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The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary

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The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion AMIR DASTMALCHIAN Foundation for Interreligious and Intercultural Research and Dialogue and University of Geneva This is the draft version of: Dastmalchian, A. (2!"#), %The &'istemology of Religious Diversity in Contem'orar) Philosophy of Religion’ in Philosophy Compass, vol. 8, iss*e 3, pages .-/#!-. 0http:/1onlinelibrar).wile).com1doi/"!.1"""1'hc3.1 !!41a2stract5 0http:/1'hilosophy/com'ass.com1sections1'hilosophy/of/religion5 The '*2lished version a''ears 3ith two s*''lements, a teaching and learning (*ide, and a video a2stract. ABSTRACT Religious diversit) is a 7e) topic in contemporar) 'hilosoph) of religion. One wa) religious diversit) has 2een of interest to 'hilosophers is in the e'istemological 9*estions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversit) has 2een seen to 'ose a challenge for religious 2elief. In this st*d) four a''roaches to dealin( with this challenge are disc*ssed. These a''roaches corres'ond to four well/7nown 'hilosophers of religion, namel), Richard Swin2*rne, Alvin +lantinga, :illiam Alston, and ;ohn Hic7. The st*d) is concl*ded 2) s*ggestin( four factors 3hich sha'e one,s res'onse to the challenge religious diversit) poses to religious belief. ". INTRODUCTION %Religious diversit), is the term *sed to refer to the e=istence of a multit*de of religious traditions. Religious diversit) is now one of the ma>or s*2>ects of the 'hilosoph) of religion with most recent introd*ctor) te=t2ooks either coverin( the topic in detail or a'ologisin( for its a2sence. :hat has emerged from the literat*re on this topic can 2e s'lit into first-order reflections on religious diversit) and second-order reflections on religious diversit). ?irst-order reflections on religious diversit) are those which consider matters directl) arisin( from the 'henomenon of religious diversit). These matters incl*de (a$ the e'istemology of religious 2eliefs, (b$ conce'ts of the Ultimate, and (c$ the possi2ilit) of salvation1li2eration across religious traditions (see Byrne). Second-order reflections on religious diversit) are those 3hich see7 to categorise first-order reflections and which see7 to find the most a''ropriate strate() for a''roachin( the 'henomenon of religious diversit). Second-order reflections have 'rod*ced the %tri'olar t)'ology, (Schmidt-Le*7el$ of e=cl*sivism, incl*sivism, and 'l*ralism; a t)'ology which originated with Race. These three 7e) la2els combine with a variet) of ad>ectives to give rise to a ver) s'ecific terminology for disc*ssin( the 'henomenon of religious diversit). The most common ad>ectives *sed are %e'istemic,, and %salvific, (or %soteriological,$ 2*t other ad>ectives might incl*de ‘e='eriential,, ‘alethic,, ‘doctrinal,, ‘normative,, ‘deontological,, ‘ethical,, and " The &'istemolo() of Reli(io*s Diversit) in Contem'orar) +hiloso'h) of Reli(ion so forth (King, Legenha*sen). ?or e=am'le, then, e'istemic e=cl*sivism (with regard to religious diversit)$ would 2e the 'osition that onl) one 'artic*lar religion is e'istemicall) advantaged to the e=cl*sion of all the other religions and e'istemic 'l*ralism would 2e the 'osition that more than one religion is e'istemicall) advantaged. In this st*d) I will 2e foc*ssin( on first-order e'istemological reflection on religious diversit) (mentioned as (a) a2ove). I will do this 2) introd*cin( the wor7 of four contemporar) and recent 'hilosophers of religion who have made a si(nificant contri2*tion to the s*2>ect through defendin( the reasona2leness (rationalit)$ of religious 2elief. These 'hilosophers are Richard Swin2*rne (".#B-), Alvin +lantinga (1.#B-), :illiam Alston (1. "/ !!.), and ;ohn Hic7 (1. / !" ). I will concl*de the st*d) 2) drawin( attention to themes which r*n through the wor7 of these 'hilosophers 2) s*ggestin( four factors which determine how a reflective 'erson with religious 2eliefs might deal with religious diversit) on an intellect*al level. 6*t first a few words on why this s'ecific iss*e is worth disc*ssing at all. Reflectin( on the fact of religious diversit) can ma7e a 'erson with religious convictions lose confidence in his religious convictions, or in an) religious 2eliefs whatsoever. This confidence 'roblem is e=acer2ated 2) the desire for certaint) regardin( matters of s*ch 'rimar) importance as religious matters. After all, religious traditions can 2e 9*ite demandin( regardin( commitment, 2oth 'ractical and cognitive. The 'erson who 2ecomes a3are of religious diversit) might wonder whether he is correct a2out religious matters given that most 'eople disagree with him. He as7s himself: %Can ever)2od) a'art from my coreligionists and I 2e 3ron( a2out religious mattersC, This 9*estion is all the more 'ertinent when he realises that his coreligionists consist of, for e=ample, a reformist trend within a sect within a ma>or religious tradition D not more than a handf*l of the human 'op*lationE Another 9*estion that a 'erson aware of religious diversit) ma) 'ose to himself is: %If there is so much disa(reement regardin( religious 2eliefs, how do I 7now my religious beliefs are tr*eC, . RICHARD S:INBURN&: EFID&NC&, ARGUM&NT, AND REASON Richard Swin2*rne is 2est 7nown for *sin( his academic career to ar(*e for 2oth the e'istemic virt*es of theism (The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, Faith and Reason$ and the 'la*si2ilit) of the Christian doctrines which follow from theism (Revelation, The Christian God, Providence and the Problem of Evil, Responsibility and Atonement)." His ar(*ments are s*mmarised in two 2ooks 3ritten for a non-s'ecialist a*dience ("as #esus God$ and Is There a God$). At the end of a conference address Swin2*rne reflected on his wor7 in the philosoph) of religion: :hether or not )ou acce't my claim that the Christian revelation is 'roba2l) the tr*e one, I ho'e )ou will agree that in the wa)s which I have outlined, reason can weigh the 'roba2le tr*th of rival religions, hel' *s to face *' to an) inade9*acies of our own tradition and an) merits of others, and generall) hel' *s to overcome the irrational forces which are so hard at wor7 in human religious dis'*tes. (Swin2*rne HChristianit) and the DiscourseH 2!$ Amir Dastmalchian Defence of the e=cl*sive correctness of a 'artic*lar religious tradition through 'hilosophical ar(*ment is a well/esta2lished 'ractice and often the first t)'e of res'onse a 'erson ma7es when the) feel intellect*all) threatened 2) religious diversit). A st*d) of Swin2*rne,s wor7 in the 'hilosophy of religion shows that Swin2*rne 2elieves (a$ Christianit) is tr*e, (b$ the 3a) to show that an) religion is tr*e is with 'ositive ar(*ments, and (c$ given a 'ositive ar(*ment for Christianit) rival religions demand less detailed attention. :ith re(ard to (c$ Swin2*rne e='lains why he does not feel the need to investigate in detail religions rival to Christianit): I do not need to ma7e a detailed investigation if I can show that none of those religions even claim for themselves characteristics to 2e e='ected a 'riori of a tr*e religion and claimed 2) Christianit), and that there is enough evidence that Christianit) does have these characteristics. ?or then I will 2e in a 'osition to ar(*e that there are reasons ade9*ate to show that the Christian religion is more li7el) to 2e tr*e than the) are. (Swin2*rne HRes'onse to M) CommentatorsH 3"!/#""$ So, it can 2e seen that Swin2*rne has a 'riori e='ectations of 3hat the tr*e religion is li7e and he finds that these e='ectations are f*lfilled 2) Christianit) alone. An e=ample incl*des his e='ectation that God would 3ant to a*thenticate his revelation with an inimita2le si(nat*re. The re'orted res*rrection of ;es*s of Nazareth, sa)s Swin2*rne ('Intellect*al A*tobiogra'hyH "J, Resurrection v, Revelation "K , "-), matches our e='ectations: it was an event which violated the laws of nat*re and was closel) associated with a religious message. Swin2*rne,s a''roach to religious en9*ir) (and conse9*entl) to religious diversit)$ arises from the vie3 that a religious 2elief should ideall) 2e the res*lt of ade9*ate investigation and ob>ectivel) correct ind*ctive criteria (Faith and Reason "! ). Ade9*ac) of investigation refers to a 'erson e='endin( s*fficient time and effort D that is, givin( d*e diligence D in order to obtain tr*e 2eliefs (or at least 'roba2l) tr*e 2eliefs). Ind*ctive criteria refer to the criteria 2) which one assesses a 2elief@ for Swin2*rne these are 'redictive 'ower, coherence, simplicit), and scope, all of which follow from Swin2*rne,s commitment to 2a)esian e'istemology (Faith and Reason BJ, .B).# That these four criteria are ob>ectivel) correct, accordin( to Swin2*rne, means that the) are cond*cive to selectin( tr*e beliefs. See Supplement 1 #. ALFIN PLANTINGA: BYPASSING TH& N&&D FOR EFID&NC& Alvin +lantinga also defends Christianit). His defence has 2oth negative and 'ositive as'ects. The negative as'ect is the thorough criti9*e of :estern e'istemology. The 'ositive as'ect is the 'resentation of an e'istemological framewor7 which, he claims, is consistent with Christian teachings on how a 'erson can come to acce't Christianit). Here we foc*s on the 'ositive as'ect of +lantin(aHs Christian a'ologetic although the two as'ects are not easil) divorced from each other.B +lantin(a sa)s that for a tr*e 2elief to count as 7nowledge a 'erson must not onl) 2e deontologicall) >*stified in 2elievin( it (that is, the) must not have # The &'istemolo() of Reli(io*s Diversit) in Contem'orar) +hiloso'h) of Reli(ion failed an) intellect*al d*ties$ 2*t the) must also 2e %warranted,.
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