A Hermeneutic Critique of Evidentialism: an Alternative To

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A Hermeneutic Critique of Evidentialism: an Alternative To SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Reconstructing Rationality: A Hermeneutic Alternative to Evidentialism and Reformed Epistemology Using Themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Ricoeur A Dissertation Presented by Patrick James Casey to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University December 2013 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Patrick James Casey We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Gary Mar – Dissertation Advisor Associate Professor of Philosophy Donn Welton - Chairperson of Defense Professor of Philosophy Edward Casey – Internal Reader Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Lorenzo Simpson – Internal Reader Professor of Philosophy Andrew Flescher – External Reader Associate Professor of Preventive Medicine and English This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Charles Taber Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Reconstructing Rationality: A Hermeneutic Alternative to Evidentialism and Reformed Epistemology Using Themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Ricoeur by Patrick James Casey Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2013 We live in a culture divided between dogmatism and relativism. This division arises, in large part, from competing rationalities—a plurality of beliefs about what is true or good. This dichotomy is particularly manifest as regards the diversity of religious truth claims. By outlining a mechanism of inter-cultural justification of beliefs the dissertation addresses how it is possible to adjudicate diverse rationalities without appealing to Enlightenment notions of evidence or Reformed epistemologies. The Enlightenment demanded that religious beliefs be justified by evidence acceptable to all; the Reformed epistemologists argued that religious beliefs are justified by “properly basic beliefs” produced by the proper functioning of God given faculties. These two popular philosophical approaches, the dissertation argues, are inadequate to the bridging the contemporary culture divide. Moreover, the dissertation argues that the rejection of Enlightenment principles of rationality in favor of a hermeneutic model will not lead to skepticism or relativism. Utilizing the resources of the hermeneutic school, it is argued that understanding justification as eminently context dependent, yet intelligible (in principle) to any potential interlocutor, allows for a robust understanding of rationality without falling into either dogmatism or relativism. iii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 1. A Tale of Two Theories ............................................................................................................ 25 1.1. Plantinga’s Critique of Evidentialism ................................................................................ 33 1.2. Towards a Reformed Criterion of Justified Belief ............................................................. 48 1.3. On the Necessity of an Alternative to Reformed Epistemology ........................................ 58 2. A Wittgensteinian Critique of Evidentialism ............................................................................ 81 2.1. The Rules of Certainty ....................................................................................................... 89 2.2. The Rules of Justification ................................................................................................. 107 3. Contra Relativism: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes .......................................................... 111 3.1 Worlds Apart or Words Apart? ......................................................................................... 122 3.2. Translation: A Transcendental Argument for Commensurability .................................... 136 4. Competing Rationalities and Progress .................................................................................... 148 4.1. Speaking of the Same Thing ............................................................................................ 157 4.2. The Lifeworld and the Foundation of Successful Cross-Cultural Deliberation ............... 170 5. A Rational Reconstruction of Conversion .............................................................................. 183 5.1. Religious Discourse.......................................................................................................... 191 5.2. Religious Discourse as the Invitation to a New Mode of Being-In-The-World .............. 203 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 232 iv Introduction This dissertation addresses a question familiar in our pluralistic society: how do we adjudicate inter-cultural disagreements?1 It is often taken for granted that varying social groups have different ways of understanding the world, and correspondingly, different values, norms and practices of justification. And indeed, cultures ostensibly have quite different beliefs about what is true, what is good and what is right. Additionally, different cultures have produced disparate religious traditions that have a variety of incompatible beliefs about the divine, and thus incompatible ways of talking about God. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam claim that the ultimate reality is personal, Hindus believe the ultimate reality is the impersonal Brahman, and Buddhists and atheists believe there is no ultimate deity. Pantheists identify God with the cosmos, some believing that the ultimate reality is like a life-force, drawing living beings with spiritual qualities up from simple matter. Muslims and Jews believe that God is One, while Christians maintain that God, while being One in substance, is also a Trinity. In this dissertation I will focus on the way the problem of adjudicating disagreements manifests itself in the problem of religious diversity, although, I believe, the solution I offer can be mapped onto any inter- cultural dispute. The problem of religious diversity arises because different religions maintain mutually exclusive beliefs about the nature of ultimate reality. It is a problem because of the intellectual 1 Here I construe ‘culture’ in a broad and non-technical sense, signifying a variety of traditions, religious or philosophical systems as well as any cohesive system of reason and value. 1 tension brought about by the apparent disagreement among rational individuals. It is easy to countenance disagreement when one of the two sides is ignorant of or resistant to relevant facts, or when the disagreement is about mere matters of taste. But sincere disagreement among informed people about beliefs as momentous as the meaning or purpose of life, the existence of God, eternal souls and the afterlife does (and ought to) produce intellectual tension. Many undergraduates confront such clashes in belief first hand when they come to college. They may have had some exposure to others with differing beliefs earlier in life, but coming to college and learning about and meeting sincere practitioners of other faiths is often unsettling to religious believers. Moreover, as schools at all levels turn away from confessional modes of teaching (i.e., “this is what we as X believe...” and how it relates to everything taught) and towards information based teaching about religion (i.e., “this is what these people believe and this is what these other people believe...”), each religion or way of life appears to be on a par with one another.2 The combination between awareness of diversity and the apparent sincerity and rationality of practitioners of other faiths often results in acute intellectual and spiritual tension. Of course the difficulty students face is a manifestation of a more general problem of the clash of worldviews in pluralistic societies. Indeed, given the fact of a plurality of worldviews3, students, and societies, are pushed towards a bifurcation between skepticism and relativism, on the one hand, and fundamentalism and dogmatism on the other. Some are led by the fact of a plurality of religious worldviews and the apparent parity between them to conclude that religious, philosophical and moral beliefs are a matter of arbitrary opinion. No one religion or 2 It is important to note that at this point I am not praising or condemning this change in education, but simply describing a cultural shift. 3 When I use the word ‘worldview’ here I am again using it in an everyday, non-technical sense. The question of whether different beliefs give rise to different experiences – such that the world appears differently to members of different cultures – has not yet been raised. 2 worldview is more justified than another; one’s choice between them is thus effectively a matter of taste, not one that could be the result of rational choice. Others react to diversity by shutting their minds and dogmatically reasserting – often with no particular justification, but just as a result of a kind of “religious patriotism” – an invincible confidence
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