment of the ties among the actors. We recall that an egonet comprises a main actor (ego) and his secondary actors (alters) who are all tied to him either strongly (2) or weakly (1). Granovetter (1973) demarcated the lines that determined the strength of a tie as a composite of four variables: “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (1361). Consequently, within the context of our research, a “strong tie” pertains to relations where the actors engaged (or were said to engage) in repeated contact, felt positively about each other, and confided in each other. The converse, we accept, as a “weak tie,” i.e. actors do have amicable

74 occasional contacts with each other but do not necessarily confide in each other.

Earlier, we did explain that the document search offered us a starting list of potential actors. Choosing the egocentric network as our point of analysis meant that we started off attempting to map out the network by first reaching the preliminary list of dominant actors suggested by the documents, in the first phase of the data collection.

In summary, either of the above four levels of network analysis has its advantages and limitations: “For example, transitivity of choice relations is a substantively important variable for theories of friendship formation…which can be observed at the triadic level but not at the egocentric or dyadic level” (Knoke & Yang 1982:14). However, in the end we focused our analysis in a manner that we believed would have allowed reliable information within the administrative limits of the study.

3.12 Data Collection and Analysis in SNA One of the most common data collection techniques used in SNA is interviews (Scott 1991; Wasserman & Faust 1994). We can now describe our use of interviews to collect data.

3.13 Semi-Structured Interviews Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher an opportunity to explore the network in detail. We sought to conduct interviews with each of the actors described as potentially dominant through the previous phase of data collection. One principal objective of these interviews was network boundary specification. Through these interviews, participants informed about their alters and of other potentially dominant actors, some of whom were cited by earlier documents as relevant to the Act’s evolution as potentially dominant actors or as alters. These interviews were consequently, used for the collection of data about the actors and

75 triangulation (Gay & Airasian 2003; Merriam 1989; Patton 2002; Stake 1994) for data gleaned from the documents, e.g. they allowed us to validate any information we had gotten pertaining to the identity of other actors, both dominant and secondary. A second objective in employing the interviews was to learn about the Act. We wanted to delve in detail into the factors that led to the construction of the Act in a manner that a questionnaire or reading a document would not have permitted.

We therefore used 60-minute face-to-face semi-structured interviews to collect data from the shortlist of actors whom we initially considered “dominant.” We used a pre-established list of open-ended questions to guide the data collection process (Fontana & Frey 1994; Gay & Airasian 2003; Patton 2002). These face-to-face interviews were audio-recorded with the participants’ consent and were subsequently transcribed by the researcher. The transcripts were assigned a code, “T,” and then studied using the theme analysis technique described above. After the analysis was complete, there was a second interaction with five of the actors in order to validate certain pieces of data. A copy of the interview guide used in this phase of data collection is found in the Appendix 4.2.

3.14 Validating Data One challenge with social network data is its reliability and validity because typically the researcher relies on participants’ knowledge of connections among actors in order to arrive at valid conclusions. Our original plan had built in at least three reliability and validity measures. However, as the data collection process advanced, we were forced to make necessary adjustments without jeopardising the integrity of the study. We can examine those quality assurance measures and the reasons why the first two were supplanted with others.

3.15 Jaccard Similarity Coefficient We intended to employ the Jaccard Coefficient to measure the similarity between two lists of alters that dominant actors would have provided us. We initially planned to receive a first list from them during the interview. Then, using a follow-up interview or questionnaire, we would have measured the similarity between the first list obtained from them and a second list that they would have provided us during that second encounter. We were convinced that this test would have added to the reliability of the networks that would have existed on the creation of the IPO.

3.16 Questionnaires We also intended to use questionnaires to collect data. Questionnaires are listed as another commonly used technique to collect data in SNA because they allow the respondent to describe his network in detail. They also serve as reliable validating tools. We intended to use questionnaires to interact with 33 actors whom we learnt, through our document analysis and semi-structured interviews, to be alters (secondary actors) of the dominant actors. Our aim was to collect data that would have first, strengthened our network mapping exercise by informing us of the other actors and of the ties among them and second, would have helped us validate data obtained using other techniques. Indeed, we were convinced that the questionnaires could have enhanced the reliability and validity of our study in at least four ways; especially in light of their widespread sue in the literature on SNA (Marsden 1990; Milgram 1967). Appendix 4.1 contains the questionnaire that was mailed to potential respondents. However, the response rate to the questionnaires was too low to allow us to use the data collected using this technique. Out of 33 questionnaires posted, we received five responses.

3.17 Triangulation of Sources We therefore sought to authenticate our data and, subsequently our conclusions through other means, mainly through triangulation of sources (Gay & Airasian 2003; Merriam 1989; Patton 2002; Stake 1994). Patton (2002) describes triangulation of sources as “comparing and cross-checking the consistency of information derived at different times and by different means within qualitative methods [author’s italics]” (559). Triangulation of sources is a technique involving the collection of data from various sources so that the researcher can constantly check the authenticity of information received.

In our case, we employed a triangulation of sources approach. We checked data collected from one actor against that which we received from another on the same topic. For example, if actor A said that actor B had requested that the Act be delayed, we did ask actor B and actor C about actor A’s assertions as well as searching through documents that would have elucidated his statement. This methodical effort at data collection is time consuming and monotonous, but we found that in light of the challenges posed by the absence of questionnaire responses, the triangulation of sources was a reasonable technique for authenticating our data.

Consequently, notwithstanding the loss of questionnaire responses, we believe that we have taken adequate steps to maintain the reliability of our data and conclusions. In the next section, we discuss how we analysed the data using SNA techniques.

3.18 Analysing Power Relations Above, we described how we analysed power relations using the theme analysis of documents. This analysis, we can say, was largely from an agential perspective, i.e. we focused largely on the actor’s resources and

78 how he deployed them. Here, we describe how we analysed power relations from a structural perspective. This analysis has been largely facilitated by the use of UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman 2002).

3.18.1 UCINET UCINET software is one of a plethora of programmes used by social network researchers to analyse social network data, e.g. Egonets. Most of them are however, merely visualization tools that offer the user a platform for producing and displaying social network connections. The advantage with UCINET is that it allows us to treat, analyze, and display relational data.

The first step in using UCINET is to create a dataset for the data emanating from our research. However, even before these can be produced, the data must first be organised. This could be done using at least two formats of matrices: incident or adjacent matrix. The first arranges two different categories in columns and rows. For example, in the first column, we could arrange all actors and in the first row, different attributes of those actors. We would then match actor to each attribute that applies to him by 1. In cases where the attribute does not pertain to an actor, we would insert 0. An example of this type of matrix is found at Figure 3. In the adjacent matrix, we are interested in representing relations among actors, i.e. which actor is adjacent/next to another. Hence, in the first column, we list all actors and we do the same in the first row. We also use a binary value of 1 or 0 to indicate the presence or absence of a tie. It is also possible to vary between 1 or 2, depending on the strength of a tie. For example, a strong tie could be assigned a value of 2 and a weak tie, 1. Zero would indicate the absence of a tie. Figure 4 below illustrates an adjacent matrix. It assumes that we have four actors (A, B, C, and D). A has a weak tie to B, strong to C, but

79 has no tie to D. We note however, that although A considers himself in a strong tie with B, this view is not reciprocated. B only thinks he has a weak tie to A. We have therefore a non-reciprocal tie and the matrix is called an asymmetric matrix because relationships are not equal. If all actors are considered to perceive their relationships equally, we have a symmetric matrix. Similarly, if any two actors consider their relation to each other in like manner, then the tie is considered reciprocal. Figure 5 illustrates a symmetric relationship.

Figure 3: Example of Incident Matrix

Teacher Lawyer Married Single A 0 1 0 1 B 1 0 1 0 C 1 1 0 1 D 0 1 1 0

Figure 4: Example of Asymmetric Adjacent Matrix

A B C D A 0 1 0 0 B 2 0 2 1 C 2 1 0 1 D 0 1 1 0

Figure 5: Example of Symmetric Adjacent Matrix

A B C D A 0 1 2 0 B 1 0 2 1 C 2 2 0 1 D 0 1 1 0

In this thesis, we are concerned about relations among actors. We have therefore employed the adjacent matrix to prepare data for UCINET. We have not had data to indicate that ties were not reciprocal. Hence, we assumed them to be all symmetric. We used Microsoft Excel to create adjacent matrices. Once completed, we imported each into UCINET in order to build our datasets into the software. The result is a matrix that resembles what one finds in Appendix 3.1. From this point, we can

80 command the software to perform a myriad of routines, e.g. graphic displays of the ties among actors, delineation of the egonets, and calculation of centrality scores.

UCINET, itself, does not create the graphs. Instead, it has a built in software called Netdraw that does this. Through a simple import of the matrix generated by UCINET, Netdraw is commanded to display in graphic format the entire network of actors. What emerges is a total representation of the ties among all the actors. These ties are displayed as connecting lines. Again, if the ties are asymmetrical, Netdraw can be instructed as such. Consequently, there would be an arrow pointing in one direction, e.g. (using the asymmetric adjacent matrix from Figure 4 above), A claims to have no ties with C, but C claims to have strong ties with A. This asymmetricity would be reflected in the graph as one arrowhead pointing from C to A, but zero arrow head pointing back from A to C. A line with no arrowhead connecting actors indicates symmetricity. Additionally, the software can be ordered to display the attributes of each actor. Different shapes and colours could be used to represent different categories of actors. Furthermore, it is possible to command Netdraw to show only specific egonets by importing the relevant dataset, commanding the display of egonets from the Netdraw interface, and selecting the specfic egos of concern. Netdraw then produces a graph of the kind displayed in Figures 6 to 17. In the end, Netdraw uses UCINET’s dataset to produce a clear and convincing visualization of the connections among the actors. These graphs can be saved in different formats.

For its part, UCINET has been used to calculate a plethora of routines. Degree centrality is one common phenomenon that is calculated using UCINET. As in the case of the graphic visualizations, the relevant dataset is imported, the specifications must be detailed (e.g. symmetric or

81 asymmetric data) and the software runs the routine requested. In the case of directed ties, indicating asymmetrical relationships, it is possible to calculate the number of ties sent out by an actor and the number directed towards him. The former is called out-degree ties and the latter, in-degree ties. The former indicates the level of influence of the actor and the latter, his popularity. We are interested in knowing precisely the structural power of an actor, less interested in his popularity. In addition, we have considered all our ties to be non-directed. We have therefore opted to calculate degree centrality scores using non-directed data. The report of these calculations is a log file of the kind seen in Appendix 7. The greater the degree score, the more centralised and consequently, the more powerful an actor is said to be.

We ran the software to determine the egonets, to establish and illustrate the connections among the actor, and to calculate the degree centrality of the dominant actors.

3.18.2 Connections among Actors It is not possible, to understand actor power in the networks perspective of the policy process without also understanding the ties that may feed into or impede this power. Indeed, part of the core thesis in this perspective is one of interdependence, as we explained in Chapter 2: Actors, tied together, supply each other, feed off each other, or restrict each other. Therefore, we used UCINET to highlight the strong and weak ties within the networks. This was a second level at which we sought to understand how and why the actor used his power in the power play surrounding the IPO’s formulation; the first being the theme analysis of power relations as suggested by documentation.

3.18.3 Actor Centrality Having delineated the egonets and the ties among the actors, we then used UCINET to measure the degree centrality of egos as articulated by

Freeman (1979).We avoided the inbetween and closeness centrality calculations. The first, because we did not believe that we had collected data on all relations among actors, named and unnamed, to calculate inbetween routines and speak convincingly of the most inbetween actor. The third measure of network power (closeness centrality) is significant. However, we have also opted to omit it from our analysis because we saw it as potentially providing information that would have already been confirmed through our interviews and the degree centrality routine. Besides, degree centrality scores correlate to approximately 90% with other centrality measures such as inbetween and closeness. Consequently, we concluded that the degree centrality measures would have provided us with adequate data that would indicate who the dominant, and most powerful, actors were. The UCINET routines facilitated the production of graphic representations of the egonets and sub-groups on the creation of the IPO. Appendix 3 contains the matrices that were used to input data into UCINET software.

UCINET’s analyses are significant because they facilitate the study of our central thesis that the IPO results from power relations among self- maximizing actors. We recall that in social network analysis, an actor’s power is a result of his structural position in a constellation of actors and less of his personal attributes, e.g. being rich. The actor who is most connected to others is considered the most central actor and in turn, this actor is considered the most powerful. It is assumed that his central position allows him to increase his power because he has a myriad of actors either who feed him information or who may contribute financially to his cause. Of course, it is conceivable that the ability to coordinate the flow of resources among a number of actors incurs costs for the central actor, e.g. in time, money, and energy. However, it is this ability to “pay” the costs that could have added some more to the stature of that actor as central in a network. Hence, in analysing power relations from a

83 structural angle, we advance our theory that rational actors have used their power attributes because of their understanding of their power position in a network of actors.

In summary, UCINET has played a central role in our data collection and analysis. In particular, it has facilitated the determination of the egonetworks, permitted us to graphically demonstrate the ties among the actors involved in the evolution of the Act, and has allowed for the analysis of those ties so that the most central actors are highlighted.

3.19 Summary of Chapter 3 This thesis focuses on power relations within networks of actors surrounding the choice and design of an institution charged with the responsibility to oversee integrity and probity in Dominica, the Integrity in Public Office Act (2003). We have chosen the theme of power relations because we theorize that self-maximizing actors have chosen a design of a public integrity oversight body that facilitates their agenda.

Considering the context in which the IPO Act evolved, the main questions of “who” were these actors, “why” did they choose that design, and “how” were they able to succeed in having their design triumph in the final document necessitate an examination of interrelations among relevant actors. This examination took place in two distinct but interdependent phases. First, document search and analysis provided the broad framework for the second phase, a comprehensive interaction with participants that the first phase suggested were relevant to the study. It was that second phase that allowed us to validate data from the first, determine the list of dominant actors, and confirm the boundary of the ego-network. We are concerned about relational data. Consequently, the combined approach of SNA and qualitative techniques appeared to be the most appropriate choice to do so.

Indeed, SNA techniques have played a critical role in determining key responses to our study. In all, we have described the use of four techniques to determine the list of dominant actors surrounding the evolution of the Act: Theme analysis from documents that revealed a pattern of involvement by the actors, interviews with a select list of actors, a UCINET analysis of the numerical size of the egonets, and UCINET centrality scores. SNA techniques therefore, comprised 50% of the determining manoeuvres for arriving at a list of dominant actors.

We believe that the techniques described above have allowed us the type of analytical rigour that is necessary for a thesis research on power relations surrounding the choice and design of Dominica’s IPO. They are not without deficiencies, e.g. the subjective nature of the codes to be used to record power relations and rank power resources. However, we are confident that as whole, they have allowed reliable and valid conclusions. In the next chapter, we discuss the results of our use of these techniques. First, however, we can already examine a few anticipated conclusions.

3.20 Anticipated Conclusions The central question that has driven this study is, why the Commonwealth of Dominica adopted a centralised- public model of a public integrity institution. After preliminary analysis, we believe that there is partial support for our theory that the Act was a choice of political elites who all saw in it a potential whip, i.e. an opportunity to curtail the economic and political power of their opponents.

Hence, if we examine our two hypotheses, we can probably envisage mixed results. With regards to H1 = the choice of a specialised anti- corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the

preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO, we expect confirmation of our hypothesis. The policy was a calculated strategy by dominant actors to use political power to dominate the policy process. There may not be confirmation of the rival hypothesis, however. H2 = the characteristics of alternative options and models of public integrity institutions are those of the non-dominant actors. Results may be partial here. We recall the observation by Borgatti et al (2011) that we cited earlier in our discussion on network centrality: A powerful actor who is tied to a weak one is likely to increase his resource base because the weak actor is dependent on him and will, conceivably, provide that dominant actor with resources in the hope of improving his weak position. The position of the non-central actors however, is not necessarily as powerful. We expect that dominant actors would opt for alternatives that reflect their structural positions. Non-dominant actors, consistent with theories on structural positions in a network, will be less effective in articulating alternatives. In Chapter 5, we engage in a more elaborate discussion of the conclusions to our study. In Chapter 4 however, we will first describe the results that allow them.

CHAPTER 4: THE RESULTS The principal question that has driven this study is why policymakers in the Commonwealth of Dominica chose a particular design of a pro-public integrity institution over other possible choices, which we described in Chapter 1. We postulate to a theory of self-maximizing powerful actors engaged in a power play to secure an institution that favours their political agenda. We must begin this present chapter cognizant of these two central features of our thesis document.

Having laid out the questions, hypotheses, and method that shape this study, we now examine the results. Our approach is largely descriptive in this chapter. First, we describe a few precisions that will facilitate an understanding of the data and responses that we describe. Second, we describe the answers to each of our six research questions. These are, we reiterate: 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters? 2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors? 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution? 4. What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? 5. What resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power?

For each research question, we first describe the methods used to seek answers and then, we describe the results. We believe that this internal organisation will facilitate a clear and logical progression to responses to the overall research question of “why” a particular choice of anti- corruption agency was embraced for Dominica. The chapter ends with a relevant conclusion.

4.1 Overview

4.1.1 Key Concepts Some concepts appear to be most relevant to this chapter. Therefore, in order to facilitate the description of the results, we believe it is prudent to remind ourselves of their significance and, in some cases, to add some precisions. 1. Degree centrality. It describes the actor who is the target of or the disseminator of the highest concentration of power resources in a network. This actor is considered the most centrally located, most powerful, and most prominent in a network. 2. Egonet. This pertains to a focal actor (ego) and the number of network actors to whom he is directly connected (alters). It also comprises the ties among these alters.

4.1.2 Pre and Post Phases We observed two distinct trends in the configuration of actors (egonets) in the period under consideration, 2000 – 2008. The first emerged early in the debates surrounding the Act; namely, 2000 to 2002. In that period, certain actors were aligned to others. In the next, some of the original alliances were re-structured. There is a correlation between these new patterns of relationships and a series of resignations and defections from the ruling Dominica Labour Party (DLP). This shift in configuration, we refer to as a transition phase, where loyalties and alliances shifted as some actors either resigned from political parties or simply stopped being loyal to certain actors for various reasons. We have used the terms “pre- transition” and “post-transitions” to refer to the constellation of actors before and after there were any known shifts.

These shifts were not often due to a resignation. In most cases, in fact, there was no formal resignation but the relationship between an ego and his alters changed from, for example, a weak tie to zero tie, or from a

88 weak to a strong tie, or vice versa. (Note the dense configuration of strong ties in the right of the Netdraw graph in Figure 7.) This shift in alliances is significant because it results in two different constellations of actors, as we show in this chapter and a hybrid code for the actors involved. For example, an actor in the pre-transition phase may be “PU 00.” However, in the post phase, he may have become a “POL” actor. In that phase, he may be “POL 00.” His code would therefore be “PU 00/POL 00.” This hybrid code is significant in order to truly represent the dynamics of the power relations surrounding the Act’s evolution. Structurally, it has meant that some actors subsequently either saw their positions strengthened by having a wider network that fed them while others saw their positions weakened as they lost alters. Different phases have been characterised by structural changes, consequently. This is precisely the case with actor PU 02/PRI 02. As a member of one network of actors, that actor was PU 02 and had two alters. However, once he became PRI 02, he lost those alters but remained part of a large network of actors that reinforced dominant actor PRI 2. Equally noteworthy is the observation that the classification of actors had changed during the gestation period of the Act. Some actors began as “PU” and by the time the Act was formally enacted, their status had changed to “PRI”. In most cases, this came about as the “PU” actors either resigned from public office or were not re-elected. Our data show, most significantly, that this change in the coding status of some actors also coincided with the structural changes of which we spoke earlier; this is so even for actors whose coding had not changed because in some cases actors’ allegiance changed after they resigned from public office or after a general election. We describe these observations some more below. Where relevant, we have described data pertaining to both the pre-transition and post- transition phases.

4.2 Results for question #1 Question #1 reads: Who are the dominant actors and their alters? We believe that the analysis to understand the power sources and power relations among the actors must begin with an understanding of the composition of the network surrounding the construction of the IPO. In order to determine who these dominant actors were, we employed theme analysis of relevant documents, conducted interviews, and used UCINET software to analyse the network of actors. Our principal sources of data pertaining to these ties were the interviews, and follow-up encounters with the participants. Participants described their alters and reported on those of other actors, and the ties among all alters.

In Chapter 3, we defined a “dominant actor” as an individual or organisation who has resources that have been used in advancing the creation of the IPO, who was involved in decisions regarding the creation of the Act, or any actor who has been actively involved in the construction of the Act or in promoting its implementation. More precisely, we had three determinants of a “dominant actor” status: The names of actors that were most frequently mentioned in documentation and interviews as surrounding the emergence of the Act, actors with the largest egonets, and actors with the highest degree centrality scores. Here, we list these actors as well as those whom our network analysis revealed as “central” in the networks surrounding the IPO’s creation. In social network analysis, an “alter” is an actor who is directly connected to egos. We have occasionally referred to alters as “secondary actors.” Two UCINET routines have led to our results to this question. The first dealt with delineating the egonets and the second, the degree centrality scores of the actors (i.e. number of direct ties an actor has in the network).

There are two lists of dominant actors, one of which is the final list. The first, the preliminary, totalled 15 actors and was developed early in the data collection from documents and subsequent interviews. The second is much shorter and comprises five actors. It emerged after theme analyses of documents and interview transcripts and UCINET analyses. In the first list, four actors were of the “POL” category, it was noted that 10 belonged to the “PU” notation, and one was recorded as private, “PRI.” Two actors did not respond to the invitation to an interview and therefore, there were only 13 interviews. Theme analysis (of documents and interview transcripts) suggested that five actors may have been dominant in the development of the Act. They were: PU 1, PU 2, PU 3, PRI 1, and PRI 2. However, this observation was very preliminary. In order to further validate it, we proceeded to employ UCINET analyses, which comprised the 3rd and 4th sources of validation of the dominant actors, as described in the summary to Chapter 3. Table 2 below depicts the frequency with which certain actors’ names were mentioned in documents studied in our analyses.

Table 2: Results of Theme Analysis of Interviews and Frequency of Actors’ Names

Interview Theme Description Frequenc Code 1 y2 1 “government” 1 PU 1 3 Bretton Woods 2 PU 010 2 PU 04 2 801_0006 PU 03/PRI 03 2 3 Checks and balances “Prove your anti-corruption stance” Respond to public pressure 2 Actions…petition 4.1 Personal wealth 801_0007 and 1 Bretton Woods 1 801_0008 …World bank, IMF

1 As described in “Analysis of Documents” section in Chapter 3. 2 A tally of the number of times an actor was mentioned.

Cabinet 1 Opposition 1 ORG 01 1 PRI 2 3 PU 01/PRI 01 3 PU 015/PRI 012 1 PU 017 1 3 Pressure from Bank to regularise financial management 1 PU 3 3 PRI 1 2 PU 2 1 ORG 02 1 ORG 03 1 PU 02/PRI 02 1 POL 01 1 801_0009 PRI 2 1 PRI 016 1 PRI 021 1 PRI 017 1 3 Campaign promise Checks and balances on power Self-protection 3 promise 6 decreasing 1 ORG 02 1 PRI 1 1 PRI 010 2 801_0010 PRI 013/POL 06 1 PRI 2 2 PU 03/PRI 03 2 PRI 011 2 4.1, 4.3, Media resource used by PRI 2, 5, 8 PRI 011 and PRI 010 801_0011 3 Deter future leaders Restrict power of government Check and balance 2 Informal pressure 4.1, 4.3, Sources …info, money 5 1 PRI 20 1 801_0012 PRI 021 1

1 PRI 014 1 POL 02 1 POL 03/PU 07 1 3 Satisfy international world 1 PU 02/PRI 02 2 PU 3 1 801_0013 PU 1 4

POL 02 2 POL 07 1

4 - 7 Power strategy, source, for negative influence, instrumental power, using media and information in parliament 3 “ a dare”…challenge Delay is a Precautionary measure 1 PU 01/PRI 01 PRI 05 PU 1 PRI 2 801_0014 PRI 20 ORG 01 PRI 1 members of the UWP management team and the parliamentary opposition PU 03/PRI 03 PU 011 801_0015 1 World Bank 1 PU 2 2 PRI 010 3 PRI 2 1 3….. Motivation to block future politicians/reduce their power 801_0016 1 PU 3 2 PU 1 1 PU 02/PRI 02 2 PRI 2 1 PU 01/PRI 01 1 3 standing with international community, deter future graft…motivations for delayed implementation are nefarious 2(negativ Instrumental power through public e), 5 6 presentations 1 PU 01/PRI 01 1 PU 3 1 PRI 20 1 PU 02/PRI 02 1 801_0017 PRI 05 1 PU 02/PRI 02 1 ORG 06 1 ORG 01 1 PU 1 3 3 Campaign promise 1 PU 3 2 PU 02/PRI 02 1 801_0018 PU 03/PRI 03 1 Cabinet 3 Campaign promise 5 Succumb to pressure (instrum

ental) 1 PU 016 1 PU 04 PU 3 PRI 1 ORG 07 ORG 03 PRI 2 801_0019 PU 01/PRI 01 ORG 01 PU 03/PRI 03 2, 5 Drafts of Act to parliament (social) direction of power (2)

4.2.1 Egonets We did indicate in Chapter 3 that we were also interested in the composition and structure of ego networks. Using a dataset of all known actors involved in the evolution of the Act, we ran UCINET routines to analyse the composition of egonetworks. These indicated that five actors combined had the largest share of the total network: Three belonged to the public sector: PU 1, PU 2, and PU 3 and two were “private;” PRI 1 and PRI 2. Four of these actors maintained ties, mostly strong ties, among themselves. In fact, at various times, some were alters of the other. The preliminary suggestion that these five appeared to be the most dominant actors was consistent whether we examined the pre-transition or post-transition data. Most of our print and audio sources and interview participants had earlier revealed that these five as well as PU 04, PU 03/PRI 03, and PU 02/PRI 02 were key players in driving the Act. This observation was made more precise by UCINET analyses of the ties among the actors and their alters. Dominant actors PU 1, PU 2,PU 3, PRI 1, and PRI 2 had a significant share of the total alters, while PU 04, PU 03/PRI 03, and PU 02/PRI 02 did not have as many as some participants thought.

A total of 59 actors, inclusive of the five egos, were relevant to the evolution of the Act. Together, in the pre-transition phase, these five actors have an egonet of 48 actors (nodes) and covers 81.4% of the total network. The size of this neighbourhood of actors grew slightly in the post-transition phase: 52 nodes, that is 88.1% of all nodes in the network. With the exception of actor PRI 1, all dominant actors have ties with most alters. Appendix 2 lists the actors and Appendix 5 describes the egonets in the pre and post transition phases. Table 3 below summarises the sizes of these ego-networks.

Table 3: Summary of Size of Egonets of Dominant Actors

Pre-Transition Post-Transition Difference Ego # of % of # of % of in nodes networ nodes network percentag k e point PRI 1 133 22.0% 12 20.3% -1.7% PRI 2 15 25.4% 27 45.8% 20,4 PU 1 30 50.8% 24 40.7% -10,1 PU 2 24 40.7% 18 30.5% -10.2 PU 3 19 32.2% 11 18.6% -13.6

Among the five actors, PRI 2 is the only one whose share of the network increased in the post-transition phase. Note that although the total size of the top five egonets is 48 individual nodes, the data in Table 2 are recorded in a manner that reflects the ties among actors. Consequently, an alter who is part of the egonet of PRI 1 could also be listed as an alter to PRI 2 and PU 1, for example. We recall that an egonet comprises an ego, his alters, and the ties among them.

3 Inclusive of ego.

Missing from this summary is however, the actual anatomy of each egonet, its composition. We consider it important to indicate the number of nodes in each egonet who were PU, POL, ORG, or PRI. This disaggregation, we believe, could elucidate the sources and, conceivably, the intensity of the power behind the creation of the Act. Table 4 below describes the anatomy of the ego networks. The columns highlighted refer to the post-transition phase.

Table 4: Summary of Composition of Egonets of Dominant Actors

Eg PR PRI PU PU POL POL ORG ORG o I PRI 2 3 6 6 0 0 3 1 1 PRI 3 12 0 0 2 5 4 4 2 PU 1 4 3 13 11 1 0 0 0 PU 2 6 6 12 10 1 0 0 0 PU 3 5 1 11 8 0 0 0 0

Tables 3 and 4 and Appendix 5 indicate that most alters associated with the genesis of the IPO were of the PU category, 29 in the pre-transition phase and 1 in the post. This is the single largest category of alters; the second is 15 and five PRI alters in the pre and post-transition phases respectively. PRI 2 is the only dominant actor not to have ties with PU actors. Additionally, few dominant actors had ties with POL alters; only PRI 2 and PU 1.

Figures 6 to 17 contain graphic representations of the egonets and the connections among all known actors. They have been inserted here, in the body of the text, in order to facilitate the reader. Strong ties are represented by strong dark lines while the lesser dark lines represent weak ties.

Figure 6: Netdraw Graph Displaying Pre-Transition Ties Among Actors

Figure 7: Netdraw Graph Displaying Post-Transition Ties Among Actors

Figure 8: Pre-Transition PRI 1 and Alters

Figure 9: Post-Transition PRI 1 and Alters

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Figure 10: Pre-Transition PRI 2 and Alters

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Figure 11: Post-Transition PRI 2 and Alters

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Figure 12: Pre-Transition PU 1 and Alters

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Figure 13: Post-Transition PU 1 and Alters

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Figure 14: Pre-Transition PU 2 and Alters

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Figure 15: Post-Transition PU 2 and Alters

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Figure 16: Pre-Transition PU 3 and Alters

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Figure 17: Post-Transition PU 3 and Alters

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4.2.2 Degree Centrality Scores In SNA, the actor with the highest centrality score is seen as the most central and, the most dominant. Our calculations of degree centrality scores were therefore meant to further elucidate the most dominant actors. Here, we describe the results of those calculations.

UCINET routines for degree centrality suggest that many actors were key in deploying and receiving resources in the development of the Act. In the pre-transition phase, the five most dominant actors were, PU 010 (32.000), PU 012 (33.000), PU 1 (32.000), PU 2 (32.000), and PU 04 (38.000).

The degree centrality scores changed in the post-transition, however. ORG 06 (39.000), ORG 05 (38.000), ORG 01 (37.000), PRI 2 (41.000), POL 01 (35.000), and POL 02 (35.000) were the top six actors in that phase. Additionally, although PU actors did have relatively high centrality scores none emerged among the top five dominant actors. PU 04 who had emerged with the highest centrality score in the pre- transition phase (38.000) dropped to 26.000 in the post phase. Indeed, in that phase, we saw the dominance of ORG actors: ORG 06 (39.000), ORG 05 (38.000), ORG 01 (37.000), POL 01 (35.000). We discuss the rise in prominence of ORG actors in Chapter 5. Degree centrality scores therefore did not result in a clear list of dominant actors. UCINET analyses showed two different groups of egos in both pre and post phases.

In summary, the sum of UCINET degree centrality analyses suggest that power was diffused among many actors during both phases of the Act’s development, with certain actors being most dominant during the individual phases. In total, PU 2, PRI 2, and PU 04 have consistently had among the highest scores. However, the size of the egonets and both

109 document analysis and interviews conducted suggest that five actors may have been most critical in the possession and the deployment of resources surrounding the emergence of the Act. These actors are PU 1, PU 2, PU 3, PRI 1, and PRI 2.

4.3 Results for question #2 Question #2 is, what were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors. Although answers to this question emanated both from theme analyses of documents and interview transcripts, it was largely the latter that provided rich data pertaining to the motivations of the dominant actors. Participants reported at least four reasons for both the decision to create the IPO and for the choice of model of IPO created. Ten of the 13 interviewees responded to this question. Four of them (PRI 2, PU 1, POL 03/PU 07, and PU 02/PRI 02) indicated that the Act was a campaign promise fulfilled. The DLP administration had campaigned in 1999 on a platform of anti-corruption and had promised integrity in public office legislation if elected. Hence: “the motivation was the prevention of corruption; having regard to the platform on which the labour party complained in 2000, the anti-corruption platform “(PRI 1). According to those participants, once in office, the DLP administration therefore felt the moral obligation to keep true to its promise to the electorate; “it was a campaign promise, so to speak. So they had to live up to it” POL 03/PU 07.” Although not explicitly supporting those participants, PRI 2 confirms:

That was Rosie Douglas and his team back in 2000 that contested the elections and alleged that there was a lot of corruption that went on in the government under the UWP. And one of the things that Rosie attempted to do, Bernard Wiltshire will tell you this, was to introduce integrity legislation.

The conviction that the IPO evolved out of the need to adhere to a political covenant between the DLP and the electorate was therefore

110 strongly argued by those who considered it the primary motivation behind the IPO’s decision and the design.

Yet, the IPO Act was also intended to create another level of protection for the State’s resources , as a layer of checks and balances and as a deterrent (PU 05/PRI 04, PU 02/PRI 02, and PU 04). In the words of PU 04:

the whole idea of the integrity commission was to certify whether persons in public office were enriching themselves as a result of their position there… the idea behind it was to give professional organisations a sort of non-political stokehold in the society, a role in ensuring that there was no "hanky panky" in the administration of the State.

This observation was reinforced by PU 02/PRI 02, who confirmed:

Society requires some means to control public officials but if you did not pass the law, how do you control public officials? … What we wanted was proper effective administration which required that things got done and people did not steal from the state in order to enrich themselves at the expense of the public.

Similarly, PU 1 sees the IPO as a necessity for regulation of the behaviour of public officials: “Its real purpose was to regulate as a result of the behaviour in office of the UWP [United Workers Party].”

This search for an IPO that created checks and balances has also been extended to future government officials, it appears. Three interviewees indicated that the Act was intended to be a layer of checks and balances that deterred future illegal and corrupt acts. According to PRI 1, “my position was that it was needed because you were not staying in government.” Indeed, PU 2 had also intimated that Dominica needed the IPO because that actor feared what would have happened to the resources of the land in case "we lose and these fellars [guys] come back in again." PU 04 echoes the view of PRI 1: “We needed to take into

111 account that we would not be in government forever so the legislation should be tweaked in such a ways that in the hands of anybody, it could not be abused and therefore this was the guiding light in framing legislation.” In this regard, the Act was intended to be a safety valve to the coffers of the State against any attempts by future unscrupulous leaders at corrupt acts.

A number of actors who were all aligned also affirm that the Act was absolutely necessary in order to protect the State’s resources from persons in or close to the DLP administration whom they considered to be plundering the Treasury. For them (PU 03/PRI 03, PU 02/PRI 02, POL 01, POL 02, PU 05/PRI 04), suspicion of the incumbent was sufficient impetus to seeking an Act. They therefore shared the same interest, mission, as others to establish an institution that protects the State resources, albeit driven by different persuasions.

When quizzed about the persistent efforts by certain actors to have the incumbent implement the Act that had been passed in 2003, PRI 2 explained: Things were getting out of control. The party in government had been campaigning on a platform of anti-corruption, prevention of corruption in public office and so on. They put the Act in place in 2003. It is on the books, it had the assent of the President but it has gone to sleep. And while it is sleeping ministers are helping themselves. The evidence is suggesting that ministers are helping themselves. You see all signs of illicit enrichment emerging. … They promised something but they are doing something different.

In fact, POL 02 confirms “they [the DLP government] wanted to put their house in order before they implemented the legislation” and POL 01 echoes:

You know their main objective from 2003, very early one, was in fact to find ways and means to bend the rules and to get money in their pockets as opposed to operating on an above board level. I

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think they therefore felt that the full implementation of the Act in 2003 would have impeded what is it is they had on their plate or … to get finance for themselves and the party.

Both POL and PU actors and their associates therefore, seemed equally determined to create an Act that would protect the State resources.

PU 05/PRI 04 and POL 02 see another motivation behind the actual decision to have an IPO Act, however. In their view, the DLP administration needed to secure its legitimacy. The government: “put it [the IPO] there to satisfy the political posturing that had occurred and that had taken place…. It is the public pressure later on that forced their hands to implement it” POL 02. At stake therefore, in the eyes of that participant, was the DLP’s legitimacy to govern especially in light of the forceful claims made by the DLP against the UWP when the former was in opposition. Therefore, once in office, the DLP had to proceed openly, publicly, with measures that would give credence to its platform during the election campaign. Legitimacy-building was not unique to the DLP. When pressed on the motivations behind the Act POL 01, POL 02, and PU 01/PRI 01 were adamant that an instrument was needed through which the UWP could have a chance in court to clear its name and restore its credibility with the electorate. Still hurting from an election defeat (1999 general elections) in which they were mercilessly labelled as corrupt, actors who were on the UWP side affirmed that: “coming out of that election we [the UWP Opposition] took a position that we are here, we are not going anywhere. It is necessary for that corruption, which Pierre Charles, in about 2001 or 2003, some place like that … [alleged] clear up … So we continued to press for an investigation an inquiry, whatever, into the allegations of corruption” (POL 02). This intense desire for a legal framework within which they could be vindicated is also reaffirmed by POL 01 almost with some degree of lament:

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We consistently called for taking them [the allegations of corruption] to court: where is the info [information]? You charged us with corruption. Take it further. Take us to court put us in jail. Do what you have to do. There was never one commission of inquiry and there were never any charges filed and never any real attempt to pursue the matter …”

A moment to restore their name seemed to have been one of the main motivations for these POL actors. Consequently, legitimacy building is identified by both PU and POL actors (the largest groups of actors) as one other motivation for the choice and construction of the IPO.

PU 01/PRI 01 and PU 06 offer an additional perspective on the origin of the IPO. They believe that the Act was created and shaped to appease international development partners:

The IPO Act was designed to introduce new standards of management and operations of the pub sector that would allow for 2 things. One, better government, better management, but would also allow us to meet the increasingly stringent application of these standards by the international community …. I think it was just done to satisfy the international community that ‘ok we have checked the box’ (PU 01/PRI 01).

This view, however, was in a minority and that, not repeatedly mentioned by these two participants. However, PU 1 confirmed that the Act emerged as part of a broader discourse in the Caribbean region on public integrity: “it was a topical issue at the time and so people felt let’s go ahead with it.” Indeed, Hansard records of the debate on the Act indicate that in introducing the Bill to the House, the Attorney General at that time did indicate that one element of the context in which the Act emerged were the suggestions from the Organisation of American States, United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and Transparency International that members enact integrity legislation.

4.4 Results for question #3 Question #3 is, who determined the original goals of the institution?

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We believed that the answers to this question could have shed light on the principal research question, viz why did the State develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003).

The principal sources of data informing on this question were interview participants and parliamentary documents. No participant has conclusively identified one single actor as solely responsible for the goals of the Act, although many participants point to PU 02/PRI 02 and PU 03/PRI 03 as the main architects of the Act. PU 02, PU 1, and PRI 1 indicate that the idea for the IPO originated with PU 3. PU 1 claims that the Act was “Labour Party idea. It was the Labour Party that first put this forward and that was articulated during the election campaign...of 2000.” In the eyes of that participant, the Act is consequently, a creature of the DLP. Indeed, it appears that once the DLP decided to proceed with the legislation, the government simply used existing draft legislation in St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Bermuda in order to design Dominica’s (PU 02/PRI 02). According to PU 1: “We looked at legislation throughout the region that was already existing, and we drafted legislation, largely almost copied it out of Trinidad.” PU 05/PRI 04 concurs. When asked “who determined the objectives of the Act… Was there a collective decision or some person decided,” The participant responded:

There was just talk. Well, my opinion was that they took sample legislation from different territories and they just implemented them. I don’t think there was any big discussion or pressure group or committee I think the objectives of the Act were basically the objectives as they were in St. Lucia or Antigua...

The goals of the Act were therefore influenced by the anti-corruption agenda of the DLP and the existing similar benchmark legislation in neighbouring jurisdictions. No single actor was identified as the sole architect of the goals of the IPO.

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4.5 Results for question # 4 It reads: What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? The responses to this question, we believed, would have highlighted the dominant actors and their intent regarding the design of the Act. If there were other options considered we would need to know who proffered them and why they did not become the IPO that exists today. Question #4 is therefore critical in validating our thesis. Again, most of the data informing on this question were gleaned from the theme analysis of interview transcripts.

No participant or document indicated that an alternative institution to public integrity oversight was considered. Actor PU 03/PRI 03 indicated that a model draft bill for Integrity Commission by Justice Dame Monica Joseph, a prominent Caribbean jurist, was used to inform the Dominica draft but even that bill was deemed to be inadequate to the Dominican political arena because “our draft was superior.”

In fact, in response to the question “why did we opt for an IPO,” PU 05/PRI 04 responded: “Because everyone is doing it…..Everyone in the Caribbean.....England has it, Trinidad has it, and so on.” Additionally, When questioned on the explicit choice of the IPO and its structure, PU 1 observed: “there are sufficient provisions [in our laws] to counter corruption and so forth” and mentioned the Parliamentary Ombudsman. However, that participant also indicated that such institutions were costly. Similarly, PU 02/PRI 02 dismisses the idea of an Ombudsman: “There has never been an ombudsman...we don’t have an ombudsman. The ombudsman is to deal really with maladministration.” In defending the choice of the IPO as the institution of choice, PU 02/PRI 02 explains: “You need something...appropriately structured to deal with that and that what’s the IPO is to do. Because the IPO has a commission, there is a law, there is a, you know, a procedure to go about doing things.”

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Hence, the concept of an IPO seemed the most accepted choice among actors.

Establishing an IPO as the choice of institution to oversee public integrity does not, however, mean that the acceptance was universal. POL 03/PU 07, PU 1, and PRI 1 indicate that the cost of maintaining the IPO was seen then to be sufficiently prohibitive to nullify any argument in favour of the institution. POL 03/PU 07 goes even further: “personally, I don't see the need. Personally, I think we have enough structures in place to prevent what you call corruption”. Nevertheless, Hansard records show that parliament unanimously adopted the current version of the Act (with one abstention); and, at no occasion during the debate in the House did a member propose an alternative, although references were made to various sections from the Trinidadian, St. Lucian, and Barbadian models. The question of whether other potential options to the IPO were considered is therefore, clearly answered: No.

However, Hansard records of the debate on the creation of the Act are instructive of the concerns of many parliamentarians who spoke on the creation of the Act. Table 5 below summarizes those concerns.

Table 5: Principal Concerns of Parliamentarians who Contributed to the Debate in the House on the Creation of the IPO (2003)

Speaker # United Workers Party Dominica Labour Dominica (Official Opposition) Party (Majority Freedom Party coalition partner with DFP) 1 1. Expand to include Support Supports Bill “important public Bill…”several offices...judges, customs countries in the area, Solicitor General,” p. world have 257 introduced similar 2. Criminalise. An official legislation.” would be suspect of impropriety in accepting gifts without first proof of such would have been made,

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p. 257. 3. Need for “limits” to latitude of public officials in raising resources for political parties and communities, p. 259. 2 1. “False accusation” of 1. Supports Supports Bill…to corruption should be Bill, p. 294. curb noted criminalised, p. 260. 2. St. Vincent examples of bribery 2. Independence of IPO. and Trinidad are and impropriety. Commission should be doing it, p. 293 appointed by the President “in his own deliberate judgment,” p. 260. 3. Independence of IPO. Cabinet has to determine emoluments of commissioners, p. 261. 4. Independence of IPO. Reports of gifts have to be made through the PM to the IPO, p. 262 5. Oversight “who is to guard the guards,” p. 262 6. Expand to include local Government leaders, p. 263. 3 Supports Bill More education to Supports Bill, p. public needed prior 315. to debate, p. 307. 4 1. Impediment. Can 1.“There is Speaks glowingly of discourage persons from autonomy and the Bill serving on statutory boards, there is p. 270. independence,” p. 2. Too broad a list of 311 officials targeted, p. 270. 2.Supports Bill, p. 3. Too costly…”Can we 313. afford this thing? Can we,” p. 271? 4. Distraction from real issue of building the economy, p. 271. 5 1. Independence. Should Supports Bill, p. be appointed directly by the 315. President, p. 274. 2. Can “criminalise” hastily, p. 275 3. Place a monetary value on gifts to be declared, p. 275 4. Penalty for possession of property in excess of one’s legal income property was “too harsh,” p. 276.

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5. Independence. Declaring gifts should not be through PM, p. 278. 6 1. “Property” not defined. Supports Bill. 2. Independence. Rebutts arguments President should appoint “in from UWP his own deliberate judgement”, p. 288 3. Quorum should not be an even #, p. 289. 4. Clause providing for disqualification of members from a Tribunal formed by the Commission is needed if held political office (or a political activist) during the 5 years immediately preceding the date of appointment, p. 289. 5. Severity of sentences for various offences, p. 290. 6. Expand list of public offices, p. 290. 7. Section on trivial gifts was unnecessary, p. 290. 8. Independence. Reporting through the PM is “unnecessary”, p. 291. 7 1. Expand to Comptroller of Customs and inland Revenue, p. 299 2. Demands placed on individuals to declare assets and expose privacy sometimes for little returns from their position, p. 300. 3. Raise penalty for false accusations from 10 grand to 100 grand and make it retroactive, p. 304. 4. Independence. President to act in “deliberate judgement,” p. 304.

An analysis of Table 5 above indicates the following: 1. The largest block of parliamentarians contributing to the debate on the Act came from the minority Opposition, United Workers Party (UWP).

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2. The lack of autonomy of the IPO Commission and the narrow list of targeted public officials were the main concerns of most of those Opposition speakers. Additionally, in the Committee stage, where the sections of the Act were discussed in detail and where amendments were suggested, those two concerns solicited the lengthiest deliberations: 1. Independence (Selection method of commission and authority of the President to appoint a sub-committee of the Commission from among Commissioners. Some wanted a commission independent of members of the commission) = 6 pages. 2. Scope. Targets of the Act to be broadened = 3 3/4 pages. Consequently, although there was no formal alternative presented, many parliamentarians had suggestions regarding modifications to the draft version that was before the House in 2003.

4.6 Results for question # 5 Question #5 asks: What power resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? The search for responses to this question advances our discussion on our thesis by examining power relations from two different perspectives simultaneously. Consistent with our thesis that rational actors have acted rationally to create an IPO that serves them, the question must be studied from both the agential and structural perspectives. Its focus on the resources of the actors, presumes an agential perspective of the thesis; that is, it postulates that rational agents have resources that they have consciously and deliberately deployed to influence their power position, or that of their colleagues, in a network of actors in order to achieve a strategic end, their choice and design of the Dominican IPO. Yet, we also accept that this deployment of resources is conditioned by the location of an actor in a network of actors as well as the actor’s perception of his strength and that of his adversaries. This question therefore sought to describe the techniques

120 employed by those actors in their manoeuvrings within that pre-IPO period in order to create the Act. We recall the typology of power resources created by Imbeau and Couture (2010) that we discussed in Chapter 2: force, knowledge, and wealth. Our responses to this and related questions are built upon this typology.

Several considerations have therefore, guided our description of the answers to this question. We examine each of these before proceeding to answer the question because they create the framework within which the responses must be analysed. First, we refer to a description of the declared power resources of the dominant actors and the known power resources of their alters. Ideally, we would have wished that every actor respond to the questionnaire and provide rich information regarding the sources of his power and those of his associates. In the absence of these completed questionnaires, we therefore relied on data provided by the 13 interviewed participants and theme analysis of documentation. In cases where our sources did not provide clear data on the resources of power of an actor, we referred to his job occupation as an indicator of his power resources. Second, in seeking data pertaining to this question, we were looking for practical manifestations of the resources as suggested by the participants. Hence, force was essentially formal political authority as enshrined by the Constitution; knowledge as a resource would be manifested in information resources (media, speeches, discourse, etc); and wealth could be seen in a reliance or material or financial resources. Third, we examined the choice of resources employed by the various actors. We assumed that the choice of each resource and intensity with which each was deployed varied based on the type of power relation, i.e. social or instrumental. We also assumed that the same were determined by the perceived power position of the actors involved. Hence, our results below examine not only the sources of power of the multitude of actors, but also the intensity of the power used, and the structural power

121 position of the actors involved. Indeed, we can sub-divide our research question further: 1. What were the resources of power used by the actors? 1.1 What was the general distribution of the sources of power over the two phases? 2. What was the distribution of power as possessed by the individual category of actors? 3. Against whom did the actors use their power? A fifth logical question, under what conditions did the actors deploy their power resources, is the subject of our final research question and so, it is not discussed here, but below.

4.6.1 Results for sub-questions #1 and #1.1 Here, we address the questions: What were the resources of power used by the actors and what was the distribution of the sources of power? Among the 59 actors (five egos and their alters) whom we recorded as being involved in the IPO’s creation, force (formal political authority), knowledge, and wealth were the sources of power used in power relations. Here, we discuss our findings for each of these.

An important number of actors have shown that their primary power resource was knowledge. Whether it was in instrumental or social power relations, every actor interviewed used it (although the 13 interviewed informed us of the resources of those who were not interviewed, it was not possible to always validate the information that they gave, as we described above at 4.6). It was the primary source of power of two dominant actors and the secondary source for three others. Additionally, in the pre -transition phase, knowledge was cited as the primary source of power for 21 alters (26 in the post) and the secondary source for 36 (33 in the post). Knowledge nevertheless, was not a tertiary source for any actor, ego or alter.

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We also found that the second most commonly used power resource was force. This is especially true for three of the five dominant actors. It was not a source of power (primary, secondary, or tertiary) for the two other dominant actors. In the pre-transition phase, force was the primary source of power for 34 of the 59 alters. In the post-transition phase, this figure drops minimally to 29 alters whose primary source of power was force. We do not record force as a secondary or tertiary source of power for any actor (ego or alter).

The number of actors whose primary source of power was wealth is the least remarkable among the three sources noted; four in both the pre and post phases. It was a secondary source of power for one dominant actor and the tertiary for three others. Wealth was not a source of power for the fifth dominant actor, ego. In the pre-transition phase, it was however, the primary source of power for four of the 54 alters, the secondary source for three alters, and the tertiary source for 25 alters. In the post-transition phase, it was the secondary source for six alters, a primary for four, and a tertiary for 21, all of whom were PU actors.

Broadly, knowledge was reported as the most widely used source of power; force came second, and wealth third. In the pre-transition phase, force was the most widely used primary source of power among alters. The second most widely used primary source in that phase was knowledge. The dominance of force as the primary power source was sustained even after the transitions. Knowledge’s dominance as a second level choice has already been noted above. When it was used as a secondary power source, its share of the network was slightly higher in the pre-transition phase than in the post, 38 and 33 respectively. Knowledge is the only source of power that emerges strongly in both phases and at both primary and secondary levels. Wealth does feature as

123 an important source as well. However, unlike force and knowledge, its strength is diffused over the three levels of importance (primary, secondary, and tertiary). As a power source, it emerges most strongly as a tertiary choice. However, wealth is the only source to have been used at all three levels and in both pre and post phases. We examine the details of these findings in the next sub-section.

4.6.2 Results for sub-question #2 What was the distribution of power resources as possessed by the individual category of actors? This question requires the disaggregation the above data on the source of actors’ power so that we can better understand the distribution of power resources among the four different categories of actors (public, private, political, or organisational). Such a distribution could further elucidate the strategies employed by certain actors in order to advance their interests as well as, potentially, the advantage of one type of power resource over others in shaping the Act. Ultimately, such an analysis could help answer the principal research question: Why did the State develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). Table 6 below facilitates this analysis. To protect the anonymity of the five dominant actors, we have opted not to include data pertaining to the sources of their power.

Table 6: Distribution of Power Resources among the Four Different Categories of Actors in the Pre and Post-Transition Phases

Source Category Primary Secondary Tertiary Source # of Source # Source # Alters of Alters of Alters Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Force Public (PU) 26 21 0 0 0 0 Private (PRI) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Political (POL) 8 8 0 0 0 0 Organisational 0 0 0 0 0 0 (ORG) Totals 34 29 0 0 0 0 Knowledge Public (PU) 3 3 21 21 0 0 Private (PRI) 13 17 2 3 0 0 Political (POL) 0 1 8 7 0 0

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Organisational 5 5 2 2 0 0 (ORG) Totals 21 26 38 33 0 0 Wealth Public (PU) 0 0 0 0 25 21 Private (PRI) 2 2 1 4 0 0 Political (POL) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Organisational 2 2 2 2 0 0 (ORG) Totals 4 4 3 6 25 21

The following observations regarding the results described in Table 6 are most relevant: 1. Authority does not emerge as a secondary level or tertiary level source of power; always a first. 2. Where force was a power resource, it was the primary resource and never the secondary or tertiary. 3. The primary, principal, source of power for public officers (PU) was political force. In fact, in referring to internal discussions surrounding the creation of the Act, PU 02/PRI 02 commented on how certain actors dealt with the reservations expressed by PU 04: “Everybody supported it. PU 04 was against it… always was against it. But he was in a minority… we just ignored him. We overruled him…ignored him.” (UCINET analyses show that PU 04 had a higher closeness score than PU 02/PRI 02, but the latter was part of a majority partner in coalition.) Political authority, force, has been a readily available source of power for PU actors, it appears; sometimes using it to maximal force. 4. Knowledge was always either a primary or secondary resource for actors; never a tertiary. 5. Although the primary source of power for PRI and ORG actors was knowledge, it was only a secondary source for PU actors. 6. No actor used knowledge as a tertiary resource.

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7. As a source or power for PU actors, wealth features almost as the direct opposite of force, i.e. it does not emerge as a primary source but only as a tertiary level source of power. 8. Wealth is, however, the primary source of power for PRI actors.

In summarising the responses to Sub-question 2, it appears significant to note the preponderance of force as the power resource among PU actors while knowledge and wealth are clearly more frequently the power sources among PRI actors. ORG actors embraced both wealth and knowledge as power resources. The lingering question remains, however, who were the targets of the sources of power used by the alters (and their egos) and under what conditions. The first of these two lingering questions we answer below. Appendix 6 of the Appendices provides further details on the actors and their sources of power.

4.6.3 Results for sub-question #3 This final sub-question of Question # 4 reads: Against whom did the actors use their power? In order to answer this part of Question #4, we turn to Table 7 below and two sets of matrices on power relations, labelled as Table 8 and Table 9. One matrix, Table 8, pertains to the use of social power surrounding the construction of the IPO and the other, instrumental power. We recall that the former pertains to an actor’s ability to bring about outcomes by acting on events or things. Social power, we described as “power over” another; an actor’s ability to act in a manner that directly makes another actor do his bidding. Here, we describe these types of power relationships in an effort to illustrate the intended targets of the deployment of power resources. These matrices give a clear indication of the types of resources employed by the various actors and in what type of power relation. Most of the data that provided responses to this question came from interview transcripts. Where it

126 appeared that a notation would have compromised the confidentiality of the data collection process, data have not been added to this table. Table 7: Key Activities Surrounding the Evolution of the IPO (2003), Classified According to Power Relation Type.

Event Power Type 1. PU 3 launches public anti-corruption campaign Instrumental against POL 02 2. ORG 03 holds public sessions about good Instrumental governance 3. ORG 02 holds public sessions about good Instrumental government 4. PRI 1 urges PU 3 to act against corruption Social 5. PU 3 instructs PU 02/PRI 02 Social 6. PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 018 on the design Social 7. PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 017 on the design Social 8. PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 016 on the design Social 9. PU 018 advises PU 02/PRI 02 Instrumental 10. PU 2 instructs PU 02/PRI 02 Social 11. PU 02/PRI 02 shuts down PU 04 Social 12. PU 02/PRI 02 deposits Bill in House Instrumental 13. PU 2 makes submission in House on Act Instrumental 14. POL 02 makes submission in House on Act Instrumental 15. PU 03/PRI 03 deposits drafts 3 Instrumental 16. PRI 09 facilitates public information session Instrumental 17. PRI 08 facilitates public information session Instrumental 18. PRI 2 addresses public on the need for the Act Instrumental 19. President gives assent to Act in 2003 Social 20. ORG 01 hosts public meeting Instrumental 21. ORG 05 give money to ORG 01 Social 22. Coalition to advance implementation of Act is Instrumental announced 23. ORG 01 public event on IPO Instrumental 24. President instructs Cabinet Secretariat gazetting of Instrumental Act

We record a minimum of 25 occurrences of power relations surrounding the choice and design of the Act (one has been omitted from the table). Among these, 15 were instrumental and 10 were social. The numbers of these relations are themselves informative, as we will discuss in Chapter 5. However, of equal interest to us here is also the category of the actors involved in the relations and the direction of the relations. This thesis has identified four categories of actors: Public (PU), Private (PRI), Political (POL), and Organisational (ORG). All of these were involved in power

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relations. However, we record that 5 of the 15 events of instrumental relations were initiated by PU actors. Having just concluded our discussion on the nature of power resources employed by actors, we can now highlight that the principal source of power employed in these five instrumental relations is knowledge. From the beginning of intense and deliberate public discussion on the need for integrity in public office legislation (during the 1999 election campaign) to the eve of the order to implement the Act in 2008, actors used information and persuasion to inform either the general public or the members of parliament about their perspective of the Act.

With regards to the 10 social power relations, eight of the 10 occurrences were also initiated by only three PU actors. Such relations include direct instructions to design the Act to those that triggered the actual implementation of the Act. Additionally, in nine of the 10 social power relations, the source of power used was authority. The tenth occurrence involves a documented effort by members of a forum to finance the activities of its organisation. Participants inform that in the post-assent but pre-implementation period of the Act, the dormant period, mobilized groups organized town hall-styled meetings in which audience members were addressed on the need for an IPO. At such gatherings, persons present were urged to financially support the “movement” to have the IPO implemented. Many did so by making financial contributions at the meetings or in private; “people contributed at the forums ... helped us meet the cost to carry a live broadcast…,” PU 01/PRI 01 informs. Those meetings are the only known relations in which wealth was used as the power resource expressly with the intention of equipping the organisers of the meetings to advance their campaigns surrounding the IPO’s creation.

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Table 8: Social Power Relations Surrounding the Creation of the IPO (2003)

Power Resources of the Target Authority Wealth Knowledge

Power Authority PU 3 (1) (1+) President (1), (2- (Min.) → PU ), (Max.) → (sum 02/PRI 02 total of PU and Resources PU 2 (1) (1+) POL actors) (Min.) → PU of the 02/PRI 02

Initiator PU 02/PRI 02 (1) (2-) (Min.) → PU 04 PU 1 (1) (1+) (Min.) → President of the Commonwealth PU 1 (1) (1+) (Min.) → President of the Commonwealth PU 02/PRI 02 (1) (1+) (Min.) → PU 016 (instructions on the design) Wealth ORG 05 (1) (1+) (Max.) → ORG 06 ORG 05 (1) (1+) (Miax.) → ORG 07 Knowledge ORG 07 (1) (1+) ORG 07 (1) (1+) POL 02(1) (2-) (Max.) → ORG 05 (Max.) → ORG 05 (Max.) → PU 1 POL 02 (1) (2-) ORG 01(1) (1+) (Max.) → PU 2 (Max.) → ORG 05 ORG 07 (1) (1+) ORG 01(1) (1+) (Max.) → ORG 06 (Max.) → ORG 05

Authority Wealth Knowledge

Key: (1) = ranking of the power resource/s employed (1 – if the source is the main resource, 2 – secondary, 3 – tertiary, 4 – eclectic, 5 – if the source is unknown) (1+) = direction of power (1+ increasing the power or 2- restraining the power of another actor); (Min.) = Strength of the resource used by the influencer (Max, Min).

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Table 9: Instrumental Power Surrounding the Creation of the IPO (2003)

Power Ressources Authority Wealth Knowledge Influencer Authority PU 1 (1) (1+) (Min.) → (A) public PU 02/PRI 02 deposits draft (1) (1+) (Min.) → parliament PU 2 (1) (1+) (Min. → parliament Wealth PU 05/PRI 04 (4) ORG 06, ORG 07 (2) (2-) (Max.) → (1+) (Max.) → public public officials PRI 08 (1) (2-) (Max.) → public oficials PU 05/PRI 04 (4) (1+) (Max.) → public PRI 08 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public Knowledge PU 3 (4) (Max.) → public ORG 01 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public ORG 01, ORG 06, ORG 07(1) (1+) (Max.) → public ORG 06, ORG 07 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public ORG 01 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public PU 2 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public PRI 2 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public PRI 1(1) (1+) (Max.) → public PU 3 (1) (1+) (Max.) → public Authority Wealth Knowledge

Key (1) = ranking of the power resource/s employed (1 – if the source is the main resource, 2 – secondary, 3 – tertiary, 4 – eclectic, 5 – if the source is unknown) (1+) = direction of power (1+ increasing the power or 2- restraining the power of another actor); (Min.) = Strength of the resource used by the influencer (Max, Min).

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In summarising our analysis pertaining to research question # 5, what power resources the actors used to shape the IPO, we have detailed the power relations among the actors around the creation of the IPO. Our observation is that among the three sources of power noted (authority, knowledge, and wealth), most alters have used knowledge as their choice of power source in their effort to advance their interests in the creation of the IPO. In addition, they did so largely in instrumental power relations. Earlier in this chapter, we described the structural characteristics of power in the egonets surrounding the creation of the IPO, notably as these pertain to the degree centrality of the egos and their alters. Therefore, we will not repeat them here. However, below we refine our findings regarding the occurrences of social and instrumental power.

4.7 Results for question #6 This question reads: What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? This question is equally central to our thesis because one key argument that we advance is that structural conditions have determined how networked actors have deployed their resources to advance an Act that serves them. Interview transcripts were among the most informative sources for our responses to this question. In studying those records, we were interested in knowing what made actor X use his power resources and conversely, what made actor X not use his resources. We also consider the decision not to deploy power resources as a decision onto itself because it elucidates the actor’s understanding of the power situation in which he finds himself. Consistent with Lukes (1974) third face of power, it could be, for example, that the actor considers himself in a less powerful position than another and therefore, he opts to not deploy his resources. Alternatively, it could be that the actor refrains from deploying his resources not out of weakness but in order to optimize the use of his resources in another battle, conceivably against other actors. Consequently, in search of responses to this

131 research question, we conduct our analysis on two levels. First, we focused on the circumstances surrounding actions and non-actions of actors and their alters. Second, we studied the structural locations of actors within an egonet and then, broadly, the entire network as we know it. This second analysis is important because a central element in our thesis is that an actor’s motivations and behaviour are shaped by his understanding of his location in a network, a constellation, of actors. In order to describe the conditions under which the actors use their power, we are consequently interested in understanding the location of the actors involved in the activities outlined in Table 6.

Table 10 to 12 below therefore, are of much relevance to us here, as well as the UCINET analyses that informed us above. They build upon the previous, Table 6. The tables list the main activities surrounding the emergence of the Act, but most importantly, they describe the resultant power relations and the conditions under which they occurred. These conditions are not only reflected in the third column, but also in the second. We believe that this kind of detail is critical to understanding the connection between the structural conditions and political action/inaction surrounding the evolution of the Act.

Table 10: Key Activities on the Creation of the IPO, Resultant Power Relations, and the Conditions Under Which the Activities and Relations Occurred.

Event Notation Conditions PU 3 launches public PU 3 (4) (Max.) 1. Two and a half years prior anti-corruption campaign →knowledge to Jan. 2000 election against incumbents. campaign 2. Incumbent had won 1995 election with one-seat margin 3. Incumbent had completed some visible projects and had planned others. 4. Ego in a network

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ORG 03 holds public ORG 03 (1) (Max.) → 1. One year prior to Jan. 2000 sessions about good knowledge election campaign. governance. 2. Increasing public calls for mobilization against corruption. ORG 02 holds public ORG 02 (1) (Max.) → 3. Little or no formal ties to PU sessions about good knowledge and POL actors. government 4. Informal but strong ties with PU 2 and PU 3 5. Direct and indirect geodesic distances to PRI actors. PRI 1 urges PU 3 to act PRI 1 (1) (Min.) → PU 3 1. DLP had promised the Act. against corruption 2. PRI had direct and strong ties to POL and PU actors in both pre and post- resignation phases. PU 3 instructs PU 02/PRI PU 3 (2) (Min.) → PU 1. DLP had promised the Act. 02 02/PRI 02 2. DLP had a majority in parliament 3. The UWP, the party that was ousted in the 2000 elections, repeatedly demanded the Act. 4. Ego in a network. PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 02/PRI 02 (2) (Min.) 1. DLP had promised the Act. PU 016 on the design. → PU 016 2. DLP had a majority in PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 02/PRI 02(2) (Min.) parliament PU 017 on the design → PU 017 3. PU 02 is alter of PU 2 PU 02/PRI 02 instructs PU 02/PRI 02 (2) (Min.) 4. PU 02/PRI 02 was ego of PU PU 018 on the design → PU 018 016, PU 017, and PU 018 PU 018 advises PU 02/PRI PU 018 → Knowledge 1. DLP had promised the Act. 02 2. DLP had a majority in PU 2 instructs PU 02/PRI PU 2 (2) (Min.) → PU parliament 02 02/PRI 02 PU 02/PRI 02 (PU 02/PRI PU 02/PRI 02 (1) (Min.) 1. Pre-transition phase 02 21.000 degree → PU 04 2. Part of majority in centrality pre-transition parliament score) shuts down PU 04 3. PU 04 formed part of (PU 04 38.000 degree minority in government centrality pre-transition) 4. PU 02/PRI 02 has strong ties to PU 3 and PU 2, unlike PU 04. PU 02/PRI 02 deposits Bill PU 02/PRI 02 (1) (Min.) 1. DLP had promised the Act. in House → knowledge 2. DLP had a majority in PU 2 makes submission in PU 2 (1) (Min.) → parliament House on Act knowledge 3. PU 02/PRI 02 and PU 2 occupied dominant positions in the House on this issue because they were main purveyors of information.

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Table 11: Key Activities on the Creation of the IPO, Resultant Power Relations, and the Conditions Under Which the Activities and Relations Occurred. (Continued.)

Event Notation Conditions POL 02 makes POL 02 (1) (Min.) → submission in knowledge House on Act PU 03/PRI 03 reads PU 03/PRI 03 (1) 1. DLP had promised the Act. drafts 3 (Min.) → knowledge 2. DLP coalition government had a 11- seat majority in parliament PRI 09 facilitates PRI 09 (4) (Max.) → public information knowledge session 1. No connections to PU

PRI 08 facilitates PRI 08 (4) (Max.) → public information knowledge 2. Strong connections to POL and PRI session actors PRI 2 addresses PRI 2 (4) (Max.) → public on the need knowledge for the Act 3. Holders of power resources that had the potential to mobilize many actors. President gives President (1) (Min.) assent to Act in → knowledge 2003 1. Government had decided to legislate. President instructs President (1) (Min.) Cabinet Secretariat → Cabinet gazetting of Act Secretariat 2. President was directed to give assent. 1. Act passed in 2003 had not been implemented five years later. ORG 01 hosts ORG 01 (1) (Max.)→ 2. Public mobilization for the public meeting knowledge implementation since 2003 without success. 3. General elections were due within two ORG 05 gives ORG 05 (4) (Max.)→ years money to ORG 01 ORG 01 1. Act passed in 2003 had not been implemented five years later. Coalition to ORG 06 (1) (Max.) 2. Opposition actors had been clamouring advance → knowledge for the implementation since 2003 implementation of without success. Act is announced 3. Opposition did not believe itself capable of impacting the implementation through formal channel. ORG 01 public ORG 01 (1) (Max.) → 4. ORG 06 is created. event on IPO knowledge Opposition mobilization through public meetings Act implemented in September 2008 Key  (#) = ranking of the power resource/s employed (1 – if the source is the main resource, 2 – secondary, 3 – tertiary, 4 – eclectic, 5 – if the source is unknown)  (Min.) or (Max.) = Strength of the resource used by the influencer (Max, Min).

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This dissertation is about the genesis of an institution to regulate the behaviour of public officials, specifically as this behaviour pertains to the use of public funds. With regards to the power relations surrounding the creation of the IPO, Table 7 indicates that the dominant structural conditions that accompanied the use of certain power resources, in different intensities, were: the actors’ perception of the urgency to advance their cause, the nature of ties among the actors, and the actors’ perception of their power position in a network. These conditions, we have found, have structured the deployment of the actors’ resources. For example, in the opening salvoes that represented the early stages of the struggle for the Act, PU 3 used maximal application of eclectic power (i.e. a mix of his power resources) to launch a public anti-corruption campaign against the incumbents, seemingly in order to affect the knowledge structure of the public. He did so, however, sensing that the incumbents were seemingly in a politically strong position, only 2.5 years prior to general elections. Similarly, cognizant of his strong and direct ties to egos PU 2 and PU 3 PU 02/PRI 02 ignored the concerns of PU 04 (who has had very strong degree centrality scores; see Appendix 4 for a detailed picture of the power relations during the evolution of the Act.) Below, we offer greater insight into our observations with regards to the influence of structural conditions on actor behaviour.

4.7.1 Urgency One condition that is frequently described as accompanying an activity in the route to developing the Act was the fact that the Act was promised. Convinced that the incumbent UWP was corrupt and the way to prevent the perceived abuses of the public purse in the future was to legislate against certain behaviours among public officials, certain actors seemed determined to adhere to that promise. Consequently, PRI 1, PU 3, PU 2, PU 03/PRI 03, PU 02/PRI 02 invested to advance this cause. This investment varied from maximum force in the early stages of the public

135 campaign to promote the concept of the Act and then subsequently, minimal force to actually create the Act once in power. Those PU actors were reported to have been most vociferous in their public campaign for the Act once they felt that the incumbent had been using political authority to enrich itself. In fact, once in government and prior to the debate in the House, PU actors were most active. However, once the debate was completed, PUs emerge only twice and POLs and ORGs became very active.

Hence, we see a crescendo in the deployment of the power resources of those actors, from minimal force to maximum coinciding with the amount of political authority that they possessed. The less authority they possessed, the more intense was their use of power.

The Act was passed in 2003 but it remained dormant until 2008 when its implementation started. However, in the post 2003 period, POL and certain PRI actors were active in influencing the implementation of the Act. We observe a similar crescendo effect in the deployment of power resources of those actors. In the discourse on the Act, we see in Tables 11 and 12 that POLs and PRIs surface, simultaneously, halfway through the chronological events surrounding the birth of the Act, in the House to debate the Act. Curiously, subsequent to that debate, POLs do not feature as an actor in either Table.

Instead, PRI and ORG actors dominate. Documents and interviewees inform that the post 2003 period saw the most public activity on the evolution of the Act. The three dominant conditions during that period were: One, It was the period during which the Act was “put to sleep” (PU 02/PRI 02); two, it coincided with repeated accusations by the UWP of corruption against the incumbent DLP administration; and three, general elections were approaching in 2008. Indeed PU 02/PRI 02, POL 01, PRI

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2, PU 01/PRI 01 inform that they believed the DLP had delayed the implementation of the Act, put it to “sleep” in order to clean up its house before allowing the implementation of the Act. Consequently sensing a political opportunity and an urgency to have the IPO regularised, PRIs and ORGs used maximum investment to mobilize political support and financial resources. This investment seems to have subsided once the President of the Commonwealth, under the instruction of the Prime Minister, instructed that the Act be implemented. Yet, this investment, we see, has been facilitated by the presence of key PRI and POL actors among the ORG’s.

4.7.2 Structurally Among PU actors, we have evidence of actors using their egonets to advance self-directed interests. PRI 1 was able to use his direct and strong ties to PU 3 and PU 2 and PU 1 to urge the creation and development of the Act. Additionally, ORGs 02 and 03 who had low closeness scores to dominant actors (PRI 1, PU 1, PRI 2, PU 2, and PU 3) found themselves investing heavily to promote their agenda. Moreover, in discussions surrounding the need for the IPO, PU 02/PRI 02 used his political authority to suppress the concerns of PU 04. At the time that he did, he was ego of a small egonet (3 alters minus himself), he had strong and direct ties with PU 3 and PU 2 (unlike PU 04 did), and he was an ego in the strongest coalition in parliament.

4.7.3 Composition of the Coalitions/Pre and Post-Transitions We have already established that our research spans two distinct periods of political accommodation among relevant actors. We have named those periods the pre- transition and the post- transition periods. These two periods were characterised by the use of different resources of power, which were also deployed in different intensities. We are interested in the actions of PU 02/PRI 02, PU 05/PRI 04, PU 01/PRI 01, POL 03/PU 07, PU 03/PRI 03. The behaviour of the first three catches our attention.

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First, they all lose PU classification, and in the process, they lost some political authority although they maintained ties to some POL actors. Yet, they also gained access to PRI, POL, and ORG actors that they did not have before. Documents show that these five actors used maximum force in their ties with ORG 05, ORG 01, and ORG 06. Appendix 3 shows the pre and post-transition ties of actors PU 02/PRI 02, PU 05/PRI 04, PU 01/PRI 01, POL 03/PU 07, PU 03/PRI 03, as well as of other actors..

In summarizing the results for this question, we highlight both the agential and structural conditions that appear to have impacted the power relations surrounding the birth of the IPO (2003). Central to the results described here are the new configurations that emerge after the transitions of resignations and defections.

4.8 Summary to Chapter 4 We began this chapter with six research questions, which, themselves, have been further sub-divided: 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters? 2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors? 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution? 4. What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? 5. What resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? Let us review a summary of results pertaining to these questions.

Contrary to our preliminary theme analysis of relevant documentation, we found that there were five dominant actors on the creation of the Integrity in Public Office Act of the Commonwealth of Dominica. Their motivation and goals differed but there is some correlation: The Act was meant to create a framework within which public integrity could be

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enhanced among public officials. There was no moment of consensus- building on these goals, however. They originated from the initiators, who, once in government, institutionalized this vision in the form of the IPO Act. Similarly, there was no formal discussion on alternatives to the Act. There was concern expressed by some members of the DLP administration regarding the relevance of the Act to the Dominican political arena. However, not even such concern was matched with the recommendation for an alternative institution. The status quo seemed sufficient to those concerns. Consequently, the IPO was created, but not without much power play. First, actors used a range of resources (wealth, force, or knowledge) to advance their position on the Act.

This deployment of resources was largely influenced by a number of factors; namely, general elections, perceived levels of regime success, perceptions of one’s position vis à vis that of other actors, and shifting alliances and the concomitant shift in loyalty among actors, access to resources, and the use of those resources. Structural conditions have, therefore, shaped the deployment of power resources by rational actors operating in a constellation of actors.

Having thus laid out the data that inform our research questions we can now more closely examine the relationship between these data and our thesis. Such an exam will lay the foundation for conclusive responses to our research questions as well as the validation of our hypotheses.

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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION Chapter 4 reveals a few significant phenomena surrounding the emergence of the Integrity in Public Act of the Commonwealth of Dominica. Here, in Chapter 5, we shall focus on them. The intention is to contextualize and elucidate these phenomena in the hope that we will offer a plausible and convincing response to our question: Why the Dominica parliament adopted this centralised - limited – ad-hoc type of IPO. We begin the chapter with a review of our work thus far.

5.1 Review Consistent with our earlier discussion on good governance, integrity building is seen as part of the effort to achieve good governance and economic development in developing countries and to maintain economic development in developed ones. The logic between the two, integrity and good governance, is built on the premise that institutions that regulate actor behaviour are a critical component in the development of public accountability; that is, they allow the electorate a clear view on how its leaders conduct themselves and manage public resources in its name. This is the assumption that underpins models of institutions that aim to engender and oversee public integrity. The good governance argument presumes further, that when actors are asked to regulate themselves, they will do so guided by the altruistic and noble ideals of public service, rule of law, and a public ethos. Unfortunately, both arguments are illogical because they undervalue the potential for calculated actor behaviour to deliberately dominate and thwart the institution-building process in its name. Critically, they both seem to ignore the fundamental principle of political survival, as articulated by rational institutionalists, that an actor will act rationally to maximize his position among a community of actors. In the context of policy networks, an actor in a network will logically seek out opportunities and actors that will allow him to advance his interests.

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We do not believe therefore, that the genesis of the Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) of the Commonwealth of Dominica was facilitated out of this noble conviction on which much of the literature on building institutions of public integrity is built. In fact, we are convinced that in the case of the Dominican IPO, Dominican actors deliberately used their power to advance a model of an IPO that serves them. They did so, however, only after analysing their power position relative to that of other actors, who all form part of a wider network of actors. This is a structuralist view ἁ la Giddens (1979), embracing both structural and agential dimensions of power, and it has been the central thesis of our research project. In other words, actor A supported actor B in debating for an IPO only after actor A understood that the only way he was going to see his desire materialise is by associating with actor B. It stands to reason therefore, that different actors acted in a manner that would advance their interests, not necessarily that of the public, however, it is defined. Hence, institutional-building, that ingredient of the Bretton Woods good governance agenda, is but the result of calculated and methodical campaign by rational actors. Power relations among rational actors are therefore, the main focus of our thesis.

In fact, the principal question that we asked before implementing this research project was: Why did the State develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). Emanating from this broader research questions were a few more specific ones that were intended to add methodological precision to the elaboration and eventual examination of our thesis statement. We did describe these specific questions on p. 47, in Chapter 3, viz: 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters? 2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors? 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution?

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4. What alternative options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? 5. What power resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power?

We further hypothesised that the choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO and the characteristics of alternative options and models of the Dominican IPO are those of the non-dominant actors.

In order to answer these questions and validate these hypotheses, we opted for a mix of qualitative and social network analysis techniques. We believed that this combination would allow us the analytical tools that are most appropriate to studying power relations on the genesis of the IPO. Broadly speaking, we learnt: 1. There were only five dominant actors. 2. There were four principal categories of motivations; namely, the need to deliver on an election promise, the perceived need to create another protective shield for the State’s resources, the desire for political legitimacy, and regionalisation. 3. The incumbent party decided upon the original goals of the Act. 4. There were no alternative models of integrity in public office institutions considered. 5. Rational actors mostly used a mix of authority, knowledge, and wealth in power relations. 6. Finally, actors generally invested moderately or heavily in the deployment of their power resources when they felt an urgency to do so, otherwise, they simply did not act. In this chapter, we discuss these broad findings in detail in order to eventually arrive at conclusions regarding our thesis statement. It begins

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with a discussion on our characterization of the Dominican IPO. The chapter is further divided into six parts, the final one being a discussion on the limitations of the study.

5.2 The Anatomy of a Centralised IPO In Chapter 1, we discussed a typology of integrity in public office institutions. First, we identified six features of an ideal-type IPO: 1. Its composition is non-partisan. 2. It is decentralised away from the control of the Executive or any of its entities. 3. It is supported by the political leadership but the source of its resources is not subject to the whims of the Executive. 4. It reaches beyond public officials. Such organisations accept that corruption among political leaders is often supported and enhanced by informal contacts of these leaders in the private sector. 5. It has the power to investigate, prosecute, and educate. 6. It forms part of a broader network of institutions that all aim to promote and oversee integrity among public officials. Upon further analysis, we concluded that there are eight types of IPOs: 1. Centralised-limited (in scope and mandate) – ad-hoc 2. centralised-broad - ad-hoc 3. centralised-limited –NIS 4. centralised-broad- NIS 5. decentralised- limited – ad-hoc 6. decentralised-broad- ad-hoc 7. decentralised-limited –NIS 8. decentralised-broad- NIS. Additionally, Type 8, decentralised-broad- NIS, is the ideal-type .We further concluded that Dominica’s IPO is of the centralised-limited – ad-

143 hoc type. Our results to Question 4 indicate the following features of the Dominican model: 1. Partisan. At least four commissioners (out of a total of seven) are direct nominees of the political parties that command the largest number of seats in parliament. This means that invariably, the DLP and the UWP have nominated persons whom they think will advance their interests. Indeed, PU 1 and PU 04 inform of the non- partisan approach to the nomination that the incumbent embraced in nominating its choice of members for the Commission, once the Act was passed. However, they quickly point to the “political” choices made by the UWP. Besides, the Chairman of the Commission is nominated by the heads of the DLP and the UWP. This joint-nomination is intended to prevent partisan bias. However, considering the well-researched and documented truism that in such situations, actors will support nominees that can advance their interests, it is reasonable to conclude that each of the two political parties has a minimum of three persons on the IPO’s Commission. 2. Centralised. There is little about the Dominica IPO that is decentralised. The Commission is located within the Ministry of Justice, Immigration, and National Security; it is subjected to the scrutiny of the Director of Audit; its staff must be public officers (who, as per administrative rules of public administration, are expected to be loyal to their employers); and its requests for resources must be directed to the Executive. In fact, since its creation in 2008, the Commission has repeated its requests for greater resources in each of its annual reports. 3. Limited range. The IPO focuses solely on certain categories of public officials. Never was there a consideration, it seems, for subjecting private officials to the jurisdiction of the Act. It does not even subject the Commissioners themselves, to the same level of

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scrutiny that they exercise on other public officials. The implication of this deficiency is that the IPO is incapable of serving as a real tool for managing the behaviour of public figures because its authority does not go beyond networks involving public actors. Consequently, allegations of inappropriate behaviour by private actors to subvert public policy remain untouched. On page 88, we indicated that Hansard records reveal a deep interest among POL actors, and at least two PU actors, for the breadth of the Act. The debate centred on whether it was necessary to add certain categories of public officers or to restrict the Act to others. Some feared that an expanded list of public officials would discourage persons from accepting positions of authority in the public service, while others could not see the logic in excluding certain categories, e.g. the judiciary. In the end, Parliament opted for a version that focuses solely on public officials. 4. Narrow scope. Among the three critical functions of the “ideal- type” IPO, investigate, prosecute, and educate, this anti-corruption commission created by this Act simply investigates and it only does so under certain circumstances; that a written complaint with supporting evidence has been filed or in cases where the Commission, upon the review of submissions made by public officials (e.g. financial declarations) suspects that there is reason for an investigation. There is no provision for the education function and, as stated in the Introduction to this thesis, the Act certainly does not endow the Commission with prosecutorial powers. The following excerpts from the Act elaborate further on the process for dealing with complaints that have been received by the Commission.

33. (1) where upon examination of a complaint made under section 31, or otherwise, the Commission is of the view that

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investigation is necessary to ascertain whether any person in public life commits a breach of any provision of the Code of Conduct it shall inquire into the matter. 34. (1) On the conclusion of any inquiry under section 33, the Commission shall submit a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the President. (2) Where the Director of Public Prosecutions is satisfied, on the examination of the report referred to in subsection (1) and other relevant evidence, that any person in public life ought to be prosecuted for an offence under section 30, he shall institute and undertake criminal proceedings against the person in public life. (3) Where the Commission has forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions a report under subsection (1), the Director of Public Prosecutions shall inform the Commission and the President, in writing, about the action taken in pursuance of the report. (Integrity in Public Office Act 2003)

5. Ad-hoc. The Dominica IPO is a stand-alone organisation, precisely the type of organisation against which the literature speaks (Pope 1999; Stapenhurst & Kpundeh 1999). There is no other functioning Dominican institution whose raison d’être is the oversight of public integrity. Indeed, the Commission must lean on the arrest and prosecution powers of the Police and the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). Additionally, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Office of the Director of Audit have oversight over the financial management of public officers. From this limited perspective, it can be said that it has institutional support, that it is part of a triad. However, overseeing public integrity is not explicitly the function of any of these institutions. The IPO Commission therefore, finds itself a peculiar artefact in an institutional landscape alien to it. This last observation raises several questions.

The overriding question for us to discuss in this chapter is therefore, why the Dominica IPO diverges from the ideal type in so many ways. Why was

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the choice the centralised-limited – ad-hoc type as opposed to the ideal type? These questions have dominated our analysis and will shape our discussion here.

5.3 Part I: Institutional Divergence In Chapter 4, we described at least four reasons for the emergence of the Act: a political covenant honoured, the need to build checks and balances for public officials, legitimacy building, and the desire to satisfy regional and international partners. Additionally, we suggested that our data do not allow us to conclusively state that the latter (responding to the wishes of development partners) was indeed motivations shared by a majority. Between political posturing, campaign promise kept, and the desire for checks and balances….what is the real reason that they passed the Act, implemented it, why did they choose this formula? This question becomes all the more pertinent given the realization that although both the incumbent and the Opposition expressed dissatisfaction with the IPO Act, both sides accepted it. There was only one abstention on the vote in the House. An Act at all cost, then? We focus in this section on the motivations of the dominant actors in order to begin to understand the choice and structure of the Dominican IPO.

5.3.1 A Multi-Purpose Tool The Dominican IPO has diverged from the ideal type because of two principal reasons. First, the Opposition UWP wanted an institution that it hoped would be an extension of its party political toolkit; i.e. it wanted an institution that would allow it to investigate and prosecute the DLP incumbent as the “corrupt” government that party members thought it to be. Secondly, the DLP incumbent passed the Act because it was forced to do so by its own campaign promises and by political pressure from the opposition (note the lower case “o” for opposition). It was supposed to be something for everyone, i.e. each of the main parties; a complement to political campaigning or an accessory to legitimacy-seeking behaviour. In

147 fact, we need not look further for support for this affirmation than in the statement of one interviewee on the emergence of the Act:

Well, I think at the time it was a topical issue. I would say that there were concerns within the Caribbean of certain sections of the law. Including the A.G [Attorney General] … had serious issue with a number of aspects of it. So, there were issues with it but it was a topical issue at the time and so people felt let’s go ahead with it. It was promised, there were accusations made against us in the govt. so let us go ahead with it. (PU 1)

Let us examine these two theories below.

In Chapter 4, we discussed the motivations of the architects of the Act. We described four reasons for the birth of the Act as advanced by the dominant actors. Although some of those actors were from the Opposition, most were not. The best indicators for the reasons that the Opposition pursued the Act are found not in their description of what they perceived to have driven the incumbent, but in evidence of their suspicion of the delay mechanism that the incumbent had built into the Act during its design. The assertion by actors POL 02, POL 01, and PU 02/PRI 02 that they insisted on the Act’s implementation because “you said we were corrupt, now prove it” (POL 02) is instructive because it reveals a central preoccupation of the Opposition in the development of the Act. In their view, the only way to erode the political advantage from the DLP government was through an argument that the government’s delay feature was intended to allow its members time to clean up their act before they passed the law. Hence, from the perspective of the Opposition, this delay was clear evidence that the DLP regime was corrupt and it had to be evicted from office. An IPO that would facilitate the prosecution (and the persecution) of political opponents in the DLP was consequently, the primary goal of the UWP.

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5.3.2 Clanification and the Bear Syndrome Yet, the UWP faced a major challenge. It did not possess the political capital that the incumbent DLP enjoyed and consequently, the party had to strategize otherwise. Besides, sensing that the UWP Opposition was investing heavily in order to challenge its political power, the DLP mobilized to nullify the impacts of the strategies embraced by the UWP. This need to mobilize and increase resources has led to homophilious behaviour among all actors and the rise in dominance of some ORG actors, as we indicated in Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.2. Even a cursory glance at the graphs displayed in Figures 6 and 7 indicate two major clusters. To the right of Figure 6, many nodes appear connected to PRI 2. Most are POLs, PRIs, or ORGs. To the left in that same graph, most nodes are connected to the remaining four egos. Most nodes in that cluster are PUs. The trend in clustering resurfaces in the post-transition phase, the sole apparently significant difference being a change in the sizes of egonets surrounding the egos PRI 2 on one hand and the remaining four egos on the other. Our data, consequently, present clear evidence of clustering along nodal categories and surrounding certain egos, namely PRI 2 and PU 1. Let us examine this observation in detail.

Our results for Question #6, as described above in Chapter 4, indicate that the investment in power resources is contingent upon an actor’s understanding of his power vis à vis that of others. The actor reasons that the use of moderate or heavy investment of his power resources is predicated by the knowledge that to do otherwise will result in defeat, in the loss of all or part of his resources, viz political authority, knowledge, or wealth. He will therefore, act once he feels his position threatened by an opponent. Non-action, consequently cannot be interpreted as capitulation; the actor simply displaces the direction of his power. We have at least two manifestations of this analysis. First, both POL 02 and PU 01/PRI 01 informed that the option of formally challenging the

149 government on the delay mechanism that was built into the Act, notwithstanding their conviction that this mechanism was a tactic to conceal errant behaviour by the government officials, was beyond the Opposition. In supporting their position, they argued that the government had a parliamentary majority that nearly guaranteed that any measure in the parliament that was brought forward by the Opposition would have been defeated. Second, by 2003 – 2004 the incumbent DLP had seemingly increased its political capital (an observation that is reflected in increase seats in parliament in the 2005 general elections). This rise in popular support had emboldened the incumbent. It seems reasonable to conclude therefore, that the incumbent did not feel sufficiently threatened by the investments of the Opposition to concede territory to them.

Indeed, the DLP was relatively rich in political capital. Economically, the island was in a precarious state but the DLP had repeatedly argued that the island’s economic woes were a direct result of bad economics and poor governance by the UWP. Besides, the UWP had once miscalculated the opinion of the electorate and had called a general election just 4 year into its reign. The UWP Opposition therefore found itself in a comparatively weaker power position, with regards to the DLP. It knew it could not challenge the DLP in the Parliament because the incumbent had a majority there and it knew that public opinion was still, in 2003 – 2005, in favour of the DLP. Having analysed its strength position, the UWP concluded therefore that it was structurally and politically weaker than the DLP. However, by 2004 general elections were approaching (elections were held in 2005). The party had to act quickly in order to be successful at the polls.

It therefore chose not to challenge the DLP in the House but instead, informally. The UWP’s strategy was to build an opposition force, a

150 network of actors, that was so strong and well-resourced that it could reasonably be expected to rival and overwhelm the DLP. The common denominator among all actors in that network was the shared conviction that the DLP administration had to fall. This explains in part why nearly all the resignations and defections from the DLP did not remain independent but instead joined the Opposition and it also explains the increased investment by PRIs and ORGs from 2003 to 2008, a period that coincided with the debate in the House and general elections (held in 2005). This record of shifting alliances is also captured in the construction of a coalition to force the implementation of the IPO. A well- resourced coalition meant broadening the network of actors who could provide resources. Hence, no fewer than three groupings (and an undisclosed number of “individuals”) agreed to pool their resources together in an effort to:

Shape a common agenda in going forward, in the sense that if you did not like the direction in which the country was going and you saw the need for change, in the sense that regardless of what your political colour was, it was important that you put heads together. (PRI 2)

This grouping, we have coded ORG 06. ORG 06 deserves particular attention because in Chapter 4, we reported that in the pre-transition phase, the actor had an egonet of seven nodes and a degree centrality score of 13.000 (see Appendix 7.1). The size of that egonet and the degree score rose sharply in the post-transition phase (24 nodes and 39.000 respectively) as more actors coalesced to strengthen the grouping in the face of an increasingly, seemingly, intransigent DLP incumbent, which refused to implement the Act and which seemed, at least in the eyes of the opposition, to be “setting up themselves” at the expense of the public purse. This coalition of opposing forces, ORG 06, is therefore a monument to the classic opposition tactic to group up when faced with menacing or overwhelming force.

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The principle of homophily was therefore, thoroughly embraced by the UWP: United in opposition to the DLP; any actor who was sufficiently suspicious of the DLP was mobilised by the UWP. Indeed, homophily also featured prominently among actors aligned to the incumbent DLP. In Chapter 4 we noted that most dominant actors were of the PU category, most alters to PU actors were also of the PU category, most alters to POL were POL or PRI, and that political authority was concentrated in PU. Additionally, in spite of the potentially redundant information among PU actors (because of the recorded strong ties among most of them), these actors were less likely to seek ties with non-PU actors outside egonet. This type of natural grouping among actors of the same “type” strengthens the argument that the IPO was a creature that emerged along partisan lines, but it goes further. It is said that bears stand on their hind quarters when threatened in order to appear more ferocious than they really are. Clanification, a result of homophilious forces, has been a deliberate tactic of all actors involved in the creation of the IPO at appearing more ferocious; this is especially true of the UWP Opposition. Clanification surrounding the creation of the Dominican IPO is consequently, a consequence of the bear syndrome, the desperate attempt to appear powerful in the hope that the opponent will acquiesce. It is one strategy employed especially by the dominant Opposition actors as a response to the perceived threat posed by the DLP incumbent. It appears patently obvious therefore, that the use of power resources, what many may perceive to be “the use of power,” is contingent upon actors’ understanding of the potential cost to them in deploying or not deploying the resources; the potential for expanding one’s resources through coalition building; and an understanding of one’s structural position in a network of actors.

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The efforts of the dominant players aligned with the UWP at broadening their egonets are consistent with some of the findings of studies on network centrality and coalition-building. Christopoulos (2006) elaborates on the notion of network centrality and power in a study that uses SNA techniques to investigate how entrepreneurial an actor is in order to influence policy. The researcher focuses on examining the actor’s attributes and how they relate to the structure in his network. The study is guided by one hypothesis: “Public entrepreneurs attempt to control the policy cycle by incrementally adjusting their policy positions” and a ‘rival’ hypothesis, “public entrepreneurs attempt to effect policy change by opportunistically intervening in the policy cycle” (766). Christopoulos (2006) records strong evidence of opportunistic behaviour by entrepreneurs and concludes: “The potential for coalition building and/or commanding support was highest for the most powerful actors, who in this instance are the ones generating most publicity and actively seeking contacts with others” (770). A final conclusion is equally informative because it aptly describes the political alliance between the Opposition and ORG 01, ORG 04, ORG 05, and ORG 07: “It seems a legitimate assumption that actors with low political capital can only hope to attain prominence by engaging in high-risk opportunistic actions; while actors with high political capital can be more circumspect and invest their more extensive resources in low-risk incremental ventures” (773). In effect, this final conclusion confirms Freeman’s (1979) thesis on inbetweenness centrality and power, particularly with regards to access and alternatives. It also explains why the DLP-aligned dominant actors did not invest heavily in the pre-2003 period (the year the IPO was debated and passed into law): They did not feel that their power position, their political capital, reflected in a majority in Parliament, was threatened.

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5.3.3 Talk, and More Talk However, once on its hindquarters and appearing tall with its broadened network, due to defections and a coalition with certain forces opposed to the DLP government, the UWP bear embraced talk as the tactic par excellence to mobilize political capital. We learnt in Chapter 4 that the principal power resource of most of the actors who were not PU actors was knowledge because they were all of the same view that the only way to challenge the political authority of the incumbent and to force it to implement the Act was through the public meetings and media talk shows. In fact, PU 01/PRI 01and PRI 2 seemed to share the view that “nobody is going to listen to PRI 2” or any of those speaking in opposition. This choice of using the airwaves was therefore a calculated move.

The heavy investment in the use of knowledge power by the UWP was however, a victory for the DLP. The views of PU 01/PRI 01 and PRI 2 support this perspective. We recall in Chapter 2 we described the third face of power according to Lukes (1974), which essentially theorises that in the face of overwhelming power, an actor may simply acquiesce or engage in a non-action that is tantamount to acquiescing to an opponent. In the evolution of the Act, the UWP had no other choice but to use talk to counter the overwhelming power of the DLP. It was essentially locked out of the principal arena for shaping the Act in its favour, the Parliament, because of its loss of parliamentary seats. Having lost much political power therefore, it found itself with reduced economic power as well because it did not have access to public funds to finance its campaigns. Consequently, the UWP, cognizant of the political reality that it was not sufficiently powerful to challenge the overwhelming power of the incumbent DLP in the usual arena for debate, acquiesced in the Parliament and the courts and was forced to invest heavily in an alternative route to advance its IPO: public campaigns. It is logical

154 therefore to conclude that notwithstanding the UWP’s conviction that its public relations campaigns on the Act were successful (as expressed by PU 05/PRI 04, PU 02/PRI 02, POL 02, POL 01, and PRI 2), it was forced into this campaign by the realisation that the DLP occupied a much more formidable structural position than it. Luke’s theory of the third face of power is therefore reinforced by the UWP’s principal tactic of talk shows and public meetings in the emergence of the IPO.

5.3.4 Political Survival As for the DLP, it is split among those who truly wanted the IPO for primarily noble reasons such as, building integrity in public office (namely PU 2, PU 3, and PU 02/PRI 02) and those who viewed the Act as a necessary evil (PU 1 and PRI 1). Yet, it must be said that even PU 2, PU 3, and PU 02/PRI 02 were driven by one other principal internal force: a promise made to the electorate. The DLP therefore, has had little appetite for the Act. It only went ahead with it initially because it was keen on its political survival. Chapter 4 has taught us that the common denominator among the members of these two categories is the desire for self-survival. It is therefore the overwhelming and one sustaining reason that emerges for the Act, from the perspective of the DLP incumbent; not the noble goal of building public integrity. In fact, the DLP was not convinced that it needed the Act to regulate itself, and other public officials; actors PU 04, POL 03/PU 07 indicated as much. Besides, PU 1 suggested that challenges with financing the implementation of the Act (i.e. lack of political will) resulted logically in the delay to implementation. Furthermore, we also note that few PU actors spoke on the Act and that when they did, the thrust of their presentations was to defend the then draft. Finally, the fact that almost every actor interviewed indicated that the Act was a promise made to the people strengthens the argument that political legitimacy was the principal factor that drove the Act, from the incumbent’s perspective. In fact, Hansard records show that the then

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Leader of the Opposition, Edison C. James, while speaking in Parliament on the draft IPO bill stated:

Madam Speaker what we have here is a government that is now coming with what that can be described as a save face legislation, a campaign act because during the campaign they talked all this thing about corruption…after three years, Madam Speaker, they are lost so they come with this save face Bill, Madam Speaker.

The DLP feared the loss of political capital if it did not keep the promise of taking the moral high ground and implement an Act to legislate integrity in public office. Cognizant that its refusal to pursue the Act could have resulted in the loss of parliamentary seats, the party decided to adopt the Act. It was therefore the latent, as opposed to kinetic, active, threat of political conflict within and without its ranks that forced it to adhere to its promise and have the Act implemented. In other words, fully aware that its location in the network of actors in the creation of the IPO is due in large measure to the political support of many other actors, the DLP hastened to first pass the Act and then, hastened again to implement it when it felt (according to PU 1) that the public opinion was weighing heavily down upon it for the implementation of the Act. The fear of losing its political power if it had not passed the Act was so real that the DLP government was obliged to pass and then implement the Act.

5.3.5 Defensive Democratization This analysis above is important for our thesis because it confirms that an actor, notwithstanding his structurally powerful location in a constellation of actors, acts pre-emptively to institutionalize and strengthen that power because it perceives its location to be under threat. Self-preservation therefore, appears to be the principal dominant force in institutional design from this perspective. Robinson (1998) calls such decisions by political leaders to protect themselves, defensive democratization.

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Defensive democratization emerges within the rationalist tradition. It postulates that institutional choice and design are a calculated attempt by political leaders to capture, undermine, or infest the processes involved in creating an institution so that it serves them. The suggestion here is that dominant actors aligned with the DLP opted for a centralised institution because they had been seen to be responding to the growing public mobilization for the IPO’s implementation but they really were not convinced that the Act was needed. They therefore opted for the least costly alternative that would give them the maximum political traction that they wanted in the upcoming election campaign. (Recall that the Act was implemented in 2008. Elections were constitutionally due in 2010.)

States may create institutions to give the illusion of being democratic and responsive to the voices from the electorates. This is a survival tactic by the political elites: “uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis, the regime undertook sufficient reform to assure its political longevity, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan. I term this ‘defensive democratization’" (Robinson 1998:387). In an equally cynical tone, Roberts and Doss (1992) affirm: “Put simply, public organizations, cannot afford to have the legitimacy of their actions tainted by conflict-of-interest allegations involving members of their organizations” (261). Defensive democratization, a political tactic, is conceivably a survival tactic and insurance against risk.

Maor (2004) seems to offer some evidence to support Robinson‘s theory. In a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales.), he argues, “when investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate”(2). Maor (2004) is therefore interested in

157 understanding the implications for public officials when they are targets of the investigations of these bodies, and their behaviour to the same. After focusing on evidence of resistance to the institutions by various public officials (legislatures and senior public service officers), Maor (2004) concludes: “The test cases presented so far indicate that anticorruption instruments are put into place either in response to a public outcry or to media and political pressures” (22).

Schwartz and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2002) later elaborated a more cynical perspective of this theory; they speak of politics of accountability (Schwartz 2003). They explain that political elites symbolically create institutions with sufficient deficiencies so that they can control them in the future. Using a 2000 OECD review of measures of ethics in member countries, Schwartz (2003) studies the opportunities and risks for six prominent integrity and anti-corruption institutions. He was interested in measuring the advantages and disadvantages of specific mechanisms within the institution, namely the independence, resources, investigative powers, jurisdiction, and sanctioning powers. He concluded: “Political considerations have found their way into the design or the operation of even ostensibly highly independent IAIs [independent accountability

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institutions]” (15). Politics of accountability therefore aptly explains the location of the IPO under the centralised control of the Executive. This does not mean that the DLP regime deliberately intended to capture the IPO. It does indicate however, that the regime lacked the political will to create an institution that would truly function in the spirit of a public- integrity building institution because the dominant actors on the DLP’s side simply was not convinced that this Act was anything but a political necessity.

5.3.6 Fluctuating Investments The argument of political survival, and by inference, power preservation, is further reinforced in the manner in which the DLP invested its power resources. In detailing results to Question #5, in Chapter 4, we described fluctuating investment of power resources by the DLP. Pre- 2000, out of office, there was a high investment of power and a subsequent minimal investment once in office because the party’s political strength had increased; that is, structurally, the party’s political power had increased above that of UWP so there was no need for heavy investment. However, two events of political significance emerged that forced a change of investment level. First, the 2010 general elections were approaching. Having passed the Act since 2003 and having resisted calls from all quarters and survived suspicions of many regarding the delayed implementation, the DLP was concerned of a loss of political authority if it had not moved on the Act. Second, the UWP had increased its power resources through its coalitions with various PRI and ORG actors, against the incumbent. These two factors forced the DLP to re- evaluate its structural position among the other actors, study the threat to its position, and respond with the Act. This analysis does not minimize in any way the potential impact that the mass meetings and candle-lit events had on the DLP. However, we firmly believe that it was these two events that forced the DLP into implementing the Act. Those meetings

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had been ongoing, anyways. There never was a period of political disengagement in Dominica since the UWP lost office in early 2000. Hence, the DLP incumbent was used to surviving the public meetings and talk shows. The decision to pursue the development of the Act is therefore, a political survival tactic.

5.3.7 International Pressure In Chapter 4, alters PU 05/PRI 04 and PU 01/PRI 01 also describe another dimension of this strategy of political survival. They affirm that the decision to create an IPO Act was the result of international pressure. They argue that due to international demands, the DLP felt that it had to deliver an IPO Act in order to ensure that much needed international financial assistance would continue to flow into the Treasury. The evidence in support of this conviction is weak because no actor could refer to a specific document to substantiate the claim that international pressure forced the creation of the IPO, although all who posit to this argument seemed convinced of this. We found no evidence that an international organisation specifically requested an IPO. However, as we described earlier in Chapter 1, Dominica’s economic woes from 1999 to 2005 resulted in a close relationship between the island and the IMF. This relationship further created the opportunity for other organisations to impose their conditions for financing on the island. One central feature of those organisations is the creation of a strong central state that has the capacity to implement firm structural adjustment measures. It is therefore conceivable that international pressure influenced the development of a centralised model of the IPO. From either perspective therefore, it is not difficult to understand the actual design choice of the IPO. The Dominican government had to satisfy all three major blocks of actors that exerted pressure on it: the electorate that mobilized and demanded the Act, its regional partners, and its international financiers.

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In summary, it is clear that the Dominica Integrity in Public Act (2003) was seen as a necessity by both sides of the political divide. It was indeed, the double-edged sword that neither cared about because of its potential to thwart their power but in which both saw the political opportunity to increase its power and obstruct or reduce that of the other.

5.3.8 Unexpected Findings Four curious findings also support our argument that the Act was the result of a power struggle between blocs of dominant political actors, each attempting to score political points or to subjugate the other. First, we learnt in Chapter 4 that the Act pertains only to certain senior public officials. Chapter 1 informs that typically, an IPO is broad enough to cover a wide range of public officials. However, our documentary evidence shows that only certain senior PU actors are subject to the Act. Second, in Chapter 4, we summarised in Table 4 the concerns of Members of Parliament concerning the draft IPO Bill before them in the House. Hansard records show little appetite, political will, to broaden the scope of the Act although a few members of Parliament suggested this. Third, we found only five dominant actors. One would have thought that given the level of mobilisation surrounding the issue of corruption and public integrity, the dialogue on the creation of the IPO would have been subjected to more intense and more inclusive political activity involving a wider range of actors at different levels. This was not the case. In fact, we can recall the strong betweenness scores of PU 02/PRI 02, POL 01, and PU 04 in the pre-transition phases as we described in Chapter 4. In spite of their extremely strong location as go-betweens and potential brokers, neither emerged as one of the most dominant five actors (and neither was able to advance a less centralised IPO model). This finding confirms that ownership of the IPO Act was reserved to an oligarchy in which political power was concentrated.

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Fourth, in spite of our expansive document search in the media houses, we struggled to find rich data on the Act’s emergence for much of the period under review, 2000 – 2008. This is alarming because, again, in light of the purported political significance of the Act and the public sensitization and mobilization surrounding it, we expected that the IPO would have featured more prominently on the media agenda. We conclude that the IPO Act simply did not feature prominently on the public’s agenda. At face value, it may be tempting to simply conclude that our findings are consistent with observations made by Soroka (2002), that scandalous issues get media attention; after all, the actual charges of corruption got attention. We may also concur with the writer that issues that do not appear to be of interest by the public are unlikely to be included on the media agenda. Yet, such an analysis would be too simplistic. We believe that the scant media attention to the issue confirms our view that the IPO was merely the result of a battle between a few elites of two political parties and therefore, it was NOT a demand that emerged from the public. The IPO Act is therefore, a deliberate decision by some political actors for all political actors, not on behalf of the electorate.

5.3.9 Summary We began this section of Chapter 5 with the question: Why did the Dominica parliament adopt this centrally-located IPO. The IPO Act (2003) is a partisan document. The evidence of this resides in the clanification that accompanied its creation and, as we described above, the composition of the Commission appointed to implement it. This observation begs the question: Why would a legislature create such an institution while promoting it as the best public integrity promoting tool that the island possesses. The answer to this question is straightforward, we believe: Both sides in the House wanted an Act that served them. Therefore, the UWP supported it as long as it thought that the Act gave it

162 an opportunity to “capture” the DLP actors red-handed in corrupt acts, i.e. it wanted an Act that would have provided it the legal platform to reduce the power resource of the DLP. For the DLP, it was keen to implement the IPO as long as it meant that the party would maintain its political capital. Consequently, each side of the political spectrum wanted an Act that would bolster its power resources. The question remains though, why did they both opt for that particular model of IPO? Our discussion on the typology of Integrity in Public Office Acts in Chapter 1 describes four types of IPO institutions: centralised-public, centralised-with focus on public and private actors, decentralised-public, and decentralised-public/private. The Dominica parliament could have opted for either but it chose the most centralised model. We now need to explain the actual choice of the centralised-public IPO supported in the House.

5.4 PART II: Explaining the Choice of the Dominican Model Our previous discussion on the power relations surrounding the evolution of the IPO Act is analytically strong, we believe, because it highlights and analyses the power play that went on in the creation of the Act, situating power relations within the structural conditions that affect them. However, it is incomplete because although we have explained the decision to pursue an IPO, we still have not yet examined the actual choice of the centralised model that has now been the IPO Act (2003). The literature both on policy networks and institutional design is immensely informative here in developing an explanation for the actual choice of this centralised-limited – ad-hoc IPO Act. In Chapter 2, we described how heterogeneous but interdependent actors coalesce and compete in networks to advance self-maximizing agendas. We also postulate here to a process of interrelated actor behaviour that leads to the emergence of the Dominican model.

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5.4.1 Isomorphism It is our view that the choice of a centralised model was mostly due to one form of institutional isomorphism. This phenomenon “is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:149). We accept that the motivations of the dominant actors, the desire to prosecute and persecute and rationalist explanations such as defensive democratization support our theory of rational actor behaviour leading to the decision to have an IPO. Second, the fact there was no alternative advanced to the model of the IPO that was initially tabled in Parliament is a curious feature, if one views the absence of an alternative from the perspective of traditional pluralistic thinking; i.e. many different views shall contend. This absence suggests that actors were wholly satisfied with the only model that was advanced for debate in the House. Besides, the absence of an alternative from the Opposition in particular, is not surprising because, after all, what they really wanted was a tool, a whip, to muzzle the power of the incumbent actors. As long as they had that whip, they would have been satisfied. Both these explanations point to rational actor behaviour to subvert the power of another or to maintain one’s power resources. Similarly, we believe that there is evidence that the current model of Dominica’s IPO, the actual choice of the vehicle to facilitate the interests of the various actors, is also a rational phenomenon.

Writers on institutional mimicry (Bélanger & Mercier 2006; Hall & Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000; Powell & DiMaggio 1991) posit that institutional choice and design are an outcome of actors mimicking adjoining institutions to create new institutions as a response to a particular problem because imitation is a less costly venture than building from a “Stage 0.” This imitation occurs through different means: mimetic, normative, and coercive (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). The former suggests

164 that institutions model their structure based on what exists previously in similar contexts because there is some degree of uncertainty about the intended context of the new institution. Normative isomorphism explains that homogenization occurs among professional institutions of the same profession because the professionals belonging to a particular field have built a certain identity for that profession and consequently, mobilise to maintain this identity.

5.4.2 Coercive isomorphism For DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism:

Results from both formal and in-formal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function. Such pressures may be felt as force, as persuasion or as invitations to join in collusion. (150)

Later, the writers describe coercive isomorphism as a “direct and explicit imposition of organizational models on dependent organizations” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Both these definitions seem to suggest that coercive isomorphism is a less than rational process, organic to the institutional environment. Coercive isomorphism is however, a rational process. It pertains to a conscious decision to model an institution. That there are structural forces that “pressure” and impose constraints pertaining to the evolution of that institution, is without doubt. However, it is not possible to divorce agential action (non-action) from the actual morphology of the selected institution because it is he who customizes the institution based on his understanding of those structural forces and constraints. In the public service, some of these constraints are institutionalised in Weberian-style rules that reflect an obsession with homogeneity as a strategy for public service efficiency. Coercive institutional modelling emerges consequently, as a deliberate response to the concern of decision-makers for the permanence of the Weberian standard legal environment for the administration of public goods and

165 services. Legitimacy, therefore, is at the core of coercive modelling of institutions; an observation that appears to have been shared by Pierson (2000). Hence, the centralised-limited – ad-hoc model for the Dominican IPO is the result of a deliberate decision to go along with the regional political agenda of harmonisation in the interest of building legitimacy among regional partners as a partner in regional development.

We recall that in Chapter 4 actors PU 08, PU 02/PRI 02, and PU 05/PRI 04 informed that the Dominican IPO was built upon various existing models from the region and internationally. Indeed, circa 2003, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, a regional sub-grouping of seven eastern Caribbean islands, was busy attempting to develop a harmonised IPO Act. The Dominican model is consequently, partly flavoured by infusions of that effort by the OECS Secretariat. We were also informed by PU 01/PRI 01, PU 08, PU 05/PRI 04, and PRI 1 that Bretton Woods organisations and their counterparts all exerted immense pressure on the Dominican government, especially between 1999 to 2004, in order to force the government to implement far-reaching institutional “good governance “ adjustments. Some of those adjustments included membership in the Financial Action Task Force and the adoption of accountability and transparency structures that were more in line with the goals of those organisations. We have therefore documented evidence that the IPO Act (2003) also emerged in a climate of regional harmonisation and international bullying; although dominant actors PRI 1 and PU 1 insist that, the decision for the structure of the Act was not a result of external pressure. The centralised-limited – ad-hoc model of the IPO that was adopted is consequently, the result of a natural inclination of the local authorities to adhere, appropriately so, to the regional harmonisation agenda as well as to suggestions of their Bretton Woods partners.

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In summary, our discussion on the actual choice of the type of IPO reinforces our thesis that rationalism is at the core of the creation of the IPO. The assumptions inherent in arguments in favour of isomorphism typically are not built on a theory of rational behaviour. However, in deciding to go along with the rest of its regional (and global) partners on the model of an IPO, the Dominican parliament actually took a calculated decision that its structural location among a body of independent states acting in concert with each other made it imperative that it embraces the centralised model proposed by that constellation of states. To do otherwise, would have been to risk conflict, as in a divergence of views, and possible political ostracization. Its decision is consequently, manifestly rational; fully cognizant of its obligations as a member in a family of many. Our data therefore confirm that the actual architecture of the Dominica Integrity in Public Office Act is the quintessential manifestation of coercive isomorphism. This observation therefore introduces our discussion on the state of the two hypotheses that have framed our study. Below, we discuss our findings in light of each.

5.5 Part III: Validating Hypotheses We recall that the overarching thesis of this study is that rational dominant actors have acted to create an IPO that serves their partisan interests. This implies that both the decision to create such a structure as well as the subsequent design of that structure were the result of calculated power play among dominant actors who coalesce or compete in policy networks. We further explained that those dominant actors deployed their power resources, in varying degrees, only after fully understanding the power position in a network of actors. It is conceivable even that an actor, unaware of the sum of relations to which he is connected in a network and the resulting implications for his power resources, may even have acted (or not) as a result of this unknown broader network. Structural forces and agential forces have always been

167 at interplay, we believe, in the creation of the Dominican IPO. This is the broad framework of our study into the Dominican IPO.

Our literature study resulting from this framework allowed us one principal hypothesis; which we have discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This, we thought allowed for sufficient operationalising of the principal concepts emanating from the literature study in such a manner that we could employ analytically sound approaches to analyse our thesis. That principal hypothesis reads: the choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO. To add analytical depth, rigour, to our hypotheses, we then designed an alternate hypothesis: The characteristics of alternative options and models of public integrity institutions are those of the non-dominant actors. Here, in this section of Chapter 5, we discuss our hypotheses vis à vis our findings.

Hypothesis #1: the choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO. In Chapter 3, we explained that our analysis of the literature on the creation of anti-corruption agencies strongly favoured the confirmation of this hypothesis. In Chapter 4, however, we found partial confirmation of this hypothesis. In that chapter, we described four different motivations for the Act, each is listed below in order of significance, i.e. based on the number of participants who indicated they were key considerations among the dominant actors: 1. A campaign promise by the then Opposition party, the DLP. 2. Another deterring layer of checks and balances. 3. The need to secure political legitimacy. 4. Regionalisation.

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In Chapter 5, we further observed that once it occupied the seat of government, the DLP was especially interested in motivations #1, #2, and #3 above; while the Opposition was truly interested in #2 and #3.

The question is whether the dominant actors, although not all of the same political party, have succeeded in creating that IPO that meets their preference. We believe no. The DLP seems to have succeeded in restoring its legitimacy by fulfilling a campaign promise. Additionally, it is possible that the IPO could be serving as a deterrent to errant behaviour among selected public officials because the mere knowledge that one has to account for his finances could theoretically be sufficient to keep persons in line. However, the Act’s powers to prosecute are very limited – it must first recommend such action to the Director of Public Prosecution; its resources subject to the consideration of the Executive, and its membership is partisan. It is difficult to see how a highly centralised and partisan organisation with limited scope and powers like the IPO Commission could therefore successfully prosecute the senior DLP officials whom the UWP pursued so fervently in supporting the creation of this Act. In theory, much is possible; however, in practice, it is doubtful. Indeed, since the Act’s creation, dominant actors within the UWP have submitted three complaints against top officials of the DLP, including its political leader, Hon. Dr. Skerrit. None has resulted in any measure of prosecutorial action against the DLP officials. Furthermore, since the genesis of the Act, two of the UWP’s successive nominations to the Commission have been very public supporters of the party! This is clear evidence in support of our observation that the UWP wanted an IPO that would allow it to monitor and pursue the senior DLP officials whom it has ceaselessly claimed to be corrupt. However, it also confirms that a direct consequence of this partisanship is that the IPO Commission is not likely to be seen by a trial court judge as a fair and impartial body. Consequently, we believe that our principal hypothesis is only partly

169 confirmed. This is not the case with our alternate hypothesis, which is not confirmed.

Hypothesis #2: The characteristics of alternative options and models of public integrity institutions are those of the non-dominant actors. We have already established in Chapter 4 that there were no alternative models. This unusual finding can be explained by our discussion in the preceding paragraph. The main motivation for dominant actors from the UWP side was an institution that would subjugate the ability of actors on the DLP side to use their office to increase their personal economic power. Once they saw that the Act allowed for the prosecution and possible incarceration of the guilty, they accepted this. They then moved to infiltrate the IPO Commission with their personnel who would do their bidding. There was consequently, little motivation among non-dominant actors on the UWP side to offer an alternative. Equally, we can examine the role of non-dominant actors in the DLP side. To offer an alternative would have meant disagreement tantamount to political treason. Besides, the few actors within the DLP camp who voiced their reticence to the Act (as we described in Chapter 4) were outnumbered in the DLP caucus. Without the political power to override or to promote their alternative, if they had one, those with reservations to the Act simply acquiesced and agreed to bind together in a coalition.

Indeed, this show of solidarity (or subjugation) reaffirms what we described earlier: That in the face of opposition that menaces their structural superiority, the individual actors gel together in order to reinforce the political superiority of their clan. It goes further though. If actors suppress their displeasure with a policy in order for the esprit de corps and semblance of group unity to prevail, what does this say for the actor’s motivation? It is individual and rational! Even when the actor seems to surrender to a more powerful actor, his surrender is a strategy

170 that seeks to allow his continued strength because to fight the other individual members of his clan could result in loss of political power in Parliament and subsequently, his own power. The absence of an alternative model to the Act is therefore not surprising. It is very rational and was meant to consolidate the power positions of individual actors. We have therefore had mixed results to our hypothesis. In the final Chapter to this thesis, we examine the broader implications of these results, and of the broader study.

5.6 Summary to Chapter 5 In summarizing this chapter, we return inevitably to the problem that triggered our inquiry: The observation that institutional building in a context of nascent democratic institutions can be problematic because the absence of certain built-in controls that already (supposedly) exist in more advanced democracies mean that actors are less restrained structurally in their mobilizations to maximize their personal or partisan interests. Indeed, through this thesis, we have shown that the underlying reason for the creation of the Dominican IPO was partisan; political legitimacy, political survival, or institutionalised persecution. The Act therefore emerged from a rational decision among actors who were principally concerned about their power positions. Similarly, the choice of architecture of the Act is the result of rational political behaviour. The power play that ensued in the months preceding the development and subsequent to the implementation of the Act had minimal effect on the actual structure of the Act, as we have noted in Chapter 4 (Hansard reports) and discussed here, in Chapter 5. The Dominican IPO is a centralised stand-alone institution with a very limited mandate; contrary to what the literature describes as the ideal type. However, this choice did not originate from a strategic decision to subvert the Act, but out of a regional movement towards harmonised integrity legislation. The IPO is consequently, a creation of both structural and agential forces.

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Conceptually and theoretically, our discussion here in Chapter 5, is most instructive. We elaborate further in our Conclusion.

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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, we summarize and conclude this study. That the Dominican IPO is the result of partisan rational behaviour that has been influenced by structural considerations, is the dominant observation made in Chapter 5. What does this mean for the building of institutions responsible for the oversight of integrity, especially in contexts that do not have the democratic reserve that has been associated with certain Western democracies? Conceptually, what does this mean for the concepts of “power”? What about such trendy concepts of transparency and public integrity; how do Chapter 5 and our conclusions here, relate to those concepts? We offer answers to these questions in this closing chapter of our thesis.

There are six sections to the Conclusions. First, we review the purpose of the study and the questions that shaped it. Second, we remind ourselves of the central thesis of this research. This is critical because it will allow us to juxtapose our discussions above vis à vis our theory on the development of the Dominican IPO. Third, we restate the major findings of the study. This section will be followed by the fourth section, a discussion on the implications of those findings and our interpretation of those findings (as reflected in Chapter 5). In the fifth section, we describe the challenges to this study that may have impacted upon the reliability of our findings and the integrity of our conclusions. The sixth and penultimate section of this chapter is a description of further areas for research. We end with some pertinent concluding statements.

6.1 Review According to the Bretton Woods-prescribed good governance agenda, development cannot be divorced from a democratised context. This means that in order for countries to realise economic growth, prosperity, and at a minimum, globally-acceptable standards of social growth and

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stability, the key structures of those countries must be supported by an institutional context that is both the result of democratic processes and that support the sustainability of democratic processes. From this perspective, the “good governance” recipe prescribed by the World Bank and its Bretton Woods partners for developing states like Dominica is institutional, i.e. structural. It does not seem to consider the agential factors that could influence the emergence of such structures. Consequently, once Dominica decided to embark on the creation of one such democratic structure, the development of an Act to institutionalize public integrity, this initiative found itself mired in a web of power play among senior rational actors, the actual targets of the Act. It is this observation that triggered our research into the choice and design of that Dominican institution, known simply as the Integrity in Public Office Act (2003).

The purpose of that study was accordingly, to understand and explain how structural and agential factors have resulted in the creation of this Act. Our principal guiding question was why did the state develop and implement the current design of the IPO (2003). We theorized that “rational” actors first strategized that an IPO Act was necessary. They then decided to use their power resources to choose and model an IPO Act so that it serves them and their allies. We further theorized however, that this strategic decision by actors was taken as a result of structural considerations, i.e. the decision or non-decisions of actors were premised upon structural factors, either upon the actors’ cognisance of their structural position in a network of actors or by other structural factors of which they may not be aware. Our central theory is therefore, built on not simply structural explanations but also agential factors. This theory, of course, diverges from the core assumptions in the Bretton Woods good governance recipe, which have a largely institutional bias.

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This theoretical frame logically led to a study of the relevant literature. In turn, the latter allowed us to add conceptual rigour and to facilitate analytical direction to our thesis through the design of six specific research questions, which we have discussed above, and one principal hypothesis: 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters? 2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors? 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution? 4. What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? 5. What power resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power? In fact, we designed one principal hypothesis and one alternate hypothesis that we described in Chapter 3: 1. Hypothesis #1: The choice of a specialised anti-corruption agency and the subsequent design of that agency reflect the preferences of the dominant actors who were involved in the creation of that agency, the Dominican IPO. 2. Hypothesis #2: The characteristics of alternative options and models of the Dominican IPO are those of the non-dominant actors. In order to pursue answers to our research questions and to validate our hypotheses, we designed a methodological framework that mostly embraces qualitative and social network analysis techniques.

The cumulative effect of our study design is six major results. These we have described in Chapter 4 and discussed in Chapter 5. However, we can briefly summarize them for ease of reference. 1. Who are the dominant actors and their alters?... There were five dominant actors.

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2. What were the motivations and goals of the dominant actors?... The stated motivations varied from maintaining a covenant with the electorate, seeking another deterring level of checks and balances, the need to secure political legitimacy, and regionalisation 3. Who determined the original goals of the institution? … The incumbent party. 4. What options of institutions were considered to address the initial problem? … None. 5. What power resources did the actors use to shape the IPO? … Force, knowledge, and wealth. 6. What are the conditions under which the actors use their power?... The deployment of power was rational; that is, it was generally influenced by the challenges and opportunities created by a particular action or non-action by another actor. In addition to these general findings, we also identified two unexpected findings, namely: the very limited scope of the Act (only very senior public officials) and the scant attention that the idea of a Dominican IPO received by the local press for much of the decade during which dominant actors and their alters spoke about the need for legislation on public integrity. Having discussed these findings in Chapter 5, below, we extend our analysis of the same by discussing some key implications of our results.

6.2 Implications We can discuss three major implications of our study.

6.2.1 Power as a Language Our study can potentially advance the discourse of Power in politics, not merely as a force but as a force used to communicate. (We have capitalised the word “power” in order to reinforce the status of the concept as a specific and unique sub-theme of Political Science.) We believe that even when an actor does not actively deploy his resources,

176 but instead chooses to merely keep them on “display,” either through a record of his finances, a well-crafted speech, or through the number of seats in Parliament, he is directly or inadvertently “communicating” his strength to other actors. In the case of the Dominican IPO, for example, we cannot say that at any moment the DLP made a deliberate overt effort to remind the UWP opposition of its majority in the House. However, the UWP was always informed of this majority and its political vulnerability as a result of that majority to the extent that some of the dominant actors on the IPO who are associated with the UWP have revealed that their only course of action was public sensitization through the media because they lacked the political capital to challenge the DLP incumbent. Power is therefore interactive even when there is no actual physical or verbal contact. A man who opts to climb Mont D'Iberville does so only because he has already acknowledged the challenges inherent in his decision.

Power is also reflective because it always forces the beholder to evaluate his structural location and resources before making active use of his power. The climber will, after assessing the power of the mountain, assess his power potential and then proceed accordingly. It is the same with the Dominican IPO. The incumbent Dominica Labour Party agreed to the Act because it was convinced that not doing so would jeopardize its political resources.

Power is therefore a force that is used not simply to push or drive someone to do something, but it is a force that has a certain language of its own. It is a force that communicates an advantage and an opportunity for an actor. This almost telepathetical ability of power is what makes institutional design for public integrity so complicated. Unfortunately, common approaches to such institutions do not appear to

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even consider the power dimension of integrity building let alone consider a higher level debate on power as energy used to communicate.

6.2.2 Dobel Triangle, Policy Networks, and Public Integrity In fact, the literature on creating institutions for public integrity is inundated with approaches that postulate to a largely institutional approach to both analysing public integrity-related issues and formulating related policies at the detriment of another salient variable, i.e. actor behaviour. Our study has elucidated the deficiency with a purely institutional approach to studying institutions of public integrity and it has reinforced the central thesis in the Dobel Triangle of Judgment (Dobel 1999), as discussed earlier. That triangle crystallises the deficiencies in an institutional approach to building institutions with oversight for public integrity. Dobel (1999), we recall, theorises that the public official is constantly seeking a balance among three critical pressure zones; obligations of office, personal commitment and capacity, and prudence. A balance among these three should lead to an acceptable level of public integrity displayed by that official.

However, our research has shown that this balance is nearly always elusive. The decision to have an IPO and the subsequent design of that IPO show scant consideration for obligations of office or prudence but a significant dose of partisanship, i.e. “personal” considerations. One piece of research that strongly supports this conclusion is that completed by Rosenson (2003). The writer’s conclusion is unambiguous: When legislators are asked to regulate themselves, it is not necessarily the noble and patriotic goals of state-building and democracy that prevail but partisan and political considerations. In other words, networked actors may not necessarily hold fast to princely ideals but instead are driven to amalgamate or compete especially when their own interests are threatened. In the context of IPO legislation, whenever a public official is

178 obliged to reveal his assets, he naturally resists because this obligation requires him to surrender some of his power (valuable confidential information). In our view, anytime a policy obligates an actor to surrender control over his resources, this policy will likely be resisted by the individual. The converse is true, an individual who is desirous of subjugating another, reducing his power, will logically advance a policy that will succeed in doing so. Consequently, the Dominican IPO, as is any piece of integrity legislation, is always going to be a point of conflict fought, in reality, not along ideational lines but for power. The institutionalisation of public integrity is therefore, most appropriately analysed through the lens of power among competing actors; moving away from a wholly institutional perspective.

6.2.3 Reconceptualisation of Public Integrity and Political Transparency Our thesis therefore, underscores the need to re-conceptualise public integrity issues as broader than reactive responses to scandals but as power issues (interplay between officials who have been empowered by the “people” and the “people” who think they still retain power to subjugate officials to their will). This perspective will ensure that the impact of actor behaviour in institution-building for the oversight of public integrity will feature more prominently in discourses that seek to advance a public integrity agenda. Reconceptualising public integrity as a sub-theme of Power, itself, a theme in Political Science therefore permits us to begin to more accurately examine and measure the broader complement of variables involved surrounding the choice and design of such an institution. This refocus allows us to broaden our analysis to recognize that each actor will logically work to resist or advance reforms for integrity depending on the degree to which these reforms fit with his internal resource base or that of his associates. Specifically, this new conceptualisation allows us to predict that all actors involved in the IPO

179 will invest in deploying their power resources to resist an IPO that requires them to surrender their power.

The same argument applies to that of “transparency” in public administration, a cousin of public integrity. Transparency has been discussed in Political Science and public administration as a value, a component of democratic regimes that involves the openness of actors, one to the other (Etzioni 2010; Fox 2007; Hood 2001). If we were to relate the concept to Dobel’s Triangle, transparency presupposes that the actor has found the balance suggested in the Triangle and is now ready to be open with others. Transparency, however, is not merely about openness because it also presupposes that the actor, the public official for example, has understood that that balance will likely deplete his power resources in favour of another. For example, the Dominican politician who adheres to the requirement of the IPO to declare his assets and all gifts received does so fully cognizant of the fact that the IPO Commission (those actors nominated along partisan lines) is using its political power to force him to make public his financial power and potentially expose that power to a legal process that could result in a significant reduction of his power. Like public integrity, the related concept of transparency is consequently best understood as a sub-theme of Power. This study does not focus on transparency but on the effort to establish an institution that demands that actors allow themselves to be subjugated to the political power enshrined in that institution. Part of the effort of submitting to the IPO Act is willingness, arguably coerced, to be transparent in one’s affairs. Consequently, a parallel can be drawn between the treatment of public integrity and transparency in the literature. Public management and Political Science have more to gain in analysing either from the angle of power relations.

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Apart from its logical rigour, a perspective that conceptualizes public integrity (and its cousin) as a sub-theme of Power is more conceptually rich and methodically sound because it broadens the discourse on public integrity into methodological approaches that we would not be able to use if we study public integrity from a purely institutional perspective, e.g. SNA. In turn, this broadened conceptual and methodological view of public integrity will lead to more accurate conclusions on actor behaviour and public integrity, as we believe we have done here. As long as public integrity remains merely an independent ethical matter that is strongly suggested or rigorously pursued as an issue to be studied and resolved through institutions, it will not be institutionalised.

6.2.4 Conflict Zone Our study has therefore shown that Dominica’s Integrity in Public Office Act, and the IPO Commission that is meant to implement it, is conceivably a zone of intense political conflict. First, as we have argued above, the Act challenges actors to make the deliberate decision to surrender their control over their resources, namely material resources. Such an imposition is likely to meet resistance among targeted actors. Second, we already know that the opposition United Workers party (UWP) wanted an IPO that would facilitate its partisan agenda, i.e. to prosecute and persecute PM Skerrit and his colleagues. It is therefore fair to conclude that if the IPO fails to facilitate this request, its legitimacy will be severely challenged by the UWP. Third, one consequence of defensive democratization, as we identified for the DLP, is that the political will to implement the full spirit of the policy takes second place to other partisan goals. Our thesis therefore suggests that the implementation of the IPO could suffer from a deficit in political energy among the main actors responsible for its implementation. This deficit could be reflected in a lackadaisical attitude to financing and supporting the work of the IPO’s Commission. Indeed, according to Pierson (2000) “If

181 institutional arrangements are adopted because they are perceived to be appropriate, not because they serve a means-end instrumentality, then such arrangements may actually be dysfunctional for the particular local context” (478). Will the IPO be consequently, an instrument for political accountability, transparency, and good governance as it was promised pre-2000? This thesis suggests that the IPO is not a vehicle for democracy, but an instrument of political conflict.

We can advance this last conclusion a bit further. As an instrument of conflict, it is unlikely that the IPO will advance the noble democratic principle of a people “in control” of its political leaders. Instead, this thesis has shown that the Act is a partisan document, built to advance the interests of networked actors, not of the masses. The IPO Act is therefore likely to broaden existing chasms between the electorate and the principal political leaders; and so, for at least three reasons. First, it is so for all of the reasons that we have described in Chapter 5, viz its centralised nature, its composition, its scope, and its location. Second, we have seen that the Opposition will resort to maximal use of eclectic force (including the formation of coalitions) to advance its interests especially when it feels the urgency to do so, such as in situations when it feels its position of power is threatened. The current allocation of seats in the parliament (15-6 in favour of the incumbent DLP) means that the Opposition will continue to invest heavily in order to successfully use the IPO to advance its interests. Third, in Chapter 4, we indicated that private material resources have played an important role in the genesis of the Act. Among those private actors were media houses and personnel, a category of actors who typically play a critical role in agenda setting and in the proliferation of ideas. The active presence of private resources, especially that of the media, in the period of mobilization for the development of the Act could mean an unfair advantage to private interests in what is supposed to be a public institution that is managed

182 for common, public, goals. The potential for further distancing the Act from certain demographics is consequently real. The cumulative effect of this scant interest and the preceding premises is that we can logically deduce that there is not likely to be an up swell of interest in the IPO’s work unless there is another scandal, as Soroka (2002) has described or, as in the case of 2005 and 2008, an approaching general election, when both political jockeying in order to influence each other’s agenda and political mobilization would be most intense.

6.2.5 Summary In summary, our thesis has significant theoretical, conceptual, and empirical implications both for Political Science and the Dominican socio-political context. Principally, it forces us to interpret public integrity from a new angle. One consequence of this new perspective is that public integrity as a concept is also to be re-conceptualised in light of its deep and clear relation to power. This connection, in turn, confirms that policies to oversee public integrity will logically be zones of conflict, especially as is manifested in our findings on the Dominican IPO.

6.3 Challenges We believe that our conclusions in this study have been valid and are reliable. However, this study is not without its limitations. There are at least three of them. This dissertation could potentially suffer from bias on at least two fronts. First, in attempting to delineate the size of the egonets and the ties among the actors we wanted to use questionnaires. These, as we described in Chapter 3, would have allowed us a more reliable list of actors and their alters. However, the responses were too few and consequently, we had to use an alternative, albeit a less reliable, means of determining the network to be studied: the responses of the interviewees. This alternative could result in the inadvertent exclusion of relevant data (other actors and ties among alters) from the study and, regrettably, potentially unreliable data.

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Second, the researcher is a public officer in the Commonwealth of Dominica. At the moment that he began the study, he was a middle–level officer. By the time it is being completed, he is a senior public officer who is subjected to the oversight of the IPO. His view of the behavior of actors on the IPO, especially that of the political actors, may not, therefore, be wholly objective.

A third limitation pertains to the first. Limited responses made it impossible to calculate inbetween scores because the research was not informed adequately on the ties among sub-network actors, alters. These scores would have validated data pertaining to the structural power of egos.

The potential for bias and unreliable data in this study is therefore, real. However, our use of triangulation techniques and a rigorous review of the finding by the research team have ensured that the integrity of the study is maintained and the validity of its conclusions confirmed. In addition, the high correlation between degree centrality with other centrality measures such as inbetween and closeness means that the former is a valid measure of centrality for the purposes of our study. Consequently, we are satisfied in the conclusions emanating from the study.

6.4 Areas for Further Study At least four areas offer themselves as prime areas for further study, all of them surrounding the core theme of this thesis: power. Here, we describe these areas for further study.

6.4.1 Measuring Power We defined power as a force, and later, we associated the term “energy” to that definition. This force, we explained, is manifested in at least three different ways: force (formal political authority), knowledge, and wealth.

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Additionally, research question #6 reads “What are the conditions under which the actors use their power?” We described our results to that question in Chapter 4. However, it is clear that it is insufficient to simply know those conditions, we needed to know the power used and for further clarity, the amount of force used. In fact, if power is a force, it should be able to apply scientific means to measure the use of that force. However, our thesis has shown that the task of measuring the precise quantum of force dispensed by an actor to achieve certain goals under certain conditions remains unchartered territory. We have tried a measurement based on “maximal” or “minimal force” (as described in Chapter 3). However, that measure is crude and subjective. Additionally, our review of the literature did not offer us a reliable alternative. There is therefore the need to study for a search for a functional and reliable equation for measuring power.

The relevance of measuring power used must not be underestimated because as we have seen, an actor’s decision to deploy his power resources is directly related to his perception of his strength vis à vis that of other actors in a network. In other words, actors make very rational decisions about their use of power. Actors on the IPO’s creation did not use all their resources on a whim. We have discussed evidence of a calculated expenditure of resources. The question that remains for us pertains therefore to the precise quantum of that expenditure in a given context. Consequently, it is our view that knowledge of that quantum of power deployed will add analytical precision to discourses on power relations.

6.4.2 Democracy and Public Integrity: The Conundrum Our discussion on public integrity has inevitably taken us into the sphere of transparency because in many ways, public integrity requires an actor to be open about the material resources that he may have

185 received. Consequently, it seemed natural that our re-conceptualisations of public integrity and transparency sub-themes of Power would be a precursor to a discussion on transparency, power, and democracy. We have avoided this discussion in order to remain relevant and coherent. However, if public integrity and transparency are democratic principles, must they be imposed on others? Further research into these two from a power perspective would do at least two things: First, it would enhance the discourse on the paradoxes of democracy and second, it should confirm that indeed, these two concepts have less to do with democracy than they do with Power.

6.4.3 The Centralised Model Vs the Ideal Type Finally, certain actors informed that the architecture of the Dominican IPO is strongly influenced by a movement towards the regional harmonisation of public policies. The Act is consequently a regional model that was advanced through the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (a sub-regional political and economic grouping). In fact, one actor opined that the regional model was also, in turn, influenced by modifications that Dominica had made to the same model that was being promoted among the islands. We therefore logically ask: Why did Caribbean governments opt for a centralised-limited-stand- alone model of Integrity in Public Office Act? The literature on institutional design for overseeing public integrity has shown that such a model runs contrary to the ideal type model. In addition, the OECS governments would have been informed by empirical cases in other jurisdictions because that effort to have a harmonised approach to institutions of public integrity in the Eastern Caribbean sub-region was facilitated by the Organisation of American States (OAS). (The OAS is a grouping of most of the states that comprise the American continent, from Canada to Argentina.) The decision therefore, to promote a centralised model of an IPO Act requires further study in order to

186 understand the other forces at play in institutionalising public integrity in the broader Caribbean region. Indeed, such a study would be an expanded version of this current thesis, with the same overarching question: “why did the Eastern Caribbean governments opt for a centralised integrity in public office act?”

6.5 Concluding Comments In the end, this thesis is about power and how, as a force, it is concentrated and diffused, strategically or inadvertently, in favour of an actor or group of actors, who invariably operate in a constellation of actors. In the case of this thesis that used the Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) of the Commonwealth of Dominica as its test case, the favour advanced is that of partisan interests. It is not so much about agential attributes of power as it is on the conditions that influence the deployment of those power resources. Power, we have seen, is fluid. A chest full of political capital is only effective if the actor possessing that capital is convinced that his capital truly has a greater advantage over the combined power resources of other actors in a given network of actors. If he perceives, even for one moment, that notwithstanding his political authority, the political behaviour of other actors threatens to nullify his authority, he will act to protect that power. This dissertation therefore, confirms that power is a reflection not solely of individual attributes but also the spatial arrangements that frame relationships. We have consequently, contributed to the structure – agency debate and voiced our support for Gidden’s structuration thesis (Giddens 1979).

Pause. To be Continued…

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Example of Matrix used for Analysing Documents

Codes Employed in Matrices Themes 1. The actors involved = #1 2. Their actions and inactions…..who did/said what? = #2 3. Their motivations….what was the intentions/why did the actor do so = #3 4. Their power relations = #4 1.1 sources of power 1.2 rankings of their sources of power 1.3 measure of the power that they used in their relations Categorires of Documents 1. Media documents = M 2. Government files = G 3. Hansard = H 4. Private sources = P 5. Transcript = T 6. Internet = I 7. Other = O

Item Cod Excerpts Relevanc Section e e Code 1997 G “Heads of Government reaffirmed Backgrou Commonwea their commitment to the nd lth Heads of fundamental values of the Government Commonwealth, as set out in the Meeting: The Harare Commonwealth Declaration Edinburgh of 1991 and emphasised that Communiqu democracy, good governance, é sustainable development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were interdependent and mutually reinforcing.” “I must, therefore, commend the Actors G4 Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Dominica and the Dominican Bar Association on the assiduity with IPO which they undertook their duty in Chairman G advising the President on the speech appointment of the Integrity Commission.” “Also, in this forum, at this time, I Actors G5 wish to commend the interest groups, including the owners/managers of the mass

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media, for encouraging and advancing public dialogue in the press, on the television and on the radio.” “The issue of Good Governance Actors and G9 and the elimination of corruption Power … It was, for example, on the relations agenda of the Commonwealth of Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1997 which set up a group of experts to examine the matter…Combating corruption has been the subject of Convections by the United Nations, the European Union, OAS, and the focus of Transparency – International. Donor governments and International lending agencies now routinely impose conditionalities that require clean and ethical government. The U.K, U.S.A, Japan, Germany, Canada, among others and the Commonwealth Caribbean states of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Lucia, Antigua have all enacted Integrity in Public Life legislation.” Senator Hon H “Advisers (to the PM) paid by the Broaden H3, p. Norris public purse and advisers who are the scope 254; H1, Prevost not paid by the public purse…” of the Act p. 258 speech “I mean, u have magistrates, you to include have judges…these people are not private gods…so, I am recommending that advisers to these offices must be included as PM well” “The section dealing with Increase H1, p. accusations made of corruption to political 260 the Commission has to be power of criminalised…” Commissi oner “We are saying that the members Increase H4, p. of the commission should be political 261 appointed by the president in his power of Julien own deliberate judgement…” president Prevost H … and speech reduce political power of PM and Oppositio n Leader. “Their security of tenure, the Reduce H2, p. security of their emoluments…and pol power 261

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the manner in which they are of Cabinet appointed and in all of those respects…” “If I received a gift the PM has to Reduce H1, p. know about it?” pol power 262 of PM “Who will guard the guards?” Reduce H3, p. the 263 political power of Commissi oners “What about the chairmen of local Broaden H2, p. Government…shouldn’t they be the scope 263 part of that list?” of the Act to include local governme nt leaders Soufriere MP’ H “I believe the politicians of this Aim/motiv H5, Baron country need regulating…” ation p.265 “Chairman of the commission Reduce H3, p. should be appointed directly by the the 274 president…” political power of PM “Where there is reasonable excuse H2, 275 that there should be reasonable grounds when the person fails to Reduce file in his or her declaration…there the power Roseau should be a safeguard because I of the Valley MP, H do not believe that failing to file political Norris and refusing to file is the same commissio Charles thing.” n “That part of the Bill [declaring all H3, p. gifts] is a little bit harsh.” 275 “I do not think that the form Reduce H1, p. should come through the PM or the power 278 the Permanent Secretary.” of the political commissio n Minister for H “On any objective analysis and Approves H3, p. Tourism, examination of the composition mode of 285 Charles and its manner of appointment, selecting Savarin one can find no fault…” commissio ners “It appears to me that the Reduce H4, p. President should act in his own the 288 deliberate judgment.” political Senator H power of Doreen Paul PM “We should include here that a Broaden H1, person who has been a political scope of p.289

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activist should be disqualified.” disqualifie H10, p. (Proposal rejected by government d potential 341 side.) nominees “You leave the business of the Reduce H3, p. country to answer an inquiry for a political 290 tie?” power of commissio n “I would want to support my Broaden H3, p. colleague Sen. Prevost, who said scope to 290 that this would really include all include Advisers and Special Assistants to special Ministers…” advisers to PM “You report of the gift received to Reduce H3, p. the Chairman of the IPO through pol power 291 the PM…I think that is of PM objectionable.” Minister of H “It is a trend…I do not believe that The IPO is H11, p. Communicat we should wait in Dominica until a regional 293 ion and you catch somebody red-handed…” trend Works, Reginald Austrie “A ‘saveface’ bill.” descriptio H4, p. n 298 “Include the comptroller of Broaden H5, p. customs and the comptroller of scope of 298 inland revenue.” IPO “Who is in a position to give Limit H3, p. Leader of patronage.” scope of 301 Opposition, IPO H Eddison “I would suggest here that this be Broaden H1, p. James increased to about…” power of 304 IPO “On the appointment of the Reduce H4, p. Chairman, I propose that this be pol power 338 by the President in his own of PM in deliberate judgment.” compositio n of IPO Describes H1, p. Minister of limited 303 Foreign scope “We have scorched the snake not Affairs, H Describes killed it.” Osborne lack of Riviere educative role Minister for H “LPOs to go and collect material Backgrou H1, p. Health and signed by individuals.” nd 318 Social H2, p. Security, “14.5 million invested from Social 317 Sabaroche security funds «bypassing Minister of Social Security and bypassing the Social Security Board.”

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PM Pierre H “The Opposition has been calling Motivation H3, p. Charles on the coalition government to 323 bring forward the integrity H5, p. legislation.” 323 “The Opposition called for the commission of inquiry (into DLP allegations of corruption against UWP) now we are saying we are putting it in to satisfy them.”

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Appendix 2: List of all Actors

1. PRI 1 2. PU 1 3. PRI 2 4. PU 2 5. PU 3 6. PU 04 7. PU 01/PRI 01 8. POL 01 9. PU 02/PRI 02 10. PU 03/PRI 03 11. PU 05/PRI 04 12. PU 06 13. POL 02 14. POL 03/PU 07 15. PRI 05 16. PRI 021 17. POL 04 18. POL 05 19. PRI 010 20. PRI 06 21. PRI 07 22. PRI 08 23. PRI 09 24. PRI 20 25. PU 09 26. PU 010 27. PU 011 28. PU 012 29. PU 014 30. PU 015/PRI 012 31. PU 019 32. PRI 013/POL 06 33. POL 07 34. POL 08 35. POL 09 36. PRI 014 37. PRI 015 38. PRI 016 39. PRI 017 40. PU 016 41. PU 017 42. PU 018 43. PU 020

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44. PU 021 45. PU 022 46. PU 024 47. PU 025 48. PU 026 49. PU 027 50. PU 028 51. PU 029 52. PU 030 53. ORG 01 54. ORG 02 55. ORG 03 56. ORG 04 57. ORG 05 58. ORG 06 59. ORG 07

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Appendix 3: Matrices Showing UCINET Ties Among Actors

Appendix 3.1: Pre-Transition Ties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 PR PU PR PU PU PU PO PU PU PU PU PO PO PO PO PO PR PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PR PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PO PR PU PR PR PR PR PR OR PR PR OR PR PR OR OR PO PU PR OR OR OR PU I 1 I 2 3 0 L 0 0 0 0 L L L L L I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L I 0 I I I I I G I I G I I G G L 0 I G G G 0 1 2 1/ 0 2/ 3/ 4 5/ 02 05 04 07 08 01 16 17 9 10 12 21 14 09 19 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 18 09 01 15 06 01 05 08 07 01 02 02 05 01 01 04 03 03 11 01 07 02 06 6 PR 1 PR PR PR 5 4 /P 3/ 1 0 6 7 /P 0 I I I I RI PO U 01 02 03 04 0 L 07 12 06 ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 7 POL 01 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 PU 03/PRI 03 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 10 PU 04 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 11 PU 05/PRI 04 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 POL 02 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 POL 05 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 POL 04 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 POL 07 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 16 POL 08 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 PRI 015 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 PU 016 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 PU 017 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 21 PU 010 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 23 PU 021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

207

24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 25 PRI 09 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 PU 019 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 27 PU 020 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PU 022 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 PU 024 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 PU 025 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 PU 026 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 32 PU 027 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 33 PU 028 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34 PU 029 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 PU 030 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 36 PU 018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 POL 09 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 38 PRI 014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 PU 015/PRI 012 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 40 PRI 06 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 PRI 013/POL 06 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 PRI 05 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 43 PRI 08 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 PRI 07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 ORG 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 46 PRI 021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 PRI 020 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 ORG 05 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 49 PRI 016 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 PRI 017 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 ORG 04 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 52 ORG 03 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 53 POL 03/PU 07 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 54 PU 011 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 ORG 06 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 59 PU 06 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0

208

Appendix 3.2: Post-Transition Ties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 PR PU PR PU PU PU PO PU PU PU PU PO PO PO PO PO PR PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PR PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PU PO PR PU PR PR PR PR PR OR PR PR OR PR PR OR OR PO PU PR OR OR OR PU I 1 I 2 3 0 L 0 0 0 0 L L L L L I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L I 0 I I I I I G I I G I I G G L 0 I G G G 0 1 2 1/ 0 2/ 3/ 4 5/ 02 05 04 07 08 01 16 17 9 10 12 21 14 09 19 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 18 09 01 15 06 01 05 08 07 01 02 02 05 01 01 04 03 03 11 01 07 02 06 6 PR 1 PR PR PR 5 4 /P 3/ 1 0 6 7 /P 0 I I I I RI PO U 01 02 03 04 0 L 07 12 06 ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 7 POL 01 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 PU 03/PRI 03 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 PU 04 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 11 PU 05/PRI 04 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 POL 02 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 POL 05 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 14 POL 04 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 POL 07 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 16 POL 08 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 PRI 015 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 18 PU 016 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 PU 017 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 21 PU 010 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 23 PU 021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 25 PRI 09 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 PU 019 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

209

27 PU 020 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PU 022 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 PU 024 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 PU 025 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 PU 026 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 32 PU 027 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 33 PU 028 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 34 PU 029 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 PU 030 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 36 PU 018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 POL 09 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 38 PRI 014 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 39 PU 015/PRI 012 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 40 PRI 06 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 41 PRI 013/POL 06 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 42 PRI 05 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 43 PRI 08 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 PRI 07 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 45 ORG 01 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 46 PRI 021 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 47 PRI 020 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 48 ORG 05 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 49 PRI 016 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 50 PRI 017 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 51 ORG 04 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 52 ORG 03 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 53 POL 03/PU 07 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 54 PU 011 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 58 ORG 06 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 59 PU 06 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0

210

Appendix 4: Questionnaire and Interview Schedule Intended for used in the Data Collection

Appendix 4.1: Questionnaire on the Creation of the Dominica Integrity in Public Office Act (2003) Thank you for agreeing to help me complete this questionnaire. Your responses will help me improve my understanding of the Integrity in Public Office Act (IPO), in particular the actors and their motivations surrounding its creation. Throughout the questionnaire, the masculine pronoun is usually used in order to facilitate reading.

General

1. Code …………………………………………………………………….. 2. What is your main occupation? ………………………………………………………………………. 2.1 Please list your other occupations if they exist in their order of importance to you, that is, please list the second most important one first, etc: ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………… 3. Are you a member of an organization? …………………………………………. 3.1 If so, what is your formal position within that organization? ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………… 4. What role did you play in the creation and/or the promotion of the IPO? .………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………….

The IPO: The Most Dominant Actors

5. Name three actors whom you considered the three most dominant actors on the creation of the IPO in 2003 and its subsequent implementation in 2008. “Dominant” means they were most actively involved in taking decisions on the kind of IPO to be created OR most actively involved in taking decisions on the strategies to be used to make the IPO a reality. “Dominant” could also mean the actor/s who championed the idea of an IPO, who

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paid monies, gave instructions, or decided who and what was broadcasted, etc. An “actor” is any individual or organization. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………….

6. Name three actors whom you considered the three most dominant actors on the design of the IPO. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………….

7. Among the actors whom you listed in #5 and #6, name three whose ideas, in your view, are most present in the IPO? We shall also refer to them as the “most dominant”. If there is only one, please name him. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………. 8. In your opinion, which actor was most successful at getting his ideas into the IPO? Please list no more than three. ………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………

Actions

9. What techniques or approaches did the actors in #5 and #6 use to advance their position on the formation of the IPO? ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………….

10. Who were the main persons or organizations targeted by the actors in #5 and #6? ..…………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………. 9.1 What did those targets do or say in reaction to the most dominant actors?

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……………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………… ………….

Motivations of the Most Dominant 11. Why did the most dominant actors want an IPO? …………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………….

12. Who set the original goals of the IPO? ………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………. 12.1 What were the original goals? ………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………… 12.2 What caused a change in these goals, if there was a change? …………………. ………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………. 12.3 Who proposed that change? ………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………

Ego and Respondent Checkboxes below pertain to questions 13 and 14. 13. Using the table below (#14), please rate your relationship with each of the persons by inserting “1” where you consider that relationship to be “close” and “0” if it is not close, even though there were frequent contacts between you and that person regarding the IPO.

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14. Check off the names of all the persons below with whom you have had a conversation about the IPO before its creation in 2003. Insert “1” where there was a conversation and “0” if there was none.

Individual Closeness IPO conversation PM Roosie Douglas PM Pierre Charles PM Roosevelt Skerrit Anthony Astaphan, S.C Lennox Linton Hon, Eddison James Hon. Ron Green Bernard Wiltshire Henry Dyer Athie Martin Hon. Charles Savarin Former Cabinet Secretary Gregoire

QUESTIONS ABOUT EGO 15. In question #5 above, you described the top three dominant actors. Here, kindly list all other actors whom you consider to have been dominant in creating the IPO. These persons/organisations may have all played different roles and although they are not the top most dominant actors, they were active in shaping the 2003 IPO Act and/or its eventual implementation. …………………………………………………….. ……………..………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………. ……………………………..…………………………………. …………………………………………………….. …………………………..……………………………………. ………………………………………………..… …………………..………….…………………………………. ……………………………………………...... ……………..……….……………………………………. …………………………………………………….. ……………………..……….…………………………………. ………………………………………………..……. …………………………...…………………………………….

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………………………………………………….. …………………………….……………………………………….

16. Please list any other persons whom you know were involved in creating the IPO. Leave out any names that you mentioned above in questions #5 and #6. This list should include any individual who was actively involved in public discussions about the IPO. If an organization as involved, please list its name and the person who represented it then. Some of these discussions may have been private. If these private discussions pertained to the creation, the promotion, or the actual design of the IPO, please name the persons involved in those discussions. You may add a separate document if there is not enough space below. …………………………………………………….. ……………..………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………. ……………………………..…………………………………. …………………………………………………….. …………………………..……………………………………. ………………………………………………..… …………………..………….………………………………….

17. Next to each of the names you listed above (at question 15), kindly write “1” if you consider yourself to be close to the individual/organization. Write “0” if you do not consider your relationship to be close. 18. We now have five lists of names. A list that I provided (question #14) and four that you provided (questions #5, 16, #15, and #16). Below, write the names of all the actors from these lists who are close, in your view. Indicate first, the person/organization and the other persons/organizations with whom he is close.

Individual Close PM Roosie Douglas PM Pierre Charles PM Roosevelt Skerrit Anthony Astaphan, S.C Lennox Linton Hon. Eddison James Hon. Ron Green Bernard Wiltshire Henry Dyer Athie Martin Hon. Charles Savarin

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Former Cabinet Secretary Gregoire

19. If I want to get to the following persons below in the left column, could you indicate at least two contacts who could lead me to them, please? In addition, please indicate two contacts who can lead me to any 5 persons/organizations from your list at question 15. In cases where the actors are deceased, kindly list those living contacts that could have led me to the deceased. If you are unable to suggest contacts, please tick “unable”. Individual Contact #1 Contact Unable #2 PM Roosie Douglas PM Pierre Charles PM Roosevelt Skerrit Anthony Astaphan, S.C Lennox Linton Hon. Eddison James Hon. Ron Green Bernard Wiltshire Henry Dyer Athie Martin Hon. Charles Savarin Former Cabinet Secretary Gregoire

Interactions on the Creation of the IPO 20. Please list all the dominant actors with whom you discussed the IPO before it became law in 2003. ……………………………………………………………………………………… .. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………..……………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………...

21. In questions #13 and #14, you indicated how close you are to dominant actors on the IPO. Here, please describe the nature of the relationship between yourself and those dominant actors. First,

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list the person/organization and then, indicate if he was your supervisor, your club member, etc.? Individual/Organization Nature of the relationship

22. For each person/organization that you mentioned at #20, please describe why was it necessary for you to communicate about the IPO? Please state…. a. The actor’s name b. If he/she requested that you do/say something regarding the IPO? c. If so, what was the request/order? d. What were the responses? Actor 1: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 2: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 How were these requests made? Through media, email? ………………………. 12.4 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 3: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 4: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? ……..

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12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 5: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 6: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 7: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 8: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

Actor 9: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

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Actor 10: 12.1 Did he/she request that you do/say something regarding the IPO? …….. 12.2 What was the request/order? ………………………………………………………………… 12.3 What were your responses? …………………………………………………………………..…

23. If you can, please describe the interactions among actors mentioned at #5, #6, and #14 regarding the creation of the IPO. First, kindly name the persons involved in the communication and then indicate… a. indicate who said or requested something b. indicate what was said or requested c. indicate when the request was made/instruction given d. indicate the responses of the other actor/s Actors: …………………………………………………………………. Description: ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………

24. If you can, please describe the interactions among all actors regarding the creation of the IPO. First, kindly name the persons involved in the communication and then indicate… a. the requests made or instructions given b. What were the responses? Actors: …………………………………………………………………. Description: ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………. ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………….………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………

Actors and their Resources 25. Actors can use various resources to promote their interests. Some use material things (e.g. money or gifts), some use words (e.g. debates, articles in the media, etc), some use their legal power (e.g. the police force, laws). Still, some can use a combination of resources. Please complete the following table by indicating the type of resource that each actor mentioned in questions #5, 6, and

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14 used to promote his/its ideas on the IPO before it was finally passed in 2003. Indicate all that applies. The first row is completed as an example to give you an idea.

Actor Material Words Legal John Doe Money Wrote letters --

26. Were there any groups that were clearly for the IPO or clearly against the IPO? …………………………………………………… 27. Name 3 actors who made up each of these groups a. For the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ………..… ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………….. b. Against the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………….. 28. Within each of these two groups were there any disagreements that may have led to even smaller groups? ……………………………………………… 29. What were the main areas of disagreement within the groups that a. Supported the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ……… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………….. b. Opposed the IPO?: ……………………………………………………………………………… ……… ………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………..

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Further Information 30. What else can you tell me about the birth of the IPO? ………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………

Appendix 4.2: Interview Guide Thank you for agreeing to meet me for a conversation on the Integrity in Public Office Act, the IPO. Your responses will help me improve my understanding of the IPO, in particular the factors surrounding its creation. General

1. Name …………………………………………………………………….. 2. What is your main occupation? ………………………………………………………………………. a. Do you have any other occupations? If so, please tell me about them …… ……………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………… 3. What job position did you occupy between 2000 and 2003? ………………………………………………….. 4. Are you a member of an organization? …………………………………………. a. If so, what is your formal position within that organization? ……………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… b. Were you part of this organization from 2000 to 2003? …………………………….

Motivations and Goals

5. Whose idea was it to create an IPO? a. What made him want to have an IPO?

6. What were supposed to be the objectives of the IPO?

7. How were these objectives determined?

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8. In what way do the objectives of the current IPO differ from the original objectives? 6.1 What or who caused this change?

9. Why was the implementation of the IPO delayed by 5 years?

The IPO: The Most Dominant Actors

10. Who were the top three most dominant actors on the promotion of the IPO prior to its formation in 2003? “Dominant” means they were most actively involved in taking decisions on the kind of IPO to be created OR most actively involved in taking decisions on the strategies to be used to make the IPO a reality. “Dominant” could also mean the actor/s paid monies, gave instructions, or decided who and what was broadcasted, etc. An “actor” is any individual or organization. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………

a. How did that individual achieve this? ……………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………..

11. Who were the top three most dominant actors on the design of the IPO? ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… a. How did that individual achieve this? ……………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………

12. How did they arrive at this prominent position? What did they do/say to get there? ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………

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……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………… a. What resources did they use? ………………………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………..… 13. You have been mentioned as a “dominant actor”. In what way did you shape the IPO Act that was passed in 2003? Tell me about your pre-2003 IPO activities. ……………….. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………..… a. Why? .…………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………… b. Was there any particular plan or strategy? If so, what was it? .…………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………

c. What determined the choice of strategy/techniques that you used? .…………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………… d. How did you determine what strategy to use…what factors helped you decide? .………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………

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………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………… e. What did you want out of the IPO? …………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………….….

14. Whose idea/voice is most reflected in the final design of the IPO? ………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………… a. Why do you say so? …………………………………………………………………………………… ………

Questions About Alters 15. List three of your most active partners in pursuing the IPO ……………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………… a. Was their involvement public? …………………………………………….. b. In what way were they active?...... ………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………. 16. Please list all the persons whom you know were involved in creating the IPO, other than the three whom you suggested earlier as “dominant actors”. You may add a separate document if there is not enough space below. ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ……………………………………………… ……………………………………………… …………………………………………………

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Links Among Alters

17. Talk to me about your relationship with those actors mentioned here and any others not yet mentioned. a. Closeness b. Type of relationship c. Did you have a conversation about the IPO? d. What was discussed? e. Who made requests of whom? f. What were the requests? g. What were the instructions/orders given? h. What were the responses? i. How did you seek to influence each other?

18. Can you tell me about the relationships between those actors? a. Which were close? b. Which ones shared a relationship? c. What was the nature of the relationship? d. Are you aware of a conversation between any of them on the IPO? e. What was discussed? f. How did they seek to influence each other?

Actor Tie Request Response

Actor Alters Tie

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Sub-Groups

19. Were there any groups that were clearly for the IPO or clearly against the IPO? …………………………………………………… 20. Name 3 actors who made up each of these groups a. For the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ………..… ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………….. b. Against the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………….. 21. Within each of these two groups were there any disagreements that may have led to even smaller groups? ……………………………………………… 22. What were the main areas of disagreement within the groups that a. Supported the IPO: ……………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………….. b. Opposed the IPO?: …………………………………………………………….……………… ………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………..………… ……………………………………..

Further Information

23. What else can you tell me about the birth of the IPO?

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APPENDIX 5: Egonets in the Pre and Post-Transition Phases

Appendix 5.1: Adjacent Matrices Showing Egonet for Top Five Egos and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition This egonet has 48 nodes. It comprises 81.4% of all known nodes in the network. 1 2 2 4 5 5 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 1 1 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 2 4 1 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 9 0 4 9 7 2 7 5 0 2 3 5 1 2 8 8 9 7 P P P P P P P P P P P O O P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P O O O O P P P ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 PU 01/PRI 01 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 10 PU 04 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41 PRI 013/POL 06 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9 PU 03/PRI 03 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 11 PU 05/PRI 04 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21 PU 010 0 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 26 PU 019 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27 PU 020 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PU 022 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 PU 024 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

227

30 PU 025 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 PU 026 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 PU 027 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 PU 028 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 PU 029 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 PU 030 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 POL 09 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 PU 015/PRI 012 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 PRI 016 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 50 PRI 017 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 54 PU 011 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 PU 06 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 POL 01 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 12 POL 02 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 17 PRI 015 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 25 PRI 09 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 PRI 06 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 PRI 05 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 43 PRI 08 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 ORG 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 51 ORG 04 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 52 ORG 03 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 ORG 06 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 PU 016 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 19 PU 017 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 47 PRI 020 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Legend: Zero, “0” = no tie One,”1” = weak tie Two, “2” = Strong tie.

228

Appendix 5.2: Adjacent Matrices Showing Egonet for Top Five Egos and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 52 nodes. It comprises 88.1% of all known nodes in the network.

1 2 2 2 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 0 2 4 5 5 6 7 0 1 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 3 4 9 6 7 8 1 2 5 7 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 0 1 2 8 8 9 P P P P P P P P P P O O P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P O P O P P O O O P P ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 PU 04 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 PRI 09 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 20 PU 09 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 PU 010 0 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 PU 019 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 PU 020 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PU 022 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 PU 024 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 PU 025 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 PU 026 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 PU 027 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 PU 028 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

229

34 PU 029 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 PU 030 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 POL 03/PU 07 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 PU 011 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 PU 06 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 7 POL 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 8 PU 02/PRI 02 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 PU 05/PRI 04 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 POL 02 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 15 POL 07 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 17 PRI 015 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 37 POL 09 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 38 PRI 014 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 39 PU 015/PRI 012 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 40 PRI 06 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 41 PRI 013/POL 06 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 42 PRI 05 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 43 PRI 08 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 PRI 07 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 45 ORG 01 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 47 PRI 020 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 48 ORG 05 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 49 PRI 016 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 50 PRI 017 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 51 ORG 04 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 52 ORG 03 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 ORG 06 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 18 PU 016 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 19 PU 017 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

230

Appendix 5.3: Egonet for PRI1 and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition

This egonet has 13 nodes. It comprises 22.0% of all known nodes in the network.

1 2 2 4 5 5 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 2 4 1 5 6 7 P P P P P P P P P P P O O ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 10 PU 04 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 41 PRI 013/POL 06 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Appendix 5.4: Egonet for PRI1 and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 12 nodes. It comprises 20.3% of all known nodes in the network.

1 2 2 2 5 5 5 1 2 3 4 5 0 2 4 5 5 6 7 P P P P P P P P P P O O ------1 PRI 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 PU 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 PRI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 PU 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 5 PU 3 2 1 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 10 PU 04 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 22 PU 012 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 24 PU 014 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 25 PRI 09 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 56 ORG 07 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 ORG 02 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

231

Appendix 5.5: Egonet for PU1 and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition

This egonet has 30 nodes. It comprises 50.8% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 2 1 4 5 6 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 9 0 4 5 9 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ------2 PU 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 PU 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 5 PU 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 9 PU 03/PRI 03 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 10 PU 04 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 11 PU 05/PRI 04 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 22 PU 012 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 24 PU 014 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 27 PU 020 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PU 022 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 PU 024 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 PU 025 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 PU 026 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 32 PU 027 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 33 PU 028 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34 PU 029 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 PU 030 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 37 POL 09 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 39 PU 015/PRI 012 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 49 PRI 016 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 50 PRI 017 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 54 PU 011 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 59 PU 06 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

232

Appendix 5.6: Egonet for PU1 and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 24 nodes. It comprises 40.7% of all known nodes in the network.

1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 2 1 4 5 0 0 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 3 4 5 9 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ------2 PU 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 PU 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 PU 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 PU 04 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 PU 012 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 PU 014 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 PRI 09 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 27 PU 020 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 28 PU 022 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 29 PU 024 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 30 PU 025 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 31 PU 026 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 32 PU 027 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 33 PU 028 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 34 PU 029 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 35 PU 030 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 53 POL 03/PU 07 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 54 PU 011 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 59 PU 06 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0

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Appendix 5.7: Egonet for PRI2 and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition

This egonet has 15 nodes. It comprises 25.4% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 1 7 2 7 5 0 2 3 5 1 2 5 7 8 P P P P P P P P P O O O P O O ------3 PRI 2 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 7 POL 01 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 12 POL 02 2 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 17 PRI 015 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 25 PRI 09 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 PRI 06 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 PRI 05 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 43 PRI 08 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 45 ORG 01 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 51 ORG 04 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 52 ORG 03 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 57 ORG 02 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 ORG 06 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0

Appendix 5.8: Egonet for PRI2 and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 27 nodes. It comprises 45.8% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 1 6 7 8 1 2 5 7 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 0 1 2 5 7 8 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P O P O P P O O P O O ------3 PRI 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 7 POL 01 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 8 PU 02/PRI 02 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 11 PU 05/PRI 04 2 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 POL 02 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2

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15 POL 07 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 17 PRI 015 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 37 POL 09 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 38 PRI 014 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 39 PU 015/PRI 012 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 40 PRI 06 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 41 PRI 013/POL 06 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 42 PRI 05 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 43 PRI 08 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 PRI 07 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 45 ORG 01 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 47 PRI 020 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 48 ORG 05 2 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 49 PRI 016 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 50 PRI 017 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 51 ORG 04 2 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 52 ORG 03 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 55 PRI 010 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 57 ORG 02 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 58 ORG 06 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0

Appendix 5.9: Egonet for PU2 and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition

This egonet has 24 nodes. It comprises 40.7% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 1 2 5 6 8 9 0 1 7 8 9 0 1 2 4 6 0 7 9 7 9 0 5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ------4 PU 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 PU 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 PU 3 2 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 9 PU 03/PRI 03 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 10 PU 04 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 11 PU 05/PRI 04 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 PRI 015 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 PU 016 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 PU 017 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

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22 PU 012 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 24 PU 014 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 30 PU 025 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 POL 09 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 39 PU 015/PRI 012 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 47 PRI 020 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49 PRI 016 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50 PRI 017 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 55 PRI 010 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

Appendix 5.10: Egonet for PU2 and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 18 nodes. It comprises 30.5% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 4 1 2 5 0 7 8 9 0 1 2 4 6 0 7 9 0 5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ------4 PU 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 PU 1 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 PU 3 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 PU 04 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 17 PRI 015 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 PU 016 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 PU 017 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 22 PU 012 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 24 PU 014 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 30 PU 025 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 47 PRI 020 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 49 PRI 016 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 50 PRI 017 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 55 PRI 010 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Appendix 5.11: Egonet for PU3 and Ties among Alters in Pre- Transition

This egonet has 19 nodes. It comprises 32.2% of all known nodes in the network.

1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 1 2 4 6 8 0 1 0 1 2 4 5 6 9 7 9 0 4 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ------5 PU 3 0 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 PU 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 4 PU 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 6 PU 01/PRI 01 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 PU 02/PRI 02 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 10 PU 04 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 11 PU 05/PRI 04 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 22 PU 012 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 24 PU 014 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 25 PRI 09 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 39 PU 015/PRI 012 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 47 PRI 020 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 49 PRI 016 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50 PRI 017 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 54 PU 011 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

Appendix 5.12: Egonet for PU3 and Ties among Alters in Post- Transition

This egonet has 11 nodes. It comprises 18.6% of all known nodes in the network.

1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 2 4 0 0 1 2 4 6 4 P P P P P P P P P P P ------5 PU 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 PRI 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 PU 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 PU 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 0

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10 PU 04 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 PU 09 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 21 PU 010 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 22 PU 012 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 24 PU 014 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 26 PU 019 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 54 PU 011 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

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Appendix 6: Actors and Their Ranked Power Resources

Appendix 6.1: The Egos and Their Ranked Power Resources

Actors Primary power Secondary Tertiary PRI 1 Knowledge Wealth PU 1 Force Knowledge Wealth PRI 2 Knowledge PU 2 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 3 Force Knowledge Wealth

Appendix 6.2: The Alters and Their Ranked Power Resources in the Pre and Post-Transition Phases

Alter Primary Secondary Tertiary Power PU 01/PRI 014 Force Knowledge Knowledge POL 01 Force Knowledge PU 02/PRI 02 Force Knowledge PU 03/PRI 03 Force Knowledge Wealth Knowledge -- PU 04 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 05/PRI 04 Force Knowledge Wealth Knowledge Wealth -- POL 02 Force Knowledge POL 03/PU 07 Force Knowledge Force Knowledge Wealth PRI 05 Knowledge PRI 021 Knowledge POL 04 Force Knowledge POL 05 Force Knowledge PRI 010 Knowledge Wealth PRI 06 Knowledge PRI 07 Knowledge PRI 08 Wealth Knowledge PRI 09 Wealth Knowledge PRI 20 Knowledge PU 09 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 010 Force Knowledge Wealth

4 This second code applies to the post-transition phase.

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PU 011 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 012 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 014 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 015/PRI 012 Force Knowledge wealth Knowledge PU 019 Force Knowledge Wealth POL 06/PRI 013 Force Knowledge Wealth Knowledge Wealth POL 07 Force Knowledge POL 08 Knowledge POL 09 Knowledge PRI 014 Knowledge PRI 015 Knowledge PRI 016 Knowledge PRI 017 Knowledge PU 016 Knowledge PU 017 Knowledge PU 018 Knowledge PU 020 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 021 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 022 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 024 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 025 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 026 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 027 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 028 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 029 Force Knowledge Wealth PU 030 Force Knowledge Wealth ORG 01 Knowledge ORG 02 Knowledge ORG 03 Knowledge ORG 04 Knowledge ORG 05 Wealth Knowledge ORG 06 Wealth Knowledge ORG 07 Knowledge

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Appendix 7: Showing Degree Centrality Scores in Both Phases

Appendix 7.1: Degree Centrality Measures. Pre-Transition.

1 2 Degree nDegre e ------1 PRI 1 17.000 0.293 2 PU 1 32.000 0.552 3 PRI 2 21.000 0.362 4 PU 2 32.000 0.552 5 PU 3 27.000 0.466 6 PU 01/PRI 01 21.000 0.362 7 POL 01 25.000 0.431 8 PU 02/PRI 02 21.000 0.362 9 PU 03/PRI 03 21.000 0.362 10 PU 04 38.000 0.655 11 PU 05/PRI 04 14.000 0.241 12 POL 02 29.000 0.500 13 POL 05 10.000 0.172 14 POL 04 8.000 0.138 15 POL 07 20.000 0.345 16 POL 08 12.000 0.207 17 PRI 015 18.000 0.310 18 PU 016 10.000 0.172 19 PU 017 8.000 0.138 20 PU 09 27.000 0.466 21 PU 010 32.000 0.552 22 PU 012 33.000 0.569 23 PU 021 15.000 0.259 24 PU 014 30.000 0.517 25 PRI 09 11.000 0.190 26 PU 019 23.000 0.397 27 PU 020 17.000 0.293 28 PU 022 16.000 0.276 29 PU 024 15.000 0.259 30 PU 025 18.000 0.310 31 PU 026 17.000 0.293 32 PU 027 17.000 0.293 33 PU 028 17.000 0.293 34 PU 029 16.000 0.276 35 PU 030 18.000 0.310 36 PU 018 7.000 0.121 37 POL 09 21.000 0.362 38 PRI 014 13.000 0.224

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39 PU 015/PRI 012 20.000 0.345 40 PRI 06 13.000 0.224 41 PRI 013/POL 06 13.000 0.224 42 PRI 05 17.000 0.293 43 PRI 08 6.000 0.103 44 PRI 07 8.000 0.138 45 ORG 01 21.000 0.362 46 PRI 021 7.000 0.121 47 PRI 020 11.000 0.190 48 ORG 05 17.000 0.293 49 PRI 016 7.000 0.121 50 PRI 017 12.000 0.207 51 ORG 04 19.000 0.328 52 ORG 03 4.000 0.069 53 POL 03/PU 07 10.000 0.172 54 PU 011 11.000 0.190 55 PRI 010 19.000 0.328 56 ORG 07 8.000 0.138 57 ORG 02 7.000 0.121 58 ORG 06 13.000 0.224 59 PU 06 14.000 0.241

Appendix 7.2: Degree Centrality Measures. Post-Transition.

Degree Measures

1 2 Degree nDegre e ------1 PRI 1 17.000 0.293 2 PU 1 28.000 0.483 3 PRI 2 41.000 0.707 4 PU 2 23.000 0.397 5 PU 3 15.000 0.259 6 PU 01/PRI 01 30.000 0.517 7 POL 01 35.000 0.603 8 PU 02/PRI 02 18.000 0.310 9 PU 03/PRI 03 8.000 0.138 10 PU 04 26.000 0.448 11 PU 05/PRI 04 8.000 0.138 12 POL 02 35.000 0.603 13 POL 05 10.000 0.172 14 POL 04 8.000 0.138 15 POL 07 22.000 0.379

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16 POL 08 11.000 0.190 17 PRI 015 19.000 0.328 18 PU 016 8.000 0.138 19 PU 017 6.000 0.103 20 PU 09 21.000 0.362 21 PU 010 26.000 0.448 22 PU 012 30.000 0.517 23 PU 021 16.000 0.276 24 PU 014 26.000 0.448 25 PRI 09 7.000 0.121 26 PU 019 20.000 0.345 27 PU 020 18.000 0.310 28 PU 022 17.000 0.293 29 PU 024 16.000 0.276 30 PU 025 19.000 0.328 31 PU 026 18.000 0.310 32 PU 027 18.000 0.310 33 PU 028 18.000 0.310 34 PU 029 17.000 0.293 35 PU 030 19.000 0.328 36 PU 018 4.000 0.069 37 POL 09 20.000 0.345 38 PRI 014 18.000 0.310 39 PU 015/PRI 012 21.000 0.362 40 PRI 06 17.000 0.293 41 PRI 013/POL 06 20.000 0.345 42 PRI 05 19.000 0.328 43 PRI 08 10.000 0.172 44 PRI 07 17.000 0.293 45 ORG 01 37.000 0.638 46 PRI 021 27.000 0.466 47 PRI 020 11.000 0.190 48 ORG 05 38.000 0.655 49 PRI 016 22.000 0.379 50 PRI 017 15.000 0.259 51 ORG 04 28.000 0.483 52 ORG 03 3.000 0.052 53 POL 03/PU 07 20.000 0.345 54 PU 011 9.000 0.155 55 PRI 010 17.000 0.293 56 ORG 07 11.000 0.190 57 ORG 02 9.000 0.155 58 ORG 06 39.000 0.672 59 PU 06 14.000 0.241

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