Is the Scientific Study of Religious Activity Compatible with a “Religious Epistemology”?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Scientific Models for Religious Knowledge: Is the Scientific Study of Religious Activity Compatible With a “Religious Epistemology”? by Andrew Ralls Woodward A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Trinity College and the Theological Department of the Toronto School of Theology In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology awarded by the University of Trinity College and the University of Toronto © Copyright by Andrew Ralls Woodward 2016 Scientific Models for Religious Knowledge: Is the Scientific Study of Religious Activity Compatible With a “Religious Epistemology”? Andrew Ralls Woodward Doctor of Theology The University of Trinity College and the University of Toronto 2016 Abstract Epistemologies of tested beliefs (knowledge claims) in scientific practice and non-tested yet faith-imbued beliefs (belief claims) in religious life are compared and contrasted. A study of models of rationality in contemporary philosophy of science and religion is completed with the purpose to assess possible compatibility systems in “science and religion” literature. Myths are re-contextualized in the modern scientific cosmos via the igmythicist conception of myths—myths are neither mere delusions nor reflections of an ontological reality for the gods, but myths are the application of meaning-enclaves enclosed in the world of natural human experience. It is argued that, if a compatibility system is successful in mapping shared epistemic territory between knowledge claims and belief claims, the compatibility system will be based on a theory of rationality which consistently tests knowledge claims and belief claims. While the cognitive values of a scientific epistemology provide an epistemic benchmark for testing many beliefs, the problem of constructing a “religious epistemology” in a modern, Western university is analyzed. Philosophical and theological benefits and limitations of the proposed “religious epistemology” are assessed and the place for a theory of rationality in religious life considered. ii Contents Part I. Systems of Human Belief: Knowledge and Belief Claims!..............1 1. Background Information and Assumptions ..........................................................................1 1.1. Introduction, Purpose, and Definitions of Terms .....................................................1 1.2. Initial Plausibility of Assumptions ...........................................................................7 1.3. Outline of Thesis Statement and Argument ...........................................................22 2. Knowledge Claims and Belief Claims ................................................................................32 2.1. Survey of Religious and Philosophical Beliefs ......................................................32 2.2. Epistemic Justification of Scientific Beliefs ..........................................................52 3. Attitudes of Mind Toward Testing Beliefs ..........................................................................64 3.1. Religion and a Modest Naturalism .........................................................................64 3.2. Science and Scientism ............................................................................................75 Part II. Science and Religion Compatibility Systems!...............................85 4. What Is a Compatibility System? Who Is it For? ...............................................................85 4.1. Outline and Description of a Compatibility System ...............................................85 4.2. Myths and Igmythicists ..........................................................................................97 4.3. Initial Responses ..................................................................................................109 5. Presentation of Potential Compatibility Systems .............................................................124 5.1. Knowledge and Belief Communities: “You too!” ................................................124 5.2. Further Examples .................................................................................................132 6. Philosophical Models in Scientific Life ............................................................................143 7. Philosophical Models in Religious Life............................................................................ 162 iii Part III. Scientific Study of Religious Activity and a “Religious Epistemology”!............................................................................................175 8. The Scientific Study of Religious Activity .......................................................................175 8.1. Cognitive “Explanations” for Religious Activity .................................................175 8.2. Natural and Unnatural Cognitive Systems ...........................................................188 9. Designing a “Religious Epistemology” ............................................................................192 9.1. What Type of Rationality? ....................................................................................192 9.2. Initial Complications for a “Religious Epistemology”? .......................................209 10. Summary of Conclusions................................................................................................ 227 11. Bibliography of Works Cited ..........................................................................................231 11.1. Major Works .......................................................................................................231 11.2. Minor Works....................................................................................................... 233 iv Part I. Systems of Human Belief: Knowledge and Belief Claims Ah, that he could pass again into his neutrality! Who can thus avoid all pledges and, having observed, observe again from the same unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, unaffrighted innocence—must always be formidable. —Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841) 1. Background Information and Assumptions 1.1. Introduction, Purpose, and Definitions of Terms In general terms, epistemology is a central area of philosophy. Both philosophy of science and philosophical theology raise epistemological questions. For instance, questions about knowledge claims and belief claims: (i) What kinds of knowledge claims are legitimate and what kinds are not? (ii) How do we adjudicate the acceptability of a knowledge claim; the acceptability of a belief claim? Epistemology is relevant to both science and religion, because both scientific and religious exercises involve the making of conjectures about states of affairs in the physical world. As human beings we possess and utilize various systems of “belief” about states of affairs in the world: When demarcating between scientific and religious systems of belief, we can make an epistemic distinction between tested beliefs in scientific practice and non-tested yet faith-imbued beliefs in religious life. For the sake of a typology, in this thesis I shall refer to the tested beliefs of scientific practice as knowledge claims and the non-tested yet faith-imbued beliefs of religious life as belief claims.1 A knowledge claim in scientific practice might be the chemist’s proposition: “an atom is the smallest physical piece 1. To be developed further in Section 1.3 (Outline of Thesis Statement and Argument), my typology is based on the Thomistic distinction between (i) a claim known—the intellect is compelled to assent by the proposition itself, and (ii) a claim believed—the intellect is compelled to assent by belief about the proposition. For the outline of this distinction, and its rationale in formulating the knowledge claim and belief claim typology, see pages 25-28. 1 2 of a chemical substance.” A belief claim in religious life might be the theist’s testimony: “a superhuman agent called ‘God’ intervenes in the physical world.” From the outset, my typology, however useful as a heuristic, may appear to some to favour the modern scientific enterprise: I do reserve what seems to be the intellectually robust phrase knowledge claims for the tested beliefs of science, leaving the more skeptically evocative phrase belief claims for the non-tested beliefs of religion. I acknowledge this possible “distinguishing” of the scientific enterprise; it will be addressed in my arguments. The question of whether and in what way a belief claim (religion) is epistemically different from a knowledge claim (science) is central to this thesis. However, providing an answer to that question, where the intents and purposes of both knowledge and belief claims are respected, will be difficult. Nevertheless the distinction between these two types of claims, at least in so far as any distinction is applied in one’s life or in one’s academic work, seems not always clear or understood. Thus, throughout this thesis, we shall often consider the question: for whom does a science and religion “compatibility system” exist? Furthermore, which individuals, academic disciplines, or professional groups, may possess the interest to design and build a compatibility system between science and religion? Phrasing the question in more candid but not unreasonable terms, as twenty-first-century scholars situated in the context of Western intellectual life, should we even care about potential science and religion compatibility? As mentioned, this thesis will explore the implications