Is Religion Natural?

International Journal of Philosophy and Theology

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Is religion natural?

Esther Engels Kroeker & Willem Lemmens

To cite this article: Esther Engels Kroeker & Willem Lemmens (2020) Is religion natural?, International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 81:4, 343-350, DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpt20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 2020, VOL. 81, NO. 4, 343–350 https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491

ARTICLE Is religion natural? Esther Engels Kroeker and Willem Lemmens

Philosophy Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Why is religion such a widespread human experience? In enlight- Received 8 April 2020 enment Scotland, philosophers had already attempted to answer Accepted 15 April 2020 this question turning to natural histories of mankind, and to a KEYWORDS careful analysis of the human mind and of those cognitive capa- Religion; David Hume; cities responsible for religious-type beliefs and attitudes. This early Thomas Reid; cognitive approach is also echoed today, as scholars from the cognitive science; Robert N. Bellah; sciences seek to show how religious-type beliefs and practices are Hans Joas; human nature produced either directly or as a by-product of natural cognitive processes. Others continue to study the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices. The authors of this special issue continue this discussion, focusing on speciﬁc topics and challenges posed by current studies on religion as a natural phenomenon.

In the opening paragraphs of the Natural History of Religion (NHR) the 18th century Scottish Philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) famously wrote:

As every enquiry which regards religion is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular which challenge our principle attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature1. In his NHR Hume thus clearly abstracts from the first question, which deals with the rational justification of central religious beliefs and claims, and focuses on the second, to wit, the investigation of the way religion as a natural phenomenon derives from basic features of human nature. In this special issue we will follow Hume’s lead. If religion is such a widespread human occurrence, we might wonder what parts of human nature and of the human mind or psychology explain this phenomenon. In this introduction, we first point out some pertinent historical answers to this question. In the second section, we offer a sketch of current approaches to the study of religion as a natural phenomenon, focusing on contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR). The third section offers a short summary of the topics of the papers of this issue, which as a whole offer an overview of some challenging issues and discussions related to this prominent recent approach of religion as a natural phenomenon. The authors of this volume agree that the crucial features of religion derive from the workings of the human mind, but they each bring to light different approaches of this core idea and highlight different philosophical implications of Hume’s invitation to study religion as an integral part of human nature.

1. Some historical considerations: a Scottish context? Although the study of religion as a natural phenomenon – especially as embedded in human cognition and psychological processes – has received a surge of attention during the last two decades, it is interesting to notice that the contemporary debate is strikingly similar to the context of 18th century Scottish philosophy. In fact, several prominent figures of the present debate explicitly mention the connection between current work and the views of Scottish philosophers, such as David Hume and Thomas Reid (1710–1796). Helen de Cruz writes, for instance, that Hume was a cognitive scientist of religion avant la letter.”2 Just like current cognitive science of religion (CSR), Hume, as we noticed, set out to study the natural origins of theistic belief, making use of reflections on history and the human mind. Kelly James Clark and Justin L. Barrett also refer to an 18th century Scottish philosopher: Thomas Reid. They write that Reid offers an understanding of the human mind that is completely in line with current CSR3. The similarities between the works of Hume and Reid and current research is indeed remarkable. The views of Hume and Reid developed in a context in which the focus on natural history was, according to Paul Wood, the ‘most fashionable and popular intellectual pur- suit’ of that period4. Hence several authors of that period presented histories of mankind to show how various human activities such as morality and religion, or even societies, developed. Lord Kames (1696–1782), for instance, contributed significantly to the discussion in his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion in which he attempts to show the historical origins of religion. Religion, according to Kames, progressed from polytheism to monotheism. And religious beliefs are not the result of fear of unknown causes, since the religious beliefs persist while knowledge of causal relations increases. Moreover, fear of unknown causes is not universal enough, as these appearances do not strike terror in every one. Rather, the origin of religion, for Kames, is found in a natural sense of Deity, that matures and is made evident as nations progress to maturity. As Kames’s protégée, Hume was well aware of his views on the origin of religion, and he developed, most likely in reaction to them, his own hypothetical account of religion as found in history and in human psychological processes. Hume also thought religion evolved from polytheism to theism (and then back and forth), but contrary to Kames, he held that human beings have no natural sense of god or of religion. Rather, religious beliefs and practices for Hume arise as humans experience unforeseen and disordered events. They tend to think these events are effects of unknown causes, which, confused, are objects of their fears and hopes. To make their conceptions more definite, they clothe these unknown causes in qualities more understandable and they start offering gifts, prayers and sacrifices to them to make them flexible to their own needs. For Hume this gives rise to idolatry, which, together with the tendency to anthropomorphize and to adulate heroes, gives rise to ideas of a most-praiseworthy being, and hence to monotheism5. Hume employed observations from history, from anthropology, but he also drew from observations concerning the psychological study of the human mind and of human cognitive processes (natural tendencies, passions, mechanisms) to reach conclusions about what explains the widespread phenomenon of religion. For Hume religion is hence tied to natural passions such as fear and hope, and to tendencies to praise heroes and to anthropomorphize, which are then reinforced by customs and cultures. However, apart from such a reductionist account, Hume at times recognizes a more universal and INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 345 primitive foundation for religion, especially when it comes to design-type beliefs. He admits he cannot shake away this belief6, and seems to also offer an account of religion as an intrinsic feature of our collective cultural history. Writing after Hume, Reid – often considered to be Hume’s greatest critic – turns away from conjectural or hypothetical histories, since, for him, they appeal to a large set of unobservable data. But Reid retains the claim that some beliefs and practices are natural. In fact, he holds that beliefs in an intelligent creator mind is more original or natural than what Hume had claimed. In line with Hume, Reid also appeals to observations concerning the human mind. Reid’s contribution is to show that the human mind possesses innate cognitive capacities, which need education and culture to function well, but that nevertheless are part of the cognitive makeup of human beings. Moreover, reasoning (abstract reasoning or reasoning from experience) is just one among several cognitive capacities. Other belief-forming capacities process information and generate nonreflec- tive beliefs according to Reid (as Clark and Barrett also notice)7. Among the cognitive modules or systems, we thus find reasoning, but also perception, memory, consciousness, etc. and the beliefs they generate are beliefs that may be supported by reason and reflection, but that are not typically believed because of reasons8. These beliefs, such as beliefs in the objects perceived, or beliefs in other minds, are natural beliefs, for Reid. He thinks of them as principles of the human mind, as tools of thought, that are presupposed in our languages and reasonings. And among such natural beliefs we find design-type beliefs such as the belief that nature is produced by an intelligent mind. Therefore, Reid was also deeply interested in an empirical understanding of the workings of the human mind, and he held that some cognitive systems and some of the beliefs they generate are natural, in the sense that they are held non-reflectively, and are neither the result of reason, experience, or culture. For Reid, beliefs in an intelligent designer are therefore more original than what Hume believed. They are not produced by other beliefs, tendencies or passions, but are immediately produced by modules of the minds that have reached maturity. The links between the study of religion as a natural phenomenon in the history of philosophy and current work in cognitive science, anthropology, experimental psychology and evolution theory (to name a few domains of enquiry) stands in need of more research, and we believe it is a fruitful domain of investigation. Hortense de Villaine, in her chapter on Henry Maudsley in this volume also brings to light important aspects of the 19th century context of the discussion. The other papers, however, turn to more current approaches to the study of religion as a natural occurrence.

2. Contemporary approaches to the question Among the approaches from diverse and important areas of the study of human beings we wish to bring to light two areas that intersect with philosophical considerations. The first we briefly present here is CSR and the second the study of religion as a historical and cultural phenomenon. Contemporary scholars who have turned to the question ‘Is Religion Natural?’ all seem to accept that religion is, indeed, natural – in some sense. But just like their 18th and 19th century predecessors, they disagree about what accounts for its naturalness, about what aspects of religion are natural, and about the philosophical implications of various 346 E. E. KROEKER AND W. LEMMENS studies. To address these points is beyond the scope of this introduction, and some of them will be addressed in the chapters of this issue. In what follows we turn to a few points of agreement among cognitive scientists. Cognitive scientists of religion seek to explain, rather than describe, the pervasiveness of religious-type beliefs and behaviors by appealing to the workings of the human mind9. CSR hence studies the natural (mostly psychological) origins of theistic belief, making use of studies in anthropology, history and experimental psychology in order ‘to formulate hypotheses on why religious beliefs are cross-culturally pervasive and what motivates people to hold them.’10 In 2000, Justin Barrett writes of ‘a new cognitive approach to religion,’ bringing new insights into how religious concepts are acquired, kept, and used to motivate action11. He writes that findings in CSR point to the fact that what might seem to be extraordinary religious beliefs and practices are in fact produced and supported by ordinary human cognition, and hence may be called ‘natural.’ And in 2008, Barrett writes that recent ‘new insights from the cognitive science of religion have played a part in reviving interest in naturalistic attempts to explain the prevalence and recurrent forms of religious ideas and activities.’12 Scholars seem to agree, moreover, that theistic-type or religious-type beliefs arise from the human mind’s preoccupation with agents. Human cognition involved in these actions and attitudes is social, and as all social cognition is characteristically unreflective rather than requiring abstract or higher order reflection13. Among the normal mental tools involved in social cognition and religion, research reveals the existence of an Agency Detection Device: humans have well documented predispositions to interpret the world as ordered and to detect agency even when there is no observable agent14. Humans tend to think there is human-like agency such as the agency of supernatural god or gods behind natural events. In fact, Barrett argues that this agency detection device, ‘responsible for detecting intentional agency’ is hypersensitive15. Relatedly, moreover, scholars agree that concepts that are more consistently transmitted are minimally counterintuitive. Pascal Boyer, for instance, observes in a several publications that concepts that differ slightly from fully intuitive concepts are more readily transmitted. Concepts related to gods or to supernatural beings, which deviate slightly from concepts about human agency, are therefore more easily transmitted than, for instance, more theological and reflective-based concepts. Furthermore, another predisposition shared by humans is to ascribe minds or mental states to other agents. This tendency is called Theory of Mind. Humans tend to interpret other agents (other than themselves) as having desires, beliefs, emotions, plans, and goals. Cognitive sciences also agree that human beings seem to be natural dualists, interpreting other agents to have minds and bodies, and able to conceive of minds without bodies and of bodies without minds16. And finally, they hold that human beings tend, naturally, to interpret the world as purposeful. Humans ascribe purpose and design to nature, and hence display what Deborah Kelemen has coined ‘promiscuous teleology.’17 CSR hence seeks to explain specific religious-type beliefs and attitudes by showing how they are produced by normal human cognition. CSR need not necessarily appeal to evolutionary or adaptive theories to explain why human cognition functions as it does. Hence, CSR and evolutionary accounts are not necessarily related. However, several scholars turn to evolutionary science to offer explanations for such natural predispositions. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 347

According to evolutionary accounts, humans fare better or have better survival chances because of these natural predispositions. Scholars working on such accounts, often in parallel with CSR, usually contend that there are two ways of thinking about religion and natural selection. One way is to think of religion as a byproduct of mental capacities that have evolved for nonreligious purposes (perhaps à la Hume). Another way (perhaps in line with Reid) is to think religion is ‘selected for directly’ and is hence adaptive18. Work in CSR has often sought to explain religious-type beliefs, but currently scholars also turn to religious-type actions such as prayer, rituals, and also belief in spirit possession – all of which are culturally pervasive. These actions seem to capitalize on an ‘already present conceptual arrangement that appears naturally as part of human development.’19 CSR, therefore, invites interdisciplinary research not only of the basic cognitive struc- tures and tools of the human mind, but also of the way religious belief is interwoven with and dependent on specific forms of human action and cultural practices that evolve through history. This brings us back to Hume, whose NHR contains not only what we could call from a contemporary perspective a psychology of religion, but presents also a historical thesis about how religious belief evolved through time and appears always related to variable cultural practices and meanings20. In this special issue, most contributions focus on some specific topics and challenges posed by the mainstream CSR of the past decades and touch on the cultural and prax- eological dimension of religion only briefly. However, some recent research within CSR has shown an increasing interest in these dimensions21. In fact, this shift toward the study of religion as a historical and cultural phenomenon would imply a sort of retrieval of previous approaches in the study of religion in cultural anthropology and sociology, such as developed by Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim at the turn of the 20th century and a few decades later by cultural anthropologists such as Victor Turner and Clifford Geertz. More recent investigations of religion standing in that line of tradition are, for example, Robert N. Bellah’s Religion in Human Evolution. From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age and Hans Joas’ Die Macht des Heiligen. Eine Alternative zur Geschichte der Entzauberung. Both authors remind us, each in their own way, of the fact that religion is indeed a constitutive aspect of the human condition and in this sense a ‘natural’ phenomenon that developed through history. While both authors also stress the importance of religious belief as a specific dimension of human cognition, they at the same time stress the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices to emerge and gain a deep grip on the human mind and social action. Bellah tries to show in his impressive and wide ranging study how both biological and cultural evolution lie at the root of the development and transformations of religions through history, and how this process led to the emergence of monotheism in the axial age22. Joas, a German sociologist and philosopher influenced by Habermas, American pragmatism and phenomenology, focuses in Die Macht des Heiligen on the quest for a better understanding of religious belief and practices under influence of the secularization of Western culture since the Enlightenment. With reference to Hume’s Natural History of Religion, he pleas for what he calls an ‘affirmative genealogy’ of religion and criticizes the idea that the study of religion as a natural phenomenon can only result in a reductionist account of religious beliefs and practices23. In Joas’ view, religion is a constitutive dimension of the human condition and has a crucial role to play in the emergence of a sense of self- transcedence and the creation of moral values and ideals24. 348 E. E. KROEKER AND W. LEMMENS

3. Conclusion The authors of this volume offer original reflections on some of the philosophical implications of the study of religion as a natural phenomenon. Thomas J. Spiegel brings to light difficulties with concepts such as ‘natural’ and ‘naturalism.’ He argues for quasi- naturalism, which avoids the problematic ontological restrictions of modest and scientific naturalism, and which allows religion to be a genuine phenomenon, not in need of reduction, while upholding respect for science. In the next chapter, Hortense de Villaine describes the views and context of Henry Maudsley, a 19th century British naturalist, who held that religion is natural but produced from common mistakes due to limited human knowledge and inflamed imagination. Heather Morris, in the following chapter, returns to the current context of CSR. She argues that contrary to those who think that CSR supports atheism rather than theism, or, as Justin Barrett holds, theism more than atheism, she maintains that Barrett’s explanation for religious beliefs is compatible both with theism and atheism. Halvor Kvandal subsequently argues that Barrett’s CSR cannot be used to support reformed epistemology (RE), as some have contended. Reformed epistemology, he writes, maintains that human beings possess a god faculty by which they form the belief in an omnipotent creator-god. Barrett, however, holds that humans tend to form beliefs in supernatural beings using a less specified cognitive system, and, according to Kvandal this latter view receives more empirical support, but is not compatible with RE. In the last chapter John Teehan evaluates the role and epistemic status of religion as it emerges out of an evolutionary-cognitive study. He shows how the moral force of religion emerges from its engagement of our moral psychology and moral emotions. He contends that theology (the moral rational elaboration of religion) evolves because of its moral and social function, not because of the truth of its claims. Still, he argues that theology – as all moral world views – sustains and enables the religious impulse, and hence plays an important role in human life. We hope the reader will enjoy this introduction to topics around philosophical implications of cognitive science, philosophy of religion, and the study of religion as a natural phenomenon. Work on this issue was initiated in the wake of a conference held at the University of Antwerp in 2018, where the authors of several chapters of this volume presented their papers. We thank the participants of that conference, together with those who were not at the conference but who participated in this volume25.

Notes

1. Hume, NHR, 33. 2. De Cruz, Relevance of Hume’s Natural History,1. 3. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 641. 4. Wood, “Natural History of Man,” 89. 5. Hume, NHR. 6. Hume, NHR, section 15; Hume, Dialogues, section 12; see also Marusic, “Refuting the Whole System.” 7. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 650. 8. And these beliefs need not be supported by reasons in order to be justiﬁed; they are self- evident for Reid. 9. For a clear overview of and introduction to CSR, see White 2017. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 349

10. De Cruz, Relevance of Hume’s Natural History,1. 11. Barrett, “Exploring the natural foundations,” 29. 12. Barrett, “Science of Religious Beliefs,” 109–110. 13. Green, “Cognitive Science and Knowledge of God.” 14. Teehan, “Cognitive Science and Limits,” 2. 15. Barrett, “Cognitive Science of Religion;” Barrett, “Science of Religious Beliefs.” 16. Bloom, “Religion is Natural.” 17. Kelemen, “Are Children Intuitive Theists?” 18. Marsh adds that a third possibility is that religion starts ‘out as a byproduct of evolved capacities and later co-opted for adapted purposes’ (Marsh, Darwin, 361). 19. Barrett, “Cognitive Science of Religion,” 778; Cohen, The Mind Possessed. 20. Lemmens, “Hume’s Psychology of Religion.” 21. Watts and Turner, Evolution, Religion; Klostergaard Petersen and Gilhus, Evolution, Cognition. 22. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution. 23. Joas, Die Macht des Heiligen. 24. See also Joas, Braucht der Mensch Religion. 25. We thank the Center Pieter Gillis of the University of Antwerp for their help in organizing and sponsoring this conference. We are also grateful to the Fund for Scientiﬁc Research of Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) for funding the project (G040818 N) which made work on this issue possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [G040818N].

Notes on contributors

Esther Engels Kroeker is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). She has published several articles and book chapters on Thomas Reid and David Hume, as well as on love and practical reasons. Willem Lemmens is Professor of Early Modern Philosophy and Ethics at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). He published several articles and book chapters on Hume’s moral philosophy and his philosophy of religion and was co-editor of the translation into Dutch of Hume’s Natural History of Religion (2011).

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