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ISLAM, the CONSTITUTION, and HUMAN RIGHTS the Problematics of Religious Freedom in Indonesia

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ISLAM, the CONSTITUTION, and HUMAN RIGHTS the Problematics of Religious Freedom in Indonesia ISLAM, THE CONSTITUTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS The Problematics of Religious Freedom in Indonesia Ahmad Suaedy Rumadi M. Subhi Azhari Badrus Samsul Fata Islam, The Constitution, and Human Rights: The Problematics of Religious Freedom in Indonesia © THE WAHID INSTITUTE xii + 238 page: 14,5 x 21cm AUTHORS: Supervisor: Yenny Zannuba Wahid Coordinator: Ahmad Suaedy Members: Rumadi M. Subhi Azhari Badrus Samsul Fata TRANSLATOR: Rebecca Lunnon EDITOR Alamsyah M. Dja’far COVER & LAY OUT Muhamad “Amax” Isnaini 1st Ed, June 2009 ISBN : 978-979-98737-8-1 PUBLISHED BY: Jl. Taman Amir Hamzah No. 8 Jakarta Selatan 10320 Telp : +62-21-3928233, 3145671 Fax. : +62-21-213928250 E-mail : [email protected] Website: www.wahidinstitute.org ii FOREWORD THE INDONESIAN STRUGGLE to freely stand on its own feet – to borrow Bung Karno’s words – as a democratic country is still a long way off. At the centre of this issue are the rights of all citizens to be treated fairly and equally in the face of the Indonesian constitution and law. In enforcing legislation in Indonesia there should be no differentiation between citizens based on their wealth, skin colour, ethnicity, religion and so on. Yet this is precisely what is happing. Rights have been quite explicitly regulated in the 1945 Indonesian constitution, which states who has authority and elects the government as enforcer. These rights include the right to form alliances/associations, economic rights, cultural rights, rights concerning religion and belief etc. One of the most important rights for all nations including Indonesia is the right to religion and belief. This right, besides being guaranteed in the 1945 constitution is also expressed in international laws ratified by the Indonesian government such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , as well as in religious teachings. Thus, reformation and democratisation should demand that the government implement initiatives that strengthen equality and fairness for the rights of all citizens. Yet reality iii shows that this is far from where it should be at, and indeed there are many obstacles hindering such initiatives. For instance, there is still an incomplete paradigm or lack of understanding about the state amongst citizens themselves, let alone amongst state apparatus and leaders. This lack of understanding concerning citizenship and human rights then spreads into newly compiled legislation and other regulations, and is very apparent in their implementation. The Wahid Institute is honoured to present an in-depth examination of this issue, which is based on aspirations and a commitment to enforce and guarantee one important right of Indonesians without exception and thus to realise the aspirations of the Indonesian nation and state as imagined by the Indonesian people and founding fathers – namely the right to freedom of religion or belief. The Wahid Institute Editorial Team Jakarta, May 2009 iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Aliansi Gerakan Anti-Pemurtadan AGAP : Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan/Anti- BeragamaApostasy Movement dan Berkeyakinan Alliance AKKBB : Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran/National KepercayaanAlliance for Freedom Masyarakat of ReligionCoordinating or Belief Bakor Pakem : Society / BarisanBoard for Ansor Monitoring Serbaguna Mystical Beliefs in Banser : Barisan Anti-Pemurtadan/Multi-function Helpers Front BAP : Berita Acara Pemeriksaan/Anti-Apostasy Front BAP : Badan Intelijen Negara /Police AInvestigativegency Report BIN : Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi/State Intelligence BPD : Brigade Mobil /Democratic Pioneer Star Party Brimob : /Mobile Brigade CAT : Convention Against Torture CEDAW : Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Dofiscrimination Discrimination Against Women CERD : Committee on the Elimination of Racial Pengendali Massa CRC : Convention on the Rights of Children Dalmas : /Riot Control Troops v Komandan Komando Wilayah Distrik/District Dandim : Komandan Pangkalan Udara/ CommanderMilitary Commander Danlanud : Komandan Rayon Militer Air Force Commander Danramil : Departemen Agama /District Military Depag : Departemen Dalam /DepartmentNegeri/ of Religious Affairs Depdagri : Departemen Luar Negeri Department of Internal Affairs Deplu : Dewan Republik Indonesia/Department of Foreign Affairs DPR : DPR Daerah /Indonesian House Deklarasiof Representatives HAM Universal DPRD : /Regional Parliament DUHAM : Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragam/Universal RDeclarationeligious Harmony on Human Rights FKUB : Front Pembela Islam /Forum for Fraksi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera FPI : /Islamic Defenders Front FPKS : Forum Rakyat Madani /Prosperous ForumJustice UmatParty IslamFraction FRM : Forum Umat Islam Bersatu/Civil Society Forum FUI : /Muslim Forum FUIB (Probolinggo) : Forum Ulama Umat Islam /United Muslim CommunityForum and Ulama FUUI : Gerakan Masyarakat Anti /IslamicAliran Sesat Forum Gemas : Gerakan Anti Ahmadiyah /Social Movement Against Deviant Sects GERAH : Gerakan Pemuda Ansor /Anti-Ahmadiyah Movement GP Ansor : Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia/Ansor Youth Movement GPdI : /Indonesian Pentecostal Church vi Gerakan Umat Islam Gerakan Umat Islam Indonesia GUI : /Muslim Movement GUII : Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan/Indonesian IslamMuslim Movement GUPPI : Islamic Education /Joint Effort for the Development of HAM : Hak Asasi Manusia/Human Rights ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD : International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESCR : International Covenant on Economic,Islam and Social, and Cultural Rights ICIP : IzinInternational Mendirikan Conference Bangunan on IkatanPluralism Pencak Silat Bima Suci IMB : /Building Permit IPBS : Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia /Holy Water Pencak Silat Association JAI : Jaksa Penuntut Umum /Indonesian KepalaAhmadiyah Kantor Group Depag JPU : /Public Prosecutor Kakandepag : Kepala Kepolisian Daerah/Head of the Department of Religious Affairs’ Office Kapolda : Kepala Kepolisian RI /Regional Police KepalaChief Kepolisian Sektor Kapolri : /Indonesian Police Chief Kapolsek : Kepala Kepolisian Wilayah/Sectoral Police Chief Kapolwil : Kejaksaan Negeri /District Police KomandoChief Laskar Islam Kejari : Command /State Prosecutor KLI : Komisi Nasional HAM /Islam Troop Komnas HAM : Komponen Muslim Kab./National Kuningan CommissionKuningan on Human Rights KOMPAK : / vii Kartu Tanda Penduduk KantorMuslim Urusan Component Agama KTP : /National ID Card KUA : Kitab Undang-Undang/Religious Hukum Pidana Affairs CriminalOffice Code KUHP : Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia / KWI : Lembaga Bantuan Hukum /Indonesian Church Fellowship LBH : /Legal Aid Foundation LP : LaskarLembaga Pembela Pemasyarakatan/Correction Islam Center/Prison LPI : Lembaga Penelitian dan/Islamic Pengkajian Defenders Islam In Force LPPI : Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat / - stitute for Islamic Studies and Research LSAF : Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia/Institute for Philosophy and Religious Studies Mabes Polri : Markas Polisi Resort / HIndonesianeadquarters Police Headquarters Mapolres : Menteri Koordinator/Regency Politik, Hukum, Police dan Keamanan Menkopolhukam : Majelis Jemaat/Coordinating GKI Jatibening Ministry Indah for Political, Legal and Security Affairs MJGKI-JI : Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat / Jatibening Indah Church Board MPR : /People’s Consultative Assembly MRORI : MajelisMonthly Ulama Report Indonesia on Religious Issues MTA : ofMoslem Ulama Television Ahmadiyah MUI : Musyawarah Nasional /Indonesian Council Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah Munas : /National Meeting Muspida : /Council for Provincial Officers viii Musyawarah Pimpinan Kabupaten Muspika : Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/Council for Government District Officers NKRI : Nusa Tenggara Barat /United States of the Republic of Indonesia NTB : Organisasi Konferensi/West Islam Nusa Tenggara NU : Nahdlatul Ulama OKI : Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan/Organisation Masyarakat of Teamthe Islamic for Conference Pakem : Society / Panitia KhususMonitoring Rancangan Mystical Undang-Undang Beliefs in Pemilihan Presiden Pansus RUU Pilpres : Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa/Special Committee for Pimpinanthe Presidential Daerah Election Muhammadiyah Bill PBB : /United Nations PDM : PT Pelabuhan Indonesia / Muhammadiyah Regional Leadership Pelindo : Pemerintah Daerah /State Owned PeraturanSeaport company Bersama Pemda : Peraturan Presiden /RegionalRI Government Perber : /Joint Regulation Perpres RI : Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia/Indonesian Presidential Regulation PGI : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa /Alliance of Indonesian Churches PKB : Pengadilan Negeri /National PegawaiAwakening Negeri Party Sipil PN : Kepolisian Daerah/State Court PNS : Perguruan Pencak Silat/Civil Servant Polda : Pengadilan Tata Usaha/Regional Negara Police PPS : /Pencak Silat Institute PTUN : Persatuan Umat Islam /State UAdministrativenion Court PUI : Rancangan Aksi Nasional/Indonesian HAM Muslim RAN-HAM : /Human ix Republik Indonesia RukunRights TetanggaNational Action Plan RI : Unit /Republic of Indonesia RT : Remaja Masjid al-Huda/Neighbourhood Manis Lor Association RUDAL : Rukun Warga /Manis Lor Satuanal-Huda Polisi Mosque Pamong Youth Praja Group RW : /Community Association Unit satpol PP : Surat Keputusan Bersama /Municipal Police SBY : Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono SKB : Tim Pengacara Muslim /Joint Decree ST : Setara Institute TPM : /Muslim Legal Team UIDHR : Undang-UndangUniversal Islamic Declaration of Human Undang-UndangRights Dasar 1945 UU : Constitution /Legislation UUD 1945 : Undang-Undang Republik
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