July 25, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 20669 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS U.S.S. GUAM LEADS EXCITING At this time, Mr. Speaker, I request The task force arrived on-station off the LIFE that the article "With the Bulls in coast of Lebanon on June 12. This was Beirut," be inserted in the RECORD. known as MODLOC for "modified location" Thank you. and it will long be remembered by the men HON. ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit and OF GUAM [From the Wings of Gold Magazine, Amphibious Squadron FOUR. As the Israe IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Summer 19831 lis tightened their stranglehold on the PLO, WITH THE BULLS IN BEIRUT Monday, July 25, 1983 preparations continued for the anticipated e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor. 20670 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS July 25, 1983 manned only to be can.:!elled or left on five then ride the ship to Naples. We were to ready for immediate missions. The oper minute standby. perform our shuttle missions from Inde ation proved particularly frustrating to All these frustrations were forgotten, pendence and then brief the SH-3 crews on Cobra crews who, due to political sensitivity however, we.h our first mission which took Forrestal who were scheduled to relieve us and the aggressive nature of their mission, place on the first of July. We were to on July 31. Little did we know that we were not utilized in Beirut. Their ordeal was launch from 40 miles off the shore, navigate would remain on station bouncing back and perhaps the hardest-standing alert con to Juniyal, make a passenger pick-up, return forth betwen Indy and Forrestal before stantly for a period of 17 days without being to Guam for fuel, and go on to Tel Aviv. Guam returned on August 20. called upon to take an active part. Sidearms were the only weapons author We soon got used to our new surroundings One of the more important operations ized. Navigation was a sticky point as radio in the CV Navy, although I suspect the car consisted of the airlift of communications aids were nonexistent and any error to the rier people never got completely accustomed south or north would cause the aircraft to to seeing our two green Hueys disrupting equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces break the shoreline over hostile Beirut or the orderly chaos of the CV flight deck. We who were endeavoring to establish their au over Syrian held territory to the north. A must have been a curious sight strapping on thority in the area. This equipment was air key navigational and communications assist our .38's, and launching off into the haze to lifted into Larnaca by Air Force transports was arranged with E-2C aircraft based on return a few hours later from somewhere in then ferried by squadron aircraft to the the USS Forrestal, which was also operating the east. waiting arms of the Lebanese in the Port of inMODLOC. Our most interesting mission came on Beirut. With Beirut International Airport I watched the two Hueys disappear in the August 7 as we were returning to Forrestal unavailable for use, the only rapid means of haze, then made my way from Primary to from Juniyal carrying the U.S. military liai moving this gear was via the helicopter link the Helo Direction Center to monitor their son team following its first meeting with between Cyprus and the Beirut landing progress on radar. They made their way Mr. Habib in Beirut. There was no E-2C air zone. Over 100,000 pounds of gear was trans toward the beach on vectors initially from borne this time so Rear Admiral Chatham ported during the operation. Guam and then from the W-2 aircraft of ordered USS Wainwright to a point 30 miles With the PLO evacuation completed, the VAW-124. off Juniyal to provide the necessary radar Marines were airlifted back to the ships on The helos caught sight of the coastline coverage. September 10 and the force retired toward and after a few anxious moments over Jun An SH-3H from HS-3 accompanied us to Naples. The operation had been eminently iyal Harbor, spotted the landing zone. Radio provide radio relay while we were in the successful and we all figured we would not contact was finally made with the Embassy landing zone. The H-3 accompanied us to see Beirut again this cruise. It seems we staff at the landing site and the aircraft the mouth of Juniyal Harbor and remained guessed wrong! While we were in Naples, landed to pick up their passengers. airborne as we landed to make our pickup. the massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla ref Returning to Guam, the aircraft were re As we took off and headed seaward, he fueled for their flight to Tel Aviv. The warned us of two F-16's overtaking us. We ugee camps took place. flight path, altitudes, and IFF procedures had seen Israeli aircraft and gunboats on And so, on September 21, the force sortied had been dictated by the Israelis. It was to previous missions and weren't too concerned from Naples Harbor en route to Lebanon be followed precisely. An enrout navigation about their presence in the area. But as the once again. We crossdecked our Cobras to al aid in the form of a Navy destroyer with bright blue Star of David, camouflage paint, the Nashville on the 23rd where they would Tacan was provided to form the southern and mounted Sidewinders on the wings of remain throughout the Beirut II operation. point of the "Gater airway." This ship was the F-16's flashed directly in front of our This strategy provided for more rapid re located about 65 miles south of our windscreen at about 100 feet, we had some sponse and freed up spots on the Guam MODLOC and became a sort of stepping second thoughts. For the next 15 minutes, flight deck for transports. stone to the Tel Aviv FIR. The flight to Tel the two fighters took turns splitting our for The heliborne insertion of two companies Aviv, was carefully plotted and flown to mation, passing in front, over, and below us, was planned at the Beirut International Air keep the helos out of SAM range from the and buffeting our aircraft as we proceeded port with another company to go ashore at Lebanese coast. back to Forrestal at 100 knots and 300 feet. the Port. All elements would link up and While our Hueys were south in Tel Aviv, This harassment continued for approxi occupy a line around the airport while the . another mission was called away and an mately 30 miles whereupon the planes broke Italians and French occupied positions to other pickup was made in Juniyal. This time off, climbed, and headed south toward the north. Political considerations delayed the destination was Larnaca, Cyprus to the Israel. the landing until 29 September. At 1400 on north. The two CH-46's employed communi When we returned the team to Juniyal that date, Lt. Col. Geske led eight CH-46's, cated with Larnaca through the E-2C which the next morning, Israeli soldiers met them three CH-53's, and two Hueys into the air relayed traffic. This aircraft followed the in the landing zone. The Israelis demanded port. helos' progress on radar, made all the neces identification, the nature of their business, Two reinforced rifle companies, nine sary calls to the tower, and even "watched" and detained them for 45 minutes before al the taxi evolutions on radar from a distance lowing them to be on their way. jeeps, four M274 Mules and 126,000 pounds of 100 miles. What capabilities those air After crossdecking back to Independence, of cargo were landed by air in three hours. craft and their crews have! This evolution we rejoined Guam on August 20 as she came For the next month, logistics flights were began a cooperative association with VAW- back on station. Enroute from Naples, the flown daily from Guam. Special diplomatic 125 and VAW-122 that lasted throughout squadron had picked up 103 passengers, missions and log flights to Cyprus were also the Beirut operations. Time and again air 15,000 pounds of mail and 40,000 pounds of routinely conducted. A medevac detachment borne E-2C's served as our eyes and voices cargo that had been waiting in Sigonella was established ashore to respond to emer in the eastern Med on flights between Leba and Souda Bay for transport to the contin gencies. This support was tested on Septem non, Israel, and Cyprus. gency forces. ber 30 when ordnance clearing operations We remained in MODLOC continuing our By this time the decision had been made resulted in injuries to four Marines. A CH- training, standing by, and flying special dip to insert a Multinational Force into Beirut 46, flown by our Executive Officer, Major lomatic missions. Ordnance training was to effect the evacuation of the PLO. Having Gary Rainey, responded to an urgent re conducted for Cobra crews and for the made a helo recon of the port facility the quest and quickly carried the injured Ma transport door gunners. day prior, Colonel Mead led the 32nd MAU rines to Guam for treatment. Meanwhile, negotiations were being con ashore in the Port of Beirut on August 25. Our relief came over the horizon on Octo ducted by the Special Envoy to the Middle While the battalion and service support ber 29 as HMM-263 embarked on Inchon ar East, Ambassador Philip Habib and his as group were ashore effecting the PLO with rived on station. Turnover was conducted sistant Mr. Morris Draper. Both were car drawal, the squadron remained aboard expeditiously and Guam departed Lebanese ried into and out of Lebanon by HMM-261, Guam three miles offshore. waters on November 1. who acquired the nickname the "Cammie We supported the operation by flying Cab Company." daily logistical flights between ships and Operations over the previous five months In late July, after having been at sea for shore. Numerous flights were also made to had been intense, exciting and meaningful. 66 days, Guam was released to a 72-hour Cyprus for high priority cargo and person Despite the hours of frustration that go recall and allowed a Naples port visit. In nel. Several VIP's appeared on the manifest hand-in-hand with an operation of this sort, order to continue necessary support for the during this period including the Secretary it was a rewarding experience. The Bulls shuttle diplomacy mission, two Hueys were of Defense on September 1st, when he came were going home with a new sense of confi crossdecked to the on-station CV, Independ to have a look at the evacuation operation. dence and accomplishment.• ence. Throughout this period, an alert force was Our small detachment land on the Indy maintained consisting of six CH-46's, two on July 26 expecting to stay a week and CH-53's, one Huey, and three Cobras ... July 25, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 20671 FORGET THE MAINE Why? Probably because of Nicaragua, solve, as they did in Cuba after a confronta whose welcome revolution produced an un tion that neither should want to repeat. welcome Cuban-style regime. The Sandi Forget the Global Equilibrium. That is HON.EDWARDJ.~Y nista rebels now running Nicaragua have nothing more than a pitch for spheres of in OF MASSACHUSETTS been rooting for an helping the rebels in El fluence, and those have to be earned, as in 1N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Salvador and, anticipating Yankee hostility, Europe. Nicaragua is no more surely "ours" Monday, July 25, 1983 taking arms from Cuba and other Soviet than Pakistan, or Afghanistan, is the Rus friends. sians'. Mr. Kissinger is right to say that mis • Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, doc Mr. Reagan says he'll go to any lengths to managing power anywhere can dissipate trines have been a staple of American stop Nicaragua's interference. But the evi power everywhere, but wisdom does not diplomacy for several decades. I am dence grows that this a pretext for efforts flow only from the barrel of a gun. Nicara sure my colleagues learned of the to overthrow the Sandinista regime. Hondu gua's deplorable passage from a right- to Monroe Doctrine while still in grade ras has been made a base for American-led campaigns in both El Salvador and Nicara left-wing dictatorship is an object lesson, school. We were taught that the gua, and people in Washington now not a threat to world peace. Monroe Doctrine is a fundamental ele expect-intend?-that provocations will Beware the dominoes, by all means. Nica ment of American foreign policy. As permit the Honduran Army, supported by ragua, like Cuba, should be prevented from an editorial in yesterday's New York American forces, to crush the leftists in exporting weapons, by joint action of hemi Times points out, however, perhaps we both countries. sphere nations. But blockades won't keep should reconsider the role of doctrines The Administration insists it will thus radical ideas from reaching frail societies. since they can take us to a place where provide for the "safety of our homeland" Does that mean acquiescing in the tri I, this Congress, and the American with a few billion dollars and without many umph of communism in one Cuba after an people do not want to go. I recommend American troops. Its private documents, other, in the doctrine of the Irreversible the column to my colleagues: however, already stress the value of at least Revolution? Of course not. Even Cuba will threatening direct American action. not forever be a Soviet ally. Much depends [From the New York Times, July 24, 19831 With the public unmoved, and Congress on what the United States has to offer FORGET THE MAINE torn between doubt and loyalty, Mr. Reagan Latin Americans, including its revolutionar 11-059 0-87-2:1 (Pt. 15) 20680 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS July 25, 1983 simplest, most dependable technology capa money by choosing a low-technology, low bers of Somoza's National Guard, the ble of performing the mission at hand and capability option are all too obvious. In a United States has more fully identi meeting potential threats. Less-costly tech way it really is too bad that no number of nology gets preference also-as long as it flighters capable of attacking an enemy at fied itself with the late Nicaraguan can do the job. 60,000 feet can stop in invader capable of dictator than seemed possible in 1979, Everyone involved with military hardware flying at, and shooting down from, 70,000 when we finally distanced ourselves and its development knows that this is true. feet. Too bad, perhaps, but true. from that despotic regime. The pre The problem is not with the facts, but with Many such things need to be said. People dictable effect inside Nicaragua has misunderstanding or misrepresentation of need to understand that the days are long been to consolidate support for the the facts. Such misunderstanding or misrep gone when numbers alone were the decisive Sandinistas and to discredit the inter resentation-they aren't always easily dis element in warfare. They need to under nal opposition. tinguished-sometimes reaches extremes stand that option for less advanced technol that would be hilarious if they weren't so ogy doesn't necessarily mean saving money. The image of hemispheric meddling damaging in their possible results. A good All these things need to be said. and they is straining the bonds of confidence example was an editorial published by one need to be heard.e and shared interest which form the of my home city's daily papers in February basis of U.S. relations with Latin of this year. That editorial observed, in America and other allies. words conveying both scorn and dismay, CENTRAL AMERICA: A SOUND Concerned about these strains, a dis that the F-100 Sabrejets of thirty years ago POLICY PROCESS-NOT ADVEN tinguished panel of Latin American cost much, much less than the air superiori TURISM ty fighters used by the U.S. Air Force today. and U.S. leaders led by Sol Linowitz The implication, clearly, was that increasing and Galo Plaza cautioned: costs were the result of an entrenched ob HON. CHARLES ROSE Sharp external confrontation with revolu session with fancy gadgetry. OF NORTH CAROLINA tionary regimes is more likely eventually to This editorial failed, rather predictably, to IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES breed intensified nationalist and revolution make note of certain significant details. It Monday, July 25, 1983 ary sentiment. • • • Policies that magnify a neglected to observe, for example, that F- danger out of proportion can themselves 100s were single-engine jets armed with • Mr. ROSE. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow become part of the problem. 20mm cannons, while today's air superiority the House will begin open consider If reciprocal and mutual security is to be fighter has two engines and an awesome as ation of H.R. 2760. This important fashioned in a region that has often experi sortment of air-to-air and air-to-ground enced overt and covert U.S. intervention, it weapons. Today's air superiority fighter has measure would end funding for the covert paramilitary action in Nicara would be useful to provide unmistakable as four times the thrust of the F-100. It flies surances that the United States will refrain twice as fast and twice as far and is so supe gua while authorizing overt security from reverting to these practices. rior in radar and flight control systems as to assistance funds for friendly countries make comparison seem absurd. in the region. FAULTY POLICY PROCESS None of this was considered in the editori Having had the privilege of serving Recent policies directed at ·resisting al. If any of it had been, it very likely would on the Intelligence Committee from Soviet and Cuban encroachment and have been viewed as another example of wasteful spending for airborne hot rods. But 1977 to 1983, I feel compelled to defending democracy in Central Amer U.S. citizens are capable of understanding inform my colleagues of the conclu ica have failed. Part of the explana that the improvements in fighter capability sions I have reached regarding the war tion lies in a policy process that has achieved since the early 1950s didn't result in Central America. systematically neglected the two prin from someone's whim. Those improvements In his appearance before a joint ses cipal ingredients of sustainable foreign were achieved because they were needed. .sion of Congress in April, President policy: Precise definition of our na The offensive forces of our potential en Reagan eloquently argued that the tional security interests and funda emies are always improving. We develop and build better fighters because without them United States has a stake in Central mental respect for the American we'd be left undefended. Voters can under America. I strongly agree that "the re democratic system. stand such things. But they need and de gion's freedom and our security" are The dilemma posed for the Congress serve the facts. at stake. As chairman of the Subcom is complex. The United States Without facts, people will be ill-equipped mittee on Oversight and Evaluation of launches a secret war which immedi to deal constructively with another thing the House Permanent Select Commit ately becomes public; it backs groups they often hear today-that modem tech tee on Intelligence for 5 years, I care whose aim is and has always been to nology makes weapons undependable be cause of its terrible, uncontrollable com fully watched events in Central Amer overthrow the Sandinistas, but claims plexity. This is demonstrably untrue, and ica, inCluding the growth of guerrilla it supports no such objective; it argues again a detailed comparison of the F-100 strength in El Salvador and the pro that vital hemispheric security inter with today's air superiority fighter is both gressive loss of pluralism in Nicaragua. ests are in peril, but cannot devise an typical and illuminating. F-100s, though far With the President, I oppose "pacifity, effective and consistent policy toward more rudimentary in virtually every kind of resignation and defeatism" in the face the region and marshal the national technology, had a record of 34.4 crashes of these and other developments. To consensus necessary to support it. with damage beyond repair per 100,000 flight hours; this record was accumulated his rhetorical questions I respond, Developing sound relations with a over a total of 500,000 flight hours for the "No, a democracy does not have to be revolutionary Nicaragua posed ample F-100 fleet. Today's air superiority fighter passive; no, we must not 'stand by challenges to policymakers both under fleet, having now accumulated well over while independent nations are inte the previous and the current adminis 600,000 total flight hours, has a loss rate of grated into the most aggressive empire tration. This administration, with its 4. 7 aircraft per 100,000 hours. Thus the F- the world has ever seen.' " contrasting approach in foreign policy, 100's loss rate was more than seven times But, while the President speaks of has failed to define clearly U.S. inter higher-and newer, better technology ac the threat posed by an aggressive est, communicate them effectively, counts for the difference. Improvements in technology also explain why F-100s aver empire, and the need for nations-as and address them through a full range aged about 2200 flight hours per aircraft, Harry Truman urged-to choose be of diplomatic, economic, and security while today's F-15 is designed for 8000 tween two ways of life, I believe the policies. Instead, there has been inflat hours of useful service. issue is not whether we stand up to ed rhetoric and inconsistent policies Examples of this kind could be listed the challenge, but how. Indeed, I see a which, for example, offer "negotia almost to infinity. And there are still other sad irony. Despite all its zeal to defend tions" simultaneously with an unde perspectives from which the question can be our security interests, this administra clared war. Asked what our policy is viewed; all are valid and all demonstrate that an alarmist response to the quality tion has-through some short-sighted toward Nicaragua, the administration quantity issue is not only unnecessary but policies-helped diminish our Nation's explains that we seek to influence Ni unjustified. security. caragua's internal policies in the direc The attractions of thinking that we might · By arming and directing paramili tion of greater democracy. It is un somehow defend the free world and save tary forces which include exiled mem- clear how paramilitary raids are con- July 25, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 20681 sistent with that objective, or even dispatch of some 12,000 to 15,000 for the policy or, conversely, gaging whether those actions have been seri Cuban military personnel • • • ." the degree of congressional oppposi ously examined against that goal. CIA's list of successes showed that tion to it. Equally important, an un Instead, we have seen reliance on a nothing had been learned from histo stated objective such as muscle flexing covert war that ·shortcuts a sound ry. The only study to have systemati is an untested objective. Costs and policy process. We have seen greater cally examined the classified ·records benefits are not weighed, and possible efforts to establish positions and play for a wide range of covert and military consequences are not considered. the aggrieved party than to define programs-the final report of the com While the press was beginning to U.S. interests and work creatively to mittee chaired by Senator Frank know as much about the operation as achieve them. Church-in 1975-76 found paramili the oversight committees, I was read Intelligence-the critical eyes and tary operations to be "an anomaly, if ing reporting dating back to the fall of ears of the Government in foreign af not an aberration, of covert action." It 1981 that Nicaraguan exiles were wait fairs-has also been jeopardized by argued that, in terms of achieving the ing for the United States to give them this polarization and by subtle pres policy goal and maintaining deniabi the green light. It was clear that if the sures to tell policymakers what they lity, "the evidence points toward the Nicaraguan exile community was wait want to hear. Last fall the Permanent failure of paramilitary activity as a ing for the green light from the Select Committee on Intelligence technique of covert action." I never United States, it would be no secret to issued a staff report that cited intelli found any indication that this admin the Cubans or the Sandinista govern gence weaknesses, including "occasion istration seriously evaluated previous ment of Nicaragua. As the operation al oversimplification and the sugges U.S. experience with paramilitary ac grew in strength the people who were tion of greater certainty than warrant tivity before committing the country being supported became more vocal, ed by the evidence." I emphasized at to it in Central America. not in their desire to interdict arms the time that, although I was not ac THE OVERT-COVERT WAR but in their intention to overthrow the cusing intelligence officials of having The presence of a U.S.-backed forces ... Government of Nicaragua. given in to policy pressures, these was already well known throughout Latin weaknesses, if not corrected, "could America. . . . Inevitably the operation Although from the start the oper lead to the intelligence community became as secret as Christmas Day. Wyden, ation risked sparking a war between being manipulated by administration Peter, "Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story." Nicaragua and Honduras. I was con policy rather than policy being guided . . . It began as a relatively small and low vinced that insufficient attention had level operation. However, as planning devel been given either to estimating this by properly evaluated intelligence." oped, it began to grow larger and larger and Beyond the accuracy and integrity of possibility or to considering what U.S. U.S. government participation in this activi response might be required. The great intelligence, there is the potential for ty began to become more and more appar an even greater casualty-the reputa ent. Wyden, Peter, "Bay of Pigs: The Untold danger of such activities is that they tion of the intelligence community. Story." can lead to miscalculation on one side or the other. It might lead to an ex PARAMILITARY ACTION IS NOT THE ANSWER In December 1981, when first ap " ... perhaps the most important question prised of a paramilitary program panded Cuban presence in Nicaragua. the United States must ask, is the risk against Nicaragua, I was struck by the It might lead to the presence of worth the potential pain? Has there been a arrogance and even the cynicism of combat aircraft. It might lead to an true evaluation of the chance of success or those who briefed us. Questioning the extended border clash with Honduras failure by an objective group not directly or complexity of the program, I asked, which could result in a general confla emotionally involved with its. implementa "How likely is it that U.S. involvement gration which would involve not only tion? Do the policymakers have a realistic Honduras and Nicaragua but all of the understanding of the operation?"-Kirkpat can be kept secret?" The response was, rick, Lyman J. Jr., "Paramilitary Case "If it is not leaked in Washington, countries in Central America, and Study: Bay of Pigs." there is probably a good chance that it could include the United States and PAST HISTORY will be kept secret." As I considered Cuba and, yes, possibly the Soviet In my tenure as chairman of the that response, I doubted that the pur Union. Wars have started over less Subcommittee on Oversight and Eval pose was a truly secret effort limited much less. And the provocation be uation, I saw firsthand and beginning strictly to interdicting arms-there tween Honduras and Nicaragua is cer steps in a process that has cost the was in my view an unacknowledged .ob tainly there. United States so much in Central jective-to reveal U.S. muscle. With the Gulf of Tonkin in mind, I America. A first step was the rea I found the ·parallels so similar to was equally concerned that such a wakening within the CIA of an enthu the disaster that befell the United paramilitary operation could be used siasm for paramilitary activity. I States in the Bay of Pigs that I circu as a pretext by the United States for became aware of this early in 1980, lated to the members of the commit committing U.S. forces to the defense and took. the occasion of a committee tee excerpts from Peter Wyden's book, of Honduras under the Rio Treaty. In briefing with a senior CIA official to "Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story." One fact, there are some who believe this ask, "When was the last time that we only has to substitute Nicaragua for was the objective but the Sandinistas had a paramilitary operation you Cuba and Honduras for the U.S. train did not bite. would characterize as successful?" ing base in Guatemala to bring With this overt-covert was being fea Unable to answer the question at the Wyden's book up to date. tured nightly on network news, with time, he agreed to provide a written It became clear in March 1982 that journalists being invited to travel with response. When it came, the response there was an unacknowledged objec the anti-Sandinista FDN forces in was unsettling, for it cited a very small tive-the flexing of U.S. muscle-when Nicaragua, no doubt with the adminis number of successes-chief among NSC documents related to the oper tration's blessing, it is little wonder which was the CIA's paramilitary in ation became public. Since those docu that the American people and the volvement in the Angolan war. As ments were not provided to the two Congress find themselves in conflict former CIA Director William Colby congressional intelligence committees, with such a policy. wrote in "Honorable Men," the effect it was evident that the executive Admiral Stansfield Turner, with of U.S. assistance to NFLA and branch was behind the revelation and whom I had my share of differences UNITA during the summer of 1975 the White House did little to deny it. when he was Director of Central Intel was to drive the MPLA "in their des While a covert paramilitary activity ligence, correctly emphasized recently peration" to call "for open help from was inconsistent with a sound policy the need to ensure that covert actions their Soviet and Cuban allies, who re process, its overt acknowledgment are undertaken only when they are sponded with a massive airlift of made it more so. It precluded develop likely to be supported by a national tanks, artillery, and rockets, and the ing necessary congressional backing consensus, and that careful judgments 20682 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS July 25, 1983 are needed to establish the nature of The overriding theme of this story is and applause from the crowds that gather our national interests and the way in that of young American determination to hear them play. which these can best be served. Since to overcome impossible odds to realize There's been just one snag. Call it disorga it is impossible to calculate the degree nization. a vision, an American impossible Until a few hours before the band mem of public consensus supporting a dream that came true in West Berlin. ber's first performance at the Zehlendorf covert action, a sound policy process Certairily we have a right to be proud town hall, city officials did not know they requires that any covert action be of these young people of Florida's were coming. There were no musical stands "consistent with, and in support of, 17th Congressional District who over available. the publicly avowed foreign policy of came so much adversity to travel so When the band showed up Thursday to the United States." That is, in fact, far. march in the parking lot of Berlin's town one of the requirements provided for Following are two Miami Herald ar hall, the cars were still there and couldn't in the Intelligence Activities Oversight ticles about this trip. be moved. Police at the town hall said there Improvement Act, recently introduced was no way they could rope off the lot for by the current chairman of the Sub THEY ARE THE STARS IN BERLIN the 30 minutes the band needed. SUMMARY OF LOCAL TELEPHONE RATE INCREASES Stated rationale . State 1982 increase 1983 increase Anticipated increases FCC access charge FCC depreciation Long-distance Loss of lon~ - Normal increases decision decision Deregulation of CPE AT&T divestiture competition distance subsidy operating expenses Alabama ...... 1 117,000,000 C Alaska ...... Arizona...... 2 79,000,000 Arkansas ...... 2 138,000,000 California ...... 2 1,400,000,000 Colorado ...... I 38,000,000 C Connecticut ...... 1 89,024,000 ...... C Delaware ...... 2 25,900,000 District of Columbia ...... • 82,000,000 florida ...... I 113,000,000 Georgia...... 2 158,463,000 B Hawaii...... 2 82,368,000 ...... A Idaho...... 2 34,000,000 ...... c c A Illinois ...... 1 21 ,000,000 B Indiana ...... 2 96,000,000 Iowa ...... 2 68,800,000 Kansas ...... 2 213,000,000 Kentucky ...... c Louisiana ...... C Maine ...... 1 11,400,000 C Maryland ...... 2 218,000,000 Massachusetts...... C c c !i~ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::~::~:~:~::::: : ::::~: ~: ~ : : : :: ~ 8 8 20696 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS July 25, 1983 SUMMARY OF LOCAL TELEPHONE RATE INCREASES-Continued Stated rationale State 1982 increase 1983 increase Anticipated increases FCC access charge FCC depreciation Long-distance Loss of lone· Normal increases decision decision Deregulation of CPE AT&T drlestiture axnpetition distance subsidy operating expenses Montana ...... 2 20,710,000 NeiJrasb ··-························································· I 8,033,000 c Nevada ...... I 5,857,000 c New Hampshire...... 1 8,380,000 ...... C c New Jersey ····························· 2 245,000,000 ...... c A c New Mexico ...... 2 86,100,000 B B New York ...... -...... C c North Carolina ...... 2 143,974,447 North Dakota ...... C c Ohio ...... 2 179,838,000 B Oklahoma ...... 2 301,000,000 Oregon ...... I 36,400,000 Pennsylvania ...... 2 378,000,000 Rhode Island ...... 2 21,139,000 South Carolina...... C South Dakota ...... 2 21 ,500,000 Tennessee...... 2 218,000,000 Texas ...... 2 1,000,000,000 Utah...... 2 43,961 ,000 Vermont ...... 2 16,000,000 ...... C V"argioia...... I 63,826,000 C i.~~-~: : : :::::: ::::::: : : :: :: ::: : :: ::: :::::: : ::::::::::::::::: ::~ : ~~ : = ·· ~ =nNiCO::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: c Virgin Islands ...... 1 Granted. 2 Pending. A= 1982 increase; B= 1983 increase; C= anticipated increase.e RISKING WAR FOR WHAT? A PEAcE ScARE FRoM MANAGUA ble proving any significant Nicaraguan role What is a reasonable bargain that could in El Salvador. Yet America's support of HON. RICHARD L. OTIINGER promote stability and perhaps even peace in rebels in Nicaragua is now blatant. Central America? Here is one idea: Call off The President justifies supporting the OF NEW YORK the dogs of war, insist on absolutely no mili "contras" by comparing the Sandinistas to IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES tary intervention across any border, ban the the European Communist regimes kept in shipment of offensive weapons to all gov power by Soviet tanks. If that were the case, Monday, July 25, 1983 ernments in the region, buy one-way tickets he should welcome Nicaragua's offer to send e Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, the home for all foreign military advisers, away its Cuban helpers along with all for issue of U.S. involvement in Central reward respect for human rights and demo eign advisers in the region. America has become the premier cratic elections and encourage true reconcil The hostilities of years are not going to be international issue in the press and in iation all around. dispelled by the semantic maneuvers of a the minds of our citizens. National You may be forgiven for not realizing that few days. Plainly, it would take a lot of unity on this issue is growing against this is precisely the plan the Reagan Admin strings to make any such diplomatic pack intervention, against Mr. Reagan's istration says it favors. It is the program age hold. But some promising ideas are now desire to demonstrate our might to proposed by Central America's democratic on the table, put there by allies as well as states at a meeting in Costa Rica last Octo adversaries. They call for something more Nicaragua, and against what is now ber. And in crucial respects, it overlaps pro considered than Mr. Reagan's remark that the constant haranguing for more posals just offered by Nicaragua and by the dealing with the Sandinistas is difficult be military aid and advisers to El Salva Contadora group of mediators comprising cause "they're being subverted or directed dor and Honduras. Mr. Reagan's blue Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia and Panama. by outside forces." ribbon Kissinger Commission is hardly This week, just as the White House was Generously testing the sincerity of Nicara the way to gain national unity. cranking up Caribbean war games, Nicara gua's overture would cost little. Perhaps the Instead of trying to gain a national gua was obviously hoping to take the wind Nicaraguans want to be more reasonable consensus . by saying the same things out of American sails. Its leftist rulers only because they are scared of the new more loudly, Mr. Reagan would do dropped their insistence on direct talks only Yankee belligerence. But isn't that what well to listen to the consensus that has with the United States and Honduras. They Mr. Reagan hoped for? already formed: it is time to stop our came around instead to the American view warmongering in Central America. It that meaningful talks to stabilize Central is time to recognize the potential of America have to be regionwide. RISKING WAR FOR WHAT? helping these nations develop, safely Yes, said the State Department, that's a "positive step." But where are Nicaragua's
<<