i ii Table of Contents Tab 1: Intelligence Overview Defining and Using Intelligence...... 7 What is the Intelligence Community?...... 7 The Six Steps in the Intelligence Cycle...... 10 Tab 2: Intelligence Community Members Office of the Director of National Intelligence...... 15 Central Intelligence Agency...... 18 Defense Intelligence Agency...... 20 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency...... 22 National Reconnaissance Office...... 23 National Security Agency...... 23 Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence...... 25 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis...... 25 Coast Guard...... 27 Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration...... 27 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation...... 29 Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research...... 31 Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis...... 32 Army...... 32 Navy...... 33 Air Force...... 34 Marine Corps...... 34 Tab 3: Requirements, Planning, and Direction What Intelligence Can (and Cannot) Do...... 39 Who Uses U.S. Intelligence?...... 41

1 Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation...... 44 Acquisition/Science and Technology: Delivering Technical Capabilities...... 45 Intelligence Community Requirements Processes...... 46 Collection Management Overview...... 47 Prioritizing Intelligence Issues: The National Intelligence Priorities Framework...... 49 Tab 4: Collection, Processing, and Exploitation Sources of Intelligence...... 53 GEOINT...... 53 HUMINT...... 54 MASINT...... 54 OSINT...... 54 SIGINT...... 55 Processing and Exploitation...... 56 Tab 5: Analysis, Production, and Feedback Analysis and Production...... 59 Estimative Language...... 59 Analytic Products...... 60 Classification...... 61 Review and Release...... 62 Tab 6: Organizational Oversight Joint Intelligence Community Council...... 67 Legislative Oversight...... 68 National Security Council...... 69 President’s Intelligence Advisory Board...... 70 Office of the Inspector General...... 70 Financial Management and Oversight...... 70 Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity...... 71 Civil Liberties and Privacy Office...... 72

2 Tab 7: Careers in the Intelligence Community The Benefits of Working in the IC...... 75 Tab 8: References Glossary of Terms...... 79 Acronyms and Abbreviations...... 86 Resources...... 90 Laws and Policies Governing the IC ...... 94 Subject Index...... 97

3 4 INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW

Intelligence Overview

5 In the early morning hours of May 2, 2011, a U.S. military raid on an al-Qa’ida compound in Abbot- tabad, Pakistan, killed America’s most-wanted terrorist, Usama Bin Ladin. U.S. agencies and partners across the Intelligence Community had been collecting intelligence about the compound since it was discovered in August 2010. The raid on the compound, authorized by the President on April 29, was conducted by a small team of special operations soldiers. The raid was designed to minimize collateral damage and risk to non-combatants in the compound and Pakistani civilians in the area. The death of Bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida’s founder and only amir, or commander, in its 22-year history, marks the single greatest victory in the U.S.-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually dissolve al-Qa’ida.

THE OPERATION THAT KILLED BIN LADIN

Courtesy of CIA Intelligence Overview

Defining and Using Intelligence According to the Intelligence Reform and Ter- The U.S. Government uses intelligence to rorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the improve and more fully understand the con- terms “National Intelligence” and “intelligence sequences of its national security decisions. related to national security” refer to all intel- Intelligence informs policy decisions, military ligence, regardless of the source from which it actions, international negotiations, and inter- is derived and including information gathered actions with working-level contacts in foreign within or outside the United States, countries. In some circumstances, intelligence can also aid the efforts of homeland security n that pertains, as determined to be con- providers and first responders. sistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one U.S. Govern- What is the Intelligence Community? ment agency; and The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of n that involves: Executive Branch agencies and organizations n Threats to the U.S., its people, that work separately and together to engage in property, or interests; intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection n The development, proliferation, or use of the national security of the United States. of weapons of mass destruction; or These activities include: n Any other matter bearing on U.S. national homeland security. n Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council,

7 the Secretaries of State and Defense, and into three groups: Program Managers, Depart- other Executive Branch officials for the ments, and Service components. performance of their duties and fulfillment n Program Managers advise and assist the of their responsibilities. ODNI in identifying collection requirements, n Production and dissemination of developing budgets, managing finances, intelligence. and evaluating the IC’s performance. n Collection of information concerning n Departments are IC components embed- intelligence activities directed against the ded within Government departments (other United States, international terrorist and than the Department of Defense [DoD]). narcotics activities, and other such hostile These components focus on serving their activities carried out by foreign powers, parent department’s intelligence needs. organizations, persons, and their agents. n All intelligence personnel in the armed n The conduct of actions to protect against forces are members of the Service IC hostile activities directed against the components, which primarily support their United States. own Service’s information needs. Each Service has at least one major intelligence n Performance of special activities. organization as well as intelligence officers n Performance of administrative and support integrated throughout its structure. activities within the United States and abroad that are necessary for the Intelligence Integration performance of various other intelligence The core mission of ODNI is to lead the Intel- activities. ligence Community in intelligence integra- n Performance of such other intelligence tion. Basically, intelligence integration means activities as the President may direct from synchronizing collection, analysis, and counter- time to time. intelligence so that they are fused—effectively operating as one team. The IC is led by the Director of National Intel- ligence (DNI), who is the head of the Office Unifying Intelligence Strategies (UIS) are of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) the central critical plans for achieving intel- and whose duty is to coordinate the other 16 IC ligence integration. They cover our strategies components based on intelligence consumers’ by geography and topic. They foster an environ- needs. The other members of the IC are divided ment that encourages, enables, and recognizes integration at all levels of the IC.

8 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

PROGRAM MANAGERS

FBI National Central Defense National National National Geospatial- Intelligence Intelligence Reconnaissance Security Security Intelligence Agency Agency Of ce Agency Branch Agency

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DEA Of ce Energy Of ce of DHS Of ce of State Bureau of Treasury Of ce of National Intelligence and Intelligence Intelligence of Intelligence Security Counter- and Analysis and Research and Analysis Intelligence Intelligence

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Air Force Army Coast Guard Marine Corps Naval Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence

National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) and with leading integration across the IC by topic their teams create UIS in line with the IC and region. prioritized requirements. They are thus charged

9 Planning & Collection Processing & Analysis & Dissemination Evaluation Direction Exploitation Production

The Six Steps in the Intelligence Cycle The Intelligence Cycle is the process of devel- oping raw information into finished intelligence for use by policymakers, military commanders, and other consumers in decisionmaking. This six-step cyclical process is highly dynamic, continuous, and never-ending . The sixth step, evaluation (which includes soliciting feedback from users) is conducted for each of the other five steps individually and for the Intelligence Cycle as a whole. The six steps that constitute the Intelligence Cycle are as follows:

10 Planning and Direction: [HUMINT], Measurement and Establish the consumer’s intel- Signature Intelligence [MA- ligence requirements and plan SINT], Open-Source Intelligence intelligence activities accordingly. [OSINT], and Signals Intelli- gence [SIGINT]). The sources of The planning and direction step the raw data may include, but sets the stage for the Intel- are not limited to, news reports, ligence Cycle. It is the spring- aerial imagery, satellite imag- board from which all Intelligence ery, and government and public Cycle activities are launched. documents. Oftentimes, the direction part of the step precedes the planning Processing and Exploitation: part. Generally, in such cases, Convert the raw data into a com- the consumer has a require- prehensible format that is usable ment for a specific product. That for production of the finished product may be a full report, a product. graphic image, or raw informa- tion that is collected, processed, The processing and exploitation and disseminated, but skips the step (see the Glossary of Terms analysis and production step. for a definition of “exploitation”) Given the customer’s require- involves the use of highly trained ment, the intelligence organiza- and specialized personnel and tion tasked with generating the technologically sophisticated product will then plan its Intel- equipment to turn the raw data ligence Cycle activities. into usable and understandable information. Data translation, Collection: Gather the raw data data decryption, and interpreta- required to produce the finished tion of filmed images and other product. imagery are only a few of the pro- cesses used for converting data Data collection is performed to stored on film, magnetic, or other gather raw data related to the media into information ready for five basic intelligence sources analysis and production. (Geospatial Intelligence [GEO- INT], Human Intelligence

11 Analysis and Production: Dissemination: Deliver the Integrate, evaluate, analyze, and finished product to the consumer prepare the processed informa- that requested it and to others as tion for inclusion in the finished applicable. product. The consumer that requested The analysis and production step the information receives the also requires highly trained and finished product, usually via specialized personnel (in this electronic transmission. Dissem- case, analysts) to give meaning ination of the information typi- to the processed information cally is accomplished through and to prioritize it against known such means as websites, email, requirements. Synthesizing the Web 2.0 collaboration tools, and processed information into a hardcopy distribution. The final, finished, actionable (see the finished product is referred to as Glossary of Terms for a defini- “finished intelligence.” After the tion of “actionable”) intelligence product is disseminated, further product enables the information gaps in the intelligence may be to be useful to the customer. identified, and the Intelligence Note that, in some cases, the Cycle begins all over again. Intelligence Cycle may skip this step (for example, when the Evaluation: Continually acquire consumer needs only specific feedback during the Intelligence reported information or prod- Cycle and evaluate that feedback ucts such as raw imagery). This to refine each individual step and was the case during the Cuban the cycle as a whole. Missile Crisis (October 1962) Constant evaluation and feed- when President Kennedy needed back from consumers are only the actual number of pieces extremely important to enabling of Soviet equipment in Cuba those involved in the Intelligence and facts concerning reports on Cycle to adjust and refine their observed Soviet activity with no activities and analysis to better analysis of that information. meet consumers’ changing and evolving information needs.

12 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Intelligence Community Members Navajo Code Talkers

Courtesy of Navajo Code Talkers

With little more than ingenious application of their native language, the Navajo Code Talkers created the only unbreakable code in modern military history. From Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Code Talkers served with distinction in every major engagement of the Pacific Theater from 1942 to 1945. Their code, which the Japanese never managed to break, helped to end World War II and save thousands of lives. The Code Talkers were young Navajo men who were tapped by the U.S. Marines to devise a code for radio communications. The Code Talkers’ cryptographic innovation made use of a little-studied and extremely complex Native American language unlike any other. English words were spelled out using Navajo words to represent letters of the English alphabet. For instance, the words “wol-la-chee” (which means “ant” in Navajo) and “be-la-sana” (apple) both stood for the letter “A.” The developers of the code also used Navajo words to represent more than 400 frequently used military terms. The word “da-he-tih-hi” (hum- mingbird) stood for “fighter plane,” and “chay-da-gahi” (tortoise) was translated as “submarine.” Intelligence Community Members

Office of the Director of National Intelligence Post 9/11 investigations proposed sweeping the DNI with the advice and consent of the change in the Intelligence Community (IC), Senate. The DNI works closely with a Presiden- which resulted in Congressional passage of the tially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Principal Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Deputy Director of National Intelligence to Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The IRTPA created the effectively integrate all intelligence related to Office of the Director of National Intelligence national and homeland security in defense of (ODNI) to improve information sharing, pro- the homeland and in support of United States mote a strategic, unified direction, and ensure national security interests at home and abroad. integration across the U.S. Intelligence Com- The core mission of the ODNI is to lead the IC munity. The ODNI stood up on April 21, 2005; in Intelligence Integration, forging a communi- it is led by a Director of National Intelligence ty that delivers the most insightful intelligence (DNI). possible. Intelligence Integration is the key to As the leader of the 17 Intelligence Com- ensuring that the highest quality of intelligence munity organizations, the DNI serves as the is delivered with the right inputs, at the right principal advisor to the President and the Na- time, in defense of the Homeland. tional Security Council for intelligence matters The ODNI is also comprised of several statutory related to the national security, and oversees components, to include the National Counter- and directs the implementation of the National terrorism Center (NCTC), the National Coun- Intelligence Program. The President appoints terproliferation Center (NCPC), the National

15 Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), and the terrorism threat reporting; management National Intelligence Council (NIC). and incident information tracking; and support for worldwide, national, and inter- national special events. n Directorate of Terrorist Identities: Main- tains a consolidated repository of informa- tion on international terrorist identities and National Counterterrorism Center ensures Federal agencies can access the The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), information they need through the Terrorist which resides within the ODNI, has primary Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). responsibility within the U.S. Government n Office of National Intelligence Manage- for counterterrorism intelligence analysis and ment: Provides strategic management of counterterrorism strategic operational planning. all national intelligence related to the IC’s NCTC’s components are the Directorate of In- counterterrorism mission to set analytic telligence, Directorate of Strategic Operational and collection priorities; advance analytic Planning, Directorate of Operations Support, tradecraft and training; and lead strategic Directorate of Terrorist Identities, and the planning, evaluation, and budgeting. Office of National Intelligence Management. Their functions are: n Directorate of Intelligence: Leads the pro- duction and integration of counterterrorism analysis for the U.S. Government. National Counterproliferation Center n Directorate of Strategic Operational The National Counterproliferation Center Planning: Directs the U.S. Government’s (NCPC) is the bridge from the IC to the policy planning efforts to focus all elements of community for activities within the U.S. Gov- national power against the terrorist threat. ernment associated with countering the prolif- n Directorate of Operations Support: Provides eration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). the common intelligence picture for the NCPC conducts strategic counterproliferation counterterrorism community with 24 hours planning for the IC to support policy efforts a day/7 days a week situational awareness; to prevent, halt, or mitigate the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related

16 O OR F NA materials and technologies. This includes both CT T E IO IR N D A

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C O O actors. NCPC achieves this by drawing on the E expertise of counterproliferation professionals National Intelligence Council in the IC, the U.S. Government, industry, and The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a academia. These relationships foster an atmo- Congressionally-mandated council, is a com- sphere of collaboration and intelligence sharing ponent of the ODNI that conducts mid- and in order to protect the U.S.’s interests at home long-term strategic analysis through the use and abroad. of all-source intelligence. Since its formation in 1979, the NIC has been a source of deep substantive expertise on intelligence matters and a facilitator of integrated, IC coordinated strategic analysis on issues of key concern to senior U.S. policymakers. Some of the NIC’s core functions are to: National Counterintelligence Executive The National Counterintelligence Execu- n Produce National Intelligence Estimates tive (NCIX) serves as the head of national (NIEs) — the IC’s most authoritative counterintelligence and security for the U.S. written assessments on national security Government. Per the Counterintelligence En- issues, as well as a broad range of other hancement Act of 2002, the NCIX is charged Community coordinated products. with promulgating an annual strategy for all n Foster outreach to nongovernmental ex- counterintelligence elements of the U.S. perts in academia and the private sector to Government. The Office of the NCIX is charged broaden the IC’s perspective. with integrating the activities of all counter- intelligence programs to make them coherent n Articulate substantive intelligence priori- and efficient. They also coordinate counterin- ties to guide intelligence collection and telligence policy and budgets to the same end. analysis. It is also responsible for evaluating the perfor- mance of the counterintelligence community against the strategy. ONCIX’s Special Security Division is responsible for security policy and uniformity across the U.S. Government.

17 penetration by hostile foreign organizations and individuals. NCS also carries out covert actions in support of U.S. policy goals when legally and properly directed and authorized by the Central President. Intelligence Agency The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyzes all-source intelligence and produces reports, The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the briefings, and papers on key foreign intel- largest producer of all-source national security ligence issues. This information comes from intelligence for senior U.S. policymakers. The a variety of sources and methods, including CIA’s intelligence analysis on overseas devel- U.S. personnel overseas, human intelligence opments feeds into the informed decisions by reports, satellite photography, open source policymakers and other senior decisionmakers information, and sophisticated sensors. in the national security and defense arenas. The CIA does not make foreign policy. The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) accesses, collects, and exploits The Director of the CIA (DCIA) is the National information to facilitate the execution of the Human Intelligence Manager and serves on CIA’s mission by applying innovative scientific, behalf of the DNI as the national authority for engineering, and technical solutions to the coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of most critical intelligence problems. clandestine HUMINT operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, Executive Orders, and interagency agreements. CIA is headquartered in McLean, Virginia.

Organization The National Clandestine Service (NCS) has responsibility for the clandestine collection (primarily human source collection, or HU- MINT) of foreign intelligence that is not obtain- able through other means. The NCS engages in counterintelligence activities by protecting classified U.S. activities and institutions from

18 The Directorate of Support (DS) delivers a that meets the needs of policymakers, the full range of support, including acquisitions, military, state and local law enforcement, communications, facilities services, financial operations officers, and analysts through- management, information technology, medical out the U.S. Government. services, logistics, and the security of Agency n Helping to enable open source capabili- personnel, information, facilities, and technol- ties in other parts of the Government and ogy. DS services are both domestic and inter- military. national in focus and are offered 24 hours a day/7 days a week. n Hosting open source material on Open- Source.gov for Government-wide use. CIA is the Executive Agent for In-Q-Tel, the nonprofit, strategic venture capital firm char- About OSC: OSC produces more than 2,300 tered to connect the technology demands of products daily, including translations, tran- the CIA and IC partners’ intelligence missions scriptions, analyses, reports, video compila- with the emerging technology of the entrepre- tions, and geospatial intelligence, to address neurial community. short-term needs and longer-term issues. Its products cover issues that range from foreign political, military, economic, science, and technology topics, to counterterrorism, coun- 2SHQ6RXUFH&HQWHU terproliferation, counternarcotics, and other homeland security topics. The Open Source Center OSC also collects “gray literature,” which is The Open Source Center (OSC), under the material with very limited distribution, such as DNI, is the U.S. Government’s center for open academic papers, brochures, leaflets, and other source intelligence. The Director of the CIA publicly distributed materials. serves as the Executive Agent for the DNI in OSC provides training through its Open Source managing the OSC. It is charged with: Academy, consultative services, and personnel n Collecting, translating, producing, and exchanges. disseminating open source information

19 Director also serves as commander of the Stra- tegic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Defense Intelligence Agency Organization The Directorate for Analysis (DI) assesses for- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) col- eign militaries with focus on weapons of mass lects, produces, and manages foreign military destruction (WMD), missile systems, terrorism, intelligence for policymakers and military com- infrastructure systems, and defense-related manders. It has major activities at the Defense medical issues. The Deputy Director for Analy- Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Joint Base sis is dual-hatted as the Functional Manager Anacostia-Bolling, in Washington, D.C.; the for Analysis for the Defense Intelligence Analy- Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), sis Program. in Huntsville, Alabama; the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), in Frederick, The Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff Maryland; Rivanna Station near Charlottesville, (J2) provides foreign military intelligence to the Virginia; and Quantico Marine Corps Base, Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior DoD officials. Virginia. Approximately 30 percent of DIA’s The Defense Counterintelligence and Human employees are military, and approximately 70 Intelligence Center (DCHC) directs, manages percent are civilians. and conducts Defense Counterintelligence (CI) The DIA Director is a senior military intel- and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) activities ligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense to meet Defense requirements. The DCHC is and the DNI. In addition, the DIA Director is organized to direct, coordinate and deconflict the program manager for the General Defense CI and HUMINT issues across Defense, com- Intelligence Program (GDIP); program man- batant commands and the service CI/HUMINT ager for the DoD Foreign Counterintelligence organizations. Program; functional manager for Measure- The Directorate for MASINT and Technical Col- ment and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) lection (DT) is the defense intelligence center and, since 2006, program coordinator for the for Measurement and Signatures Intelligence DIA and Combatant Command portion of the (MASINT). It collects and analyzes MASINT, Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The DIA and also develops new MASINT capabilities.

20 assess underground facilities (UGFs) used by adversarial state and non-state actors. UFAC coordinates IC efforts to detect, analyze, col- lect, and report on UGF programs in support of U.S. policymakers, warfighters, and the de- fense acquisition community. The UFAC Direc- tor reports jointly to the Secretary of Defense and the DNI through DIA. UFAC is composed of elements from DIA, Defense Threat Reduc- tion Agency (DTRA), NGA, and NSA.

“United in Memory – Committed to Freedom” is a memorial dedicated to the seven DIA employees who lost their lives on 9/11 at the Pentagon.

The Directorate for Information Management National Media Exploitation Center and the Chief Information Office serves as DIA’s information technology component. It The National Media Exploitation Center manages the Department of Defense Intel- (NMEC) ensures the rapid collection, process- ligence Information System (DoDIIS) and ing, exploitation, dissemination, and sharing of operates the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Com- all acquired and seized media across the intel- munications System (JWICS). ligence, counterintelligence, military, and law enforcement communities. These tasks include the collection, receipt, cataloging, initial pro- cessing, and transmission of information; fo- rensic analysis and translation; and reporting, storage, dissemination, and sharing. NMEC is a DNI Center, and DIA is its Executive Agent. The Underground Facilities Analysis Center The Underground Facilities Analysis Center (UFAC) uses national intelligence and non- intelligence resources to find, characterize, and

21 National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is the nation’s premier source of geospa- tial intelligence.

As a Department of Defense combat support Headquartered in Springfield, Virginia, NGA agency and a member of the U.S. Intelligence also has facilities in St. Louis, Missouri. NGA Community, NGA provides imagery, geospatial, support teams are located worldwide to provide and targeting analysis, along with image sci- direct GEOINT services to NGA customers and ences and modeling for U.S. national defense, partners. disaster relief, and safety of navigation. The vision of NGA is to put the power of Geo- spatial Intelligence (GEOINT) into its custom- ers’ hands n By providing online, on-demand access to its content, services, expertise, and sup- port, along with the tools that allow users National to serve themselves, and Reconnaissance n By broadening and deepening its analytic Office expertise, providing anticipatory analysis, The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was and moving from a target-based model to an established in September 1961 as a classified issue-driven, activity-based environment. agency of the Department of Defense (DoD). NGA seeks to know the Earth, show the way, The existence of the NRO and its mission were and understand the world. declassified in September 1992.

22 Headquartered in Chantilly, Virginia, the NRO The NRO is funded through the National develops and operates unique and innovative Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military overhead reconnaissance systems and con- Intelligence Program (MIP) consistent with the ducts intelligence-related activities for U.S. na- priorities and processes established by the DNI tional security. The NRO is staffed by members and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intel- of the armed services as well as civilians from ligence (USD(I)). the Central Intelligence Agency and the DoD. The NRO is managed by a Director, a Principal Deputy Director, and a Deputy Director. NRO systems provide SIGINT (enemy com- munications, signals from foreign weapons systems, and other signals of interest) and National GEOINT (imagery) intelligence data. NRO Security Agency satellites are frequently the only collectors able to access critical areas of interest in support of The National Security Agency and its military covert and high priority operations. partner, the Central Security Service, leads the U.S. Government in cryptology that en- Key customers and mission partners of the NRO compasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) include: policymakers, the Armed Services, the and Information Assurance (IA) products Intelligence Community, Departments of State, and services, and enables Computer Network Justice, and the Treasury, and civil agencies. Operations (NCO) in order to gain a decision All of them depend on NRO systems to help advantage for the nation and our allies under attack hard problems such as: all circumstances. n Countering the Improvised Explosive De- NSA is part of the Department of Defense, vice (IED) threat and is staffed by a combination of civilian and n Capturing terrorists military personnel. n Warning of enemy attacks The Central Security Service (CSS) provides timely and accurate cryptologic support, knowl- n Combating WMD proliferation edge, and assistance to the military crypto- n Combating drug trafficking logic community. It promotes full partnership between NSA and the cryptologic elements n Supporting natural disaster response of the Armed Forces, and teams with senior

23 military and civilian leaders to address and act both foreign Signals Intelligence and Informa- on critical military-related issues in support of tion Assurance, maintains cognizance of na- national and tactical intelligence objectives. tional security information needs, and monitors CSS coordinates and develops policy and guid- unfolding world events. ance on the Signals Intelligence and Informa- The NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) tion Assurance missions of NSA/CSS to ensure uses both Information Assurance and Signal military integration. Intelligence information and authorities to NSA/CSS has an extensive consumer outreach uncover and characterize cyberthreats and system, with representatives in many intelli- to provide situational awareness for network gence consumer organizations in the Washing- operators and defenders. ton, D.C., area, in other parts of the U.S., and The Research Directorate is the only “in- around the world. NSA’s headquarters is at Fort house” organization in the Intelligence Com- Meade, Maryland. munity dedicated to advancing intelligence through science. They create research break- Organization throughs in mathematics, science, and engineer- The Signals Intelligence Directorate is respon- ing that enable NSA/CSS to achieve and sustain sible for collecting, processing, and dissemi- advances for the Intelligence Community. nating information from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and to support military operations. Operating under the authority of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Information Assurance Directorate ensures the availability, integrity, Department authentication, confidentiality, and non- repudiation of national security and telecom- of Energy munications and information systems (national Office of Intelligence and security systems). CounterIntelligence The National Security Operations Center The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible (NSOC) is a 24 hours a day/7 days a week for U.S. energy policy. operations center that provides total situational awareness across the NSA/CSS enterprise for The Department of Energy also has a system of National Laboratories and Technical Centers,

24 which are primarily operated by private corpo- Review. I&A ensures that information related to rations and universities. They conduct scien- homeland security threats is collected, ana- tific research in the national interest. lyzed, and disseminated to all relevant custom- ers. The I&A mission is to equip the Homeland The Office of Intelligence and Counterintel- Security Enterprise with the intelligence and ligence (IN) is DOE’s intelligence office and IC information it needs to keep the homeland component. It focuses on assessing worldwide safe, secure, and resilient. I&A’s mission is nuclear terrorism threats and nuclear counter- supported by four strategic goals: proliferation, and evaluating foreign technology threats. This office also provides the IC with n Promote understanding of threats through access to DOE’s energy information and techni- intelligence analysis cal expertise. n Collect information and intelligence perti- nent to homeland security n Share information necessary for action n Manage intelligence for the homeland security enterprise Department I&A is a member of the Intelligence Commu- of Homeland nity and part of a larger Homeland Security Security Enterprise that includes Departmental leaders and components, state, local, tribal, territorial Office of Intelligence and and private sector partners and other IC mem- Analysis bers, all of whom require and generate home- The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) land security intelligence and information. The is responsible for leading the unified national Under Secretary for I&A (U/SIA) also serves as effort to secure the United States by prevent- DHS’ Chief Intelligence Officer and is responsi- ing and deterring terrorist attacks and respond- ble to both the Secretary of Homeland Security ing to threats and hazards. and the Director of National Intelligence. I&A’s budget is 100 percent funded in the National The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Intelligence Program (NIP). provides intelligence support across the full range of Homeland Security missions, as I&A has a unique mandate within the Intelli- defined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security gence Community and the Federal Government

25 lead for sharing information and intelligence environment for the receipt, analysis, gather- with state, local, tribal, and territorial govern- ing, and sharing of threat-related information ments and the private sector. I&A serves as the between the Federal Government and state, information conduit and intelligence advocate local, tribal, territorial, and private sector for state, local, tribal, and territorial govern- partners. ments. I&A supports 72 recognized state and Located in states and major urban areas major urban area fusion centers with deployed throughout the country, fusion centers are personnel and systems, training, and collabora- uniquely situated to empower front-line law tion. This national network of fusion centers enforcement, public safety, fire service, is the hub of much of the two-way intelligence emergency response, public health, Critical and information flow between the Federal Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) pro- Government and our state, local, tribal, and tection, and private sector security personnel territorial partners. The fusion centers repre- to understand local implications of national sent a shared commitment between the federal intelligence, thus enabling local officials government and the state and local govern- to better protect their communities. Fusion ments who own and operate them. centers provide interdisciplinary expertise and Although they are not part of the IC, several of situational awareness to inform decision-mak- DHS’s other components have extensive inter- ing at all levels of government. They conduct actions with the IC, including Immigration and analysis and facilitate information sharing Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border while assisting law enforcement and homeland Protection, Transportation Security Administra- security partners in preventing, protecting tion, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Citizenship against, and responding to crime and terrorism. and Immigration Services. Fusion centers are owned and operated by In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard, a DHS com- state and local entities with support from ponent, is a member of the IC. federal partners in the form of deployed per- sonnel, training, technical assistance, exercise Fusion Centers support, security clearances, connectivity to State and major urban area fusion centers federal systems, technology, and grant funding. serve as focal points within the state and local

26 Y THREA NC T E A Coast Guard protects the vital economic and S G S A E R S E S

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R T D A I N sponsibilities including the safety and security Interagency Threat Assessment and of the public, our natural and economic re- Coordination Group sources, the global maritime transportation sys- The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal tem, and the integrity of our maritime borders. first responders from around the United States The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal and federal intelligence analysts from the Investigations Enterprise develops actionable Department of Homeland Security, Federal intelligence to support the Coast Guard in all Bureau of Investigation, and National Coun- eleven of its statutory missions. terterrorism Center working to enhance the The Coast Guard fills a unique niche within sharing of federal information on counterter- the Intelligence Community. As a result of its rorism, homeland security, and weapons of diverse authorities and missions, the Coast mass destruction with state, local, and tribal Guard maintains broad awareness of the consumers of intelligence. maritime environment. As a military service operating within the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard operates at the inter- section between homeland security and nation- al defense. As a law enforcement agency and a national intelligence community member, the Coast Guard Coast Guard also bridges between these two communities. The Coast Guard is also a federal The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal regulatory agency with robust interaction with Investigations Enterprise, as the intelligence industry and regional groups. element of the Coast Guard, provides timely, actionable, and relevant intelligence and The nation depends on the Coast Guard’s ac- criminal investigative expertise and services to cess, operations, and expertise in the maritime shape Coast Guard operations, planning, and environment. We protect citizens from the sea, decisionmaking, and to support national and we protect America from threats delivered by homeland security intelligence requirements. sea, and we protect the sea itself. As the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship, the

27 Cryptologic Group, Coast Guard Cyber Com- mand, and the Intelligence Coordination Center. Actionable intelligence is also provided by intelligence staffs on each coast at the two Areas—Pacific and Atlantic, Regional Districts, and Local Sector Commands, and by a Mari- time Intelligence Fusion Centers.

Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States. It brings to the criminal and civil jus- tice system of the United States or any other Organization competent jurisdiction, those organizations and the principal members of those organiza- The Assistant Commandant for Intelligence tions involved in or facilitating the growing, and Criminal Investigations is the Intelligence manufacturing, or distribution of controlled Community Element Head for the Coast Guard. substances appearing in or destined for illicit The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal traffic in the United States. DEA also has Investigations Enterprise includes the Coast important responsibilities for the oversight and Guard Investigative Service, Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service, Coast Guard

28 enforcement of laws pertaining to controlled pharmaceuticals (including, for example, pre- scription narcotic drugs, such as those derived from oxycodone and hydrocodone) under the Controlled Substances Act. In addition, DEA Department recommends and supports non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of of Justice illicit controlled substances on domestic and Federal Bureau of international markets. Investigation DEA has 21 field divisions in the U.S. and The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as more than 80 offices in more than 60 coun- an intelligence and law enforcement agency, tries worldwide. is responsible for understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national Office of National Security Intelligence and transnational networks that have a de- DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence sire and capability to harm the U.S. The FBI (ONSI) became a member of the IC in 2006. coordinates these efforts with its IC and law Located at DEA Headquarters in Arlington, enforcement partners. It focuses on terrorist Virginia, ONSI facilitates full and appropri- organizations, foreign intelligence services, ate intelligence coordination and information Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) prolifera- sharing with other members of the U.S. Intel- tors, and criminal enterprises. ligence Community and homeland security ele- The FBI is headquartered in Washington, D.C. ments. Its goal is to enhance the U.S.’s efforts It has 56 field offices and more than 400 sat- to reduce the supply of drugs, protect national ellite offices throughout the U.S. The FBI also security, and combat global terrorism. has more than 60 international offices, known as Legal Attaches, in embassies worldwide.

29 to terrorist screening and create a single com- prehensive watch list of known or suspected terrorists. The TSC helps ensure that federal, local, state, and tribal terrorist screeners have National Security Branch ready access to information and expertise. The National Security Branch (NSB) oversees the FBI’s national security programs. It in- Joint Terrorism Task Force cludes four divisions, plus the Terrorist Screen- Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are FBI- ing Center (TSC). led multi-organization task forces composed of local, state, and federal entities. They were The Counterterrorism Division (CTD) focuses established by the FBI to conduct operations to on both domestic and international terrorism. predict and disrupt terrorist plots. JTTFs are in It oversees the Joint Terrorism Task Forces more than 100 cities nationwide; in addition, (JTTFs). there is at least one in each of the FBI’s 56 The Counterintelligence Division (CD) prevents field offices. The National Joint Terrorism Task and investigates foreign intelligence activities Force (NJTTF), in Washington, D.C., coordi- within the U.S. and espionage activities in the nates all the JTTFs. U.S. and overseas. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is the FBI’s intelligence analysis component. It has em- bedded employees at FBI Headquarters and in each field office through Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) and fusion centers. The National Virtual Translation Center The Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate The National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) (WMDD) prevents individuals and groups from was established in 2003 to provide timely acquiring WMD capabilities and technologies and accurate translations in support of na- for use against the U.S., and links all opera- tional security. Its mission includes acting as tional and scientific/technology components to a clearinghouse for facilitating interagency accomplish this mission. use of translators; partnering with elements of the U.S. Government, academia, and private The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was cre- industry to identify translator resources and en- ated to consolidate the Government’s approach gage their services; building a nationwide team

30 of highly qualified, motivated linguists and n Analyzing foreign events, issues, and translators, connected virtually to the program trends. office in Washington, D.C.; and applying state- n Coordinating intelligence policy and of-the-art technology to maximize translator ef- activities. ficiency. NVTC is a DNI Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is its Executive Agent. n Surveying foreign public opinion and analyzing foreign media. n Organizing conferences to benefit from out- side expertise, managing the Intelligence Community Associate’s Program, and administering the Title VIII grant program Department on Eurasian and East European Studies. of State n Analyzing foreign humanitarian challenges. Bureau of Intelligence and INR has approximately 300 personnel drawn Research principally from the Civil Service and the For- The Department of State is the lead agency eign Service. for U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. Its intelligence support component is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The Bureau of Intelligence and Research pro- vides intelligence support to the Secretary of State and other State Department policymak- Department ers, including ambassadors, special negotia- of the Treasury tors, country directors, and desk officers. As Office of Intelligence the senior intelligence official at the State and Analysis Department, INR’s Assistant Secretary ensures that intelligence informs policy and that intel- The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) ligence activities support American diplomatic represents the Department of the Treasury in objectives. the Intelligence Community and is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence INR supports the Secretary of State’s global responsibilities by:

31 activities related to the operations and respon- Organization sibilities of the Department. It is OIA’s mission The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, is the senior to advance national security and protect the intelligence officer in the U.S. Army and is integrity of the financial system by informing responsible for Army intelligence activities. Treasury decisions with timely, relevant, and This includes policy formulation, planning, accurate intelligence and analysis. OIA sup- programming, budgeting, management, staff, ports the formulation of policy and the execu- supervision, evaluation, and oversight. As the tion of the Treasury Department’s authorities Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, his or her staff is by providing expert analysis and intelligence also responsible for coordinating all Army intel- production on financial and other support ligence. networks for terrorist groups, proliferators, and other key national security threats. OIA also National Ground Intelligence Center assists departmental customers in maintaining The National Ground Intelligence Center situational awareness on the full range of eco- (NGIC) produces and disseminates scientific nomic, political, and security issues by provid- and technical intelligence and military capabil- ing current intelligence support and facilitating ities analysis on foreign ground forces required access to Intelligence Community production by war fighting commanders, the force modern- on strategic issues. ization and research and development com- munities, Defense Department, and national policymakers to ensure that U.S. forces have a decisive edge in current and future military operations. NGIC, headquartered in Charlottes- ville, Virginia, is a major subordinate command Army under the U.S. Army INSCOM. Its mission includes irregular and conventional warfare The Department of the Army’s IC component is analysis examining foreign ground forces from called Army Military Intelligence (Army MI). It a perspective that includes battlefield operat- is fully integrated into Army forces. Army MI’s ing systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques and goal is to provide all-source intelligence that is procedures, training, maintenance, logistics relevant, useful, and timely, to the Army and and order of battle. other military personnel at all levels.

32 Intelligence and Security Command The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Com- mand (INSCOM), the Army’s operational intel- ligence force, is headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It is a global command with major subordinate commands that tailor their support to the specific needs of different theaters of operation (e.g. Europe, South America, South West Asia). INSCOM’s strategic organization of 16,800 Soldiers, civilians, and contractors at more than 180 locations around the globe ensures that leaders at all levels have access to the intelligence information they need, when Office of Naval Intelligence and where they need it. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), head- quartered at the National Maritime Intelli- gence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, Maryland, is a major production center for maritime intel- ligence. It produces intelligence on seaborne terrorism, weapons and technology prolifera- Navy tion, and narcotics and smuggling operations. ONI also analyzes foreign naval strategies, Naval Intelligence’s mission is to support mari- capabilities, operations, characteristics, and time operations worldwide in defense of the trends to support Navy, Department of De- United States. Naval intelligence professionals, fense, and national needs. who are all members of the Information Domi- nance Community, are deployed throughout the ONI and the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordi- Navy and the Department of Defense. nation Center (USCG-ICC) both have a mari- time mission, and they share an intelligence Organization partnership that started in the early 1970s. They are identified as the core element of the The Director of Naval Intelligence is also desig- Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) nated as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Plan. That plan is a component of the National for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) Strategy for Maritime Security, which was and reports to the Chief of Naval Operations signed by the President in late 2005. ONI and (CNO).

33 USCG-ICC man an around-the-clock maritime The AF ISR Agency has more than 19,000 watch in the NMIC, which tracks over 18,000 military and civilian members serving at 72 vessels worldwide. locations worldwide and commands several subcomponents, including the 70th ISR Wing, The 480th ISR Wing, the 361st ISR Group, the Air Force Technical Application Center, and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Air Force The Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AF ISR) is the Air Force’s IC component. Marine Corps Organization The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) produces tacti- The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelli- cal and operational intelligence for battlefield gence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (A2) support. Its IC component is comprised of all provides policy, oversight, and guidance to all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps. Air Force intelligence organizations. Most Marine Corps intelligence professionals are integrated into operating forces. The Air Force ISR Agency organizes, trains, equips, and presents forces to conduct intelli- Organization gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for com- The Marine Corps’ Director of Intelligence batant commanders and the nation. Air Force (DIRINT) is its principal intelligence staff offi- ISR is also responsible for implementing and cer, and is the service’s functional manager for overseeing policy and guidance, and expanding intelligence, counterintelligence, and crypto- AF ISR capabilities to meet current and future logic matters. challenges. The AF ISR Agency commander serves as the Service Cryptologic Element under NSA, and oversees Air Force Signals Intelligence activities.

34 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity any national, theater, or operational command Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), in in the U.S. Armed Forces. MCIA’s analysis and Suitland, Maryland, and Quantico, Virginia, production support not only the Marine Corps, is the USMC service production center. In but also the national decisionmaker, theater addition, MCIA supports other services as ap- commander, and operational warfighter. propriate. It provides the Marine Corps with MCIA is a major production organization intelligence for planning, training, operations, for expeditionary intelligence and cultural and exercises. MCIA can be tasked to provide intelligence. expeditionary warfare intelligence to support

35 REQUIREMENTS, PLANNING, AND DIRECTION

Requirements, Planning, and Direction Inventor, Writer, Publisher, Diplomat, Statesman and…Spy!

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

Although most people know of Benjamin Frank- lin as a prolific inventor, scientist, author, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, few know that “spy” can be added to the list. He served on a number of committees of the Sec- ond Continental Congress, including the Com- mittee of Secret Correspondence, which was essentially the country’s first foreign intelligence directorate. The group employed numerous agents abroad and established a secret Navy for receipt of information and supplies. Franklin also served on another secret committee that clandestinely obtained and distributed military supplies and sold gunpowder to privateers hired by the Continental Congress. During a diplomatic mission to France, Franklin gathered intelligence, distributed propaganda, and coordinated aid from America’s secret allies (and also discovered that several of his employ- ees, including a secretary and courier, were, unfortunately, British agents). Franklin also was a crafty propagandist. To weaken enemy forces, he reportedly distributed leaflets disguised as tobacco packets that prom- ised American land grants to deserting soldiers. Courtesy of CIA Requirements, Planning and Direction

What Intelligence Can (and Cannot) Do “The United States Intelligence Community must constantly strive for and exhibit three characteristics essential to our effectiveness. The IC must be in- tegrated: a team making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. We must also be agile: an enterprise with an adaptive, diverse, continually learning, and mission-driven intelligence workforce that embraces innovation and takes ini- tiative. Moreover, the IC must exemplify America’s values: operating under the rule of law, consistent with Americans’ expectations for protection of privacy and civil liberties, respectful of human rights, and in a manner that retains the trust of the American people.” National Intelligence Strategy 2009

Intelligence can be an extremely powerful tool, standards affecting the production and dissem- but it is most useful when the consumer has ination of intelligence, these general guidelines a clear understanding of its limits. With the can help consumers know what to expect from ever-changing laws, policies, capabilities, and this valuable resource.

39 What Intelligence Can Do n Numerous priorities competing for Intelligence can: finite budget dollars, personnel, and capabilities. n Provide an advantage in dealing with for- eign adversaries by supplying information n Limited access to denied areas. and analysis that can enhance the intel- n Technological limitations of some IC ligence consumer’s understanding. systems. n Warn of potential threats and opportunities. n The IC must maintain its ability to obtain n Provide insight into the causes and conse- useful information. quences of current events. n The need to protect information and n Enhance situational awareness. intelligence sources and methods may limit the sharing or use of some n Assess long-term strategic issues and alter- reports. native futures. Violate U.S. law or the U.S. Constitution n Assist in preparation for international or planning meetings. The activities of the U.S. IC must be conduct- ed in a manner consistent with all applicable n Inform official travelers of security threats. laws and Executive Orders (see a listing of Ex- n Report on specific topics, either as part of ecutive Orders in Tab 8). The IC is particularly routine reporting or upon request. aware of the importance of ensuring: n Compile information on persons of interest. n Civil liberties and the privacy of U.S. citi- zens and lawful U.S. residents. What Intelligence Cannot Do n Confidentiality of sources and the identi- Predict the Future or Know about Everything ties of IC personnel and protection of privileged information. n Intelligence can provide assessments of likely scenarios or developments, but it n Appropriate conduct of IC personnel and cannot provide predictions of what will activities. happen with absolute certainty. The IC’s resources and capabilities are limited by:

40 Who Uses U.S. Intelligence? n International organizations, especially for The IC serves a wide range of consumers, both such activities as treaty monitoring. within and outside the U.S. Government, with the level of intelligence services varying ac- Types of Customers cording to the customers’ responsibilities and While intelligence users can easily be grouped the specific circumstances. The IC’s customers by organization (e.g., Department of State), include the following: level of seniority (e.g.Assistant Secretary), or discipline (such as diplomacy), grouping n The White House, particularly the Presi- customers according to the purpose to which dent, Vice President, and National Security they are applying intelligence (also known as Staff. a “segment”) is a more useful categorization. n Executive Branch Departments and Agen- The segment determines the characteristics cies, including the Departments of State, that will make an intelligence product or Defense, Homeland Security, the Treasury, service effective. A customer may change seg- Energy, Commerce, Justice, and others. ments, depending on the specific activity. In such cases, the customer’s needs also change. n Military unified commands, services, and For instance customer segments might include deployed forces. the following: n The Intelligence Community itself, for IC internal operations, special activities, National Interagency Action, e.g., Deputy National acquisition, and policy support. Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism n Requires coordination of multiple agencies n The Legislative and Judicial branches for or partners. oversight and to inform and protect. n Needs to understand what is important to n State, local, tribal and territorial officials, each colleague. especially law enforcement and emergency planning and response personnel. Organizational Policy and Decisionmaking, e.g., State n The U.S. public, including commercial Department Assistant Secretary for European Affairs entities and academia. n Focused on a single agency mission. n Allied governments. n Finished, all-source, tailored analysis.

41 n Time sensitivity and need to share vary multiple IC personnel, including analysts, security and counterintelligence personnel, and Negotiation, e.g., U.S. Trade Representative managers of intelligence operations. Overall, n Is extremely time sensitive and close hold. the IC interacts with its customers in the fol- lowing ways: n Raw, tactical, narrow collection reports. Supports customers’ decisionmaking and op- Strategic Resource Deployment and Acquisition, e.g., erations by: DoD Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics n Informing customers of factual develop- ments, generally through dissemination of n Long-range planning. collection reports. n The intelligence is often critical to counter- n Processing, aggregating, and interpreting ing an adversary’s capabilities. facts in light of extensive knowledge to n Thorough analysis. ultimately evaluate events and trends.

Threat Preparedness and Prevention, e.g., DHS As- n Conducting research in response to cus- sistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection tomers’ specific requests for information. n Plan to respond to threats or to more fully n Consulting or collaborating with customers understand potential threats. to more fully understand an issue and to provide ongoing expertise. n Widely shareable analysis. Works with customers by: Threat Response and Tactical Deployment, e.g., mili- tary forces engaged in combat or a city police force n Apprising customers of ongoing IC opera- responding to an event tions that might intersect with customers’ operations and by playing a supporting role n Operational activities. in customers’ operations. n Raw, specific, timely collection reports and n Harvesting information with intelligence analysis. value that customers collect in the course Ways to Interact with the Intelligence Community of their normal operations. IC personnel interact with many customers, n Planning for future collection, analysis, or and due to the size and wide range of respon- other resource deployment by specifying sibilities of the IC, many customers work with

42 and transmitting customers’ requirements and priorities. n Evaluating the effectiveness of IC support to improve service to customers. n Training customers in intelligence, secu- rity, and special technologies. Protects customers by: n Identifying, deceiving, exploiting, or dis- rupting efforts aimed against customers by hostile intelligence services. n Protecting sensitive data by, for example, n Integrate the IC into their operational cycle providing secure facilities or granting secu- and processes. rity clearances. n Early integration of the IC into a cus- n Providing secure communications, includ- tomer’s operations helps the IC deliver ing information technology for securing better service more quickly. Sensitive Compartmented Information n Expect intelligence support to be a push- (SCI). and-pull process. n Providing crisis and consequence man- n The IC should flag emerging issues as agement support during national security well as answer customers’ questions as special events and emergencies. they arise.

Roles, Responsibilities, and Expectations of n Answers to customers’ questions can Customers be delivered in various formats (for Customers themselves play a vital role in en- example, in briefs, papers, graphics, suring that IC support meets their needs. Good or simulations) depending on the most communication between the customer and the expedient and effective way to supply IC, often through the agency intelligence office the information. of the customer, will improve intelligence sup- n State their requests specifically. port. For the best possible assistance, custom- ers should:

43 n The customer should specify their Intelligence Planning, Programming, current understanding of an issue or Budgeting, and Evaluation problem. The Assistant Director of National Intelligence n The customer should specify exactly for Systems and Resource Analyses (ADNI/ what they need to know. SRA) manages the integration and synchroni- zation of the Intelligence Planning, Program- n The customer should specify the ming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) context of the request (for example, to system. This system is employed to effectively support a meeting, an event, or deci- shape intelligence capabilities through the de- sionmaking). velopment of the National Intelligence Program n Share what they know. (NIP) and budget in a manner consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS). n National security information is every- where; the IC has no monopoly. The IPPBE process comprises the interde- pendent phases of planning, programming, n Shared information can inform op- and budgeting that are linked by the ongoing portunity analysis, communicate the evaluation phase. Each phase is informed and intended direction of policy or op- guided by the products and decisions of each erational endeavors, or options under of the other phases: consideration. n Planning: The planning phase identifies n Share their timeline. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) n Customers should specify the factor or strategic priorities and major issues to be factors that are influencing the time- addressed in the programming phase. line so that the intelligence effort can n Programming: The programming phase be scoped and scaled accordingly. provides options to frame DNI resource n Customers should understand that de- decisions through analyses of alternatives classification or downgrading of infor- and studies that assess cost-versus-perfor- mation takes some time to complete. mance benefits. n Provide feedback on the utility of IC prod- n Budgeting: The budgeting and execution ucts and services. activities are addressed in IPPBE in a manner consistent with the policy prin- n Customer feedback helps the IC to ciples of Intelligence Community Directive refine its approach.

44 (ICD) 104, with the goal of producing and forms), applications (automated processes and implementing an annual, consolidated NIP user tools), and human interfaces. Each MSA budget. is run by an IC agency team of highly skilled professionals, including scientists, technicians, n Evaluation: The evaluation phase assesses engineers, and mathematicians. They manage the effectiveness of IC programs, activi- the significant systems engineering effort that ties, major initiatives, and investments in is required to reliably deliver MSA capabilities. implementing DNI guidance in the context of original objectives, measures of ef- Intelligence Community Science and Technology fectiveness, metrics, outcomes, benefits, Many IC elements conduct science and tech- shortfalls, and costs. nology (S&T) research in their own laboratories, The IPPBE system ensures a predictable, and almost all IC elements sponsor research transparent, and repeatable end-to-end process conducted by universities, industry, or Depart- to collect and prioritize critical intelligence ment of Energy (DOE) national labs. IC S&T requirements within the context of the strate- leads the world in some areas of research gic objectives of the DNI and the IC. In addi- specific to IC missions and works with industry tion, the IPPBE framework supports the DNI’s to develop other new technologies that have participation in the development of the Military limited commercial applications. Rather than Intelligence Program (MIP). invest research in technologies that industry develops for consumers, IC S&T monitors com- Acquisition/Science and Technology: mercial products and looks for ways to adapt Delivering Technical Capabilities them to the specific operational and security requirements of IC operations. IC S&T research Major System Acquisitions can lead directly to IT products, may result in a At any given time, several dozen Major System capability within an MSA, or may generate spe- Acquisitions (MSAs) are underway at agen- cialty applications, relatively low-cost technolo- cies throughout the IC. MSAs cost hundreds of gies such as miniaturized tracking or collection millions or billions of dollars, and they typi- devices, which are produced in small numbers cally take years to develop, build, and deliver. and deployed to address a specific intelligence MSAs are usually either Platform and Payload problem. IC S&T also conducts basic research systems, such as satellites and surveillance into areas such as cryptology and computer ships, or information technology (IT) systems, science, which generate no physical products including infrastructure (hardware and plat- but are essential to intelligence work.

45 processes are used within the IC—the Intel- ligence Community Capability Requirements (ICCR) process, which is used largely for MSAs, and the DNI Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration (DDII) Requirements Process.

ICCR Process The ICCR process applies to all MSA programs of special interest as designed by the DNI or the Deputy DNI for Acquisition and Technol- ogy (DDNI/A&T) that are funded in whole or in large part by the NIP. The objectives of the ICCE process staff are as follows: Procurement and Contracting All IC agencies have offices that manage the n To ensure that the requirements for all contracts through which the agencies purchase NIP-funded MSA programs are validat- mass-produced technologies and manage the ed by the Deputy Executive Commit- resources and logistics necessary to support tee (DEXCOM) Intelligence Resources the deployment of those technologies into Board (IRB). operations. n To work with the Joint Staff/J8 via a Facilities “gatekeeper” process on coordinating NIP- and MIP-funded programs, and to Facilities also provide an essential platform for work with IC stakeholders via the Ca- intelligence technologies, from office buildings pability Requirements Working Group to ground stations to data centers. (CRWG). Intelligence Community Requirements n To provide and maintain a document- Processes ed, agile, and transparent process for The established IC requirements processes soliciting and approving capability- are the primary means for developing, based requirements that leads to documenting, assessing, validating, and ap- achievable system developments or proving capability requirements for NIP capa- non-material solutions with a positive bilities that are mission relevant and fiscally mission impact for the IC. sound. Two complementary requirements

46 DDII Requirements Process The DDII Requirements Process will be execut- The DDII Requirements Process applies to ed to coincide with major budget milestones those programs that do not meet the MSA or and schedules to ensure that requirements are special interest threshold. The DDII Require- on track with funding cycles. ments Process enables ODNI senior leaders to have a single, prioritized list of mission-based Collections Management Overview requirements. Collection management is the process of con- verting intelligence requirements into collec- The process also allows for the consideration tion requirements (see the Glossary of Terms of all mission-based requirements proposed for a definition of “collection”), establishing by all stakeholders across the IC. The single, priorities, tasking or coordinating with appro- validated, prioritized, mission-based, approved priate collection sources or agencies, monitor- intelligence requirements list is then used for ing the results, and re-tasking, as required. NIP funding purposes. Collection management is divided into two The process involves interacting with the business areas: requesting stakeholders and mission experts n Collection Requirements Management and uses a common set of prioritization criteria (CRM): CRM is the authoritative develop- to establish the validity of requirements. The ment and control of collection, processing, major steps in the process are analysis and as- exploration, or reporting requirements that sessment, validation, prioritization, and recom- typically result in either the direct tasking mendation of funding strategies. of assets over which the collection man- The process includes the maintenance of the ager has authority, or the generation of baseline and requirements, including both tasking requests that are sent to collection requirements to be funded and requirement on management authorities at a higher, lower, the Prioritized Unfunded Requirements List. or equivalent level to accomplish the col- The process also creates output to be used for lection mission. other DNI processes (e.g., SRA, chief informa- n Collection Operations Management (COM): tion officer [CIO], chief financial officer [CFO]), COM is the authoritative direction, sched- and to evaluate, review, and report on the uling, and control of specific collection status of requirements until their completion. operations and associated processing, exploitation, and reporting resources.

47 Essentially, CRM is what gets done in the RMs to perform a more complete analysis of an collection cycle, while COM is how it gets information request, determine the most effec- done. The collection management process is a tive collection system(s) to fulfill the request, staff activity focused on decisionmaking and and perform a thorough, overall assessment of choices concerning collection request (CRs) the unit’s organic and non-organic reconnais- and requests for information (RFIs) from nu- sance and surveillance support. In addition, merous sources. collection coordination supports the develop- ment of a collection strategy, including a cover- A collection manager can be either a require- age plan, selection of sources and selection of ments expert or an operations expert. The disciplines, and assessment of the efficiency of collection manager is the individual who tasking assets and resources. orchestrates and manages the analysts’ needs throughout the collection cycle. A collec- Because CRM is essentially a support func- tion manager’s duties include receiving CRs, tion for expediting information collection and researching intelligence systems, developing dissemination, the RM and staff are their own collection strategies or plans, developing col- best resources for assessing CRM performance. lection requests into collection requirements, Nevertheless, coordination with an all-source validating collection requirements, and track- production facility can facilitate the assess- ing requirements through the collection cycle ment task. to determine stakeholders’ satisfaction with the The COM process is an intelligence staff func- outcomes of the requirements. tion that is based on collection tasking and The CRM process begins when requests are mission guidance developed in support of in- identified, logged, and initially processed. The formation requirements. COM relies heavily on entire process involves tracking a request from supporting organizations that own and operate the time of its receipt, validating the request, collection and exploitation assets. tasking the necessary collectors, confirming COM involves several tasks, including plan- fulfillment of the requestor’s information need, ning, scheduling, and the control of collections and updating the collection plan. operations; execution of collections operations; The availability and capability of collection as- and exploitation and dissemination of collec- sets and resources are determined, in part, by tion results. the exchange of timely data among the opera- Collection operations personnel, who typically tional mission planners and asset managers are intelligence operations staff members, who update intelligence. This data helps the

48 are responsible for detailed planning, tasking, Exploitation of collected information at the tac- scheduling, and control of collection opera- tical level is closely associated with manage- tions. The operations planner reviews mission ment of collection assets and resources. The requirements, such as available assets, sensor operational staff with collection capabilities and target range, system timelines, threats, also controls sensor-specific processing, ex- weather, and reporting requirements and ad- ploitation, and analysis equipment. The asset justs the collection plan to reflect the plan of manager who is responsible for executing the operations, including the integration of specific collection operation also controls the operation reconnaissance requirements. Requirements of the exploitation element. As such, exploita- are translated into collection-mission tasking tion is as much a part of the COM function as orders, which are directed to the asset man- are mission planning and asset management. ager, who is responsible for execution of the orders. Prioritizing Intelligence Issues: The National Intelligence Priorities Framework The asset manager chooses the equipment, platform, and personnel to perform the as- The National Intelligence Priorities Framework signed mission based on such considerations (NIPF) is the DNI’s guidance to the IC on the as maintenance schedules, training, and national intelligence priorities approved by the experience. The operations planner provides President. availability and asset location information, The NIPF is the DNI’s sole mechanism for es- while the asset manager provides data related tablishing national intelligence priorities. The to operational constraints and timeliness of operations.

49 NIPF consists of: Council, and other internal components of the ODNI. Ad hoc adjustments may also be made n Intelligence topics reviewed by the Nation- to reflect changes in world events and policy al Security Council Principals Committee priorities. and approved by the President. The ODNI and IC elements use the NIPF to n A process for prioritizing foreign countries guide allocation of collection and analytic and non-state actors that are relevant to resources. In addition, IC elements associ- the approved intelligence topics. ate intelligence collection requirements and n A priorities matrix that reflects consumers’ analytic production with NIPF priorities, and priorities for intelligence support and that they report to the DNI on their coverage of ensures that long-term intelligence issues NIPF priorities. are addressed. The NIPF is updated semiannually in coordina- tion with IC elements, the National Intelligence

50 PROCESSING, AND EXPLOITATION COLLECTION, Collection, Processing, and Exploitation Harriet Tubman is best known for helping slaves to escape to safety through the secret network of the 1800s known as the Underground Railroad. Her involvement in intelligence collection during the Civil War, however, also is well documented. After her last secret rescue mission in 1860, Tubman was tapped by Union officials to organize and lead spying expeditions behind Confederate enemy lines. Disguised as a field hand or poor farm wife, she led several missions while directing others from Union lines. She reported her intelligence to Col. James Montgomery, a Union officer commanding the Second South Carolina Volunteers, a black unit involved in guerrilla warfare activities. The tactical intelligence Tubman provided to Union forces, including identification of enemy supply areas and weaknesses in Confederate troop deploy- ments, was used effectively in military operations. When Tubman died in 1913, she was honored with a full military funeral in recognition of her intelli- gence activities during the war. TUBMAN’s TRIUMPH S Courtesy of CIA Collection, Processing, and Exploitation

Sources of Intelligence “National Intelligence and the term ‘intelligence related to national security’ refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and in- cluding information gathered within or outside the United States, that pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one United States Government agency; and that involves threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.” United States Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 1012, Public Law 108-458, December 17, 2004

MASINT HUMINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MA- Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection SINT) is intelligence produced through quan- of information—either orally or via documen- titative and qualitative analysis of the physical tation—that is provided directly by a human attributes of targets and events to characterize source. It is the only type of intelligence for and identify those targets and events. which collectors speak directly to the sources

53 of information, control the topic of discus- tion may immediately eliminate access to that sion, and direct the source’s activities. Human source. sources can obtain access to information that is not obtainable any other way. GEOINT The types of HUMINT range from high-level, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploi- strategic, national security information, for tation and analysis of imagery, imagery intelli- example, to unit-specific information collected gence (IMINT) (see the Glossary of Terms), and on the battlefield. As stated HUMINT may also geospatial information to describe, assess, and be acquired overtly or clandestinely. visually depict physical features and geographi- cally referenced activities on the earth. In overt collection, the collector meets openly with sources as a declared U.S. Government OSINT representative. Overt collection comprises Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is intel- many forms of information collection, includ- ligence produced from publicly available ing debriefings of persons who have travelled information that is collected, exploited, and to countries of national interest, diplomatic re- disseminated in a timely manner to an appro- ports from embassies on host-country officials’ priate audience for the purpose of addressing a stated reactions to U.S. policy initiatives, and specific intelligence requirement. OSINT draws law enforcement reports on criminal activities, from a wide variety of information and sources, such as drug trafficking. including the following: Clandestine collection is conducted in secret. A clandestine collector must locate a person with access to desired information, initiate and discreetly develop a relationship with that prospective source, and ultimately convince the source to divulge secrets. A source may or may not be told of his interlocutor’s U.S. Government affiliation. After the source is re- cruited, contact is usually strictly controlled in an effort to elude discovery. The recruitment of a clandestine human source can take months or years, but the leak of a source’s informa-

54 n Mass Media: Newspapers, magazines, worldwide satellite photography, often in radio, television, and other computer-based high resolution, on the Web (e.g., Google information. Earth) has expanded the public’s ability to acquire information formerly available only n Public Data: Information derived from to major intelligence services. government reports; official data, such as data on budgets and demographics; SIGINT hearings; legislative debates; press con- ferences, speeches, directories, organi- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence zational charts, marine and aeronautical gathered from data transmissions, includ- safety warnings, environmental impact ing Communications Intelligence (COMINT), statements, contract awards, and required Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign financial disclosures, and other public Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). sources. SIGINT includes both raw data and the analy- sis of that data to produce intelligence. n Gray Literature (or Grey Literature): Open- source material that usually is available n COMINT is intelligence derived from track- through controlled access for a specific au- ing communications patterns and proto- dience. Gray literature may include, but is cols (traffic analysis), establishing links not limited to, research reports, technical between intercommunicating parties or reports, economic reports, travel reports, groups, and analyzing the meaning of com- working papers, discussion papers, unof- munications. ficial government documents, proceedings, n FISINT is information derived from the preprints, studies, dissertations and the- interception of foreign electromagnetic ses, trade literature, market surveys, and emissions associated with the testing and newsletters. The material in gray literature operational deployment of non-U.S. aero- covers scientific, political, socioeconomic, space, surface, and subsurface systems and military disciplines. including, but not limited to, telemetry, n Observation and Reporting: Information beaconry, electronic interrogators, and of significance, not otherwise available, video data links. that is provided by, for example, amateur n ELINT is information derived primarily airplane spotters, radio monitors, and from electronic signals that do not contain satellite observers. The availability of

55 speech or text (which are considered to be that carry these data. Various activities fall COMINT). The most common sources of under the category of processing and exploita- ELINT are radar signals. tion including, but not limited to, interpret- ing imagery; decoding messages; translating Processing and Exploitation foreign-language broadcasts; converting telem- A substantial portion of U.S. intelligence etry into meaningful measurements; preparing resources is devoted to processing and exploi- information for computer processing, storage, tation—the synthesis of raw data into material and retrieval; and converting HUMINT-based that is usable by the intelligence analyst—and reports into more comprehensible content. to securing the telecommunications networks

56 Analysis, AND FEEDBACK PRODUCTION,

Production, ANALYSIS, and Feedback Julia Child is widely credited with bringing French cuisine into the American main- stream. But long before she gained fame as a cookbook writer and TV personality, she enjoyed a dynamic career as an intelligence officer. During WWII, Julia wanted to serve her country. Too tall to join the military (she was 6’2”), Julia volunteered for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of to- day’s Central Intelligence Agency. She started out in the Washington, D.C., headquarters, working directly for General William J. Dono- van, the head of the OSS. She joined the OSS Emergency Sea Rescue Equipment Section, where she helped to develop a repellent to keep sharks from setting off explosives before they reached their target. She also served as Chief of the OSS Registry, processing highly classified communications.

Julia Child: LiFE BEFORE French CUISINE

Julia then met and married Paul Child, an OSS officer assigned to the U.S. Information Agency in Paris, where Julia embarked on her legendary culinary career. Julia Child’s contributions to her country are well remembered and appreciated by the OSS family. She died in 2004, two days before her 92nd birthday.

Courtesy of CIA Analysis, Production, and Feeback

Analysis and Production Intelligence analysts are generally assigned to Estimative Language a particular geographic or functional specialty When the Intelligence Community uses words area. Analysts obtain information from all such as “we judge” or “we assess” (phrases sources pertinent to their area of responsibil- that are used synonymously) and “we esti- ity through information collection, processing, mate,” “likely” or “indicate,” the IC is con- and forwarding systems. Analysts may tap into veying an analytical assessment or judgment. these systems to obtain answers to specific Such statements often are based on incom- questions or to generate information they may plete or fragmented information and are not to need. be regarded as statements of fact, proof, or ab- Analysts receive incoming information, evalu- solute knowledge. Some analytical judgments ate it, test it against other information and are based directly on collected information; against their personal knowledge and expertise, others are based on assessments that serve as produce an assessment of the current status building blocks. In either case, the IC does not of a particular area under analysis, and then have “evidence” that shows something to be forecast future trends or outcomes. The analyst factual or that definitely establishes a relation- also develops requirements for the collection of ship between two items. new information. Statements that address the subject of likeli- Analysts rarely work alone; they operate within hood are intended to reflect the IC’s collective a system that includes peer review and over- estimate of the probability of a development or sight by more senior analysts. an event occurring.

59 The IC’s use of the term “unlikely” is not in- n A low confidence level generally indicates tended to imply that an event definitely will not that the information used in the analysis happen. By comparison, the words “probably” is scant, questionable, fragmented, or that and “likely” indicate that a greater-than-even solid analytical conclusions cannot be in- chance exists of a particular event occurring. ferred from the information, or that the IC The IC uses such phrases as “we cannot dis- has significant concerns or problems with miss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot the information sources. discount” to refer to an unlikely event whose consequences are serious enough that it war- Analytic Products rants mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used when the IC is unable to Current Intelligence fully assess the likelihood of an event because Current intelligence addresses day-to-day relevant information is nonexistent, sketchy, or events. It details new developments and fragmented. background information related to those de- velopments to assess their significance, warn The IC also refers to “high,” “moderate,” or of their near-term consequences, and signal “low” confidence levels that reflect the scope potentially dangerous situations in the near and quality of the information supporting its future. judgments. n A high confidence level generally indicates Trend Analysis that the IC’s judgment is based on high- Trend analysis, also referred to as second- quality information or that the circum- phase reporting, provides information on an stances of the analysis enable the IC to event or series of events. A trend analysis render a solid judgment. report on an event includes an assessment of n A moderate confidence level generally whether the relevant intelligence on the event indicates that the information being used is reliable, information on similar events, and in the analysis may be interpreted in vari- background information to familiarize the ous ways, or that the IC has alternative reader with the issue. Typically, the intelligence viewpoints on the significance or meaning used in trend analysis is compared with intel- of the information, or that the information ligence from other sources and vetted through is credible and plausible but it is not suf- experts within the IC. Second-phase reports are ficiently corroborated to warrant a higher much more thorough than current intelligence/ level of confidence.

60 first-phase reports and may require weeks or engagement of U.S. military forces or that months to produce. would have a sudden and detrimental effect on U.S. foreign policy concerns. Warning analysis Long-Term Assessment involves the exploration of alternative futures Long-term assessment is also known as third- and low-probability/high-impact scenarios. phase reporting. It addresses developments within a broad-based context, assesses future Research Intelligence trends and developments, or provides com- Research intelligence includes research stud- prehensive, detailed analysis of an ongoing ies that support both current and estimative issue, a particular system, or some other topic. intelligence. Long-term assessment reports, which can take months to produce, may be coordinated with Scientific and Technical Intelligence experts from across the IC and may include Scientific and technical Intelligence includes projections of future developments. an examination of the technical development, characteristics, performance, and capabili- Estimative Intelligence ties of foreign technologies, including weapon Estimative intelligence uses future scenarios systems and subsystems. This category of and projections of possible future events to as- intelligence covers a spectrum of scientific sess potential developments that could affect disciplines, technologies, weapon systems, and U.S. national security. By addressing the im- integrated operations. plications of a range of possible outcomes and alternative scenarios, estimative intelligence Classification helps policymakers to think more strategically Certain information must be kept in confidence about long-term threats. to protect U.S. citizens, institutions, homeland security, and U.S. interactions with foreign Warning Intelligence nations. The IC, in accordance with Executive Warning intelligence “sounds an alarm” for Order (EO) 13526, classifies information (that policymakers. This type of intelligence conveys is not Unclassified) as Confidential, Secret, or a sense of urgency and implies a possible need Top Secret. Classification may be applied only to respond with policy action. Warning intel- to information that is owned by, produced by or ligence includes the identification or forecast- for, or is under the control of the U.S. Govern- ing of events, such as coups, third-party wars, ment. Section 1.4 of E.O. 13526 discusses or refugee situations, that would warrant the classification techniques.

61 In EO 13526, classification levels are defined n Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or as follows: administrative error; n Top Secret: Unauthorized disclosure of the n Prevent embarrassment to a person, information could be expected to cause organization, or agency; exceptionally grave damage to the national n Restrain competition; or security. n Prevent or delay the release of informa- n Secret: Unauthorized disclosure of the tion that does not require protection in the information could be expected to cause interest of the national security. serious damage to the national security. Basic scientific research information not n Confidential: Unauthorized disclosure of clearly related to the national security may not the information could be expected to cause be classified. damage to the national security. Access to Classified Information At the time that material is classified, the original classification authority must establish As stated in EO 13526, a person may have ac- a specific date or event for declassification. cess to classified information provided that: When that date is reached or when the event n A favorable determination of eligibility for occurs, the information is automatically de- access has been made by an agency head classified. Unless an earlier date or event can or the agency head’s designee (i.e., the be specified, declassification must be marked person has been granted an appropriate for 10 years from the date of classification, or security clearance); up to 25 years from the date of classification, depending on the circumstances. Upon review, n The person has signed an approved non- the original classification may be extended for disclosure agreement; and up to 25 additional years, the classification n The person has a need-to-know the may be changed, or specific portions of the information. classified information may be reclassified. No information may remain classified indefinitely. Review and Release Information may not be classified or be main- Due to the need to protect the identity of tained as classified information in order to: information sources and due to the potential implications of the results of IC analysis, most

62 intelligence reports are classified. Classifica- n The sensitivity and vulnerability of the tion of intelligence reports can limit the cus- information source or method. tomer’s ability to use them, particularly when n The uniqueness or traceability of the they are interacting with individuals outside information source. the U.S. Government. In recognition of the importance of making intelligence useful to its n The effect on external relationships. customers, the IC has established procedures n Specific wording may determine whether to allow for appropriate release of intelligence. the information is releasable. General guidelines for the release of intelli- gence include the following: n Less specific language and attributes are more likely to be approved for n Some intelligence can be shared through release. foreign disclosure, some through dis- cretionary release by the IC, and some n The identification of the information through the Freedom of Information source is often the most sensitive Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. Section 552) with information in a report. redactions. n The intended audience has an impact on n Different categories of review and re- the decision. lease requests are handled differently. n Is the intelligence being released to Some categories are handled collabor- a federal department, a state police atively with the requestor, while others agency, a foreign liaison service, a for- are handled strictly through internal IC eign official, or to the public or news processes. media? n The IC is working to maximize discov- n “Publicly Available” does not necessarily erability, by the by the IC and USG, of mean “Officially Acknowledged.” information and utility of intelligence products. n The IC complies with the FOIA as writ- ten. 5 U.S.C. Section 552, as amended, n The originators of the information will provides that any person has the right to consider many factors, including: obtain access to federal agency records, n The impact of release of the except to the extent that those records, or information. portions of them, are protected from public disclosure by one of the nine exemptions allowed under FOIA.

63 n The IC classifies and declassifies national unauthorized disclosure could reasonably security information in accordance with be expected to cause identifiable or de- EO 13526. Information shall not be con- scribable damage to the national security. sidered for classification unless its

64 Organizational Oversight ORGANIZATIONAL OVERSIGHT Courtesy of NSA The cipher disk is a deceptively simple cryptographic tool invented around 1470 by an Italian architect. Although the tool has been “re-invented” a number of times over the centuries, the basic concept of the cipher disk remains much the same. It consists of two concentric disks marked with letters, numbers, and other symbols around the edge of each disk. The smaller disk, which is mounted on the stationary larger disk, can be moved to create a crypto- graphic key. The appeal of the cipher disk lies in the fact that messages can be enciphered and deciphered without the need for bulky or compromising written materials. The cipher disk first came into large-scale use in the United States during the Civil War. About a half-cen- tury later, the U.S. Army adopted a version of the device, which used both a standard and a “reverse- standard” alphabet. The two disks may be left in the same setting to create an entire mes- sage, thereby producing the simplest possible cryptogram, or the setting may be changed with every letter of the message to create an extremely secure cipher. THE CIPHER DISK Organizational Oversight

Oversight Joint Intelligence Community Council Executive Committee The National Security Act of 1947, as amend- For more routine management and gover- ed, establishes the Joint Intelligence Com- nance of the IC, the DNI has established the munity Council (JICC), which consists of the IC Executive Committee (EXCOM), which is Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (chair), chaired by the DNI and composed of the heads Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, of all 17 IC members plus the Under Secretary Secretary of Defense, U.S. Attorney General, of Defense for Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of Home- of Staff Director for Intelligence (J-2), the land Security. The JICC advises the DNI on Principal Deputy DNI, and the Deputy DNI for establishing requirements, developing budgets, Intelligence Integration. The EXCOM’s role is and managing financial matters; assists the to advise and support the DNI in the leader- DNI in monitoring and evaluating the perfor- ship, governance, and management of the mance of the Intelligence Community (IC); IC, including advising the DNI on IC policies, and ensures the timely execution of programs, objectives, and priorities and ensuring the IC’s policies, and directives established or devel- capability to fulfill its mission. oped by the DNI. The JICC is the most senior executive body for managing the IC. The JICC Deputy Executive Committee typically meets semiannually. Issues that the EXCOM addresses are often handled by its subordinate body, the IC Deputy

67 Executive Committee (DEXCOM), which is chaired by the Principal Deputy DNI and is composed of the deputy heads of the 17 intelligence organizations plus the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration.

Legislative Oversight The U.S. Congress has long overseen national intelligence activities. From the 1940s on, the Armed Services Committees and Appro- priations Committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate have exer- cised responsibility for oversight of national intelligence activities, although those opera- tions were typically discrete and hidden from the public eye. On May 19, 1976, the U.S. Senate es- tablished the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). The U.S. House of Representatives followed suit on July 14, the SSCI and HPSCI as oversight commit- 1977, by creating the House Permanent Select tees for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). These Within the U.S. Congress, these committees committees, along with the Armed Services are responsible for producing Intelligence and the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Authorization bills, which proscribe certain Committees, were charged with authorizing the activities of the IC. The SSCI also provides ad- programs of the intelligence organizations and vice and consent on the nominations of certain overseeing their activities. presidentially appointed intelligence officials. The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act set forth The Appropriations Committees, given their the current oversight structure by establishing constitutional role to appropriate funds for all

68 U.S. Government activities, also exercise over- advisor to the NSC, and the Director of Na- sight of intelligence activities. Specifically, the tional Intelligence is the intelligence advisor to House and Senate appropriations subcommit- the NSC. The Chief of Staff to the President, tees for defense produce annual appropriations Counsel to the President, and Assistant to the for national and military intelligence activities President for Economic Policy are invited to via the Defense Appropriations Act. attend any NSC meeting. Other senior officials are invited to attend meetings of the NSC as These authorization and appropriations com- appropriate. mittees are the principal Congressional recipi- ents of IC products, briefings, notifications, The NSC drafts, coordinates, and approves Na- and reprogramming requests. These commit- tional Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs), tees routinely conduct hearings on budgetary which are instruments for communicating and other oversight matters. Presidential decisions about U.S. national security policy. Other Congressional committees interact with the IC as needed. President’s Intelligence Advisory Board National Security Council The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) The National Security Council (NSC) was are tasked with providing the President with an established by the National Security Act of independent source of advice on the effective- 1947. The NSC is the President’s forum for ness of the IC in meeting the nation’s intelli- discussion and examination of national security gence needs and the vigor and insight of the IC and foreign policy matters with the President’s plans for the future. The PIAB provides advice senior national security advisors and cabinet to the President concerning the quality and ad- officials. The NSC also serves as the Presi- equacy of intelligence collection, intelligence dent’s principal arm for coordinating foreign analysis and estimates, counterintelligence, policy matters among various government orga- and other intelligence activities. Because the nizations. The NSC is chaired by the President. PIAB is independent of the IC and free from Its regular attendees (both statutory and non- any day-to-day IC management or operational statutory) include the Vice President, Secretary responsibilities, it is able to objectively render of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary opinions on the sorts of intelligence that will of Defense, and Assistant to the President for best serve the country and the organizational National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the structure most likely to achieve IC goals. Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military

69 The IOB, a committee of the PIAB, informs violation of laws, rules, or regulations; mis- the President of intelligence activities that management; gross waste of funds; abuse of it believes may be unlawful or contrary to an authority; or a substantial and specific danger Executive Order (EO) or presidential directive to the public health and safety. The Inspec- and that are not being adequately addressed by tor General for the IC accepts and processes the Attorney General, the DNI, or the head of notifications from IC employees or contractors a department concerned. The IOB also informs who are intending to report an urgent concern the President of intelligence activities that it to the U.S. Congress. believes should be reported to the President immediately. Financial Management and Oversight The PIAB may consist of up to 16 individu- The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven- als who are not full-time employees of the tion Act of 2004 (IRTPA) provides the DNI U.S. Government. The Board has been known with a significant amount of authority over the as the PIAB since 2008 when the President IC’s budget development and ensuring the ef- signed EO 13462. Previously, it was known as fective execution of that budget. the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory The National Intelligence Program (NIP), Board (PFIAB) under EO 12863, a predecessor formerly known as the National Foreign Intel- Executive Order. ligence Program (NFIP), provides the resources needed to develop and maintain intelligence Office of the Inspector General capabilities that support national priorities. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) The Joint Military Intelligence Program and conducts independent investigations, audits, the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities inspections, and special reviews of IC programs program were combined in 2005 to form the and activities that are the responsibility of and Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The MIP under the authority of the DNI to detect and funds the specific intelligence needs of the deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, Department of Defense and tactical forces. The and to promote integrity, economy, efficiency, MIP is controlled by the Secretary of Defense, and effectiveness in the IC. The Inspector and the DNI participates in the development of General for the IC leads the OIG, chairs the IC the MIP. Inspectors General Forum, receives and investi- gates allegations of IC activities constituting a

70 Resolution activities, reasonable accommoda- tions, workplace climate, and behavior inter- ventions. Aggrieved persons who believe they have been discriminated against must contact an agency EEO counselor prior to filing a formal complaint. The person must initiate counselor contact within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.

Civil Liberties and Privacy Office The Civil Liberties and Privacy Office (CLPO) is Equal Employment Opportunity responsible for ensuring that civil liberties and and Diversity privacy protections are appropriately incorpo- IC EEOD serves as the principal advisor to rated into the policies and procedures of the IC. the DNI and IC senior leaders on issues that The CLPO also reviews, assesses, and inves- impact diversity, inclusion, and equal oppor- tigates complaints and information indicating tunity across the IC. The Office is responsible possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in for developing, implementing, and measuring the administration of programs or in the opera- performance against the five-year IC EEO and tions of the ODNI. Diversity Strategic Plan and overseeing and setting IC-wide policy guidance for the devel- To effectively use the tools and information opment and implementation of IC agency and that are needed for national safety and se- component plans linked to that strategy. The curity, the IC must have the trust of the U.S. office also advises ODNI and IC senior leaders public and continually demonstrate that it is on highly sensitive, confidential personnel con- worthy of that trust. Through a framework of cerns and matters. In addition to its IC-wide laws, policies, and oversight and compliance responsibilities, IC EEOD is also responsible mechanisms, the CLPO works within the entire for providing EEO and diversity services to IC to maintain the public’s trust by safeguard- the ODNI workforce, including managing the ing the freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy EEO complaints process, Alternative Dispute rights guaranteed to all U.S. persons.

71 Careers in the Intelligence Community CAREERS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Hurricane Assistance

During the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, the most destructive hurricane season on record, the National Geospatial-Intelligence agency responded with what then NGA director, James R. Clapper, called the best work by an intelligence agency that he had seen in his 42 years in the intelligence business. The NGA’s assistance to Hurricane Katrina relief ef- forts began before the first waves hit the Louisiana shore on August 29, 2005. For first responders and relief organizations, the agency provided scores of graphics depicting the locations of major airports, hospitals, police and fire stations, emergency opera- tions centers, hazardous materials, highways, and schools based on imagery from commercial and U.S. Government satellites and American military airborne platforms. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which struck the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisi- ana in September 2005, NGA forward-deployed more than two dozen analysts and two Mission Integrated Geospatial-Intelligence Systems (MIGS) to the affect- ed areas to provide timely, on-site support. Courtesy of NGA Careers in the Intelligence Community

THE BENEFITS OF WORKING IN THE IC The U.S. Intelligence Community offers the of Public Policy Implementation (http://best- following benefits to personnel within the IC placestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/). and to individuals considering a career within There are multiple pathways into the IC, as the IC: the following graphic indicates. Another key n A profession with a meaningful connec- pathway is the Intelligence Community Centers tion to protecting the United States and its of Academic Excellence (CAE) Program (www. citizens. dni.gov/cae). n Diverse work environments and corporate A diverse workforce is critical to the IC’s suc- cultures with all members of the IC work- cess. An essential component of intelligence ing toward a common goal. is an understanding of people and cultures that differ from those of the United States and n Work opportunities in almost every profes- knowledge of other areas around the world. As sional field imaginable. such, the IC seeks individuals of all ages and The IC has been repeatedly recognized as one ethnic backgrounds with diverse skills and of the “Best Places to Work in the Federal educational experiences to fill positions across Government” in an independent analysis spon- the IC. Hiring incentives and special pay scales sored by the Partnership for Public Service and are also available for those with certain foreign the American University Institute for the Study language skills, cultural expertise, and other critical skills and experience.

75 Scholarships Scholarships & Financial Aid C O Y L R L Fellowships A E Co-op Education Programs T I G

L E I

ROTC Programs M Part Time Internships

PR OR Highly Quali ed Experts IVATE SECT Career Changers

Another pathway to a career with the IC is the intelligence technologies, design software and IC Wounded Warrior program. Wounded War- hardware, write reports for the President, man- riors, many of whom already possess the skills age the IC’s people, programs, and processes, and experience that the IC seeks, are recruited and perform many more important activities. through IC-wide internship fairs and other IC U.S. citizenship is required for employment Agency-based initiatives. Wounded Warriors with the IC. An extensive background investi- may obtain internships across the IC that lead gation, which includes drug screening, must to full-time employment and an opportunity to be successfully completed for all job appli- serve Agencies that will benefit from their dis- cants prior to their being hired into the IC. cipline and experience. See www.intelligence. Some positions may also require medical and gov/woundedwarrior for more information on psychological examination and a polygraph the program. interview. The IC is an Equal Opportunity Em- The 17 agencies that form the IC include ployer and is fully compliant with the Ameri- staffed offices in all 50 states and around the cans with Disabilities Act. To find out more world. The men and women in these offices about IC careers and employment opportuni- collect and analyze information, translate ties, visit www.intelligence.gov. foreign-language documents, develop new

76 References REFERENCES On November 20, 1965, the Central Intelligence Agency com- pleted flight testing on the A-12, the fastest and highest-flying jet aircraft yet to be built. It flew for 74 minutes at 90,000 feet at a sustained speed of Mach 3.2 and a peak speed of Mach 3.29. The A-12 program (code named “Oxcart”) was a successor to the U-2, the CIA’s first high-altitude strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The U-2 was built to fly deep inside the Soviet Union, but it was soon vulnerable to Soviet air defenses—a problem demonstrated when the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers was downed by a Courtesy of CIA surface-to-air missile. Lockheed Corporation’s advanced design facility, nicknamed the “Skunk Works,” submitted a design for a new reconnaissance aircraft that would fly too high and too fast to be intercepted by the Soviets. But by the time the A-12 went into production, Soviet air defenses had advanced enough that even an aircraft flying faster than a bul- let at the edge of space would be vulnerable. The CIA successfully deployed the A-12 to Asia, where it flew 29 missions in 1967 and 1968. Eight deactivated A-12s are on display at museums around the United States, and one is at CIA Headquarters.

CODE NAME “OXCART”: the supersonic A-12 References

Glossary of Terms Analysis: The process by which information is A transformed into intelligence; a systematic ex- Access: The means, ability, or permission to amination of information to identify significant approach, enter, or use a resource. facts, make judgments, and draw conclusions. Actionable: (1) Information that is directly useful to customers for immediate exploitation C without requiring the full intelligence pro- Classification: The determination, in the inter- duction process; actionable information may est of national security, that official informa- address strategic or tactical needs, support tion requires a specific degree of protection of U.S. negotiating teams, or actions dealing against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with with such matters as international terrorism or a designation signifying that such a determina- narcotics. (2) Intelligence and information with tion has been made; the designation is typi- sufficient specificity and detail that explicit cally called a “security classification,” which responses based on that information can be includes CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP implemented. SECRET classification levels. All-Source Intelligence: Intelligence infor- Collection: The identification, location, and mation derived from several or all of the recording and storing of information— typically intelligence disciplines, including SIGINT, from an original source and using both human HUMINT, MASINT, OSINT, and GEOINT. and technological means—for input into the

79 Intelligence Cycle for the purpose of meeting a Covert Action/Operation: Activity or activities defined tactical or strategic intelligence goal. of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions Communications Intelligence (COMINT): The abroad, where it is intended that the role of capture of information, either encrypted or in teh United States Government will not be ap- “plaintext,” exchanged between intelligence parent or acknowledges publicly, but does not targets or transmitted by a known or suspected include activities the primary purpose of which intelligence target for the purpose of tracking is to aquire intelligence, traditional counterin- communications patterns and protocols (traffic telligence activities, traditional diplomatic or analysis), establishing links between intercom- military activities, or traditional law enforcemnt municating parties or groups, or analysis of the activities. substantive meaning of the communication. COMINT is a sub-discipline of SIGINT. Confidential: A security classification designat- D Deployment: The short-term assignment of ing information that, if made public, could be personnel to address specific problems or de- expected to cause damage to national security. mands related to national security. Consumer: An authorized person who uses intel- ligence or intelligence information directly in the decisionmaking process or to produce other E Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): (1) Informa- intelligence. tion derived primarily from electronic signals Counterintelligence: Information gathered that do not contain speech or text (which are and activities conducted to identify, deceive, considered to be COMINT). (2) Information exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, obtained for intelligence purposes from the in- other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assas- terception of electromagnetic non-communica- sinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign tions transmissions by other than the intended powers, organizations, or persons or their recipient. The most common sources of this agents, or international terrorist organizations type of information are radar signals. ELINT is or activities. a sub-discipline of SIGINT. Counterterrorism: The practices, tactics, tech- Exploitation: The process of obtaining intelli- niques, and strategies adopted to prevent or gence information from any source and taking respond to terrorist threats or acts, both real advantage of it for intelligence purposes. and suspected.

80 F G Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence Geospatial Intelligence: Intelligence derived (FISINT): Information derived from the inter- from the exploitation of imagery and geospatial ception of foreign electromagnetic emissions information to describe, assess, and visually associated with the testing and operational depict physical features and geographically deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, referenced activities on the earth. and subsurface systems including, but not limited to, telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links. FISINT is a H Homeland Security Information: Any informa- sub-discipline of SIGINT. tion possessed by an SLTT or federal agency Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): The Freedom that relates to (1) a threat of terrorist activity; of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, enacted in (2) the ability to prevent, interdict, or dis- 1966, statutorily provides that any person has rupt terrorist activity; (3) the identification or a right, enforceable in court, to access federal investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist agency records, except to the extent that such organization or any person, group, or entity as- records (or portions thereof) are protected from sociated with or assisting a suspected terrorist disclosure by one of nine exemptions or three or terrorist organization; or (4) a planned or exclusions. actual response to a terrorist act. Fusion Center: A collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, exper- I tise, and information to a center with the goal Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): Intelligence that of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, includes representations of objects reproduced investigate, and respond to criminal and terror- electronically or by optical means on film, elec- ist activity. State and major urban area fusion tronic display devices, or other media. Imagery centers are recognized as a valuable informa- can be derived from visual photography, radar tion-sharing resource. They are the focus, but sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro- not exclusive points, within the state and local optics. environments for the receipt and sharing of ter- Intelligence Analyst: A professional intelligence rorism information, homeland security informa- officer who is responsible for performing, coor- tion, and law enforcement information related dinating, or supervising the collection, analy- to terrorism. sis, and dissemination of intelligence.

81 Intelligence Community: A federation of Execu- Intelligence Officer: A professional employee of tive Branch agencies and organizations that an intelligence organization engaged in intel- work separately and together to conduct intel- ligence activities. ligence activities necessary for the conduct of Intelligence Products: Reports or documents foreign relations and the protection of U.S. na- that contain assessments, forecasts, asso- tional security. These organizations are (in al- ciations, links, and other outputs from the phabetical order): Air Force Intelligence, Army analytic process. Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, Depart- Intelligence Requirement: The need to collect ment of Defense, Department of Energy, De- intelligence information or to produce intel- partment of Justice, Department of Homeland ligence, either general or specific, on a particu- Security, Department of State, Department of lar subject. the Treasury, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps J Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): A JTTF is a co- Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence ordinated “action arm” for federal, state, and Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Na- local government response to terrorist threats tional Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence. in specific U.S. geographic regions. The FBI is Intelligence Cycle: The steps through which the lead agency that oversees the JTTFs. information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. The cycle typically includes six steps: planning and direction, col- M Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MA- lection, processing and exploitation, analysis SINT): Technically derived intelligence data and production, dissemination, and evaluation. other than imagery and SIGINT. The data re- Intelligence Mission: The role that the intelli- sults in intelligence that locates, identifies, or gence function of an agency fulfills in support describes distinctive characteristics of targets. of the overall mission of the agency; the intel- It employs a broad group of disciplines includ- ligence mission specifies in general language ing nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, what the intelligence function is intended to seismic, and materials sciences. accomplish.

82 NIEs express the coordinated assessment of N the IC and, thus, represent the most authorita- National Intelligence: National Intelligence tive assessment of the DNI with respect to a and the term “intelligence related to national particular national security issue. NIEs contain security” refer to all intelligence, regardless of the coordinated judgment the IC regarding the the source from which it is derived and includ- probable course of future events. ing information gathered within or outside the United States that pertains, as determined to be consistent with any guidance issued by the O President, to (1) more than one U.S. Govern- Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT): Publicly avail- ment agency and that involves threats to the able information appearing in print or elec- United States, its people, property, or interests; tronic form, including information from radio, (2) the development, proliferation, or use of television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, weapons of mass destruction; or (3) any other commercial databases, and videos, graphics, matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland and drawings used to enhance intelligence security. Source: Intelligence Reform and Ter- analysis and reporting. rorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 1012, Public Law 108-458, December 17, 2004. P National Intelligence Council (NIC): The NIC is Privacy Act: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. the IC’s council for midterm and long-term 552a, establishes a code of fair information strategic thinking. Its primary functions are to practices that governs the collection, mainte- support the Director of National Intelligence, nance, use, and dissemination of personally provide a focal point for policymakers to task identifiable information about individuals that the IC to answer their questions, reach out to is maintained in systems of records by federal nongovernment experts in academia and the agencies. A system of records is a group of private sector to broaden the IC’s perspective, records under the control of an agency from contribute to the IC’s effort to allocate its re- which information is retrieved by an individu- sources to policymakers’ changing needs, and al’s name or by some other identifier assigned lead the IC’s efforts to produce National Intel- to the individual. The Privacy Act requires that ligence Estimates and other NIC products. agencies provide public notice of their systems of records through publication in the Federal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): NIEs are Register. The Privacy Act prohibits the disclo- produced by the National Intelligence Council. sure of information from a system of records

83 absent the written consent of the individual critical information needed for intelligence who is the subject of the information search, analysis. unless the disclosure is pursuant to one of 12 statutory exceptions. The Privacy Act also provides individuals with a means by which T Threat: (1) A source of unacceptable risk. (2) to seek access to and amend their records The capability of an adversary coupled with the and sets forth various agency record-keeping adversary’s intention to undertake actions that requirements. would be detrimental to the success of certain activities or operations. R Top Secret: Information that, if it is made pub- Raw Data: Bits of collected data that individu- lic, could be expected to cause exceptionally ally convey little or no useful information and grave damage to national security. must be collated, aggregated, or interpreted to provide meaningful information. Raw Intelligence: A colloquial term meaning U Unauthorized Disclosure: A communication or collected intelligence information that has not physical transfer, usually of sensitive but un- yet been converted into finished intelligence. classified information or classified information, to an unauthorized recipient. S Unclassified: Information not subject to a Secret: Information that, if it is made public, security classification; that is, information not could be expected to cause serious damage to classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP national security. SECRET. Although unclassified information is Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intelligence de- not subject to a security classification, there rived from signals intercepts comprising, indi- may still be limits on its disclosure. vidually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and/or FISINT. W Warning: To issue an advance notification of Source: A document, interview, or other means possible harm or victimization following the re- by which information has been obtained. From ceipt of information or intelligence concerning an intelligence perspective, sources are indi- the possibility of a crime or terrorist attack. viduals (or HUMINT) who collect or possess

84 Acronyms and CRM: Collection Requirements Management Abbreviations CRWG: Capability Requirements Working Group CTD: Counterterrorism Division A A2: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, D Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Air Force) DA: Directorate for Analysis ADNI/SRA: Assistant Director of National Intel- D/CIA: Director Central Intelligence Agency ligence for Systems and Resource Analyses (formerly DCI) DCHC: Defense Counterintelligence and Human C Intelligence Center CAE: Center of Academic Excellence DDII: Deputy Director Intelligence Integration CD: Counterintelligence Division DDNI: Deputy DNI Director for Intelligence CFO: Chief Financial Officer Integration CI: Counterintelligence DDNI/A&T: Deputy DNI for Acquisition and CIA: Central Intelligence Agency Technology CIKR: Clinical Infrastructure and Key Resources DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration CIO: Chief Information Officer DEXCOM: Deputy Executive Committee CLPO: Civil Liberties and Privacy Office DHS: Department of Homeland Security COM: Collection Operations Management DI: Directorate of Intelligence CNO: Chief of Naval Operations DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency CNO: Computer Network Operations DIAC: Defense Intelligence Analysis Center COMINT: Communications Intelligence DIRINT: Director of Intelligence CSS: Central Security Service DNI: Director of National Intelligence CR: Collection Request DoD: Department of Defense

85 DoDIIS: Department of Defense Intelligence Information System G GDIP: General Defense Intelligence Program DOE: Department of Energy GEOINT: Geospatial Intelligence DS: Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer GMII: Global Maritime Intelligence Integration DS&T: Directorate of Science and Technology DT: Directorate for MASINT and Technical Col- H HPSCI: House Permanent Select Committee on lection Intelligence DT: Domestic Terrorism HUMINT: Human Intelligence DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency I E I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS) ELINT: Electronic Intelligence IC: Intelligence Community EO: Executive Order ICCR: Intelligence Community Capability EXCOM: Executive Committee Requirements ICD: Intelligence Community Directive (replaces F Director of Central Intelligence Directives) FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation IED: Improvised Explosive Device FIG: Field Intelligence Group IMINT: Imagery Intelligence FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act IN: Office of Intelligence and Counterintelli- FISINT: Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intel- gence ligence INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research FOIA: Freedom of Information Act (DOS) FOUO: For Official Use Only INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (Army)

86 IOB: Intelligence Oversight Board MSIC: Missile and Space Intelligence Center IPPBE: Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation N NCIX: National Counterintelligence Executive IRB: Intelligence Resources Board NCMI: National Center for Medical Intelligence IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Pre- vention Act of 2004 NCPC: National Counterproliferation Center ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais- NCS: National Clandestine Service sance NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center IT: Information Technology NDIC: National Defense Intelligence College ITACG: Interagency Threat Assessment and NGA: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Coordination Group, NCTC (formerly NIMA) J NFIP: National Foreign Intelligence Program J-2: Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff NGIC: National Ground Intelligence Center Intelligence NIC: National Intelligence Council JICC: Joint Intelligence Community Council NIE: National Intelligence Estimate JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force NIP: National Intelligence Program JWICS: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communi- NIS: National Intelligence Strategy cation System NJTTF: National Joint Terrorism Task Force M NMEC: National Media Exploitation Center MASINT: Measurement and Signatures NMIC: National Maritime Intelligence Center Intelligence NRO: National Reconnaissance Office MCIA: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity NSA: National Security Agency MIP: Military Intelligence Program NSB: National Security Branch MSA: Major System Acquisition

87 NSC: National Security Council NSOC: National Security Operations Center S S&T: Science and Technology NSPD: National Security Presidential Directives SCI: Sensitive Compartmented Information NTOC: NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center SIGINT: Signals Intelligence NVTC: National Virtual Translation Center SLTT: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial O SSCI: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intel- S&T: Science and Technology ligence OIG: Office of the Inspector General T TIDE: Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment ONCIX: Office of the National Counterintelli- gence Executive TSC: Terrorist Screening Center ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence ONSI: Office of National Security Intelligence U UFAC: Underground Facilities Analysis Center OPNAV N2/N6: Deputy Chief of Naval Opera- UGF: Underground Facility tions for Information Dominance UIS: Unifying Intelligence Strategies OSC: Open-Source Center USCG: U.S. Coast Guard OSINT: Open-Source Intelligence USCG-ICC: U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence P Coordination Center PFIAB: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory USD(I): Undersecretary of Defense for Board Intelligence PIAB: President’s Intelligence Advisory Board U/SIA: Under Secretary for I&A R USMC: U.S. Marine Corps RFI: Request for Information

88 W WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction WMDD: Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Resources

Organization URL Description IC Agency Web Sites

Air Force ISR (Intelligence, http://www.afisr.af.mil n General office information Surveillance, and n News, press releases, and videos Reconnaissance) Agency n Links to career and internship opportunities Central Intelligence Agency http://www.cia.gov n General office information and information on CIA mission n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, videos, and CIA World Fact Book n Links to career and internship opportunities and descriptions of the CIA organizational culture Defense Intelligence Agency http://www.dia.mil n General office information and information on the DIA mission and Defense Intelligence Enterprise strategy n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities (within dia.mil site) and descriptions of the DIA organizational culture Federal Bureau of Investigation http://www.fbi.gov n General office information, FBI overview, and overview of Directorate of Intelligence n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities

89 Organization URL Description IC Agency Web Sites National Geospatial- http://www.nga.mil n General office information and information on NGA mission Intelligence Agency and strategic intent n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities National Reconnaissance Office http://www.nro.gov n General office information and information on NRO mission n News, press releases, and videos National Security Agency/ http://www.nsa.gov n General office information and information on NSA/CSS Central Security Service mission and strategic plan n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and video transcripts n Links to career and internship opportunities Office of the Director of http://www.dni.gov n General ODNI information, ODNI mission information, and U.S. National Intelligence National Intelligence Strategy n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and speeches n Links to information on ODNI careers, internships, scholarships, and other such opportunities U.S. Army Intelligence and http://www.inscom.army.mil n General office information Security Command n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Depart- http://www.uscg.mil n General office information ment of Homeland Security n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities U.S. Department of Energy http://www.energy.gov n General office information and DOE Directives n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities

90 Organization URL Description IC Agency Web Sites U.S. Department of Homeland http://www.dhs.gov n General office information and information on DHS mission Security and DHS strategic plan n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov n General office information and information on the State Department mission n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities U.S. Department of the Treasury http://www.treasury.gov n General information and information on the Department of the Treasury mission and U.S. economic strategy n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, and other information resources n Links to career opportunities U.S. Drug Enforcement http://www.justice.gov/dea n General office information and information on DEA mission Administration n Policy and appointment updates n Congressional testimony–related links n News, press releases, videos, and news and information on the Drug Enforcement Administration Museum and Visitors Center n Links to career and internship opportunities and descriptions of the DEA organizational culture U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. http://www.usmc.mil/unit/ n General office information Marine Corps Forces Special marsoc/msoib n News, press releases, and videos Operations Command, Marine n Links to career and internship opportunities Special Operations Intelligence Battalion U.S. Navy, Office of Naval http://www.oni.navy.mil n General office information Intelligence n News, press releases, and videos n Links to career and internship opportunities

91 Organization URL Description IC Employment Websites Central Intelligence Agency https://www.cia.gov/careers Identifies career opportunities and career paths within the CIA Defense Intelligence Agency http://www.dia.mil/careers The DIA’s “Employment Headquarters” website Federal Bureau of Investigation http://www.fbijobs.gov Highlights the FBI’s featured opportunities and other news as well as links to information on FBI career paths FBI Language Services: http://fbijobs.gov/ling/ Contains postings specifically on FBI contract linguist Contract Linguists opportunities National Geospatial- http://erecruit.nga.mil Identifies current career opportunities at the NGA Intelligence Agency National Security Agency/ http://www.nsa.gov/careers Identifies current NSA career opportunities and the benefits of Central Security Service working at the NSA/CSS National Virtual Translation http://www.nvtc.gov Provides answers to pertinent FAQs related to employment at the Center NVTC Office of the Director of http://intelligence.gov/careers- Highlight the diverse careers that the IC offers and the type of National Intelligence in-intelligence/ talent needed across the IC (Intelligence.gov) U.S. Air Force http://www.airforce.com/ Provides an overview of the requirements to become an Air Force joining-the-air-force/officer- officer overview/ U.S. Army Intelligence and http://www.inscom.army.mil/ Provides links to USAJobs.gov and Army-specific sites for current Security Command Employment/Defaultjobs.aspx employment opportunities U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Depart- http://www.uscg.mil/top/ Identifies current career opportunities and the benefits of work- ment of Homeland Security careers.asp ing for the Coast Guard as officer, enlisted, reserve, civilian, or auxiliary personnel U.S. Department of Energy http://jobs.energy.gov/ A career information portal that enables users to search for DOE opportunities through the USAJobs website. U.S. Department of Homeland http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/ Identifies current DHS career opportunities and the benefits of Security careers working at the DHS U.S. Department of State http://careers.state.gov Identifies the career opportunities within the State Department U.S. Department of the Treasury http://www.treasury.gov/ Identifies career opportunities at the Department of the Treasury careers headquarters and at the individual Treasury bureaus U.S. Drug Enforcement http://www.justice.gov/dea/ Identifies career opportunities within the DEA Administration resources/job_applicants.html

92 Organization URL Description IC Employment Websites U.S. Office of Personnel http://usajobs.gov/ Highlight the diverse careers that the IC offers and the type of Management (USAJobs.gov) talent needed across the IC U.S. Marine Corps http://www.marines.com Provides an overview of opportunities as enlisted or officer http://officer.marines.com personnel U.S. Navy http://www.donhr.navy.mil/ Naval civilian HR and ONI job-search sites Department of the Navy Civilian http://www.oni.navy.mil/ Human Resources Join_Us/hot_jobs.htm Office of Naval Intelligence http://www.oni.navy.mil/ “Hot Vacancies” Join_Us/Military_duty.htm Office of Naval Intelligence “Military Duty at ONI”

Laws and Policies Governing the IC Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel Legal Reference Book The Constitution Of The United States Of America National Security Act Of 1947 Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act Of 2004* Central Intelligence Agency Act Of 1949 National Security Agency Act Of 1959 Department Of Defense Title 10 Authorities National Imagery And Mapping Agency Act Of 1996 Homeland Security Act Of 2002*

93 Counterintelligence And Security Enhancements Act Of 1994 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act Of 2002 Classified Information Procedures Act Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Of 1978 Protect America Act Of 2007 Usa Patriot Act Of 2001* Usa Patriot Improvement And Reauthorization Act Of 2005* Detainee Treatment Act Of 2005 Military Commissions Act Of 2006 Freedom Of Information Act Privacy Act Federal Information Security Management Act Inspector General Act Of 1978 War Crimes Act Of 1996 Interception Of Wire, Electronic, And Oral Communications Implementing Recommendations Of The 9/11 Commission Act Of 2007* Executive Order 12139 Executive Order 12333 Executive Order 12949 Executive Order 12951 Executive Order 12958 Executive Order 12968

94 Executive Order 13354 Executive Order 13355 Executive Order 13388 Executive Order 13462 Executive Order 13467 Executive Order 13491 Executive Order 13492 Executive Order 13493 Intelligence Sharing Procedures For Foreign Intelligence And Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted By The Fbi Guidelines For Disclosure Of Grand Jury And Electronic, Wire, And Oral Interception Information Identifying United States Persons Guidelines Regarding Disclosure To The Director Of Central Intelligence And Homeland Security Officials Of Foreign Intelligence Acquired In The Course Of A Criminal Investigation Guidelines Regarding Prompt Handling Of Reports Of Possible Criminal Activity Involving Foreign Intelligence Sources The Attorney General’s Guidelines For Domestic Fbi Operations Strengthening Information Sharing, Access, And Integration B Organizational, Management, And Policy Development Structures For Creating The Terrorism Information Sharing Environment Guidelines To Ensure That The Information Privacy And Other Legal Rights Of Americans Are Pro- tected In The Development And Use Of The Information Sharing Environment Criteria On Thresholds For Reporting Intelligence Oversight Matters Mou: Reporting Of Information Concerning Federal Crimes Intelligence Community And Government Websites

95 Department of Defense.8, 21, 22, 23, 24, 33, Subject Index 34, 70, 82, 86, 94 Air Force...... 34, 82 Department of Energy. 25, 45, 82, 87, 91, 93 Analysis, Production and Feedback . . . .59 Department of Homeland Security. 25-28, 82, Army...... 32-33, 82, 87, 91, 93 86, 91, 92, 93 Careers in the Intelligence Community. . .75 Department of Justice...... 29, 82 Central Intelligence Agency.18-19, 23, 68, 82, Department of State. . . 31, 41, 82, 92, 93 86, 90, 93 Department of the Treasury. . 32, 82, 92, 93 Civil Liberties and Privacy Office . . . . .72 Deputy Executive Committee. . . 46, 67, 86 Coast Guard. . . 25, 27, 34, 82, 89, 91, 93 Director of National Collection Operations Management. . .47-49 Intelligence...... 8, 15-17, 18, 19, Collection Requirements Management . 47-48 20, 21, 23, 26, 31, 44-45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 67-72, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93, 94 Collection, Processing and Exploitation. . .53 Drug Enforcement Administration. 29, 82, 86, Communications Intelligence. 55, 80, 81, 85, 92 86 Electronic Intelligence . . 55-56, 81, 85, 87 Congress (House of Representatives and Senate). .15, 17, 53, 68, 69, 70, 90, 91, 92 Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity ...... 70-71 Counterintelligence. .16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 35, 42, 69, 80, 86, 87, 88, Executive Committee ...... 67, 87 89, 95, 96 Federal Bureau Counternarcotics ...... 19 of Investigation.27, 29-30, 31, 82, 87, 90, 93 Counterproliferation . . . . .16-17, 19, 25 Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence . . . . .55-56, 81, 85 Counterterrorism. .16, 19, 27, 30, 80, 86, 88 General Defense Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency . .20-22, 82, 86, Program...... 20, 87 90, 93

96 Geospatial National Counterintelligence Intelligence. . . . .11, 19, 22, 53, 82, 87 Executive...... 16, 17, 88, 89 House Permanent Select Committee National Counterproliferation on Intelligence...... 68, 87 Center...... 16-17, 88 Human Intelligence . .11, 18, 20, 54, 86, 87 National Counterterrorism Center...... 16, 17, 27, 88 Imagery Intelligence...... 53, 82, 87 National Defense Intelligence Intelligence Cycle...... 10-12, 80, 82 College ...... 21-22, 88 Intelligence National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. .22, Integration...... 15-16, 46, 67-68, 86 82, 88, 91, 93 Intelligence Oversight Board . . . 69-70, 87 National Ground Intelligence Center. . 35, 88 Intelligence Overview ...... 2 National Intelligence Intelligence Planning, Programming, Council. . . . . 16, 17-18, 49, 83-84, 88 Budgeting and Evaluation. . . . 44-45, 87 National Intelligence Estimates. . . .17, 84 Intelligence Resources Board. . . . .46, 88 National Intelligence Managers . . . . . 16 Interagency Threat Assessment and National Intelligence Priorities Framework. .49 Coordination Group...... 27, 88 National Intelligence Program. . 15, 23, 26, Joint Intelligence Community Council. .67, 88 44-45, 46, 47, 70, 88 Joint Terrorism Task Force. . . . 30, 83, 88 National Intelligence Marine Corps...... 20, 34-35, 82, 88 Strategy...... 39, 44, 88, 91 Measurement and Signature National Joint Terrorism Task Force . . 30, 88 Intelligence. . . . .20, 54, 79, 83, 87, 88 National Media Exploitation Center. . .21, 88 Military Intelligence National Reconnaissance Program...... 20, 23, 45, 46, 70, 88 Office ...... 23, 82, 88, 91 National Air and Space National Security Agency. . . 23-25, 82, 88 Intelligence Center...... 34

97 National Security Council . .7, 15, 49, 69, 88 Organizational Oversight...... 67 National Virtual Translation President’s Intelligence Advisory Center...... 31, 89, 93 Board ...... 69-70, 89 Navy...... 33-34, 82, 92, 94 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review . . 26 Office of Intelligence and Requirements, Planning and Direction. . .39 Counterintelligence...... 25, 87 Senate Select Committee Office of National Security on Intelligence...... 68-69 Intelligence...... 29, 89 Signals Intelligence . .23, 24, 55-56, 79, 80, Office of Naval Intelligence. . . .34, 89, 92 81, 83, 85, 89 Office of the Director of National Underground Facilities Intelligence. . 8, 15-16, 47, 72, 82, 89, 91 Analysis Center...... 15-16, 89 Office of the Inspector General. . . . 70, 89 Weapons of Mass Destruction . .7, 16-17, 20, 23, 27, 30, 53, 83, 90 Open Source Center...... 19 Wounded Warrior Program...... 76 Open Source Intelligence...... 11, 19, 79, 84, 89

98 Legal Disclaimer Nothing in this handbook shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof. Additionally, the handbook is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

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