IRAQ ON THE EDGE EACE P

UND FOR UND F

THE REPORT #10 2009-2010

PAULINE H. BAKER

Copyright ©2010 The Fund for All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.

The Fund for Peace 1720 I Street, NW, 7th Floor Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-223-7940 Fax: 202-223-7947 www.fundforpeace.org

Table of Contents

PREFACE...... 2

SUMMARY ANALYSIS ...... 3

INDICATOR RATINGS ...... 8

FIG. 1: CONFLICT TREND, MARCH 2003 TO MARCH 2010 ...... 8

GRAPH 1: INDICATOR SCORES, MARCH 2003 TO DECEMBER 2008 ...... 9

GRAPH 1 (CONT.): INDICATOR SCORES, JANUARY 2009 TO MARCH 2010 ...... 10

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE...... 11

APPENDIX I: August 2009 ...... 13 APPENDIX II: September 2009...... 31 APPENDIX III: October 2009...... 50 APPENDIX IV: November 2009...... 66 APPENDIX V: December 2009...... 84 APPENDIX VI: January 2010...... 97 APPENDIX VII: February 2010...... 113 APPENDIX VIII: March 2010 ...... 130

MAPS ...... 149

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Preface

Although there have been many reports on Iraq, The Fund for Peace (FfP) is contributing to the debate by providing a systematic evaluation of Iraqi progress, or lack thereof, using specific metrics for measuring social, economic, and political stabilization since the invasion in April 2003. Applying CAST (the Conflict Analysis System Tool), the analytical framework developed by the FfP to assess societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse, this series of reports evaluates Iraq’s progress toward sustainable security – the state at which the country is largely peaceful and capable of governing itself without external military or administrative oversight.1

The methodology employed is detailed in the Methodological Note at the end of this report. Briefly, it is based on independent ratings of twelve top conflict indicators enumerated in the attached charts and assessment of five core political institutions (military, police, civil service, system of justice and leadership) and “stings” (unanticipated events and factors). The purpose of the ratings is to trace patterns and trends over time. Ratings are reviewed carefully, based on information gleaned from open-source English and language sources, government reports, diverse organizations and groups that have conducted site visits in Iraq, and various scholars and journalists.

While research assistants and staff at the FfP have contributed to the report, the conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the author. She has been ably assisted in these reports by outstanding students who have brought creative skills, thoughtful insights, and critical minds to a topic that is highly complex and controversial. She would like to take this opportunity to thank the 32 research assistants and staff who contributed to the drafting and publication of all the reports released in the FfP Iraq Report series since 2003: Muwafaq Al-Serhan, Afa Alizada, Jenesil Benito, Nick Carney, Suzie Clarke, Lauren Crain, Sumani Dash, Gamze Demirtola, Samantha DeFilippo, Jennifer Doumato, Kathleen Gillen, Ashley Heacock, Arpine Hovasapyan, Kavitha Joseph, Mohamed Jourieh, Alex Kapitanskaya, Gina King, Margarita Konaev, Andrew Levin, Matthew Manes, Amy Matt, Tim Newcomb, Lauren O’Brien, Jennifer Oie, Cynthia Parmley, Bradley W. Pope, Jessica Rice, Anianna Sarar, Will Seuffert, Günther Von Billerbeck, James Waterhouse and Liana Wyler. For this report, special thanks go to Afa Alizada, Ashley Heacock, Margarita Konaev, Jessica Rice and James Waterhouse for their excellent research assistance.

1 For another application of the CAST methodology, see the “Failed States Index” in Foreign Policy, July/August 2008. Additional details on the methodology, as well as prior reports on Iraq, can be obtained on The Fund for Peace Web site at www.fundforpeace.org.

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Summary Analysis

This is the tenth and final report in a series that monitored conflict risk in Iraq from the time of the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 until parliamentary elections were held in March 2010. Each report examined twelve social, economic and political/military indicators, tracking developments in incremental periods over a total of 84 months.2

The objective was to assess progress, or lack thereof, following the military overthrow of . At that time, Iraq was a strongman state with weak state institutions. Grave abuses, lingering group grievances, inequality, sectarian tensions, massive corruption, and economic problems from mismanagement, international sanctions and war costs made it a weak state. But Saddam, a classic strongman, retained formidable security resources and imposed tight authoritarian control.3 The U.S.-led invasion pushed the country over the brink, making it a failed state. Saddam fled, state institutions collapsed, a power vacuum emerged, the professional classes left, millions were displaced, and sectarian rivalries plunged the country into a well-organized insurgency and a vicious civil war.

That was not the way it was supposed to happen. Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the second was known, was depicted by the U.S. administration at the time as a war that would eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which were said to have presented an “imminent” and “grave” threat to American national security. Proponents argued that the occupying troops would be welcomed by the oppressed local population and that the war would be short and cheap, paid for out of Iraqi oil revenues. The result was to be a democracy that would become a beacon to the Middle East.

Saddam was driven from power and eventually executed. However, there were no weapons of mass destruction found in the country. Seven years later, U.S. costs had soared to an estimated $704 billion, none of which was paid for out of Iraqi oil revenues.4 Instead of a democracy, soared, a sectarian civil war broke out, oil production plummeted, and public services declined. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed.5

2 See www.fundforpeace.org/trackingIraq. The twelve indicators were drawn from the framework of the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) produced by the FfP. Details are contained in the methodological note in this report. 3 We make a distinction between a “strong state,” which has functioning governance institutions that fulfill their functions and serve the people, and a “strongman state,” which is led by authoritarian leaders who often abuse the law, commit human rights abuses, mismanage the economy, commit widespread corruption, and undermine state institutions. Strongman states may be benevolent dictatorships, but they are inherently unstable nonetheless; once the top leaders are removed from the scene, the institutions are usually too weak to sustain peaceful leadership succession, fulfill their functions, or manage crises. 4 This is the estimate as of February, 2010 by the Congressional Budget Office. No definitive study of war costs has been made, but all estimates agree that the costs have far exceeded projections. Nor do they include, as yet, the costs of bringing the troops back home (roughly $5-7 billion) or of the post-combat troop deployment estimated at $1-4 billion. Indeed, of all U.S. wars, only World War II cost more than the . 5 There is no authoritative assessment, as yet, on how many people died from the war. However, the general consensus tends to be from 50,000 to 100,000. The other human costs of the war, as of March 2010, were 4.397 U.S. troops killed, 31,778 U.S. troops wounded, 316 non-U.S. troop casualties, and 140 journalists killed.

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Historians will debate how and why the U.S. got it so wrong. What this study investigated is whether it could be put right. That is, putting aside the question of the justification of the war, we wanted to assess whether the shattered state could achieve sustainable security—the capacity to solve its internal problems peacefully without an outside administrative or military presence. In essence, this was a test case of state-building, albeit one for which the U.S. was totally unprepared.

The Seven-Year Trend Line

Over the course of seven years, Iraq went through five phases, roughly following the pattern of a jagged bell curve, as shown in Fig. 1:

Stage 1 - Foreign Entry: (March 2003-September 2003) Stage 2 - Loss of Control: (September 2003-March 2006) Stage 3 - Full-Scale Civil War: (March 2006-March 2008) Stage 4 - Turning Point: (March 2008-March 2009) Stage 5 - Stasis: (March 2009-March 2010)

At the outset, there was a window of opportunity when the situation improved. The security apparatus that kept Saddam in power dissolved, and massive human rights violations against groups, such as the Kurds, Shiites and minorities, were suspended. Law and order broke down, with widespread looting of shops, hospitals, water plants, museums, universities, ministries, and armories that stripped the country of its infrastructure and cultural icons. Nonetheless, once the military cracked down to end the looting, it seemed as if a new political order could have been created.

However, the interim government that was formed did not achieve legitimacy, especially among the Sunni population. Instead of restructuring and reintegrating the members of the and police into a new security force, American officials launched a de- Baathification campaign that purged party members from state institutions, including the armed forces, police, civil service, schools, universities, and hospitals. While the policy was relaxed somewhat later, the damage had been done. De-Baathification marginalized and impoverished Sunnis, who had been the ruling elite in Iraq ever since British rule began at the end of World War I. Even as U.S. forces began to wind down, the Iraqi government continued to discriminate against the Sunnis, including reneging on promises of employment for those who supported the American forces and turned against insurgents. Foreign occupation thus created a fundamental shift in the local balance of power, laying the foundation for a legacy of group grievance.

The ensuing instability is reflected in the sharply ascending conflict risk trend line in Fig.1, beginning in May 2003, when President George W. Bush declared “mission accomplished,” and extending to September 2006, when the media released a video showing the botched execution of Saddam Hussein by political opponents.

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A turning point occurred in March 2008. The insurgency began to be contained and sectarian violence diminished, due largely to the concurrence of three factors: 1) the surge of U.S. troops, 2) the “Sunni Awakening” in which the local Sunni population rejected the extremism of foreign militants and decided to cooperate with the Americans, and 3) the decision by Moqtada al Sadr, a militant Shiite leader, to order his militia to observe a cease fire while he ostensibly went for religious study in . By the fifth year of the war, Iraq began to show gradual signs of improvement in the security situation, although, as U.S. commanders pointed out, progress was still fragile and reversible.

However, a year later, roughly by March 2009, another new and largely unrecognized phase emerged when expected improvements stalled and most indicators remained fixed. The country as a whole has been resistant to substantial progress ever since.6 By March 2010, Iraq’s trend line was in almost the identical place that it started out at the time of the 2003 invasion.7

A Weak State on the Edge

This study suggests that as U.S. combat troops prepare to leave Iraq,8 and despite some notable accomplishments—increased revenues from oil production, a build-up of the Iraqi military, and the conduct of parliamentary elections—Iraq remains a highly fragile state that has not yet achieved sustainable security. Though not failing precipitously as it was during 2006-2008, it suffers from a host of unresolved problems, lingering disputes, sectarian rivalries and institutional deficiencies that have been downplayed by the media and top decision-makers. If not addressed adequately, these factors have the potential to plunge the country back into civil conflict:

Iraq is still not free of substantial threats of political violence. Assassinations and bombings increased after the March 2010 election and Sunni insurgents have shown that they retain the capability to carry out highly coordinated attacks. The 2010 annual Terrorism Risk Index rated Iraq as the most dangerous country for the second year in a row, noting that “even though the terrorist situation in Iraq has improved, the frequency, scale and human impact of attacks still make it the most extreme risk country for terrorism, with nearly 4,500 civilians killed in 2009.”9 The vast increase in the number of the government’s security forces to a level of some 650,000 (armed forces plus police) is impressive, but they are targeted by the insurgents and their professionalism remains in question.10

6 Iraq’s lowest (or best) rating was 92 in June 2003, three months after the invasion. This was very close to being in the Warning zone, where a viable peace may have been possible. The highest (worst) rating was 117, from March through September 2007. See Figure 1. In the scheme used here, the four rating zones are: Alert: 90-120; Warning: 60-89; Monitoring: 30-59; and Sustainable: 1-29. 7 In March 2003, the aggregate score was 101. In March 2010, it was 104. See Graph 1. 8 U.S. troop levels are to be reduced from 92,000 in March 2010 to 50,000 by September 1, 2010, down from a total of 170,000 during 2007. All U.S. combat troops are due to be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011. “Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says,” Washington Post, May 27, 2010. 9 “Iraq, India and top Maplecroft terrorist list-Thailand emerges as extreme risk nation,” Maplecroft, 2/16/2010. 10 One Iraqi commander in was quoted as saying “We’re not yet an army. This is just AK-47s and Humvees.” In “U.S. drawdown comes at time of high risk in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/14/2010.

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Sectarian rivalry continues to divide the country as demonstrated by the outcome of the March 2010 election, where high voting turnout was split along sectarian lines. As Joost R. Hiltermann noted, “in ethno-sectarian terms, the election outcome is almost identical to the result four years ago. The Shiite parties jointly gained a mere 2.5 percentage points; the secular and Sunni parties together stayed even; and the combined Kurds lost 3.5 percentage points…”11 The bulk of approximately 2.7 million internally displaced persons and two million refugees have not returned home.12 This represents the largest displacement crisis in the Middle East since 1948.13 The most significant improvement occurred in the economy. Iraq is considered to have the world’s third largest oil reserves and is beginning to award contracts for exploitation. Increased production is shown by real GDP growth of 9.5% in 2009. Yet oil is likely to overshadow other economic sectors, fan corruption and inspire political conflict. The National Hydrocarbon Law, which is needed to govern regional rights to develop the old fields, remains deadlocked in parliament. Corruption is undermining state legitimacy and shows no sign of abating. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranked Iraq as the fourth most corrupt country in the world, after , Afghanistan and Burma. Social services are grossly inadequate, especially outside the capital. The political class is highly factionalized, Iranian influence is deepening, and many state institutions function poorly. Minorities, especially Christians, have become targets of persistent persecution. Private militias are pervasive, challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Prognosis

This catalogue of issues touches upon some of the main concerns that illustrate Iraq’s fragility and uncertain future. There are many more. Yet analysts continue to differ on what will happen once U.S. combat troops depart. Some argue that Iraq will become more resilient, moving gradually on a path toward reconstruction and reconciliation as U.S. assistance shifts toward advisory military support and economic development. Others are more pessimistic, arguing that Iraq will backslide as centrifugal forces pull the country toward violence and a path toward fragmentation once the security blanket the U.S. provides is removed. Based on the trends identified in this study, the most likely near-term scenario is an unstable coalition between the Shia and Kurds, with some Sunni representation, and the creation of a ruling elite that will contain competing factions and repress opposition using a considerable security establishment: about 1 out of every 30 Iraqi citizens is a member of a military or police organization.14

11 Joost R. Hiltermann, deputy program director for the Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group, in “Ruling Baghdad,” National Interest online, 5.10.2010. http://www.nationallinterestonline.org/Article.aspx?id=23364. 12 See “IOM emergency needs assessments: post February 2006 displacement in Iraq,” IOM, 4/1/2010; 13 “Realizing protection space for Iraqi refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” UNHCR, accessed 4/27/2010. 14 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Report to the Congress, April 30, 2010.

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If the country holds together after the transition to full sovereignty,15 it will be because of 1) the militarization of Iraqi society, 2) back-room alliances among the sects, tribes and clans which the Economist noted were now “well-oiled political machines”16 that use patronage, corruption, tribal justice, and traditional loyalties to keep the peace and deliver votes, and 3) large oil revenues that will grease the wheels of those political machines. Joe Biden opined in 2006, as a senator, that Iraq was veering toward partition.17 However, as Vice President, he said that this danger had diminished because the groups all found value in participating in politics due to expected oil windfalls: “The glue that holds the country together is oil... Everyone has figured out that getting a legitimate share of a much bigger pie is a pretty good deal,” he concluded.18

But these are thin reeds upon which to reconstruct a country. If oil becomes the main factor fueling national unity, as Biden suggests, then Iraq’s stability will be no stronger than the world price of this single commodity, the ability of to share its benefits equally through legally binding agreements, and their commitment to use the collective wealth for the benefit of the people rather than line the pockets of the political class, as has occurred in most other culturally divided, oil-producing, post-conflict societies. And if a political consensus is not found to surmount tribal and ethnic factionalism, then, as the Economist warned, the country could turn into “a kind of Somalia with oil, an anarchic collection of wealthy competing fiefs, with tribes to the fore.”19 Iraq also stands to become a political battlefield for rival regional influentials, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan, and a lucrative prize in the wider Middle East power struggle between Sunni and Shia communities.

In the end, Iraq serves as an example of what can happen when state-building strategies are not well thought-out, given adequate resources, or tailored to the needs of the particular country at risk. The good news is that, while not yet a success story, Iraq does have a chance to make it. The bad news is that the emphasis on security and counter-terrorism has shortchanged other priorities of state-building. The trend line has flattened. Iraq’s future depends upon how the sectarian and tribal groups will coalesce and whether their political leaders will put the national interest above their narrow factional interests.

15 Legally, Iraq is already regarded as a sovereign state and has a seat in the UN. However, as long as tens of thousands of foreign combat troops are on its soil, it is not exercising full sovereignty. This should come in 2011 after all U.S. combat forces are withdrawn. 16 The Economist, 5/22/2010. 17 The author of this series observed the same trend and argued for a “managed partition” to control the forces driving Iraq apart. The fear at the time was that partition would occur violently if current trends continued. While Iraqi security has improved since then, comparable improvements in other sectors have not materialized. The danger of backsliding still exists. 18 “Iraq exit will be on time, Biden says,” Washington Post, 5/27/2010, 19 The Economist, 5/22/2010.

7 Conflict Trends March 2003 to March 2010 120 January 10, 2007 President Bush announces troop surge of about 30,000 new troops. January 2010 IHEC bans 500 candidates February 22, 2006 January 1, 2009 from parliamentary elections

Askariya Shrine bombed. Status of Forces Agreement 115 comes into effect June 28, 2004 U.S.-led coalition Aug. 29, 2007 February transfers Shia cleric Muqtada al- 2010 sovereignty to December 15, 2005 Sadr calls for a cease Less than interim Iraqi fire by Mahdi Army. January 31, 2009 100,000 government. National assembly Provincial elections election held. U.S. held in nine Troops 110 governorates remain in Iraq September March 19, Dec. 31, 2006 2007 U.S. troop 2003 Media releases Operation controversial video strength May 20, 2006 Iraqi Unity reaches height Iraqi Freedom Government forms under showing partisan begins. execution of of 168,000 total 105 Prime Minister Nouri al– troops. Maliki. Saddam Hussein.

June 30, 2009 March 7, 2010 U.S. troops withdrawn Parliamentary 100 from all major Iraqi Elections held cities and towns except November 2009

January 30, 2005 Iraq holds Transitional national a assembly election. successful oil contract Indicator Totals Indicator 95 auction Dec. 13, 2003 U.S. troops capture Saddam Hussein.

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December 2009 May 1, 2003 Elections Law passes amidst President Bush violence, controversy announces “Mission Accomplished.” 85

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3 4 4 5 6 6 7 8 0 0 0 0 0 '05 0 0 0 '0 '08 0 '09 '09 1 1 ' ' r ' ' r r ' ' h h e h h e e h h rc rc rc b rc rc arc mb mber ' mber ' mb Ma M te Ma te Ma te March '07 tem March te Ma Ma p p p p p January ' e e September '03 Se S S Se Se September

Fig. 1: Iraq Aggregate Trendline: March 2003-March 2010 8

Graph 1. Indicator Scores March 2003 to December 2008

'03 March June September December '04 March June September December '05 March June September December '06 March June September December '07 March June September December '08 March June July August September October November December 1. Demographic 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 Pressures 2. Movement of 8 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Refugees or IDPs 3. Legacy of 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 Vengeance

4.Human Flight 7 5 5 4 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5. Uneven Economic 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Development 6. Economic 9 8 8 8 8 9 9 8 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 8 Decline 7. Criminalization 10 10 9 9 9 7 9 9 10 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 10 of the State 8. Deterioration of 7 8 8 7 8 9 9 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 Public Services 9. Suspension of 10 6 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 Human Rights 10. "State Within a 10 6 9 10 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 State" 11. Factionalized 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Elites 12. Intervention of 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 External Actors

Total 92 98 98 111 111 101 110 112 113 115 116 117 117 117 116 112 110 112 112 110 102 100 108 104 104 109 109 109

9 Graph 1 (cont’d). Indicator Scores January 2009 to March 2010

May June April March March August August July '09 October February February December September September November November January '09 January '10

1. Demographic 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Pressures

2. Movement of 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Refugees or IDPs

3. Legacy of 9 9 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 Vengeance

4.Human Flight 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5. Uneven Economic 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Development 6. Economic 8 8 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 Decline 7. Criminalization of 8 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 the State 8. Deterioration of 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Public Services 9. Suspension of 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Human Rights 10. "State Within a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 State" 11. Factionalized 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 Elites

12. Intervention of 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 External Actors

Total 106 104 104 104 105 105 106 105 105 104 102 103 104 105 104

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Methodological Note

This report is the tenth in a series of progress reports on the war in Iraq launched in March 2003. These reports are based on an analytical methodology, CAST (the Conflict Assessment System Tool), that has been developed and tested since 1996. The objectives of this particular project are to: Assess the extent to which Iraq is moving toward sustainable security, a situation in which it can solve its own problems peacefully without an outside military or administrative presence. Analyze trend lines in Iraq along 12 top social, economic and political/military indicators of internal instability. Evaluate five core institutions (political leadership, civil service, system of justice, police and military), which are necessary for the state to function. Review “STINGS” – the surprises, triggers, idiosyncrasies, national temperament, and other frequently overlooked factors. Present a “before” and “after” portrait, with trend lines, showing progress and regression in specific indicators as well as the aggregate at several intervals over time.

This report offers a balanced combination of quantitative data grounded in rigorous qualitative research. This even blend of statistical and descriptive analysis accurately portrays the internal situation in Iraq according to trends across 12 distinct variables or ‘indicators’. Ratings are assigned to each indicator according to a comprehensive assessment of daily news coverage of Iraq. The research team referenced over 150 domestic and international news sources, including Arabic language sources. The data collected is open source information available to the public through accessible media sources. At the end of each month, a rating (on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the best and 10 being the worst) is assigned based on the developments of that particular month by indicator.

This report is a comprehensive analysis that examines trends since the start of the U.S.-led invasion, beginning with a base line assessment in March 2003. It is important to note that these summaries provide a condensed representation of the most significant developments on the ground, as reported by the media, experts, and independent organizations, some of which were on site. Any specific developments omitted are done so because they are judged by the research team to be redundant, outliers, or relatively unimportant with respect to the highlighted events. From this methodology, the internal stability of Iraq is assessed by following trends, both by indicator and aggregate ratings.

This research team was lead by Dr. Pauline H. Baker, president of the FfP and the original author of the methodology. We recognize that the rating system of 1-10 is somewhat subjective. However, in light of the logistical barriers to conducting field research in any conflict environment or collapsing state, the potential for bias is reduced by internal checks, extensive citation, the collection of vast amounts of data, and comprehensive review. Moreover, the research team maintained consistency in research patterns and sources, accompanied by cross- referencing of any observed inconsistencies. Furthermore, over time, as these reports continue,

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the numerical ratings define themselves in specific tangible conditions, relative to previous ratings, so that clear trends emerge.

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Appendix I: August 2009 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Regional drought that has been plaguing Iraq for the past four years hit hard in August, potentially leaving as many as two million people in the south without electricity and drinking water. The severe water shortage has forced two out of the four turbines to shut down and it is estimated that if water levels drop 20 centimeters (7.87 inches) further the last two will shut down as well, resulting in a widespread electricity blackout. In the last three weeks of August alone, electricity has declined by 50% in Nasiriyah—Iraq’s fourth largest city—due to the falling water level of the River. According to Iraq's Water Minister, Dr Abdul Latif Rashid, approximately 3,000 people in have had to evacuate due to a lack of fresh water and rise in salinity levels, and an additional 300,000 marshland residents have fled to nearby cities due to dried-up land that can no longer support them.20

Agriculture is also suffering as a result of the critical water shortages. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, around 90 percent of Iraq’s land is turning into desert or encountering severe desertification.21 Diyala province, for instance, relies on an agricultural economic base, yet 60% of its land has been destroyed over the past three years either from war or natural causes. Local council officials say this loss of livelihood has contributed to a high number of unemployed graduates in the province, which stands at 80,000.22 As a result of these low rates of farming, the Food and Agriculture Organization predicted that Iraq’s traditionally abundant wheat production will drop to under one million tons this year—down from 1.5 million last year and 2.5 million on average from the years 2000 to 2007. As a result of the shortage, Iraq will have to import four million tons of wheat and 1.25 million tons of rice this year.23 Many unemployed farmers will also be looking for work, and could possibly turn to insurgencies and religious extremism if their needs are not met.

Although talks with Syria, Turkey, and Iran have been underway for years to ameliorate the water crisis, no definitive compromises have been made. A new round of discussions took place between Iraqi and officials from neighboring countries this month regarding water allocations, irrigation systems, dams, pumps, wells, and new innovations in technology. However, no tangible agreements were made. Iraqi officials also began digging wells and bores in the southern provinces to compensate for low water levels—which are at 20% of original levels; down from 75% in 2006/07. However, much larger efforts by the government still need to be undertaken to improve infrastructure.24 Until outside discussions and internal improvements are substantial enough to lessen the burden on the Iraqi people, migration, unemployment, and high imports will continue to plague the country.

20 “Iraq: ‘We have lost the soul of our lives,’” The Guardian, 08/27/2009 21 “Iraq’s dried marshes cause dust cover,” Gulf News, 08/04/2009 22 “Ramadan security alerts in Diyala,” Niqash, 08/26/2009 23 “Iraq: Drought hits rice, wheat staples,” IRIN, 08/31/2009 24 “Iraq: ‘We have lost the soul of our lives,’” The Guardian, 08/27/2009

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2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

The Iraqi government continues to urge the immediate return of its 3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees—an action criticized by some Sunnis as an effort “to improve it’s (the government’s) standing ahead of January’s national elections.”25 Government officials ordered the removal of most concrete road barriers in Baghdad in early August in an attempt to facilitate movement in the city.26 However, the order did not cover some of the most violent neighborhoods in Baghdad. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian aid agencies in Iraq remain cautious of the government’s resettlement efforts, pointing out the lack of a “workable plan” that guarantees security for the returnees. The government is even calling for refugees to return to places such as Diyala and Abu Ghraib, where violence is still raging. Commander of the Iraqi forces, Major- General Abud Qanbar, announced at a meeting with U.S. officials that his government planned a prompt return of nearly 3,000 mostly Shiite families to Abu Ghraib, which is predominantly Sunni.27 Although security remains a major concern for the IDPs and refugees planning to return to their homes, access to basic necessities, such as food, water, and shelter also greatly influence their decision to return home.

Living conditions of the IDPs scattered throughout Iraq remained grim in the month of August. According to a recent report by the Homeless Families Organization, an NGO working with displaced families, there are more than 200,000 IDPs living in deserted government buildings, most of which lack water and electricity. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that in governorates like Anbar, which has a population of 9,431 internally displaced families, there is a significant shortage of water. In Karbala, which is home to about 13,599 displaced families, 16% of households are headed by females.28 Many of these women lack the necessary tools and skills to provide for their families and are vulnerable to illegal activities, such as prostitution and trafficking operations.

Iraqi refugees residing mainly in the urban areas of neighboring states also remain vulnerable. According to Abeer Etefa, UNHCR spokeswoman for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the urban setting poses further challenges such as high living costs, traveling long distances to reach UNHCR registration centers, and problems due to inaccessible health and education services.29

The growing violence against the gay community in Iraq is forcing gays to flee the country in large numbers (see Indicator 9). UNHCR and Human Rights Watch are urging states to give priority to Iraqi gays seeking asylum and resettlement.

25 “Iraq’s government orders barriers removed,” The New York Times, 08/05/2009 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 “Governorate Profile August 2009-Kerbala,” IOM, 08/31/2009 29 “ IRAQ: Iraqi refugees face urban challenges,” IRIN, 08/04/2009

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3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

The summer’s rise in violence continued into August with an increased number of bombings and civilian casualties. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq’s cities at the end of June, the unstable environment called into question the ability of the Iraqi government to provide security on its own (see Indicator 10).30 Insurgents continued to focus their attacks on religious and ethnic minorities as well as government facilities, particularly in the north and around Baghdad. According to Reuters, the number of civilian casualties reached 393—the highest level since April—primarily due to large-scale bombings in Baghdad and northern Iraq.31 Iraq Body Count, a database that records all violent deaths in Iraq, reported 537 civilians killed in attacks and at least one vehicle bomb going off nearly every day of this month.32 Despite the inevitable variation in reporting the exact number of fatalities, the number of large-scale attacks in August point to a disturbing trend of increased insecurity in Iraq’s most volatile regions.

A momentary sense of social unity between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites did occur on August 22, as they both began Ramadan on the same day for the first time in ten years.33 Meanwhile, however, insurgents attempted to shatter that harmony by taking aim at Shiite religious gatherings with large-scale, sensationalist attacks designed to provoke wide-scale sectarian violence reminiscent of past years. Shiite leaders and clerics successfully urged their followers to restrain from retaliatory attacks—a positive sign that at least some militant groups are increasingly choosing to fight their battles within the political arena.34 For instance, Asa'ib al- Haq, a Sadrist splinter group that continued to fight after other Shiites had stopped in 2008, renounced violence against Iraqis after talks with the government in early August.35

Insurgents struck a major blow to confidence in the Iraqi security forces when two large truck bombs leveled the Foreign and Finance Ministry buildings in Baghdad on August 19, killing 100 and injuring nearly 600 civilians and police officers.36 In what was the deadliest day since February 2008, approximately 10% of the Foreign Ministry’s staff were killed or injured.37 More attacks in Baghdad, Babil, and Hamad (north of Baghdad) followed in the days after the ministry bombings. They targeted public places such as markets and police stations and killed 23 civilians and six policemen altogether.38 Police stations were also targeted in Anbar province, particularly on August 12 when six policemen and civilians were killed in Ramadi from a suicide attack. Although small-scale in comparison to other regions, attacks in Anbar were persistent throughout August, particularly in cities such as Haditha, Ramadi, and Fallujah.

Attacks aimed at specific religious and ethnic groups also continued in August, beginning on August 7 with a series of attacks on crowded Shiite sites in Baghdad and Mosul, killing 50

30 “Iraq attacks threaten stability claims,” BBC, 08/19/2009 31 “Iraq civilian deaths are highest since April,” Reuters, 09/01/2009 32 “Iraq Body Count,” http://www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed 09/14/2009 33 “Sunnis and Shiites See an Omen for Reconciliation in Iraq,” The New York Times, 08/22/2009 34 “Shiites in Iraq show restraint as Sunnis attack,” The New York Times, 08/12/2009 35 “Shiite group agrees to renounce violence in Iraq,” Asharq al-Awsat, 08/04/2009 36 “Two blasts expose security flaws in heart of Iraq,” The New York Times, 08/19/2009 37 “Baghdad bombing leaves hole in diplomatic corps,” Christian Science Monitor, 08/24/2009 38 “Iraq Body Count,” http://www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed 09/14/2009

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people. The largest deliberate attack killed 38 and injured 95 when a suicide car bomber targeted worshipers leaving a Shiite mosque in Mosul. Several smaller-scale bombings killed twelve people in Baghdad.39 On August 10, two large dump trucks filled with explosives flattened a large swath of Khazna, a village near Mosul populated mostly by Shabak, a Kurdish Shiite minority group. This attack, along with several smaller bombings throughout Baghdad, killed 45 people that day.40 A third major bombing the same week took place on August 13, when two suicide bombers killed at least 21 people in a café frequented by , a Kurdish-speaking minority in Sinjar.41 Yazidis were again targeted on August 29, when a car bomb at a market killed six and wounded 20 people (see Indicator 11).42

Heightened violence has exacerbated rising political tension in the Kurdish region as the central Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders continue to disagree on how to interpret the Iraqi constitution’s articles regarding oil exploration in the autonomous region. On August 4, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki traveled to the region for the first time in two years to meet with Kurdish leaders stating that, “I think we largely agree, and if they are disputes, they are small.”43 However, without a plan for reconciling the political differences, many believe that the potential for military conflict is rising.44 As Iraqi political activist and columnist Haroun Mohmad states, “The main issue is in the constitution. What makes things more complicated [is that] there is no national and independent constitutional body to settle the disagreement.”45 The recent attacks have intensified debates over who should provide security in disputed areas of Nineveh, , and Diyala provinces, leading to several tense standoffs between the Kurdish and the Iraqi security forces along the “trigger line.” U.S. General Ray Odierno called persistent tension between and Kurds the “number one driver of instabilities” in the country, and proposed deploying U.S. troops with the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces for the first time in Nineveh province, in “recognition of where we think the bigger problem areas are.”46

Although the vast majority of attacks in August took place in Baghdad and in northern provinces, Iraqi officials express concern for potential resurgent violence in the south, particularly in Wasit province. On August 24, bombs on two minibuses killed twelve people in the relatively quiet town of Kut.47 Iraqi forces state that they found numerous arms caches in August throughout Wasit, including weapons made in Iran.48 Police officials claim that Shiite militia groups are recruiting fighters in the region and plan to increase attacks leading up to the Parliamentary elections in January.

39 “Iraq bombs kill 50, mostly Shi'ites targeted,” Reuters, 08/07/2009 40“ Series of bombings in Iraq targets Shiites,” The Wall Street Journal, 08/1120/09 41 “Double suicide bombing kills at least 21 in northern Iraq,” The Washington Post, 08/14/2009 42 “Attacks in Iraqi cities claim lives,” Al Jazeera, 08/29/2009 43 “Iraq-Kurd tensions on the boil,” Al Jazeera, 08/04/2009 44 “Kurdish fault line threatens to spark new war,” The Independent, 08/10/2009 45 “Iraq-Kurd tensions on the boil,” Al Jazeera, 08/04/2009 46 “U.S. troops may be sent to Iraq's Arab-Kurdish 'trigger line,'” Los Angeles Times, 08/18/2009 47 “Bus bombings kill Iraqi civilians,” Al Jazeera, 08/24/2009 48 “Arms finds in hitherto quiet south Iraq ring alarms,” Reuters, 08/31/2009

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4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

The Iraqi government’s efforts to curb and reverse human flight have not proved effective. Iraqis who have returned say the government is failing to provide them even with basic necessities. There are returnees coming home, but many face a lack of viable housing, enduring sectarian tensions, limited job opportunities and shortages of electricity, clean water, education, and health care. With the U.S. presence dwindling in Iraq and violence escalating, it is unlikely that many will believe government assurances that it is safe to return home. Recent outbreaks of violence, political factionalism, growing attacks on Iraqi Christians and gays, and the lack of comprehensive government policies towards returning refugees are also likely to discourage many of the Iraqi middle class and minority groups from returning to Iraq any time soon.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Due to central budget pressures over oil sales (see Indicator 6) and growing tension over the disputed oil-rich northern region, President Nouri al-Maliki visited the Kurdistan Region at the beginning of this month for the first time since he took office in 2006. An agreement was formed to create a higher committee that will resolve issues such as land disputes over the oil-rich provinces of Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Diyala.49 Deadlines for resolutions will be assigned and the hope is that all issues will be mediated before American forces withdraw in two years. 50

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) issued a new quarterly report this month presenting unemployment figures that demonstrate inequality among the provinces with regards to unemployment and underemployment. The average national unemployment rate was 17.3%, with Wasit showing the lowest unemployment rates at 13.6% and Dhi Qar the highest at 36.5% unemployment. Two out of the three Kurdish provinces were below the national average for underemployment, which stands at 29.4%. Arbil displayed the lowest rate at 18.1% and Wasit showed the highest underemployment rate at 51.4%.51

These figures show that the Kurdish region is developing at a faster rate than the rest of the country. This trend can also be seen in a new road system, state-of-the-art street lighting, 24 new oil contracts, and more than 1,000 foreign companies doing business throughout the three northern provinces. Reasons for such high rates of progress include oil wealth and relatively improved security compared to the rest of the country. 52 For instance, no American soldier has died in the region since the Gulf War in 1991 and Christians, who have faced violence and persecution in other parts of Iraq since 2003, fled to the Kurdish region for refuge53

Sunni frustration has been growing as many members of the Sunni Awakening Councils have not received the payments or the employment opportunities the Iraqi government has promised them.

49 “Al-Maliki visits Iraq’s Kurdistan for talks over land, oil,” Xinhua, 08/02/2009. 50 “Iraqi Kurdish official on al-Maliki’s visit to Kurdistan region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 08/20/2009. 51 “Unemployment and underemployment numbers for Iraq,” Musings on Iraq, 08/12/2009. 52 “In Iraq’s Kurdistan, political pessimism clouds progress,” WordPress, 08/10/2009. 53 “The ‘other Iraq’ – ,” BBC News, 08/21/2009.

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Additionally, a law that permits former Baath Party members to acquire their old jobs or pensions lost after 2003 has not been carried out. As attacks this month by Sunni extremists have shown, there continues to be great fear among the Sunni population that oil wealth and jobs will not be fairly distributed.54

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 8

Figures released this month indicate that July oil exports reached their highest level since the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, coming in at 2.037 million barrels per day. As the month of August came to a close, the price of a barrel of oil increased above $70, after slumping earlier in the year to below $30.55 This new development precipitated the committee reviewing Iraq’s proposed 2010 budget to increase spending plans up from Iraq’s 2009 approved federal budget that was based on $50 per barrel and 2 million bpd, to spending plans based on oil prices of $60 per barrel and average crude exports of 2.15 million bpd.56

However, due to an unexpected drop in average oil prices from almost $150 per barrel in 2008 to $27 per barrel in 2009, experts now predict a 2009 fiscal account deficit around $13bn—a sharp decrease from 2008’s $11bn surplus.57 As a result, recent development projects initiated in 2008, when oil prices were high, were put on hold and the government (which currently employs approximately 1/3 of the population) issued a hiring freeze.58

In order for the government to alleviate these budgetary pressures, oil production and investment in other sectors will have to increase. In a sign of recognition, Iraq lowered its upfront signing bonuses for oil contracts at the end of this month to $1.2 billion for 15 fields involved and also agreed to allow foreign companies to operate the fields.59 However, despite the obvious failure of the first licensing round for Iraqi oil, Iraq has yet to come close to enacting an oil and gas law or legislation on privatization, and has not made any significant strides towards resolving disputes in the oil-rich Kurdish region. Without these assurances, international oil companies remain hesitant to invest in Iraq.60

Without a recent census it remains difficult to pinpoint exact unemployment numbers, but figures released this month in the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) report show that the numbers for 2009 have not fluctuated dramatically. The national averages remain high, with 17.3% unemployment and 29.4% underemployment, and are in danger of being exacerbated by the continued government hiring freeze due to low oil revenues and growing debt.61 Since agriculture is the largest source of private-sector employment, accounting for approximately 25% of all jobs, unemployment will also likely worsen as the drought continues

54 “Iraq’s Sunnis,” The New York Times, 08/14/2009. 55 “INTERVIEW-Iraq budget outlook firm on oil’s rise – CBI head,” Reuters, 08/22/2009 56 “Iraq budget panel sees 2010 oil price at $60 per bbl,” Khaleej Times, 08/29/2009 and “Iraqi finance Minister interviewed on Damascus visit, other issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 08/21/2009 57 “Iraq country report,” Economic Intelligence Unit, August 2009 58 “Iraqi oil finally meets production and price goals set in budget,” Musings on Iraq, 08/13/2009 59 “Iraq lowers upfront oil fees,” Wall Street Journal Abstracts, 08/26/2009 60 “The second licensing round for Iraqi oil: Political aspects,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 08/25/2009 61 “Unemployment and underemployment numbers for Iraq,” Musings on Iraq, 08/12/2009

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(see Indicator 1), sending farmers and displaced persons to already overcrowded cities looking for work.

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

The ministry bombings on August 19 were a major set-back for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki and his campaign, which aimed to restore confidence in the Iraqi government and security forces, as U.S. troops scaled back their operations. The Prime Minister’s critics accused him of damaging national reconciliation by taking credit for reduced violence in order to gain support before January’s scheduled elections.62 They also revealed a disconnect between al-Maliki’s optimistic rhetoric and the reality of security capabilities on the ground (see Indicator 11). The massive bombings were coordinated in a way meant to demonstrate that insurgents have the capacity to target the entire country’s infrastructure—not just one sectarian group.63 Furthermore, the bombings were well-timed to coincide with al-Maliki’s plan to remove all concrete barriers in Baghdad by mid-September to allow for freer traffic flow throughout the city. Immediately after the attacks, the government halted barrier removal and issued a ban on trucks within the city—a measure seen by many as a delayed response to compensate for the incapacity of Iraqi security. In the words of one blogger on Inside Iraq, “one day after [the] bombings… the manned checkpoints very well, at least on main roads. The devices that should detect explosives are being used now. No cars can enter Baghdad or to cross a bridge inside Baghdad without being checked by the soldiers. But it is too late.”64

Not only do these incidents reveal the vulnerability of Iraqi security forces, but they also highlight the expanding rift between government factions and the deep, lingering suspicion of outside influence. The blame game began immediately, including accusations characterized as “sectarian conspiracy theories,” along predictable political and sectarian lines.65 On the day following the attack, 11 police and army officers were arrested for their negligence in allowing the bombs to pass through their sectors. Several government officials, including the Deputy Interior Minister and Prime Minister al-Maliki, publicly attributed the attacks to Al-Qaeda and Baathist members. 66 Two days later, on August 22, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari claimed that security forces must have actively collaborated for the attack to be so successful, and blamed the al-Maliki government for creating a "false general sense of the security situation."67 The same day, the Iraqi government began arresting suspects connected to the Baath party who apparently admitted that they belonged to a network created to carry out the attacks.68 On August 23, the chief military spokesman for Baghdad announced the arrest of what he called the mastermind of one of the bombings and aired a videotaped confession.69 Baghdad’s governor, who is a member of the Prime Minister’s Dawa party, went even further, claiming that the government had obtained evidence that the attackers had been acting under orders by several

62 “The politics behind Baghdad bombings,” Financial Times, 08/20/2009 63 “Bombed back to a state of fear,” The National, 08/22/2009 64 “Always one step behind,” McClatchy, 08/20/2009 65 “Behind the carnage in Baghdad,” The Washington Post, 08/25/2009 66 “Baghdad blasts 'were inside job,'” BBC, 08/22/2009 67 “Iraqi official says security forces may have colluded in bombings,” The Washington Post, 08/23/2009 68 “Wednesday attackers Baathists,” Aswat al-Iraq, 08/22/2009 69 “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 08/23/09

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Sunni Members of Parliament. The , an Al-Qaeda-linked group, claimed responsibility for the attacks on their website on August 25, and on August 29, the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 Al-Qaeda members in Baghdad.70 Some officials also tied the competing theories to outside intervention, linking The Islamic State of Iraq to Al- Qaeda, and the Baathists to Syria (see Indicator 12).

The ministry attacks also expose how deep corruption runs within the security forces. Interviews with truck drivers and police in Baghdad reveal that it is a common occurrence for large trucks to pass through checkpoints uncontested, especially if the guards are offered small amounts of cash, even though all trucks are required to be searched.71 The suspect whose confession was broadcasted on Iraqi state television claimed that he paid over $10,000 to have trucks with explosives get through checkpoints. Policemen admit off the record that bribes remain endemic within the force. Even a member of the Iraqi Parliament’s anti-corruption committee, Alia Nusaif Jasim, stated that "corruption is a bigger threat for us than insurgency, because it is preventing all of our government institutions - and especially our security services - from doing their job."72

Journalists reported being prevented from effectively covering the bombings, and claimed they were barred from subsequent emergency parliamentary hearings, in what Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) characterized as a “deliberate security policy.”73 RSF sees the government’s actions as serious restrictions on freedom of the press, and journalists continue to fear violent retribution for exposing government scandal and corruption (see Indicator 9). 74

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

Slow but steady progress in the public service sector has brought Iraq’s rating for this indicator to an optimistic 8. According to an Associated Press report comparing figures from the end of August 2009 to pre-war conditions, several key services have improved notably across the country. As of July 30, the number of people with access to potable water is 21.2 million compared to 12.9 million before the war. Almost twice as many people, 11.3 million, have access to sewer services, compared to 6.2 million in the pre-war era. Approximately 1,200,000 have landline phones and 17.7 million have cell phones, compared to 833,000 and 80,000, respectively.75

As for electricity, according to United States Department of State analysis, output has improved 47% compared to output in August 2007, reaching an average daily supply of 153,800 MW. Electricity supply across the country is on the rise, but it still falls well below the estimated demand and tends to vary by region and neighborhood.76 For instance, large remote areas of Anbar and Basra provinces still receive very limited electricity and water.77 Additionally,

70 “Al-Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 08/26/2009 71 “Corruption undermines Iraqi security,” BBC, 08/28/2009 72 “'Illusion' of security in Iraq,” BBC, 08/11/2009 73 “Internal security threats suddenly off-limits for news media,” Reporters Sans Frontières, 08/26/2009 74 “Hate campaign by Shiite party against government newspaper journalist,” Reporters Sans Frontières, 08/11/2009 75 “Iraq: Key figures since the war began,” Associated Press, 09/01/2009 76 “Iraq weekly status report,” United States Department of State, 09/02/2009 77 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 07/30/2009

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Baghdad’s electricity supply still lags behind the rest of the nation even though there were improvements from last year. Baghdad’s hours of power received in August after supplying essential services was 13.4 (less than before the war) compared to 13.8 in the rest of the country.78 Despite the sustained increase in electricity since 2007, the country’s supply falls consistently short of the estimated demand, and many areas report as little as two hours of power a day. Unfortunately, the fragile national grid is being threatened by an increase in attacks targeting public utilities in general and power plants in particular. The latest assault was on the main power plant in , which supplies Iraq’s most densely populated township on the outskirts of Baghdad.79 Physical improvements to the grid will be required to maintain the upward progress in output. According to an advisor of the (CBI), Modhihir Mohammed Salih, the government plans to devote a large portion of an expected $5.5 billion in IMF loans to improving the electricity sector.80

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

Violence against Iraq’s gay community continues as perpetrators go unpunished. According to a report by the Iraqi LGBT, a London-based group providing support to the vulnerable lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community in Iraq, 87 gay men or men “deemed effeminate” have been killed so far—six just in the month of August. This killing campaign, fuelled by increasingly anti-gay sermons in mosques and perpetrated usually by members of the Mahdi Army militia, took off across Iraq in the early months of 2009. These militia members are singling out men whom they deem not “manly” enough, or whom they suspect of being homosexual. According to a recent report by the Human Rights Watch, “the killers invade the privacy of homes, abducting sons or brothers, leaving their mutilated bodies in the neighborhood the next day.”81 Police and prosecutors, infiltrated by the militia members, ignore these crimes, as they do not want to be known as defenders of “effeminate” men.82 Detention conditions and human rights abuses in Iraqi prisons also remain critical. Torture tactics, which include beating, using cattle prods for electrocution, burning of detainee flesh with cigarettes, raping, and other forms of physical abuse, remain a reality in Iraq’s prisons. New reports on human rights violations undermine the current government’s claims that respect for the rule of law and human rights is a primary concern of the government.83 As reported in Indicator 7, media is becoming increasingly censored as the government moves to enact laws to control the flow of information into Iraq. The government claims that these efforts are directed at stopping sectarian violence, since easy access to extremist literature and internet websites available in the country encourage the youth to commit crimes. The Iraqi government plans on banning websites deemed “harmful to the public,” requiring internet cafes to register with the authorities, and pressuring publishers to censor certain books.84 Nearly 100 Iraqi

78 “Iraq weekly status report,” United States Department of State, 08/05/2009 79 “Attacks cripple Iraq’s national grid,” Azzaman.com, 08/25/2009 80 “Iraq to get loan to improve electricity,” Aswat al-Iraq, 08/19/2009 81 “Murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq,” Human Right Watch, 08/17/2009 82 “Anti-gay gangs terrorize Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, 08/19/2009 83 “Iraqis ‘still using torture,’” The Times, 08/04/2009 84 “Censorship creeping back into Iraq as leaders seek a balance,” International Herald Tribune, 08/05/2009

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journalists, news media workers and their supporters protested in Baghdad in August against what they said was an attempt by the current government to silence them.85 Many journalists fear that the vague censorship bills that are soon to be voted on by the parliament appear to be an attempt to restore a Saddam-style watch dog over the media.

The coalition forces transferred 107 detainees to the Iraqi criminal justice system this month, dropping the overall number of detainees under U.S. custody to 8,947—the lowest number since March 2005.86 Human rights groups are concerned about the ill-treatment and abuse of the detainees once they are transferred into Iraqi custody. The death of a man in Iraqi army detention after allegedly being beaten, given electric shocks with a cattle prod and burnt with cigarettes highlights the abuses suffered by detainees at the hands of Iraqi security forces.87 Thomas Cruise, a former adviser contracted to the Iraqi Defense Ministry’s human rights branch, commented on the incident saying that torture is part of the Iraqi culture: "The majority of people think it's totally acceptable to torture detainees. If you have a culture that accepts torture then it's pretty hard to instill a respect for human rights and the rule of law.”88

Moreover, approximately 90,000 detainees who have been released from American-controlled detention centers are now finding opportunities lacking when they return home. These men, most of whom were held for several years without charges, have come back to jobs no longer available and families in debt due to the loss of income. Many potential employers are fearful of the detainees’ backgrounds and worry they themselves may one day be charged with guilt by association and be arrested in a round-up; therefore, getting hired is proving to be a difficult task for many former detainees. The dangerous combination of a lack of employment and social stigma allows militias to recruit from the population of former detainees.89 In fact, the suicide truck bomber who targeted Iraq's Foreign Ministry in one of the most deadly attacks in August was a former detainee at the U.S. detention camp known as Camp Bucca and was freed from U.S. custody earlier this year.90

In a report released in August, Amnesty International criticized the Iraqi criminal justice system, stating that death sentences in Iraq—which has one of the highest rates of execution in the world—do not meet international fair trial standards.91 According to the report, defendants complained that information pried from them under torture was later used against them as evidence in trial and “that they [were] not able to choose their own defense lawyers.”92

85 “Iraqi journalists protesting in Baghdad say the government is trying to censor them,” The New York Times, 08/14/2009 86 “Detainee population falls below 9,000,” Multi-national Force-Iraq website, 08/30/2009 87 “Beaten, burnt and found dead in jail: old habits die hard in the new Iraq,” The Times, 08/04/2009 88 Ibid. 89 “Iraqis freed by US face few jobs and little hope,” The New York Times, 08/06/2009 90 “Iraq: suspected bomber recently released by US,” Associated Press, 08/30/2009 91 “Report criticizes Iraq's executions,” CNN-International, 08/31/2009 92 Ibid.

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10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Tensions rose alarmingly as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) moved in to reassert control over northern Iraq after Kurdish peshmerga forces deployed beyond the official Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) border. ISF and peshmerga units are now in increasingly close proximity to one another, positioning themselves to gain territorial footholds and increasing the chances for direct confrontation. In Nineveh province in particular, the political stalemate between Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen parties has increased confusion over who is responsible for security, especially due to the increase in attacks targeting minorities throughout the region (see Indicator 3). In the words of an Iraqi soldier from Khazna, “we have three governments up here: the central government, the Kurdish government and the Islamic State of Iraq government,” leaving minorities “lost in the middle” (see Indicator 11).93 Both sides blame the other for the rise in violence and use it to justify the reason for their forces taking on greater security responsibility, especially within ethnically-mixed areas.

The Sunni Arab majority party, al-Hadbaa National List, is following through on its campaign rhetoric to reassert provincial government rule over disputed territories that are currently under Kurdish control. According to Nineveh’s governor, Atheel al-Najaifi, the provincial government will begin forming its own army of approximately 14,000 fighters in Mosul, in order to “replace” peshmerga forces. The force will be financed by the central government, but drawn from Mosul’s population and run by the Sunni-dominated provincial government.94

Meanwhile, the Iraqi central government continues to be slow in integrating the Sunni Awakening Council, with approximately 80% out of the projected 89,000 force still waiting for jobs (see Indicator 5).95 At the beginning of August, the government processed 3,331 applications for various ministry jobs—not including the defense and interior ministry that still have a hiring freeze in place (see Indicators 6 and 11).96

Integration at the local level has been more successful. For instance, in Diyala province 8,800 council members were recruited for local security positions.97 However, many still complain of not being paid, increasing the likelihood that Awakening members will leave their posts.98 As of mid-August, security in Babil province has deteriorated since Awakening members withdrew from their positions in protest for not getting paid.99

93 “Minorities trapped in northern Iraq’s maelstrom,” New York Times, 08/15/2009 94 “Iraqi Al-Hadba List to form army in Ninawa governorate,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 08/25/2009 95 “ gain government employment,” Multi-National Force – Iraq, 08/28/2009 96 “3,331 files of Sahwa fighters referred to concerned ministries,” Aswat al-Iraq, 08/02/2009 97 “8,800 Sahwa council personnel absorbed into Diala’s security apparatus,” Aswat al-Iraq, 08/09/2009 98 “Sons of Iraq in Samarra, Salahaddin complain about government not paying them,” Al Jazeera, 08/09/2009 99 “Security situation worsening in Iraq's Babil after Awakening withdrawal,” Al-Hayat, 08/15/2009

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11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

In an effort to gain more support in the upcoming elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been trying to reduce political factionalism by promoting nationalism and branding himself as the unifier of the Iraqi people. In a surprise move, al-Maliki alienated himself and his Dawa Party from the Shiite coalition that launched the new Iraqi National Alliance (see Indicator 12). According to his aides, al-Maliki’s intention is “to form his own coalition that will cross sectarian lines to contest the election on a secularist, nationalist platform.”100 Despite these efforts, ethnic and sectarian factionalism persists in Iraq. Sunnis are concerned about their security and do not believe they will ever get a fair share in Iraq’s oil revenues under a Shiite- dominated government. Shiites, on the other hand, believe that they still need to recover from the losses and rectify the imbalance that reigned during Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government. Sunnis are also in conflict with Kurds, contending for a larger political share in the northern semi-autonomous Kurdish region. These tensions have intensified since the U.S. pullout in June and a new campaign of attacks between the factions emerged in the month of August.

The struggle for land and resources in northern Iraq is undermining efforts at unifying the Iraqi people. Deadly attacks in early August in Mosul and nearby villages killed 92 people and wounded almost 200.101 This region of Iraq is home to many ethnically and religiously diverse groups, including Shiite Shabaks (a Kurdish-speaking minority), Yazidis, Shiite Turkmen, and others, who are caught up in the bigger fight between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Worried for their security, these minorities are steadily adopting a mindset that creating their own militias, comparable to the Sunni Awakening Councils or Kurdish peshmerga, might be a viable option in securing their villages and protecting their families.102

Therefore, al-Maliki’s rhetoric on unifying Iraq has not been effective and is also not reflected in government policies. For example, there is still no law outlining how oil revenues will be distributed among quarreling factions, and the Iraqi government continues to battle with Kurds over what the government perceives as a Kurdish separatist agenda. 103 Also, many former Baath Party members have not been able to reclaim their jobs or receive pensions. For instance, the government has not put forth the effort to incorporate members of the Sunni Awakening Councils who were promised jobs and other benefits in return for their support.104 The fact that the Awakening Councils have not been fully integrated into the Iraqi security forces fuels tension between the factions, as Sunnis view this as the government’s reluctance “to increase the number of Sunni Iraqis appointed to the security forces and civil service.”105 This poses a major hurdle in ensuring stability in Iraq, since the disaffected groups are more likely to resort to violence, and in the case of Awakening Council members, that could also mean joining the ranks of Al-Qaeda.

100 “Iraq's prime Minister ditches Shiite coalition,” Chicago Tribune, 08/25/2009 101 “Minorities can't escape fury of northern Iraq's ethnic and religious maelstrom,” The New York Times, 08/16/2009 102 Ibid. 103 “Iraq’s Sunnis,” The International Herald Tribune, 08/15/2009 104 Ibid. 105 “Awakening councils key to security?” Aljazeera.net, 08/09/2009

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Extremist rhetoric also intensified in August with the start of Ramadan. In Diyala, where violence has been rampant, people fear that unemployed and disenfranchised youth are fast becoming radicalized by violent Friday sermons. Some of these clerics have been arrested by the security forces, including a leader of the Mahdi movement, Fadhel al-Marsoumi, whose heated sermons have been calling the followers not only to unite against Sunnis and Kurds, but also to disobey other Shiite clergy.106 Like many other clerics in the area, Marsoumi ran for provincial elections and won 5,000 votes—not enough to secure him a seat on the Provincial Council, but enough to cause concern, since most of the votes came from his radicalized young followers.107

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 7

The multi-national effort has officially become a U.S. operation, as the last remaining British, Australian, and Romanian troops departed at the end of July.108 U.S. military commanders have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to the draw-down plan, even with the latest surge in violence.109 However, given the rising tensions in several northern provinces, U.S. General Ray Odierno now is calling for an increased U.S. troop presence in Nineveh province, initially centered around Mosul, and extending out towards Kirkuk and parts of Diyala province. Although such an increase would go against the terms of the Security Pact, the Iraqi central government and Kurdish leaders both appear to support joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in order to defuse tensions and give both sides more time to reach a security agreement.110 Gen. Odierno stated that the “confidence-building” initiative would be a small adjustment to the current disposition of forces in the region. "As we deliberately withdraw our forces, you will see that there will be less forces withdrawn from the north than any other place.”111 He emphasized that such an operation cannot solve the ethnic divides and disagreements that still plague the contested region. Mediations and negotiations must take place alongside any U.S. military effort in order to solve the lingering conflicts before American combat troops fully and permanently withdraw from Iraq.

The day American troops do withdraw may be coming sooner than expected. The Iraqi government has backed a referendum that would allow Iraqi voters to decide in January’s elections whether U.S. forces are to withdraw a year earlier than the agreed-upon deadline of 2011. This announcement, coming at a time when violence has skyrocketed since the U.S. troop withdrawal from major cities on June 31, shows indifference to the advice and wishes of the U.S. government and generals on the ground. It is still unknown whether parliament will approve of the referendum and it is also unclear whether the Iraqi public will vote for it. Many Sunnis and Kurds are wary of a Shiite-led government and see the U.S. presence as a balancing force.112

Relations between Iraq and Syria became tense this month after Iraq accused Syria of creating a safe haven for insurgents and demanded Syria hand over two men Iraq believes to be responsible

106 “Ramadan security alerts in Diyala,” Niqash, 08/26/2009 107 Ibid. 108 “US troops now a 'coalition of one' in Iraq,” Associated Press, 08/01/2009 109 “American commander: US on the road out of Iraq,” Associated Press, 08/31/2009 110 “Withdrawal plan on hold as civil war fears demand the return of US troops,” The Times, 08/18/2009 111 “U.S. force may go to Arab-Kurd hot spot,” Los Angeles Times, 08/18/2009 112 “Iraq may hold vote on U.S. withdrawal,” The Washington Post, 08/18/2009.

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for the ministry bombing attacks. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued a harsh statement saying, “There are other countries and governments behind it…Neighboring countries should behave like good neighbors because it is not hard for us to do the same things they did.” 113 However, the Islamic State of Iraq, an insurgent group with links to Al-Qaeda, claimed the bombings were their planning and proceeded to call the Iraqi government an agent of Iran. Some American and Iraqi officials have stated the attacks were likely perpetrated by Al-Qaeda due the familiar nature and hallmarks they bore. Such accusations rising from every direction concerning which country, or which insurgent group, were involved in the attacks, illustrate Iraq’s continued susceptibility to outside influences.

Fears that the government of Iran is heightening its influence in Iraq also grew as a new Shiite coalition was formed bringing together the movement of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, Ahmad Chalabi, and Ibrahim al-Jafari. It is led by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a long-time ally of Iran, and it excludes current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. If this alliance succeeds in securing a majority of seats in January’s election, the new government of Iraq could develop stronger official ties to Iran, threatening its relationship with the U.S.114

113 “Iraq accuses Damascus of sheltering insurgents,” The International Herald Tribune, 08/26/2009 114 “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraq’s PM,” Sydney Morning Herald, 08/26/2009

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Core Five and STINGS – August 2009

1. Police Rating: Weak

The success of the Baghdad ministry bombings demonstrates just how vulnerable the police force remains as they take over security responsibility from the U.S. military. Although the number of attacks compared to previous years remains low, insurgents clearly demonstrated their ability to carry out large-scale attacks at will. Police targets remain particularly vulnerable, as sporadic attacks across the country continue against checkpoints, stations, and personnel, making it more dangerous to be an Iraqi policeman than an Iraqi soldier.115

Police forces also continue to be plagued by poor training, lack of equipment, corruption (as discussed in indicator 7), and perhaps most importantly, strong ties to ethno-sectarian and political groups. As of August 1, the National Police Force has been renamed the Iraqi Federal Police (IFP) in order to emphasize its multi-ethnic composition. However, according to the former police chief and mayor of in Nineveh province, “ethno-sectarian ties pose the largest obstacle to the ISF in its quest to become genuinely professional and truly national in character.”116 The police fare worse than the military in creating perceptions of political favoritism, as local and regional governments regularly bypass Interior Ministry oversight and directly recruit police members.

The force is also rife with training inconsistencies, as many new hires have had to wait months to begin basic skills training. The hiring freeze on new police should allow the government to catch up on training new recruits; however, the lack of a coherent national training program still leads to ad hoc and spotty skill sets. Furthermore, the U.S. military still provides much of the training at local levels, which has resulted in an emphasis on paramilitary and counterinsurgency skills.117 The IFP needs to establish a training program focused on core policing skills and professional development in order to effectively carry out traditional law and order tasks.

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

In the wake of the coordinated attack on two ministries that killed more than 100 people, the (NIA) announced its formation on August 24, taking advantage of the disarray in an attempt to undermine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s once-lauded security efforts. The Iran-leaning Shiite alliance, led by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), is set to challenge al-Maliki’s Dawa party in January’s national elections. It includes such leaders as Muqtada al-Sadr, Ahmad Chalabi, and Ibrahim al-Jafari, as well as two minor Sunni figures. Despite a large following, however, the alliance has no clear leadership and critics accuse it of being little more than a tool for rival factions to gain power.118

115 “Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the readiness of Iraqi security forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08/12/2009 116 “Iraqi security forces after U.S. Troop withdrawal: An Iraqi perspective,” National Defense University, 08/2009 117 “Iraqi Federal Police fight hand to hand,” Multi-National Force – Iraq, 08/17/2009 118 “Blowing a hole in the political landscape; the reshaping of Iraqi politics,” The Economist, 08/29/2009

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One reason for the absence of leadership is that just days after the announcement of the NIA, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the ISCI, died from cancer at the age of 59 in a hospital in Iran. Known for being one of the most notable opponents of Saddam Hussein—fighting on the side of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and with the U.S. during the invasion in 2003—his party went through many changes in recent years trying to scale back affiliation with Iran and loosen their pro-federalist stance regarding the Shiite south. Hakim’s son, Ammar al-Hakim, will assume leadership of ISCI until the Consultative Council of ISCI formally picks a successor, which is predicted to be Ammar.119

Prime Minister al-Maliki will also have to recalculate his allegiances due to the formation of the new NIA, which al-Maliki purportedly refused to join since he wasn’t guaranteed to be the sole candidate for prime Minister. Previously accustomed to wide-spread popularity because of the improved security situation he took credit for, al-Maliki now is facing deterioration in his support base. As violence has intensified this month, many followers have lost faith in him as a leader qualified to protect Iraqis against insurgents and outside interference. Therefore, in order to garner back popular support, he will have to clamp down on the Sunni insurgency and reach out to minority groups such as the Kurds and Sunnis, and Shiites who are weary of Iranian influence.120

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

Iraq’s bloated civil service due to over-hiring across the public sector is impacting its ability to attract foreign investment in state-owned factories and industries. For example, at one state- owned electrical plant in Baghdad, a maximum of 2,500 workers are required, but 4,370 employees are on the payroll.121 Privatizing such sites and cutting excess public workers will make them more efficient, but the government is not ready to provide for thousands of unemployed workers.

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

As mentioned in Indicator 9, Amnesty International has recently raised concerns about the high rate of death penalty sentences being issued in Iraq, saying that most of the trials have been conducted secretively and hastily. According to the report, the courts that sentence people to death do not meet international standards and Iraqi authorities "provide very little information on executions.”122 The report lists a wide variety of crimes that can result in the death penalty and they include murder, crimes compromising state security, attempts to overthrow the government by violent means, and the damaging of public property.123 Amnesty International also documented several instances of “political interference” in the trials of former Iraqi officials that

119 “Al-Hakim’s death unsettles Iraqi politics,” Salon, 08/27/2009 120 “Iraq’s Al-Maliki finds himself without political backing,” The Boston Globe, 08/25/2009 121 “Iraq investors face bloated workforce dilemma,” Reuters, 08/10/2009 122 “Report criticizes Iraq's executions,” CNN-International, 08/31/2009 123 Ibid.

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have undermined the “independence and impartiality of the tribunal.”124 The report contends that even the trial of Saddam Hussein was subject to such interference, as the government dismissed a judge who was considered unlikely to support the death penalty against him.125 Considering these weaknesses, some observers are concerned that the rapid transfer of detainees from U.S. custody to the Iraqi criminal justice system, which is not ready to absorb them, will only exacerbate the situation and will increase the incidents of human rights violations.

5. Military Rating: Moderate

Iraqi troops continue to take on increased security responsibilities across the country, although they still rely heavily on U.S. forces for training, equipment, and intelligence information. U.S. troops accompany their Iraqi counterparts on routine missions, such as patrols, and continue to provide everything from basic equipment to attack aircraft, intelligence, and even weather forecasting.126 However, a high emphasis has been placed on demonstrating the leading role of Iraqi forces, with the U.S. serving an advisory and support role. For example, U.S. soldiers present in Baghdad during the ministry bombings reported having to watch from the sidelines as they never received a formal support request from Iraqi forces.

The U.S. commander in charge of training Iraqi security forces, Army Lt. Gen. Frank Helmick, says he is frustrated with the pace of training, which may not be going fast enough and will therefore be interrupted by a full U.S. troop withdrawal at the end of 2011. He states that U.S. trainers have built up Iraqi infantry and police forces, but tasks such as developing forensic teams, logistical capabilities and intelligence are coming much more slowly.127

While the army is generally regarded as a more professional force and less divided along sectarian lines than the police, corruption is still endemic. Incidents such as the ministry bombings perpetuate the widespread belief that the army is just as susceptible to bribery. This makes it more difficult to convince Iraqis that the Iraqi security forces are self-sufficient and do not depend on the U.S. troops for security. The Ministry of Defense denies all corruption accusations, but stories of bribery in the army abound. “I have to give a bribe to join the army, I have to bribe at checkpoints, I have to bribe the commander if I am in the army - everywhere I turn I have to bribe,” said one Baghdad resident.128 On the other hand, as Ambassador Christopher Hill points out, “The Iraqi Army is not the [same] one people worried about three years ago…now it’s an army that is broadly understood not to be engaged in sectarian violence.”129

124 “Human rights in Republic of Iraq, report 2009,” Amnesty International, 08/31/2009 125 “Report criticizes Iraq's executions,” CNN-International, 08/31/2009 126 “Iraqis uneasy at idea of early US withdrawal,” Associated Press, 08/15/2009 127 “US training commander 'frustrated' in Iraq,” Associated Press, 08/25/2009 128 “'Illusion' of security in Iraq,” BBC, 08/11/2009 129 “Shiites in Iraq show restraint as Sunnis attack,” The New York Times, 08/12/2009

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STINGS:

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), died on August 26, two days after the Shiite coalition led by his party and other Shiite factions announced a new electoral alliance, the Iraqi National Alliance.130 Under Al-Hakim’s leadership, ISCI played an important role in Iraq’s stability, as its militia, known as the Badr Brigades, was absorbed into the government’s security apparatus.131 Al Hakim was seen as a unifying, and often a pacifying force within Iraqi politics: “Mr. Hakim’s influence could be seen as recently as February, when a plan by leading politicians to try to oust Mr. Ak-Al-Maliki was scuttled because Mr. Hakim would not offer his support…”132 Without the central leadership role previously played by al-Hakim, the direction Shiite leaders will take in the future remains to be seen.

130 “Shiite power broker dies, in blow to Iraqi party,” The New York Times, 08/26/2009 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid.

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Appendix II: September 2009 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Persistent drought continues to adversely affect Iraq’s supply of water and electricity, threatening an environmental disaster. Although drought, caused by extremely low levels of precipitation, is the biggest contributor to the shortage of water and electricity, some also blame Iraq’s neighbors, mainly Turkey and Syria, for restricting water flow from the Euphrates and Rivers by building dams. Turkey’s Ataturk Dam, for instance, has reduced water flow from the Euphrates by one-fifth, and ongoing construction of Aliso Dam on the Tigris River is estimated to deprive Iraq of a third of its arable land.133

Marshlands of southern Iraq—mainly in Nassiriyah, Missan and Basra provinces—have been hit the hardest, as drought threatens the livelihoods of the local populations. The marshland residents, whose population is estimated at 1.2 million, have built their lives around these marshes, fishing, raising water buffalo for milk and cheese, and living in huts woven from marsh reeds.134 With the area of lush marshlands shrinking fast (only 10-12 percent of the current marshland area is covered by water), farmers are losing livestock and arable land.135 According to recent official statistics, the number of water buffalo endemic to this region has decreased by 35% due to a shortage and poor quality of water.136 Decreased water flow has also stifled proper water circulation, creating stagnant pools that are perfect breeding grounds for harmful bacteria. In effect, many farmers have reported their buffalo going blind or not producing as much milk because they have been infected by contaminated water.137 The province of Basra is reported to have the highest level of contaminated water (47% according to a recent World Health Organization report), which is likely to increase the prevalence of cholera and other waterborne diseases in the region.

Another side effect of dropping water levels is the rise in salinity levels in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, a major water source in southern Iraq. The head of Basra Provincial Council Jabbar Amin described the situation as an “environmental crisis” and declared the affected areas “disaster areas with no life due to the displacement of humans and damage to agriculture.”138 Increasing salinity renders the water unusable for irrigation or consumption, while low levels of water forces local authorities to shut down more electricity generating plants. The presence of higher-than-normal salinity levels can be attributed to the decrease in fresh water flow from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers that has allowed salt water from the to flow in to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Shatt al-Arab waterway, which has been an issue of contention between Iraq and Iran for decades, feeds off of the Karun and Karkha Rivers originating in Iran. Local authorities accuse Iran of exacerbating the situation in the region by diverting and

133 “Iraq's marshes are dying a second death,” Los Angeles Times, 09/24/2009 134 Ibid. 135 “IRAQ: Iraq’s marshlands in peril again,” IRIN, 09/21/2009 136 “Buffalos down by 35% due to drought in Amara,” Aswat al-Iraq, 09/12/2009 137 “Iraq's marshes are dying a second death,” Los Angeles Times, 09/24/2009 138 “Driven out of farming by a salty waterway,” IRIN, 09/03/2009

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restricting the course of these two rivers. They are frustrated that the central government is not doing enough to combat what they call “Iranian infringements on Iraq’s share of the Shatt al- Arab’s waters.”139

To address the water crisis in the region, officials from Iraq met with their counterparts from Syria and Turkey early in September. Turkey promised to increase the water flow into the Euphrates River, but no long-term solution to the problem was reached. The Iraqi government’s domestic efforts to alleviate the problem include recently-announced multibillion dollar projects, such as building dykes on marshlands to boost water flow into drought-ridden areas and installing satellite technology to track water quality and levels.140 These projects, however, will not be completed in the near future. Meanwhile, many families in the affected regions are forced to sell their livestock and abandon their arid lands in the hopes of finding better opportunities in nearby cities. Over 150 families (about 1,200 individuals) have already left their homes in the city of Faw in Basra, according to the head of Basra Agriculture Directorate.141 The displaced join an estimated 3,000 others who left their land on the banks of the Shatt al-Arab in August after rising salt levels rendered water unfit for consumption and farming.142

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) continue to suffer harsh conditions both in camps and upon their return home. According to UNHCR, 1,650 refugees and 10,370 IDPs returned home this month—the lowest rate of return since January 2009. Of the returnees, 67% returned to Baghdad and 26% to Diyala, with the rest going to the 16 other governorates. The total number of refugees and IDPs currently amount to around 1.5 million and 2.8 million, respectively.143

Shelter, food, and employment rank as the top needs of Iraq’s IDPs. For example, unemployment numbers among IDP families show a very bleak picture: unemployment is 99% in Kirkuk, 97% in Qadisiya, 94% in Basra, 89.4% in Wasit, 60% in Baghdad, and 58% in Diyala.144 Due to the lack of income generated by most IDP families, fear of losing their home, if they own one, is a very real concern. Some parents have resorted to sending their kids to beg or work rather than attend school (see Indicator 9) and most female-headed households have had to rely exclusively on external sources to survive, while remaining vulnerable to prostitution and trafficking.145 In Kirkuk, however, where approximately 70,000 IDPs reside and unemployment is especially rampant, access to work is not a priority at this point because access to food, shelter, and water are. More than one quarter of all IDPs in Kirkuk live in “precarious housing situations,” which can include public buildings, tents, collective settlements, or abandoned military camps.

139 “Salt levels in Shatt al-Arab threaten environmental disaster,” Niqash, 09/02/2009 140 “Iraq’s marshlands in peril again,” IRIN, 09/21/2009 141 “Driven out of farming by a salty waterway,” IRIN, 09/03/2009 142 “Surge of seawater drives Iraqis from their homes in the south,” The Guardian, 09/12/2009 143 “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – September 2009,” UNHCR, 09/2009 144 “Iraq: Work, shelter, and food top needs of internally displaced,” Relief Web, 09/15/2009 145 Ibid.

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Moreover, access to food through the Public Distribution System (PDS) reaches merely 18% of IDPs on a regular basis, and 25% only sometimes.146

Finding sources of food has also proven difficult for IDP families outside of Kirkuk, even with the public distribution system (PDS) in place. For instance, in Ninewa and Wadissya, 79.1% and 53% of IDP families, respectively, are receiving food irregularly, and in governorates such as Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, and Basra, IDP families are not even being reached. Another growing concern is a lack of clean water for IDP populations in Anbar, Kirkuk, Muthana, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din.147 Damaged or insufficient infrastructure, old and overburdened networks, absence of sanitation facilities, sewage flows, and long travel distances are all reasons why access to this vital resource has declined. Health problems such as cholera and other diarrheal diseases have resulted, and long distances to proper healthcare facilities have exacerbated the problem.148

Kurdish IDPs living in collective towns in have also reported that they are lucky if they receive water every ten days. However, their displacement dates back to the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein gassed and razed Kurdish villages in the north forcing residents to flee. They were resettled in collective, makeshift towns and thousands still remain there today. Called the “forgotten displaced,” many of these Kurdish residents are frustrated with the two ruling Kurdish parties who only help them during election seasons, and who only resettle the IDPs who have political connections or influence. For the remaining IDPs who do not have the ability to move, life in these ramshackle establishments remains a daily struggle, as public funds rarely reach them and economic opportunities are limited.149

The Palestinian population in Iraq is also facing hardship, as its previous population of 30,000 in Baghdad in 2003 has been reduced to half that number over the past six years. Initially, Saddam Hussein had encouraged the migration of Palestinians to Iraq in order to display his dedication to the notion of Arab unity and to create an image for himself as protector of the oppressed. However, after the U.S. led invasion in 2003, many Palestinians were directly targeted by vengeance-seeking Shiite militias and were forced to flee their homes. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that at the largest border camp in Syria, Al-Tanf, none of the Palestinians seek to return to their homes in Iraq. Even though conditions in the camps are described as “appalling” and numerous health problems abound, Palestinians are more fearful of the violence they would face upon returning home. They also worry that the state will discriminate against them or neglect them due to their Sunni, Palestinian identity. However, Abdul Samad Sultan, Iraq’s Immigration Minister, refuted these claims and stated, “The government cares about Palestinians as much as it cares about all other Iraqis.”150

146 “ Profile July 2009,” IOM, 07/2009 147 “Iraq: Work, shelter, and food top needs of internally displaced,” Relief Web, 09/15/2009 148 “Iraq—complex emergency,” USAID, 09/30/2009 149 “On Iraq’s margins live the forgotten displaced; Earlier conflicts uprooted villagers who now subsist with little official support,” International Herald Tribune, 09/05/2009 150 “Iraqi Palestinians yearn to belong,” Relief Web, 09/09/2009

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3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

The first half of September witnessed fewer and less-deadly attacks, which contributed to the overall drop in the number of deaths in September from 537 in August to 296 in September.151 Tightened security following the deadly bombings of the Foreign and Finance Ministries in August contributed to a greater sense of security among Iraqis, who felt relatively safe going out and congregating in large crowds as they celebrated Ramadan.152 However, as the Muslim holy month of Ramadan drew closer to an end, the number and intensity of attacks picked up again.

While some of the attacks occurred in ethnically and religiously diverse areas, others were targeted at particular Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish neighborhoods where insurgents sought to exacerbate sectarian tensions between these groups. One bomb exploded in a parked car in the town of Mahmoudiya, which has a sizable Shiite community. At least seven people were killed and 21 wounded. Another suicide bomb in a Kurdish village killed at least 19 villagers and wounded 13.153 These attacks demonstrate that insurgents are taking advantage of lingering ethnic and sectarian disputes that the Iraqi government has failed to address.154

Disputes between the Kurdish Regional Government and the central government over land and oil continue to fuel ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, especially in Kirkuk and Nineveh. The central government and the Kurdish authorities have been unable to agree on how to share the oil revenue, which has blocked payments to Western oil companies operating in Kurdish regions.155 The lack of progress in these disputes is trying the patience of many Kurds, who believe their regional government is fully capable of making its own decisions and see Baghdad’s interference as a major obstacle to developing the Kurdish regions. In his interview with Niqash, Sa’di Ahmad Bira, a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), expressed his concern about the lack of progress and said that military action was a possibility if the central government fails to propose a tangible solution.156

The latest report from the International Crisis Group focuses on and identifies the region as “Iraq’s new battleground”. According to the report, conflict between Sunni Arabs and Kurds threatens to spiral out of control in Nineveh, which has seen a dramatic increase in attacks while levels of violence have dropped in other parts of the country.157 After Baghdad, Nineveh was the hardest hit in August attacks, with at least 63 deaths and 275 injuries reported.158 In response, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, suggested creating joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Nineveh, which was welcomed by Nineveh’s Kurdish Fraternal List, but rejected by the ruling Sunni-Arab al-Hadbaa party.159 In neighboring Tamim

151“Iraq Body Count,” http://www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed 09/30/2009 152 “Iraqis venture out near Ramadan end as violence drops,” Reuters, 09/16/2009 153 “Car bomb kills 7 in market south of Iraqi capital,” Associated Press, 09/18/2009 154 “Truck bomb in north Iraq Kurdish village kills 19,” Reuters, 09/09/2009 155 “Iraq may not pay for Kurdish oil for years,” Reuters, 09/08/2009 156 “PUK: We are prepared for a military solution,” Niqash, 09/22/2009 157 “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa,” International Crisis Group, 09/28/2009 158 “Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish patrols okayed In Ninewa objected to In Kirkuk,” The Ground Truth in Iraq, 09/10/2009 159 Ibid.

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province, home to Kirkuk, Arabs and Turks also protested against such an initiative, fearing a larger presence of Kurds in Kirkuk.

The government’s recent efforts to crack down on the Awakening Councils lately has also contributed to grievances and is seen by some as one of the reasons for an upsurge in violence. Critics argue that Prime Minister al-Maliki has launched a systematic campaign against the councils by fabricating arrest warrants on false charges of murder and corruption, in an effort to diminish their influence.160 Most Awakening Council members have not been incorporated into the Iraqi security forces as of yet and see al-Maliki’s policies toward them as an effort to disarm their largely Sunni group. Growing discontent poses a major threat to Iraqi security, as disillusioned council members are more susceptible to joining the ranks of insurgent groups.

Despite Prime Minister al-Maliki’s efforts to convince his constituencies and the international community that stability is growing in Iraq, other Iraqi officials remain highly cautious of immediate U.S. military withdrawals. In an implicit criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's exaggeration of security in Iraq and reluctance to ask the U.S. for help, Iraq's Vice President Dr. Abdul Mahdi called for a reassessment of the role of U.S. forces in Iraq.161 , former interim and currently a member of Iraq's Parliament, and Saleh al-Mutlaq, head of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (a Sunni party), testified before a U.S. Congressional committee in September, also raising concern about the effects of a U.S. withdrawal on the upcoming January elections. They called for increased monitoring by the U.S. and United Nations to ensure safe and transparent elections, which, as indicators already show, will likely be marred by ethnic and sectarian tensions (see Indicator 11).162

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), Iraqi minority groups that have already left the country, such as Christians, , Circassians, Shabaks, Turkmen, and Yazidis, have no future plans to return. Even when monetary incentives were given, minority groups repeatedly refused to return to their homes in Iraq due to a fear of being targeted because of their religion and culture. MRG pointed to a general lack of law and order that inhibits the government from protecting these communities. One Mandaean Iraqi currently residing in Sweden reflected this sentiment: “We will never go back, it is impossible. We will suffer death if we go back…If you stay in Iraq, you will convert to Islam or be killed. For this reason, the future is dead for us there.”163 Women also express an unwillingness to return because they don’t feel Iraq is safe for them and don’t feel respected. Many have been forced to wear a hijab or walk outside with a male escort; others have been victims of rape and/or abduction.

Tellingly, Iraq continues to rank second in MRG’s “Peoples Under Threat” table, which indicates countries where minorities face the greatest risk of genocide, systematic violent

160 “Government crackdown and internal feuds weaken Awakening Councils,” Niqash, 09/30/09 161 “Iraq's vice president says Iraq should call on US for security help,” Christian Science Monitor, 09/16/2009 162 “Iraqi Politicians Urge Cautious US Military Withdrawal,” Voice of America News, 09/18/2009 163 “Uncertain refuge, dangerous return: Iraq’s uprooted minorities,” Minority Rights Group International, 09/2009

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repression, or mass killing.164 As of September 18 the number of Iraqi academics killed was 431, and gays, Christians, and other minorities have repeatedly been under attack by militia groups (see Indicator 9).165 For instance, in a northern city near Mosul, a Christian doctor working as a gynecologist was abducted by an armed gang. She was freed shortly after the kidnapping, but the kidnappers’ motivation is still unknown.166 Recognizing the precarious state of Iraq, Abdul Khaliq Zangana, Chairman of the Iraqi Parliament’s Deportees, Immigrants, and Expatriates Committee, stated this month that, “as much as we would like to see all refugees…return to their homes, we have to admit that favorable conditions conducive to their return are still nonexistent.”167

However, some artists in Iraq still hope for a revival of the once-thriving arts industry. After the US invasion in 2003, galleries were closed down, bookstores destroyed, and many of Iraq’s artists fled to Europe or the Middle East. One painter claimed few of his colleagues have returned and asked, “Will they come back for the unemployment? Or death? Or for the lack…of general services, such as electricity and water?” However, another musician who plays for the Iraqi National Symphony Orchestra—that has recently played a record number of concerts since after the 2003 invasion—disagrees and had a more optimistic outlook, believing that it is still possible for the arts to survive regardless of the harsh circumstances.168

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

The rural population of Iraq continues to be passed over by economic development in the country. Many rural communities feel neglected by the government because they do not see a fair share of the oil revenue even though their own lands are being exploited by oil companies for development. When China National Petroleum, China’s biggest oil company, recently started developing the oil fields in Wasit province, for example, the local community was largely left out. Residents—a vast majority of whom are Shiites—complain that despite the multibillion dollar development project of Ahdab oil field in Wasit, the local community has not seen a major increase in employment or other benefits.169 Farmers in the province also complain about the company's equipment damaging their homes and crops. Their demands to get $1 per barrel of oil produced—which would go towards improving access to clean water, paving roads, building schools and hospitals, and other much needed public services—have gone unheeded.

Rural communities in the south greatly affected by prolonged drought also believe the government is not doing enough to alleviate their suffering (see Indicator 1). They contend that the government has been downplaying the severity of the problem by restricting the movement of residents out of these areas. In one such case, families trying to leave Faw, a remote region in Basra province, were stopped at checkpoints and forced to go back.170

164 “Uncertainty and injustice for minority refugees from Iraq – new report,” Relief Web, 09/24/2009 165 “Iraq: Key figures since the war began,” CBS News, 10/01/2009 166 “Kidnapped Christian doctor released in northern Iraq,” Agence France Presse, 09/27/2009 167 “Iraqi refugees, displaced persons slow to return home,” Radio Free Europe, 09/25/2009 168 “Iraq’s once-vibrant arts scene looks for revival; Supporters see positive signs after years of fear,” USA Today, 09/08/2009 169 “Iraq activism grows as oil fields open to foreigners,” The International Herald Tribune,09/07/2009 170 “Worsening water crisis drains hope for future,” The National, 09/19/2009

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Despite ongoing disputes with the central government, the Kurdish region is developing at a much faster rate than the rest of the country due to an increased flow of foreign investment and relative political stability and security in the region. A good indicator of such progress is improved infrastructure and public services. For example, the self-ruled Kurdish government has been able to provide an average of more than 18 hours of electricity daily to parts of their population, which is higher than the national average (see Indicator 8).171

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 8

Factors such as the global financial crisis, rising inflation, mismanagement of the budget, rampant corruption within the government, and escalating violence continue to impede economic development in Iraq. According to a recent report by Iraq’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), the inflation index rose 2.9% during August and now stands at 10.8%.172 The Iraqi government’s reliance on oil sales for more than 90% of its revenue renders economic development vulnerable to volatile oil prices in the global market. For instance, the Iraqi government had to cut its 2009 budget twice, from $79 billion to $58.6 billion, because of a sharp drop in oil prices, which halted development projects across the country.173 With the price of oil slightly rebounding, the Iraqi government proposed a 20% raise in the 2010 budget based on U.S. $60 per barrel. However, according to Iraq's Deputy Finance Minister Fadhil Othman, despite the raise, the 2010 budget still falls short of the country's funding needs.174

Corruption and budget mismanagement by local authorities also contribute to the economic stalemate in Iraq. According to Iraq’s Planning Minister, who visited Nineveh province in early September, 80% (or $58.6 billion) of the 2009 overall budget went to operational costs such as salaries, pensions, and ration cards, leaving only 20% for investment in development.175 Distribution of the 2010 budget is expected to follow the same pattern, with $51 billion of the budget going toward operational expenses, while only about $19 billion going toward infrastructure projects.176 This highlights the fact that the government is unable to fill the vacuum in the investment-starved economic sector and will rely heavily on foreign aid and investment in the oil sector to close the gap.

However, with growing political instability and violence, foreign investors remain cautious to invest in Iraq—with exception of the oil sector—despite the government’s reassurances that it is safe to invest in Iraq. Along with security concerns, foreign investors are also discouraged by the level of bureaucracy, corruption, and heavy involvement of the government in business transactions. The concept of market economy and privatization of economic sectors are still foreign concepts to many Iraqi officials. In his interview with the New York Times, Sami al-

171 “Power problems mean Iraq suffers hot summer, again,” Associated Press, 09/07/2009 172 “Iraq inflation up by 2.9% in Aug. – COSIT,” Aswat al-Iraq, 09/27/2009 173 “US: Iraq budget shortfall poses security challenge,” Associated Press, 09/30/2009 174 Ibid. 175 “Minister says govt. unable to cover projects, eyes private sector,” Aswat al-Iraq, 09/03/2009 176 “US: Iraq budget shortfall poses security challenge,” Associated Press, 09/30/2009

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Araji, the chairman of Iraq’s National Investment Commission, reflected on the situation, stating that, “We are not after shock therapy…We are after a gradual change from a centrally controlled economy to an open one.”177

The lack of comprehensive laws for regulation of investments, land rights, and financial services, along with a shortage of basic public services such as electricity and paved roads, have already caused freezes on multibillion dollar projects and are likely to deter many investors from investing in Iraq. Disagreement between the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government about sharing oil revenues is forcing foreign investors to think twice about investing even in lucrative Iraqi oil. As reported in Indicator 3, oil companies operating in the Kurdish region may have to wait for years before the government pays them and are therefore, “in no hurry to start pumping yet.”178

Security implications due to Iraq’s economic weakness are alarming. With U.S. troops fast withdrawing, Iraq will soon have to rely entirely on its own security forces to provide safety and security for its people. However, with budget constraints facing the Iraqi government, defense officials have already been told to implement hiring freezes and limit their military spending.179 The recent rise in violence suggests, however, these cuts in personnel and security trainings will further incapacitate the struggling Iraqi security forces and will lead to even more widespread violence as elections approach.

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

There have been numerous claims of corruption across the country this month, affecting Basra, Diwaniyah, Anbar, and Kurdistan. In Basra, security forces were accused of administrative corruption as well as partisan politics. They were charged with targeting specific factions with links to Iran while supporting other gangs that took part in the extortion and abduction of civilians. A member of one of the armed groups asserted, “Each police department or other Interior Ministry organ is under the control of a specific party, something that gives the command of that organ the freedom to act according to partisan whims.” 180 Security sources confirmed allegations of increased corruption in security bodies and also stated that bribes are a regular occurrence.

Accusations flared in Diwaniyah Province against the (SLC) after several major leadership changes were carried out within the security forces. The SLC is headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who took office at the beginning of this year after winning the provincial elections. Diwaniyah Provincial Council Member Husayn al-Budayri claimed that “more than 90 percent of the terrorism-fighting officers were transferred to border areas,” 181 referring to the officers who took part in Operation Lion’s Roar, a strategy focused on dissolving

177 “Many investors still avoiding risks of Iraq,” The New York Times, 09/28/2009 178 “Iraq may not pay for Kurdish oil for years,” Reuters, 09/08/2009 179 “US: Iraq budget shortfall poses security challenge,” Associated Press, 09/30/2009 180 “Pro-Iran groups in Iraq’s Basra under pressure after new security plan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/25/2009 181 “Iraq: Al-Diwaniyah officials, residents view city’s security stability, threats,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/02/2009

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Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups in May 2008. Al-Budayri professed that they are being punished and marginalized for measures they took in the past to rid the area of insurgents. On the other hand, Hajj Karim Zughayyir, the new chairman of the provincial council's Security Committee, disputed the claim and argued that many of the officers had violated human rights and taken part in corruption, aggression, and extortion. One citizen believed it was a good sign that government officials could be substituted so easily and was grateful that officers who ignore Iraqi laws are held accountable. Another citizen, however, linked the current accusations to January’s parliamentary elections and postulated that each side was merely trying to defame the other.182

The new government in Anbar Province also came under pressure, with charges spreading that council leaders only seek to “enrich themselves through sweetheart business deals,” and have no interest in helping the people. The previous Sunni, that won 2005’s provincial elections (due to secular, tribal Sunnis boycotting it) was repeatedly called illegitimate and corrupt, as millions of dollars given to it by the central government could not be accounted for. However, the tables have now turned and the province’s current governor, Qasim Abed al- Fahadawi, is accused of collaborating with Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha who led the Awakening Movement two years ago and is now the leader of the dominant provincial political party, Awakening of Iraq. The two men are accused of controlling the distribution of business deals and of favoring their tribal and business friends over others. Rival tribal leaders have gone so far as to proclaim that Sheikh Ahmed only desires to “cement his position as the province’s de facto chieftain and to freeze them out of lucrative business interests.”183

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had to face the Oslo Stock Exchange this month after an investigation revealed that insider trading had taken place between the KRG’s Resources Minister, Ashti Hawrami, and DNO International, one of three oil companies the KRG is working with to develop their oil fields. Minister Hawrami reportedly was the middle man in a transaction worth $29.7 million between the Norwegian oil company DNO and the Turkish oil company Genel Energji. Genel Energi and Addax Petroleum, a subsidiary of China Petrochemical Corporation, operate the Taq Taq site in Iraqi Kurdistan, while DNO runs the Tawke field. The KRG has tried to cover up Minister Hawrami’s illegal dealing by suspending DNO’s work in Kurdistan for 6 weeks and demanding that DNO repair the KRG’s reputation— threatening to suspend the contract altogether if a “proper explanation” is not given. The government contended that it was merely trying to assist the oil companies so they would be able to work in Kurdistan. However, the recent controversy may have only hurt the region’s chances to attract oil companies, as none of the companies have even been compensated for their work up to this point, and now they are at risk of incrimination by the KRG.184

The Iraqi Integrity Commission Report for 2008 uncovered by McClatchy Newspapers this month revealed the extent to which public officials have evaded submitting their financial disclosures and have repeatedly pardoned corruption cases. None of the members of parliament turned over their finances in 2008, and in 2007, only 14 out of 275 did. Additionally, 2,772

182 Ibid 183 “Old problems persist despite new leadership in Iraq’s Anbar Province,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/13/2009 184 “Oil scandal hits Kurdistan,” Musings on Iraq, 09/23/2009

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defendants were pardoned for corruption in 2008 and of the 11% of pardoned cases that were given a dollar value, $1.3 billion was found to be lost due to corruption. One reason corruption rates are so high is because the Iraqi Amnesty Law, that was intended to enable reconciliation, has been used to circumvent corruption charges. Article 136B of the Iraqi Penal Code has also played a large part in enabling high-ranking officials to block investigations by the Integrity Commission. Transparency International ranks Iraq as the third most corrupt country in the world out of 180, indicating dire need for reform if credibility and stability are to prevail in Iraq.185 Even if elections in January are free and fair, extensive corruption on this scale will continue to erode government legitimacy.

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

According to a report by the United States Department of State, the supply of electricity in Iraq from early to mid-September was 39% above supply in the same period a year ago and met 67% percent of estimated demand, compared with 49% the year before.186 Iraq's current electricity capacity is around 7,500 megawatts, compared with an estimated demand of 12,000 megawatts.187 The rise in electricity supply has been uneven, with some regions—especially Baghdad, Arbil, and other Kurdish regions—receiving more than others. Average hours of power for this month, after meeting demand for essential services, were 15.6 in Baghdad and 15.2 in Iraq, compared with 7.3 and 11.7, respectively, for September 2008.188 The report credits the rise, specifically in Baghdad and Arbil, to the construction of additional power generators and improvement in reliable transmission lines. Despite these developments, Iraq’s electricity infrastructure—which has been repeatedly targeted by insurgents and further weakened by severe water shortages—falls short of supplying sufficient amounts of electricity to many parts of the country.

Severe droughts that have plagued Iraq in recent months have contributed to drastic water shortages in communities along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in southern Iraq. As reported in Indicator 1, low water levels in the rivers have also increased salinity in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, further reducing fresh water flows. To ameliorate the situation, the Iraqi Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works announced at the end of September that it started eight projects to purify water in Basra—one of the hardest hit regions in Iraq.189 The locals are not as enthusiastic about the projects, because they view the efforts as too little too late, especially for those who had to sell their animals and leave their homes to escape the drought. Access to potable water remains limited in other parts of Iraq as well, due to damaged or insufficient water infrastructure. Many families throughout Iraq continue to rely on untreated water from rivers and farms, increasing the likelihood of waterborne diseases.

Iraq’s public education system also remains in dire condition. Shortage of electricity and water, crowded classrooms, and outdated facilities are overwhelming Iraq’s already fragile school

185 “$1.3 billion is pardoned in Iraq and more,” McClatchy Newspapers, 09/13/2009 186 “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” United States Department of State, 09/16/2009 187 “Iraq awards power contracts to SNC, URUK,” Reuters, 09/19/2009 188 “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” United States Department of State, 10/07/2009 189 “Eight new water purification projects in Iraq's Basra,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/26/2009

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system. The situation is especially dismal in Sadr City, a Shiite slum of Baghdad. This impoverished and densely-populated district is home to 1.3 million of the Baghdad's 7 million residents, most of whom are children.190 According to Yasin Waheeb, an education planning director in Baghdad, Sadr City classrooms are accommodating 40 to 50 students and many of 191 them have to sit on the floor. The length of the classes are reduced from 45 to 30 minutes and many schools work in shifts, with sets of students attending class for only three hours daily.192 High unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy rates in Sadr City are predicted to only worsen, as schools are not able to accommodate the growing population and many students drop out of school.

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

Child labor is a growing dilemma in Iraq, with around 15 percent of children under the age of 14 now working. Nearly five million Iraqi children are orphans, and the Iraqi Ministry of Education reported that the percentage of school dropouts has reached an alarming 60%. Child labor began in the 1980s, worsened during heavy sanctions, and escalated after the 2003 invasion. Parents oftentimes face limited employment opportunities or in other cases the breadwinner is absent. A sociology professor at Baghdad University asserted that the problem is not with existing laws, but rather with society itself, for the practice has become so widespread that it “surpasses the limit of individual and even institutional capabilities.”193

Unspeakable crimes against gays in Iraq have continued unabated while security forces remain unresponsive. The deaths of around 680 men have been reported since 2004, with 130 since the beginning of the year and 70 in the past five months.194 Government officials, however, are fearful of being labeled as defenders of “immorality” and therefore have not brought forth one murder case to be investigated, nor has one suspected perpetrator been arrested. Militia groups, which in the past waged violence against sectarian targets, have now decidedly taken on a new vigilante role, touting themselves to be the guarantors of religion and morality. Women, in effect, have also become victims. Hundreds, if not thousands, of women have been killed since 2003 for reasons of working outside the home, walking on the streets unveiled, or donning pants or makeup. Some analysts believe this is just the beginning of a new campaign of brutality and that if these acts are not condemned and prosecuted now, the rights and lives of all Iraqis could be at stake.195

Nightly curfews that were reinforced in Baghdad in June continue to allow police to easily round up dissenters of the Shiite-led government—many of whom are leaders of Sunni Awakening Councils that drove out Sunni rebels hoping in exchange to be given a share of the new power structure. A unit known as the Baghdad Brigade, or less formally “the dirty squad,” purportedly

190 “Iraqi crisis report: Sadr City schools overwhelmed,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 09/30/2009 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 “Al-Jazeera TV program examines ‘alarming’ increase in Iraq child labor,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/29/2009 194 “How Islamists track and kill Iraq’s gays,” The Observer, 09/13/2009 195 “Iraq’s new surge: Gay killings,” Foreign Policy, 09/09/2009

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has carried out the most sensitive of cases and is under the authority of Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki.196 Concern was raised by many human rights groups that Iraq may be returning to its past identity as a police state. For instance, censorship laws were enacted against journalists, plans to censor imported books and the internet were announced, and internet cafes are now forced to register with the government—giving rise to concern that internet users may lose their anonymity. Tellingly, Iraq is ranked 158 out of 173 (its lowest since America’s 2003 invasion) on Reporters Without Borders’ press-freedom table.197

Death penalty sentences in Iraq—amounting to more than 1,000—are also disturbing signs that the era of Saddam Hussein’s brutality may not only be in past memories. Crimes authorized to be punishable by capital punishment were widened in 2004 by the Iraqi government and include “membership and support of armed groups” along with other wide-ranging offenses. Moreover, the judicial system has been alleged to not meet international standards and many of those accused are said to have made false confessions under torture. Iraq’s Human Rights Minister Dr. Wajdan Mikhail Salam supports the death penalty, yet Amnesty International claims that “there’s no evidence that the death penalty ever provides an effective deterrent – and it has palpably failed to stem years of violence in Iraq.”198 One Western diplomat with extensive experience in Iraq stated when asked if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, “This will be a police state, no question. It’ll take two or three years. But it’s coming.”199

The Iraqi government is also under pressure to release 36 members of the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) that were detained on July 28 after Iraqi security forces tried to forcibly overtake Camp Ashraf where 3,400 members reside. The MEK, which advocates the overthrow of the Islamic revolutionary government in Iran, has been in exile in Iraq since welcomed by Saddam Hussein in 1986. However, the new Shiite-led government with ties to Iran has indubitably taken a different stance towards the group. For instance, a local Iraqi court ruling that ordered the release of the 36 detainees on grounds that “they had no charges to answer” has not been carried out by the local police and the government has not intervened. In effect, the 36 men in custody are reported to be in poor health, as they have been on a hunger strike since July 28. Their story has caused fellow Iranian-immigrant protestors in cities across the world to join in the hunger strike as they await action by the Iraqi government or international actors.200

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Allegations against , military, and counterterrorism forces ran rampant this month throughout the country. The security bodies are regarded as being guided by sectarian and political leanings, and opposition parties to the government accuse Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki of being partisan to these actions. For instance, recently he was charged with “purging the American-trained security apparatus so that he could attain quasidictatorial powers.”201 Multiple

196 “Could a police state return?” The Economist, 09/15/2009 197 Ibid. 198 “Amnesty attacks Iraq’s ‘brutal’ justice system,” Birmingham Post, 09/01/2009 199 “Could a police state return?” The Economist, 09/15/2009 200 “Hunger strikers press for Iraq’s release of Iranian exiles,” The New York Times, 09/19/2009 201 “Leader accused of sinister purge to become dictator,” The Times, 09/10/2009

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army and police commanders were dismissed, the head of the intelligence service was pressured into resigning, and three leading members of the Ministry of Interior—which administers the fight against insurgent groups—were let go. Additionally, nightly interrogations and arrests continue throughout Baghdad, journalists face threatening authoritarian controls, and one in twenty Iraqis now reportedly work for the security services in some capacity. Many analysts fear Iraq could turn back into a dictatorial government and liberal MP, Maysoon Al-Damluji agrees: “We mustn’t forget what we went through under Saddam. Power should not be in the hands of a few. What we see now is the preparation once again for something sinister.” Mr. Ak-Al-Maliki has not commented on why he let go of certain officials, but he has said that efforts are being made to improve the security forces.202

The Counterterrorism Agency has also come under fire as accusations that political differences are causing detrimental power struggles arose. A source from the Counterterrorism Agency retorted that “all officers and soldiers of the agency…represented all sects of the Iraqi people” and that “the candidates…signed legal pledges that they would not join any political party or be inclined towards certain sects, and that their loyalty should be to Iraq.”203 However, despite assurances made on paper, it is evident that political influence has seeped into the Iraqi security forces.204 As reported in Indicator 3, Sunni Awakening members have charged the Shiite-led government with initiating an organized campaign against them, using baseless criminal charges and arrest warrants. Many leaders of the Awakening Councils—formed in 2006 to counter al- Qaeda—have already been arrested and Sunnis worry the government is now on a “manhunt” against them, despite previous assurances they would be incorporated into the government. Major General Mohammed Al-Askari, spokesman for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, rejected the allegations and said “there are security campaigns underway to apprehend outlaws regardless of their capacity, post or connections.”205

As reported in Indicator 3, violence in Nineveh province has skyrocketed as debate over a power-sharing deal continues to divide the Sunni Arab al-Hadbaa List and the Kurdish Nineveh Brotherhood. Al-Hadbaa garnered 19 seats in the last election, while Nineveh Brotherhood held onto 12. This change in power, due to the Sunni boycott of elections in 2005, has left Kurds feeling marginalized because they weren’t granted high-level administrative posts in the government.206 Tamim also remains at the center of controversial debates, while tensions in the north have continued to build as a political solution remains illusive.207 The joint security operation promoted by US General Ray Odierno to decrease the violence was welcomed by Kurds, but labeled as illegal and a probable source of sedition by many Arabs and Turkmen.208 US military officials have warned that as elections draw closer, heightened conflict will occur in the oil-rich north because of prevalent power struggles and long-standing political/ethnic tensions that have yet to be resolved.209

202 Ibid. 203 “Iraqi official expresses fears over future of Counterterrorism Agency,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/20/2009 204 “US General says Iraq troop reductions may quicken if elections go well,” The New York Times, 09/30/2009 205 “Government crackdown and internal feuds weaken awakening councils,” Niqash, 09/30/2009 206 “Iraq’s new battlefront: The struggle over Ninewa,” International Crisis Group, 09/28/2009 207 “Iraq Ninawa’s Arab, Kurdish lists set to hold talks in Baghdad,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/10/2009 208 “Iraqi Arabs, Turkmen warn against US plan for Kirkuk forces,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/11/2009 209 “US to send 4,000 troops home to Iraq; General sites data showing fewer attacks,” The Boston Globe, 09/30/2009

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11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

Segmentation has grown among ethnic and religious groups across the Iraqi political spectrum. For example, the Kurds have been in disagreement over whether to run on one ticket or multi- lists in the January election. The PUK and KDP support the latter, as they say multi-lists will be detrimental to Kurdish interests at a time when solidarity is most essential to reach a political solution in the north. On the other hand, the upcoming Kurdish party, Change, is frustrated with the old, longstanding leadership and believes having multi-lists will be to the benefit of Iraq and the Kurds. It does support adopting the same rhetoric and stance in parliament on issues related to the Kurdish region, but believes each party is entitled to its own views on other matters. Change has also insisted that employees who were fired from their governmental posts for supporting the Change List be reinstated, but as of yet Barzani, the region’s president, has only made vocal assurances to do so (see Civil Service).210

Fractionalization is also prevalent among the Shiites, as al-Maliki has gone ahead with his State of Law coalition that will confront the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) in January’s elections. Both parties have been seeking unusual alliances, partnering with leaders outside of their religious persuasion and political views. The , the largest Sunni political party in Iraq and part of the Sunni Iraq Accord Front (the third largest bloc in parliament behind the Shiites and Kurds), has also experienced a decline in members as an unofficial “national unity” campaign has taken over the country. For instance, Sunni cleric Mullah Nadhim Khalil al-Jubori entertained an alliance with al-Maliki, asserting that the days of religious parties are in the past; Shiite Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani initiated a Constitution Party on the basis of “citizenship;” and Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, formed his own party, Renewal, which he touts as “non-sectarian and non-ethnic.”211

Analysts disagree over whether these newly-formed alliances are sincere indications of national unity, or are mere tools used to gain and hold on to power. Some say the partnerships “could reinforce a sense of Iraqi citizenship and nationalism, creating a pluralistic, democratic and tolerant society out of the chaos of the war.”212 Others have proclaimed that the alliances are phony and only temporary; that they are being used by elites to garner unwarranted power and that devastating tactics will be used to undermine each other as January draws closer.213

The northern region is predicted to see the most unrest, as conflict between ethnic sects remains a real cause of concern. During an interview by Al-Iraqiyah Television, Turkmen MP Fawzi Akram for the Al-Sadr Movement, Sunni MP Muhammad Tamim for the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and MP Ahmad Anwar for the Kurdistan Coalition, were questioned about the complex situation that existed in the north. Akram insisted that Turkmen were the true owners of the land and that only recently has there been an influx of Kurds to places like Kirkuk, Mosul, Salah al-Din, and Diyala because they hope to “seize the wealth, the resources, the geography, and the institutions and organizations.” He also questioned why the northern region of Iraq was

210 “Iraqi Kurdish Change movement top official interviewed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/2009 211 “‘National Unity’ slogan is the ‘Yes we can’ of Iraqi politics,” The International Herald Tribune, 09/30/2009 212 Ibid 213 “In sign of times, alliances shift ahead of Iraqi elections,” The Washington Post, 09/30/2009

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called “disputed,” as that is a term used for regions disputed between countries, not for land that should be part of a unified Iraq. Tamim agreed that the region is not historically Kurdish and added that the Kurds should not be awarded political gains or annexation. Anwar, on the other hand, called for Article 140 to be implemented, which calls for the identity of the regions to be determined after a census is held. He also rejected Akram’s claim that peshmerga forces were “outlaw” forces that “must be dealt with as any militias that take up arms against the state and want to topple the government.” Rather, Anwar asserted that peshmerga forces are used to maintain security and stability.214 This interview exposed the contradictory views held by the Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds and demonstrates the uphill struggle mediation efforts face.

One such issue that has encountered stagnation due to the afore-mentioned ethnic dispute is the passage of an election law and national census. If the new election law allowing open lists is passed, voters can choose individual candidates or lists; however, if the 2005 election law remains, voters will only be able to choose lists developed by the parties. The Council of Representatives is currently debating passage of the law, but many fear that it is unlikely to be ratified in time for January 2010’s elections due to disputes over voting in Tamim province where oil-rich Kirkuk—which hosts Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians—is located. The Kurdish Alliance recommends Tamim be treated as a regular province; however, others do not want voting to take place in the province at all, and the Iraqi Islamic Party is pushing for a quota system that would divide power between the four major ethnic groups.215

An Iraqi census that would have determined the ethnic composition of Kirkuk was delayed this month as well, after the Iraqi Council of Ministers decided to postpone the Iraqi census to October of 2010. This comes after the Iraqi Council of Representatives voted for the census to be taken on October 24 of 2009, and after Article 140 of the Constitution called for a referendum on the status of Kirkuk along with a national census, to be held by 2007. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President issued a statement condemning the Council of Ministers’ decree to delay the census and stated the Council’s anticipation of fraud and violence was “irrational.”216

Political differences and election alliances that outwardly prevail in Iraq are igniting concern among some analysts who fear instability and a lack of cohesion will undermine the democratic process and lead to great conflict. US Vice President Joseph Biden traveled to Iraq this month, encouraging the multiple political factions present in Iraq to reconcile their differences before parliamentary elections in January. American Ambassador Christopher Hill reiterated this call by saying “I think the threat is that the political process will not give the country sufficient cohesion to work on its economic issues and otherwise become a strong and stable factor in the region.”217

214 “Iraqi TV talk show views disputed areas problem,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/25/2009 215 “Kirkuk and the 2010 Election Law,” Musings on Iraq, 09/30/2009 216 “Regional Kurdish government criticizes Iraqi government decision to delay census,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/04/2009 217 “The Green Zone takes fire for a second day during Biden’s visit to Baghdad,” The New York Times, 09/17/2009

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12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 7

Following the August 19 bombings of two ministries in Baghdad, Iraqi officials accused their neighbors—particularly Syria—of harboring Al-Qaeda and former Baath Party suspects linked to attacks carried out in Iraq. In September, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appealed to the United Nations Security Council, demanding an international tribunal, since Syria would not cooperate in surrendering former Baath Party members suspected in the August bombings.218 Al-Maliki’s critics accused him of trying to divert attention away from serious security lapses at home by blaming neighbors and contributing to already tense relations with Syria. Syria, which is home to a number of mid-ranking and senior members of the former Baath Party, responded to al- Maliki’s accusations by stating that the Iraqi government has not provided sufficient evidence to prove the suspects’ involvement. Syrians contend that without such evidence, handing over people who have escaped political persecution and found asylum in Syria would be “immoral.”219

Meanwhile, the U.S. continued to withdraw troops from Iraq, despite the escalating violence in the last few months. During his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Army General Ray Odierno announced that troop levels in Iraq will fall to 115,000 by the end of this year and then to about 50,000 by mid-2010.220 The U.S. presence in Iraq is diminishing not only in numbers, but also in activity. Since the June 30 deadline for initiating withdrawals, the Iraqi government has limited movement and operation of U.S. troops to mainly patrolling rural areas and overseeing reconstruction projects.221 With the exception of Mosul, where U.S. soldiers still patrol alongside Iraqi soldiers, their presence in big cities, including Baghdad, has significantly diminished.

218 “Iraq accuses Syria of harboring suspects in ministry attacks,” The Boston Globe, 09/04/2009 219 “Saddam revisited as Iraq accuses Syria of sheltering Baathist bombers,” The Independent, 09/11/2009 220 “U.S. General says Iraq exit is on track,” The Wall Street Journal, 09/30/2009 221 “In Iraq, U.S. troops learn to cope with rejection,” Los Angeles Times, 09/07/2009

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Core Five and STINGS – September 2009

1. Police Rating: Weak

Police corruption, lack of training, and shortages of personnel have significantly contributed to recent security breaches in Iraq. Early in September, the Iraqi government announced that 29 police and army officers, arrested after the August ministry bombings, were being charged with negligence in performing their duties, further marring the image of the Iraqi security forces. Many insurgents, including those responsible for the bombings, are believed to have crossed the border from Syria into Iraq by bribing their way through checkpoints. The battalion commander of the Iraqi Border Patrol in Nineveh, Lt. Col. Rashid Hassan al Raskani, expressed his concern about the shortage of manpower stating that, “We need an extra 700 to 1,000 to be able to do our job properly and they probably need better pay.”222 A recent jailbreak of 16 prisoners, including five Al-Qaeda members, further highlights the struggle Iraqi security forces face in maintaining control over an overcrowded prison system, which is soon expected to absorb thousands more detainees from U.S. forces.223

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

With January elections fast approaching, “national unity” rhetoric is becoming more prevalent across all party lines in Iraq. The nonsectarian trend, which some would argue was started by al- Maliki, is now the campaign platform of many party leaders (see Indicator 11). Sunni, Shiite, and secular party leaders are reaching across ethnic or sectarian lines to expand their support base and garner the most votes. Despite the call for unity, however, Iraqi politicians have been exhibiting a great lack of unity by failing to pass an electoral law that would enable elections to take place in January. The main hurdles in passing an electoral law have been disagreements over Kirkuk and changing the electoral system from a closed to an open list. An open list, where voters can pick candidates and not just parties, favors small parties, such as al-Maliki’s Dawa Party, which puts him at odds with larger Shiite parties within the National Iraqi Coalition.224 Since the electoral law is supposed to be in place 90 days before voting takes place, there is concern that elections will have to be pushed back from the original date of January 16, 2010.

Failure to implement comprehensive electoral legislation along with escalating violence in Iraq put the credibility of Iraqi leadership and its ability to provide security on its own into question. Al-Maliki, who has been counting on the improved security situation as well as unification rhetoric to gain him support, now faces a major challenge from the National Iraqi Alliance (NIA)—a large Shiite coalition created last month comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Sadr Movement, the National Congress, and the National Reform Party. Al- Maliki’s mismanagement of the security situation along with his decision to include Sunnis in his coalition and distance himself from the Shiite alliance has alienated some of his supporters. Sunni leaders also question his allegiance and Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, former speaker of

222 “Border not a barrier into Iraq,” The National, 09/22/2009 223 “Al-Qaida-linked inmates break out of Iraq prison,” Associated Press, 09/24/2009 224 “Iraq cabinet approves draft elections law,” Reuters, 09/12/2009

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parliament and head of the Sunni Independent National Trend who was thought likely to join al- Maliki’s nonsectarian coalition, reportedly is now considering joining the National Iraqi Alliance.225 Al-Maliki’s critics also accuse him of exaggerating stability in Iraq and refusing greater support from the U.S. in the wake of recent bombings just so he can retain his image as a liberator who brought about a withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Despite its increasing influence, the National Iraqi Alliance also lacks a coherent platform and is experiencing internal feuds. Although the Sadrists and Islamic Supreme Council put aside their bitter rivalry to join forces in a unified Shiite force last month, tensions between these two parties continue. Sadrists, who are strongly anti-U.S. and favor strong central government, have repeatedly criticized the Islamic Supreme Council and its late leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim for supporting the U.S. occupation of Iraq. With al-Hakim’s son Ammar taking over and vowing to continue his father’s policies, rivalry has not eased. In an effort to undermine each other’s chances of garnering majority Shiite support, the Sadrists have been negotiating with Ayad Allawi, the former Iraqi Prime Minister and currently a viable rival to al-Maliki, to join the Alliance. Meanwhile Ammar al-Hakim tried, although fruitlessly, to convince al-Maliki to reconsider his position and join the Alliance to limit al-Sadr’s “majority effect.”226

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

Corruption, present in most governmental bodies throughout Iraq, continues to be a problem, and allegations that employees have been fired for their political leanings abound (see Indicator 7). For example, the Kurdish opposition party, Change, claimed following July 25 regional elections that hundreds of its supporters were dismissed from governmental positions due to their political affiliation. The KRG has disputed the accusations, but Barzani, the region’s President, did call for the formation of a committee to hear complaints and investigate the conditions under which employees were let go.227

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

Concern continues over the ability of the judicial system to keep up with the growing number of detainees in Iraq, and human rights groups have been alarmed by the number of capital punishments handed down by the courts (see Indicator 9). At the beginning of this month, four of the Rafidain bank robbers were sentenced to death after just two and a half days of open trial. Two of the accused did not have lawyers to represent them, leading the judge to ask one of the other defense lawyers to summarize their case. His response was, “Let justice take its course.” Of the remaining five accused, one was acquitted and the other four have disappeared.228

225 “Iraq: al-Mashhadani announced his withdrawal from Al-Maliki's coalition,” AKI, 09/28/2009 226 “ Iraqi pre-election political map—The Shiites scene,” Roads to Iraq, 09/21/2009 227 “Iraqi Kurdistan Region to investigate alleged civil servants’ dismissals,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/15/2009 228 “Justice, of a sort, takes hold in Iraq,” The International Herald Tribune, 09/04/2009

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Crime has been on the rise throughout Iraq, yet many criminals have gone unpunished. Violent acts against gays and women, for instance, have not been taken to court (see Indicator 9). The government remains more concerned with insurgents carrying out sectarian attacks and it has therefore not put effort into tracking the number and type of crimes that currently abound, nor has it prioritized limiting criminal acts or bringing those accused to justice.229

However, some crimes of “libel and slander” have been put on trial and MP Sami al-Askari was charged with accusing the Foreign Ministry of “failure and corruption.” The Iraqi Federal Court of Cassation delivered its ruling on September 20 and ordered al-Askari to financially compensate the Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, for any “moral and material damage” he may have experienced as a result of the accusation.230

5. Military Rating: Moderate

As 4,000 more U.S. troops plan to leave within the next month, the Iraqi military is becoming increasingly in charge of security. However, Iraqis continue to call on U.S. capabilities in areas where they lack expertise or equipment, such as in training, aerial surveillance, medical evacuations and forensics.231 U.S. troops also continue their training of Iraqi wardens and guards, as more and more detention camps are being handed over to Iraqi custody.232 With the September closure of Camp Bucca and only two detention camps remaining, some worry that there is not enough time to provide adequate training to Iraqis and are concerned about the treatment of detainees once Iraqis take full control. This year, 1,360 detainees have been transferred to the Iraqi government, with 8,305 detainees still remaining in coalition custody.233

229 “Horrific crimes the new scourge of Iraq,” The Advertiser, 09/26/2009 230 “Iraqi MP loses defamation case,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 09/20/2009 231 “In Iraq, U.S. troops learn to cope with rejection,” Los Angeles Times, 09/07/2009 232 “US military training Iraqi prison guards,” Associated Press, 09/18/2009 233 “Camp Bucca detention center closes in Iraq,” Multi-National Force – Iraq, 09/18/2009

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Appendix III: October 2009 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Cases of cancer have skyrocketed in Babil province, which lies south of Baghdad, since the US- led invasion of Iraq. In this year alone, nine thousand residents have been diagnosed, up from seven thousand in 2008, one thousand in 2006, and five hundred in 2004.234 Depleted uranium (DU) from US military equipment is being blamed by many residents and analysts, and an international campaign to ban DU weapons is gaining steam; however, the US Department of Defense contends DU is not a threat. Purportedly, radioactive dust spreads easily through wind and sandstorms and can contaminate soil and water. Humans absorb DU by breathing it in, eating food contaminated with it, or exposing themselves through wounds. Alarmingly, uranium in Basra’s soil has increased to 10,000 becquerels per kilogram in 2009, compared to around 65 in 1991. Areas hit hardest by war have reported as much as 36,205 becquerels per kilogram in the soil and the UN Environment Program located 311 sites in Iraq that were contaminated by DU in 2005.235 This implies there are probably many more radioactive sites today, and if DU does turn out to be a major cause of cancer, diagnoses in Iraq could increase dramatically.

A recent UNESCO report presented the government with the very first inventory of karez, manmade underground aqueducts residents of northern Iraq have depended on for centuries. The report highlighted the severity of the four-year drought that has displaced 100,000 people in areas close to the border with Turkey and Iran, which has translated into population declines of 70% in affected communities. A lack of proper maintenance and repair knowledge of karez persists in most communities and has contributed to the disaster, as only 116 out of 683 karez are still in functioning order.236 Many farmers have had to rely on the town government, US forces, or community members to haul water each day, but this is merely a temporary solution that has usually ended in abandonment of crops.237 The study points to 50 communities that could benefit from the restoration of karez systems, and UNESCO is partnering with the Iraqi Central Government on a project called Karez Initiative for Community Revitalization, which is expected to begin helping adversely affected communities in 2010.238

Surprisingly, in Kurdish areas just miles away, citizens have been abusing unrestrained water flow, leading government officials to entertain the implementation of fines on households consuming over a certain amount of water. Residents of the Kurdistan Region pay just one dollar a month for unlimited water use, with the government subsidizing 89% of the cost. This has caused many inhabitants to adopt wasteful habits and the government now fears water shortages. According to a study by the Swedish Engineering Company (SWECO), Kurdish residents use 800 liters of water per day, compared with 120 in Denmark, 300 in Sweden, and 580 in Turkey. Therefore, the government has proactively initiated a program to install water meters in homes

234 “Iraqi cancer figures soar,” Al Jazeera, 10/13/2009 235 “Iraq: War remnants, pollution behind rise in cancer deaths?” Relief Web, 10/14/2009 236 “Water shortage fueling displacement of people in northern Iraq, UNESCO study finds,” Relief Web, 10/13/2009 237 “Drought, damns force Iraqi farmers to abandon crops,” Radio Free Europe, 10/02/2009 238 “Water shortage fueling displacement of people in northern Iraq, UNESCO study finds,” Relief Web, 10/13/2009

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across the region to fine people for overexploitation with the hope of encouraging more mindful water usage.239 Basra province in the south, on the other hand, has looked to Iran to ameliorate its water shortage and will receive 650,000 liters of drinking water from Iranian ships every two days.240

Panic also swept through parts of Iraq this month over fear of the H1N1 virus and some schools have temporarily shut down. In Dhi Qar province, 1,477 schools were shut down on October 22 for ten days and in Wasit province, 950 schools were closed for five days starting on October 21. So far, three people have died from H1N1 in Iraq and there have been 523 confirmed cases, with only 113 of those being Iraqis and the rest being foreigners. Iraqi Education Minister Kudhair al- Khuzaie called the school closures “illegal and unprofessional” and caused by “exaggerated media reports.” However, he did note that overcrowding in Iraqi schools has increased the risk of diseases spreading and called for the construction of 4,500 new schools (on top of the present 19,000) in order to alleviate cramped conditions.241

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

Although the number of Internally Displace Persons (IDPs), refugees, and returnees differ from source to source because of different methodologies used, the overall picture is that the return of the displaced continues rather slowly. UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) reports that 195,890 IDPs out of approximately 2.65 million, and 25,644 refugees out of approximately 1.90 million, have returned to their homes as of January 2009.242 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is currently monitoring and assessing the displacement and return of IDPs in the post-2006 period, which they identify as the height of sectarian violence and IDP movement in Iraq. IOM estimates the IDP population at 1.6 million and reports that about 348,660 IDPs (or 58,110 IDP families) have returned to their homes as of October 2009.243 IOM reports that almost 90% of post-2006 displacement originated in Baghdad, Diyala, and Nineveh governorates and that the majority of returns are concentrated in those provinces as well.

Despite a drop in the number of displacements, chronic displacement and human flight persist in Iraq due to a lack of basic services as well as violence against minorities. For example, water shortages caused by severe droughts have forced over 100,000 people out of their homes in northern Iraq, while prompting an estimated 300,000 marshland residents in the south to relocate to nearby cities in the last four years.244 Meanwhile, minority groups such as gays and Christians have been targeted, forcing them to leave Iraq.

According to a recent IOM report, approximately 53% of the IDPs interviewed post-2006 wish to return home, while another 45% wish to integrate permanently into their places of displacement or move to a third location. The most frequently reported priority needs among

239 “Kurdish authorities call for water restrictions,” Niqash, 10/08/2009 240 “Iran provides Iraq with drinking water,” Alsumaria, 10/09/2009 241 “Swine flu panic shuts down 2,000 schools,” IRIN, 10/22/2009 242 “Country operations profile: Iraq,” UNHCR, accessed 10/30/2009 243 “Assessment of return to Iraq,” IOM, 11/3/2009 244 “Water shortage fueling displacement of people in northern Iraq,” ReliefWeb, 10/13/2009

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returnees are food (61%), fuel (44%), and health (42%).245 Security, employment opportunities, and affordable housing are also very important factors for the IDPs intending to return. In fact, 43% of the assessed returnees cited improved security as the main reason for deciding to return.

Meanwhile, unemployment is very high among the IDPs and returnees: 35% of men are able to work but are currently unemployed. The situation is worse for female-headed families, which constitute 12% of the IDP families: 70% of women are unable to work and an additional 26% who are able to work have not found work. Among returnees, 34% report being able to work, but claim they cannot find employment.

Housing also remains dire for IDPs and returnees. Returnees usually go back to find their homes either partially or completely destroyed (42.5%). In addition, 50% of returnees in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Kirkuk governorates no longer have movable property, such as cars, due to loss or theft. Other returnees find their homes occupied by lawful residents, because when they initially fled they were forced to sign paperwork handing over rights to their home.246

Life is difficult for Iraqi refugees as well. The majority of Iraqi refugees reside in neighboring Syria (1.2 million) and Jordan (450,000), where they are struggling to find employment and rely heavily on food and financial support from UNHCR and other humanitarian aid agencies.247 Because of the hardship they are experiencing in the neighboring countries, many Iraqi refugees would like to relocate to a third country, ideally to Europe or the United States. However, Iraqis are not always welcomed in those countries and face discrimination. European states have begun to forcibly return some of the Iraqi refugees over the last few months and UNHCR has voiced concern about the forced returns. In a statement, UNHCR said that asylum-seekers from Iraq, especially from the central governorates, need protection since “the serious human rights violations and continuing security incidents throughout Iraq” render their immediate return very unsafe.248

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

Iraq was devastated this month by another major attack on government buildings. Two cars strapped with bombs exploded outside the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad Provincial Administration buildings. The Municipalities and Public Works Ministry also experienced severe damage, causing the overall death toll to reach approximately 155 and number of wounded to be around 650. It was the biggest assault since 2007 and follows the August bombings of the Foreign and Finance Ministries that killed 100 and injured up to 600.249 Al-Qaeda in Iraq took responsibility for the attack, claiming they “targeted the dens of infidelity,” and the “Ministry of Injustice and Oppression.”250 The Baghdad Operations Command quickly arrested 61 police officers and soldiers who were responsible for monitoring the attacked neighborhoods, but it did

245 “Assessment of return to Iraq,” IOM, 11/3/2009 246 Ibid. 247 Quarterly Report, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 10/30/2009 248 “Involuntary returns to Central Iraq contrary to UNHCR guidelines,” ReliefWeb, 10/23/2009 249 “Bombings rock Iraq’s political landscape,” The Washington Post, 10/26/2009 250 “Al Qaeda group claims Iraq bombings,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/04/2009

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not release any information about their possible collaboration in the bombings.251 Some analysts speculate the cause for the attacks to be the dissatisfaction some Sunnis feel towards the Shiite- led government, which has not been as welcoming as most had hoped.252

Citizens of Karbala, a holy city for Shiites, were also attacked this month as they congregated for evening prayers. Three homemade bombs killed six people and wounded 45 just outside of the security barrier that encapsulates the Husseni and Abbas shrines. Additionally, two days earlier in Baghdad eight people were killed and fourteen wounded after a group of robbers stole gold jewelry from a marketplace and then proceeded to throw grenades as they escaped (see Indicator 7). The Iraqi government subsequently arrested seven soldiers who were responsible for patrolling the devastated area as part of a new policy that seeks to hold security forces accountable.253

Despite extensive counterinsurgency operations in Anbar province in the past, violence has steadily increased ever since American troops began their withdrawal from the region. Rivalries have rekindled in the face of upcoming elections between Sunni tribal leaders from the Awakening Councils and Sunnis who belong to Al-Qaeda in Iraq or Saddam’s former Baath party (see Indicator 10).254 Tellingly, barriers that the provincial councils declared would be taken down in September were instead reinforced. The most devastating attack came when Prime Minister Al-Maliki met with local Sunni Arabs in Ramadi in a step towards reconciliation. The first car bomb exploded next to Ramadi’s main government building, where their meeting took place, but did not inflict great damage. Minutes later, a second car bomb went off in the parking lot, and one hour later, a third car attempting to drive into Ramadi General Hospital exploded at the checkpoint outside. Twenty three people were killed as a result of the attacks and 65 were wounded.255

In a rare report issued by the Iraqi government, the Human Rights Ministry estimated the death toll due to violence between 2004 and 2008 at more than 85,000 people. The number does not include the approximately 10,000 missing persons or 15,000 unidentified bodies, and does not factor in deaths due to infrastructure damage or psychological or health problems. The count was taken using death certificates but an estimated figure for those wounded was also included and given at around 147,000.256 The ministry’s estimates were conservative compared to some organizations that give the death toll anywhere from 100,000 to more than half a million, but they were similar to the Iraq Body Count at 86,000, and the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index at 102,000.257

251 “Iraq makes sweeping arrests over Baghdad blasts,” The New York Times, 10/30/2009 252 “Iraq bombs are an explosive message,” The Guardian, 10/26/2009 253 “6 are killed by 3 separate explosions near shrines in a holy city for Iraqi Shiites,” The New York Times, 10/15/2009 254 “Triple bombing kills scores in Iraq’s Anbar Province,” The Christian Science Monitor, 10/12/2009 255 “Bombings outside Iraq reconciliation meeting kill 23,” The New York Times, 10/11/2009 256 “Iraq rights ministry says 85,000 killed in 2004-08,” Reuters, 10/13/2009 257 “Iraq ministry counts 85,000 dead from 2004-Oct. 2008,” Education for Peace in Iraq Center, accessed 10/15/2009

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4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

Continued attacks and kidnappings of Christians in Iraq have reduced the size of the Christian community as they flee the country. Recently, the body of a Christian health worker was found two days after he was kidnapped, and last month, a well-known Christian pediatrician was kidnapped in Kirkuk but released after his family paid the kidnappers $100,000.258 The situation is especially dismal in Kirkuk, where continued disputes over territory and oil revenue have exacerbated inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions. In the face of rising kidnapping and murder cases, at least 10 Christian families have left Kirkuk in recent weeks.259 Some accuse the government of turning a blind eye to the atrocities inflicted upon Christians. Major General Jamal Tahir of Kirkuk’s police force downplayed the severity of the situation stating that, “There is no flight of Christians from Kirkuk because of violence. Christians normally leave willingly to other areas or other countries to live in better conditions.”260 However, Christians are convinced that there is an underlying political reason for the murders and kidnappings—that being to cleanse Iraq of Christians.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

The housing and shelter report released by the UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future described a dismal state of living for many Iraqis. However, conditions are much worse for some provinces than for others. For instance, the three provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan, Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymania fair better than almost all the other Iraqi provinces by ranking at the bottom of the list for households living under slum conditions, averaging around 43% of households. 261 On the other hand, Diyala province has the highest percentage, at an astounding 86% of households living in slum-like conditions, and Maysan and Kirkuk follow with 82% and 78% respectively.262 The reason rates for Kirkuk are so high could be due to the recent influx of Kurds to the region as part of the Kurdistan government’s attempt to influence population statistics in their favor.

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 7

A $67 billion draft budget for 2010 based on oil prices of $60 per barrel was approved by Iraq’s cabinet this month and awaits Parliament’s ratification. Approximately $17.83 billion will go towards reconstruction and infrastructure projects, and the rest will go towards government operating costs, which primarily includes salaries. Falling short of what is needed by about $15

258 “Kidnappings, killings drive more Christians to flee northern Iraq,” Associated Press, 10/05/2009 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid. 261 According to UNHABITAT, slum conditions exist if one of the following conditions is satisfied: 1) house walls are made of reed or non-stable materials or windows are made of non-stable materials 2) more than 3 persons per room (room includes bedrooms, living rooms, dining rooms, guest rooms) 3) subjective evaluation of the head of the household saying they do not have a sufficient water supply 4) 1 toilet per 10 or more persons 5) tenancy of the house is not owned, nor rented, not provided by an employer or household has no agreement with the owner. 262 “Fact sheet: Housing and shelter in Iraq,” UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 10/05/2009

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billion, some analysts worry that reconstruction and security efforts will be adversely affected. Cuts are expected to take place in government and military spending, and a continued hiring freeze is also predicted.263

Around one thousand Iraqi officials gathered in Washington, DC this month for the US-Iraq Business and Investment Conference. This comes at a time when the standard of living is half what it was during Saddam’s era and unemployment wavers around 20%. Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was in attendance and announced, “Business and investors can work freely in any province they want…There are no hot zones in Iraq.”264 However, numerous barriers to investment still exist beyond security, including corruption, a large bureaucracy, complicated and contradictory investment laws, and poor Iraqi worker social protection.265 Additionally, many of Iraq’s sectors, save the oil industry, have a complete absence of infrastructure and will require substantial effort and time to mature.266

Iraq’s hydrocarbons law, which would regulate the oil sector as well as designate responsibility to the central government and local provinces, has been delayed again until after parliamentary elections are held in January. Iraq’s economy depends almost exclusively on oil profits so the law is crucial for the development of the country.267 However, three years have now gone by as debates continue to be held regarding this highly-sensitive topic and an agreement remains distant. For instance, just this month the central government deemed oil contracts that were made between the Kurdistan Regional Government and 35 companies illegal. Additionally, any company found to be taking part in such activities in the north has been banned from bidding on oil deals offered by the central government, and also has been restricted from buying Iraqi crude oil.268

However, despite the absence of a hydrocarbons law and confusion in the north, the central government has gone ahead with oil contract negotiations in the south. An agreement between the Iraqi Oil Ministry and BP, with partner Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, was announced this month to develop Iraq’s largest oil field, Rumaila, which produces half of the country’s entire output. However, allegations were quickly made to discredit the deal, as some prominent leaders allege the contract must be approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives.269

Action was also taken on the Zubair West Qurna Phase 1 oil fields this month. Zubair oil field was rebid on by ’s , with partners US and Korea Gas Corporation. No agreement has been made as of yet, but the Eni consortium did consent to the Oil Ministry’s terms of $2 a barrel. Exxon Mobil also made another bid for West Qurna Phase 1 and consented to $1.90 a barrel. Russian Lukoil and Conoco Phillips partnered together to challenge Exxon for West Qurna Phase 1 and the government said it hopes to award oil deals soon.

263 “Iraq Cabinet approves $67B budget for 2010,” Associated Press, 10/14/2009 264 “Iraq: Open for business,” The New York Times, 10/21/2009 265 “Iraq’s economy needs more than security,” Brookings Institute, 10/23/2009 266 “Priming the pump, Iraq seeks foreign investment to rebuild,” The Washington Times, 10/23/2009 267 “Iraq delays hydrocarbons law until after election,” Agence France Presse, 10/03/2009 268 “Blacklist enlarged and challenged,” Iraq Oil Report, 10/01/2009 269 “First Rumaila hurdle cleared, many remain,” Iraq Oil Report, 10/08/2009

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Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani and government spokesperson Ali al-Dabbagh heralded the oil company concessions as proof their strict contract terms were a success and claimed there is no need for Parliament’s approval of the contracts—only the Council of Ministers. However, some MPs, Kurdish officials, and members of the Iraqi Parliament’s Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Committee have declared all oil deals are illegal that have not been approved by the Council of Representatives.270 What is to become of these oil contracts is still to be decided, but as long as a hydrocarbon law is absent, it will be difficult to rebuild Iraq’s oil industry, and consequentially, its economy.

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

The October 25 suicide bomb attacks in the heart of Baghdad—the deadliest in two years— highlighted not only the incapacity of Iraqi security forces, but also the deep-seated corruption that permeates the Iraqi government (see Indicator 3). In the words of Judge Abdul Sattar al- Beiriqdar, “These car bombs didn’t come from the sky! … If there were no corruption, the attackers wouldn’t risk passing through these checkpoints.”271 A recent report on corruption by the Iraqi Interior Ministry detailed cases of corruption within the Ministry as well as elsewhere in the public sector, and included cases against top officials all the way down to checkpoint guards. Crimes include supervisors skimming off salaries from their workers, commanders taking salaries from “ghost police officers” listed on payrolls, lawyers or court officials freeing insurgents and criminals through bribery, prison guards torturing detainees to extort money from relatives, and so on.272 With nearly 62,000 employees fired because of criminal backgrounds in the past two years, and $122 million unaccounted for within the Interior Ministry in the first half of this year alone, it is going to take a far more concerted effort on the part of all government agencies to tackle the immense problem of corruption in Iraq.

In addition to security implications, rampant corruption in Iraq also threatens political stability. Early in October, the head of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), Faraj al-Haidari, was questioned by parliament about allegations claiming that the Commission was involved in financial corruption as well as election violations last January, which included tampering with voter lists, manipulating the results in favor of certain party blocs, and spending contributions on personal items such as cars and home furnishings.273 Al-Haidari, who is the former leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), rejected the allegations and accused the government of going on a “political witch hunt.”274 He also warned the government about serious implications that could result due to hampering with the Commission’s work, stating: “In case a vote of no confidence is used against the supreme election commission, the forthcoming elections will not be held on time and they will have to be delayed for months from the scheduled date of January 16, 2010.”275 With elections approaching, another worry is that politicians may exploit their connections in the security forces to intimidate their rivals or even try to get rid of them.276

270 “Ministry claims oil policy vindication,” Iraq Oil Report, 10/14/2009 271 “Pervasive corruption rattles Iraq’s fragile state,” International Herald Tribune, 10/28/09 272 Ibid. 273 “Corruption charges against election commission threaten January vote,” Niqash, 10/21/2009 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid. 276 “In Iraq, battling an internal bane,” The Washington Post, 10/22/2009

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The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which is usually deemed more transparent and stable than the rest of Iraq, is facing their fair share of corruption cases as well. As reported last month, an investigation carried out by the Norwegian authorities revealed a questionable trade deal that took place between DNO International, a Norwegian oil company, and Turkish Genel Energy with help of the KRG’s Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami. In his recently-issued, detailed statement, Hawrami denied any wrongdoing, stating that he merely assisted two companies that were facing financial problems as a result of restrictions imposed on Iraqi Kurdistan by the central government, and that his intentions were to “to keep the region's energy plans on track.”277

Meanwhile, violent crime is on the rise throughout Iraq. Taking advantage of vast lawlessness and corruption, powerful mafia groups are looking to make easy money through kidnapping, drug trafficking, and armed robberies. Security forces often cooperate with these groups by letting them bribe their way though security checkpoints and a recent armed robbery in the Baghdad jewelry shops is a testament to this (see Indicator 3). Witnesses say they saw unmasked and heavily-armed men raid the shops, killing eight and injuring nine. They believe the guards cooperated with the perpetrators, alleging: “I spend two hours sometimes at that checkpoint… it would have been impossible for the well-armed assailants to pass unhindered through the checkpoint.”278

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

According to UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 57% of Iraq’s urban population lives in “slum-like conditions.” High fertility rates and a young population have added to increasing population growth, and overcrowding has resulted. For example, 13% of Iraqi urban houses host more than ten people and 37% of houses include rooms with three residents or more. Moreover, the UN painted a dim picture for the state of public services in Iraq, with the national average of unstable water sources being 89%, the percentage of Iraqis who do not have access to a waste or sanitation network being 73%, and the natural average of power interruption per day being 16 hours.279

Indicative of the aforementioned report, hundreds of Iraqis demonstrated early in the month demanding access to public services as well as open elections. They chanted, “No water, no electricity in the country of oil and the two rivers,” referring to ancient Iraq, known as , that subsisted around the Tigris and Euphrates. Seeming to be a wake-up call for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who previously focused his campaign around security, he has now started to discuss plans for future infrastructure projects, which he claims will be top priority for next year.280

277 “Iraq Kurdistan denies wrongdoing in DNO affair,” Reuters, 10/09/2009 278 “In Iraq, battling an internal bane,” The Washington Post, 10/22/2009 279 “Fact sheet: Housing and shelter in Iraq,” UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 10/05/2009 280 “Iraqis take to streets to protest government,” MSNBC, 10/10/2009

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UNHABITAT has already been working with government agencies to improve housing finance institutions, enable private sector investment, and allow public land to be used for housing development.281 For instance, just this month, the Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction completed a draft of the National Housing Policy, which is meant to improve housing conditions in the country.282 Additionally, the Baghdad Mayoralty took steps to improve the living standards of families of political prisoners by allocating land, on which 5,000 housing units are expected to be built, to the Political Prisoners Institution. The Mayoralty also announced they would take steps towards offering the families jobs as well as free access to tourist and entertainment sites.283

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

After two and a half months of detainment, 36 Camp Ashraf residents were finally released this month. Camp Ashraf in Iraq has been home to the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), an exiled dissident group that was welcomed by Saddam Hussein who utilized them in the war against Iran. When U.S. authorities handed over the camp to the Iraqi government earlier this year, Iraqi authorities raided the camp and arrested 36 leaders, killing 11 residents and wounding over 500. Videos filmed during the raid show the Iraqi police shooting and brutally beating the camp residents.284 Despite the release of the detainees, human rights organizations remain highly concerned about the fate of camp residents. The UN has called for their protection and opposes their forcible deportation, expulsion, or repatriation.285 However, the current Iraqi government is eager to restore a friendly relationship with Iran and is, therefore, inclined to deport the camp residents. Since the U.S. and many other countries still officially consider the PMOI a terrorist group and are unwilling to offer asylum, the fate of the camp residents is yet to been resolved.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government is increasingly censoring the media, as more and more journalists complain about harassment and restriction of movement. The government has banned the movement of press vehicles to broadcast live, especially inside Baghdad, following the recent car bombings.286 Iraqi journalists view recent government efforts, including the imposition of new license fees on all broadcast media outlets, as a crackdown on dissent as elections draw near. Several journalists claim to have been beaten and intimidated by security forces while trying to provide coverage. Early in October, female reporter of Al Iraqiyya TV station Zohra al- Musawi was beaten and sexually harassed by unidentified men, while the police failed to intervene.287 The reason the police failed to intervene, some claim, is because the person responsible for the assault was the son of one of Iraq’s most influential politicians.288

281 “Fact sheet: Housing and shelter in Iraq,” UN Habitat, 10/05/2009 282 “National housing policy for Iraq drafted,” Aswat al-Iraq, 10/08/2009 283 “Plot of land allocated to build 5,000 housing units in Baghdad,” 10/11/2009 284 “Camp Ashraf groups vow to fight on,” BBC News, 10/08/2009 285 “UNAMI continued concern over the humanitarian situation at Camp Ashraf,” ReliefWeb, 10/26/2009 286 “Iraq restricts movement by TV journalists,” Azzaman, 10/30/2009 287 “After eight days of silence, prime Minister promises probe into attack on woman journalist,” Reporters without Borders, 10/13/2009 288 Ibid.

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Some also fear increasing restrictions on religious freedom in Iraq. In October, the provincial council in Najaf voted to outlaw alcohol sales in the province, stating that it contradicts the principles of Islam.289 The Najaf provincial council's decision follows a similar measure taken in August in Basra. Liquor stores are usually owned and operated by Iraqi Christians and secular Muslims, and they are worried that religious extremism in Iraq is on the rise.

Ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq have also been caught in the middle of a struggle for land and oil between Kurds and Arabs. Recent months have seen increasing attacks targeting ethnic minorities such as Turkmens, Yazidis, Chaldeans, and Shabaks—a strategy seen by some as a way for extremist groups to incite “finger-pointing” between Kurds and Arabs.290 The impact of this struggle is especially evident in ethnically-diverse areas like Mosul, where the Arabs and Kurds have been competing for minority support. The majority of Yazidis, for example, have been aligning themselves with Kurdish parties in the hope that Kurdish security forces, the peshmerga, will offer them protection. On the other hand, Chaldean Christians, another minority group in the region, mistrust the Kurdish security forces and accuse them of “harassment and intimidation,” but are not sure if the alternative would be any better. It is a “terrible predicament,” says Joost Hiltermann with the International Crisis Group, because these minorities are at risk of making a “fatal choice” if they do not align themselves with the “winning” side.291

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Although efforts aimed at diminishing the ethno-sectarian divides within the Iraqi police and military have been relatively successful, Iraq’s security forces remain heavily politicized. Political appointments of security officials is a prime example of how many political leaders still rely on force and intimidation to carry out their agenda. Iraqi people are growing highly skeptical of police and military officials, whom they see as serving politicians rather than protecting citizens. Last summer alone, the Interior Ministry was forced to hire 1,500 new police recruits because they were nominated by Iraqi political parties.292 According to an official at the Ministry, none of the recruits were competent and “they were only there to carry out their parties' agendas.”293 As reported in Indicator 7, there has been a rise in political violence, as politicians use their connections in the security forces to intimidate their rivals.

Rampant corruption in the security forces is also a major hurdle in combating the recent rise in insurgency. Insurgent groups continue to undermine the Iraqi government’s legitimacy by infiltrating security forces and delivering blow after blow to government structures. After the coordinated ministry bombings at the end of this month (see Indicator 3), 61 security officials, including soldiers, policemen, and commanders of local police posts were arrested with charges of neglecting their duties and involvement in the attacks.294 According to Army Brigadier

289 “Alcohol ban ahead of elections,” The Herald, 10/12/2009 290 “Iraq's Minorities Caught Between Arabs, Kurds,” National Public Radio, 10/07/2009 291 Ibid. 292 “In Iraq, battling an internal bane,” The Washington Post, 10/22/2009 293 Ibid. 294 “Iraq makes sweeping arrests over Baghdad blasts,” The New York Times, 10/29/2009

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General Stephen Lanza, a U.S. military spokesman, Al-Qaeda and other groups are changing their tactics to spoil the January elections by attacking government institutions, rather than targeting the public sphere such as mosques or markets.295

The Iraqi government is also jeopardizing security in the country by failing to incorporate the majority of the Awakening Councils. Najim Abed al-Jabouri, former mayor of Tel-Afar, in his op-ed contribution to the New York Times, blamed the “pressure from ethno-sectarian parties and their gatekeepers in the Defense and Interior Ministries” for keeping the Awakening Councils out of the security forces to avoid Sunni influence from increasing.296 Politically marginalized, unemployed, and often targeted both by the government and Al-Qaeda, the Councils are more susceptible to rebellion. The Awakening tribal leaders in Anbar province feel especially remorseful, fearing that the Councils have become an easy target because of their allegiance to Americans in the past (see Indicator 12).297 Giving credibility to this fear was the triple bombing this month that targeted the reconciliation meeting occurring between representatives of the central government and local members of the Awakening movement in Anbar (see Indicator 3).298 Anbar province, once considered the cradle of an insurgency that the Councils helped crush, now faces the possibility of becoming increasingly unstable once again.

Residents of Diyala province are also worried that insurgency groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, are reestablishing their influence in the province. They are concerned that there is growing support for fundamentalist organizations such as the Iraqi Islamic Army Organization, the Rashidain Army, and the Armed Naqshabandy group. However, police spokesman in Diyala Ghalib al-Karkhi downplayed the fears, stating that “the security services have full control over the security issue.”299

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced his new coalition this month by proclaiming “national unity” as its main goal.300 The State of Law coalition, comprised of over 40 parties, includes Shiite, Sunni, independent Kurdish, and secular parties. Al-Maliki hopes that the broad scope of the coalition will bring him the necessary votes to secure victory in January. However, critics point to the fact that al-Maliki was unable to reach out to and persuade key Sunni political figures such as Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, the former parliament speaker, or Ahmed Abu Risha, whose brother led the U.S.-backed counterinsurgency in western Iraq, or Ayad Allawi, former interim prime minister, who would have helped al-Maliki’s coalition garner more support from Sunnis.301 The Prime Minister also alienated Sunni voters when he accused Syria and the Baathists of being connected to the ministry bombings in August.302 On the other hand, al-Maliki runs the risk of losing the support of Shiites, who constitute a majority in Iraq, by embracing the

295 Ibid. 296 “For every Iraqi party, an army of its own,” The International Herald Tribune, 10/28/2009 297 “In Anbar, U.S.-allied tribal chiefs feel deep sense of abandonment,” Washington Post, 10/03/2009 298 “Bombings outside Iraq reconciliation meeting kill 23,” New York Times, 10/11/2009 299 “Diyala confronts new Al-Qaeda threat,” Niqash, 10/05/2009 300 “Al-Maliki coalition tries to bridge Iraq's deep sectarian divisions,” The Wall Street Journal, 10/02/2009 301 “Al-Maliki creates coalition to compete in Iraqi vote,” The Washington Post, 10/02/2009 302 “Al-Maliki re-launches the state of law list: beautiful but is it powerful enough?” Historiae.org, 10/01/2009

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Sunni parties within his coalition. Moreover, considering lingering sectarian tensions—generally defined as Shiites seeking to preserve their privileges and Sunnis hoping to reassert themselves—it is yet to be seen if Iraqis will be able to overcome their divisions and vote for parties and candidates from the opposite sect.303

Sectarian divides are especially apparent in disputed regions such as Kirkuk and Nineveh, where Kurds and Arabs have not been able to agree on a power-sharing arrangement. After the Sunni- Arab al-Hadbaa party won the provincial elections in Nineveh, the Kurdish Brotherhood List boycotted the new provincial administration because “they humiliate Kurds and never allow them to hold any position in government, although they won 33 per cent of the vote.”304 Al- Hadbaa members deny the allegations, instead claiming that Kurdish dissatisfaction is linked to their ambitions to annex Nineveh and other northern territories to the Kurdish Regional Government. Arabs and Kurds have also been unable to agree on the make-up of the security forces in the province, which has jeopardized security in Nineveh. Arabs see the presence of peshmerga, Kurdish security forces, as the main hurdle in reaching an agreement, whereas Kurds insist that peshmerga are legitimate security forces recognized by the Iraqi government that contribute to the province’s security.

There is also infighting taking place within the Kurdish community. The two major political parties that have ruled the Kurdish region for decades, namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), now face a serious challenge from the Change List. Change list leaders have repeatedly accused the two main parties of corruption and intimidation and have called for real reform of Kurdish politics. The PUK and KDP, on the other hand, are trying hard to create a unified Kurdish front that would run as one list in the coming national elections. They argue that uniting Kurds is crucial in resolving territorial and oil disputes with the central government.305

Despite the Iraqi government’s efforts throughout the past months to take down as many blast walls as possible to “normalize” life in Iraq, these walls continue to physically separate already- divided communities. In the city of Samarra, for example, the divide is apparent, as a blast wall separates the Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods. The wall was erected to protect the Shiite shrine that had been repeatedly targeted by Sunni insurgents. Residents complain these walls have not only divided the community psychologically, but they have also created economic hardship. Sunni businesses used to benefit from the influx of Shiite pilgrims to the shrine, where they would also spend time shopping. Now the concrete wall, raised to protect the shrine, further reinforces the divisions between Sunnis and Shiites and hurts the reconciliation process.306

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 7

The Iraqi government was much more careful this month to not place blame on Syria after the October 25 bombings, altering its response away from its reaction to August’s ministry

303 “More Iraqis trying to move beyond sectarian divide,” Los Angeles Times, 10/31/2009 304 “Nineveh ethnic divide fuels tension,” Al-Jazeera, 10/23/2009 305 “Kurdish opposition splinters,” Niqash, 10/07/2009 306 “Security walls at Samarra shrine now create divide,” Associated Press, 10/06/2009

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bombings when it quickly condemned Syria. However, government spokesmen did claim the two incidents were carried out by the same group, indirectly pushing responsibility in the same direction. Iraq believes the perpetrators were Iraqi Baathists who were harbored in Syria and called on the UN to investigate the bombings.307

Although many Iraqis look forward to the day foreign troops leave their soil, there are some who dread the day and are already feeling the effects of America’s withdrawal. For example, Sunni sheikhs from Anbar province, who led the Awakening Councils funded by the US to rid the region of insurgents, are now feeling abandoned and at risk of being murdered due to their support of the Americans. US combat troops have dwindled by two thirds, 27 military bases and outposts have turned into three, and money is not flowing in like it used to. As Sheikh Raed Sabah dismally commented, “We stood by them, we carried out their requests, we let no one hurt them…They weren’t supposed to abandon us…I expect I’ll die at any time.” Colonel Matthew Lopez, the Marine commander of the province, acknowledged that not everybody was happy about their departure, but said it was necessary the US military start to court only a few select Sheikhs—around 20 or so—as they withdraw.308

Similar sentiments are being felt in Baghdad, where the US established local councils in 2003 to acquire allies, gain knowledge about enemies, distribute reconstruction funds, and establish a sense of legitimacy for US-enforced security measures. However, ever since the establishment of a central Iraqi government, local councils have held little sway and retain no constitutional basis. Therefore, these former leaders, who have been labeled American agents, are frightened for their lives and feel deserted.309

Nevertheless, US military spokesman, Brig. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza, affirmed this month that the goal is to reduce the US troop presence to 50,000 by August of 2010. By the end of this month, American troops will number 120,000, down from 143,000 in January 2009. However, the disputed election law has the power to stall elections planned for January 2010, which would delay further US troop withdrawals that Lanza predicted would happen 30 to 60 days after a successful Iraqi election.310 Meanwhile, the Iraqi Council of Representatives approved the deployment of 100 British troops to secure oil ports and train ISF in the south of Iraq. This comes after British troops were forced to leave earlier this year because Iraq’s parliament delayed extending their stay.311

307 “Iraqi foreign Minister interviewed on 25 Oct bombing in Baghdad,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10/26/2009 308 “In Anbar, US-allied tribal chiefs feel deep sense of abandonment,” The Washington Post, 10/03/2009 309 “After six years, ‘We’re worthless’; Iraqis on US-created local councils feeling vulnerable as American pullout looms,” The Washington Post, 10/11/2009 310 “General puts US troops in Iraq at 120,000 by end of October,” The New York Times, 10/13/2009 311 “Iraq Status Report,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State, 10/14/2009

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Core Five and STINGS – October 2009

1. Police Rating: Weak

Throughout October, the Iraqi Federal Police (IFP) has continued to build its capacities and take on a larger role across the country, albeit with steady assistance from ever-present US troops and advisors. AFP forces number a sizeable 400,000, representing approximately two-thirds of all Iraqi security forces.312 They are increasingly proving their ability to search, question suspects, and carry out criminal arrest warrants without incident.313 Furthermore, they are taking on a significant counterinsurgency role, tracking down and arresting Al-Qaeda members as well as other insurgent networks in several cities.314

On October 1, 798 federal policemen graduated from training provided by the Italian Carabinieri police team as part of the NATO Training Mission. The specialized training included crowd control, VIP protection, traffic stops, and hostage rescue, and has produced over 5,000 graduates since 2007.315 In the following course that began on October 10, 40 Kurdish trainees participated, representing an important move in integrating KRG recruits into the force. IFP is also focusing on specialized training for the upcoming elections in 2010. A Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) course graduated 30 policemen in mid-October that focused on election security, building protection, and civil disorder management.316

Unfortunately, as described in Indicator 7, corruption within the Interior Ministry in particular has had an adverse impact on security. The latest bombings directed at ministry buildings, which were facilitated by checkpoint bribes, demonstrated the susceptibility of the Iraqi police forces. Even as agencies such as the Iraqi Commission of Public Integrity and the Board of Supreme Audits increase their investigations, corruption remains endemic and difficult to tackle, undermining confidence in the reliability of the police force. Moreover, police are increasingly becoming targets of attacks, as demonstrated in Anbar province this month when insurgents detonated bombs at a police station (see Indicator 3).317

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced his new “national unity” coalition this month, which comprises more than 40 parties and transcends ethno-sectarian differences. Al-Maliki hopes to garner votes from Iraqis who are tired of conflict and want real change. However, as reported in Indicator 11, al-Maliki will face difficulties alluring Shiite votes in the south as well as Sunni

312 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 10/30/2009 313 “Iraqis arrest terrorist financier, others,” American Forces Press Service, 10/01/2009 314 “Police: 14 Al-Qaeda members arrested in Iraq,” Associated Press, 10/22/2009 315 “798 Iraqi Federal Police graduate Carabinieri training” Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq Public Affairs, 10/3/2009 316 “SWAT class graduates train for Iraqi police emergency response” Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq Public Affairs, 10/29/2009 317 “19 killed in series of Anbar bombings” Associated Press, 10/11/2009

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votes. He will also have a hard time gaining support from voters who have faced continued improper infrastructure and lagging services throughout his term as prime minister.318

A new government was sworn in this month in Iraqi Kurdistan, yet not without protest. Several MPs, mostly from the Change bloc and the Islamist-Communist bloc, walked out of the session because they wanted a separate vote for each minister but were denied their request. In total, 20 Ministers were sworn in, down from 42 Ministers that made up the previous government’s cabinet. Former Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh was sworn in as Prime Minister of the KRG and is also the primary reason for the walkout. MP Abdullah Mollah Nouri from the Change list explained: “We have many reservations about how he led the (Kurdish) government in 2001 and 2004,” therefore, they wanted to question and vote on each minister separately.319 Such displays of disagreement are likely to occur more often in the new Kurdish parliament, as the Change list and other opposition groups become more vocal as a result of their increased power.

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

Despite optimism expressed by Prime Minister al-Maliki at the US-Iraq Business and Investment Conference, the lack of private sector employment remains an obstacle to Iraq’s economic development.320 The Interior Ministry, for instance, employs a quarter of Iraqis working in the public sector, which still accounts for a vast majority of the jobs in Iraq.321 Earlier this month, the Prime Minister lamented the number of Iraqi soldiers and police, which he said is straining the budget and hindering reconstruction projects. Almost three quarters of Iraq’s $58 billion budget this year was used to pay the salaries and operations of Iraq’s more than 640,000 security personnel.322

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

Human rights violations in Iraq continue to be an area of concern, as highlighted during the Human Rights Conference hosted by the Defense Minister in Baghdad on 7 October. Steps are being taken to move the Iraqi justice system away from a confessions-based system and more towards a rule-of-law based system. This would include investigating cases of missing or dead detainees, and training Iraqi security forces and correctional officers on human rights. The Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani stressed that, “Iraq seeks to balance domestic and international human rights issues through institutions committed to professionalism.”323

318 “Al-Maliki coalition tries to bridge Iraq’s deep sectarian divisions,” The New York Times, 10/02/2009 319 “New Kurdish government sworn in despite MPs walkout,” Agence France Presse, 10/28/2009 320 “Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki,” US Department of State, 10/19/2009 321 “In Iraq, battling an internal bane: Spate of crime underlines need to purge corruption, extremists from security forces,” The Washington Post, 10/22/2009 322 “Iraqi security forces strain budget, PM says,” Associated Press, 10/7/2009 323 “New face of Iraqi justice: Iraqi leaders committed to human rights, fair treatment,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10/07/2009

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Slow progress is also being made in other areas. For instance, arrest warrants and detention orders are gradually being incorporated into the judicial system, evidence collecting is beginning to be regarded as essential, and seeing prosecutions through to conviction is becoming the norm.324 However, as the bombings this month demonstrate, extrajudicial harassment and violence are still rampant, and Iraq continues to rely on US support in several areas, including judicial security and major crimes cases.325

5. Military Rating: Moderate

The Iraqi Air Force achieved several this month, setting it well on its way to becoming an independent institution. An advanced digital radar system was installed at Kirkuk Regional Air Base, which now allows Iraq to fully monitor its own airspace.326 Additionally, Iraq’s pilot training program graduated 11 new rotary-wing pilots for the first time in over a decade, and new fixed-wing pilots continue to graduate at a steady rate.327 Moreover, the Air Force is planning to begin managing their own training by the end of the year, and October was also the first month that Iraq began fully independent transport operations with its C-130 aircraft.328

The Iraqi army is also expanding its capabilities, as the largest class of new lieutenants began their Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) training this month. Divided into eight platoons, 383 students are being taught counter-insurgency operations, offensive and defensive maneuvers, as well as ethics and values.329

324 “Iraqi security forces leverage partnership, see success in legal prosecution,” Multi-National Division - North Public Affairs Office, 10/31/2009 325 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 10/30/2009 326 “Advanced radar improves Iraqi air surveillance,” American Forces Press Service, 10/30/2009 327 “Iraq graduates first class of rotary-wing pilots in years,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10/06/2009 328 “Iraqi Air Force to expand capability,” Aviation Week, 10/05/2009 329 “Largest class starts Iraqi Infantry Basic Course,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10/08/2009

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Appendix IV: November 2009 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

The month of November began with severe weather conditions, including heavy flash flooding, rain and winds throughout the northern Kurdistan region. Two people were killed and several injured: 3,000 people (500 families) in the districts of Mergasur, Choman, Sumeil, Rawandus, in Arbil and Dahuk governorate in the KRG were affected (approximately, 336 families in Dahuk and 160 families in the Arbil governorate.) Substantial damage was caused to personal and public infrastructure.330 A hundred and eighty houses were significantly damaged or entirely destroyed by the mud, as the inhabitants of the households lost access to the water storage facilities usually located on the roofs of the houses, as well as food, livestock and personal belongings. The Governor of Dahuk promised to provide each affected family in his governorate $1,000 to meet the immediate needs of those under severe economic stress.

The electricity infrastructure and water networks were also substantially damaged. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that the main water project that supplies water to the towns of Mergasur and Garatoo in the Arbil Governorate, as well as 42 other villages, was damaged. The food security of people affected by the floods could also be at risk, specifically for those whose livestock was killed and whose farms and vegetable gardens were washed away. Estimates indicate that 40 acres (120 donumes) of farm land might have been washed out in Dahuk, and approximately 170 cattle died in Piran and Doratoo in Choman and Mergasur districts.331 Some schools were also damaged, and access to them remained blocked, preventing the resumption of classes. The flooding of roads and bridges impaired access to remote locations, hindering the delivery of assistance and efforts to restore the basic water and electricity supply.

While the floods caused considerable damage, the return of rain to the northern Kurdistan region is a welcome break from the two-year drought that has affected the area severely, causing the displacement of more than 100,000 people since 2005, as indicated by the UNESCO report from October 13, 2009.332 According to officials in the Arbil Agriculture Directorate, farmers who have left their lands and livestock behind to look for alternative employment in areas where water is less scarce are beginning to return to their abandoned land.

Food insecurity is estimated to be on the rise across Iraq. Muna Turki Al-Mousawi, head of the state-run Centre for Market Research and Consumer Protection, also noted that “there is still a big percentage of Iraqi people who can’t secure enough food. With unemployment running at 18- 20 percent they can’t buy what they need.”333 The latest report assessing food insecurity, the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis published jointly by the World Food Program (WFP) and the Government of Iraq, shows that there were 930,000 people needing food

330 “Iraq: Flooding. Situation Report #1,” OCHA Iraq and UNAMI, 11/10/2009 331 Ibid 332 “Iraq: Northern drought-displaced farmers look to return home,” Relief Web, 11/2/2009 333 “Iraq: Food insecurity on the rise, says official,” IRIN, 11/8/2009

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assistance and an additional 6.4 million who are vulnerable to becoming food insecure if not for the Public Distribution System (PDS).334 On November 17, WFP supporting the Ministry of Education, launched a three month long pilot program to provide 172,000 Iraqi primary school children with a free 80-gramme nutritious date bar fortified with a range of micronutrients at school to help boost school attendance, learning and improve food security in eight of the Iraq’s poorest districts, including Sulaymaniyah Governorate in Kurdistan Region and in in central Iraq, as well as the Diyala and Nineveh Governorates. This $1.6 million pilot program is being funded by the Government of Iraq, while next year the WFP plans to expand its school meals program to attend to 960,000 children in the most vulnerable districts in 14 governorates.335

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

According a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, Iraq continues to be the largest country of origin for asylum seekers worldwide. In the first six months of 2009, 13,000 Iraqis applied for asylum in 38 countries, with over half of the claims submitted in four countries: Germany, Turkey, Sweden and the Netherlands.336 While the overall security situation is perceived to have improved throughout the country and large scale displacement has subsided, the flow of return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) continues to be slow, since both are primarily concerned with the security situation and the services available in their home communities. The numbers of displaced internally and beyond Iraq’s border differ from one source to another, partly because the figures are politically sensitive.337 Recent International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports indicate that the majority of the 348,660 IDPs who have returned to their homes as of October 2009338, are struggling to have their basic needs met and some are worse of than when they were first displaced.339

Overall, those who return suffer from a lack of physical security, scarce livelihood and employment opportunities, and severe difficulties in accessing social services. IDPs and returnees lack basics, such as adequate shelter and secure access to food and clean water, while unemployment remains particularly high among these two groups.

Adequate housing is a particularly troublesome issue for returnees. Many of those who returned found their homes either substantially damaged or completely destroyed (42.5%). Additionally, many abandoned homes remain occupied by squatters. According to an official from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration in Baghdad, since mid-2008, two-thirds of homes

334 “Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) in Iraq,” United Nations World Food Programme, accessed 1/26/2009 335 “WFP Launches school meals pilot programme in Iraq,” World Food Programme, 11/17/2009 336 “Iraq remains top source of asylum seekers,” Jordan Times, 11/5/2009 337 UNHCR numbers differ from those reported by IOM. UNHCR reports that 154,930 IDPs have returned to Iraq as of December 2009. (“IDP Return to Iraq January-November 2009,” UNHCR, 11/30/2009 and “November 2009 Factsheet,” UNHCR Iraq, accessed 11/26/2009). November figures approximate the number of returnees at 2,430 families (13,780 individuals). It is vital to note that neither IOM nor UNHCR document whether the returnees settle in Iraq once they return or whether the dire circumstances they faced displaced them once again. 338 “Assessment of return to Iraq,” IOM, 11/3/2009 339 “Displaced Iraqis returning home face task of rebuilding lives,” Relief Web, 11/3/2009

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belonging to IDPs that have been occupied by squatters have since been evacuated: “as of 20 November 2009, 1,164 houses had been evacuated in Baghdad’s Karkh area (western side of the city) out of 2,299 houses that were occupied. While in Rasafa (eastern side) about 800 homes have been evacuated.”340 The evacuation of the squatters is sanctioned by the 2008 evacuation decree.341

The situation remains dire for Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries as well, as the host governments of Jordan and Syria, which have received the vast majority of refugees fleeing Iraq, (450,000 and 1 million people respectively), continue to restrict entry and job opportunities and social services for Iraqi refugees. Life is particularly difficult for female-headed families, as refugee widows and single women often face substantial physical danger with profound psychological implications. In Syria, many refugee women are subjected to stereotypes and harassment from their neighbors, and are often alone in their trauma and pain.342 With limited access to legitimate employment and vocational skills training, or legal protection, financial stability is particularly difficult for refugee women. Young girls are often forced to marry at a very early age or are pushed into prostitution to survive.

Human Rights Watch reported that, all together, two-thirds of Iraq’s Christians have fled their homes under Saddam Hussein and in the aftermath of the US-led invasion. While before the 2003 US-led invasion, the number of Christians in Iraq was only 5% of the total population, they now constitute an estimated 10% of IDPs and nearly 20% of Iraqi refugees in neighboring nations.343

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

The November death toll in Iraq fell to its lowest point since the US-led invasion in 2003, when a total of 122 Iraqis—88 civilians, plus 22 policemen and 12 soldiers were killed in political violence throughout the country344. According to Health Ministry data, November was the first time the civilian body-count dropped below 100.345 Despite this improvement, the situation remained volatile and this month was off to a bloody start when on November 1, several bombings throughout both the Sunni and the Shiite areas across the country killed 12 people and wounded over 50 others, both police and civilians.346The deadliest of the attacks took place near the predominantly Shiite southern city of Hilla, where a bomb strapped to a parked motorcycle exploded next to a busy restaurant, killing 12 people and wounding 37 others.347 In Karbala,

340 “Iraq: Squatters moved out of nearly two thirds of returnees’ homes,” IRIN 1/10/2010 341 According to the International Displacement Monitoring Center, Prime Ministerial ‘Order #101’ and Decree No. 262 issued by the Council of Ministers on July 17th, 2008 requires all squatters to evacuate from IDP and refugee accommodations in Baghdad, otherwise they will be persecuted. In return, the Government promised IDP squatters 300,000 Iraqi Dinars per month for a period of six months, as well as established facilitation centers aimed to assist returnees with the registration process and property issues. 342 “Iraqi refugees: Women on the margins,” Relief Web, 11/30/2009 343 “In the Iraq war, Christians pushed to the brink,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/15/2009 344 “Iraq Status Report,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs U.S. Department of State, 12/2/2009 345 “Iraq civilian deaths drop to lowest level of war,” Reuters-AlertNet, 11/30/2009 346 “Scattering of attacks in Iraq,” The New York Times, 11/1/2009 347 “Strikes slice across Iraq, leaving at least 12 dead and 50 wounded,” The New York Times, 11/2/2009

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which has seen a spike in attacks in the past several months, three people were killed and another 12 wounded when a bomb attached a minibus full of passengers exploded. Two police officers were killed by a car bomb and a suicide bomber near Ramadi. Violent attacks have also occurred in Mosul Province, where two Iraqi soldiers and four police officers were killed by a bomb and shootings, respectively.

While no other massive attacks took place this month, a sequence of scattered smaller bomb attacks around the country contributed to a sense of insecurity and wide-spread fears that violence will continue to escalate with the approaching elections and the withdrawal of American troops. Nineveh province saw the greatest violence this month, with 61 attacks resulting in 41 dead and 80 wounded, compared to 59 attacks in Baghdad, 38 deaths, and 165 wounded. Baghdad remains the most dangerous place in the country. The absolute majority of the attacks in the Nineveh province took place in Mosul, where 37 people were killed and another 71 wounded in a total of 55 attacks.348In Mosul, the second most dangerous city after Baghdad, security is compromised by frequent shootings by masked gunmen, small pipe bomb explosions and extensive extortions. Ideology seems a secondary motive for the attacks, according to Colonel Gary Volesky, the commander of U.S. Forces in Mosul, as "the insurgency has evolved from being ideologically-driven to organized crime looking for money."349

Anbar province continues to suffer from violent attacks on Iraqi soldiers, police and civilians as well. U.S. Brig. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza noted “in the few last months you have had an attempt by AQI to regain a foothold here,” targeting vital infrastructure, checkpoints, and locations frequented by police officers, and by assassinating influential tribal leaders. 350 Sixteen people were killed by a suicide bomber in an attack on a restaurant frequented by policemen in Falluja, while in Haditha, another six were killed during a police officer’s funeral. Seven police officers were killed when a water tanker exploded in Ramadi, where another 26 were killed while attending a national reconciliation meeting.351 Two attacks in particular raised fears of sectarianism and resurgent activity of AQI. The first attack took place in two villages in the Abu Ghraib district of Baghdad’s outskirts, where gunmen dressed in Iraqi Army uniforms shot dead 13 members of the same tribe, including a Sunni politician, in what was reported to be an execution-style killing.352Nine days later, six members of the same family, including women and children, were killed by men dressed in Iraqi Army uniforms in a small village north of Baghdad. Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi said “we are witnessing the return of death squads,” in the aftermath of the aforementioned events. 353

348 “Security situation in Mosul, November 2009,” Education for Peace in Iraq Center, 12/15/2009 349 “Suicide attacks down, extortion up in Iraq’s Mosul,” Reuters, 11/27/2009 350 “Iraq insurgents reassert themselves in former stronghold: Government forces come under sustained attack from Sunnis in Anbar.” The International Herald Tribune, 11/18/2009 351 “Attacks threaten fragile security gains in cradle of Iraq insurgency,” The New York Times, 11/16/2009 352 “Abu Ghraib attack raises fears of resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/17/2009 353 “In Iraq, 2 attacks raise fears of sectarianism,” The New York Times, 11/25/2009

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4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

A recent report by the Brookings Institution described displacement and human flight in Iraq, as a “long-term structural phenomenon,” caused and persisted by “practices of revenge, persecution and eviction,” that have ethno-sectarian as well as economic and political motivations.354 Those who fled and continue to leave Iraq are by no means a homogenous group; they have left for different reasons and require different levels of humanitarian assistance. The significant decline in the size of the Christian population is an indicator of persistent persecution, with both religious and economic motivations. Some sources report that at least 25% of Iraq’s Christians have fled the country since the 2003 invasion. The city of Ankawa, on the outskirts of Arbil, is one of the only places where the Christian population has grown—almost doubling in the past six years. Christians fleeing the violence in Baghdad and Mosul have found a shelter in this relatively secure city, as a result of the heavy American and international presence and protection provided by the KRG security forces.355 While many of the middle-class Iraqis IDPs who settled in the three provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan, Dahuk, Arbil and Sulaymania, have been able to secure employment and felt relatively safe, the language and cultural differences constitute a barrier to social and economic integration, often resulting in hostilities. Yet, return seems unlikely for those who fear their home communities remain insecure.356

Interestingly, the Brookings report pointed out that while some consider those Iraqis who left the country after 2003 as refugees, others view them as voluntary migrants who left in pursuit of better economic opportunities. As security improves, economic development is perhaps the other vital factor that could reduce the rate of human flight.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

The Kurdish region, which has enjoyed greater stability throughout the past several years, has been able to attract significant private investment, particularly from Turkish and Western European firms seeking to expand trade opportunities with the KRG. Yet this year, there has been a sharp decline in investment in the northern governorates under the control of the KRG, as “with most of the upcoming major oil and gas deals located in southern Iraq, the Kurdish share of private Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) will remain relatively low over the next years,” while the overall FDI flow is expected to increase.357 Investment in Basra accounts for a 38.9%, or $61,057 million, of the total FDI flow to Iraq in 2009. Moreover, southern Iraqi governorates, especially Dhi Qar and Qadisiyya as well as Basra, attracted a substantial portion of FDI deals smaller than $1 billion, at 19%, 17% and 21%, respectively. Provincial governments have grown more active and, in the case of the aforementioned governorates, more successful, in attracting FDI as well as in pressuring the foreign firms to supplement their investment with social services, such as building schools and roads for the benefit of the local population.

354 “Resolving Iraqi Displacement: Humanitarian and Development Perspectives,” The Brookings Institution, 19/11/2009 355 “Kurdish sanctuary for Christian refugees,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 24/11/2009 356 “Arab IDPs seek new lives in Arbil,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 12/9/2009 357 “Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009” Dunia Frontier Consultants, accessed 3/16/2010

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The city of Basra and its surroundings account for 60%-70% of Iraq’s oil production. Out of the five undeveloped oil fields that the Government of Iraq opened for bidding for foreign companies this month, four are in Basra. The expected revenues from the oil deals are substantial yet, unlikely to benefit the residents of Basra and its surrounding towns and villages—three million people, amongst Iraq’s most poor citizens. Public services throughout the city are in a dire condition, many lack access to clean water and only a few ill-equipped health facilities. Moreover, it is unlikely that the new oil industry will reduce unemployment substantially. When the Iraqi Basra-based South Oil Company recently announced it would be hiring 1,600 people, 27,000 applied, many waiting in line for days. 358 The jobs often require a level of education and skills most Basra resident do not have. Many believe that bribes and connections are the reasons some get hired. Moreover, the development of oil fields and the industry that surrounds them, negatively impact the health of Basra’s residents and the general quality of life. The sharp contrast between the astronomical profits the Government of Iraq and the provincial authorities will draw from the recent deals over the oil fields of Basra, and the entrenched poverty of the region’s inhabitants, is an indicator of flawed wealth distribution mechanisms that are sustained by a poorly managed social services system.

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 6

This month, the Iraqi Oil Ministry signed several important oil deals. Iraq, with the third largest oil reserves in the world, is estimated to have nearly 115 billion barrels of proven reserves and another 100 billion in potential new finds.359 Currently, up to two-thirds of Iraq’s discovered fields are not producing; hence, exports are far below potential. Output, which has not been steady, has averaged 2.39 million barrels in overall production this year, while average exports stand at 1.91 million barrels.360

On November 2, after several months of secret negotiations, a consortium led by the Italian Eni S.p.A signed an initial agreement with the Iraqi Oil Ministry to develop the 4.1 billion barrel Zubair oil field.361 Eni and its partners, Occidental Petroleum and Korea Gas Corporation, plan to invest $10 billion in the upcoming seven years to raise the production to 1.125 million barrels per day from the current 195,000.362 Two days later, a consortium made up of British oil giant BP PLC and China’s CNPC signed the final agreement to develop the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq, as the only winners in Iraq’s historic yet quite disappointing oil licensing auction in June. BP and CNPC will be paid $2 per barrel to raise production from the current 1 million to 2.85 million barrels per day—the Rumaila field near Basra is estimated to have 17.8 billion barrels.363 The agreement stipulates that BP will hold a 38% stake in the venture, CNPC will hold 37%, and Iraq will own the remaining 25%.364 ExxonMobil and PLC

358 “Marooned on sea of Iraqi oil, but unable to tap its wealth,” The New York Times, 11/7/2009 359 “Iraq’s Oil Politics: Where Agreement Might be Found,” USIP, accessed 2/3/2010 360 “Exxon, Dutch Shell win Iraq oil contract,” CBS News, 11/5/2009 361 “Oil companies look to the future in Iraq,” The New York Times, 11/30/2009 362 “Iraq, Eni S.p.A led group including Occidental Petroleum Corporation sign initial Zunair oil deal,” Reuters, 11/2/2009 363 Ibid 364 “BP-China National Group Signs Pact for Iraq Oil Field,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/4/2009

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won the right to develop the West Qurna-1 oil field also near Basra, with verified reserved of 8.7 billion barrels. These two largest publicly traded oil companies agreed to up the current 270,000 barrels per day production to 2.25 million barrels a day, within seven years, and to pay a license fee of $1.90 a barrel to the Iraqi government.365 Negotiations also continued with the Japanese Nippon Oil Corp., Inpex Corp., and JGC Corp. for the Nassiriya field in the Southern Iraqi province of Dhi Qar. Officials in the Iraqi Oil Ministry hope that these contracts will bring the country’s oil production from the current (approximately) 2.5 million barrels a day to seven million barrels a day in about seven years.366

A report documenting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Iraq in 2009 found a 241% increase in FDI flows over last year, concentrated in oil and gas deals (46.58%) and mixed investment projects (35.05%) which are “intended to develop large-scale economic zones and industrial cities that provide residential and commercial real estate, as well as manufacturing, processing, service-sector and other productive infrastructure.”367 The expanding investment in the Iraqi real estate sector is particularly important considering the substantial housing shortages, with the current UN estimates indicating 2.8 million housing units falling short by about 1.3 million units to meet the needs of the population.368

Beyond the oil industry, with improvements in the security situation, foreign companies are beginning to show interest in Iraq’s commercial sector. In early November, Baghdad held its first international trade fair in over six years, hosting over 400 foreign firms. While several trade fairs took place in the northern region of Kurdistan, where the security situation has been less volatile, the influx of international companies into Baghdad is a positive development for Iraq’s economic prospects. Iran, Turkey, France and Brazil were the four countries that exhibited the greatest commercial interest in Iraq.369 The French airport operator Aeroports de Paris recently won a $42.5 million contract to build a new international airport serving the three provinces of Kerbala, Najaf and Hilla.370

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that measures perceptions of corruption in the domestic public sector world-wide ranked Iraq as the fourth most corrupt country in the world (176th out of 180 countries). With Somalia, Afghanistan, Burma heading the list, Iraq tied with —a slight improvement from 2008 when Iraq was ranked third. This year, Iraq is rated the most corrupt country out of the 19 Middle Eastern countries evaluated in the report. The report notes that Iraq is struggling with “establishing solid and transparent public institutions, with appropriate mechanisms for accountability: the essential elements for preventing and fighting corruption.”371 While Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has

365 “ExxonMobil wins $50bn contract to develop West Qurna oilfield,” The Guardian, 11/5/2009 366 “Exxon group wins Iraq oil contract,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/6/2009 367 “Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009” Dunia Frontier Consultants, accessed 3/16/2010 368 “Cramped quarters define struggles of Iraqis,” The New York Times, 2/27/10 369 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010 370 “French firm ADP wins Iraq airport contract,” Reuters, 11/2/2009 371 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” Transparency International, 11/17/2009

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argued that “corruption has reduced in high-level government organizations and exists now only in the low-level offices,” the reality is that corruption permeates nearly every aspect of Iraqi public life, incriminating top political figures, as indicated by the recent summoning of Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Ministers, Hussein Shahristani and Karim Wahid, before the national assembly’s integrity committee.372 According to Sabah al-Saedi, the head of the integrity committee and a senior official in the Fadhila party, al-Maliki has failed to cooperatively respond to the committee’s inquiries about ministers in his government—an accusation which has adamantly been denied by al-Maliki’s loyalists. Meanwhile, a number of Baghdad municipal government employees were arrested for embezzling $20 million.373

This month, Iraqi anti-corruption efforts included the country’s participation in the Third Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in Doha, Qatar, where the parties agreed the UN will monitor Iraq’s implementation of UNCAC principles once every five years. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament established the Anti- Corruption Committee as part of the July Good Governance and Transparency Strategy drafted by the KRG.374

Corruption is by no means the exclusive domain of political elites. A recent controversy involving both the Iraqi political and military leadership has centered on the ADE 651, a bomb detecting device shaped like a small hand-held wand, with a telescopic antenna on a swivel, that is used at hundreds of checkpoints throughout Iraq. The Iraqi government has purchased more than 1,500 ADE 651 devices from the London-based ATSC company. Eight hundred devices were purchased in 2008 for $32 million and an unspecified even larger amount this year for $54 million, in a no-bid contract with ATSC, where Iraqi officials paid up to $60,000 per unit, for a product that could be purchased for $18,500. The questionable bidding and purchasing procedures are currently under investigation by the inspector general for the Ministry of the Interior, Aqeel al-Turaihi. The price tag is only part of the controversy. Described by some American officers as “nothing but an explosives divining rod,”375 ADE 651’s efficiency is also being questioned by the National Explosive Engineering Sciences Security Center at Sandia Labs, which works closely with the American Department of Defense. Yet, officials from The Baghdad Operations Command reject statements criticizing the utility of this bomb detector, and have blamed the allegedly ill-trained human operators in cases where the device failed to detect explosives or weapons.

While the security situation improved this month with the civilian death toll reaching its lowest point since the U.S-led invasion in 2003, organized crime is on the rise throughout Iraq. Robberies and extortions are common in cities and villages were the rule of law is imposed poorly, if at all. While it is difficult to assess the accurate scope of kidnappings due to underreporting and general lack of systematic data, kidnappings, specifically of children, are believed to have soared.376 Many Iraqis who have their loved ones kidnapped are reluctant to

372 “Iraqis critical of anti-corruption efforts,” Relief Web, 11/24/2009 373 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” 1/30/2010 374 Ibid. 375 “Iraq swears by bomb detector U.S. sees as useless,” The New York Times, 11/3/2009 376 “Iraqi kidnappings unabated as broader violence subsides,” Reuters, 11/6/2009

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report the crime to the authorities, not only from fear but also because they do not trust the security forces. As a report by the Dubai AL-Sharqiya Television indicated, Baghdad is witnessing a noticeable rise in children’s abduction by organized gangs that are said to carry out their operations with the knowledge of the security agencies. Security sources say that some security agencies collude with those gangsters.377

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

This month, the post-war reconstruction debate was centered on the sustainability of reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the withdrawal of U.S. troops in a few months. A recent OCHA report stressed that, “safe and reliable access to quality social services such as health care, education, electricity and water are a growing concern of Iraqis and may become an important issue around the elections for early 2010.”378 This assessment is reinforced by the focus across the political divide on reconstruction efforts as a major issue in the upcoming March 2010 parliamentary elections. The Iraqi government says it will need $400 billion for reconstruction efforts, which according to Ali al-Alak, an adviser to Prime Minister al-Maliki, it hopes to draw mostly from oil revenues.379 Yet, the volatility of the international oil prices might undermine the government’s plans.

American spending on relief and reconstruction in Iraq since 2003 currently amounts to $54 billion—mostly invested in the construction and rehabilitation of water-treatment plants, electricity stations, hospitals, schools, roads and bridges. Despite the vast financial investment by Americans and other foreign actors, the quality and availability of public services remains, for the most part, sub-standard. Oxfam reports that 90% of the 180 hospitals in Iraq do not have basic medical and surgical supplies, and while some improvements have been noted throughout the past several years, maternal mortality level in Iraq, 300 per 100,000, is by far the highest in the region, as well as under-five mortality, neonatal mortality and low-birth weight deliveries. Iraqis also disproportionately suffer from cerebral palsy and cancer. Limited access to clean water and proper sanitation is also alarming. Approximately 15% of the Iraqi households are not connected to the public water network, while another 37% are vulnerable to water shortages due to the poor quality of the water network. These populations are susceptible to environmental and health crises.

A great challenge to the sustainability of reconstruction is the severe lack in trained professionals to operate the sophisticated facilities built by the Americans and other foreign contributors. For instance, the $270 million water treatment plant in Nasiriya is currently working only to minimal capacity since there are not enough trained Iraqi workers to manage its complex operations. Similarly, in Falluja, a $98 million waste water treatment plan only benefits a third of the population it was built to serve, because the Iraqi government does not supply it with enough

377 “Iraq civilian toll lowest since 2003: Officer killed in Kirkuk; roundup 1 Dec,” BBC, 12/1/2009 378 “Iraq: Humanitarian Action Plan,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 2/2/2010 379 “U.S. fears Iraqis will not keep rebuilt projects,” The New York Times, 11/21/2009

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fuel.380 Moreover, many newly built hospitals, prisons and schools stand empty because their operation and maintenance has been given over to the Iraqi government which has failed to supply the facilities with sufficient equipment and staff to run them. As a recent OCHA report indicates, “shortage of professional staff is particularly acute among civil servants, teachers and medical staff; among the latter group, some 54% have left Iraq.”381 This crisis of human capacity is expected to continue to weigh heavily on Iraq’s reconstruction efforts in the future.

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report on the repression of minority groups in the disputed northern areas, specifically Nineveh province, where minority groups, including the Chaldo-Assyrian, Yazidi, and Shabak communities, are caught in the midst of a dispute between the Government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government. The HRW report notes that “Kurdish forces have mostly relied on intimidation, threats, arbitrary arrests, and detentions to coerce the support of minority communities for the KRG plan regarding the disputed territories,” in extreme cases, violence and torture were also reported. 382 Fearing the rise of violence in the run-up to national elections, minority communities in northern Iraq have appealed both to the local and national authorities for protection and many have expressed little trust in the government forces.383 This is particularly evident in Mosul, one of the most violent cities in Iraq, where shootings by masked gunmen, extortions, kidnapping and murder have become a daily occurrence even though large-scale bombings have subsided.384 The dire situation in Kirkuk also persists—as faith in the authorities’ ability or willingness to protect minorities dwindles, those who do not leave, must fend for themselves. Targeting of prominent political figures and businessmen is particularly common. After the murder the Mosul representative Yawiz Ahmed Husseinon on November 22, the Front representing the Turkmen minority in northern Iraq called for a militia to work alongside the Iraqi security forces. In a separate attack that day, Sheikh Fadil Jaroh, a leader of the Shabak ethnic minority was also killed in eastern Mosul.385 Not only have these attacks left the minority communities fearful to proceed with their daily lives, according to Joe Stork, the deputy Middle East director at HRW, but if significant steps are not taken by the proper authorities to protect these populations, a “looming catastrophe” is fast approaching. 386

The Iraqi government plans to execute over 900 people whose sentences were verified by the Presidential Council before the upcoming parliamentary elections, in what is said to be an effort to present an uncompromising stance against crime. Amnesty International suggests that it is

380 “A search for blame in reconstruction after war; Iraqis and Americans admit errors as country still lacks basic services,” The International Herald Tribune, 11/21/2009 381 “Iraq: Humanitarian Action Plan,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 2/2/2010 382 “On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories,” Human Rights Watch, 11/10/2009 383 “IRAQ: Minority Communities in Nineveh appeal for protection,” IRIN, 11/15/2009 384 “Suicide attacks down, extortion up in Iraq’s Mosul,” Reuters, 11/27/2009 385 “Minorities in northern Iraq targeted in assassinations, abductions,” Relief Web, 11/23/2009 386 “Minorities in Iraq’s north seen as threatened,” The New York Times, 11/10/2009

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likely that some of the prisoners have been sentenced under unfair trials, as was the case with Samar Sa’ad ‘Abdullah, who was found guilty on multiple accounts of murder. 387 She claimed that the Baghdad police beat her and subjected her to electric shocks to extort a confession. Baha al-A'raji, head of the parliament's Legal Committee, said that “some were given death sentences for political reasons,” and that some retired Interior Ministry offices admitted to extract confessions by coercion and force for political reasons.388

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

The political and ethno-sectarian based divisions within Iraq’s security forces are a major hurdle to improving security and enforcing the rule of law throughout the country. The close links between political figures and officials within the Iraqi army and police also strain relations between the security forces and the Iraqi population, many of whom deeply distrust the security forces or do not consider them capable of protecting Iraq. For instance, the Fifth Iraqi Army Division, in Diyala Province northeast of Baghdad, is strongly influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the largest Shiite party in Parliament; the Eighth Division, in Diwaniya and Kut to the southeast of Baghdad, is associated with Prime Minister Nouri al-Malik’s Dawa, party; the Fourth Division, in Salahuddin Province in northern Iraq, is aligned with the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Often, these and other branches of the security forces are used to exhort power and control within the political system.389 Moreover, recruitment into the ranks of the army and the police is highly politicized, which often compromises the quality of the security forces—an alarming trend, particularly within an institution already struggling to adequately perform its duties.

A political controversy ensued after the Iraqi government ordered the Ministry of Defense to consolidate multiple military training facilities into one Iraqi Military College in Baghdad under the name Rostamiya. The Kurds strongly opposed this decision. The Kurdistan Region Minister of Peshmarga Affairs, Sheikh Ja'far Sheikh Mustafa, argued that this decision was a political one since the “Kurdistan Regional Government spent millions of dollars to open these two colleges. Qalachwalan and Zakho military colleges in the Kurdish region are two important institutions that created officers and cadres who continuously trained peshmerga forces,” while the head of Kurdistan Region Presidency Office, Fu'ad Hussein, reiterated the constitutional right of the “Kurdistan region to have its own army.”390

Some experts suggest that the failure of the Iraqi government to incorporate the Awakening Councils and provide the promised payments, employment and inclusion in the Iraqi security forces has directly contributed to the resurgence of the insurgency, including the resilience of AQI. Najim Abed al-Jabouri, the former mayor of Tal Afar has said that the leadership of the Awakening Councils is being targeted directly and is losing credibility amongst former followers since it can no longer serve as a source of patronage and employment. Consequently, “the tribal

387 “Over 900 people on death row in Iraq face imminent execution,” Amnesty International, 12/4/2009 388 “Iraqi MP says government “executing innocent Iraqis,” for political gains,” BBC, 11/7/2009 389 “For every Iraqi party, an army of its own,” The New York Times, 10/29/2009 390 “Baghdad attempts to close military colleges,” The Kurdish Globe, 11/25/2009

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leaders may seek to settle differences with the Al-Maliki government by aiding its enemies.”391 The recent arrest of Brig. Gen. Mustafa Kamal Shibeen, a Sunni paramilitary leader and an aspiring politician also stirred a controversy. Shibeen was arrested by a Ministry of Interior elite unit, without the knowledge of either the U.S. military or the Iraqi security forces which would have prevented his arrest had they been informed. U.S. military officials are concerned that his arrest will leave a power vacuum to be exploited by AQI, while some Iraqi legislators who condemned the arrest suggested that “this action and the targeting of the Awakening leaders will have a very negative effect on the political and the security situation in Iraq.”392

Corruption within the security forces is believed to directly contribute to the rise in organized violence and insurgency, particularly AQI and other groups that are launching violent attacks in the prelude to elections. American officials believe that “the AQI, as well as Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite militants, appear to be targeting mixed urban areas, including those in the Nineveh, Tameem, Diyala and Baghdad provinces, with the intent of inciting sectarian violence as well as undermining public confidence in the Iraqi government.”393 The several deadly attacks by gunmen dressed in Iraqi Army uniforms (see Indicator 3) raised alarm among the local population about the possible infiltration of the security forces or extrajudicial killings committed by Iraqi soldiers.394 Moreover, the head of the commission to investigate the October 25th bombings, Foreign Minister Hoshyar al-Zebari, found severe security breaches and noted that the “planners had done extensive surveillance and had a detailed knowledge of the Iraqi security system and of the ministries.”395

The Kurdish security forces are also under severe scrutiny and criticism for relying on intimidation, threats, arbitrary arrests and excessive use of force against minorities in the disputed territories, specifically in the Nineveh province. The KRG also funds private militias which human rights attorneys say are intended to protect the Shabak and Yazidi communities from violence, but in actuality serve to secure Kurdish influence to guarantee victory in any referendum deciding the political future of the disputed regions.396

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

On November 8, with 141 votes out of the total of 195 deputies present, the Iraqi parliament passed a revision of the 2005 Election Law after weeks of political disputes which threatened to delay not only the scheduled January 16 parliamentary elections but potentially the withdrawal

391 “Shift in Sunni payments facilitates surge in violence,” The Washington Times, 11/12/2009 392 “Key player in Iraq pacification jailed: The Awakening leader, accused of murder, had avoided arrest with the help of joint forces,” Los Angeles Times, 11/10/2009 393 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2009 394 “Militants push back in former stronghold; Iraqi security forces under sustained attack from Sunnis in Anbar,” The International Herald Tribune, 11/18/2009 395 “Iraq government: Looking ‘very seriously’ at security breaches that led to Oct. 25 bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/12/2009 396 “On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories,” Human Rights Watch, 11/10/2009

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of American troops.397 The controversy that delayed and almost thwarted passage of the election law centered on how to hold elections in Kirkuk. Non-Kurdish residents, particularly Sunnis, accused the Kurds of overestimating their numbers in the province with the intention to secure a popular vote in any future referendum supporting the annexation of oil-rich Kirkuk in the northern Iraqi semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan. While many Kurds who were forcefully displaced by Saddam Hussein’s efforts to ‘Arabize’ the city had returned to Kirkuk since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Arab and other minority group residents of Kirkuk complained that the Kurdish-dominated local government tampered with electoral registers to inflate the Kurdish population. Concerns were also voiced that many of the Kurdish returnees did not originate from Kirkuk, but have been encouraged by the Kurdish authorities to make their way to Kirkuk, in order to secure political control over the city.398 The compromise between the opposing camps stipulated that while Kirkuk will be under additional scrutiny in the aftermath of the elections, other governorates where voting registers appear ‘dubious’ can also be subjected to investigation and possible modification of results.

The political compromise, however, did not hold. On November 18, the Iraqi Presidential Council, through Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, vetoed the election law. It was not Kirkuk that motivated al-Hashimi’s veto, but a quota of seats reserved for Iraqis in exile, the majority of whom are Sunni. The 5% quota for “national” and “compensatory” seats was intended to secure a proper level of representation for Iraq’s minority groups and persons in exile. Sixteen seats in total, half of the seats under this quota are minority seats reserved for Christians (5), Sabaeans (1), Yazidis (1) and Shabak (1). With over two million refugees, the level of representation of out-of-country voters is sub-standard, particularly in comparison to the constitutional standard of one deputy per 100,000 Iraqis. Al-Hashimi wants to see the quota increased to 15%.

There were intricate political considerations behind al-Hashimi’s veto. Al-Hashimi’s party was in negotiations with the nationalist Allawi/Mutlak alliance, which opposed the quota during the legislation process. Nationalist Iraqis were not the only supporters of al-Hashimi’s veto. The Kurds were threatening to boycott the elections, arguing that the current division of seats is “an attempt to reduce the number of Kurdistan Region representatives in the next Iraqi parliament and diminish their achievements.”399 Kurdish concern over the number of minority seats is mostly centered on internal politics in the Nineveh province, where the Kurds hope to promote Kurdish or sympathetic leaders amongst the Shabak and the Yazidi communities, as well as voters in exile. Al-Hashemi’s veto reignited sectarian divides in the Iraqi parliament.

On November 23, the Iraqi parliament passed a new amendment to the election law, linking out- of-country votes to governorates of origin so that the exiled voters could receive appropriate representation as votes that are cast domestically. The amendment also includes minor modifications to the procedure for electing the Christian minority seats, grouping them into a single electoral constituency.400

397 “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reading deal on Kirkuk,” The Washington Post, 11/9/2009 398 “Kirkuk dispute may delay Iraq elections,” Associated Press, 11/2/2009 399 “Iraq’s Kurds threaten to boycott elections,” MSNBC, 11/17/2009 400 “Iraq officials halt preparations for January vote,” MSNBC, 11/18/2009

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12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 7

In light of the upcoming elections, U.S. and Iraqi security forces have stepped up efforts to curtail arms smuggling and infiltration from Iran. The links between Shiite militant attacks and Teheran are undeniable. Speaking about the Iran-Iraq border in Maysan Province, Lt. Col. Scott Stephens said: “everything that happens in Baghdad or Mosul by the sectarian Shiite groups is all tied to Iran – you have to cut the threads that tie them, and almost all of them start here.”401 It is widely believed that Iraqis from this area are trained for attacks inside Iraq across the border, while most of the lethal equipment used in these attacks is smuggled from Iran.

As part of a four-day visit to Iraq, Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and the head of Iran’s Shura Council, met with the head of the Islamic Supreme Council, Ammar al-Hakim and Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, to discuss the Iraq-Iran relations as well as the upcoming elections. Larijiani also met with the Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Iyad al-Samarraie, his two deputies, Sheikh Khaled al-Attiya and Aaref Tayfour Larijani. In his meeting with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, Larijiani failed to reach a deal on the possible pardon of Iranians detained by Iraqi security forces and an exchange of Iranian detainees for Iraqi prisoners held in Iran.402 Iran is strongly interested in maintaining a Shiite government in Baghdad that would not become hostile to Tehran.

As of November 30, 115,000 American troops were stationed in Iraq.403 As the Iraqi parliament continued to struggle with the election law, the prospect of holding elections as scheduled in January dwindled, causing concern amongst American officials.404 President Obama pledged that in August 2010, only 50,000 American troops would be left in Iraq in an advisory role, and a complete departure of all U.S. troops is planned for the end of 2011. The election is widely considered as a prerequisite for the U.S. to meet its withdrawal objectives.

401 “US and Iraq try to contain Iran weapons smuggling,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/6/2009 402 “Al-Hashemi disagrees with Larijani on several issues-source,” Aswat al-Iraq, 11/6/2009 403 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2009 404 “Iraq passes crucial election law,” The New York Times, 11/8/2009

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Core Five and STINGS – November 2009

1. Police Rating: Weak

The Iraqi police continue to expand its ranks and professionalize its force, with training provided by American troops and numerous other international experts in rule of law. Currently, there are 292,711 Iraqi Police, 43,809 Iraqi Federal Police, 42,442 Border Enforcement policemen and 29,500 Oil Police. This month, for the first time, 50 women joined 1,050 male classmates, in a graduation ceremony from Iraq’s police officer training academy, after completing a nine-month training program.405 As more than 40 suicide attacks have been carried out by women in 2008, the Government of Iraq recognized the compelling need to train female security personnel. The newly graduated female officers received forensic and investigations training, and will not be limited to performing administrative tasks. Ten of the recent female graduates are members of the Daughters of Iraq, who supported U.S. efforts against AQI.

The Correctional Training Center, which is run primarily by Iraqi instructors, graduated its fourth and largest class of more than 600 Iraqi Correctional Officers. These cadets will join the Iraqi Corrections System and be sent to work in Taji.406 The Iraqi police, specifically the Personal Security Detail unit, began preparing for the upcoming elections, in light of the anticipated increase in security threats. The PSD unit of the Maysan Province completed a course led by the U.S. military and the Department of State’s International Police Advisor-Trainers on how to protect and secure the safe passage of leaders and officials at times of attacks, with an emphasis on handling weapons, foot patrol techniques, team positions and fire and manoeuvre. This unit is also expected to expand exponentially to provide protection to members of the Judiciary.407

While the Ministry of Interior has been able to diminish to influence of the various militias on the Iraqi police to a considerable extent, corruption within the police continues to hinder efforts to strengthen the rule of law throughout Iraq. The Iraqi Commission of Integrity announced that for 2009, out of the 972 arrest warrants for corruption-related allegations, which resulted in 285 convictions, the majority of those convicted were low-ranking policemen. A recent report by the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghdad documented that while some progress has been made in securing Baghdad’s neighborhoods, there was a “growing concern among civilians that corruption in the police forces was on the rise, and the Iraqi media continued to question the capability of the police to protect the population.”408 While in Wasit, instances of corruption appeared to have declined, this could be the result of underreporting. Reports from the Diyala province describe the police as ‘sectarian and ineffective,’ mirroring the two endemic challenges within the Iraqi security forces as a whole—sectarian divides that compromise necessary

405 “Women ascent to Iraq’s elite police officer corps,” The New York Times, 11/9/2009 406 “Largest Iraqi correctional officer graduates at FOB Future,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 11/8/2009 407 “Maysan province security unit prepares for election demands,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 11/27/2009 408 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010

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cooperation, and a severe lack of capacity and professionalism, exacerbated by rampant corruption. 2. Leadership Rating: Weak

The Iraqi political system was shaken by the controversy around the election law, which is yet to be resolved. While after nearly three weeks of debate, the Council of Representatives passed a draft of the election law, it was vetoed by Sunni-Arab Vice President, Tariq al-Hashimi. The KRG also threatened to boycott the elections, as President Massoud Barzani claimed that the seat allocation was “illogical, contradicts the reality on the ground and is a distortion of the facts,” namely, an attempt to reduce the Kurdish presence and influence in the next Iraqi parliament. 409 Ironically, the revised version of the election law that was adopted by the Council of Representatives on November 23 seemed less favorable to Sunni Arabs since it eliminated reserved seats for Iraqis in exile, holding that Iraqis in exile will have their votes counted in their provinces of origin. Al-Hashimi threatened to veto the bill for the second time, but his aides insinuated that his concerns could be mitigated by implementing changes in the election commission’s seat allocation process in the new Parliament.

Importantly, President Talabani and Vice President al-Mahdi expressed support for the new version of the elections law and stressed their concern about prolonging this debate despite the dissatisfaction voiced by Iraqi people over this controversy.410 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who only last month announced the formation of his State of Law Coalition of over 40 parties in an effort to promote an electoral platform that transcends ethno-sectarian divisions, this month was reluctant to accept various other factions that sought to join his alliance.

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

USAID and the Government of Iraq held a conference in Baghdad on the topic of Civil Service Reform, where President Nouri al-Maliki noted that now that the “challenges of security and restoring stability have been identified,” Iraq could prioritize state-sector reforms that emphasize recruitment based on ‘professionalism’.411 A recent UN report noted that Iraq is suffering from a human capacity crisis as a result of “major loses in human and social capital during the regime of Saddam Hussein and particularly since the 2003 conflict, with violence driving professionals and entrepreneurs from the country.”412 The civil service sector has been hit particularly hard by this brain drain, and continues to be undermined by rampant corruption and general incompetence. A recent UNAMI report also pointed out that civil servants continue to be targets of attacks and killings, which further discourages competent workers from pursuing employment with the civil service.

409 “Iraqi Kurds warm of election boycott in dispute over seats,” The Washington Post, 11/17/2009 410 “Iraqi lawmakers hunt for election compromise,” The New York Times, 11/26/2009 411 “Iraq public sector needs fundamental reform: PM,” France 24, 11/16/2009 412 “Iraq: Humanitarian Action Plan,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 2/2/2010

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4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

Judges, as well as prosecutors and defense lawyers, suffer from consistent threats, intimidations and violent assaults. In an effort to provide security to Iraq’s 1200-plus judges, the Ministry of Interior and the Higher Judicial Council established a security detail to work alongside the police. Yet, the security personnel are often ill-trained, and the lack of unity of command, i.e., the fact that the security personnel receive orders from two different agencies creates delays, causes inefficiency and corruption. The independence of the Iraqi judiciary was once again put in question this month, when on November 10 the Iraqi court issued a ruling fining The Guardian for publishing an article criticizing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The article, published in April by Ghaith Abdul- Ahad, quoted intelligence officials who said that al-Maliki was becoming increasing authoritarian. Peter Galbraith described it as “an important story about Iraqi Prime Minister Al- Maliki’s efforts to create an intelligence service loyal to him personally and to concentrate power in his own hands at the expense of his partners in parliament and government.”413 The ruling and the fine raised grave concerns in Iraq and abroad not only about the freedom of press in Iraq, which is already considered tenuous at best, but over what the New York based Committee to Protect Journalists referred to as the “politicization of the Iraqi judiciary,” and the undermining of democracy in Iraq.414 Moreover, as many commentators have suggested, the court awarded damages in the case to al-Maliki, which somewhat undermined the statement issued by his Dawa party denying his involvement in bringing the case before the court and influencing the ruling.

Important joint international and Iraqi efforts in this category included a high-level summit on the Iraqi Judicial Development Strategy Five Year Plan 2009-2013 held in Arbil in the end of the month that was attended by the Chief Justice of Iraq, 22 Iraqi senior judicial representatives and Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) senior representatives. Discussions focused on issues related to judicial independence, judicial and legislative reform, the role of the media and corruption. The conclusions were set to form a basis for future joint Iraqi-EU activities.415 In Basra, officials from the Iraqi police and Iraqi judges, together with American military and civilian representatives, met to discuss the responsibilities and performance of their respective investigation officers and the state of the correctional facilities. It was noted that some confusion about jurisdiction over the investigative responsibilities still remained, while the legal professionals criticized the police for failing to perform effectively and present the court with the necessary evidence for trial. The opening of communications lines between the judiciary and the police was a vital step towards improving the relationship within the comprehensive structure of the rule of law in Basra.416 In a related effort to improve and

413 “Iraq condemned around the world for ruling seen as attack on press freedom: Fine over Guardian report quoting Al-Maliki’s critics ‘makes a mockery,’ of Baghdad’s claim to be democracy,” The Guardian, 11/13/2009 414 Ibid 415 “04.11.2009-High level summit on the Iraqi judicial development strategy five year pan 2009-2013 in Arbil, Iraq,” Council of the European Union, accessed 2/10/2009 416 “Open talk advances Iraqi legal system,” Operational Iraqi Freedom: Official Website of Multi-National Force- Iraq, 11/17/2009

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professionalize the Iraqi judicial system, judges and prosecutors from the Ministry of Interior Court of Cassation and the Ministry of Defense court attended an educational tour at the Baghdad Police College forensics lab on November 19. The judges received information meant to assist them in making evidence-based court-room decisions rather than ruling on confessions.417 5. Military Rating: Moderate

The Ministerial Training and Development center graduated its fifth Basic Inspector General class taught by Iraqis to Iraqis, attended by 17 senior officers from the Iraqi army, navy and the air-force. The course featured presentations by Maj. Gen. Habib Hussein Abbas, Iraq’s Military Inspector General, and Brig. Gen. James M. McDonald, the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq Deputy Commander, who emphasize the need to fight and eradicate corruption.418

The Iraqi navy celebrated the arrival of the Patrol Ship Nasir, the second out of the four ships contracted from the Italian based Fincantieri Shipyard. Maritime security and the ability to adequately control Iraq’s territorial waters are particularly important since the majority of Iraq’s GDP revenue is generated by its offshore oil platforms.419

While the Iraqi security forces have made important strides towards building capacity within the ranks, they remain significantly weak with respect to the ability to gather intelligence and logistics. The budgetary constrains within the Government of Iraq translate to limitations on the expansion of the security forces and the purchasing of necessary equipment. The hiring freeze within the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense continued throughout November as well. The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission notes that the Iraqi security forces “must still overcome significant challenges to developing self-sustaining capacity in its combined forces,” while the Iraqi Ministry of Defense continues to suffer from a shortage of mid-grade leadership among officers and non-commissioned officers. 420

417 “Judges get first-hand look at forensics evidence lab,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 11/21/2009 418 “First Iraqi-led inspector general course graduates 17,” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 11/11/2009 419 “Iraq Navy celebrates the arrival of the patrol ship Nasir (UMM QASAR)” Multi-National Force-Iraq, 11/13/2009 420 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010

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Appendix V: December 2009 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Due in large part to a continuing drought, Iraq continues to face a crippling water crisis. The marshlands in Iraq, which supply water for around 2.5 million Iraqis are largely dry, the worst shortage in Iraq in over 200 years.421 The shortage leaves two million Iraqis vulnerable to severe drinking water shortages, as well as shortages in electricity generated by hydroelectric facilities. Turkey, Iran and Syria have essentially halted most of the headwaters of the three rivers—the Tigris, Euphrates, and Karoon—that feed the Iraqi marshes, compounding the drought conditions across Iraq. Additionally, sandstorms that normally occur eight to ten times per summer in Iraq, are occurring four times as often, suffocating farms with silt and closing airports. Fishermen who ply Iraqi rivers for their catch are catching smaller fish in lesser quantities, sometimes not even catching enough to feed their families, much less bring them to market, which is their normal source of income.422 Food supplies from agriculture are also compromised. Large swathes of northern Iraq, the country’s historic breadbasket, are no longer productive due to a lack of water. Such poor yields could become permanent if the trend of desertification continues, turning fertile land into worthless sand.423

Despite fears that Iraq’s beleaguered health sector would be overwhelmed by pandemic influenza (2009-H1N1), this month the Iraqi Health Minister, al-Hasnawi, announced that swine flu in Iraq is well in hand. According to the Health Minister, the mortality rate for pandemic influenza in Iraq is around six in 1,000 cases, not abnormally high for influenza.424 Al-Hasnawi also assured that the Health Ministry has an adequate supply of Tamiflu and is taking preventive measures for pilgrims heading toward Mecca, providing additional doctors and medical supplies for the pilgrimage.425

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

Although accurate statistics are scarce on the current state of refugees and IDPs in Iraq, the International Rescue Committee pegs the number of Iraqis still outside the country between one and two million, with an additional two million people displaced internally.426 Despite the winding down of American operations, comparatively few Iraqis are returning home, as day to day security remains problematic. This remains the case, despite often poor living conditions for refugees in Syria, Jordan and . And although Syria claims it affords all 1.2 million Iraqis

421 “Droughts the next great threat to Iraq?” CBS News, 12/15/09 422 Ibid. 423 “Drought hits Iraq,” Al-Ahram, 12/3/2009 424 “Iraqi Minister says swine flu ‘under control’,” Al-Mashriq, 11/21/09 425 Ibid. 426 “Iraq's unsettled refugees,” LA Times, 12/30/09

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currently staying in Syria the rights of Syrian citizens, the presence of so many refugees in Damascus’ suburbs leads to “tough competition over jobs, housing, education and other amenities.”427 These conditions and the sheer number of impoverished Iraqis flooding the host states is no surprise. There are reports of rising child labor, as children seek work instead of schooling to make ends meet. Additionally, many refugees are reliant on remittances or simply do not know how much longer their savings will sustain them.428 However, the dangers for returning refugees in Iraq are real. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reiterated its call to authorities to refrain from involuntary return of Iraqis until the security situation improves. The new UNHCR release singled out certain governorates as especially unsafe, namely – Baghdad, Nineveh, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk.429

For some Iraqis, return is not an option, and resettlement to a third country is the only route available. Many of these people worked for the U.S. military or American companies in some capacity and are vulnerable to attack if they return home. While the U.S. increased resettlement to 18,000 Iraqi families in 2009 (a 50% increase from 2008), the United Nations estimates 88,000 families still require resettling.430

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

Shortly after passing the contentious election law on December 7, Al-Qaeda in Iraq pulled off another series of spectacular suicide bombings in Baghdad. On December 8, five closely timed explosions killed 127 and wounded more than 500. Al-Qaeda’s umbrella group in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq, took responsibility for the attack.431 This continues the trend of Al-Qaeda’s move from many indiscriminate attacks on soft targets, such as markets and mosques, to rarer but higher profile assaults on government institutions. Two of the most recent car bombs damaged the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad Provincial Council building.432

The end of December saw a crescendo of religious attacks as Christians went into hiding over Christmas, and attacks targeted Shiite pilgrims as they marched to the holy city of Karbala to mark Ashura. The Shiite holiday, banned under Saddam Hussein, has been reinstituted since the 2003 invasion, and each year it has been the target of attacks. This year pilgrims were undeterred despite roadside bombs and grenade attacks on the procession.433 Likewise, religious attacks on Christians generally increase during December as churchgoers celebrate Christmas. A bomb went off across the street from a Syrian Orthodox Church in Mosul after threats were made against churches throughout Iraq. The bombing was the sixth attack on Christians in Mosul in less than a month.434

427 “1.2 million Iraqis have fled to Syria, official says,” Azzaman, 12/12/09 428 “Poverty fuels child labour among Iraqi refugees in Syria,” Global Arab Network, 12/14/09 429 “UNHCR reiterates concern about involuntary returns to Iraq amid violence,” UNHCR, accessed 1/26/10 430 “Iraq's unsettled refugees,” LA Times, 12/30/09 431 “Al Qaida bomb claim,” Middlesbrough Evening Gazette, 12/10/09 432 “127 dead as bombers aim for heart of government,” The Independent (London), 12/9/09 433 “In Iraq, on holiday, a round of attacks on Shiites,” The New York Times, 12/26/09 434 “New violence flares in Iraq, with Christians and Shiites as targets,” The New York Times, 12/23/09

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Awakening Council members were also frequent targets of attack, indicating increasing sectarian tensions. The Awakening Council members are considered traitorous by al-Qaeda for aiding the U.S. in the counterinsurgency and despite their accomplishments, they are slowly being integrated into the Iraqi security forces.435 Shiite politicians are wary of integrating the 100,000 Sunnis who joined the Awakening Councils, marking a continuing breach of trust between the two groups.

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

Human flight did not significantly worsen in December of 2009. But it did not improve either. When fighting began in 2003, Iraq had 34,000 doctors, today it has around 12,000.436 Because Iraqi doctors are often targeted by insurgents, many left fearing for their safety. The ones who remain have scant access to training or supplies, compounding the healthcare crisis.437 Because there is little sign that the security situation and employment prospects are improving, Iraqi doctors are not returning.

Also fleeing their homes are Christians. According to church officials in northern Iraq, 10,000 Christians have fled Kirkuk over the last three months, and another 2,500 have left Basra.438 Militia attacks are blamed, and the problem worsened in December due to the Christmas season. Christians reported muted celebrations and cancellation of liturgies, fearing reprisal from Shiites celebrating Ashura which falls only two days after Christmas in 2009.439

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Widespread unemployment continues to be a problem in Iraq; even after the government went on a hiring spree, people remain unemployed and unwilling to join the private sector. The private sector is not trusted in Iraq, steady government pay and pensions are sought instead, but Iraqis report that they cannot get jobs with the government unless they are Shiite or have friends in high places.440 Unsustainable and unfair hiring practices are likely to cripple the government when oil prices drop or spark Sunni anger if they remain excluded from the public sector.

Baghdad successfully organized a second round of oil bidding, this time finding companies willing to agree to their terms. While good news for Iraq’s economy, it may be bad news for the Kurds. With oil flowing on Baghdad’s terms, the central government can ignore the revenue from Kurdish projects it once needed to plug gaps in the budget.441 Without that need, Baghdad could revert to its claim that independent Kurdish oil deals are illegal so that it can retain the power of the purse over the Kurdish Regional Government. Also, despite the rising number of oil contracts being negotiated and signed, Basra (with 60-70% of Iraqi oil reserves) remains one

435 “4 Sunni guards at checkpoint in Baghdad are found dead,” The New York Times, 12/30/09 436 “Christmas appeal: Please fix my hands, I want to go to school,” The London Times, 12/6/09 437 Ibid. 438 “Iraqi Christians stay quiet during a nervous holiday,” The Washington Post, 12/23/09 439 Ibid. 440 “IRAQ: Unemployment bad and getting worse,” The Los Angeles Times, 2/15/10 441 “Iraq's new oil deals seen weakening Kurds' hand,” Reuters, 12/17/09

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of the most impoverished regions in Iraq, wracked by unemployment and slum conditions. Those that are employed fear the arrival of Western firms, citing the possibility of being made redundant by technology or corporate downsizing. Workers want job guarantees from oil companies entering Basra to ensure continued employment. 442

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 6

Oil is the most important source of economic development for Iraq in December. Two separate rounds of bidding were held, garnering 10 total contracts out of a possible 13.443 Iraq views these auctions as a critical step in rebuilding its economy, as oil represents the country’s only significant export. Iraq’s untapped reserves represent an incredible potential source of income, with some estimates predicting that by 2016, production levels could reach 12 million b/d, surpassing the current top producer, Saudi Arabia.444 This is a significant increase over Iraq’s current production levels hovering near 2.1 million b/d.445 And with new agreements to fulfill China’s growing demand for oil, it will find a ready market for its new supply.446 Significantly, the oil contracts signed are those of the service fee variety, where the oil company is paid a flat fee for each barrel of oil produced. This is more desirable for the host country than the traditional system in which oil companies receive a share of the oil field itself, and despite uncertainty about security in Iraq, the Oil Ministry was able to stick to its demands.447 American oil firms were significantly absent from the list of bid winners, prompting Iraqi claims that it was showing independence from American influence.448

However, questions remain about whether Iraqi projections are reliable considering the ongoing instability in Iraq and the water shortage (see Indictor 1). Additionally, questions remain on whether the Iraqi government can even handle the influx of revenue such expansion would bring. Corruption remains an enormous hurdle for the Iraqi government. The country is tied with Sudan as the fourth most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index of 2009. Further, the fact that Iraq is not factored into OPEC agreements yet may disrupt the oil market. With such huge reserves potentially flooding the market, oil prices could drop, reducing revenue overall. Also, despite already critical water shortages in Iraq, the Economist Intelligence Unit reports that the Iraqi government is promising adequate water supplies for all the new oil drilling which generally requires significant amounts of water to maintain pressure.449 Whether Iraq can provide water for both the oil industry and rural communities remains to be seen, as well as which will get priority.

During an agricultural conference, Prime Minister al-Maliki made an announcement that the Council of Ministers allocated $17 billion for agricultural development. This would be a boon to Iraq’s struggling agricultural sector, which is under siege by a flood of imported fruits and

442 “Iraqis optimistic foreign oil firms will bring jobs,” Al-Aribiyah, 12/7/09 443 “Iraq oil fields,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/11/09 444 “Iraq auctions development rights to oil fields,” The New York Times, 12/12/09 445 “Iraq sees 2010 exports at 2.1 million b/d,” Platts Oilgram Price Report, 12/23/09 446 “Iraq will double exports to China to satisfy thirst for oil,” The London Times, 12/23/09 447 “Iraq oil fields,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/12/09 448 “No boon for U.S. firms in Iraq oil deal auction,” Reuters, 12/12/09 449 “Three British groups vie for Iraq oil and gas contracts as optimism rules bid process,” London Times, 12/11/09

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vegetables that undermine the local varieties. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Iraq imports more than 80% of its food.450 This decline in local agriculture may also leave rural families more vulnerable to internal displacement. However, the allocated money is dependent on Parliament’s approval, and Prime Minister al- Maliki’s claim that Iraq must focus on other sectors besides oil may only be lip service.

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

The December 8 suicide bomb attacks which struck throughout Baghdad confirmed that Al- Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is still a significant threat, despite its dwindling influence overall. Increased security hampers the movement of insurgents and weapons materiel throughout Baghdad and Iraq, but AQI is adapting by placing an emphasis on rarer but higher profile attacks on government ministries and other important public buildings, as opposed to the conventional soft targets like markets and mosques. The most recent string of attacks targeting government buildings could be a bid by AQI to disrupt the upcoming elections rescheduled for March, and/or to undermine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government.451 The latter implies AQI is moving away from a general insurgency and toward a targeted campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government.

Significantly, this strategy may be working. In the days following the December 8 attacks, various organs of the Iraqi government pointed fingers at everything from corrupt security forces to Baathists, Syria and every combination in between as responsible for aiding AQI.452 This finger pointing undermines the Iraqi government, which appears befuddled, or at least unable to stem the tide of violence in Iraq. Members of the Iraqi public say that the Iraqi security forces’ inability to halt these attacks points to continued corruption and incompetence. Despite heavy security, Al-Qaeda operatives are managing to slip through the cracks. 453 Iraq’s top military commander, Lieutenant General Abboud Qanbar, was replaced following the attack. This could represent a tipping point, forcing the government to take political action.

Baghdad was not the only victim of these problems. Ramadi was struck by a similar attack in which over 20 were killed and 60 wounded, including the governor of Anbar province, the presumed target of the suicide bomber. The bomber, who infiltrated the ranks of security guards around the governor, was reportedly wearing an Army uniform when he detonated his payload. This underscores the same implications of the December 8 attack in Baghdad: first, Al-Qaeda is specifically targeting the government of Iraq, and secondly, Iraqi security forces are still being infiltrated or bypassed altogether.454

Although Iraq announced that three senior officials from the Trade Ministry were given sentences of up to two years for taking kickbacks, these successful prosecutions are just a drop in

450 “Iraq markets flooded with imports - Farmers hit hard times,” Global Arab Network, 12/27/09 451 “Iraqi Qaeda group shifts to remain a threat,” The New York Times, 12/21/09 452 “Iraqi defense Minister accuses Syria of financing armed groups,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/13/09 453 “Iraqi premier says Al-Ba'th Party, Al-Qa'idah behind Baghdad blasts,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/8/09 454 “Ramadi attacks: Is Iraq heading for more sectarian bloodshed?” Christian Science Monitor, 12/30/09

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the bucket.455 According to the Special Inspector General’s most recent report, 2009 saw 80 successful convictions for corruption, but there are still 445 cases waiting to be heard.456 The problem starts at the highest levels of government, where due to Article 136B of the Iraqi penal code, prosecution of a ministry’s employee requires the consent of the highest authority of the relevant ministry. Additionally, since 2005 most ministers and members of parliament have yet to disclose their financial records, despite being required to do so by law.457

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

The Ministry of Electricity announced it will be signing a deal with Iran to import Iranian gas across the border. The deal would seek long-term contracts to supply gas to power plants in southern and central Iraq, which are running below capacity due to fuel shortages.458 The deal reveals Iraq’s growing dependence on Iran, as well as the failure of domestic services. Despite sitting on one of the world’s largest oil reserves, Iraq can not produce enough fuel for its own electricity needs.

The Health Ministry announced it will spend upwards of $1 billion on the importation of medicine and medical equipment. The purchases include flu medication and high tech equipment such as magnetic resonance imaging and spiral scanning machines.459 While promising, it remains to be seen whether the health sector, which remains crippled by a lack of trained physicians (see Indicator 4) will be able to adequately absorb and use these purchases. And while U.S. reconstruction efforts have produced many hospitals, citizens of Arbil say despite the growing demand for a proper hospital, they are forced to use an ad-hoc system of temporary shelters to treat patients in the town of Khalifan.460

Large, expensive infrastructure projects are still in vogue. SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian engineering firm recently signed a $170 million contract to build two new power stations in Karbala and Hilla. Despite reports that Iraq may not be able to maintain these new reconstruction projects after America withdraws, they continue to be the primary means of closing the public services gap.461 Likewise, plans to renovate Rasheed Street, considered Baghdad’s cultural and economic center will run to the tune of $5 billion, despite previous construction efforts mired in corruption and incompetence.462

This represents a growing problem with U.S. reconstruction efforts. Despite billions of dollars spent on new hospitals, water treatment plants, electricity substations, schools and bridges, there is a growing concern that much of the spending was wasteful. Many projects which cost millions are now sitting unfinished or unused. A water treatment plant in Nasiriya does not run

455 “Twin bombings kill 10 south of Baghdad,” The New York Times, 12/25/09 456 “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 10/30/09 457 “$1.3 billion is pardoned in Iraq and more,” Inside Iraq: McClatchy Papers, 9/13/09 458 “Iraq to import Iranian gas to feed power plants,” Azzaman, 12/27/09 459 “Iraqi health official says 1bn dollars allocated to buy medicines, equipment,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/13/09 460 “Citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan's Khalifan demand new hospital,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/25/09 461 “U.S. fears Iraqis will not keep up rebuilt projects,” The New York Times, 11/20/09 462 “In heart of Iraq, a plan to revive the pulse of a central artery,” The New York Times, 12/29/09

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at capacity because it is too sophisticated for Iraqi workers to operate. An American built hospital was closed immediately after opening because it did not have enough doctors, medical supplies, or electricity.463 The problem represents a fundamental lack of coordination and capacity; these unused projects stand as monuments to waste while Iraqis still desperately need solutions as in previously mentioned Khalifan. The solution may be in community driven projects, such as in Nineveh, where the local council is using part of the budget surplus to pay for a water project, which will supply 100 villages and renovate an artificial limb hospital.464

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

There are fears of a conservative backlash in Iraq as the al-Maliki government clamps down on nightclubs and bars in an effort to appease the religious vote ahead of elections. During Eid al- Adha, Iraqi police raided 300 establishments, ordering alcohol be removed from the premises and warning that owners of any club which tried to reopen would be thrown in jail. Club owners say that the al-Maliki government and Americans urged them to open their nightclubs after the fall of Saddam and the recent reversal of policy leaves them with nothing.465 In addition to the crackdown on nightlife, internet cafes were told that they will soon be required to use filters which block access to certain websites, especially pornographic ones. Likewise, alcohol vendors in the international district will have to close up shop.466 After the requirement of media licensing and reports of journalist intimidation (see Indicator 9 of October report), the Iraqi government is now also asking the Arab Union to block certain satellite stations from broadcasting in Iraq, citing transmissions which spread racism and hatred. These channels are coincidentally also critical of the Iraqi government. The Arab Union has refused to comply.467

The fate of Camp Ashraf is still undecided. The 3,200 members of the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) who live there remain, despite attempts by the Iraqi government to dislodge them. There was another attempt to coerce them into leaving this month which ended in a standoff; the Iraqi government is trying to improve relations with Iran and therefore has a strong interest in removing the group, members of which had defected from Iran and aided Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. However, since the U.S. considers PMOI to be a terrorist organization, nobody is granting the group asylum.468

There are accusations against the Iraqi government of an attempt to force out members of the Zawba tribe which resides in Eastern Baghdad to make room for Shiites. These are serious charges, which if true amount to the use of government security forces in ethnic cleansing. Although there are not confirmed reports of killings, intimidation is used in the form of arbitrary arrests.469 The Zawba tribe is of Syrian origin and has ties to Damascus.

463 “U.S. fears Iraqis will not keep up rebuilt projects,” The New York Times, 11/20/09 464 “Iraq's Ninawa council approves projects worth 40bn dinars,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/17/09 465 “: Religious right clamps down on Baghdad's new decadence,” The Observer (England), 12/6/09 466 Ibid. 467 “Iraqi government seeks closure of some TV stations for ‘racism, hatred’,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/12/09 468 “Iranian exiles told to leave Iraq camp,” The Washington Post, 12/16/09 469 “Tribes accuse Iraq cabinet of sectarian "liquidation" campaign,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/17/09

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African Iraqis began a campaign for recognition as an ethnic minority in Iraq, appealing to the government to grant them the same rights as Christians, including reserved seats in parliament. African Iraqis say that although officially Iraq is “colorblind,” they face discrimination on a daily basis. Iraqis with darker skin say they are often denied even menial labor jobs and prohibited from inter-racial marriage. Many African Iraqis drop out of school at a young age, exacerbating the problem of underemployment.470 African Iraqis number around 1.2 million.

Due to the dire economic conditions in Iraq and the lax security situation, women are increasingly being sold into sex slavery. Young girls as young as twelve are being kidnapped and exported to Syria and the Gulf States or sometimes trafficked within Iraq. Estimates of the number of women who become victims of trafficking range between 200 women a year to the thousands.471

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Although there are fears that Prime Minister al-Maliki may be consolidating the security forces into a mainly Shiite army that responds to him personally, the fact is that nobody appears to have real control over the security forces. Despite repeated attempts to clamp down on insurgent movement across the country, and especially in Baghdad, Al-Qaeda continues to carry out high profile attacks, especially against government targets.472 Some argue that the change in AQI tactics is due to increased security which is draining AQI resources and limiting the movement of explosives and weapons, but the security forces’ inability to halt massive car bombs from entering the city, especially government buildings, is disturbing. American intelligence even tipped off Iraqi security forces that there was going to be an attack on December 8, and bombs still managed to slip through the checkpoint system.473

After the December 8 bombings, accusations against security forces were flying, with the initial number put at 45 conspirators among the security forces.474 Beyond sheer negligence or corruption, there is some fear that the security forces are also being undermined by militiamen inducted into police or military forces who remain loyal to the Shiite Badr or Sadr militias. Despite Prime Minister al-Maliki’s Shiite credentials, this uncertainty about the Shiite militias highlights the complexities of the security situation in Iraq—significantly that there are divisions beyond just Sunni-Shiite lines, but also among the Shiites themselves.

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

Although Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi threatened to veto the second version of the election law passed in November due to political wrangling on the part of many parties involved, the

470 “African Iraqis want to be heard,” The International Herald Tribune, 12/4/09 471 “Iraqi women being forced into sex slavery,” The Jerusalem Post, 12/13/09 472 “Iraqi Qaeda group shifts to remain a threat,” The New York Times, 12/21/09 473 “Iraqis had bomb warnings,” The Australian, 12/14/09 474 “Iraq's security forces implicated in December bombings,” The Irish Times, 12/18/09

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Iraqi parliament managed to reach a compromise on December 6. The vice president initially vetoed the first version of the bill because he felt the provisions made to ensure Iraqi refugees would be able to participate in the upcoming election were not adequate. However, after vetoing the first version of the bill, different political blocs began making additional demands in the second version beyond the electoral provisions, namely, to enlarge their own quota of seats in the parliament.475 In response, al-Hashimi commented, “I wished we could have settled the election law by amending the article concerning voters outside the country without delving into others that have not been vetoed in the first place.”476 After much debate, an extended parliament decision, and a visit by Vice President Biden,477 the parliament broke the impasse and came to a compromise which avoided much of the sectarian additions to the election bill. However, they reserved the right to bar candidates after the election.

Despite their willingness to compromise on the election bill, the Kurds are more recalcitrant on the subject of Kirkuk. The Kurdish Regional Government is holding fast to its demand that the question of Kirkuk must be resolved via Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.478 Wrapping itself in the mantle of constitutionalism, the KRG can act as if it is simply following the written law, knowing full well that due to Kurdish repopulation of Kirkuk, an election in the near future will ensure a Kurdish victory. Sunni, Shiite and Turkman politicians are all in favor of pushing back any election in Kirkuk as well as entertaining other solutions for solving the Kirkuk dispute.479

Another concern for the political system may arise out of the quickening pace of the oil economy in Iraq. Ten new oil deals were signed this month (see Indicator 6), but Iraq’s parliament has yet to pass a hydrocarbon law, which distributes the revenue generated by the oil industry. The central government is assigning per barrel bonuses to the Basra and Kirkuk region based on Article 43 of the Iraqi constitution. This arose out of Basra’s demand for more oil profits since it holds 60-70% of the country’s oil but remains one of the most destitute regions in Iraq.480 Kirkuk followed suit, and now the central government is committed to paying bonuses to the two most oil-rich regions in Iraq before the creation of an oil law.

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 8

In response to Iran’s brief occupation of the al-Fakkah oil field, Vice President al-Hashimi called on Iran to cease efforts to destabilize Iraq.481 The oil field, which is on the Iran-Iraq border is a contentious issue as both states lay claims to it. On December 15, Iranian troops allegedly crossed the Iraqi border and raised the Iranian flag above Well #4 of the oil field. They later withdrew and the dispute was resolved diplomatically.482 Although it is promising that U.S. or Iraqi forces did not have to intervene, the incident shows how dismissive Iran is of Iraqi

475 “No second veto: the election law is approved by Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi presidency,” historiae.org, accessed 1/28/09 476 “Iraqi vice-president ponders UN proposal on voters living abroad,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/6/09 477 “Breakthrough in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 12/8/09 478 “Iraqi Kurdish leader says will not give up Kirkuk easily,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/2/09 479 “A hint of harmony, at last; Iraq and the Kirkuk conundrum,” The Economist, 12/5/09 480 “Decentralisation bonanza in the Iraqi budget,” historiae.org, accessed 1/27/09 481 “Vice-President Al-Hashimi calls on Iran not to destabilize Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/23/09 482 “Iranian troops occupy oil field in Iraq, stoking tension,” The Wall Street Journal, 12/19/09

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sovereignty. As Iraq becomes increasingly reliant on Iran (see Indicator 6), Iran may attempt to exert more influence on the fledgling state.

Iran is not the only foreign player deeply involved in Iraq though. Iraq’s Foreign Minister commented that, “the rivalry over Iraq's future comes from two non-Arab countries, namely Iran and Turkey.”483 Indeed, Turkey is seeking to increase its influence in Iraq due to the Kurdish issue. Before a meeting with President Obama, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan sent Prime Minister al-Maliki a message pledging to work with Iraq on the question of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).484 Later, Turkey’s Interior Minister Atalay said while in Iraq that he had “fruitful” discussions with both U.S. intelligence and Iraqi executives in Baghdad and Arbil, and that they discussed ways of ending PKK terrorism.485 Turkey is extremely interested in expanding its influence in Iraq, as the PKK operates out of northern Iraq.

As for the U.S., the Iraqi government is ambivalent. There is now a strong emphasis on the Iraqi security forces taking the lead for day-to-day security. While American troops remain on patrol, they do not respond to incidents unless called on by Iraqi forces.486 This has been the case since American troops withdrew from the cities on July 1, 2009. The Americans remain in a supportive role, to train and assist, but allow the Iraqi security forces to take the lead. Meanwhile, the Iraqi military says that it will require American assistance well beyond the American date for leaving the country.487 The Iraqi military wants to continue its relationship with the U.S. for both training and equipment.

December was the first month since U.S.-coalition military operations in Iraq began with zero American casualties.488 This reflects the shift of American forces towards the periphery as Iraqi security forces step up their efforts.

483 “Turkey and Iran vying for Iraq's future - Foreign Minister Zebari,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/18/09 484 “Turkish PM sends message to northern Iraq regarding PKK stronghold,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/7/09 485 “Turkey, Iraq discuss ways to "eliminate" Kurdish rebels,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/22/09 486 “G.I.'s learning to stand down as Iraqis step in,” The New York Times, 12/5/09 487 “Iraqi army seeks U.S. support for long term,” The Washington Times, 12/8/09 488 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010

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Core Five and STINGS – December 2009

1. Police Rating: Weak

Police officers in Iraq remain targets of insurgent activity. In Tikrit a suicide bomber ran towards Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Fahal, head of the city’s anti-terrorism force, before detonating his payload, killing al-Fahal and wounding two other officers.489 Two similar attacks took place in Baghdad, and five officers perished. Police officers are a likely target for insurgents, and with Iraqi forces in the lead for security operations, they are likely to continue to bear the brunt of insurgent attacks.

Fortunately, Iraqi-led security efforts seem to be gaining some momentum. Iraqi police had a series of successes this month based on anonymous tips and swift action. Due to the increased likelihood of attacks on Shiite pilgrims during Ashura, police took proactive steps to increase the security presence along routes used by pilgrims.490 In Karbala City, police forces arrested an eight member “sleeper cell…with a large amount of explosives and ammunition in their possession” before they could carry out attacks during the holiday.491 Likewise, police in Wasit seized a cache of 200 rockets which were also intended to be used in an attack on Shiite pilgrims during Ashura.492 These successes are good signs of progress on the part of the Iraqi police from an operational standpoint, but as stressed in Indicator 10, corruption remains an enormous obstacle for Iraqi security forces, including the police. Unless the gaps in ground security— which Al-Qaeda is ruthlessly exploiting—are plugged, day-to-day security will not improve significantly.

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

Although elections were postponed from January to March, the parliament’s ability to push through a new version of the election law that met Vice President al-Hashimi’s approval showed statesmanship on the part of Iraqi politicians. Granted, the vote came to a crisis because of petty electoral demands from parties involved and the U.S. made last minute calls to pressure the Kurds to relent, but overall, the passage of the law was a positive step by the parliament (see Indicator 11). Further, the reason the original election law was vetoed in the first place—Vice President al-Hashimi’s insistence that Iraqi refugees be accommodated during the upcoming election—was both reasonable and significant in ensuring that Iraqi refugees were not disenfranchised.

More good news came with Iraq’s ability to resolve the al-Fakkah oil field dispute (see Indictor 12). By resolving the dispute diplomatically, Iraq’s government shows signs of growing

489 “Suicide bomber kills senior Iraqi police official, 4 others in Tikrit,” The Washington Post, 12/4/09 490 “Iraqi police to implement security plan in Maysan for Shi'i festival,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/19/09 491 “Iraqi police arrest "sleeper cell" before targeting Shi'i pilgrims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/16/09 492 “Iraqi forces seize 200 rockets said for targeting Shi'i festival,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/21/09

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maturity.493 Doing so without American aid (Iraq called neither for U.S. aid in the form of troops or diplomatic pressure) also shows signs of growing independence. While Iran certainly continues to play a heavy role in Iraqi politics, al-Fakkah represents a test, which Iraq deftly passed.

Unfortunately, rampant corruption is still crippling Iraq. It permeates every level of government, which explains why Iraq tied with Sudan as the fourth most corrupt country in the world on Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. This corruption is more than just a waste of aid money. Checkpoint bribes facilitate terrorist attacks (see Indicator 10), politicians’ flagrant abuse of their powers undermines the government’s legitimacy (see Indicator 7), and if Prime Minister al-Maliki cannot get his house in order, he may lose votes in the upcoming election.

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

Iraq’s civil service, like its leadership, is also riddled with corruption. There was no official reduction of public employment. The inability of the government to purge those responsible for embezzlement, bribery or theft means the problem continues—and may possibly worsen. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), despite comprehensive laws officially on the books, the process of awarding public contracts in Iraq is still not transparent, open competitive tender is not required, accountability chains are “fuzzy”, and there is, at best, limited coordination of procurement practices across government, and control institutions do not coordinate.494

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

Ministry of Interior head al-Bulani recently increased efforts to protect judges from harm. They are also a common target of insurgent attacks. The ministry took over personal security detachments for judges, consolidating a force previously split between the Ministry of Interior and the Higher Judicial Council. Under the new program, each of Iraq’s 1,200 judges can pick a five man security detail made up of police officers, all of whom report only to the Ministry of Interior.495 This is a definite improvement over the stop-gap system of training civilians—who are not permitted to carry firearms—to act as bodyguards for the judiciary.496

Hopefully, with more protection, judges can begin to sort through Iraq’s court docket backlog. The backlog is also being addressed by U.S. government-funded legal council centers, which pay Iraqi lawyers to act as defense attorneys for Iraqi detainees. Finally, there is now a strong effort on the part of the Iraqi government to provide acceptable evidence for holding security-related detainees. Previously, cases for those held on security charges often stalled because evidence regarding their case could not be released due to security concerns. With American assistance,

493 “Iraqi premier urges "deterring" verdicts against criminals,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/24/09 494 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010 495 Ibid. 496 “Top targets for assassinations in Mosul,” Al Aribiya, 11/29/09

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coalition detainee cases were assessed and releasable evidence was compiled so that Iraqi judges could make a just decision.497

On the same note, during a Higher Judicial Council seminar on the subject of criminal evidence investigation held this month, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called on the Iraqi judiciary to hand down “deterring verdicts against criminals and those who encroach upon the state’s institutions, so that they would not exceed their limits”498 This is puzzling as Iraq already resumed the use of the death penalty earlier this year which was not used since 2007. As there are already fears that many Iraqi prisoners may be yielding confessions under duress, many felt that harsher punishments do not seem to be the most obvious solution.499

5. Military Rating: Moderate

With Iraqi forces now primarily responsible for security operations, the Iraqi military is keenly aware that it will require significant military assistance from the U.S. well beyond the withdrawal of combat troops. Although the military realizes the extent of American involvement will be dictated by the victors of the upcoming election, General Nasier Abadi said that if the decision on whether to accept American aid was solely up to the military, “the answer would be yes, yes and yes.”500 Iraqi Security forces—which now surpass 600,000 members—are taking the lead in manning checkpoints and performing patrols or raids, but they remain critically dependant on the U.S. for specialist training and services such as intelligence, surveillance, and air support.501 Currently, a full American withdrawal would leave a very large Iraqi security force unprepared to handle all the duties required.

The area where this is increasingly apparent is Iraq’s air force. Budget constraints are stalling efforts to expand, which mean Iraq possesses almost no modern air capabilities. The U.S. donated dozens of small civilian aircraft which are useful for counterinsurgency operations, but the Iraqi government wants modern fighters and radar systems to defend its airspace, especially with Iran as a neighbor. Iraq is seeking to buy 36 F-16 jets from America, but the deal must go through Congress and could take years to finalize.502

497 “Quarterly report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010 498 “Iraqi premier urges "deterring" verdicts against criminals,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12/24/09 499 “Resumption of death penalty in Iraq sparks UN concern,” UN News Centre, 12/14/09 500 “Iraqi army seeks U.S. support for long term,” The Washington Times, 12/8/09 501 “G.I.'s learning to stand down as Iraqis step in,” The New York Times, 12/5/09 502 “Once mighty Iraq Air Force rebuilds - but pilots keep low profile,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/15/09

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Appendix VI: January 2010 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

The Iraqi news source, Niqash, published a report this month on the state of the Iraqi environment. Some of the environmental concerns facing Iraq today include polluted drinking water and drought, excessive radiological emissions, air pollution and extensive desertification. The U.S. war effort exacerbates many of these factors, especially the radiological contamination of Iraqi land by Depleted Uranium (DU) ammunition and topsoil damage from war vehicles.503 In 2007, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that during the 1991 Gulf War, 50 metric tones of DU were fired during tank battles and an additional 250 tones in air to ground attacks. There are no exact figures for the total amount of DU ammunition used during the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but estimates vary from 170 and 1,700 metric tones. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense informed UNEP that approximately 1.9 tones of DU ammunition were fired exclusively from tanks by the British forces. The UK also supplied UNEP with the coordinates of DU firing points for the 1.9 tones of DU ammunition used in the 2003 conflict. The U.S. government has yet to release information to UNEP about the use of DU ammunition by American troops.504 Despite the dangers posed by these environmental threats, Iraqi political parties are ignoring environmental concerns in favor of other electoral issues.

The state of Iraqi agriculture remains problematic. Iraq saw a record low in rice yields this year and only about 100,000 tons have been shipped to state silos. Iraq consumes more than 10 times that amount every year, which means the government will have to import around one million tons of rice in addition to another four million tons of wheat. The shortage is being blamed on the drought afflicting most of Iraq and the trickling flow of water making it down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.505 The decline in agriculture has been persistent. The importation of grain is reflective of the Iraqi agriculture sector in general, the contribution of which has shrunk to only 3% of GDP.506 The importation of foreign foodstuffs is a growing concern, with Iraqis complaining that foreign competition is wiping out local agriculture. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 80% of all Iraqi food is imported.507 It is a cyclical problem; due to the water shortage, local producers are having a hard time growing their crops. Imported food is used to shore up the gap, but with local producers not selling their normal yield, they can not afford to invest in their failing cropland and more food must be imported to cover the next shortage.

Australia has taken on 119 Iraqi students to train them in agricultural techniques to reverse desertification. Of the aforementioned environmental threats to Iraq, desertification is one of the

503 “Environment still low priority in Iraqi politics,” Niqash, 1/7/10 504 “Technical report on capacity-building for the assessment of depleted uranium in Iraq,” United Nations Environment Programme, accessed 4/20/10 505 “Iraq rice yields slump; rice imports surge,” Azzaman, 1/29/10 506 Ibid. 507 “Farmers hit hard times,” IWPR Iraq Crisis Report, 12/24/09

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most serious. It contributes to a loss of arable land, water shortages and an increasing number of sandstorms. has much experience in dryland cropping and, in conjunction with USAID, is attempting to apply some of that experience toward reducing the effects of desertification in Iraq.508 Additionally, Turkey and Iraq are organizing an agricultural fair in Iraq. The two countries are also planning to work on a detailed study on modern agricultural techniques, and Iraq has called on Turkey to assist in the spending of $1 billion allocated to improve Iraqi fields, especially large idle fields.509

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

One hundred Iraqi Kurds were found on the shores of the Mediterranean close to the French Island of Corsica, raising questions about the conditions within the Kurdish enclave. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s provinces are usually hailed as a striking success compared to the security conditions in the rest of Iraq, but there are reports that more people are now fleeing the Kurdish region than central Iraq.510 Despite the relative economic prosperity of the Kurdish region, those fleeing bewail unbearable corruption and class divisions, reportedly even worse than the rest of Iraq.511

Abdul-Khaliq Zankana, head of the Iraqi parliament's Committee on Displacement and Migration called for increased funding for IDPs and returnees. The MP said the $169.5 million currently allocated to deal with IDPs in Iraq is not enough to significantly impact the problem. Estimates of the exact number of IDPs in Iraq vary and no particularly recent information has been made available since the winter of 2009, yet most international organizations report that there are over two and a half million people internally displaced in Iraq.512 Zankana originally asked for about $425 million but his requests were rejected in favor of municipal services and security.513 His calls are supported by prominent Iraqi activist Basil Abdul-Wahab al-Azawi, head of the Baghdad-based Commission of Society Enterprises, an umbrella group of more than 1,000 NGOs inside and outside Iraq. Both men seek to end Iraq’s reliance on NGOs to fill the gap on payments made to returnees. Each displaced family was supposed to receive a payment of $80 each month, but most IDP families only received the payment once. Additionally, only about 80% of the returnee families entitled to $850 compensations were actually paid.514

508“ Iraqi students sow seeds for homeland's regrowth,” The Australian, 1/20/10 509 “Turkey, Iraq to boost agricultural trade, cooperation,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 1/27/10 510 “More Kurds flee to West despite ostensible quiet of their region,” Azzaman, 1/23/10 511 Ibid. 512 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that as of November 2009, 2,764,111 people were believed to be internally displaced in Iraq. Figures were made available by the Ministry of Migration and Displacement and the Kurdistan Regional Government, including data monitoring by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. This figure represents the total of people displaced in Iraq since 1968. 1,212,108 Iraqis were displaced between 1968 and 2003, and an estimated 200,000 Iraqis were displaced between 2003 and 2005. IOM reports that most of the displacement since the US-led invasion in 2003 occurred in 2006, and has since slowed down. Since February 2006, an estimated 1,552,003 million Iraqis have been displaced. “Iraq: Total internally displaced population is estimated to be 2.75 million (as of November 2009),” IDMC, 3/2/2010 “IOM emergency needs assessments: post February 2006 displacement in Iraq,” IOM, 4/1/2009 513 “IRAQ: MP calls for more IDP funding,” ReliefWeb, 1/5/10 514 Ibid.

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On January 24, Government and UN representatives visited several villages in the where reconstruction efforts have begun as part of the Diyala Return and Integration Initiative of July 2009. This initiative brings numerous UN agencies with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) in coordinated, inter-agency effort to improve conditions for return of the displaced populations to Diyala. Nearly 300,000 people fled their homes during the peak of violence in 2006 and 2007; many believed to be internally displaced throughout the governorate. Diyala is only second to Baghdad in terms of the number of IDPs. Recent reports indicate that as of recent, this initiative has been successful in establishing the conditions to accommodate the return of over 95,000 Iraqis, into more than 400 villages and communities around Ba’quba. The Government also promised to create 16,870 government jobs that were distributed between the 42,000 applications through a lottery. The Diyala initiative is expected to be replicated in three major return areas of Baghdad and in the Salaheddine province throughout 2010.515

Beyond failures to make payments to IDPs and returnees, the Iraqi government is also negligent in regard to the refugee situation. Abd al-Samad Rahman Sultan, Iraqi Minister of Displaced Persons and Migrants, denied that the number of Iraqis residing in Syria exceeds 1 million, suggesting the number is actually 206,000.516 He claims this number reflects the most recent polls conducted by his ministry and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, but the UNHCR and Syria both consistently report the number of Iraqis in Syria to be in excess of 1 million.517 The number of Iraqis who actually register as refugees in Syria is closer to the number provided by Abd al-Samad Rahman Sultan at 260,000.518 Civil society actors on the other hand, are expressing greater commitment to resolving what is threatening to become a protracted refugee crisis. Over 50 NGOs met in Damascus this month to discuss the issue of Iraqi refugees living in Syria, working together to compile the 2010 Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees (RRP). The plan covers the closure of al-Tanf camp and the relocation of 1,000 Palestinian refugees from Iraq to a new camp in northeastern Syria. The plan also notes that of the 260,000 registered Iraqis within Syria, less than 1,000 of the refugees seek to return home with UNHCR assistance. Reasons cited for not returning include a lack of social services and employment opportunities as well as uncertainty surrounding the upcoming election.519 This is a continuing problem for the Iraqi government, which officially encourages repatriation, but can not adequately provide for returnees.

Another factor that contributes to the slow rate of repatriation for Iraqi refugees is that many abandoned homes have been taken over by squatters. The high number of squatters in Iraq is indicative of how bad the housing situation is in Iraq. The Iraqi government is making efforts to evict the squatters to make way for returnees, but it takes a considerable amount of time to verify ownership and few squatters are taking the compensation offered to encourage them to move.520

515 “The Diyala Initiative: Facilitates the reintegration of returnees,” UNAMI, 2/23/2010 516 “Iraqi Kurdistan leader calls for settling disputed areas issue,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/19/10 517 “2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Iraq,” UNHCR Iraq website, accessed 2/18/10 518 “Middle East: Next steps for Iraqi refugees,” ReliefWeb, 1/19/10 519 Ibid. 520 “IRAQ: Squatters moved out of nearly two thirds of returnees’ homes,” IRIN, 1/10/10

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Notably, a great number of the squatters themselves are IDPs, and their plight has been largely ignored by the Iraqi authorities and the international humanitarian agencies.

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

The Accountability and Justice Commission’s decision to bar over 500 politicians from running for office in the March 7 elections has ignited a sectarian firestorm in Iraq. The commission’s decision affected Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians, but analysts say the decision hurts Sunnis the most as some of their most prominent politicians were affected.521 Some see the ban as a sectarian move directed by Iran; Ali Faisal al-Lami, one of the men in charge of the disqualifications, has close ties to the Iranian state.522 Sunnis also made a connection between the panel’s decision and Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki's visit to Baghdad, who visited just one day before the decision was made.523 While the Accountability and Justice Commission announced that those affected by the ban can make an appeal, there is concern that they will not be able to clear their names in time for the election, barring their candidacy by default.524

The whole candidate ban fiasco threatens to plunge Iraq into renewed sectarian violence; Sunnis have been discontented with their place in the political system since they boycotted the 2005 election and have been seeking to become more involved politically as the boycott essentially backfired.525 Most importantly, the Commission’s ruling undermines reconciliation efforts in Iraq. Many Sunnis feel the term “Baathist,” is being used to disenfranchise them by the Shiite government,526 as Prime Minister al-Maliki’s government tends to employ the term as a catchall phrase in reference to terrorists.527 The governor of Karbala even announced a campaign to arrest Baathists in Karbala until the city is free of them.528 If the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ban is not repealed, a resurgence of sectarian violence is a strong possibility.

This month saw efforts at bridging the gap between Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. Although not widely publicized, a new operation which places Iraqi, Kurdish and American troops into combined units which will run a string of checkpoints along the Iraqi-Kurdish fault line represents the most significant military operation for U.S. troops since they pulled out of cities in June.529 The operation’s goals are twofold: first, the hope is that by being forced to work together, Iraqi and Kurdish security forces will begin to view each other as compatriots and colleagues instead of potential opposition forces; secondly, the operation is designed to increase regional security ahead of the March elections in the North, where al-Qaeda has exploited the lack of cooperation between the different security forces in an effort to provoke an Iraqi-Kurdish conflict.530

521 “IRAQ: Sectarian tension ahead of polls threatens humanitarian crisis,” IRIN, 1/24/10 522 “How an Inflammatory Term, Baathist, Bars Candidates in Iraq,” The New York Times, 1/21/10 523 “Ba'ath saga haunts Iraq's future,” The Guardian, 1/13/10 524 Ibid. 525 “Sunnis in Iraq,” The International Herald Tribune, 1/23/10 526 “How an inflammatory term, Baathist, bars candidates in Iraq,” The New York Times, 1/21/10 527 “Iraqi forces arrest two suspected Ba'thists in Karbala,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/27/10 528 “Iraq: Campaign to arrest Ba'thists starts in Karbala,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/26/10 529 “Rivalries In Iraq Keep G.I.'s In the Field,” The New York Times, 1/27/10 530 Ibid.

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4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

On January 17, the Iraqi cabinet approved a draft law which offers some protections to Iraqi doctors in an attempt to stem the flow physicians leaving the country. Currently, when a patient dies under the care of a doctor, some tribal traditions dictate that the doctor must pay blood money to the family of the deceased. This law would make such demands illegal as well as allow doctors to legally carry firearms for personal protection.531 The law also suggests lifting the retirement age to 70 and building accommodations for medical staff by their place of employment.532 While the provision to protect doctors from tribal demands is a welcome relief for doctors, many believe that the idea that arming them will afford them a significant amount of protection is dubious at best. Considering the current security situation, being armed does not ensure one’s safety in Iraq with bombings and criminal gangs still prevalent. Dr Ali Mahmoud, a thyroid specialist from Baghdad noted, “What use will a pistol be to me if I am attacked by seven or eight gangsters in two cars carrying Kalashnikovs and PKCs [assault rifles]? The government should improve the security situation in general.”533 On the other hand, this law as an important initiative meant to provide Iraqi physicians not only with the necessary physical and legal protection, but an incentive to remain in Iraq despite the fragile security situation and the dire economic conditions. Nearly 54% of Iraq’s medical professionals have fled the country, and Iraq’s reconstruction efforts, specifically with respect to the health care system, are highly contingent on retaining and attracting those with medical training. 534

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

With oil profits generating upwards of 90% of Iraq’s total revenues, how oil wealth is distributed is a contentious issue, especially since most of the oil reserves are concentrated in traditionally Shiite and Kurdish regions, with almost none under Sunni control. Therefore it is extremely important that the yet-passed hydrocarbon law explicitly and transparently ensure that no groups are excluded or treated unfairly. Unfortunately, the Iraqi parliament has again delayed the critical oil bill and postponed debate until after elections.535 This delay will cost the Iraqi government even more potential revenue, but more importantly may be a precursor to marginalizing Sunnis.536 With the Accountability and Justice Commission’s candidate ban forcing several prominent Sunni politicians out of the running, and with Shiite and Kurdish politicians already working together on region-specific $1 per barrel oil bonuses for the Kurdish region and Basra in the new budget, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Sunnis are

531 “Iraq cabinet approves draft law to protect doctors,” Reuters, 1/17/10 532 Ibid 533 “Iraq allows doctors to carry guns for security,” The Independent, 10/17/08 534 “Iraq: Humanitarian Action Plan,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 2/2/2010 535 “Iraqi MPs postpone debate on oil law,” BBC Monitoring Middle East 1/20/10 536 “Failure to pass economic laws is jeopardizing Iraq's economy,” Niqash, 1/22/10

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going to have to fight for a fair share of oil revenues.537 One thing is certain: the current system is inadequate; even in oil-rich Basra where oil is flowing, citizens see few benefits.538

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 6

The Iraqi government remains optimistic about oil production; the Oil Ministry recently forecast estimates reaching 11.2 million b/d within 10 years and emphasized that foreign firms are keen to begin work despite fears that the Iranian incursion into al-Fakkah oil field might scare off investors.539 Fortunately for investors, many of the contracts won during open bidding in December were approved by the Council of Ministers; there is only one more step to take place—a final signing—before work can begin.540 There is little doubt that the contracts will go through. The Oil Ministry is particularly proud of the transparency of the open bidding system used to assign the most recent round of service contracts.541 All said oil prospects in Iraq are looking up; production rose to 2.4 million b/d542 and the Oil Ministry also announced that it is looking to develop 100 new oil wells itself during 2010.543

Iraqis are not the only optimistic parties though; January saw a flurry of foreign activity as increased oil production seemed closer to fruition. Lufthansa announced that it would open new service to Baghdad and Arbil by summer 2010, as well as the possibility of other new routes to Iraq.544 The European Union also signed a memorandum of understanding on energy partnership with Iraq, setting the stage for increased cooperation between the two. The memorandum focused on developing Iraq’s gas capabilities, identifying supply routes from Iraq to Europe, and developing renewable energy sources in both partners.545

Turkey looked to increase investment in Iraq as well. The Turkish Chamber of Commerce trade delegation visited northern Iraq this month, which demonstrated a readiness to invest in the Kurdish region, especially Arbil.546 The Turkish Minister of Foreign Trade said that investors who wished to have a hand in the Iraqi market would have to invest now, rather than after the security situation improves—incentives include tax exemptions and allocations of land.547 Additionally, Turkey is scheduled to begin regular train service on February 16 between the Turkish city of Gaziantep and Mosul.548 Turkey and Iran seem to be vying to outdo one another investing in Iraq; Iran also launched construction on a railway which would connect the Iranian city of Khorramshahr with Basra despite the fact that Iraq has no existing plans to build their end

537 “Decentralisation Bonanza in the Iraqi Budget,” historiae.org, 1/27/10 538 “Iraq: TV talk show discusses oil shares distribution, revenue embezzlement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East 1/2/10 539 “Iraq plans to produce 11 million barrels of oil a day in 10 years,” Azzaman, 1/14/10 540 “Iraqi cabinet approves oil service contracts,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/5/10 541 “Iraqi oil Minister highlights transparency in contacts,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/10/10 542 “Iraq's oil output rises to 2.4 million b/d” Platts Oilgram Price Report, 1/11/10 543 “Iraqi Oil Ministry plans to dig 100 oil wells in 2010,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/12/10 544 “Lufthansa to launch services to Iraq,” Airline Industry Information, 1/12/10 545 “Energy: EU and Iraq sign partnership memorandum,” Europolitics, 1/19/10 546 “Turkish trade delegation discusses investment in Iraq's Kurdistan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/13/10 547 “Turkish Minister calls on businessmen to invest in Iraq now,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 1/26/10 548 “Train services between Turkey, Iraq to begin 16 February,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 1/16/10

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of the railway.549 Iran is also supplying Iraq with more gas in order to increase Iraq’s electricity production.550 While Western firms are busy investing in oil infrastructure to export oil, Turkey and Iran are investing in Iraq elsewhere to cultivate their influence.

Iraq's annual inflation rate index fell by 4.4 per cent from December 2008-December 2009.551

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

On January 14, the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) issued a ban against over 500 candidates, barring them from running in the parliamentary elections scheduled for March. IHEC, headed by Faraj al-Haidar, received a list from the Accountability and Justice Commission that vets candidates for ties to Saddam Hussein’s outlawed Baath Party. The Accountability and Justice Commission is chaired by Ahmad Chalabi, under the executive directorship of Ali Faisal al-Lami, both hardly impartial political arbitrators. The vetting process has not been transparent, and accusations have been made that al-Lami’s decisions were political in nature, and even influenced by Iran. This ban caused significant controversy both domestically in Iraq and internationally, as numerous experts grew concerned about the detrimental effect this decision will have on the consolidation of the fragile Iraqi democracy. President Talabani appealed to the Higher Judicial Council for a ruling on whether the Commission has the legal authority to ban candidates. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki denied allegations that the Commission was targeting Sunnis and defended the ban.552 Human Rights Watch said that the Commission disqualified candidates on vague, arbitrary and secret grounds—violating the principles of free and fair elections and jeopardizing the credibility of the elections.553 The decision could potentially ignite ethno-sectarian violence, since the majority of the influential figures who were banned, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, the leader of the secular Iraqiya coalition, are Sunnis.554 U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Baghdad on January 22 to meet with the Iraqi leadership, in what some analysts considered a ‘rescue mission,’ to prevent further escalation of this political crisis. While Vice President Biden expressed his support for holding candidates linked to Saddam’s regime accountable, he remained concerned about the transparency of the vetting process and the credibility of the election. Talabani, who has been assisting Biden at brokering a compromise, said that Biden “proposed the disqualifications be deferred until after the election and that those candidates who have been barred condemn and disavow the Baath party.”555 This issue remained unresolved at the end of the month.

Corruption scandals continue to plague the government. The controversy around ADE 651, the bomb detecting device purchased in bulk from the London based company, ATSC Ltd., (see Indicator 7 of November report) peaked this month when Jim McCormick, the managing director of ATSC Ltd. was arrested on fraud charges, while the British Department for Business,

549 “Iran building railway to Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, 1/30/10 550 “Iran enters gas talks with Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, 1/20/10 551 “Iraq's annual inflation falls by 4.4 per cent,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/19/10 552 “Iraq PM Al-Maliki denies Sunni purge ahead of election,” Agence France Presse, 1/19/2010 553 “Iraq: Candidate ban jeopardizes election; authorities should suspend commission that arbitrarily disqualified more than 500 candidates,” States News Service, 1/26/2010 554 “Iraqi Commission Bars Nearly 500 Candidates,” The New York Times, 1/14/2010 555 “Biden ‘confident’ Iraq election row will be resolved,” Agence France Presse, 1/23/2010

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Innovation and Skills issued a statement saying it was banning export of the ADE 651 and similar devices to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraqi Government purchased hundreds of ADE 651 devices in a no-bid contract, paying as much as $60,000 per unit for a device that according to an ATSC associate, was not only manufactured for $250 each in Romania and the UK, but was a sham, as “everyone inside ATSC knew there was nothing inside the ADE 651.”556 Outrage at this development swept across the Iraqi government, as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered an official investigation into the procurement process of the device, while the Supreme Board of Audit announced it will focus on investigating the officials who assured the auditors the device was viable. 557 Yet, while the technical competency of the device has been rebuked by numerous experts even prior to Mr. McCormick’s arrest, it continues to be used by Iraqi security forces at checkpoints throughout Baghdad.

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

The targeting of official institutions by various insurgent groups, including AQI, has severe implications for the delivery of public services. Public servants in Baghdad were extremely fearful of coming to work in the aftermath of the massive bombing attacks that have targeted the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the most recent December 8 attack near the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad provincial council building. Heightened security is doing little to reassure public servants, many of whom fear that these measures will not deter militants from executing their goals.558

Iraq’s mental health care system is perhaps even worse of than other branches of the understaffed, ill-trained and poorly funded health care system, less than 100 psychiatrists were left in the country by 2006. Medications, for those who can afford them, have almost entirely replaced the concept of therapy and consultation. Iraq’s first clinic, focused on treating Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder, opened in Basra. Yet, while the Iraqi government has expressed a commitment to rebuild Iraq’s mental health care system, it will take decades to be adequate. Meanwhile, thousands of Iraqis who have suffered severe trauma remain unattended.

Early this month, the Iraqi Ministry of Trade and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) signed a memorandum of understating for 2010-2014 to support and improve the inadequate state-run food aid program, the Public Distribution System, which has been compromised by corruption, insecurity and mismanagement. Last year, the former Trade Minister and members of his family were arrested for embezzlement, while the food aid system as a whole has been widely criticized for delays and shortages as well as sub-standard quality. While the WFP will not be actively involved in the buying and the distribution of the food, WFP staff agreed to consult and train the employees of the Ministry of Trade on how to most effective purchase, transport, store and distribute food items, while adhering to a demanding schedule and quality regulations. This is an important step towards building capacity within the Iraqi public service sector, especially in light

556 “British man held for fraud in Iraq bomb detectors,” The New York Times, 1/23/2010 557 “Iraq MPs bid to remove bomb detector,” The Guardian, 1/24/2010 558 “Iraqi Crisis Report: Civil servants fear more attacks,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1/21/2010

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of the recent Ministry of Trade statistics that indicate that more than half of Iraqis depend upon this Public Distribution System for food.559

The largest water project in Iraq, the Al Samawa plant in the Muthana governorate in the south of the country, was inaugurated this month. The plant will provide over 250,000 people with clean drinking water. A vital component of this project is the upgrading of the Al Samawa Water Supply System as a whole, which will help meet the needs of people living in the cities of Al Samawa, Al Khidir, Al Suwair and another ten large villages along the pipeline. This is an important accomplishment since shortages of water supply and poor sanitation services are one the primary challenges the Iraqi reconstruction effort is facing. This project is expected to contribute to the reduction of water-born diseases and increase local employment opportunities. Moreover, the project is expected to substantially reduce dependence on potable water deliveries, which will improve the lives of many local residents who now need to purchase expensive and often contaminated water. The Iraqi government is struggling to meet the needs of the population, in the urban areas outside of Baghdad, potable water service coverage is at 70%, and is even lower, at 48% in the rural areas. There is certainly a high level of concern for public , with less than 8% of the population outside of Baghdad connected to sewerage systems, and the wastewater collection and treatment rates are substandard.560 Moreover, as the Electricity Minister Kareem Waheed recently said, the frequent power outages throughout Iraq are directly related to water shortages, thus, progress made in constructing and operating high- capacity water plans will help alleviate the distress caused by the recurrent and prolonged power outages.561

Other important accomplishments this month include the completion of the rehabilitation of the Umm al-Qast port in Basra562 and the launching of three new drinking water units, in total capacity of 400 cubic meters per hour, in Basra as well.563

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

This month, violence against journalists was found to be on the rise, especially by the Iraqi security forces. Reporters Without Borders found that the greatest threat to Iraqi journalists were the violent threats and attacks by the Iraqi police and army, especially in the aftermath of security incidents and bombings. Journalists were denied access to the scene of the January 14 bombing in the city of Najaf which hit a busy market, as well as the hospitals where the wounded were being treated. Similarly, journalists were not allowed to cover the January 25 bombings which targeted several hotels in central and west Baghdad. Some were turned away with threats and aggression by the security forces.564 Similar offences against press freedom frequently occur throughout the Iraqi region of Kurdistan, despite the local law that forbids the arrest and

559 “IRAQ: Iraqis welcome WFP role in state food aid system,” IRIN, 1/6/2010 560 “Iraq: A project to address the shortage in potable water supply,” Relief Web, 2/3/2010 561 “Water shortages impact power output, Iraqi Minister says,” Azzaman, 3/8/2010 562 “Rehabilitation of Iraqi Umm al-Qasr port in Basra complete,” BBC, 1/27/2010 563 “Three new potable water units launched in Iraq’s Basra,” BBC, 1/21/2010 564 “Security forces now biggest enemy for Iraqi journalists,” Reporters Without Borders, 1/26/2010

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handcuffing of journalists. A journalist who has written critical pieces about President Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) told Reporters Without Borders that on January 19, he escaped a kidnap attempt by a man whom he recognized as a member of the PUK.565

Iraqi media reported growing alarm about the return of ‘death squads’ to Baghdad after targeted killings of civilians by masked gunmen in the Adhamiya neighborhood. Four employees of the Mawteni charitable foundation and another woman were killed. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.

On January 5, Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud announced that the Iraqi Government carried out 77 death sentences in 2009—all individuals were convicted of terrorist-related activities.566 Later this month, a criminal court in Baghdad's eastern Rusafah district sentenced 11 people to death by hanging after convicting them for financing, planning and participating in the devastating August 19 bombings that targeted the finance and foreign ministries. While the names and records of the defendants were not disclosed, Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said that they had links to both the Baath party and AQI.567

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

The high-profile attacks that hit Baghdad at the end of January further indicate that the Iraqi security forces are struggling to provide security to civilians, regardless of the numerous check- points and security barriers erected throughout the city. The Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella organization that includes AQI, claimed responsibility for the January 25 bombings, where at least 38 people were killed.568 The bombings targeted the Sheraton, Babylon and Hamra hotels that were heavily guarded and surrounded by blast walls and host mostly foreign journalists and expatriate businessmen. The targeting of foreigners was said to deliver a message from the insurgents that the Iraqi government and security forces are unable to protect either the Iraqi civilians or foreigners, even inside the heavily guarded Green Zone. The following day, a car bomb killed at least 17 people, badly damaging the government forensics center in Baghdad.

The bombings raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the new national security plan which was put into effect on January 12, as a measure to enhance security for Election Day. Just last week, high-ranking Iraqi Army officials reported to have successfully prevented a high- profile attack from being carried out in Baghdad569 a week ago, and earlier that day, Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, an Iraqi Army spokesman, told the media that the Iraqi security forces damaged 21 ‘terrorist networks.’570 Yet, as a Baghdad-based political analyst noted, these attacks “proved that the ability of the intelligence [agencies] to foil attacks is weak; al-Qaeda uses very

565 “More threats and violence against independent journalists in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Reporters Without Borders, 1/21/2010 566 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010 567 “Iraq sentences 11 to death for government bombings,” The Associated Press, 1/14/2010 568 “Umbrella insurgent group asserts role in Baghdad hotel blasts,” The Washington Post, 1/28/2010 569 “37 killed in attacks on three Baghdad hotels; In coordinated strikes, suicide bombers and gunmen hit the sites, including one favored by Western journalists,” Los Angeles Times, 1/26/2010 570 “Latest bombing add new layer of anxiety and suspicion in Baghdad,” The New York Times, 1/27/2010

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sophisticated technology and human intelligence that can’t be penetrated.”571 The inability to prevent the infiltration of subversive elements into the Iraqi security apparatus hinders attempts to implement a comprehensive security strategy. Moreover, the fact that the security forces manning the check points throughout the city continue to use the ADE 651 bomb detector device, proven useless, severely undermines the already tenuous trust the Iraqi population has in the security forces and indicates that the interests of corrupt officials once again trumped public security.

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

The decision to bar over 500 candidates from running in the March 7 parliamentary elections has stirred up a political controversy of notable proportions and threatened to reignite sectarian hostilities across Iraq. Some believe that this move has deeply offset the potential for forming political alliances that will transcend the sectarian divide. It has been suggested that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who united Sunnis and Shiites on one electoral ticket in last year’s provincial elections, expressed support for the ban to strengthen his own electoral base by both appeasing the powerful Shiite led by Ahmad Chalabi and weakening the secular alliances, specifically the promising union between Saleh al-Multaq and the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The Iraqi Nationalist Movement, which brought together Multaq, Allawi and Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi with other secularist Sunni and Shiite politicians hoped to capitalize on the voter disenfranchisement with the sectarianism and the religious fundamentalism of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrists, as well as the declining popularity of Al- Maliki in light of the security failings and corruption. Some Sunni leaders are calling for a boycott of the election, while others see no choice but to support the Sunni insurgents if the political system continues to fail them.572

In the Kurdish region, new tensions mounted. Friction between the Change Movement and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) escalated this month, as both the parliament and the police investigated a chain of attacks against members of Iraqi Kurdistan’s main opposition group in Sulaimaniyah. The Change Movement released a statement claiming that ‘organized political crimes’ are being committed against its members, while an official from the party warned that if the hostilities between the PUK and Change persist, “there will likely be a civil war in the city.”573 On the other hand, PUK officials dismissed these accusations, claiming that the attacks were personal rather than political and accused Change for attempting to undermine the security situation in the city to gain political ground in time for the election. While a short period of calm followed Iraqi Kurdistan’s President Barzani January 10 call to cease political clashes between the two parties, tensions remain high, especially amongst Change members. As a senior leader noted, “the security forces and police are under the control of the political parties,” and Change as a civil movement does not have its own protection apparatus.574

571 “Blasts cast doubt over election security plan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1/28/2010 572 “Iraq’s new sectarian storm clouds,” The Nation, 2/18/2010 573 “Kurdish war of words,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1/28/2010 574 Ibid

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12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 8

Iraq’s relationship with Syria grew even tenser this month, when the Syrian government expressed disappointment in Iraqi government’s failure to assist the Iraqi refugees living in Syria. The Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal al-Mekdad said that the Iraqi government is not doing its duty towards its nationals, which further hurts the Iraqi refugees who are facing real hardship. Al-Mekdad was pessimistic about seeing any improvement in Iraqi-Syrian diplomatic relations unless the March 7 elections would result in an Iraqi government that functioned differently, both domestically and with specific regard to its neighbors.575

U.S troops continued to depart throughout January as well. The five major command groups deployed in Iraq were merged under one single command, USF-1, on January 1, while the U.S. Marine Corps concluded its mission in Ramadi on January 23.576 With the imminent withdrawal of American troops and the apparent resurgence of AQI, as evident by the statement released by the Islamic State of Iraq taking responsibility for the high-profile bombings in late January, the responsibility to provide protection and order is increasingly falling on the shoulders of the Iraqi security forces.

Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics was thought to be apparent this month when the Accountability and Justice Commission banned over 500 candidates from running in the parliamentary elections. Tehran’s interest is in promoting a Shiite sectarian alliance in Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi and Ali al-Lami, who head the Commission which issued the ban, have proven ties to Iran and have received both funding and political support. Moreover, many of those who were disqualified from running, like Jawad al-Bolani, the secular Shiite Minister of Interior who formed the Iraq Unity party, and Ahmad Abu Risha, whose deceased brother founded the Sunni- led Awakening Movement, and Iyad Jamal Aldin, a Shiite cleric, are all influential political figures who have expressed adamant opposition to Iranian interference in Iraqi politics.577

Beyond the political realm, Iran also seeks to gain influence in Iraq through economic assistance and investment. As a recent statement by the Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Products Company, Farid Ameri indicates, Iran has exported 400,000 tons of diesel, 90,000 tons of kerosene and 6,000 of jet fuel to Iraq since March 21, 2009.578

575 “Syria says Iraq evading responsibility to refugees,” Reuters, 1/18/2010 576 “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 1/30/2010 577 “Iraq’s new sectarian storm clouds,” The Nation, 2/18/2010 578 “Iran exports 400,000 tonnes of diesel to Iraq,” BBC, 1/16/2010

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Core Five and STINGS – January 2010

1. Police Rating: Weak

For the most part, Iraqis do not view the national police force favorably. To a great extent, it is the police’s inability to prevent suicide bombers and car bombs from crossing even the most heavily guarded checkpoints that undermines their reputation. Overall, corruption permeates the Iraqi police, substantially hindering efforts to build a professional and competent force capable of protecting Iraqi civilians.579 The ADE 651, a British-manufactured bomb detecting device which was proven useless in identifying explosives, continues to be used by policemen guarding checkpoints across the country. Public security is therefore compromised by fraud that permeates both the police and the Iraqi government, responsible for the purchase of these worthless bomb detectors.580 Despite mounting evidence that the bomb detectors were not functioning as intended, Iraqi policemen say they are still ordered to use the devices by their superiors.581 After the bombing in Najaf this month, a bystander was quoted as saying, "How could a car loaded with explosives be allowed to park inside the old city?" he raged. “Those policemen are useless. I believe they should rethink the whole security system, otherwise we shall see more of these attacks.”582

Because of concerns about the competence of the police force, $21.2 million was committed to buying specialized radios to coordinate border security. The hope is that with better coordination and equipment, tighter border security will follow.583 Beyond this development, Iraqi policemen continued to battle with insurgents in the street; attacks by gunmen on police still occurred, such as in Tall Afar and policemen were deployed en masse for another Shiite holiday.584 This time, 15,000 officers flooded the streets of Karbala in an attempt to stave off religious attacks during al-Arba’in, which marks the 40th day since Hussein’s death on the Muslim calendar. The security blanket was largely successful in warding off violence. 585

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

The image of the Iraqi parliament is not flattering; the public tends to view it as a body of incompetent, greedy politicians. Under the justification that the Iraqi parliament will be expanding after the new election, the parliamentary financial committee increased the parliamentary budget for 2010 at the cost of the Higher Judicial Council’s funding. 586 Additionally, despite the critical need for a hydrocarbon law, the parliament voted to postpone any debate until after the March 7 election, passing the responsibility on to the next

579 “Latest bombings add new layer of anxiety and suspicion in Baghdad,” The New York Times, 1/26/10 580 “British man held for fraud in Iraq bomb detectors,” The New York Times, 1/23/10 581 Ibid. 582 “3 explosions shatter relative calm of Shiite holy city south of Baghdad,” The Washington Post, 1/15/10 583 “Iraq invests in border security with communication equipment purchase,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/17/10 584 “Some 15,000 policemen deployed for pilgrimage in Iraq's Karbala,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/24/10 585 “Gunmen injure policeman in Iraqi town of Tall Afar,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/2/10 586 “Iraqi federal budget returned to government for amendment,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/12/10

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parliament.587 Lastly, Vice President al-Hashimi lambasted parliament as “not functioning due to partisan interests.” 588 He claims that the Iraqi government is monopolizing power and that, “while other countries move ahead, Iraq is heading backwards and is getting isolated.”589

In a move that revealed a continued immunity to anti-corruption efforts at the top echelons of government, the Interior Ministry transferred Al-Anbar Police Chief Tariq al-Asal to Baghdad instead of “referring him to a military court on charges of corruption, negligence, political collusion, and causing spilling the blood of innocent people,” as demanded by the Al-Anbar Governorate Council.590 The Foreign Ministry recalled 25 Ambassadors, who will be replaced by newly assigned officials, whose appointment seems to be politically motivated. The new ambassadors said to have close links to high-ranking officials in the Iraqi government, and suspected to have received these lucrative appointments as a result of their political affiliation and not necessarily appropriate professional experience or competency. The parliament criticized this move as unnecessary and politically insensitive in the run up to elections, yet, it seems to be another example of widespread corruption and favoritism that defines Iraqi politics.591

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) congratulated the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) on a successful start of the election operations. IHEC is aiming to print over 26 million ballots of 19 different types to be distributed to nearly 50,000 polling stations across the country, and with the support of UNAMI, IHEC also established the Out-of-Country Voting Programme headquartered in Arbil.592 UNAMI praised the lottery process for picking 300,000 poll workers as demonstrating “transparency and integrity” and commended the IHEC for its “efforts to keep the public and the media well informed.”593 As long as the candidate ban does not manage to derail elections, it seems as though the infrastructure to carry out a legitimate election is there.

Civil servants are afraid of an increased violence against government employees and targeting of official institutions ahead of the parliamentary elections in March. While the Iraqi government tightened security throughout the area of central Baghdad where most ministries and state offices are located, many civil servants doubt these measures would be useful in deterring militants. Only last month AQI targeted this specific area in a series of deadly attacks, killing 127 people and injuring nearly 500, and causing significant damage to the significantly damaged the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad Provincial Council Building. Beyond the tragic lose of human lives, the attacks on civil servants are hurting the delivery of public services to Iraqi civilians. Moreover, violence deters qualified individuals who might otherwise be interested in seeking employment in this sector from applying to civil service positions.

587 “Iraqi MPs postpone debate on oil law,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/20/10 588 “Iraqi vice-president says government monopolizing power,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/16/10 589 Ibid 590 “Iraqi Foreign Ministry said to have called back 25 ambassadors,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/1/10 591 Ibid. 592 “UNAMI congratulates IHEC on starting ballot printing for upcoming elections,” Relief Web, 1/21/2010 593 “Iraqi electoral body starts printing of ballot papers for forthcoming elections,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/22/10

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Plagued by corruption, the civil service sector in Iraq is in desperate need for reform. It could strongly benefit from an influx of new employees, hired for their professional experience rather political affiliation or favoritism. Yet, as violence persists, not only it is unlikely that many would seek employment in such a dangerous sector, the civil service also stands to lose many of its more competent employees who might leave for alternative careers out of fear.594

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

The infiltration of political agendas into what should be strictly judicial matters is one of the worrisome trends that largely compromise the independence of the Iraqi judiciary. Security concerns for judges are another issue of concern, since it discourages due process law with the threat of violent reprisals. There are currently 1,277 judges in Iraq, 700 of whom have joined the ranks of the Iraqi judiciary in the last six years, following the reestablishment of the Higher Judicial Council independent of the executive branch. The number of female judges rose from 7 to 68 during this time period, which is a positive indicator of progress in terms of institutional capacity. Yet, judicial security remains a great challenge to the consolidation of the Iraqi judiciary as an independent body. As the U.S. Department of Defense recently reported, “judicial intimidation in Iraq hinders administration of the criminal justice system, which impedes the rule of law, leads to a backlog of pre-trial cases—three years in some districts—and precipitates unfair criminal justice procedures in many other parts of the country.”595 The Ministry of Interior, which is ultimately responsible for judicial security, is failing to hire, train and assign personal security details in a timely fashion. Such delays upset attempts to improve judicial security and strengthen the Iraqi judiciary to become a capable and independent institution as a whole.

The judiciary adhered to the use of the death penalty this month, despite calls from human rights organizations to stay its use.596 Eleven men were sentenced to the death penalty for their alleged involvement in the August bombings of two government ministry buildings which left over 100 dead.597 Also, Chemical Ali was hanged after being given his fourth death sentence for his role in the Saddam regime.598

The Iraqi government may be continuing December’s trend to move toward committing to an evidence-based judicial system with the purchase of 18 specialized crime-lab vehicles which will facilitate the gathering of evidence.599 This comes on the heels of the U.S. military’s efforts to bolster evidence-based judicial proceedings and due process.600 If these trends continue, Iraq’s judicial system may be able to shake off its reputation for relying on confessions obtained under duress.

594 “Iraqi Crisis Report: Civil servants fear more attacks,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1/21/2010 595 “Measuring stability and security in Iraq,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 4/20/10 596 “Iraq must halt spiraling death sentences,” Amnesty International, 1/18/10 597 “Iraq sentences 11 for August bombing in Baghdad,” The Christian Science Monitor, 1/14/10 598 “'Chemical Ali' executed, Iraqi government spokesman says,” CNN News, 1/25/10 599 “Iraq commits to evidence-based justice with purchase of crime lab vehicles,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/4/10 600 “U.S. team works to improve rule of law in Iraq,” ReliefWeb, 1/11/10

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5. Military Rating: Moderate

The Operation Iraqi Freedom press center released a battery of updates on Iraq’s military forces: Iraq’s oldest military academy graduated almost 500 new cadets,601 the Iraqi Army Bomb Disposal School tripled enrollment,602 the Ministry of Defense hospital has been upgraded to a state of the art facility,603 a class of 200 Iraqi non-commissioned officers completed their logistical training course,604 a group of Iraqi soldiers completed a rigorous urban combat course,605 and the Iraqi army completed its Command and Control center.606

In a commendable effort, the Iraqi security forces have uncovered and destroyed an elaborate plot to bomb government buildings and assassinate influential political leaders. Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, the spokesman for Baghdad Operations Command said on January 12 that after raids on several targets throughout the city, 25 people were arrested and more than 440 pounds each of TNT and C-4, about 66 gallons of ammonium nitrate solution and 60 mortar shells, were captured.607 All of these achievements are signs of progress that the Iraqi armed forces desperately need if they are to stand without American assistance in the future.

Both President Talabani and Vice President al-Hashimi called for improving the armed forces in the future, though in different ways. Talabani stressed the need for foreign support to improve the condition of the armed forces as well as emphasizing that sectarianism would not be tolerated within the Iraqi army.608 Al-Hashimi wants “officers who were unfairly forced by [Paul] Bremer to stay at home” to return to the army. 609 He maintains that their experience would be invaluable to the Iraqi armed forces. Talabani’s statement could reveal a movement by the Iraqi government towards acceptance that the armed forces will require U.S. support in the future. Both statements move towards reconciliation—in the army at least—and the recognition that nobody should be excluded, especially if they can contribute to the effectiveness of the armed forces.

Members of the Iraqi armed forces were found smuggling crude oil and selling it on the open market in Iraq. Internal investigations revealed that crude oil was being systematically taken from pipelines and sold domestically, often sent to unofficial “mobile refining stations” or brick factories. Many of the sentries posted to oil pipelines have stopped guarding their charges because the interior ministry has stopped paying them.610

601 “Hundreds graduate from Iraq's oldest Military Academy,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/12/10 602 “Iraqi army bomb disposal school triples training capacity,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/4/10 603 “MoD medical facilities use latest technology,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/3/10 604 “Iraqi soldiers complete logistics training,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/3/10 605 “Iraqi army soldiers complete rigorous urban combat training,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/3/10 606 “IA opens ‘Command and Control’ Center,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 1/30/10 607 “Iraq says raid uncovered a plot to bomb ministries,” The New York Times, 1/12/2010 608 “Iraqi president seeks improvement of army capabilities,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1/6/10 609 Iraqi vice-president calls for correcting armed forces situation,” BBC Monitoring Middle East 1/10/10 610 “Iraqi army personnel involved in oil smuggling,” Azzaman, 1/13/10

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Appendix VII: February 2010 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Depleted Uranium (DU) ammunition that causes the radiological contamination of the land and water sources, and topsoil damage from war vehicles are causing severe health hazards, say Iraqi health officials. The damage is both wide spread and generational. According to United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates, 50 metric tones of DU were fired during tank battles and an additional 250 tones in air to ground attacks during the 1991 Gulf War. No exact figures for the total amount of DU ammunition used during the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 are available, but estimates vary from 170 and 1,700 metric tones. British forces used approximately 1.9 tones of DU ammunition during the 2003 US-led invasion, but no information about the use of DU ammunition by American troops has been made public. Exposure to DU and other heavy metals has severe implications on the health of the local population. Moreover, the toxic effects of DU could be more severe for human health than its radiological affects. 611 In Basra, where intense fighting took place in 2003 and multiple tank battles and aircraft attacks used DU munitions, infant mortality rates as a result of cancer have reach nearly 60%. Doctors in Fallujah document an increased rate of severe birth defects, including cardiac problems, missing or defected limbs, and spinal distortions. A recent study published in the American Journal of Public Health found that rates of leukemia in children living in the Basra area have almost tripled in the last 15 years, from three to almost 8.5 cases per 100,000 children. The study suggests that “war-related nerve agents and pesticides, and the widespread use of depleted uranium munitions,” might have triggered this substantial increase.612 Studies like this are largely topical, and reports are mostly anecdotal. No official, comprehensive accounts have been published by either the Iraqi authorities or international bodies. However, collected accounts of health professionals from across Iraq, and specifically from regions where heavy, prolonged fighting between Iraqis and foreign forces occurred, point out to an undeniable health concern of considerable proportions.

Iraq’s continuing water shortage is an issue of immense importance in the country’s development. The two primary rivers, Euphrates and Tigris, have been dammed by Iraq’s neighbors, severely limiting the flow of water into Iraq.613 Experts are alarmed that Iraq is ill- prepared to manage the impacts of drought. Iraqi experts met this month in Amman to attend a workshop put together by UNESCO and UNICEF to discuss drought planning options, including a possible national drought preparedness and mitigation framework. The drought that entered its third year in 2009 has severely affected the generally fertile northern Iraq. The U.S.-based Foreign Agricultural Service predicts that the winter wheat harvest will be substantially below average. Winter grain crops constitute more than 85% of Iraq’s total grain production, which means Iraq will be forced to import even more food and rely heavily on international aid.614 The

611 “Technical report on capacity-building for the assessment of depleted uranium in Iraq,” United Nations Environment Programme, accessed 4/20/10 612 “Nerve agents could be to blame for tripling of child leukemia in Basra,” The Times Of London, 2/19/2010 613 “FACTBOX-The main issues facing Iraq’s next government,” Reuters, 2/24/2010 614 “Earth Observatory: drought in Iraq,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, accessed 3/8/2010

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officials, deeply concerned about the effects of drought on Iraqi economy, drafted a set of recommendations to be presented to the Iraqi government, urging reform of the current response system that would focus more on pre-drought preparedness and mitigation efforts. Moreover, while there is a need for a comprehensive national strategy to combat and mitigate drought, it is vital to recall that some segments of the Iraqi population are more vulnerable than others, and an efficient strategy will include specific provisions to better assist these groups. This proposed strategy will be more pro-active rather reactive, and rely on improved and robust national early warning system that will provide better forecast and date about upcoming weather-related emergencies.615

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

The spike in violence and targeting of Christians in the city of Mosul in January and February led to the displacement of 720 Christian families as of March 1. Six-hundred eighty three families (4,098 people) were displaced between February 20 and 27, and an additional 37 families were displaced between February 28 and March 1, as the displacement rate slowed down substantially. The displaced families initially arrived in the two districts of Al Hamdaniyah and Tilkaif in the Nineveh governorate, and some have then crossed to Arbil and Dahuk governorates. The IDPs are being hosted by their extended families or taking refuge in churches.616 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that while both the host and IDP families feel safe in the places of displacement, significant concerns remain about the safety of Christians remaining in Mosul, many of whom were reported unable to “move freely beyond their homes, such as going to work or attending university, out of fear for their safety.”617 The Governor of Nineveh has formed a committee headed by the Director of Civil Defense to coordinate a response to the humanitarian needs of IDPs, in cooperation with the international humanitarian agencies operating in the governorate.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has finally closed the Al-Tanf refugee camp on the border of Iraq and Syria, and relocated the remaining 60 Palestinian refugees who have lived there in the past four years to temporary housing in the Al-Hol refugee camp in Syria. The camp was set up in May 2006 to temporarily host Palestinian refugees fleeing violence in Iraq, when no other country would accept them. Throughout the past four years, the camp hosted 1,300 Palestinian refugees, who were forced to endure extreme weather conditions and living in the desert, with little to no access to proper medical and social services. One thousand Palestinian refugees from the camp were relocated to third countries. UNHCR has yet to find a sustainable solution to the 600 Palestinian refugees from Iraq currently living in the Syrian Al-Hol camp.618

Human Rights Watch criticized the Government of Iraq for failing to develop a comprehensive national plan for the return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees. While local efforts such as the Diyala Return and Integration Initiative of July 2009 can be credited with assisting with the return of

615 “Iraqi experts appeal for national strategy to combat drought,” UNESCO, 2/21/2010 616 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 1,” OCHA, 2/8/2010 617 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 2,” OCHA, 3/1/2010 618 “End of long ordeal for Palestinian refugees as desert camp closes,” UNHCR, 1/2/2010

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95,000 Iraqis into more than 400 villages and communities around Baquaba (see Indicator 2 of January report), on the national scale, the accomplishments of the government in this area are nominal.619

Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria expressed doubts about whether the upcoming elections will improve the security situation in Iraq enough to allow them to return to their homes. Insecurity, sectarian violence and a severe lack of employment opportunities are often cited as reasons that preclude the return of refugees to Iraq from neighboring countries. The recent spike in violence before the March 7 elections has deepened the fears of those hoping to return to their homeland in the near future. Refugees without a residency permit are sometimes tempted to return to Iraq amidst the insecurity, since the conditions in the host country are often far from welcoming, yet, those who return are often forced to flee once again. An Iraqi refugee in told UNHCR that a week after he returned to Iraq in 2009, he was “abducted and beaten up, and a month later my wife was killed in a suicide bombing. I fled again and decided I would not return until Iraq was a secure place to live in.”620 His story is not an uncommon one. Some will go vote with the hope their voice will bring a change in Iraq’s future; others, too despaired by their living conditions and the troublesome security situation in their homeland, have little hope their vote will be of consequence.

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

The annual Terrorism Risk Index (TRI), published by the UK-based Maplecroft, rated Iraq as the most dangerous country for the second year in a row, noting that “even though the terrorist situation in Iraq has improved, the frequency, scale and human impact of attacks still makes it the most extreme risk country for terrorism, with nearly 4,500 civilians killed in 2009,” or an average of 375 deaths per month.621 It appears that violent trends of 2009 are continuing in 2010. Iraqi deaths almost doubled this month, with authorities reporting 352 people dead—211 civilians, 96 police and 45 soldiers, with an 80% increased from January’s toll of 196 deaths, and 40% higher than February of last year.

Attacks on Shiite pilgrims were particularly gruesome this month, specifically during the days of Arbaeen, the holiday marking 40 days after the Ashura anniversary which commemorates the slaying of Imam Hussein, one of the most revered figures in Shiite Islam. On February 1, a female suicide bomber killed 41 people and wounded more than 100 in northern Baghdad. She was walking among the Shiite pilgrims making their way on foot to Karbala, which rendered her nearly impossible to differentiate from the crowds. Two days after this attack, another suicide bombing in the city of Karbala killed 20 pilgrims.622 On the last day of Arbaeen, on February 5, another bombing killed 41 people.623 In an attack on a family home in Madaen, a largely Shiite

619 “The Diyala Initiative: Facilitates the reintegration of returnees,” UNAMI, 2/23/2010 620 “Refugees watch Iraqi elections with doubts and hopes,” UNHCR 3/1/2010 621 “Iraq, India and Colombia top Maplecroft terrorist list-Thailand emerges as extreme risk nation,” Maplecroft, 2/16/2010 622 “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009)” United Nations Security Council, 2/8/2010 623 “Iraq death toll spikes ahead of election,” Agence France-Presse, 3/1/2010

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town south of Baghdad, masked gunmen killed eight people, including six children. A statement from the Baghdad Operations Command indicated that some of the victims were beheaded—a popular trademark of AQI and particularly reminiscent of the devastating violence between Shiites and Sunnis several years ago.624

Experts have anticipated a spike in violence before the March 7 parliamentary elections. However, the variety of the attacks, ranging from rockets and suicide bombings directed at government buildings to targeted killings by masked gangs, makes it very difficult to differentiate politically motivated violence caused by insurgents interested in derailing the elections and discrediting the government, sectarian-based attacks and organized crime, which has been reported to be on the rise throughout Iraq. This further complicates the job of the security forces who struggle to identify the different actors who carry out violent attacks across Iraq.

Attacks against Christians in Mosul continued this month, when in a period of ten days between February 13 and 23, eight people were killed, including a father and his two sons in the Al-Ceda district of the city. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) identified the latter incident as the tipping point that triggered the latest wave of displacement of Christians from Mosul (see Indicator 2).625 While the identity of the attackers remained unknown, Human Rights Watch suspected the killings to be politically motivated in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections, indicating that this increase in violence is reminiscent of the targeting killings of Mosul’s Christians in late 2008, when 40 people were killed and more the 12,000 people were displaced.626

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

OCHA reported that while there are no official figures documenting the Christian population in Mosul, from meetings with local community leaders of the districts in the city, the information gathered suggest that about 44% percent of the Christian families in those districts have been displaced. The latest wave of displacement caused the flight of 720 Christian families, escaping rising violence in the city (see Indicator 2). 627

Health care professionals, specifically physicians, have fled Iraq in great numbers due to volatile security conditions, lack of employment opportunities and extensive vulnerability to threats and persecution. The Iraqi Health Ministry reports that nearly 8,000 of the country’s 15,000 doctors left their jobs between 2003 and 2009. The Government has attempted to introduce incentives to get the doctors to return to Iraq, promising increased salaries and accommodations, and recently, even a license to carry guns for self-protection (see Indicator 4 of January report). A Health Ministry spokesman said that 1,480 doctors returned by the end of 2009. To a great extent, the return of some doctors to Iraq comes from the overall improvement in the security situation, and as a result of financial incentives. For instance, the authorities in Wasit province of central Iraq

624 “Spike in Iraq violence as vote nears,” The New York Times, 2/22/2010 625 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 1,” OCHA, 2/8/2010 626 “Iraq’s 2010 National Elections: A human rights platform for candidates,” Human Rights Watch, 2/25/2010 627 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 2,” OCHA, 3/1/2010

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recently introduced an incentives package, which includes a payment between $850 and $1,700, a car and housing to specialist doctors willing to return to Wasit.628

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

The dispute over the rights to develop the oil fields in the northern semiautonomous region of Kurdistan, and the revenue sharing between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) continues to be a major political point of controversy. Currently, there are more than 30 oil companies operating in the Kurdish region, yet the legality of their presence, specifically if the oil deals were brokered without input from the Iraqi government, remains questionable. While the KRG contends the Iraqi Constitution allows them to sign oil and gas contracts independently, Baghdad refuses to accept this argument before the parliament passes the National Hydrocarbon Law that will determine the percentage of the profits the government will receive from such deals. Meanwhile, many of these oil giants that have already invested large sums of money in the development of the oil fields in the region have yet to receive compensation.629

Some progress was made this month, when Barham Salih, the Prime Minister of the KRG presented the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with a compromise that would allow the Norwegian DNO and the Chinese-Turkish Ttopco company to resume exports of nearly 100,000 barrels a day using Iraq’s pipeline network.630 This flow of oil from the Kurdish region to Turkey was stopped in October when the Iraqi government and the KRG failed to agree on how the foreign companies would be paid. Last month, the KRG released a statement explaining its position on the region’s oil contracts and revenues, noting that in the upcoming five years the federal government will receive $2.75 billion (2010), $8.23 billion (2011), $12.45 billion (2012), $18.27 billion (2013), and $25.62 billion (2014). While al-Maliki was allegedly impressed with the proposal, and overall, this development is by no means insignificant, until the hydrocarbon law is passed, there is no legal guarantee that this agreement will hold. Ideally, Iraqis across the country can benefit immensely from the development of the oil fields in the Kurdish region, which is expected to produce a total revenue of over $27 billion per year by 2015 (with a compensation cost of $1.5 billion per year to the companies at work).631 The hydrocarbon law remains one of KRG’s vital points of contention with the central government and will certainly be a challenge the next Iraqi parliament will have to face after the election results come through in March.

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 6

The failure of the Iraqi parliament to pass crucial economic legislation, including the hydrocarbon law, the Managing Oil Resources law and several others related to the National Oil Company and the Oil Ministry, and to endorse existing laws, is costing Iraq billions of dollars in

628 “IRAQ: Wasit province initiative to get doctors to return,” IRIN, 2/11/2010 629 “Incremental steps in Iraq to let Kurdistan oil flow,” The New York Times, 1/31/2010 630 “Iraq’s Kurdish region gears up for national vote,” Radio Free Europe, 2/28/2010 631 “KRG statement on Kurdistan region oil contracts and revenues,” Kurdistan Regional Government, 1/18/2010

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losses and is severely damaging reconstruction efforts and the Iraqi economy as a whole, said experts and parliamentary officials. The political disputes within the parliament that preclude vital legislation from moving forward are holding off new investment in reconstruction projects, impeding the growth of the private sector, and limiting the capacity of Iraqi banks to contribute to development efforts. The lack of commercial protection policies with respect to custom duties, consumer and local products protection directly cause the decrease in revenues. Moreover, Iraqi markets are forced to sell even imported goods at extremely low prices, resulting in devastating losses for the merchants that can potentially push them out of business. To pass and enforce these laws is an imperative that will boost the Iraqi economy, yet the question whether the parliament elected in March will be able to transcend political divides for the benefit of the country as a whole and make progress remains to be answered.632

Iraq was recognized as a Candidate country within the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which sets the global standard for improved transparency in the oil, gas and mining sector. The government has now committed to publish records documenting revenues from oil exports sales, which will also be expected from the international companies invested in Iraq’s extractive industries. Since oil and gas in Iraq are state owned, the approval of Iraq’s candidacy is also a step forward towards greater transparency within the government and increased pressure to eradicate rampant corruption in Iraqi public life. In order to become an EITI Compliant country, Iraq will have to implement the EITI standard and undergo EITI Validation in the next two years.633 This is a positive effort to comply with international best practices, especially since the Iraqi oil exports constitute the absolute majority of the county’s basis of revenue.

The Iraqi government signed several important oil deals this month. A consortium led by ExxonMobil (60% share), with Oil Exploration Co. (a company owned by the Iraqi government, 25% share) and Royal Dutch Shell PLC (15% share), signed an agreement to redevelop and expand West Qurna 1 field in Southern Iraq. ExxonMobil promised to recruit employees locally and make used of local vendors for the supply of services and goods, as part of a corporate responsibility push to support local progress in education, improvements in health and infrastructure development.634 The development contract for the West Qurna 2 oil field went to the Norwegian Staoil and the Russian Lukoil, to reach production at 1.8 million barrels per day for a fee of $1.15 per barrel. The 20 year contract was ratified by the Cabinet of Ministers, with the majority of interest held by Lukoil (56.25%) in partnership with the Iraq’s South Oil Company and Iraq’s North Oil Company (25%) and Statoil (18.75%).635

The government also signed a technical service contract to redevelop the giant Zubair oilfield near Basra, with the Italian Eni, Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Korea Gas Corporation, with South Oil Company and Missan Oil Company as the Iraqi partners. The interests are 32.81%, Oxy 23.44%, Korea Gas 18.75%, and Missan Oil 25%, and the agreement states that the Zubair Field Operating Division will manage the rehabilitation and expansion efforts, drawing

632 “Failure to pass economic laws is jeopardizing Iraq’s economy,” Niqash, 22/1/2010 633 “Iraq recognized as an EITI Candidate,” Executive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2/14/2010 634 “ExxonMobil to expand Iraq’s West Qurna 1 field,” Oil & Gas Journal, 2/1/2010 635 “Statoil, Lukoil ink Iraqi oilfield deal,” Nordic Business Report, 2/1/2010

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staff mainly from the South Oil Company.636 Eni’s manager, Paolo Scarloni said that it will take a significant effort and a large labor force to raise the production level to175,000 barrels per day in the upcoming three years, and up to 1.8 million barrels within the next years. Scarlonu said that “there will be very big job opportunities,” and that the “Zunair oilfield alone will need about 10,000 workers, apart from other ancillary services that will be needed as well.”637

The Iraqi government has stressed the importance of securing jobs for Iraqis in the oil industry, while Hussein al-Shahristani, the Oil Minister claims the new contracts with the international oil giants will soon solve Iraq’s unemployment crisis. Al-Shahristani said “the day will come when we put the blame on the Iraqis for not applying to vacancies generated by the oil industry over the next two years, instead of the present criticism that we don’t provide job opportunities.” Yet, not everyone is convinced that the oil deals are the silver bullet solution for Iraq’s unemployment problem. Some experts argue that such heavy, almost absolute, reliance on the oil sector in Iraq’s budgetary planning is dangerous. Moreover, it can lead to underdevelopment and neglect of vital sectors of Iraqi economy such as agriculture and industry, from which the majority of Iraqis draw their meager income.638

South Korea, as the world’s fifth-largest oil importer, has a particularly interesting stake in securing access to Iraqi oil, and has been investing in other aspects of the Iraqi industry and economy to strengthen the economic ties between the two countries. Recently, several deals have been signed between South Korean firms and the Iraqi government, including a memorandum of understating between the STX Heavy Industries and the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals to build a $3.2 billion petrochemical plant around Basra, and an agreement to expand the bilateral economic cooperation through various joint ventures, such as the construction of new power stations and supply of portable electrical power generators.639

The economic ties between Iran and Iraq were tightened this month, when the Iranian consul in Basra stated that an Iranian bank will soon be opened there as a “step towards development of the commercial and economic movement between Iran and Basra.” 640 Iran’s cooperative chamber also plans to open its first trade center in Sulaymaniyah in the near future.641 With $4 billion in trade between the two countries last year, Iran plans to expand its reach in Iraq’s economy to upwards of $10 billion in the upcoming years.642

The Iraqi government approved the Kurdistan Stock Exchange in Arbil this month. Twenty percent of the shares are expected to go to the KRG, 13% to the traders and the rest divided among private sector investors.643 This is a positive development for the Kurdish region that could strengthen the financial independence of the KRG, and attract further investment in this region that has enjoyed greater economic prosperity than the rest of Iraq. The region’s economic progress is manifested by growing energy demands. The KRG recently announced that in an

636 “Iraq, Eni group sing Zubair field agreement,” Oil & Gas Journal, 2/1/2010 637 “12 million barrels of oil promise to solve unemployment problem” Niqash, 2/12/2010 638 Ibid 639 “Local firms seek projects in Iraq,” Korea Times, 2/25/2010 640 “Iranian bank to be opened soon in Basra, consul says,” BBC, 2/22/2010 641 “Iran cooperative to establish first trade centre in Iraq,” BBC, 2/17/2010 642 “Iranian bank to be opened soon in Basra, consul says,” BBC, 2/22/2010 643 “Stock exchange opens in Iraq Kurdistan Region’s Arbil,” BBC, 2/4/2010

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effort to meet these demands in the northern provinces, General Electric Co. will provide $200 million in power generation equipment and services to the Kurdish region of Iraq starting in the fall of 2010.644

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

Previous speculation that there would be an upswing of violence across Iraq as the elections neared proved true this month. Militants seem determined to make their intentions clear by attacking election-related targets in the run up to the March 7 election. Political party headquarters have been bombed repeatedly,645 as well as a candidate’s home in Ramadi.646 Gunmen also attacked a Kurdish party headquarters in northern Iraq.647 Campaigning was marred by violence as well, with attacks against candidates hanging posters648 and scuffles breaking out between supporters vying for the best spots to put campaign banners.649 Campaign violence was accompanied by an effort to terrorize the populace and undermine confidence in the government, a trend continuing from previous months: 67 bodies, all slain by gunfire in one day, overwhelmed the Baghdad morgue and instilled fear in residents.650 Again, government institutions were targeted when a suicide bomber attacked a Ramadi compound including Anbar’s provincial council, governor’s office and police headquarters.651

Despite the violence accompanying the upcoming election, the date remains firm. This is remarkable considering the turbulence which marked the Iraqi political scene in February. Just three days into the month, an Iraqi appeals court overturned the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ban of over 500 candidates from the election, stating that they should be allowed to run and their alleged ties to the Baath party would be examined after the election.652 Prime Minister al-Maliki immediately called an emergency session of parliament in response to the decision, making it clear that he believed Iraq’s electoral commission was not bound by the court’s decision.653 Just one week later, the electoral commission announced that, in fact, most of the 515 banned candidates would remain off the ballot—only 26 of the banned candidates would be allowed to run—despite the appeal court’s previous decision.654 Due to the constant back and forth on this issue, the election’s credibility is diminished in the eyes of many voters, especially Sunnis, some of whom are calling for a boycott. However, after Saleh al-Mutlaq—the prominent head of the National Dialogue Front—who remained banned, reversed his decision and asked his Sunni followers to vote for Ayad Allawi’s party, it seems a boycott will be unlikely.655

644 “Iraq Status Report,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs U.S. Department of State, 2/24/2010 645 “Bombs hit Iraqi party offices,” The Australian, 2/15/10 646 “Iraq suicide bomber strikes in Anbar,” The New York Times, 2/18/10 647 “Gunmen attack Kurdish party offices in northern Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/25/10 648 Ibid. 649 “Iraqis awash in gifts from candidates,” The New York Times, 3/1/10 650 “Silencer guns kill 67 in one day in Baghdad,” Azzaman, 2/23/10 651 “Iraq suicide bomber strikes in Anbar,” The New York Times, 2/18/10 652 “Ban on hundreds of Iraqi candidates overturned,” The New York Times, 2/3/10 653 Ibid. 654 “Candidates to stay off ballot in Iraq,” The New York Times, 2/13/10 655 “Sunni politician decides against election boycott in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/26/10

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The ADE 651 bomb detector, now widely considered a hoax and a symbol of shameless war profiteering, continues to be used in Iraq despite evidence that it is no more reliable in predicting the presence of munitions than a coin flip. Iraqi soldiers claim they are forced to continue to use the devices by their corrupt superiors, a move which underscores how omnipresent corruption has become in Iraq, even when people are dying because weapons continue to pass checkpoints undetected.656

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

A deplorable lack of housing continues to haunt Iraq, often forcing multiple families to share the same quarters. By UN estimates, the 2.8 million housing units in Iraq falls short by about 1.3 million units to meet the needs of the population today, but it will need to more than double its stock of housing to meet the needs of the population in 2015.657 Unfortunately, the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction will not complete a large number of its scheduled 2010 projects due to lack of funding. The Housing Minister reported that despite spending every dollar allocated in 2009, even spending money promised for 2010 in advance, and finishing all planned projects, the housing budget is simply too small to make noticeable strides.658 In Kurdistan, the housing that is available is often much too expensive for the average Iraqi to buy. As oil contracts are signed, housing prices skyrocket in anticipation of oil revenue flooding in, but real salaries lag far behind the real estate market, preventing many Iraqis from purchasing homes.659 The inability of the Iraqi government to significantly impact growth of infrastructure, especially housing and electricity, is undermining the population’s faith in al-Maliki’s government and political institutions in general. Although the Minister of Planning announced the completion of planning for a 2010-2014 five year plan, it remains to be seen if effective change can be enacted.660

The Iraqi government decided to exclude nearly 120,000 people nationwide from receiving state food aid, for being considered well-off enough to fend for their own. The spokesman of the Planning Ministry, Abdul-Zahra Al-Hindawi said that this decision was part of a larger effort to improve the Public Distribution System (PDS), which has been struggling to meet the needs of more than half of Iraq’s 29 million residents who depend on it. While the number of those exclude is rather insignificant in comparison to the overall population being served by this program, questions remain about the validity of the disqualification process, especially since the food distribution system is notoriously corrupt and mismanaged.661

The demand for hospitals was apparent this month; the Health Ministry formed a special committee to accelerate the construction plans for four new hospitals in Al-Nahrawan, Al-Bayya, and Al-Sha'b, as well as the Nuclear Medicine Hospital in Baghdad.662 Meanwhile, residents of

656 “Magic wand,” The International Herald Tribune, 2/4/10 657 “Cramped quarters define struggles of Iraqis,” The New York Times, 2/27/10 658 “Reconstruction allocations for 2010 insufficient, says ministry,” Azzaman, 2/14/10 659 “Cost of housing is 'number one problem' in Kurdistan,” Niqash, 2/4/10 660 “Iraqi planning Minister says five-year plan completed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/9/10 661 “Iraq: Streamlining the state food aid system,” IRIN, 2/9/2010 662 “Iraqi health ministry, form committee to build hospitals,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/9/10

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Al-Husayniyah were up in arms about the construction of a large public building slated to serve as a youth center while the town is in dire need of medical facilities.663 The Health Ministry also called for increased hiring of paramedics and ambulance drivers, citing the need for 700 new emergency aid workers in Baghdad alone (the current number stands at 500 employees).664 There was much ceremony as the Health Minister christened a new CT scanner at the hospital in Al-Hindiyah,665 and although the government has embarked on an ambitious program to reconstruct its ruined mental health care system,666 health care in Iraq remains inadequate. Due to a lack of treatment options in Iraq, the Wasit Governorate Council paid to send 37 patients to India for treatment of “cardiac and vascular diseases.”667 Likewise, 11 patients wounded by a bombing in al-Najaf were taken to Turkey for treatment.668

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

The Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission placed new regulations on media outlets this month, requiring that “media outlets and journalists receive the commission's permission to work in Iraq” and “submit lists of all employees and equipment and vow not to instigate sectarianism or violence.”669 These regulations are widely viewed as yet another expansion of Iraqi government control over the media, not to mention dangerous for journalists. Many media sources fear publishing lists of staff as it makes them vulnerable to gangs and militias who have abducted journalists in the past.670 Iraq has been the world's most dangerous environment for journalists since the war began in 2003. At least 140 have been killed, many of them by militia and insurgent groups.671 In Kurdistan, reports of attacks, arrests and kidnaps of independent journalists are on the rise.672 Especially worrying is the connection between these incidences and the political parties of the Kurdistan Regional Government—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The French NGO, Reporters without Borders, also released a report with similar conclusions.673 Additionally, Thi-Qar's Provincial Council recently recommended that the office of al-Baghdadiya satellite TV station be closed after they praised the Baath Party.674

The human rights situation in Iraq also attracted international criticism when the United Nations Human Rights Council met this month to discuss the human rights conditions within member states. Officials brought up suspicion of severe human rights violations inside Iraq’s prisons,

663 Iraqi Al-Husayniyah residents demand construction of hospital,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/9/10 664 “Iraqi Health Ministry affirms shortage of emergency aid workers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/9/10 665 “Iraqi health Minister inaugurates new equipment at Al-Hindiyah hospital,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/7/10 666 “Restoring talk therapy for Iraqis,” The International Herald Tribune, 2/1/10 667 “Iraq's Wasit Governorate Council sends 37 patients to India for treatment,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/2/10 668 “Eleven Iraqis wounded in Al-Najaf blasts taken to Turkey for treatment,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/8/10 669 “Iraqi government criticized for new "restriction" on media, update 6 Feb,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/6/10 670 Ibid. 671 “Iraqi journalist sees threats to press freedom,” The Washington Post, 2/26/10 672 “Backsliding freedom of press in Kurdistan,” Niqash, 2/1/10 673 Ibid. 674 “Iraqi provincial council bans satellite station in Thi-Qar,” BBC Monitoring World Media, 2/15/10

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which were mentioned in several UNAMI human rights reports, including the latest one assessing the period between January and July on 2009.

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9 A particularly troubling development occurred this month when Prime Minister al-Maliki ordered Iraq's Fourth Army Division to cordon off the Tikrit provincial council building during a dispute over the appointment of the province’s governor.675 The local council had been trying to oust the governor on charges of negligence despite al-Maliki’s calls to keep him in office. This was the second instance of Prime Minister al-Maliki authorizing the use of security forces to exert his influence, raising doubts about the strength of democracy in Iraq. A week previous to this incident, in Diyala, a leading candidate from one of the main blocs challenging al-Maliki's party was arrested by special forces after participating in a recorded debate in which he criticized the security forces. Warrants are said to have been issued for five other members of Diyala’s legislature on charges that remain unclear.676

Iraqi security forces arrested 22 Hezbollah fighters near the Iran-Iraq border. U.S. officials have long accused Hezbollah Brigades of carrying out Iranian orders to destabilize Iraq, and their continued presence underscores continued Iranian interest in seeing Iraq remain unstable.677 Additionally, a Syrian gunman was killed by Iraqi SWAT forces before his compatriots escaped across the border into Syria.678 Who sponsored the gunmen remains a mystery, but these armed groups continue to operate within Iraq’s borders, with little consequence. One armed group that did face consequences this month was American private military contractors. The Interior Minister announced that 250 Blackwater employees would be expelled from Iraq and given seven days to leave.679

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

The policy of de-Baathification, originally set forth by Paul Bremer in 2003 is creating a vicious backlash for the U.S. The exclusion of Baathists in the political process was problematic from the start in that it fed thousands of recruits straight into the insurgency, but today the persistent lack of reconciliation is now causing another type of headache. The election ban crisis (see Indicator 7) remains the primary obstacle to the upcoming election, undercutting the legitimacy of the vote in a seemingly partisan move to exclude key Sunni politicians by the Accountability and Justice Commission. However, the anti-Baathist frenzy whipped up by al-Maliki and the Shiite parties in an attempt to legitimize the election bans precludes any chance of national reconciliation.680 Nehru Muhammad Abd-al-Karim, head of the Iraqi National Unity Gathering

675 “A show of army force tests rule of law in Iraq,” The International Herald Tribune, 2/11/10 676 Ibid. 677 Hezbollah fighters arrested near Iraq-Iran border,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/12/10 678 “Iraqi forces kill Syrian in clashes with "Arab gunmen" near border,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/5/10 679 “Iraq expels 250 Blackwater employees,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/10/10 680 “The long, long shadow of early missteps in Iraq,” The New York Times, 2/19/10

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called fears of a resurgent Baath party a “fabricated phobia.”681 However, the fear seems to have moved beyond the rhetoric at the national level, this month the local councils of Karbala and Basra each began dismissing state employees on the grounds that they also had Baathist ties, only furthering the anti-Baathist hysteria.682

This division is reflective of another trend in Iraq, the ethno-sectarian divides which threatens to avert any chance of a unity government in Iraq. While there are coalitions being established, Iraqi politics has developed voters in lockstep with their ethnicity. Nineveh is a microcosm of this phenomenon, where despite efforts to soothe tensions between Kurds and Iraqis via mixed- ethnicity security operations under American command, Kurds have tightened their grip on Iraqi towns which were previously under Iraqi control.683 Even the attempts to force cooperation are criticized by Arabs and Turkmen for allowing Kurds access to areas they previously did not patrol.684 Certainly the Sunni calls for boycott, following the electoral commission’s decision to ignore the overturning of the election ban by the Iraqi judiciary, taint what many Iraqis and the United States hoped would be an election that took the country beyond sectarian bloodshed. Fortunately, it appears that the boycott will be avoided (see Indicator 7). However, unless the Iraqi political parties find ways to bridge their differences and build sustainable coalitions after the election, the specter of Lebanization (see Report 5) looms ahead of this fragmented state.

It appeared as if there would be some good news when the Iraqi government announced it would reinstate 20,000 army officers who served under Saddam Hussein.685 The inclusion of experienced officers has long been needed in the Iraqi security forces, and such a move could signal the first steps toward national reconciliation with former Baathists. However, it appears to be a purely political move to gain the favor of this officer corps, considering Prime Minister al- Maliki’s stance on the election ban and the rhetoric he has lambasted alleged Baathists with for attempting to take part in the election, doubly so considering the move to purge security forces of Baathists directed by Ali Faisal al-Lami, executive director of the Accountability and Justice Commission. Al-Lami sent a list of 580 names, including senior officers credited with overseeing the improvement of security in Iraq over the last several years, to the Ministries of Defense, Interior and National Intelligence. He asserts the officers should be removed from service because of ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.686

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 9

In a particularly frank accusation, General Ray Odierno, the senior American commander in Iraq, claimed that Ahmad Chalabi and Ali Faisal al-Lami, the two chief architects of the Accountability and Justice Commission’s election ban on over 500 candidates, have close ties to

681 “Iraq politician sees campaign against Ba'thist candidates as ‘fabricated phobia’,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/16/10 682 “Iraqi Basra, Karbala councils move against suspected Ba'thists in state bodies,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/16/10 683 “Kurdish militia tighten grip on non-Kurdish districts in Iraq’s Mosul,” Azzaman 2/18/10 684 “Arabs and Turkmen angry over joint force,” Niqash, 2/8/10 685 “Iraq to rehire 20,000 Hussein-era army officers,” The New York Times, 2/25/10 686 “Iraq moves to purge security forces,” The Los Angeles Times, 2/26/10

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Iran.687 If this accusation is true, it means that there is a strong possibility that Iran does in fact have an interest in seeing Iraqi Sunnis remain out of power. This makes sense, although for his part, Chalabi denied the accusation and urged Odierno to, “not interfere in matters that do not concern him.”688 Unfortunately, it seems Odierno is probably right, based on who was targeted in the election ban. In fact, the U.S. later leveled a battery of accusations against Iran, claiming it was conducting a covert operation to influence the upcoming elections. Charges include: providing funding, campaign materials and training to pro-Iranian politicians; urging alliances between pro-Iranian Shiite slates; and encouraging the de-Baathification process via Chalabi in order to remove possible obstacles to Iranian influence. The U.S. also shared intelligence that Chalabi had visited Iran three times in the last year, and met with Iranian officials on at least five separate occasions.689

American troop levels dropped below 100,000 for the first time since 2003.690 Also, the Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni association which unofficially took responsibility for monitoring violations of the security agreement (Status Of Forces Agreement) signed between the Iraqi Government and the United States on November 27, 2008, claims to have found 336 violations by American forces, but posits that there could be many more since they did not begin fully monitoring the agreement until almost a year after it was signed.691

687 “General says 2 Iraq politicians have ties to Iran,” The New York Times, 2/16/10 688 “Iraq's Chalabi urges Odierno ‘not interfere in matters that do not concern him’,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/18/10 689 “Buying the vote; Iran is backing candidates -- in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 2/25/10 690 “Iraq: number of U.S. troops dips below 100,000,” The New York Times, 2/17/10 691 “Sunni association finds over 300 US "violations" of Iraq security pact,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/26/10

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Core Five and STINGS – February 2010

1. Police Rating: Weak

This month The Australian Federal Police finished training 101 Iraqi police officers with specialized forensic science instruction.692 The AFP is recognized as one of the leading bomb scene investigation units and their training could be put to good use considering the security situation in Iraq. For example, the police chief of Kirkuk narrowly escaped an assassination attempt this month when an explosive device was placed in his vehicle. The blast damaged his car and one of his colleagues, but the culprit remains unknown.693 Perhaps revealing their fears of improved police work, militants also detonated a car bomb outside the Criminal Evidence Department in Mosul, killing two police officers and wounding nine.694

Iraq police launched pre-emptive strikes on militants in Baghdad ahead of elections this month, in an effort to stay attempts to undermine the election. The Baghdad Operations Command announced the seizure of both rockets and caches of weapons and ammunition in the run up to the election.695 Iraqi police also found success in thwarting an attempted suicide bombing in Basra. Police discovered a mentally ill man wearing an explosive belt intending to attack Shiite pilgrims and restrained him before the attack could take place.696

Despite these successes, the Iraqi police continue to suffer from systemic corruption and poor training. This month, the Council relieved the Maysan police chief from duty for a litany of various charges, including continued security breaches and violations against citizens by policemen.697 This reflects a continuing problem of police quality in Iraq. Police, although possibly more important to counterinsurgency efforts due to their proximity to the populace, are continually under-trained and less trusted than the Iraqi military forces. A lack of police professionalism reflects poorly on the Iraqi government.

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

February saw a slew of political infighting among the various branches of Iraqi leadership. Vice President al-Hashimi blasted Prime Minister al-Maliki for supporting the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ban of election candidates, charging him with attempting to create a political crisis and smoke-screening the failure of the government to deal with the ongoing bomb-detector fiasco (see Indicator 7). It remains to be seen if the Prime Minister’s office had anything to do with the fraudulent devices, but the issue is under investigation by the Ministries of Interior and Defense.698 Al-Hashimi, for his part, was not spared, by the political disunity.

692 “Iraqi police learn from AFP,” Herald Sun (Australia), 2/8/10 693 “Iraqi police chief in Kirkuk survives assassination attempt,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/6/10 694 “Car bomb kills two policemen in northern Iraqi city of Mosul,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/16/10 695 “Iraqi forces launch preemptive strikes to ensure elections security,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/15/10 696 “Suicide attack by "mentally-ill" man on Shi'i pilgrims in Iraq's Basra foiled,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/6/10 697 “Maysan Governorate police chief dismissed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/25/10 698 “Iraqi vice-presidential official criticizes PM's office,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/8/10

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Mithal al-Alusi, deputy and head of the Iraqi Ummah Party, announced plans to file a lawsuit charging al-Hashimi supporting terrorism for his alleged involvement in helping the former Minister of Culture As’ad al-Hashim, who is accused of killing al-Alusi’s two sons, escape.699 Finally Iraq’s chief of staff, Major General Babakir Zebari again submitted his resignation on the grounds that Prime Minister al-Maliki and Minister of Defense al-Mufriji act unilaterally, especially in regards to Kurdistan.700 As chief of staff, Zebari’s duties include working as a liaison between the Kurdish and Iraq governments and attempting to iron out policy differences between the two sides. Although he puts blame on both parties, Zebari stresses that the unilateral approach the Iraqi government has taken on the Kurdish region has made his job impossible and irrelevant.

Such political divisiveness is to be expected considering the political climate that surrounds election campaigns, especially elections as contentious as Iraq’s. In addition to the controversial election ban, Reidar Visser notes than the new Iraqi government—whatever coalition ends up actually forming a government—will be guided by a completely new set of rules. No longer will the presidency be required to represent all three major ethnic groups under an unwieldy three- man presidency, and no longer does the presidency require a supermajority to be elected.701 This should streamline the formation of a government, but some worry that only requiring a simple majority will grant too much power to whichever group ends up in power.

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced that all logistical preparations for the upcoming elections were complete. Twenty-sex million ballots were printed for the election and 1,000 international election monitors are expected to participate in the election.702 Despite the logistical preparations, concerns remained about the effect of the electoral ban on the election. Early calls to boycott the election on the part of Sunni politicians revived fears that the election would end up a sham, and that violence would resume post-election.703 Although Mutlaq later rescinded his decision to boycott the election, uncertainty remains about whether Sunnis will come out in sufficient numbers to ensure a legitimate election.704

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has called for the creation of a single agency to oversee reconstruction in Iraq. Despite $53 billion spent on reconstruction efforts in Iraq, many Iraqis complain that they still suffer from a dire lack of infrastructure.705 Partially due to the 62 different agencies involved in reconstruction and the inherent confusion that such a plethora of agents brings, reconstruction has also failed largely due to a lack of oversight that breeds corruption. In addition, Iraq’s inability to provide trained staff and

699 “Iraqi deputy to file lawsuit against vice-president; security roundup,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/14/10 700 “Iraq's chief of staff says PM, defence Minister acting unilaterally,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/26/10 701 “Three’s a crowd,” The National, 2/18/10 702 “Iraqi commission says logistical preparations ready for elections,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/14/10 703 Sunni politician threatens boycott of Iraq elections,” USA TODAY, 2/15/10 704 “Sunni politician decides against election boycott in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/26/10 705 “Report seeks sole agency to rebuild war zones,” The New York Times, 2/22/10

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necessary inputs (see Indicator 6 of December report) for complete projects means many projects are simply abandoned after completion.706

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

The Iraqi judiciary exerted itself this month by overturning the Accountability and Justice Commission’s election ban of 500 candidates. The court ruled that it would reconsider the ban after the election, but that all candidates would be able to run.707 Soon after the court announced its decision, Prime Minister al- Maliki called an emergency session of parliament, including the chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council. Shortly thereafter, the court reversed its decision, suggesting constitutional standoff forced the judiciary to back down under political pressure.708 Such an outcome bodes ill for Iraq’s fledgling democracy; if the judiciary cannot stand up to the executive, a check on governmental powers goes out the window.

Eight suspects were arrested and are awaiting trial for the murder of six British military policemen who were killed by a mob of over 400 people in 2003. Nearly seven years later an Iraqi court issued arrest warrants for the eight captured men after working with the British army, which provided investigative materials and expertise for the case.709

An investigative judge for terrorism and criminal cases was killed as he left his home when a bomb went off in his front yard. Sources say unknown gunmen planted a bomb in his home’s garden.710 The attack underscored judges’ continued vulnerability to reprisal attacks by criminals and terrorists.

5. Military Rating: Moderate

The fledgling Iraqi Navy received two long-awaited military vessels from Italy this month, which will be used to patrol Iraq’s ports and regional waters.711 Also, Battalion 36, Iraq’s own shadowy special forces unit began new high-level training exercises with American special forces near Baghdad airport. Battalion 36, also known as the Golden Group, is a highly specialized anti-terrorism unit with a stellar record among the Iraqi security forces.712

On security force successes, the Iraqi army foiled an attempt to detonate a bridge over the Tigris River in northern Wasit. After cordoning off the bridge, an Iraqi police bomb-unit defused the device and the 32nd Brigade seized “a barrel with 220 liters of TNT and other high explosives materials placed under the bridge.”713

706 Ibid. 707 “Ban on hundreds of Iraqi candidates overturned,” The New York Times, 2/3/10 708 “Candidates to stay off ballot in Iraq,” The New York Times, 2/13/10 709 “Eight Iraqis arrested over Red Cap murders in 2003,” The Express, 2/13/10 710 “Iraqi judge dies in Baghdad bomb blast,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/24/10 711 Iraq receives two military vessels from Italy,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/14/10 712 “Al-Arabiya TV show discusses Iraqi Special Force role, operations,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/19/10 713 “Army foils attempt to blow up bridge in Wasit,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/24/10

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Members of the security services also continued to be targeted by militants in Iraq. In Baghdad, some 70 corpses surfaced over the course of two days, most of which were members of Iraqi security forces according to the Forensic Department.714 Additionally, the Accountability and Justice Commission extended its reach to include serving officers and non-commissioned officers, and began measures to dismiss 580 army and intelligence officers from the Iraqi security forces.715 There is speculation that the Commission is currently deciding the fate of over 70,000 officers’ posts now, raising questions of how far the de-Baathification process is going to go.716

714 “Some 70 bodies mostly of security officers found in Baghdad in two days,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/24/10 715 Iraq moves to purge security forces,” The Los Angeles Times, 2/26/10 716 “Iraqi government to dismiss 376 army, intelligence officers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2/27/10

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Appendix VIII: March 2010 Summary Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Water shortage is not only one of Iraq’s greatest challenges on the path to sustainable development, but a regional problem, worsened by the prolonged drought that has plagued northern Iraq for over two years now. Moreover, this difficult situation has been exacerbated by decades of underinvestment in crucial infrastructure and ill-managed state-run policies to prepare and deal with environmental pressures and disasters. As a result of prolonged conflict, sanctions and underdevelopment, the water sector in Iraq, in terms of delivery and distribution of clean water and proper sanitation facilities, is sub-standard. According to government estimates, 24% of Iraqis do not have access to safe water, while the numbers are double in rural areas, where 26% of people use rivers and creeks for their water needs, and only 5% use public taps. The UN estimates that only 17% of Iraqi sewage is being treated and rest is let out into waterways and rivers.

These figures are particularly alarming considering the health hazards embedded in poor sanitation habits, specifically water-borne diseases, and the environmental damage of contaminated water sources. Moreover, as Iraq’s population continues to grow, and the water resources dwindle, agriculture, which already accounts for 90% of Iraq’s water consumption, will likely suffer, and life-conditions will deteriorate. In an effort to tackle this critical problem, the UN agencies and the government of Iraq jointly launched the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2011-2014, that will focus on expanding coverage of basic water and sanitation, improved management of water resources and quality of water and sanitation service provision.717 UNDAF, which will promote the rehabilitation of numerous water stations and provision of emergency water supply to vulnerable populations affected by droughts, is part of a larger effort to develop a national strategy for better water preparedness and drought management.

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs Rating: 8

The election was a significant event for Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, with the majority of the Iraqi refugees flocking to the polls in Damascus and Amman. Not surprisingly, candidates focused greatly on Syria, which has the largest population of Iraqis outside of Iraq, and thus holds significant sway in election results. Iraqi nationals voted on March 5, 6 and 7, across the 23 polling that were set up by the International High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Damascus. High profile politicians, including Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and Ayad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya coalition, Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki’s most viable competitor, visited Damascus and Amman, in a dual effort to gather refugee votes and attempt to improve the relationship with the Syrian leadership.718 While the polling stations in Damascus reported sizable turnout, at least on March 5, the decision to vote does not necessarily imply the desire to

717 “On world water day, the UN calls for improved access to safe water in Iraq,” United Nations, 3/18/2010 718 “Iraqi election fever hits Damascus,” Asia Times, 3/5/2010

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return. As a refugee woman from Baghdad said, “I do not know if I will ever be able to go back, but I am interested in the future of my country.”719

It is widely believed that the government formation process, especially since the secularist- nationalist Iraqiya emerged only slightly ahead of al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, will be lengthy and controversial. Many Iraqi refugees are afraid that these negotiations might deepen the divides between the conflicting parties and lead to more violence.720 These fears were confirmed by Basil Abdul-Wahad al-Azawi, who heads the Commission of Society Enterprises, a Baghdad based umbrella group of more than 1,000 NGOs, who said that “any delay in forming the new government due to the expected political wrangling will have a dangerous impact on IDPs and refugees.”721 Thus, Iraqi refugees continue to follow the developments in Iraqi politics closely, inured by the difficult living conditions, hope is hesitant at best. It seems that at least in rhetoric, Iraq’s political leaders do understand that the Iraq’s mass displacement problem is a matter of great concern that must be ranked high on the new parliament’s agenda. Shortly after the preliminary results of the parliamentary elections were released, Allawi of the narrowly victorious Iraqiya said that “there are millions of Iraqi people inside and outside Iraq who have been turfed out of their homes and are experiencing injustice. We will work to help them return to their homes.”722

Meanwhile, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Migration and Resettlement, Karmi al-Saaidi spoke resentfully about European countries like Sweden, Norway and Holland that have threatened to repatriate Iraqi refugees by force. Specifically, he said that even relative improvements in the security situation as well as the success of the parliamentary elections should not be used inappropriately to pressure involuntary return by foreign governments hosting Iraqi refugees.723

Refugees International released a report identifying internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in squatter settlements in slum areas across different parts of Baghdad, Diyala and Salah al-Din as some of the most vulnerable populations in Iraq. The squatters have no legal claim to the land, very few possessions and the settlements lack basic services such as clean water and sanitation, health services and electricity. There are nearly 500,000 people living under such dire circumstances, and they are largely neglected by both the Iraqi authorities and the international humanitarian agencies.724 Moreover, the evacuation decree issued by the Iraqi government in 2008, although scarcely imposed, is a contrast reminder of how tenuous and insecure are the lives of these squatters who are caught in a legal limbo without even the most basic of rights.725

While the overall rate of displacement has fallen significantly, there are still isolated instances of population displacement as a result of persecution and violence.726 The latest displacement

719 “Iraq election: In Syrian, disillusioned refugees trudge to the polls,” The Christian Science Monitor, 3/5/2010 720 “Iraqi refugees cautious about return after landmark election,” UNHCR, 3/15/2010 721 “Iraq: Leading politician Allawi promises to help refugees, IDPs,” IRIN, 3/30/2010 722 Ibid 723 “Iraq lashes out at European countries repatriating refugees by force,” Azzaman, 3/12/2010 724 “Iraqis in squatter slums need international support,” Relief Web, 3/17/2010 725 “Iraqi: Humanitarian Needs Persist,” Refugees International, 3/17/2010 726 “Iraq: Little new displacement but in the region of 2.8 million Iraqis remain internally displacement,” International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 3/4/2010

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episode in Mosul that unraveled in late February, continued this month, with United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimating the total number of IDPs has risen to 866 families (or 5,196 people) as of March 4. The majority of the displaced remained in the Nineveh governorate, with 471 families registered in Al-Hamdaniya and 259 families at Tilkaif, others have crossed to Arbil (72 families), Dahuk (44 families) and Kirkuk (20 families). The displaced families are mostly staying with relatives or being accommodated by the local churches and humanitarian agencies. While the immediate humanitarian needs of the IDPs have been met in a timely and effective fashion, protection for the Christian families remaining in Mosul remains an alarming issue. The displaced families left the absolute majority of their possessions behind as they fled threats and violence in Mosul.727 Some have expressed hope that the security situation after the elections will improve to allow them to return to their homes and livelihoods. A recent statement by the Nineveh governorate authorities noted more than 50 families have returned to Mosul accompanied by the Iraqi security forces to resettle in their homes.728

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 10

While the active insurgency has been contained, sectarian rivalries continue to drive deep wedges in Iraqi society. This month saw a slight rise in the civilian death toll compared to February. The ministries of interior, defense and health reporting that 216 civilians, as well as 101 police officers, 50 soldiers and 57 insurgents were killed in March. Several days before the elections, deadly attacks hit the city of Baquba, where at least 33 people where killed on March 3 in three coordinated attacks.729 On the day Iraqis went to vote, attacks across the country claimed the lives of at least 37 people in 136 attacks. Nearly one million Iraqi soldiers and policemen, many of whom were charged with protecting the poll stations across the country voted early, and they themselves were targeted in at least three attacks in Baghdad, two in Mosul and one in Diyala.730

While the U.S. military concluded that overall, violence did not substantially affect the elections, crediting the “professionalism and improvement of the Iraqi Security Forces,” other local and international news sources reported that widespread violence has deterred many Iraqis from making their way to the polling stations.731 Notably, Baghdad, where the majority of the attacks took place, had one of the lowest voters’ turnouts across all Iraqi governorates, at 53% compared to the national average of 62%.732

Violence continued to plague Iraqi cities after the elections as well, when scores of attacks targeting both Iraqi security forces and civilians tore through the restive cities of Mosul and Falluja. A prominent Sunni cleric, Sheikh Abdurahamn al-Karbouli, was killed in Anbar province. His death was reported to be part of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) strategy to target Sunni

727 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 3,” OCHA, 3/6/2010 728 “Scores of fleeing Christian families return to Mosul,” Azzaman, 3/14/2010 729 “Iraq election briefs: Bombers batter Baquba on eve of election,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/5/2010 730 “In Iraq, early vote is marred by attacks,” The New York Times, 3/4/2010 731 “Iraq status report March 17, 2010,” Bureau of Near Easter Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 3/17/2010 732 “After playing down election violence in Iraq, U.S. military reassesses,” The Washington Post, 3/11/2010

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officials who denounced their support of the terrorist organization as a way to intimidate the surrounding population.733On the day the election results were announced, 57 people were killed and 73 were wounded in twin bombings near a popular restaurant in the town of Khalis, north of Baghdad. Shortly thereafter, the Diyala Police Department released a statement saying that they “have intelligence that AQI operatives are involved in the Khalis explosions.”734 These bloody events raised fears of post-election violence throughout Iraq.

Political pundits vary in their opinion on whether the election results, namely the narrow win for Iraqiya’s leader, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, is a manifestation of the deep schisms in Iraqi society, or a step forward towards national unity and away from sectarianism. Allawi, himself a Shiite, leads a coalition where at least 80% of the successful candidates are Sunnis. While the Sunnis largely boycotted the 2005 parliamentary elections, this month they voted for the Iraqiya coalition, hoping to counterbalance Islamist Shiite parties supported by Iran.735 Allawi is also favored by the Americans for his nationalist and nonsectarian political agenda. On the other hand, experts argue that despite Allawi’s lead, “the balance of power favors sectarian orientation cloaked in various disguises,”736 and the fractured nature of Iraqi politics both reflects and reinforces the divisions in Iraqi society. Iraqis largely voted according to ethnic, religions and sectarian lines, and now, many are fearful that the deeply divided political parties will fail to form a government, which will lead to a spike in post-election violence and perhaps even a military take over.737

Eight people were injured at a billiard hall in Um-al-Baroum in the al-Ashar district of Basra. It is believed that the venue, owned by a Christian, was attacked for selling alcohol. The Basra provincial council, which is dominated by the , has enforced an alcohol ban, and decided to impose a fine of $4,700 on the manufacturing, selling and public consumption of alcohol. While the ban has been loosely enforced in the Christian areas, vendors have suffered constant harassment, often violence, and have encountered difficulties attempting to renew their alcohol license. Alcohol bans are even more strictly imposed in Najaf, Wasit and Baghdad. Local authorities do not see the alcohol ban to be at odds with the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom, since the constitution also identifies Islam as the official religion of the state, and arguably, the foundation for legislation. While this issue is perhaps affecting only a small portion of the population, it is nonetheless indicative of the general attitude of intolerance and discrimination by Iraqi authorities against minorities. As a representative of the Human Rights Organization in Basra said, “the issue of freedoms does not rely on security conditions but rather on the political and social environment.”738 Thus, as the security situation improves, human rights violations, as well as social freedoms and group rights come to the fore of the debate in Iraqi society.

Along similar lines, the Governor of the Nineveh province, Atheel al-Nujafi, appealed to the UN and the European Union, asking the international bodies to undertake an investigation

733 “Violence surge in restive Iraq’s Mosul and Falluja,” Azzaman, 3/16/2010 734 “Iraqi police say Al-Qa’idah behind Al-Khalis explosions,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 3/27/2010 735 “Sunnis go to polls, this time, to retain a voice,” The New York Times, 3/7/2010 736 “Iraqi elections have not set off a democracy contagion,” Yale Global, 3/29/2010 737 Ibid 738 “Booze ban in Basra,” Niqash, 3/23/2010

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concerning the attacks targeting minorities throughout his province. Al-Nujafi blamed the Kurdish political parties and their respective militias for targeting Christians, as well as other minority groups such as the Shebek and the Yazidis, in an increasingly violent campaign to secure Kurdish dominance in the province, and especially in the capital, Mosul. Al-Nujafi’s allegations mirror the findings of a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the repression of minority groups in the disputed northern areas, particularly in Nineveh province, where minority groups suffer disproportionately as a result of the dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government. HRW found that “Kurdish forces have mostly relied on intimidation, threats, arbitrary arrests, and detentions to coerce the support of minority communities for the KRG plan regarding the disputed territories,” and in extreme cases, violence and torture were also reported (see Indicator 9 of November report).739 Earlier this month, the UN estimated that a total of 866 families (5,196 people) fled violence in Mosul since late February, and were now displaced throughout the Nineveh governorate, Arbil, Dahuk and Kirkuk.740

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 9

There has been no significant change in the rate of human flight this month, as sporadic instances of displacement continued throughout Iraq. In one of the most recent incidents in the restive city of Mosul, violence against Christians has caused the flight and displacement of 866 families (or 5,196 people), according to OCHA figures from March 4.

Iraqi academics, much like the health care professionals and many other middle and upper- middle class professionals, continue to flee the country as years of violent conflict and economic underdevelopment preclude opportunities for professional and financial advancement. The Iraqi Health Ministry estimates that nearly 8,000 of Iraq’s 15,000 physicians fled the country between 2003 and 2009. While the Ministry’s spokesman noted in February that as many as 1,480 doctors have returned by the end of last year, due to improved security conditions, there are no figures that document how many of those who have returned did not leave later on.741 Academics in Iraq face similar difficulties as health professionals. The Ministry of Education reported that between March 2003 and October 2008, there were 31,589 attacks targeting education institutions throughout the country. As many as 437 academics were assassinated since March 2003.742

Many of the 30,000 faculty members currently living in Iraq feel that despite the relative improvement in security conditions, their situation remains precarious, as attacks against educational institutions and persecution of academics persist.743 The attacks include kidnappings, forced disappearances, illegal arrests, abuse and torture, death threats and assassinations. Influential academics were targeted in particular, especially if their publications addressed culturally or politically sensitive topics. Moreover, UNESCO found that numerous academics were murdered for sectarian reasons, especially if their places of employment were controlled by

739 “On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories,” Human Rights Watch, 11/10/2009 740 “Iraq-Displacement in Mosul: Situation Report No. 3,” OCHA, 3/6/2010 741 “IRAQ: Wasit province initiative to get doctors to return,” IRIN, 2/11/2010 742 “Iraq: Key figures since the war began,” The New York Times, 4/1/2010 743 “Send in the professors,” The New York Times, 4/7/2010

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the opposite sect. Iraq also tops the list of applications to the U.S. based Scholar Rescue Fund, which provides grants for the relocation of persecuted scholars, with 111 applicants between 2002 and 2007.744

Beyond insecurity and financial reasons, restriction on academic freedom in Iraq’s universities and the politicization of academia as a whole has caused academics to seek alternative livelihoods outside of Iraq. Faculty members reported repression, favoritism and rampant corruption as obstacles for professional advancement, let alone a hindrance to academic integrity and productive scholarship. Impunity and lack of prosecution for those responsible for assassinating university professors and intellectuals is an alarming issue on its own, yet it is also indicative of a larger problem, namely, Iraq’s weak rule of law institutions, and specifically, the sub-standard judicial system. On the other hand, both the Iraqi and international media have taken an interest in the plight of academics. Substantial coverage of attacks against Iraqi academics and intellectuals has helped raise awareness of the dangerous situation these professionals face and the need for greater protection and prosecution of offenders.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

While housing shortages are a severe problem across the entire country, housing conditions are particularly poor for those Iraqis who are living in squatter slums without access to basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation. These squatter settlements are makeshift shantytowns built precariously alongside railroad tracks and under bridges, surrounded by waste and garbage dumps. A recent Refugees International study found that are there are nearly 500,000 Iraqis whose plight goes largely unnoticed by the Iraqi government, and a great number of them live in Baghdad.745 While the efforts of the Baghdadi authorities to alleviate the housing problem are important, progress is slow. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction will not complete a large number of its scheduled 2010 projects due to lack of funding. The Housing Minister reported that despite spending every dollar allocated in 2009, even spending money promised for 2010 in advance, and finishing all planned projects, the housing budget is simply too small to make noticeable strides.746

The Iraqi authorities recently reported that there are more than 27 million pieces of unexploded ordnance, specifically mines, left over from the eight-year-long Iraq-Iran war that ended in 1988. The majority of the mines are scattered throughout the provinces bordering Iran, especially in certain border oil fields, including Badra in Wasit province and Majnoon in Basra province. Demining efforts are a vital aspect of Iraqi economic development, and the failure to proceed with removal of mines and unexploded ordnance in a timely fashion could cause serious delay in the development of some oil fields.747 The Russian Gazprom Neft, which won the contract for the development of the Badra field in Wasit province, as part of a consortium with the South Korean KoGas Company, the Malaysian and the Turkish TPAO, said that the Iraqi government is responsible for demining the region before the work could begin. Leading the

744 “Education Under Attack,” UNESCO, accessed 4/13/2010 745 “Iraqis in squatter slums need international support,” Refugees International, 3/17/210 746 “Reconstruction allocations for 2010 insufficient, says ministry,” Azzaman, 2/14/10 747 “Iraq status report March 31, 2010,” Bureau of Near Easter Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 3/31/2010

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consortium, Gazprom Neft signed the deal with the Iraqis for 20 years, and the Badra field is expected to reach maximum production capacity at 170,000 barrels per day.748 If the Iraqi government fails to address this large scale demining effort in a timely fashion, the economic revenues expected to benefit the areas were the oil fields are found will be delayed. This will have dire implications for the local populations in these areas, since many are awaiting the commencement of extraction work for possible employment opportunities. The urgency of this issue is especially felt in the city of Basra and its surroundings, which hold between 60% and 70% of Iraq’s oil. There, nearly three million people mostly live in destitute conditions, and could strongly benefit from the influx of revenue from the oil industry. Moreover, stagnant economic conditions and entrenched poverty could exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions, as Basra has quite a bitter past with sectarian rivalries, not only between the Sunni and the Shiite, but amongst the Shiite population as well,

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 6

This month, Iraqi crude oil production was at 2.45 millions of barrels per day, while crude oil export was at 1.9 millions of barrels per day.749 The government seeks to boost production to 5-6 million barrels per day in the upcoming ten years, as well as extensively increase exports to generate revenue for national reconstruction and development efforts. The government signed ten contracts with numerous foreign oil giants, some for as long as 20 years, to develop Iraq’s largely untapped oil fields, with the goal of putting Iraq as one of the top three oil exporting nations in the world. Yet, while the Iraqi government has arguably mortgaged the future of Iraq’s economic development in the oil industry, many remain skeptical whether such high aims are realistic, let alone sustainable.750 Iraq’s oil infrastructure and installations, which suffered from the prolonged and numerous conflicts as well as neglect and mismanagement, will need massive investment in order to be with the necessary standards to proceed with large-scale oil extraction.

Nonetheless, Iraq is the only member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that is not subject to oil output quotas, and with the world’s third largest proven oil reserves, the resurgence of the Iraqi oil industry is expected to threaten the dominance of Iran and Saudi Arabia.751 If Iraqi production and exports are not in line with the OPEC standard, prices will go down, which will certainly damage OPEC countries; thus, it is unlikely OPEC will allow Iraq to proceed without regulation.752 Moreover, the government formation process that will take months could contribute to an increase in violence throughout the country, and any deterioration in the already fragile security situation could deter additional large scale investment and delay the production timetables established in the aforementioned contracts. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Hydrocarbon Law remains deadlocked, and it is difficult to assess if the newly established government will be more successful than the preceding one in passing this law.753

748 “Demining needed in Iraq, oil giants say,” upi.com, 3/29/2010 749 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institute, 3/30/2010 750 “Iraq oil sales up but plans ‘unrealistic’,” UPI Energy, 3/5/2010 751 “Iraq oil output projections, OPEC oil supply,” Reuters, 3/25/2010 752 “OPEC next challenge: production targets,” The Wall Street Journal, 3/14/2010 753 “Iraq’s economy grows 4.3% in 2009,” Global Insight, 3/18/2010

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After last month, when China agreed to cancel $6.8 billion, or 80% of Iraqi debt to the Chinese government, the Minister of Finance, Baqer al Zubari recently said that the Chinese might be willing to write off the whole amount of $8.5 billion debt. Iraq has expressed strong interest in attracting greater Chinese investment in the country, specifically in the reconstruction effort, as some large Chinese firms already have a presence mainly in the Iraqi energy and retail sectors. Chinese oil giants currently operating in Iraq include PetroChina, Sinochen, CNOOC and Sinopec.754 The Iraqi government also signed an agreement with the World Bank for two $250 million loans, to help finance the 2010 fiscal deficit.755

Iraqi exports of dates used to be one of the country’s largest hard-currency revenue sources, only second to oil. While agriculture as a whole has suffered as a result of environmental conditions and prolonged conflict, the date export industry was hit particularly hard since the majority of the date palm groves, found around the Basra province, were destroyed during the war with Iran and U.S. operations in the area. This month, Iraq has renewed its dates exports, and according to the Minister of Agriculture, Akram al-Hakim, the government is also concerned with helping the date palm farmers through loans and higher prices it now pays to farmers for each ton of dates.756 The diversification of Iraqi exports beyond reliance on oil exports is vital for sustainable development of the country’s economy; hence, this is certainly a positive development.

The California-based Unlisted Leedco Engineers, Inc. won a $50 million contract to construct an international airport in the Salah ad Din province in northern Iraq. The airport will be built in the next two years with an initial capacity to cater to two million passengers a year, and will be an alternative to the Baghdad International Airport.757

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 8

More than 6,000 candidates competed for 325 seats in the Iraqi parliament, as nearly 62% of Iraqis went to vote on March 7 amidst the violence, intimidation and terror attacks of AQI and other insurgent groups that attempted to derail the elections and discredit the Iraqi government and political process. The motivations of the political candidates running for office vary substantially, some are pursuing a sectarian agenda, others are truly interested in promoting democratic change, yet, all the winners will enjoy the perks that come with holding public office in Iraq. Members of the Parliament earn nearly $25,500 per month, which includes an $8,450 paycheck while the rest of the money is used to pay for staff members, mostly armed guards. Some of the Parliament Members have argued that in light of the dangers of holding public office, and the expenses on security and transportation, the pay is quite fair. Yet, the majority of the Iraqi public, a great percentage of whom remain unemployed or underemployed, strongly disagree and perceive many politicians as corrupt and self-serving. With a substantial part of the pay in spending allowances, there is room for corruption and misappropriation of public funds. For instance, many members of the Parliament do not have standing guards but rather call some on a minute notice, thus not having to spend the additional pay on staff. Moreover, considering

754 “China could scrap Iraq’s $8.5b debt,” Gulf News, 3/19/2010 755 “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 4/30/2010 756 “Iraqi dates return to international markets,” Azzaman, 3/1/2010 757 “U.S.’s Leedco wins Iraq airport contract,” Reuters, 3/29/2010

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the political deadlock around pivotal legislation such as the national oil law, which is imperative for the country’s economic and social development, many Iraqis feel the members of the Parliament are not working hard enough to deserve such high salaries.758 Interestingly, the Iraqi budget that was passed in January included a provision to cut the salaries of high ranking officials by 20%, and the medium-ranking officials’ pay by 10%, relocating the funds to the provinces development budget instead.759

While the elections were deemed credible by both U.S. and UN high-ranking representatives in Iraq, and no systematic or widespread violations or fraud was documented by the observers, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) received reports of bribes and votes buying during the campaigning portion of the elections. While IHEC did not disclose how many incidents of this sort were reported nationwide, the Iraqi media and local NGOs across the country accused the candidates for giving out fuel, food, guns and money in exchange for votes.760 Iraq does not have laws that regulate political campaign finance, and at times it is quite difficult to distinguish what qualifies as a customary, cultural gift-giving practice and what can be considered an outright bribe. Moreover, since gift-giving and distribution of goods to constituencies has been a popular practice among candidates across the board, it is a challenge to identify which candidate is engaged in improper forms of campaigning.761

Rampant corruption continues to plague the Iraqi political system. Several structural problems within the Iraqi constitution and the political framework as a whole reinforce poor habits of mismanagement and abuse of power in public office, as there is little oversight of how ministries are distributed among the various political factions. Merit and competency are often compromised for personal benefit, political agenda or financial gain.762 Weak political institutions hinder democratic development in Iraq, and without a relentless commitment to eradicate corruption from Iraqi public life, the government will continue to lose credibility, while economic and social development, as well as the post-conflict reconstruction endeavor, will suffer immensely. One important effort to meet this challenge is Iraq’s first Anti-Corruption Strategy. The strategy was developed through an inclusive effort that brought together the Joint Anti-Corruption Council, the Commission on Integrity, Board of Supreme Audit Inspectors General, Committee of Integrity of the Council of Representatives, Central Bank and a number of non-governmental organizations, drawing support and technical assistance from UNDP, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and a coalition of international donors. The implementation of the strategy, which includes 200 action items to combat corruption throughout the Iraqi public sector, is expected to commence in June. Political officials, religious and community leaders, civil servants and civil society representatives, will take part in a nation- wide campaign that will last until December 2010, as part of a greater effort to promote an anti- corruption culture across the governmental institutions and the general public. The Anti- Corruption Strategy has been applauded by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq, Ad Melkert, who pledged the continued support of the UN to the

758 “Perks of being in the Iraqi parliament,” The New York Times, 3/5/2010 759 “Iraq’s 2010 budget passed by unanimous vote,” Kurdistan News Agency, 1/26/2010 760 “Iraq election focus: vote-buying claims threaten poll credibility,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/3/2010 761 “Iraqis awash in gifts from candidates,” The New York Times, 3/1/2010 762 “Iraq’s quest for democracy amid massive corruption,” Arab Reform Bulletin, 3/3/2010

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implementation of what he sees as a remarkable and comprehensive national effort to combat fraud.763

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

The governor of Baghdad, Salah Abdulrazzaq said that the Iraqi government has allocated nearly $1 billion for reconstruction and development efforts in Baghdad, with 40% of the funds going to cover projects that have been started in the past two years. The governor said that $200 million will be invested in housing projects, to construct 5,000 housing units this year. The overall ten year effort is said to be a sizable project to construct 150,000 housing units in Sadr City, where nearly half of Baghdad’s residents live. The Mayor of Baghdad, Sabir al-Essawi said that there will be an expansion in construction of housing in central and southern parts of Baghdad as well. This is an important effort since the shortage of housing throughout Iraq is a pressing issue. UN Human Settlements Program, UN HABITAT indicates that the 2.8 million housing units in Iraq fall short by about 1.3 million units to meet the needs of the population today, and more than double this stock of housing will be needed to meet the needs of the population in 2015.764 The same study concludes that 60% of Baghdad’s seven million residents live in dwellings that require significant rehabilitation.

Poor regulation of the rampant sub-divisions of available housing is also an issue of concern. The Baghdadi authorities are attempting to put a halt to uncontrolled construction and unauthorized land deals throughout the governorate, and especially in the overcrowded slums of Sadr City. The chaos of war and the overflow of IDPs after the U.S. led invasion in 2003 only exacerbated the housing crisis in Baghdad’s poorest neighborhoods, which were already neglected and underdeveloped during the years when Saddam Hussein’s was in power. The shortage of housing, high cost of land and financial strains pressure homeowners in Baghdad to sell off or rent parts of their property through a loosely monitored and largely illegal division of standing homes into smaller units. This leads to overcrowding and increased pressure on already overstretched utilities such as electricity and the sewage and clean water systems, not to mention health hazards and poor social conditions.765

After last month’s decision to exclude nearly 120,000 Iraqis from the Public Distribution System (PDS), the state-run food aid program (see Indicator 8 of February report), the Iraqi government cut the number of food items on the distribution list by half. The Trade Ministry received only $3 million, half of the sum it requested, for PDS. Thus, significant cutbacks were made to include only the most basic items. The parcels that until now have included rice (3kg per person); sugar (2kg per person); cooking oil (1.25kg or one litre per person); flour (9kg per person); milk for adults (250g per person); tea (200g per person); beans (250g per person); children's milk (1.8kg per child); soap (250g per person); detergents (500g per person); and tomato paste (500g per person) will now be limited to rice, sugar, cooking oil and milk.766 While some Iraqis entirely depend on the non-food items now omitted from the distribution list, others have been able to

763 “UNDP, UNODC help Iraq combat corruption,” United Nations, 3/24/2010 764 “Cramped quarters define struggles of Iraqis,” The New York Times, 2/27/10 765 “Iraqi Crisis Report: Capital tackles housing woes,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/25/2010 766 “Iraq: Streamlining the state food aid system,” IRIN, 2/9/2010

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sell them for little extra money when their income is unsteady or insufficient. This decision will certainly have grave affects on half of Iraq’s 29 million residents who rely on the government for food aid.767

Important reconstruction efforts this month include the delivery of physical therapy equipment to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense Prosthetics Center at al-Mathana which provides treatment to Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior personnel and Iraqi civilians, as well as plans to expand the Baqouba General Hospital in the Diyala Province to include a $7.42 million surgical wing to be completed later this year. 768 It is worth noting that the overall reconstruction effort is currently providing employment to 20,000 Iraqis. 769

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 10

Improved security, economic development and the reconstruction effort in Iraq were the issues that dominated the debate around the parliamentary elections this month. Yet, prominent human rights advocates stressed that the human rights conditions in Iraq, especially for IDPs, detainees, journalists, minority groups and other vulnerable groups, such as women, girls and men perceived as homosexuals, remain poor and must be addressed by the political leadership. Human Rights Watch (HRW) identified several sectors where human rights violations were particularly alarming. The actions of Accountability and Justice Commission were cited for bias and sectarianism, as well as for violating due process and lacking transparency. HRW also specifically noted that the abysmal detention conditions and reports of torture and abuse of detainees by employees of the Iraqi defense and interior ministries, as well as the police, are not being sufficiently addressed by the government. The human rights conditions for vulnerable groups are especially troubling. The honor killings of women and girls by family members, as well as harassment and violence for allegedly immoral and un-Islamic behavior is both widely spread and underreported, and largely, goes unpunished. HRW reports that 60% of Kurdish women undergo female genital mutilation in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, while the persecution of Christians and other minorities by various armed groups, including those sanctioned by the KRG and the Iraqi government, results in displacement and deaths.770

HRW identified restrictions on the freedom of expression, and the targeting of journalists, ranging from assassinations, abuse and kidnapping to harassment and legal action by the government, as a high priority issue for Iraqi elections and future. Concurrently, Reporters Without Borders released a statement condemning the attempted murder of two journalists this month, Muayad al-Lami, who heads the Iraqi Union of Journalists in Baghdad and Maytham al- Ahmed, a newspaper editor who also manages a radio station in Basra. This was the second attempt on the life of al-Lami, who escaped a bomb that was set off outside his work place in September 2008. Al-Ahmed’s brother was seriously injured when two men on a motorcycle

767 “Iraq: State food aid package slashes, IRIN, 4/1/2010 768 “Iraqi prosthetics clinic gains new physical therapy equipment,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 3/8/2010 769 “Baqouba Hospital receives new surgical wing,” Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Release, 3/15/2010 770 “Iraq’s 2010 national elections,” Human Rights Watch, 2/25/2010

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threw a grenade into the garden of al-Ahmed’s home.771 The volatile political climate that preceded the elections this month also brought on what journalists in Iraqi Kurdistan described as “the most harrowing period since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003.”772 Attacks against independent and opposition journalists have been on the rise in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the media has often been able to expose evidence of corruption and misconduct by Kurdish officials from the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. While the Kurdistan Regional Government expressed its commitment to investigate these attacks, through the Interior Ministry, there is a deep sense of mistrust of authorities amongst journalists in the northern provinces, who rarely get to witness their attackers being captured and punished.

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

The use of security forces for the personal protection and advancement of political aspirations is a worrisome habit of Iraqi officials, who are known for not only having close links to specific military and police units, as well as personal militias, but for utilizing the armed forces for operations unrelated to public office. This trend was apparent during the campaigning part of the parliamentary elections, when influential candidates used their leverage over the armed forces to demonstrate their ability to provide security at uncertain times and present a veneer of control and power. For instance, Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s United Iraqi Alliance held the largest rally in Baghdad, where hundreds assembled at the large outdoor soccer stadium. Many of those present to show support were police officers who are employed by the Ministry of Interior, and it’s been said, some of the battalions were ordered to attend.773 This is a problematic situation, even beyond the questionable use of pressure on armed forces employees to advance a personal political agenda rather than public safety. The candidates who currently don’t hold public office are at a substantial disadvantage attempting to campaign in a vastly insecure and often outright hostile environment, as Ahmed Ganem, a candidate from Anbar province for a small bloc called the Iraqi Movement for Dialogue and Change put it, “government officials have troops protecting them…we don’t have that kind of power. It’s totally unfair.”774 In a similar episode, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s approval for the attempted arrest of Sheik Qais Jabouri, an elected parliament member from the Iraqiya coalition, following the disqualification of his candidacy by the Accountability and Justice Commission, appears to be politically motivated. Al-Maliki’s use of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to weaken his competition is an indication of both weak governmental institution and corruptible security apparatus. 775

On a positive note, the ISF were applauded for their commendable performance providing security and order in advance of and during the parliamentary elections. Maj. Gen. Tony Cucolo, commanding general of Task Force Marne and U.S. Division-North said that “the ISF performance during the election was absolutely superb,” and that “they dealt with things

771 “New cases of violence against Iraqi journalists,” Reporters Without Borders, 3/23/2010 772 “Legislative elections become nightmare for independent and opposition journalists,” Reporters Without Borders, 3/9/2010 773 “Iraqis awash in gifts from candidates,” The New York Times, 3/1/2010 774 “”Iraq election focus: candidates say lack of security harms their chances,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/3/2010 775 “In Iraq, newly elected lawmaker target of arrest warrant,” The Los Angeles Times, 4/1/2010

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776 professionally. They showed incredible bravery finding and diffusing IEDs.” Cucolo described the Iraqi elections as a crucial point not only in Iraq’s political development but in U.S. efforts in Iraq, while the American forces maintained a strong presence during the elections, the lion-share of the responsibility to secure the polling stations and establish an environment conducive for credible and fair elections was taken on the by ISF. 777

Praises for this largely successful effort from leading American military officials certainly indicates that important progress has been made in terms of capacity building and professionalism within the ranks of the ISF. As the U.S. forces continue the drawdown from the current 98,000 troops to the September 2010 target of 50,000 troops, when U.S. soldiers will be conducting advice and assist missions, the continued development of the ISF is absolutely crucial for sustainable security throughout Iraq. The elections were an important landmark for the ISF, yet, as the government formation process drags on and especially if there is an increase in violence, the ISF must prove itself loyal and subordinate to the Iraqi government as a civilian institution rather than a compilation of political actors. In order to consolidate democracy and foster sustainable security in Iraq, the ISF must become a professional body, united from within, and loyal to Iraq as one nation rather than divided across sectarian and political affiliations.

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 10

The Iraqi Elections Commission (IHEC) released the uncertified results of the March 7 elections on March 26. The secular-nationalist Iraqiya (INM), led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi took the lead with 91 seats (89 ordinary and two compensation), closely followed by current Prime Minister’s Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SLA) with 89 seats (87 ordinary and two compensation). The Iraqi National Alliance (INA) received 70 seats (68 ordinary and two compensation), and the Kurdistan Alliance, making substantial headway in the final count, emerged with 43 seats (42 ordinary and one compensation). The Kurdish opposition groups together will share 14 seats, with the Change List, the and the Kurdistan Islamic Group receiving eight, four and two seats respectively. The Accordance Front (Tawafuq) and Unity of Iraq received six and four seats respectively. The eight minority seats, representing nearly 60,000 votes at about 2.5% of deputies in the next parliament, are expected to mostly benefit the Kurds, with six of the minority representatives being at least somewhat pro- Kurdish.778

Elections often expose the fractionalization among and within parliament parties. The announcement of the election results in Iraq certainly did not pass without dispute. Prime Minister al-Maliki insisted on a recount of the votes, doubting the credibility of the elections and promised to pursue this claim in court. The IHEC held its ground, saying the vote was free of widespread fraud, and refused to conduct a recount. The credibility of the elections was confirmed by the U.S. Ambassador Christopher R. Hill and General Ray Odierno. Ad Melkert, the Special Representative of the Secretary General to Iraq commended the Iraqi people for ‘an

776 “Maj. Gen. Cucolo discusses drawdown, elections,” army.mil, accessed 3/18/2010 777 “General offers insight into progress, challenges in Iraq,” army.mil, accessed 3/23/2010 778 “The pro-Kurdish minority vote,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 3/25/2010

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historic achievement,’ and said that while there were some irregularities and complains, UNAMI “have not found evidence of systematic failure or fraud of widespread nature.”779

What constitutes a bloc in terms of governmental coalition formation has also been a point of controversy, as the Supreme Federal Court ruled that the key definition of the ‘largest bloc in parliament,’ can also include post-election bloc formation. Al-Maliki pushed this ruling forth to allow the bloc with the largest number of seats when the parliament re-convenes probably in June, rather than from the election, to be able to form a government, so his party will have the opportunity to overcome the two-seat gap and remain in power.780 Right before the election results were announced, a western diplomat accused al-Maliki of “using all instruments of government to try to discredit an election that until now he fully supported.”781 Moreover, the Accountability and Justice Commission moved to disqualify another six candidates after the election results were announced, making it a total of 52 candidates disqualified for alleged ties to the Baath Party. While Ali Faisal al-Lami, the director of the Commission did not initially disclose the names or party affiliation of the disqualified candidates, many believed the majority were members of Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition.782

What followed was a chain of warrants, raids and attempted arrests against candidates from the Iraqiya coalition in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. Sheik Qais Jabouri, an elected parliament member from the Iraqiya coalition, had to go into hiding late this month, after the ISF raided his home on terrorism charges connected to the 2008 bombing of a home in Madaen by Sunni insurgents. Many consider Jabouri a positive figure in Iraqi politics. He previously worked on sectarian reconciliation, heading a tribal support council, which itself was sponsored by al- Maliki’s government. Since Jabouri was part of a government-sponsored council, the warrant for his arrest and detention needed approval from the Prime Minister’s office. Thus, it appears that this has been a politically motivated move intended to weaken Iraqiya during the tedious and competitive process of government formation.783 The use of the judiciary and security forces for political reasons, especially al-Maliki’s personal aspirations to maintain the Prime Minister’s post, does not bode well for Iraqi democracy.

Allawi and al-Maliki ran a very close race, yet the distribution of votes in certain provinces indicates that Allawi proved to have greater strength as a national candidate than al-Maliki. Allawi, favored by the Sunnis for his secular-nationalist platform, had been able to reach across the sectarian divide in the mixed provinces of Baghdad, where he received 24 of the 68 seats, nearly matching al-Maliki’s 26, and in Tamim, where Iraqiya and the Kurdistan Alliance tied for six seats each. Meanwhile, the shift in the balance of power within the Shiite INA will likely prove important to the process of coalition formation. The Sadrists have gained significant representation within the INA, claiming 40 deputies out of the total 68 seats the INA received in these elections.784

779 “Iraqi elections as historic achievement, UN says as results of vote are announced,” Relief Web, 3/26/2010 780 “Al-Maliki contests the result of Iraq vote,” The New York Times, 3/27/2010 781 “In Iraq, newly elected lawmaker target of arrest warrant,” The Los Angeles Times, 4/1/2010 782 “Panel of Iraq moves to disqualify 52 candidates,” The New York Times, 3/29/2010 783 “In Iraq, newly elected lawmaker target of arrest warrant,” The Los Angeles Times, 4/1/2010 784 “The Sadrist Watershed Confirmed,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 3/29/2010

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The political turmoil of the upcoming months could translate into violent clashes. The process of government formation is almost guaranteed to be a difficult one, ridded with sectarian undertones, personal, opportunistic rivalries, and subject to external, mainly Iranian, influence. Allawi and al-Maliki are unlikely to surrender the Prime Minister post to one another, even if Iraqiya and SLA do agree on many key constitutional issues, and cooperation between the two largest parties is instrumental for passing litigation that the current parliament remains deadlocked on.785 Experts on Iraqi politics are at odds about Allawi’s chances to assemble a viable government. If Allawi will seek an alliance with the Kurds, which he has reportedly been attempting to do, his largest support base, Sunni Arab nationalists, will be expecting major concessions on Kirkuk and the disputed areas in the north—concessions the Kurds are unlikely to make. On the other hand, al-Maliki has already made contact with Moqtada al-Sadr who remains in exile in Iran, to pursue an alliance with the largely Shiite INA. The two Shiite-led blocks could come together despite al-Maliki’s past military offensive against Sadr’s Mehdi army militia, which caused a serious rift between the parties.786

Allawi’s advantage allows him 30 days to form a broader coalition of 163-seat majority to assemble a governing coalition; if he fails, al-Maliki will proceed with the task. Either way, the government formation process is expected to last at least until July, as al-Maliki continues to serve as the Prime Minister of Iraq, and making arrangements of his own to form the largest bloc in the future parliament.787 Meanwhile, the Sadrists who emerged powerful than expected within the INA, moved to organize an unofficial referendum for the Prime Minister post, in what many believed was a political gimmick to strengthen Moqtada al-Sadr’s public image. While the spokesperson for the Sadrists, Sheik Salah al-Obedi assured the “referendum is not exclusively for Sadrists’ followers,” but “for all the Iraqis to participate in,” it is unlikely many others besides this exact group will vote.788 The Sadrists, who claimed 40 seats out of the total 325, said they will cast their weight behind the winner of the referendum.

The parties will battle for power by mobilizing popular support from their constituency and possibly making use of their leverage over personal and sectarian militias, as well as links to the legal framework and the security forces. Uncertainty will dominate Iraqi politics throughout this spring and possibly summer, as those who came out victorious after the elections will not necessarily be able to lead Iraq in the upcoming years.

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 9

There is some debate about the level of Iranian influence in Iraqi elections, ranging from those who dismiss talk of Iranian interference as paranoia to others who scrutinize Iranian presence in every aspect of public life in Iraq as well as blame Iran for Iraq’s political mischief and security concerns. Yet, most experts agree that Iran has a vital stake in maintaining a Shiite government in Baghdad, one that would be friendlier to Tehran rather than Washington, and preferably, heavily influenced by men like Ahmad Chalabi, Ali Faisal al-Lami, and Moqtaba al-Sadr, in

785 “The uncertified election results: Allawi comes out on top,” historiae.org, 3/26/2010 786 “Can Dr. Iyad Allawi heal Iraq’s wounds,” BBC, 3/29/2010 787 “Allawi victory in Iraq sets up period of uncertainty,” The New York Times, 3/26/2010 788 “Empowered Sadrists organized new ballot in Iraq,” The New York Times, 3/31/2010

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order to deepen its reach into Iraqi politics and strengthen its geopolitical stance as a regional power.789 Thus, Tehran is bent on promoting its agenda by a variety of overt and covert activities, including inviting the Kurdish President Jalal Talabani, together with the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Adel Abdel Mahdi, who is a prominent figure in the pro- Iranian Shiite religious bloc, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), to meet with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah . Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki traveled to Tehran at the same time to meet with Muqtaba al-Sadr. It is believed that Tehran is working to bridge the gaps among these party leaders to form a governing coalition that will bring together al-Maliki’s State of Law, the INA and Talabani, to outweigh the coalition building efforts of Allawi, who has not been invited to Tehran.790 Allawi has accused the Iranian government of inappropriately intervening in Iraqi politics, both through direct contact with many of the leading candidates and by influencing the Accountability and Justice Commission, which has notably disqualified many of the candidates on the Iraqiya’s list.791

While there were no ceremonies commemorating the event, this month marked seven years since the U.S. led invasion of Iraqi in 2003.792 A total of 4,387 military personnel have died in Iraq in these seven years.793 As of the end of this month, the number of American troops in Iraq totaled approximately 98,000; their main purpose has shifted from security to stability operations and support.794 The drawdown of U.S. forces is now expected to proceed in quicker pace, since the elections have passed, and as of the end of this month, the Americans are on track to meet the goal of having only 50,000 troops in Iraq by September.795

789 “Shadow of Iran hangs over Iraqi elections.” Telegraph, 3/7/2010 790 “Tehran’s coup in Iraq,” The Nation, 3/28/2010 791 “Allawi accuses Iran of election interference,” BBC, 3/30/2010 792 “Little fanfare for 7th anniversary of war in Iraq,” The Los Angeles Times, 3/19/2010 793 “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessed 4/6/2010 794 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institute, 3/30/2010 795 “General offers insight into progress, challenges in Iraq,” army.mil, accessed 3/23/2010

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Core Five and STINGS – March 2010

1. Police Rating: Weak

The Iraqi police was recognized for its contribution to the largely successful effort on behalf of the Iraqi security forces to provide an atmosphere of security and order for Iraqi voters during the elections this month. The deadly attacks on the capital city of the Diyala province, Baqouba, that killed at least 33 people the day before the special vote which was scheduled only for policemen and soldiers in charge of security, targeted the police. The bombers attacked a police quick- reaction force, a police personnel office, and the third suicide bomber, who exploded himself at a hospital, was wearing a police lieutenant’s uniform, pretending to be one of the wounded. Police uniforms can easily be purchased in markets throughout Iraq, and witnesses of attacks often report that gunmen and suicide bombers were dressed in either police or military uniforms, making them extremely difficult to detect and disarm. The police arrested suspects associated with AQI immediately after these deadly attacks.796 Later reports noted that a police officer was among those arrested.

The infiltration of police ranks by various insurgent groups is by no means uncommon, and similar reports surface from across Iraq, for instance, Brig. Gen. Abdul Julebawi recently said that “the Anbar police still has AQI elements in it.”797 Despite the important steps towards professionalism and capacity amongst its ranks, the Iraqi police remain a fragile institution ridden with corruption and hostile elements.

The Iraqi police will be introducing 1,000 bomb-sniffing dogs and their handlers at checkpoints across Iraq within the next five years. While, culturally, Iraqis are rather uncomfortable with dogs, their contribution to security is important. The U.S. Military has welcomed this development, and according to Col Randy Twitchell, chief U.S. Military adviser to the Baghdad Police College, the use of bomb-sniffing dogs has proved useful in countering the threats of bombs and explosives.798 The expansion of the K-9 unit, which has rarely been used since its establishment in the 1970s comes at a crucial point of a debate about the ADE-651, a bomb- detection device which ultimately been proved to be a sham but is still being used at check points across Iraq. The controversy surrounding the purchasing and use of the ADE-651 is indicative of the widespread corruption throughout the Iraqi police, and the Ministry of Interior which oversees it.

2. Leadership Rating: Weak

The divisions and rivalry amongst Iraq’s political elite were evident during the campaigning portion of this month’s parliamentary elections, and when the final count was released, the political competition took a radical turn for the worse. While UN and U.S. officials rendered the elections credible, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki demanded a recount of the votes when his

796 “Suicide bombings target Iraqi police in Baqouba, killing 33,” McCalchy, 3/3/2010 797 “Iraqi forces prove able, but loyalty is uncertain,” The New York Times, 4/13/2010 798 “Dogs take a lead role in Iraq’s terror war; Bomb-sniffing abilities offer some security,” USA Today, 3/23/2010

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State of Law coalition came a close second to Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya. 799 The political battle for the Prime Minister’s post will be a fierce competition for power between Allawi and al-Maliki. Concurrently, other influential actors, specifically the empowered Sadrist faction of the Iraqi National Alliance as well as the Kurds, will attempt to maximize their control over key appointments in the future government, through political deals which will likely compromise competency, fairness and professionalism for opportunism and personal interests.

After the results were published, the Accountability and Justice Commission disqualified an additional six candidates, now a total of 52, for alleged ties to the Baath Party. The majority of those disqualified, including winning candidates, are members of Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition.800 The Iraqi security forces then proceeded with a series of raids and attempted arrests of the disqualified candidates, in what is largely believed to be a politically motivated campaign to undermine Allawi’s success and secure al-Maliki’s tenuous hold on the leadership post.801

Allawi now has 30 days to form a broader coalition of a 163-seat majority to assemble a government; if he fails, al-Maliki will be tasked with completing the process of government formation. This is expected to last at least until July, while al-Maliki will continue to hold the Prime Minister of Iraq post and leverage his power over both political and judiciary institutions to secure a second term.802As the government formation process drags on, the political vacuum and a general atmosphere of uncertainty can be manipulated by various insurgent groups bent on undermining political progress and delegitimizing the Iraqi government by spreading fear and public terror through violent attacks throughout the country.

3. Civil Service Rating: Weak

The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) drew largely positive reviews from international elections monitors who observed the casting of ballots throughout voting stations across the country. The Special Representative of the Security General, Mr. Ad Melkert described the elections as credible and announced that the UN did not find proof of widespread or systematic fraud in the counting process.803 IHEC faced many challenges, particularly considering the delayed passage of the Election Law, and it had to plan operations and secure a budget on very short notice. The opening of voting stations for IDPs required training of additional staff IHEP was not prepared for; yet it was able to complete this training on time. Voting opened even earlier for military and police, which required additional adjustments and resulted in problems with voters unable to find their names on the lists at the voting stations. Moreover, the volatile security situation also strained IHEC’s work, as numerous violent incidents throughout the country threatened to keep Iraqis from voicing their political opinion. As Dr. Waleed Al-Zaidy, the Director of IHEC’s Operations Department said, IHEC was able to overcome these challenges, quite successfully, largely thanks to its staff capacities, which increased with international training and support and experience in implementing elections in the

799 “The uncertified election results: Allawi comes out on top,” historiae.org, 3/26/2010 800 “Panel of Iraq moves to disqualify 52 candidates,” The New York Times, 3/29/2010 801 “In Iraq, newly elected lawmaker target of arrest warrant,” The Los Angeles Times, 4/1/2010 802 “Allawi victory in Iraq sets up period of uncertainty,” The New York Times, 3/26/2010 803 “UN official stresses Iraqi responsibility for election vote count,” UNAMI, 3/29/2010

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last several years.804 While some have criticized IHEC for taking too long to publish the election results, which could perhaps indicate flaws in the election process, IHEC also proved itself a capable and an independent body when it refused Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s call for a recount of the votes.

Overall, while IHEC’s operations are a positive example, the civil service sector in Iraq remains weak and corrupt. The civil service sector has been significantly undermined by the human capacity crisis Iraq is experiencing as a result of chronic and sustained human flight, economic stagnation and the dangers associated with working in the civil service sector, especially throughout this year as government offices have been repeatedly targeted in violent attacks. The endemic corruption that plagues Iraqi public life precludes efforts to professionalize this sector in order to make the delivery of public services more efficient.

4. Judiciary Rating: Poor

The Iraqi judiciary proved to be extremely susceptible to political influence this month, when under pressure from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Supreme Federal Court ruled in favor of post-election bloc formation, allowing al-Maliki to assemble a governing coalition before Allawi, whose Iraqiya coalition won the elections with a narrow, two-seat lead. 805 Experts noted that such a decision, favoring the political establishment over the rule of law, does not reflect well on the independence, fairness and impartiality of the Iraqi judiciary, and is detrimental to the consolidation of democracy in Iraq as a whole.

The heated debate around the legal standing of the Justice and Accountability Commission continued this month, with legal experts raising concern about the lack of a clear distinction between judicial bodies and administrative committees in Iraq. As a judicial body, the impartiality of the Commission has been compromised by the participation of Chalabi and al- Lami in the parliamentary elections for which they were charged to qualify the candidates. This blurring of the lines between political and judicial institutions testifies to the weakness of the Iraqi judicial system and the permeation of corruption throughout all of the national governmental bodies.806

U.S. Justice Edith Jones, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, visited Iraq this month and met with the Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat to discuss the development of the Iraqi judiciary and possible ways the U.S. can assist this process. Justice Jones also met with many legal professionals and scholars, as well as journalists and civil society activists. She was particularly impressed with the female judges in Iraq, and noted that “they clearly represent the best of the best, displaying remarkable courage as mothers, judges, and women.”807

804 “UMANI Focus: Voice of the mission,” UNAMI, accessed 4/13/2010 805 “Al-Maliki contests the result of Iraq vote,” The New York Times, 3/27/2010 806 “Legal turmoil dogs Iraq poll results,” Al Jazeera, 4/4/2010 807 “American high court judge visits Baghdad, Arbil,” Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, 3/25/2010

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5. Military Rating: Moderate

The Iraqi security forces were largely successful in providing security and protecting civilians during the parliamentary elections this month. Charged with the lion share of the responsibility to secure voting stations by erecting additional check-points, increased personal searches, finding and diffusing IEDs and other security measures, the performance of the ISF was “absolutely superb,” according to the American Maj. Gen. Tony Cucolo, commanding general of Task Force Marne and U.S. Division-North.808 This is certainly an indicator of progress and growing capacity within the ranks of the Iraqi military, which is making important strides towards becoming a professional force. As the American forces continue drawdown, the Iraqi security forces are gradually taking over U.S. bases, where some of the equipment and crucial infrastructure that is not being redeployed to Afghanistan or other theaters is transferred to Iraqi personnel.809

808 “Maj. Gen. Cucolo discusses drawdown, elections,” army.mil, accessed 3/18/2010 809 “U.S. preps facility for transfer to Iraqi Army as part of drawdown,” army.mil, accessed 3/26/2010

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Map 1: Middle East

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Map 2: Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Major Tribes in Iraq

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