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Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces Between US Drawdown And LOOSE ENDS: IRAQ’S SECURITY FORCES BETWEEN U.S. DRAWDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL Middle East Report N°99 – 26 October 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 A. THE U.S. TROOP DRAWDOWN ..................................................................................................... 1 B. REBUILDING FROM SCRATCH ....................................................................................................... 3 II. A DYSFUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................... 5 A. THE SECURITY FORCES ................................................................................................................ 5 B. THE INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS .................................................................................................. 8 C. THE CONTROVERSIAL COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE ................................................................. 12 III. UNCERTAIN LOYALTIES ........................................................................................... 17 A. A TROUBLED TRANSITION FROM OLD TO NEW .......................................................................... 17 1. The army .................................................................................................................................... 17 2. The police .................................................................................................................................. 20 B. CHALLENGES ON THE HORIZON ................................................................................................. 21 IV. INTEGRATING THE SONS OF IRAQ ....................................................................... 25 V. QUESTIONS ABOUT STRENGTH ............................................................................. 28 A. A GROWING PROFESSIONALISM ................................................................................................. 28 B. A LOGISTICS GAP ...................................................................................................................... 30 C. THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION .................................................................................................... 32 VI. SECURITY AND THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ............................... 35 VII. CONCLUSION: THE U.S. AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN 2011 AND AFTER .................................................................................................................. 36 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ................................................................................................................................... 39 B. GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................... 40 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 41 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2007 ... 42 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 44 Middle East Report N°99 26 October 2010 LOOSE ENDS: IRAQ’S SECURITY FORCES BETWEEN U.S. DRAWDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Much is at stake in the never-ending negotiations to form to be tolerable, has levelled off in the past two years. Iraqi Iraq’s government, but perhaps nothing more important security forces have taken the lead in several important than the future of its security forces. In the seven years operations. Recently, they have withstood three notewor- since the U.S.-led invasion, these have become more ef- thy tests: the departure of close to 100,000 U.S. troops fective and professional and appear capable of taming since January 2009; the March 2010 parliamentary elec- what remains of the insurgency. But what they seem to tions; and, over the past several months, political uncer- possess in capacity they lack in cohesion. A symptom of tainty prompted by institutional deadlock. If insurgents Iraq’s fractured polity and deep ethno-sectarian divides, remain as weak as they are and find no fresh opportunity the army and police remain overly fragmented, their loy- to exploit political fractures, security forces operating at alties uncertain, their capacity to withstand a prolonged less-than-optimal levels still should face no serious diffi- and more intensive power struggle at the top unclear. culty in confronting them. On the regional front, while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has taken worrying steps neighbours are actively involved in Iraqi politics, none to assert authority over the security apparatus, notably by has displayed aggressive behaviour that would suggest a creating new bodies accountable to none but himself. A serious military peril in the foreseeable future. vital task confronting the nation’s political leaders is to reach agreement on an accountable, non-political security Measured by their professionalism and logistical capabili- apparatus subject to effective oversight. A priority for the ties, and assessed against likely threats, the security forces new cabinet and parliament will be to implement the de- remain a work in progress, yet are faring relatively well. cision. And a core responsibility facing the international But strength is only one criterion used to measure their community is to use all its tools to encourage this to happen. sustainability and not necessarily the most pertinent. The security apparatus was built for the most part in response Iraq’s security forces are the outcome of a seven-year, to a contingency that is no more (a sprawling and deadly U.S.-led effort, which began after it comprehensively up- insurgency), in conformity to a governing paradigm that rooted and dismantled remnants of the previous regime. has become moot (drawing a relatively clear line between This start-from-scratch approach entailed heavy costs. It the political system on the one hand and those who con- left a dangerous security vacuum, produced a large con- test it on the other) and by a party that, militarily at least, stituency of demoralised, unemployed former soldiers, is on its way out (the U.S.). Today, the main threat to the and fuelled the insurgency. The corollary – a hurried at- political order does not emanate from an organised insur- tempt to rebuild forces through rapid recruitment, often gency that wishes to topple it and oust the occupiers. without sufficient regard to background or qualifications Rather, it emanates from within: the fractured nature of – brought its own share of problems. Iraq’s increasingly society and the political class which in turn promotes the fractured, ethno-sectarian post-2003 politics likewise col- security forces’ fragmentation and politicisation. oured recruitment and promotions. Facing a spiralling in- surgency, the U.S. felt it had no choice but to emphasise The structure of Iraq’s security forces reflects both the speed above much else; today, some one in seven Iraqi modalities of their creation and the character of the over- adult males is under arms. And so, even as they have gained all polity. Ex-regime elements, militia members, former strength in numbers and materiel, the army, police and insurgents and Kurdish forces were fitfully integrated into other security agencies remain burdened by this legacy of security institutions which became the prey of competing expediency. ethnic, sectarian and political forces. The result is a set of parallel, at times overlapping forces that often fail to co- Considering this backdrop, some indicators are surpris- ordinate tasks or share intelligence and that, in the main, ingly positive. Violence, albeit still far above what ought still lack both a unified vision and a unified sense of mis- Loose Ends: Iraq’s Security Forces between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal Crisis Group Middle East Report N°99, 26 October 2010 Page ii sion. A severe political breakdown – during the current will be all the more important as the U.S. military pres- process of government formation, for example, or over ence winds down. The two countries could yet agree to future elections – could reverberate throughout state insti- prolong that presence in some fashion – a decision the tutions, including the security forces. This is when the new government will have to weigh relatively soon but second criterion, cohesiveness, will matter most, the ques- that in no way would diminish the need to establish more tion being to whom individual units and their commanders cohesive, accountable and non-partisan Iraqi security in- will answer: to the state as a supposedly neutral arbiter of stitutions. disputes, or to individual political leaders who command authority over political factions, ethnic groups or confes- sional communities. RECOMMENDATIONS The U.S. has both promoted this pattern – by heavily fo- To the Caretaker Government of Iraq: cusing on churning out new security units without suffi- cient regard to their cohesion and contained it, by virtue of 1. Take steps to restore confidence in security forces its extensive presence throughout the security apparatus and and minimise risks that extrajudicial practices will political system. With the drawdown and impending full continue under the next government by in particular: withdrawal by the end of 2011, and the resulting
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