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Rationality and Theistic Belief: an Essay on College of Christian Studies Reformed Epistemology

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Rationality and Theistic Belief: an Essay on College of Christian Studies Reformed Epistemology Digital Commons @ George Fox University Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on College of Christian Studies Reformed Epistemology 1993 Rationality and Theistic Belief - Full Text Mark S. McLeod Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation McLeod, Mark S., "Rationality and Theistic Belief - Full Text" (1993). Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology. Paper 17. http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/17 This Book - Full Text is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. Preface Proponents of Reformed epistemology claim, in contrast to those standing in the long line of natural theology, that belief in God need not be rooted in argument but can be based, more or less directly, on experience. One of the results of their suggestion is that certain beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about perceived physical objects. I argue against this claim here. Although I am critical of Reformed epistemology in this respect, there is much of value in its ideas. One central notion is that theis­ tic beliefs are rational in ways similar to our nontheistic beliefs. I view this idea as important to our understanding of theistic belief and its rationality. But to which nontheistic beliefs are theistic be­ liefs similar? My thesis is that beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about human persons, rather than beliefs about non­ human physical objects. The theory in which this epistemological parity can be made out, however, is not foundationalism, as two of the main Reformed epistemologists argue. Holism is a happier home for theistic belief. At least so this book suggests. In certain ways, some of the writings of John Hick and George Mavrodes are the most recent ancestors of Reformed epistemol­ ogy, for they take experience of the divine seriously as part of the epistemic map that epistemologists of religion need to sketch. The more recent set of arguments and discussions centers in the work of William P. Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. X) Preface It is from Plantinga and Wolterstorff that the "Reformed" in "Re­ formed epistemology" comes, since both philosophers are intellec­ tually rooted in the Reformed theological tradition (they stand in the theological line traceable to John Calvin). And so the name remains. Regardless of what one calls Reformed epistemology, or who its intellectual ancestors are, its central claims are important and intriguing. As always with works of this kind, the author owes much to many people for a variety of activities. I can hardly separate my thinking from that of my teachers, J. William Forgie, Francis W. Dauer, and Burleigh T. Wilkins. They, along with Philip Clayton, Richard F. Galvin, V. James Mannoia, Shirley A. Mullen, Alvin Plantinga, and David E. Schrader, read all or parts of the manu­ script at several stages too disparate to summarize easily. Each pro­ vided helpful comments and suggestions. William P. Alston, as the series editor, read the manuscript several times and offered valuable philosophical advice along the way. Although he disagrees with me on various important points, one could not ask for a more helpful and fair editor. Director John Ackermann, of Cornell Uni­ versity Press, enthusiastically supported the project since our first contact. Kay Scheuer, Joanne Hindman, and John Thomas im­ proved the prose in many ways. As well as those who read the manuscript, there are those who encouraged its writing. Among them are Mark Bernstein, Steven D. Fratt, Arthur R. Miller, Stan­ ley Obitts, Jeanne Reeseman, James F. Sennett, Saranindranath Tagore, and Robert Wennberg. They have, in a variety of ways, cheered the writing on. I spent five years teaching at Westmont College in Santa Bar­ bara, California. My friends and colleagues from that time deserve thanks, and the following people in particular deserve special men­ tion for their contributions. The "Tea Group" was, during much of the time I was writing, a weekly source of intellectual stimula­ tion and moral support that took me beyond my own narrow con­ cerns to those of the broader intellectual community. The group was made up of historians, political scientists, biblical scholars, lit­ erary experts, and theologians. Its members were Steven Cook, A. R. "Pete" Diamond, Robert H. Gundry, Michael McClymond, Bruce McKeon, Shirley A. Mullen, William Nelson, John Rapson, Preface [xi Thomas Schmidt, and Jonathan Wilson. Ned Divelbiss and John Murray provided carrel space for me to work in the Roger Voskuyl Library, along with unflagging good cheer. George Blank­ enbaker, vice president for academic affairs, arranged faculty de­ velopment grants to provide me with summer research time. Lois Gundry, the secretary for the philosophy and religious studies de­ partments, and her staff retyped portions of the manuscript into the computer from my handwritten changes. Since I moved to the University of Texas at San Antonio, Thomas Wood, of the Divi­ sion of English, Classics, and Philosophy, likewise worked at the computer for me. Adrian A. Amaya helped me read the page proofs. Parts of Chapters 6 and 7 originally appeared as "The Analogy Argument for the Proper Basicality of Belief in God" in the Inter­ national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987): 3-20. It is re­ printed by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. Parts of Chapter 10 originally appeared as "Can Belief in God Be Con­ firmed?" in Religious Studies (1988): 311-23. Parts of Chapter 12 originally appeared as "Passionate Religion: Toward a Theory of Epistemic Commitment for Theistic Belief' in The Logic of Ra­ tional Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. William Lane Craig and Mark S. MCLeod (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). My niece, Martha Anderson, spent the summer of 1991 in Santa Barbara with my family and took care of my son while I worked in the library. Now three years old, Ian Alexander Malone MCLeod came along in the middle of my writing. He has grown into an unsurpassed delight, nothing less than the dance of God in our living room. Finally, my wife, Rebecca L. M. MCLeod, not only read the manuscript and was a member of the "Tea Group" but listened to me talk-endlessly-about the ideas in this book. She has walked with me the path of truth, joy, and love-but es­ pecially love-for over sixteen years. How can I thank her? Words fail. MARKS. MCLEOD San Antonio, Texas Abbreviations CMP Christian mystical practice CP Christian practice ]d Deontological justification ]di Involuntary deontological justification ]c Evaluative justification ]cg Grounds evaluative justification ]t'g Grounds evaluative justification (applied to epistemic practices) ]n Normative justification )ns Strong normative justification ]nw Weak normative justification PP Perceptual practice PT Parity thesis. There are many versions of the parity thesis, the most general of which is this: Under appropriate conditions, (1) S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis­ tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p, where p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the same level and (specified) kind of epistemic status as (3) S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP*, which generates nontheistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (4) S's believing that p*, where p* is a non­ theistic belief (of a specified kind). PTA Alston's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's en­ gaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are )nw· xiv J Abbreviations PT AS Alston's strong parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jt'w PT� Alston's parity thesis* : Under appropriate conditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima facie rational. PT N New parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, engaging in CP and engaging in unique person practice have, for S, the same level and strength of overall rationality. PTp1 Plantinga's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical normative proper basicality (the strongest level) as S's belief that p*, where p* is a paradigm belief. P1\� Plantinga's parity thesis': Under appropriate conditions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has at least the same nonclassical normative proper ba­ sicality (the strongest level) as S' s belief that p*, where p* is a perceptual belief. PT1� Plantinga's parity thesis*: For person S, whose epistemic equip­ ment is functioning properly in the appropriate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epis­ temic warrant. PTt,; Plantinga's parity thesis*' : For a person S, whose epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appropriate environ­ ment, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epistemic warrant. SP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice SPP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice Rationality and Theistic Belief [ I ] Introduction: Paradigms, Theism, and the Parity Thesis Few claims are more controversial than that beliefs about God are rational. Challenges to theism are many and diverse, ranging from the problem of evil to the meaninglessness of theistic ut­ terances. Given this healthy and robust religious skepticism, it is somewhat surprising and refreshing to discover philosophers who claim that beliefs about God are not only rational but just as ratio­ nal as many nontheistic beliefs that nearly everyone accepts as ob­ viously rational.
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