195 the Gulf of Guinea

THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NEW DANGER ZONE

Africa Report N°195 – 12 December 2012

Translation from French

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. A STRATEGIC REGION IN THE GRIP OF INSECURITY ...... 2 A. RENEWED STRATEGIC INTEREST IN NATURAL RESOURCES ...... 2 B. A CONTEXT FAVOURABLE TO MARITIME CRIME ...... 3 C. WEAK MARITIME POLICIES ...... 4 III. NIGERIA: EPICENTRE OF VIOLENCE AT SEA ...... 6 A. POOR GOVERNANCE AND MARITIME CRIME ...... 6 1. A leaky oil sector ...... 6 2. The rise in economic crime ...... 7 3. State capacity hampered by corruption ...... 8 4. The Niger Delta ...... 8 D. THE INCREASE IN CRIME SINCE 2009 ...... 9 1. The amnesty’s limited impact ...... 9 2. Crime onshore enables crime offshore ...... 10 3. Stronger but insufficient government response ...... 11 E. FUTURE THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY ...... 12 1. Subcontracting security ...... 12 2. Amnesty, unemployment and unrest in the north ...... 12 IV. THE SPREAD OF CRIME ACROSS THE REGION ...... 13 A. POLITICAL GANGSTERISM IN BAKASSI ...... 13 B. MARITIME RAIDS ...... 14 C. PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS ...... 15 1. Danger off the Benin coast ...... 15 2. Togo within range ...... 17 3. Ghana at risk ...... 18 V. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ...... 18 A. UNEQUAL REGIONAL COOPERATION ...... 19 1. The beginning of a strategy in Central Africa ...... 19 2. West Africa plays catch-up ...... 20 B. NASCENT INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION ...... 21 C. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT: IN SEARCH OF COORDINATION ...... 21 VI. MOVING BEYOND A PURELY SECURITY APPROACH ...... 23 A. THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM REFORMS ...... 23 1. Improving economic governance ...... 24 2. Boosting development on the coast ...... 24 3. Strengthening maritime law enforcement ...... 24 B. FIGHTING PIRACY ON LAND AND SEA ...... 25 1. Dissuading pirates: A joint task of state and private actors ...... 25 2. Arresting pirates ...... 26 C. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT COOPERATION ...... 27 1. Making the region take responsibility for its own security ...... 27 2. Coordinating international support ...... 28 VII.CONCLUSION ...... 29

APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE GULF OF GUINEA ...... 30 B. MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA ...... 31 C. MAP OF THE ECCAS MARITIME ZONES ...... 32 D. NIGER DELTA TIMELINE ...... 33 E. PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE ...... 35

Africa Report N°195 12 December 2012

THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NEW DANGER ZONE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. Maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of coopera- insecurity is a major regional problem that is compromis- tion between them have allowed criminal networks to di- ing the development of this strategic economic area and versify their activities and gradually extend them away threatening maritime trade in the short term and the sta- from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime bility of coastal states in the long term. Initially taken by does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to surprise, the region’s governments are now aware of the include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned problem and the UN is organising a summit meeting on the seaborne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and, issue. In order to avoid violent transnational crime desta- taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations, have bilising the maritime economy and coastal states, as it has appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, done on the East African coast, these states must fill the São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and Togo. security vacuum in their territorial waters and provide a collective response to this danger. Gulf of Guinea countries Having recovered from the initial surprise, Gulf of Guinea must press for dynamic cooperation between the Economic states and Western countries are exploring how best to deal Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the with the problem before it causes wider instability. States Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and regional organisations have launched specific operations take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new and are formulating strategies to improve security. The most approach based on improving not only security but also affected states aim to build navies and increase resources economic governance. for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals.

The recent discovery of offshore hydrocarbon deposits At the regional level, within the framework of its peace has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of and security policies, ECCAS has created a regional mari- Guinea. After neglecting their maritime zones for many time security centre and organised joint training exercises. years, Gulf of Guinea states are now aware of their weak- However, states find it hard to organise joint funding or co- ness. On the international front, renewed Western interest ordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and in the region is accompanied by similar interest from emerg- symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous ing nations. In this context, the rise in maritime crime has presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooper- increased collective concern in a region where, for decades, ation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political ten- the problems of sovereignty and territorial control have sions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria. only been posed on dry land. At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS The Niger Delta region in Nigeria was the initial epicentre and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has para- the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However, doxically created poverty. As social tensions and environ- inter-regional discussions have only just begun and polit- mental pollution increased, oil income has, in large part, ical tensions hamper efforts to promote practical coopera- only benefited the central government, oil companies and tion. Meanwhile, Western powers (U.S., France, UK) and local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to vio- emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with lent opposition. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to economic interests in the region are providing financial even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal support and security expertise to assist local initiatives. activities, including siphoning of crude oil, clandestine refining and illegal fuel trade. The constant increase in the The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper increase of international initiatives must not obscure the and economic crime to spread. fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page ii

to poor governance. Most states in the region have been best management practices advising ship owners, cap- unable to control economic activities in their maritime tains and crews on anti-piracy measures. zones and in international waters and ensure the devel- 7. Set up a national inter-agency anti-piracy task force opment of their shorelines. This collective failure has cre- to investigate, arrest and prosecute pirate gangs on ated a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed land and at sea. on the needs and grievances of local communities. A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms 8. Accede to all necessary international legal instruments, to improve governance of the economy and security sector, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocol to the Conven- practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of in- tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the tent. A long-term response is needed because, although Safety of Maritime Navigation, integrate these conven- piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes tions into national law and train personnel responsible for are much deeper. implementing them, especially in the judicial system.

RECOMMENDATIONS To strengthen cooperation 9. Sign bilateral agreements at the presidential level be- To the Governments of the Gulf of Guinea States tween direct neighbours to facilitate extraditions and (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, enable close cooperation between navies, maritime Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and administration agencies and police forces in counter- Príncipe, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic piracy work. Republic of Congo and Angola): 10. Organise in the near future joint surveillance opera- 1. Prioritise the fight against maritime crime by creating tions in especially dangerous zones: an inter-ministerial committee in each country to draw a) Nigeria, Benin and Togo should agree to expand up a national maritime strategy to tackle the immediate the joint Operation Prosperity to include Togo’s threat and the root causes of the problem. These com- territorial waters; and mittees should include at least the ministers of social affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior, transport, econ- b) Nigeria and Cameroon should conduct joint pa- omy, labour, fishing and natural resources. trols on their maritime borders. 11. Participate fully in efforts by ECCAS and ECOWAS To combat the root causes of maritime crime to draw up a regional maritime security strategy and share resources. 2. Combat crime in the hydrocarbons and shipping sectors by conducting research into the illegal fuel trade 12. Strengthen inter-regional cooperation by: in order to identify the companies involved in illegal a) organising a Gulf of Guinea summit at which heads activities. of state should sign the Memorandum of Under- 3. Boost job creation along the coast, in particular by standing between ECCAS and ECOWAS on Mari- protecting artisanal fishing, stimulating the local fish time Security in the Central and Western Maritime processing industry, providing professional training Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Coop- to vulnerable sectors of the population (former com- eration to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in batants and unemployed youth) and reinvesting assets West and Central Africa; and seized from fuel smugglers in development projects. b) turning the Maritime Trade Information Sharing 4. Strengthen maritime law enforcement through profes- Centre (MTISC) to be set up in Ghana into an in- sionalisation of naval forces, maritime law enforcement formation collection and dissemination tool for bodies and port authorities, which should increase their the Gulf of Guinea and transforming the regional technological capacity and intelligence networks to training service for maritime security planned by monitor all activities in their exclusive economic zones. ECCAS into a training centre for the whole region.

To strengthen anti-piracy policies at sea and on land 5. Maintain constant navy patrols in mooring zones and territorial waters and carry out regular surveillance flights. 6. Work closely with the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and shipping industry to draw up The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page iii

To International Partners:

13. Coordinate international support through a multinational maritime affairs committee for each country and ensure that foreign interventions are aligned with national strategies. 14. Assist national maritime affairs committees in designing comprehensive maritime policies that address the immediate threat and root causes of maritime crime; and support coastal states in their efforts to create jobs. 15. Impress upon Gulf of Guinea states the need to treat piracy as a transnational organised crime that demands a coordinated response including naval operations, in- vestigative police work and prosecution of suspects; and design programs to strengthen the capacities of all maritime law enforcement agencies.

To the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol:

16. Advise and assist with tracking financial flows to Gulf of Guinea states as part of investigations into pirate organisations and the smuggling of hydrocarbons.

Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2012

Africa Report N°195 12 December 2012

THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NEW DANGER ZONE

I. INTRODUCTION west were also hit by pirate attacks. The mobilisation of naval forces by unprepared coastal states may have slowed the growth of the problem but attacks continue and their Maritime crime, along with the rise in radical Islam in the perpetrators remain at large. The first half of 2012 saw an 1 Sahel, is one of the two major threats emerging in Africa. increase in attacks off Nigeria.5 The region’s loss of reve- The Gulf of Guinea is one of the world’s most dangerous nue from maritime trade, fishing and port fees and, above 2 maritime zones. Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia all, the loss of human life warrant a careful analysis of the still exceed those off Africa’s west coast in frequency, reasons for maritime insecurity. range and cost to international shipping, but maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has grown rapidly in recent After the Crisis Group report on ECCAS, which high- years.3 The international community is only now becom- lighted the maritime insecurity affecting Cameroon, Gabon ing aware of the dangerous repercussions of violent crime and Equatorial Guinea,6 this new report extends the scope at sea on both development and the global economy. of the analysis to cover the high geostrategic stakes at play in the Gulf of Guinea region as a whole. These are linked The Gulf of Guinea states vary considerably in size, pop- especially to its rich reserves of fossil fuels and its role as a ulation, wealth and institutional and political stability. vital access point to many coastal and landlocked countries The economies of Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana are much in West and Central Africa. This report explains how weak bigger than those of Benin, Togo and São Tomé and Prín- governance in the region has allowed illicit activities to cipe. However, to a greater or lesser extent they all struggle flourish at sea and create an enabling environment for vio- to assert their authority over their territory, particularly their lent crime. In Nigeria, poor economic governance has turned territorial waters. oil wealth into a curse and the country into the epicentre of violence at sea. A lack of preparedness and even negligence For decades thieves have attacked commercial traffic in in neighbouring countries has allowed violence to spread the waters off Nigeria. Violence escalated during the Ni- first east, then west. ger Delta insurgency, at its peak between 2006 and 2009, and from 2007 began to spread along the coast to Nige- This report assesses how coastal states, their international 4 ria’s eastern neighbours. In 2011, Benin and states to the partners and private companies have responded to growing insecurity. It highlights progress in and obstacles to regional cooperation and identifies shortcomings in the 1 This view is shared by a lot of organisations. For instance, dur- international community’s efforts to help. Finally, based ing an interview, an ECOWAS official referred to piracy in the on this analysis, the report makes recommendations at the Gulf of Guinea and radical Islam as the two rising threats for national, regional and international levels for a long-term the continent. Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS official, 5 Oc- tober 2012. response to a recent problem with deep roots. 2 According to the International Maritime Bureau, the Gulf of Guinea is one of three areas that suffer from piracy. The others are the Gulf of Aden and South East Asia. www.icc-ccs.org/ piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map. Attacks are common, the most recent being in September 2012 on a Singapore oil tanker near the Nigerian coast. See “Nigerian navy frees hijacked Singapore owned oil-tanker”, BBC, 6 September 2012. 3 See Appendix E for a comparison of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Somalia. Also see “The economic cost of Somali piracy 2011”, One Earth Future Foun- dation, 2012. ni Land after Shell, 18 September 2008; and N°60, Nigeria: 4 For more on Niger Delta unrest, see Crisis Group Africa Re- Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, 30 April 2009. ports N°115, The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Un- 5 “Piracy increasing in West Africa, latest report shows”, Inter- rest, 3 August 2006; N°118, Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, 28 national Maritime Bureau (IMB), 23 April 2012. September 2006; N°135, Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger 6 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°181, Implementing Peace Delta, 5 December 2007; Africa Briefings N°54, Nigeria: Ogo- and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, 7 November 2011. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 2

II. A STRATEGIC REGION IN THE GRIP ence (mainly Western) was previously limited to France, OF INSECURITY which has ties with its former colonies, and to some Eu- ropean companies with interests in the Nigerian oil sector. American influence was distant and limited while that of 7 Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is taking place in Spain and Portugal only manifested itself in the linguistic the context of renewed geostrategic interest in the region, field. However, the U.S.’s new energy policy takes the which is rich in natural resources but weakened by many Gulf of Guinea into account and emerging powers such as overt and latent conflicts. China, India, Brazil and South Africa have displayed their interest as well as many private actors, including transna- The gulf’s raw materials and hydrocarbons make it an in- tional companies, international institutions and lobbies.9 creasingly coveted zone and attract the attention of many actors: local communities claiming rights of use and a share In the 1960s, proven hydrocarbon deposits were confined, of the wealth generated by these resources; states anxious in order of importance, to Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Came- to ensure sovereign control; and private companies that roon, Côte d’Ivoire and Congo-Brazzaville. Although have been operating there for some time. The poor gov- some studies conducted at the beginning of the 1970s in- ernance that to different degrees characterises all Gulf of dicated the existence of deposits throughout the region’s Guinea countries has greatly increased this interest while waters, few Western companies received encouragement justifying and amplifying concerns raised by the recent from their governments to begin operations.10 At that time, worsening of maritime crime. This is the latest in a long Western oil policy mainly focused on onshore deposits in list of problems that have plagued the region for decades: the Middle East, with large offshore extraction being lim- extreme poverty, political exclusion, local rebellions and ited to the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Guinea only be- the criminal penetration of an increasing part of the local came a focus for strategic investment as the conflict in the economy. Middle East pushed major consumers into diversifying their supplies at the end of the 1980s. The emergence of big A. RENEWED STRATEGIC INTEREST IN new consumers, such as China, India and Brazil, also increased overall global interest in the region’s crude oil.11 NATURAL RESOURCES The Gulf of Guinea is currently the leading sub-Saharan International interest in the Gulf of Guinea, which has 8 African oil production region and home of the continent’s been economic since the eighteenth century, has signifi- main oil-producing countries: Nigeria, Angola and Equa- cantly increased in recent years due to the discovery of torial Guinea.12 The Gulf of Guinea alone produces around considerable oil and natural gas deposits along the coast five million barrels of oil per day (bpd) out of the total of and offshore. Some countries with deposits that previously nine million barrels produced in sub-Saharan Africa.13 Its attracted few international actors have recently become the oil reserves are mainly offshore and can be exploited and focus of multiple and growing interest. International pres- transported along direct maritime routes toward the U.S., Asia and Europe.

7 There are several definitions of the Gulf of Guinea. Histori- The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the main sources cally, it is the “slave coast” and covered the coastal regions of of oil and gas imported by Europe, the U.S., China, India what is now Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin and Togo as well as the Niger Delta. Geographically, it is the Atlantic coast stretching from Senegal to Angola. Institutionally (mainly used for the purposes of this report), it includes the eight members of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) created in 1999: Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Ni- geria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and São Tomé 9 See Jonathan Ndoutoume Ngome, “Le Golfe de Guinée au and Príncipe. The research conducted for this report also covers centre des convoitises mondiales”, Diplomatie, no. 56 (May- Ghana, Togo and Benin because of the recent expansion of pi- June 2012), pp. 72-74, and Come Damien Georges Awoumou, racy westwards. For more on the different conceptions of the “Le Golfe de Guinée face aux convoitises”, presentation made Gulf of Guinea, see Alexis Riols, “Piraterie et brigandage mari- at the 11th CODESRIA General Assembly, Maputo, 6-10 time dans le Golfe de Guinée”, Centre d’études supérieures de December 2005, available at http://www.codesria.org/IMG/ la marine, Paris, 2011, p. 7. pdf/awoumou.pdf. 8 The region played an important role in the triangular trade. Its 10 On the history of the oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea and large population made it a market for European products and it the Western presence, see Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and was an ideal place for acquiring slaves. Throughout the period Politics in the Gulf of Guinea (London, 2007). of the slave trade, many of the captives sent to the Americas were 11 Ibid. taken from along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. See Pierre 12 Didier Ortolland and Jean-Pierre Pirat, Atlas des espaces ma- Kipré, Sur la périodisation de l’histoire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest: ritimes (Paris, 2010), p. 58. le Golfe de Guinée (Paris, 2004), p. 187. 13 Ibid. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 3

and Brazil.14 Nigeria has been the leading regional pro- Guinea were drawn by these resources.19 The fishermen ducer for several decades, but is being increasingly caught settled in the marshy coastal zones, intermingling with the up by Angola and even Equatorial Guinea. As new discov- local population and creating a mixed economy of farmers eries are announced, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, (usually indigenous peoples) and fishing communities.20 Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and Gabon are hoping to The latter currently face competition from foreign indus- become or are already becoming big producers, making the trial fishing, which is increasingly present.21 entire region an enormous oil and natural gas field. Invest- ments by Western oil companies are rising. In January 2002, Even though it is not worth nearly as much as agricultural the U.S. established an African Oil Policy Initiative Group products or oil and gas, fish is the second highest export composed of members of the administration, Congress, the of many Gulf of Guinea states, as in Nigeria for example State Department and oil companies. This group recom- (3 per cent). According to the Gulf of Guinea Regional mended that the Gulf of Guinea be elevated to the status of Fishing Commission,22 the region has an annual potential a zone of vital interest and that Washington create a com- of one million tonnes of sea fish and 800,000 tonnes of mand structure for U.S. forces in the region and examine inland fisheries.23 However, the sector is affected by mar- the possibility of establishing a military base there.15 itime insecurity. An increase in the number of attacks on trawlers has led to a reduction in this activity,24 causing Following these recommendations, between 2002 and an increase in the price of fish on the local market.25 The 2008, American companies increased their investments in sector is also neglected by national governments and their the region. The national energy plan prepared by the U.S. foreign partners, who are more interested in hydrocarbons. in 2001 after the 11-September terrorist attacks stated that Africa will supply 25 per cent of U.S. oil needs by 2015. ONTEXT AVOURABLE TO Since 2002, the China National Petroleum Corporation B. A C F (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (SINO- MARITIME CRIME PEC) have begun operations in Gabon, Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. The Brazilian company PETROBRAS The growth of maritime crime is caused by structural is increasingly showing interest in Angola.16 problems such as poverty, socio-political tension and the grievances of local communities.26 The extent of piracy is This renewed international interest is accompanied by a an indicator of the radicalisation and willingness to turn military rapprochement strategy. Since 2003, the U.S. has deployed part of its Mediterranean fleet to the area and 19 has concluded agreements with Cameroon, Gabon and This was especially true of the Bakassi peninsula, awarded to Cameroon, but settled by many fishermen from Nigeria and Benin. Equatorial Guinea allowing U.S. forces to use their air- 20 17 On the history of fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, see P. Jorion, port facilities. Meanwhile, France has strengthened its “Going out or staying home. Seasonal movements and migra- partnership with Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea tion strategies among Xwla and Anlo-Ewe Fishermen”, Mari- and Congo-Brazzaville to help them protect their coast- time Anthropology Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (1988), pp. 129-155. 18 lines and oil installations. 21 Crisis Group interviews, fishing communities, Sawa, Douala, Bonaberi, 7 December 2011 and president of a fishing commu- After hydrocarbons, fishing resources are the second most nity association, Libreville, 24 January 2012. important maritime natural resource in the Gulf of Guinea. 22 Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea (COREP) The first waves of African migration toward the Gulf of is an ECCAS body created to protect and promote the fishing interests of member states. 23 Crisis Group interview, ECCAS fishing expert, Libreville, 26 January 2012. 24 Criminal groups also recruit among fishing communities, which have an excellent knowledge of the coastal waters of the 14 The main destinations of these flows are the U.S. (about 1.5 Gulf of Guinea. Attracted by the possibility of easy money and million bpd), Europe (one million bpd), China (850,000 bpd) facing competition from foreign ships, local fishing communi- and India (330,000 bpd). Ibid. ties believe it makes more financial sense to sell their boats to 15 See “African oil: A priority for US national security and Afri- pirates or work for them. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS mari- can development”, Symposium proceedings, Institute for Ad- time security expert, Libreville, 23 January 2012. vanced Strategies and Political Studies, Washington DC, 25 25 Paradoxically, despite the Gulf of Guinea’s fishing potential, January 2002. much of the fish supplying the local market is imported because 16 While Brazilian President Lula visited four countries in the of the undeveloped nature of the fish processing industry. Crisis Gulf of Guinea (Cameroon, Angola, Gabon, São Tomé and Prín- Group interview, ECCAS fishing expert, Libreville, 26 January cipe). These visits resulted in the signature of oil contracts. See 2012. Awoumou, op. cit. 26 Michel Luntumbue, “Piraterie et insécurité dans le Golfe de 17 Crisis Group interview, expert in maritime security, ECCAS, Guinée: défis et enjeux d’une gouvernance maritime régionale”, Libreville, 27 January 2012. analytical memo, Group for Research and Information on Peace 18 See Awoumou, op. cit. and Security, 30 September 2011. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 4

to crime of frustrated populations. Other factors are the sentment toward the governing elite about access to re- region’s densely populated conurbations, porous borders, sources. These tensions can be more or less latent, depend- quarrels between states and their inability to stop illegal ing on the degree of government control and on political re- trade in arms, oil and drugs. sponses. In Nigeria, they provoked violent opposition from the community.30 In all cases, they indicate the existence The rise in maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly of discontent and are fertile grounds for recruitment by due to the poverty of the great majority of the population pirate gangs. alongside a wealthy elite. There is a lack of transparency about what happens to the profits from the oil industry and Border disputes between Gulf of Guinea states have mul- other resources, which are monopolised by the ruling elites tiplied since the discovery of oil, leading to states being and foreign private companies. The inequitable distribution unable to exercise authority over some areas, which then of wealth means that economic disparities are blatant. serve as bases for illegal activities.31 These disputes also hamper cooperation between security forces and hinder In most of these countries, the extraction of hydrocarbons the application of the right of hot pursuit. In many areas, is accompanied by the continuous degradation of the pirates take advantage of the geographical characteristics coastal environment, which hampers agriculture, stock- of the coast (islands, peninsulas and mangroves with dif- raising and fishing, threatening the traditional livelihoods ficult access that makes them ideal hiding places). They of the local populations. As a consequence, these com- know the terrain better than the coastguards and can there- munities are increasingly tempted to engage in illegal ac- fore operate in total freedom. tivities in order to survive. This initially took the form of illegal trade of various types of goods: oil diverted from its normal supply routes, drug trafficking, etc. However, C. WEAK MARITIME POLICIES an increase in economic activity along the coast accompanied by poor governance gave impetus to the criminali- For a long time, Gulf of Guinea states have neglected to sation of the Gulf of Guinea’s economy. As a result, smug- exercise authority over their territorial waters because gling networks became more sophisticated and started to they perceived insecurity as a land-based phenomenon. deal arms, illegal oil dealers started to attack ships, former Security policies only included the sea insofar as it was delinquents became armed activists in the pay of gangs relevant to specific border disputes. and fishermen abandoned their trade to become pirates. Most of these states only observed their seas from the The dense conurbations along the coast helped to create the shore. This was also due to a failure to demarcate mari- conditions for an increase in crime. The Gulf of Guinea’s time borders in the Gulf of Guinea in line with the Mon- many port cities and capitals are among the most densely tego Bay Convention.32 Until the end of the 1990s, very 27 populated on the continent. Urban disorder, the result of continuous migration from the interior to the coast, is ex- acerbated by economic disparities and recurrent political The conflicts are sometimes stirred up by local politicians. In 28 conflicts. In some countries, immigration causes tension Lagos, “Christians” and “Muslims” regularly clash. In January between indigenous peoples and settlers,29 as well as re- 2012, they took the form of violent protests against the increase in fuel prices. In Douala (February 2008, December 2011, Jan- uary 2012), political and social tensions regularly degenerate into riots. In Libreville, Cotonou, Malabo and Bata, they take 27 Including Lagos (estimated population ten million), Douala the form of targeted attacks against traders of foreign origin and Accra (three million), Calabar and Port-Harcourt (two mil- suspected of excessively raising their prices. lion), Cotonou and Pointe-Noire (one million). 30 The Biafran secession and demands for independence in the 28 These conflicts occur repeatedly and are linked to political, Niger Delta were supported by local populations because they felt ethnic and religious tensions or increases in the cost of living. they were being “invaded”, with high immigration from other Coastal cities like Douala, Port-Gentil, Lomé and Libreville are regions of the country. See Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, generally considered to be opposition strongholds. For more on “Le Delta du Niger en état d’insurrection” in Bertrand Badie political urban violence in sub-Saharan Africa, see Marc-Antoine and Dominique Vidal (dir.), L’Etat du monde 2011 (Paris, 2010), Pérouse de Montclos, “Migration forcée et urbanisation de crise. pp. 285-289, and Crisis Group Report, The Swamps of Insur- L’Afrique subsaharienne dans une perspective historique”, Au- gency, op. cit. trepart, no. 55 (2010), pp. 3-18. 31 For example, the mouth of the River Akwayafé, the Bakassi 29 In addition to riots and electoral violence, these conflicts spo- peninsula and many creeks, notably the Man of War Sound. radically oppose “indigenous” and “non-indigenous”, “nation- See Akono Antangana, “Le problème de délimitations des es- als” and “foreigners”, “traders” and “consumers” and different re- paces maritimes en Afrique centrale”, Revue africaine d’études ligious faiths. The difference between these categories is not politiques et stratégiques, no. 4 (2007), pp. 243-259. always clear. Sparked by routine disputes, they quickly spiral 32 Adopted in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law into armed clashes between groups, followed by military inter- of the Sea, known as the Montego Bay Convention, is one of vention, which is always denounced by the parties in dispute. the foundations of the law of the sea. It established a typology The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 5

few maritime borders between coastal states in the Gulf 20 per cent of that of the defence ministry.36 The maritime of Guinea had been demarcated,33 except between Came- forces of other countries are generally symbolic, with their roon and Nigeria because of the dispute over Bakassi.34 navies having less than 1,000 men and fleets of less than ten launches. Although the attitude of states to their territorial waters has changed since the recent discovery of oil, few of them The equipment of these naval forces is generally a miscel- have allocated substantial resources to formulating mari- lany of materials in more or less good condition bought time policies. Apart from port infrastructure, which is a from or donated by Western partners. The buoy-layers used source of tax revenue, the merchant and military navies by Ghana were supplied by the U.S. as part of their mili- remain underdeveloped and usually symbolic. It is thus tary aid agreement. Nigeria has acquired second-hand ships 37 not surprising to see the vacuum filled by criminals and from various shipbuilders. However, Cameroon, Gabon, pirates, who are more accustomed to being at sea than the Ghana and Equatorial Guinea have made efforts in recent navies of coastal states.35 years to recruit personnel, acquire new equipment and train their navies. The region’s governments have different policies on mari- In July 2012, the Ghanaian government took delivery of time insecurity because they do not all suffer from its im- two German warships. The country also acquired four pact in the same way. For some, maritime insecurity is a Chinese ships to strengthen the patrols protecting off- true scourge that endangers part of the national economy shore oil fields.38 The Cameroonian navy has about 2,000 and requires the deployment of armed forces. For others, men to monitor its coasts and respond to attacks. The Ga- it takes the form of relatively small-scale transborder crime bon navy is smaller; it acquired four coastal launches with that does not threaten to destabilise the country. For a third a range of 800 nautical miles in 2010.39 Finally, Equatorial group, insecurity is above all a land-based phenomenon Guinea bought a warship and an Antonov fighter plane in with the maritime dimension being no more than an epi- 2009 to keep watch on its coasts.40 phenomenon.

This diversity as well as the differences in financial resources available to countries explain the imbalance in the naval capacity of Gulf of Guinea states. The first countries which felt the economic impact of maritime crime tried to create a navy, including coastguards. Nigeria is the leader in the field both in terms of equipment and numbers, with a naval force of about 15,000 men, about fifteen Defender launches, a dozen patrol vessels to guard maritime installations, ten coastal patrol vessels and a few amphibious landing craft. The Nigerian navy’s annual budget is about

and a system for demarcating maritime borders and defined the general principles of the exploitation of sea resources. See Al- bert-Didier Ogoulat, “Géostratégie et polémologie dans l’espace atlantique. Le cas du Golfe de Guinée”, available at http:// www.stratisc.org/Strategique_80_Ogoula.htm. 33 See Antangana, op. cit. 34 The Bakassi peninsula is located between south west Came- roon and the Nigerian state of Cross River, to the north of the Bay of Biafra and in the heart of the River Del Rey estuary. This territory of 665 sq km extends 65km along Akwayafe River and below Mount Cameroon. Bakassi is composed of four main 36 See www.nigerianavy.gov.ng. strips of land (Pelican, Fiari, Erong and Bakassi), each subdi- 37 See Augustus Vogel, “Marine et garde-côtes: définir les rôles vided into many islands encircled by creeks. The area is mainly des forces africaines chargées de la sécurité maritime”, Bulletin covered with mangroves and is ideally located to control ship- de la sécurité africaine, no. 2, December 2009. ping in the Gulf of Guinea. Most of Bakassi’s population com- 38 “Le gouvernement du Ghana a pris livraison de deux navires prises Nigerian fishing communities. For more on the history of de guerre allemands”, Xinhua, 30 July 2012. the Bakassi dispute, read Crisis Group Africa Report N°160, 39 Crisis Group interview, expert on maritime security, ECCAS, Cameroon: Fragile State?, 25 May 2010, p. 27. See the map of Libreville, 27 January 2012. the Niger Delta in Appendix B. 40 See “La Guinée équatoriale s’offre un navire de guerre et un 35 Crisis Group interview, ECCAS expert on maritime security, avion de chasse pour ses 41 ans d’indépendance”, African Press Libreville, 23 January 2012. Agency (APA), 13 October 2009. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 6

III. NIGERIA: EPICENTRE OF VIOLENCE radiates from Nigeria into the rest of the Gulf of Guinea. AT SEA The large quantities of cash carried on board lure thieves while the presence of unscrupulous buyers makes it relatively easy for thieves to sell stolen goods. Corruption in the For decades piracy and armed robbery at sea have been Nigerian maritime administration, navy and law enforce- common off the coast of Nigeria, amid extreme poverty, ment agencies undermines their already limited capacity high oil revenue, poor regulation of maritime activity, cor- to counter violent crime.44 rupt government and a long history of political violence in the Niger Delta.41 Maritime crime spread from Nigerian While thieves target licit and illicit operators alike, crimi- waters to the whole region. Criminal gangs continue to ex- nal practices within these three industries – oil and gas, ploit Nigeria’s poor governance of the maritime domain shipping and fishing – significantly increase both the in- and use violence to enrich themselves; and they show little centive and opportunity for piracy. The theft or “bunker- sign of stopping. ing” of crude oil from pipelines crisscrossing the Niger Delta and its transport and sale to buyers waiting in tankers The oil, gas, shipping and fishing industries, concentrated offshore has become a large-scale business. In February along the country’s coast, attract criminals. In the south- 2012, Shell estimated oil companies were losing 150,000 eastern Niger Delta area, both onshore and offshore oil bpd.45 While some stolen crude is refined illegally in Ni- companies extract crude oil and natural gas for export. geria, most is exported. Once at sea the oil may be traded The industries and legions of expat workers bring in and and transferred to other tankers before being taken to other create considerable wealth. Offshore traffic is heavy. West African countries where there are refineries – Ghana,46 Tankers transporting oil, liquefied natural gas and refined Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire in particular – and other des- petroleum products stay in the ports while service and tinations around the world, including India, the Far East supply boats shuttle between the land and offshore instal- and the countries of the former Soviet Union.47 Profits from 42 lations. Container ships arrive with imported goods to exporting oil illegally are used by criminal gangs to launch supply the country’s over 170 million inhabitants. Arti- pirate attacks on other vessels. sanal fishermen ply the waters close to shore while commercial trawlers fish farther out.43 Petty thieves target 1. A leaky oil sector what they can quickly and easily carry away, namely cash, equipment, ship’s stores and crew’s belongings. More or- The illegal trade in refined petroleum products off Nige- ganised and better equipped criminal gangs take cargo too: ria is even more rife than that of crude oil and creates a fish, imported goods, oil and petroleum products. major incentive for piracy.48 Nigeria has four refineries but all work far below their full capacity due to a lack of D. POOR GOVERNANCE AND maintenance and poor management, forcing the state to MARITIME CRIME import most of the fuel it needs. Very large tankers known

Chronic poor governance of maritime economic activity has given rise to a host of illicit practices within the oil, 44 See the chapter “Corruption and culpability” in Crisis Group shipping and fishing industries, both onshore and offshore. Report, Fuelling in the Niger Delta Crisis, op. cit., pp. 16-22, At sea a thriving cash-based black market has grown that and “‘Everyone’s in on the Game’: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force”, Human Rights Watch, 17 August 2010. 41 In 1979, armed thieves attacked a Danish cargo ship 3 nautical 45 “Losing 150,000 barrels per day of crude to theft – Shell”, Daily miles (5.5km) from Lagos. They killed the ship’s master, Trust, 21 February 2012. Others in the industry say it could be wounded all fourteen crew members and stole the cargo. “Africa as high as 200,000 bpd. Crisis Group interview, oil company confronts unchecked piracy on both west and east coasts”, The staff, Abuja, 11 February 2012. Cutting Edge, 7 December 2009. According to the UN Conven- 46 See “Ghana navy arrests tanker with hijacked crude”, Ghana tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), armed robbery at sea is Web, 10 March 2012. theft within 12 nautical miles (22.2km) from land (ie, within 47 Crisis Group interview, oil company official, Abuja, 11 Feb- territorial waters) whereas piracy is armed theft in international ruary 2012. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cites waters beyond the 12 nautical mile mark. See articles 3 and 101 China, North Korea, Israel and South Africa as frequently men- of UNCLOS, 10 December 1982. tioned destination countries. See “Oil from Nigeria to the world” 42 Nigeria’s main ports are at Lagos in the south west and at Warri, in “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: Port Harcourt and Calabar in the south-eastern Niger Delta. See a Threat Assessment”, UNODC, July 2009, pp. 19-26. maps in Appendices A and B. 48 The refined petroleum products most commonly traded are 43 Before piracy decimated the commercial fishing business, it Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) or petrol, primarily used to power was Nigeria’s second largest non-hydrocarbon export industry light road vehicles, Automotive Gas Oil (AGO) or diesel and after cocoa. “Africa confronts unchecked piracy on both west and Hybrid Hoffman Kiln (HHK) or kerosene, intended primarily east coasts”, op. cit. for domestic use. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 7

as motherships – holding some 60,000 metric tonnes of ment had been paying subsidy on 59 million litres of fuel fuel – come from Europe and elsewhere and, too big to enter per day while the country had been consuming only 35 port, moor offshore. Nigerian companies charter smaller million, and recommended that inquiries be launched into tankers – holding 5,000 to 10,000 metric tonnes – to ferry private companies and public agencies.53 In the autumn of the fuel from the mothership to tanks onshore, from where 2012, the Commission on Economic and Financial Crimes it is distributed to filling stations. arrested petrol distributors. Those arraigned have pleaded not guilty to the charges.54 To maintain a fixed, low price for consumers, the government has for a long time paid a subsidy to fuel import- 2. The rise in economic crime ing and distributing companies so they can buy at international market rates but sell for less at the pump. But on 1 With large quantities of refined petroleum products es- January 2012, the government removed the fuel subsidy caping official channels, a parallel and illicit trade has on the grounds that it fostered corruption and was a burden burgeoned in the Gulf of Guinea, concentrated off Nigeria. on the economy. The fuel price jumped from 65 to 141 Nai- Traders based anywhere in the world can arrange deals re- ra (from about 40 to 90 cents) per litre and mass protests motely. They only have to charter a tanker and provide broke out across the country. After negotiations, the gov- the owner and captain with the necessary technical infor- ernment agreed to continue paying part of the subsidy tem- mation: where and when to pick up and offload cargo and porarily, reducing the fuel price to 97 Naira (about 60 cents) how much. Ship owners, captain and crew may never know per litre. While most Nigerians see the subsidy as one of the seller’s or buyer’s identity or the cargo’s provenance.55 the few benefits of oil production, the abuse of this system is one of the main drivers of illegal fuel trading at sea. Opportunistic captains and crews also make illegal profit.56 They may deliver less than the amount due, claiming the That fuel is cheaper in Nigeria than elsewhere in the re- difference was left in the pipes or spilled during transfer, gion is a major incentive for smugglers to buy fuel at sub- in order to sell it later.57 In offloading, it can sometimes be sidised rates in Nigeria and sell it in nearby countries, difficult to pump out all the fuel from the tanker, so crews particularly Benin, Togo, Cameroon, the Central African collect what is left and sell it on the black market. Crews 49 Republic, Chad and Niger. They can offer a lower price are also known to exchange fuel for goods – food, alcohol, than official suppliers and still make a profit. Contraband cigarettes, DVDs – sold by tradesmen shuttling among fuel leaves Nigeria by land and by sea, to be offloaded at vessels as they wait offshore.58 illegal jetties or deserted beaches.50 Smugglers also find a ready market at sea as ships use diesel to run their en- The thriving illegal trade of refined petroleum products gines and onboard generators. Since Nigeria does not creates strong incentives for piracy. Pirates target the regulate refuelling, ships can buy fuel from any source.51 large amounts of cash used for illegal deals as well as the fuel, which they can then sell on the black market.59 The In January 2012, the House of Representatives inquiry into the subsidy scheme for the period 2009-2011 found that the system was fraught with “endemic corruption and 53 Ibid. For figures on subsidy payments and fuel consumption entrenched inefficiency”.52 It revealed that the govern- released by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), see “We’ll compel authorities to implement subsidy probe report”, The Nation, 6 February 2012. Many of those identified in the committee report strongly denied any wrong- 49 According to an executive in the oil industry, in Benin, in doing. See ibid and “Nigeria fuel subsidy report ‘reveals $6bn 2000, oil smuggled into the country represented about 5 per fraud’”, BBC, 24 April 2012. cent of the national consumption. In 2011, that had risen to 95 54 “Fuel subsidy scam: EFCC declare marketers wanted”, press per cent and forced all but one official importer to leave the coun- release, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 7 Sep- try. Crisis Group interview, petrol industry official, Cotonou, 1 tember 2012; “Nigeria : Fuel subsidy scam – EFCC arraigns 13 February 2012. See also “Oil from Nigeria to the world”, op. oil marketers”, AllAfrica, 6 October 2012. cit., p. 22. 55 Crisis Group interview, former harbour master, Cotonou, 27 50 Large wooden boats are known to offload contraband fuel in January 2012. plastic jerrycans at isolated beaches around Grand Popo in Benin 56 Crisis Group interview, ISAN representative, Lagos, 7 Feb- and Hilakondji in Togo. Crisis Group interview, petrol industry ruary 2012. official, Cotonou, 1 February 2012. 57 Crisis Group interview, Nigerian Maritime Administration 51 Crisis Group interview, Indigenous Ship Owners’ Association and Safety Agency (NIMASA) representative, Lagos, 3 Febru- of Nigeria (ISAN) representative, Lagos, 7 February 2012. ary 2012. 52 “Report of the ad-hoc committee ‘to verify and determine the 58 Crisis Group interview, Benin navy officer, Cotonou, 27 Jan- actual subsidy requirements and monitor the implementation of uary 2012. the subsidy regime in Nigeria’”, Resolution no. (HR.1/2012), 59 Tankers doing legal business carry at least $10,000 on board House of Representatives, 18 April 2012, p. 5. Available at with which to pay part of the crew’s salaries (the rest is paid on www.africaintelligence.com/images/Nigeria_subsidies.pdf. shore), for provisions and transactions in port. Crisis Group in- The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 8

ship-to-ship transfer of fuel also provides an excellent of office but they were acquitted on charges related to in- opportunity for pirates to attack as both ships are immobi- flating contracts.64 lised for several hours. Since many of the victims of piracy are involved in illicit activities, they are much less likely The result of such institutional weakness and endemic to report crimes to the Nigerian navy or law enforcement corruption is a low level of maritime regulation and secu- agencies, thus increasing pirates’ chances of success. In rity response both at sea and in Nigerian ports. Ship own- addition, illicit vessels often do not have or have turned ers complain that, eight times out of ten, their distress calls off their Automated Identification Systems (AIS) which go unanswered.65 U.S. coastguards visiting Nigeria to check identify them to national authorities on shore. The latter compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility can still see the ships on radar but they remain anonymous. Security (ISPS) code found inadequate security, which accounted for the high crime rate in ports.66 Illegal fishing off Nigeria and several other neighbouring countries also creates an environment conducive to pira- Such weak maritime governance has allowed armed rob- cy.60 Widespread fishing by commercial trawlers close to bery at sea and acts of piracy to grow steadily in tandem shore zones reserved for artisanal fishing is destroying with economic activity at sea. Since the early 2000s, at- underwater habitats and eroding the livelihoods of coastal tacks have increased dramatically, first on fishing vessels communities. This increases the likelihood of fishermen – whose decks are close to the water and thus relatively turning to crime.61 easy to board – and then on tankers and other cargo vessels.67 This rapid rise in violence at sea off the coast of Although the law requires trawlers to bring their catch Nigeria was driven in large part by the escalation of in- back to shore for registration before export, some crews, surgency and crime in the Niger Delta. with or without the knowledge of their employers, sell fish, especially species they are not authorised to catch, to illegal 4. The Niger Delta traders sailing refrigerated vessels.62 Trawlers thus carry more cash than they usually would, becoming more attrac- The Niger Delta insurgency, at its height between 2006 tive targets for pirates. and 2009, caused violent crime at sea to grow in frequency, scale and sophistication.68 Trouble began in the 1990s, 3. State capacity hampered by corruption

Nigeria’s navy and maritime administration agencies are facing serious problems of capacity and corruption. A 64 “Appeal court affirms Bode George’s conviction”, The Will, lack of government investment has left them both under- 21 January 2011. The former chairman has always maintained manned and under-equipped. In 2005, high-ranking navy his innocence. “I’ll not seek presidential pardon – Bode George”, commanders were dismissed for involvement in oil theft Vanguard, 25 January 2012. and illegal trading.63 In October 2009, a former chair of 65 Crisis Group interview, ISAN representative, Lagos, 7 Feb- the Nigerian Ports Authority and other managers were ruary 2012. The IMB also reports a lack of response to distress convicted on charges related to contract splitting and abuse calls during pirate attacks in Nigerian waters. In one incident on 16 January 2012, the master of a tanker in Lagos anchorage who discovered two heavily armed pirates on deck “contacted the Navy … but received no response”. The pirates hijacked the ship for five days and stole the crew’s and ship’s cash, personal belongings and some cargo. “Piracy and armed robbery against terview, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) ships, Report for the period 1 January – 31 March 2012”, Inter- officer, London, 20 December 2011. national Maritime Bureau (IMB), April 2012. 60 The Nigerian Trawler Owners’ Association (NITOA) reports 66 The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code that Asian and European fishing vessels, bigger than those used is a 2004 amendment to the international Safety of Life at Sea by Nigerians, enter Nigerian waters and take most of the avail- (SOLAS) Convention (1974/1988) on minimum security re- able fish, including the immature ones thereby preventing stocks quirements for ships, ports and government agencies. “U.S. from regenerating. Crisis Group interview, NITOA officer, La- threatens country over ports’ insecurity”, Vanguard, 9 March gos, 8 February 2012. For more on illegal fishing in the Gulf of 2012. Guinea, see reports by the Environmental Justice Foundation 67 Crisis Group interviews, NIMASA officer, Lagos, 3 February (EJF). 2012; NITOA officer, Lagos, 8 February 2012. See also Arild 61 See “Illegal fishing plunders and strains West Africa”, Reuters, Nodland, “Guns, oil, and ‘cake’: maritime security in the Gulf 15 March 2012. of Guinea” in Elleman, Forbes and Rosenburg (eds.), “Piracy 62 Crisis Group interview, NIMASA representative, Lagos, 3 and maritime crime: historical and modern case studies”, Naval February 2012. War College Newport Papers 35, 2010, p. 195. 63 “Nigeria: conviction of admirals confirms navy role in oil 68 Although the reliability of piracy statistics can be questioned, theft”, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 6 the number of pirate attacks off Nigeria reported to the IMB January 2005. rose markedly during the insurgency, at its height from 2006 to The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 9

caused by social discontent with the unequal distribution nappings for ransom.73 These attacks were carried out by of oil revenues at the expense of the great majority of the local criminals familiar with the waters, but increased se- people, who still live in extreme poverty and have little curity measures by oil companies in the delta and military access to essential public services.69 Popular frustration is pressure by the Joint Task Force (JTF), a unit composed also driven by the environmental damage caused by the of the army, navy and police, encouraged opportunists from oil industry, which has destroyed livelihoods by killing the delta to seek softer targets further west.74 Similarity fish and making land infertile. between the languages of the Ijaw people in the Niger Delta and Ilaje of the Lagos area may also have enabled coop- The peaceful movement of the 1990s turned into a revolt eration and the transfer of knowledge and tactics.75 and sparked an arms race between rival criminal gangs for control of territory, aided by corrupt politicians who wanted a share of the lucrative oil trade. The latter also E. THE INCREASE IN CRIME SINCE 2009 wanted to raise the spectre of insecurity to consolidate their power and were ready to pay criminal groups to in- The government managed to persuade most insurgents to timidate voters and opponents. The creation of the Move- put down their arms by launching a major military strike against rebel camps in May 2009 and offering amnesty in ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 76 2005 signalled a new stage in the violence. Crimes in- June. The amnesty program, which includes monthly cluded the theft of oil and other goods, attacks on fishing stipends and vocational training for repentant fighters, has 70 71 reduced political violence. Criminal gangs, however, have boats and kidnappings. However, it is impossible to 77 establish a clear distinction between insurgents and crim- continued to operate on land and sea. The government inals because some of them seek to make a demonstration has taken steps to galvanise its response but limited capaci- of political force while making financial gains.72 ty, corruption and inter-agency squabbles undermine its efforts. In order to limit the costs of vandalism and kidnappings, oil companies concentrated their exploration and produc- 1. The amnesty’s limited impact tion activities at sea. Far from accepting defeat, insurgents and criminals adapted to the new situation and ex- The amnesty program was part of the then-President tended their activities seawards. They quickly discovered Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s efforts to appease the rebels.78 new opportunities for becoming wealthy and developed He incorporated them into the state structure and enabled the expertise necessary to commit more audacious crimes. them to continue making money legally. Thousands of Attacks were concentrated at sea off the delta but also combatants came out of the creeks to register,79 but the spread as far as Lagos. amnesty did not stop all militant violence. On 12 July 2009,

During the insurgency, maritime insecurity was worst off the delta – near Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar in par- 73 Nodland, “Guns, oil, and ‘cake’”, op. cit., p. 196. ticular – but piracy also increased off Lagos, where attacks 74 Crisis Group interview, ISAN representative, Lagos, 7 Feb- were closer to shore (within 20 nautical miles or 37km), ruary 2012. aimed purely at financial gain and less successful and co- 75 Crisis Group interviews, oil company security manager, Abuja, ordinated than those in the south east. There were no kid- 13 February 2012; former community conflict mediator, Port Harcourt, 16 February 2012. 76 Alexis Riols, “Piraterie et brigandage dans le golfe de Guinée”, Centre d’études supérieures de la marine, October 2010, p. 26. mid-2009. In 2005 there were sixteen, in 2006 twelve, in 2007 77 Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off Nigeria reported 42, in 2008 40, in 2009 29. IMB annual reports, 2005-2009. to the IMB decreased from 40 in 2008, to 29 in 2009, nineteen 69 See “Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010”, Nigerian National Bu- in 2010 and ten in 2011. With 21 attacks reported in the first nine reau of Statistics, January 2012 and “UN Niger Delta Human months of 2012, attacks are once again increasing. See IMB Development Report”, United Nations Development Pro- annual reports for 2008-2011 and its most recent report: “Piracy gramme (UNDP). and armed robbery against ships, Report for the period 1 Janu- 70 According to a security expert, 293 incidents of piracy against ary to 30 September”, October 2012. fishing boats were recorded off the Nigerian coast between 78 Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, “The politics of amnesty in the 2003 and 2008. Crisis Group interviews, oil company security Niger Delta: challenges ahead”, Institut français des relations manager, Port Harcourt, February 2012; NITOA official, Lagos, internationales (IFRI), December 2010. 8 February 2012. See Security Council press release, SC/10558, 79 In the first 60-day window, 6 August – 4 October 2009, 27 February 2012. 20,192 self-declared militants signed up for amnesty. Some 71 199 people were kidnapped in 2007 according to security ex- who initially failed to disarm later felt they had missed out and perts. Crisis Group interviews, oil company security manager, persuaded the government to admit them to the process. In No- Abuja and Port Harcourt, February 2012. vember 2010, another 6,166 signed up, making a total of 26,358. 72 See “The lull before the storm, maritime piracy and election Crisis Group interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13 violence in the Niger Delta”, Risk Intelligence, 15 March 2011. February 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 10

MEND dynamited the Atlas Cove jetty in Lagos, killing and oil company supply vessels. The Calabar River is par- five people. This first attack outside the delta proved the ticularly dangerous.87 group’s firepower. Attacks claimed by MEND continued into late 2010 and included car bombs in Abuja in October. 2. Crime onshore enables crime offshore However, when the government finally started vocational training in Nigeria and later abroad and began distributing Unfettered crime onshore and in the creeks allows gangs monthly stipends of 65,000 Naira (about $400) for each to become richer and better prepare themselves to commit militant, attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of ex- crime offshore. Since the proceeds from crime, including patriate workers fell.80 piracy, trickle down to benefit delta communities, inhabitants provide pirates with moral and material support. Pi- But the amnesty failed to hold back rising crime in the rates have continued to raid local commercial traffic and delta. A criminal culture that developed before and during fishing trawlers,88 but they are increasingly concentrating the insurgency remains intact and loose criminal networks their attacks on tankers. The more organised groups hi- continue to operate with the same verve and impunity. Oil jack them for extended periods of time – two days to two 81 bunkering has risen. It is particularly bad around Nembe weeks – to steal their cargo, which they then sell on the 82 in Bayelsa state. As the international price of oil climbs, black market. This began during the insurgency, picked 83 selling stolen oil becomes all the more lucrative. Many up in 2009 and intensified in 2011 and 2012. more illegal refineries have cropped up, some technically advanced.84 The partial removal of the fuel subsidy in early Most attacks have taken place off Lagos and in 2011 off 2012 and subsequent rise in fuel price enables illegal re- Cotonou, Benin. Chronic congestion in Lagos’ ports forces finers to sell their product at a higher price. More and more many vessels to wait offshore for a berth to become availa- Nigerians are being kidnapped for ransom particularly in ble. Some vessels have reduced crews to cut down on oper- Delta, Rivers and Abia states. Bandits frequently hold up ational costs and are therefore more vulnerable. That some traffic on the delta’s intercity roads. Bank robberies in Port hijacked vessels end up off the Niger Delta suggests that Harcourt, a well-known danger in the run-up to Christmas, delta-based groups are involved or that Lagos-based pi- were in late 2011 notably more frequent, violent, bold rates collaborate with those in the delta.89 and better armed than in previous years.85 The groups that plan and execute these hijacks are organ- On the delta’s waterways too, armed robbery remains a ised and well connected. Their ability to target tankers threat. In the creeks, particularly on the Port Harcourt- carrying out a ship-to-ship transfer indicates they often Nembe axis around Nembe and Brass, gangs hold up pas- know the transfer is going to take place beforehand.90 Pi- senger boats to steal valuables, boats and their motors. On rates use traders or prostitutes as spies to sail close to or occasion they abduct and rape women.86 On the estuaries board moored vessels and inspect their cargo and access and rivers, attackers continue to target commercial traffic points.91 While pirates who raid vessels for cash and valuables are often very violent toward the crew, those who hijack tankers are usually disciplined and cause little physi-

80 The general maritime security off Bonny Island, Rivers state and in the previously risky area around the Bonny fairway buoy 87 Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Abuja, improved markedly. However, three to four expatriates continue 11 February 2012. to be kidnapped each year. Crisis Group interview, oil company 88 While in 2004, 36 trawler companies were using almost 300 security manager, Abuja, 11 February 2012. vessels, in 2011, less than ten remained, sailing about 120 ves- 81 Crisis Group interview, Niger Delta researcher, Abuja, 10 sels. Most have either gone out of business or moved to other February 2012. West African countries. Crisis Group interview, NITOA mem- 82 In December 2011, bunkering became so intense in this area ber, Lagos, 8 February 2012. that Shell temporarily shut down operations there. Crisis Group 89 Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Abuja, interview, Shell security manager, Port Harcourt, 15 February 11 February 2012. On 3 March 2011, pirates hijacked a tanker 2012. off Cotonou. They first told the captain to sail to 60 nautical 83 According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, Bonny Light, the miles (111km) off Gabon but, having failed to offload the cargo kind of crude oil extracted from the Niger Delta, was trading there, ordered him to sail to a location off Warri, Delta state. for about $60 a barrel in 2006. By early 2012, the price had in- When that rendezvous also failed they sailed back west and creased to about $127. www.cenbank.org. speed boats came to fetch them 3 nautical miles (5.6km) off 84 Crisis Group interviews, oil company security managers, Badagri, a town between Lagos and the Benin border. Annual Abuja and Port Harcourt, February 2012. piracy report 2011, IMB. 85 Crisis Group interviews, Port Harcourt residents, Port Har- 90 Crisis Group interview, ISAN representative, Lagos, 7 Feb- court, February 2012. ruary 2012. 86 Crisis Group interview, chairman of a union for passenger 91 Crisis Group interview, maritime security company staff, Port boat workers, Port Harcourt, 15 February 2012. Harcourt, 14 February 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 11

cal harm.92 Pirates are necessarily in contact with buyers increasing patrols and identifying suspect vessels have or brokers operating in the illegal fuel trade. reduced attacks close to shore.97 In the Niger Delta, the navy tries to control the creeks and territorial waters from Hijackers have considerable human, material and finan- a handful of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).98 If com- cial resources. Between five and 30 men in up to five speed mercial shippers are willing to pay, the navy will provide an boats approach the target tanker. Speed boats, typically escort for vessels as they approach shore.99 The govern- capable of 50 to 60 knots (about 90 to 110km per hour), ment has signalled its intention to introduce legislation are faster and more manoeuvrable than tankers. Pirates that will allow ships to carry privately contracted armed are investing their spoils in faster boats that can go greater guards.100 distances and attacks are now taking place farther from shore, between 50 and 110 nautical miles (93 to 204km).93 For a long time, Nigeria has been receiving support from Some pirates also use trawlers and other vessels as moth- partners, the U.S. in particular, to strengthen its navy erships with which to travel further out to sea before launch- and has been steadily increasing spending on the armed ing speed boats.94 Pirates are heavily armed, including forces.101 In 2012, it will devote more resources to acquir- with AK-47s, machine-guns and rocket launchers.95 They ing new boats and aircraft for the navy.102 Major oil com- have sufficient communications equipment to coordinate panies, however, recognising the navy’s weakness, increas- a rendezvous with a second tanker far out to sea. They also ingly employ private maritime security companies to escort have the expertise needed to board a ship, take control, their supply boats and patrol around offshore installations. navigate and carry out or oversee a ship-to-ship transfer. It is an increasingly common arrangement for a private con- tractor to provide and maintain boats and crew while the The full extent of the piracy problem is hard to evaluate navy provides weapons and personnel to operate them.103 as many victims do not report such crimes. If the ship’s losses are small and unlikely to be covered by insurance, Renewed efforts to reinforce Nigeria’s maritime security the ship owner may decide not to waste time and money are being undermined by internal competition for access to going into port to report the crime. Some of them do not resources. The Presidential Implementation Committee on report attacks to protect their reputation and future profits Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) was set up in or because doing so is also likely to push up insurance 2004 to implement the International Ship and Port Facility premiums for both ship owners and charterers. Those in- Security (ISPS) code. A bill that would have incorporated volved in illegal practices are even less likely to report it into a new Maritime Security Agency (MASECA) and acts of piracy, for fear their own crimes are discovered. thus endowed it with greater authority to control maritime traffic and collect taxes came up against the opposition of 3. Stronger but insufficient government response the navy and NIMASA, which feared it would deprive

The government has taken steps to boost its response to maritime insecurity but remains unable to prevent attacks.96 97 Crisis Group interviews, shipping and oil company staff, La- Off Lagos, concrete efforts by the navy and the Nigerian gos, February 2012. In August 2011, NIMASA established a Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) new unit that works directly with navy boats and one navy heli- in 2011 to crackdown on illegal shipping and piracy by copter to apprehend vessels operating illegally in Lagos anchorage, an area ten nautical miles (18.5km) wide and ten nautical miles long. Crisis Group interview, NIMASA officer, Lagos, 8 February 2012. 92 Crisis Group interview, military attaché, Abuja, 9 February 98 The navy has FOBs at several strategic locations including 2012. On 13 February 2012, eight pirates boarded a cargo ship Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar. It recently set up a new one about 110 nautical miles (about 204km) off Lagos. In the pro- at Ikot Abasi in Akwa Ibom state. Crisis Group interview, mari- cess of stealing the ship’s safe they shot and killed the captain. time security company staff, Port Harcourt, 14 February 2012. Another crew member died trying to escape. 99 Crisis Group interview, commercial shipping company, Lagos, 93 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Lagos, 3 February 2012. 8 February 2012. Of the eleven pirate attacks off Nigeria and Benin reported to 100 “FG moves to improve maritime security”, Daily Times, 13 the IMB from January to March 2012, six took place between April 2012. 70 and 110 nautical miles (between 130 and 204km) offshore. 101 On U.S. support to the Nigerian navy, see Section V.C. Ni- See “Report for the period 1 January – 31 March 2012”, op. cit. geria spent $1.9 billion on defence in 2009, $2.1 billion in 2010 94 “West Africa: expert in mothership warning”, Bergen Risk and $2.8 billion in 2011. “Nigeria’s defence budget approves Solutions, 16 January 2012. dozens of Navy acquisitions”, Defence Web, 20 February 2012. 95 Crisis Group interview, naval officer, Cotonou, 27 January 102 Ibid. At the beginning of September 2012, Nigeria acquired 2012. ten patrol boats to strengthen its navy. “Nigeria acquires 10 pa- 96 The Nigerian navy is increasing its presence in the delta, es- trol boats for oil rich Niger Delta”, Xinhua, 8 September 2012. pecially in the Bonny/Akassa/Escravos area. “Navy begins fresh 103 Some private contractors also have the equipment to carry out offensive against piracy, oil theft”, Guardian (Nigeria), 11 No- maritime surveillance. Crisis Group interview, maritime security vember 2012. company staff, Port Harcourt, 14 February 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 12

them of responsibilities and budget share. The House of Critics say it is a risk to outsource national security re- Representatives had passed the bill and the Senate was sponsibilities to a private company that will put its own considering it when, in early January 2012, the presidency financial interests first, especially one that is perceived as ordered it be withdrawn.104 PICOMSS is unlikely to re- maintaining connections to former militants. NIMASA ceive new powers but continues to operate a maritime sur- insists Global West will not be ensuring maritime security veillance system parallel to the navy’s.105 Rivalry between but rather providing boats for it and the navy to use.108 these agencies creates needless duplication of work and blocks information sharing. 2. Amnesty, unemployment and unrest in the north F. FUTURE THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY Recent attacks raise the spectre of renewed insurgency in 109 There are three types of threat. The first stems from the the Niger Delta. A new wave of violence would risk government’s decision to employ private contractors of boosting the criminal economy and creating an environ- questionable reliability to assist the navy and maritime ment more favourable to the funding, organisation and authorities. The second stems from the risk that the am- use of piracy by criminal gangs. nesty program will only have a short-term impact and not The amnesty has not lessened massive injustice in the resolve the problem of violence in the delta. The third delta. Most inhabitants still live in poverty and suffer the stems from the increase in violence in the north of the oil industry’s ill effects on the environment while the country. governing elite becomes richer, often through corruption. The amnesty and the granting of surveillance and waste 1. Subcontracting security management contracts to local communities sends out a message that violence or the threat of it will be rewarded. In early January 2012, the Nigerian authorities used a pri- A new generation of unemployed young men growing up vate company, Global West Vessel Specialist Nigeria in the delta may prove to be quick learners. As an oil Ltd, to work with NIMASA and the navy to monitor and company official said, “there’s a thin line between a patrol Nigeria’s maritime domain and enforce payment of community issue and a security issue”.110 taxes. The contract is for ten years and worth $103.4 mil- 106 lion. According to the Nigerian press, the company is The amnesty did not appease all former militants. Some alleged to have links with a suspected former MEND still demand to be included in the amnesty program that 107 leader. has so far registered about 30,000 people; others outright reject it and say they will continue to fight. Mid-ranking commanders who did not benefit to the same degree as their more famous and powerful superiors are especially keen to keep fighting.111 Even those participating in the 104 Crisis Group interview, PICOMSS officer, Abuja, 9 Febru- ary 2012. 105 See Admiral Ola Sa’ad Ibrahim, “Piracy and maritime security in Nigeria”, The Guardian (Nigeria), 8 February 2012. 108 NIMASA also says the point of the contract is to speed up 106 The transport ministry memorandum presenting the contract slow procurement procedures. Crisis Group interview, NIMASA is entitled “Award of contract for the strategic concessioning officer, Lagos, 8 February 2012. Crisis Group’s attempts to partnership with NIMASA to provide platforms for tracking contact Global West were unanswered. ships and cargoes, enforce regulatory compliance and surveil- 109 On 4 February 2012, a group claiming to be from MEND lance of the entire Nigerian maritime domain”. See a copy of the blew up a sea pipeline belonging to the Italian company Eni. agreement reprinted in annex A of “Outsourcing Maritime Se- On 1 March, MEND claimed responsibility for the murder of curity: Is former MEND commander Tompolo involved?”, four police officers who were patrolling the River Nembe in Special Report, Bergen Risk Solutions, 7 February 2012. NI- Bayelsa state. Early on 13 April, the movement attacked anoth- MASA confirmed this agreement with Global West, emphasis- er of Eni’s installations in Bayelsa. “Militants claim attack on ing the contract was based on performance criteria and that it Nigeria Eni oil pipeline”, Reuters, 5 February 2012; “Nigeria’s would allow an increase of fiscal receipts from the relevant MEND claims fatal attack on police”, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2012 ; administrations. “NIMASA: Why we’re partnering Global West “Eni oil pipeline attacked in Nigeria delta”, Reuters, 13 April on maritime security”, This Day, 9 March 2012. 2012. 107 “Tompolo tackles security of Nigerian waters”, Vanguard, 4 110 Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Port September 2012 and “Nigeria: payments to Tompolo, others is Harcourt, 15 February 2012. legitimizing militancy”, AllAfrica, 27 August 2012. Subcon- 111 A militant leader, formerly a mid-ranking commander under tracting security to former militants from the delta seems also Asari, swore that as soon as “our boy”, President Jonathan, fin- to include land installations. “Nigeria’s former oil bandits now ishes his term, he will continue to cripple the oil industry. Crisis collect government cash”, The Wall Street Journal, 22 August Group interview, former militant commander, Port Harcourt, 16 2012. February 2012. See “The lull before the storm”, op. cit. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 13

amnesty may soon be tempted to turn back to crime as the IV. THE SPREAD OF CRIME ACROSS program, while offering training, has enabled very few to THE REGION find jobs.112 The payment of monthly stipends will have to stop at some point.113 Furthermore, if power changes hands at the next elections in 2015, a new president will The geography of maritime insecurity now extends to the most likely be less sympathetic to the delta groups than whole region, from “Côte d’Ivoire to Angola” according 118 Goodluck Jonathan, who comes from the region. There is to the ECCAS secretary general. In the short term, in no guarantee his replacement would maintain the lucrative addition to Nigeria, the maritime zones most affected are state contracts that have so far appeased militant leaders. Bakassi, Benin, Togo and Ghana. Although profit is the dominant motive in most attacks and kidnappings, politi- Boko Haram’s violent campaign in the north could also cal demands are sometimes made. Moreover, countries no precipitate renewed violence in the south.114 Some mili- longer hesitate to view maritime attacks as external at- tants feel it is drawing the government’s attention away tempts at destabilisation. Criminal activities can be divided from the delta’s grievances. Those who claimed an attack into three main categories: the spread of political gangster- on a gas pipeline on 4 February 2012 said it was “a re- ism from the Niger Delta to the Bakassi peninsula; seaborne minder of our presence”.115 Among the delta’s security raids; and increasingly sophisticated acts of piracy. community there are rumours of new militant camps.116 The government’s ability to deal effectively with renewed A. POLITICAL GANGSTERISM IN BAKASSI violence in the delta would be seriously constrained by the need to quell insecurity in the north. The Joint Task The first manifestations of maritime crime in Cameroon Force is still present in the delta, but its new Operation occurred in 1987. They were restricted to the maritime Pulo Shield is reoriented to countering oil bunkering and 117 border with Nigeria, in the Bight of Biafra. Initially, at- illegal refining, not insurgency. tacks had a purely financial motivation: burglaries at port and oil installations, siphoning of crude, unauthorised fishing in controlled zones, attacks on fishing boats.119 Crime became less frequent in 1993 with the emergence of a dispute and then sporadic clashes between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. Yaoundé and Abuja henceforth considered the area to be a sensitive zone in terms of maritime security.120 Cameroon declared the coast near Nigeria to be a war zone and placed it under army control. The incidence of crime fell sharply between 1993 and 2006 and the only common crimes were burglaries and other offenses in the ports of Douala, Limbé and the seaside resort of Kribi.121

The first major manifestation of the spread of crime from

112 Crisis Group interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13 the Niger Delta appeared after the 2007 Green Tree February 2012. Most former militants would like to work in the Agreement, which returned Bakassi to Cameroon, in ac- oil and gas sector but given the specialised nature of the work cordance with the ruling by the International Court of 122 and the level of automation after the initial construction stage, Justice (ICJ). The number of attacks and ambushes there are not enough opportunities for them. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Lagos, 3 February 2012. 113 The initial end date of 2015 is now under review. Crisis Group 118 “Piracy and armed robberies are a threat in the Gulf of Guinea, interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13 February 2012. from Côte d’Ivoire to Angola” quoted in “Branle-bas de combat Also see “Post-amnesty programme may end 2013”, This Day contre la piraterie maritime”, Gabon Review, 26 October 2012. Live, 31 January 2011. In October 2012, a tanker was attacked off Côte d’Ivoire. 114 Boko Haram is a radical Islamist group that has carried out “Greek-operated tanker goes missing in Gulf of Guinea”, Reuters, scores of bomb attacks and shootings, mainly in the predomi- 8 October 2012. “Piracy off West Africa doubles”, News 24, 27 nately Muslim north, which have killed more than 1,000 people October 2012. since mid-2009. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°168, North- 119 Crisis Group interviews, port authority, Douala, 5 December ern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010. 2011. 115 “Nigerian militants attack Eni oil pipeline in delta”, Reuters, 120 “Navy: Why Bakassi buffer zone is porous”, This Day, 6 6 February 2012. November 2012. 116 Crisis Group interviews, oil company security managers, 121 Crisis Group interviews, port authority, Douala, 5 December Port Harcourt, 14-15 February 2012. 2011. 117 Pulo means oil in Ijaw. “JTF restructures, now Operation 122 In October 2004, after proceedings that lasted several years, Pulo Shield”, Sweet Crude, 9 January 2012. the ICJ awarded Bakassi to Cameroon. With a view to imple- The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 14

along the Cameroonian coast increased. They were led by proclaimed himself leader of the movement before sur- armed groups of the self-proclaimed Bakassi Freedom rendering as well.125 The BFF’s current leadership is un- Fighters (BFF), opposed to the peninsula’s return to Came- clear and claimed by different “military leaders”, some roon. Originally composed of members of the Ijaw com- saying to be still active while others “repented” and put munity, the ethnic majority group in Bakassi, the BFF down their arms or negotiated their surrender with the followed the example of self-defence groups in the Niger Cameroonian authorities.126 Most “combatants” are spread Delta and claimed they were acting to defend themselves among relatively uncoordinated but extremely dangerous against the Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities. They and violent small groups, such as the African Marine Com- put forward the same political motive as fighters in the mando (AMC), which control maritime crime and illegal Niger Delta, namely that they were defending the inter- trade of petrol, arms and drugs.127 ests of a group that had been “betrayed”. However, the BFF were not so much interested in denouncing government In response, Cameroon has combined military deployment collusion with the oil companies as preventing the possible in the field with infiltration of the armed groups. To counter expulsion of the Ijaw communities and allies from an area their mobility and capacity to quickly extend their reach, very rich in fishing resources.123 the authorities launched Operation Galilee, which involved deploying a Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR), a unit Moreover, the BFF’s political demands concealed other, equipped with speed boats. The government also launched less noble objectives: maintaining control of the lucrative a military surveillance program off the coast and territorial trade of oil and drugs in Bakassi. The path taken by the waters using radar and radio with an operational centre in group shows the range of interests behind its creation. As Douala. This has been all the more necessary because, in illegal trade increased on the peninsula, the situation be- spite of strong pressure from Bakassi residents, the Nige- came more confused and the “combatant” groups have split rian government’s recent decision not to contest the return following mutual accusations of treason and corruption. of Bakassi to Cameroon closed the legal battle but did not completely close the political battle, which might encour- In November 2007, twenty Cameroonian soldiers were age violent local demands.128 killed in Issangele creek, Bakassi. The attack was initially attributed to MEND, but Bakassi “combatants” claimed responsibility saying they wanted to “sound a warning” after B. MARITIME RAIDS the arrest of some of their comrades a few days before.124 In October 2008, another major attack was launched when The years 2008 and 2009 were notable for the intensifica- individuals travelling on speed boats attacked the SS Sa- tion of bank robberies in Cameroon and a spectacular at- gitta, a French tanker sailing near Limbé. They took ten tack on the Equatorial Guinea presidential residence at hostages, including seven French citizens, two Cameroo- Malabo by seaborne armed groups. The bank robberies in nians and one Tunisian. This attack was preceded by an Cameroon started in September 2008 in the coastal town attack on the Cameroonian army in June 2008. Then, on of Limbé. Organised like a military operation and involv- two occasions, in December 2010 and February 2011, representatives of the authorities (including two sub-prefects) were abducted by attackers claiming to be members of the BFF. 125 “‘Bakassi Freedom Fighters’ reportedly apologize and propose ceasefire with Cameroon”, APA, 14 August 2009 and “Militant In 2009, the BFF “operations commander”, Ebi Dari, and groups surrender arms in C-River”, Vanguard, 27 September 2009. one of his “generals” left the group after suspicions had 126 been raised about betrayal and the misappropriation of Some BFF members also took advantage of the Nigerian amnesty law to hand in their weapons to the Cross River state au- funds. They announced their surrender to the Came- thorities. Crisis Group interview, Cameroon military intelligence roonian authorities and asked for a “pardon from Presi- officer, Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011. dent Paul Biya”. Another radical leader, called Atikpee, 127 The extreme violence of their actions, often carried out with heavy weapons, showed how dangerous these groups can be. In February 2011, the AMC took the Bakassi subprefect hostage menting this decision, a joint commission of the two countries and offered his release in exchange for a ransom. A short time was given responsibility for organising a gradual return, taking before, another subprefect was abducted and executed by his into account the status of the majority of the population, who kidnappers. Crisis Group telephone interview, expert from a are Nigerian in origin. The Green Tree Agreement gave the Ni- security company, November 2012. gerian population of Bakassi the choice of leaving the peninsula 128 Despite internal pressures, the Nigerian government decided or remaining, with or without acquiring Cameroonian citizenship. not to appeal against the decision but it considered negotiations 123 Crisis Group interviews, members of the Ijaw community, with Cameroon to buy back Bakassi. “Le Nigéria ne fera pas Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011. appel pour récupérer la péninsule de Bakassi cédée au Came- 124 “Une vingtaine de soldats camerounais tués à Bakassi”, roun”, Slate Afrique, 9 October 2012. “Nigeria mulls buying back Agence France-Presse (AFP), 13 November 2007. Bakassi from Cameroon”, P.M. News Nigeria, 9 October 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 15

ing dozens of attackers equipped with heavy weapons, Following this spectacular attack, and although it had so this series of attacks left a dozen people dead. far been spared from similar attacks, Gabon strengthened its surveillance patrols of villages and fishing communi- In October 2008, a failed bank robbery in Kribi was fol- ties suspected of sheltering criminals or providing them lowed by the arrest of Cameroonian attackers, which in- with information about the movements of coastguards. dicates that the attacks were not only carried out by Nige- Gabonese policy consisted of infiltrating fishing commu- rians. In March 2011, ten people, including nine pirates, nities while strengthening its navy. were killed in a clash between pirates and the BIR after a bank robbery in Douala, South Cameroon’s main city. The confrontation took place at sea, near an oil production zone C. PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS off Bakassi.129 Between 2007 and 2011, there were an estimated 150 In February 2009, Equatorial Guinea experienced its first cases of maritime piracy to the east of the Niger Delta, 135 large-scale attack. About 50 armed men on speed boats led mainly off the Cameroonian coast. In most cases, the a raid against the presidential palace in Malabo on Bioko attackers were equipped with heavy weapons and rocket Island. At first, this attack was reported as an attempted launchers. According to the authorities, most of the at- coup led by the political opposition in cooperation with tacks were planned in Nigeria or Bakassi by groups that MEND, because documents found on the arrested and did not have permanent bases in the mangroves, where killed attackers seemed to indicate that they were from the living conditions can be extremely difficult. Arms were Niger Delta. However, a few days later, MEND denied supplied by a network of traffickers with links to groups in any involvement.130 After also blaming locals and the Equa- the Niger Delta, but also allegedly by accomplices within 136 torial Guinean opposition in exile, the government accused the security services. Cameroon because the attackers were reportedly wearing Cameroonian army uniforms.131 1. Danger off the Benin coast

Questioning of the arrested attackers and investigations In early 2011, several years after maritime crime began to conducted by the authorities of Equatorial Guinea, Came- increase in the eastern gulf, pirate attacks peaked off the roon and Nigeria indicated that the attack had no political coast of Benin, Nigeria’s western neighbour.137 Pirates motive and was apparently organised by criminals who attacked frequently for several months, attracted by the had confused the presidential palace with a bank or had large number of tankers and able to exploit the weakness thought that large sums of money had been stored there.132 of Benin’s navy. A few days before, the press had reported the theft of a suitcase of banknotes from the Malabo presidential resi- At the end of 2010, dozens of vessels were moored off dence.133 However, in August 2010, the Equatorial Guin- Cotonou; some were waiting for berths at Cotonou or La- ea authorities announced death sentences for four people, gos, while others were there to change crew, pick up sup- including former members of the security forces, for their plies, or carry out licit or illicit ship-to-ship transfers of role in the February 2009 attack.134 This raised again the refined petroleum products.138 Some ship owners and crews hypothesis of an attempt to destabilise the government.

No matter how this episode is interpreted, it showed for 135 Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebode, “La nouvelle posture géopoli- the first time that it was possible to plan a large-scale at- tique du Cameroun et la lutte contre la piraterie dans le Golfe tack against one of the region’s countries, and the security de Guinée” in Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebode (dir.), Piraterie et services noted the existence of seaborne armed groups terrorisme: de nouveaux défis sécuritaires en Afrique centrale able to act along the whole length of the Gulf of Guinea. (Yaoundé, 2009), pp. 43-81. 136 Crisis Group interview, Cameroon military intelligence officer, Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011. 137 In 2010 there were no reported pirate attacks off Benin but in 2011 the IMB recorded twenty, all but one of which took 129 “Cameroun: dix morts à Bakassi”, AFP, 21 March 2011. place between March and September. See “Piracy and armed 130 “Attaques contre la Guinée équatoriale: le groupe nigérian robbery against ships, Report for the period 1 January – 30 Sep- du MEND dément être impliqué”, AFP, 17 February 2009. tember 2011” and “Piracy and armed robbery against ships, 131 “Les Bakassi Freedom Fighters attaquent la Guinée équato- Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2011”, IMB. riale”, camer.be, 19 February 2010. Illustrating the problem of underreporting, the head of Benin’s 132 “Banditisme ou tentative de coup d’Etat ?”, Radio France navy, Maxime Ahoyo, said there were 35 attacks off his country’s internationale, 17 February 2009. coast in 2011. “Retour timide des navires”, Xinhua, 4 March 133 Riols, “Piraterie et brigandage maritime dans le Golfe de Gui- 2012. née”, op. cit., p. 7 138 The Central Bank of Nigeria stipulates that fuel importers 134 “Quatre condamnations à mort pour l’assaut du palais prési- only qualify for payment in foreign exchange if they load their dentiel”, AFP, 22 August 2010. products outside Nigeria’s territorial waters. Therefore, the The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 16

thought Cotonou to be safer than Lagos.139 The efforts of There were many opportunities for pirates to attack tank- Nigerian navy and NIMASA to exercise tighter control ers off Benin due to the high frequency of ship-to-ship on shipping in Nigerian waters also encouraged tankers in- transfers.146 For most of 2011, there was scarcely any dan- volved in illicit fuel trading to stay in Benin’s waters to ger of being caught. The Nigerian navy did not have the avoid scrutiny. right to operate in Benin’s waters while the Benin navy’s ability to respond was negligible. Its fleet consisted of two Pirates almost always targeted tankers.140 In all successful old patrol ships that were no longer working and two De- reported attacks pirates stole the ship’s cash, stores or fender patrol boats just over eight-metres-long donated by crews’ belongings. In successful hijack operations, they the U.S. in early 2010.147 forced the crew to sail away from the point of attack and stole fuel worth between $2 million and $6 million.141 The 2011 attacks off Benin and the subsequent rise in insurance premiums for ship owners and charterers caused Academics and experts believe that, in view of the high most maritime traffic previously operating there to moor rate of similar attacks off Nigeria before and during 2011, off Lomé instead, the capital of Togo.148 Benin has re- pirate attacks off Benin are most likely masterminded and ported a 70 per cent decrease in the number of ships ar- executed principally by Nigerians.142 They have the neces- riving in Cotonou port since the beginning of 2012.149 sary intelligence network, boats, firepower and technical However, a series of problems in the management of the know-how to execute such hijacks and sell stolen fuel.143 port that made using it more expensive and time consum- That pirates made telephone calls to Nigerian numbers from ing also explains why many container ships decided to ships hijacked off Benin supports this theory.144 However, dock at Lomé.150 the involvement of Benin nationals is very likely as pirates need to seek information from local fishermen, waterborne Realising his navy’s inadequacy and the damage to the traders and fuel smugglers. The shared history, culture economy, Benin’s president, Yayi Boni, asked for help and language of Yoruba communities on both sides of the from Nigeria and the UN Security Council.151 While visit- border encourage such collaboration.145 ing the U.S. in July and France in November 2011, he ap-

motherships of foreign companies selling fuel to Nigerian im- Plage, a village on the Benin-Nigeria border, born to a Nigerian porters moor off Cotonou or Lomé and transfer fuel to Nigerian father and a mother from Benin. Crisis Group interview, former companies’ smaller tankers, which then transport it to Lagos. Cotonou harbour master, Cotonou, 27 January 2012. These ship-to-ship transfers are illegal since no port duties or 146 Of the twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the IMB, levies are paid to any country. “Report of the ad-hoc committee seven took place on tankers while they were carrying out ship- ‘to verify and determine the actual subsidy requirements and to-ship transfers and four on tankers preparing to do so. In an monitor the implementation of the subsidy regime in Nigeria’”, incident on 24 June 2011, the crew had removed the razor wire Resolution No. (HR.1/2012), House of Representatives, 18 protecting the vessel to be able to transfer their cargo. “Piracy April 2012, p. 22. Available at www.africaintelligence.com and armed robbery against ships, report for the period 1 January /images/Nigeria_subsidies.pdf. – 31 December 2011”, op. cit. 139 Crisis Group interviews, Benin navy and port authorities, 147 Until late September 2011, the Benin navy tried to keep one Cotonou, February 2012. of the two Defenders in the water at all times to deter pirate at- 140 All twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the IMB tacks. Crisis Group interview, Benin naval officer, Cotonou, 27 were on tankers. “Piracy and armed robbery against ships, re- January 2012. port for the period 1 January – 31 December 2011”, op. cit. 148 On 1 August 2011, the Joint War Committee, which com- 141 See Lloyd’s Market Association website: www.lmalloyds. prises representatives from the Lloyd’s Market Association and com. Of the twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the International Underwriting Association of Insurers, added Be- IMB, nine involved pirates hijacking a tanker to an unknown nin’s waters to its areas listed as vulnerable to hull war, strikes, location. Ibid. terrorism and related perils. Nigeria’s waters were already on 142 “Global pirate attacks down in first quarter, Nigeria risk the list. This declaration enabled insurers to raise their premiums. grows”, Reuters, 23 April 2012. Crisis Group telephone inter- See “Hull war, strikes, terrorism and related perils – listed are- view, expert from a security company, November 2012. as”, Joint War Committee, JWLA18, 1 August 2011 accessible 143 In 2011, attacks reported off Benin took place from 4 to 67 at www.lmalloyds.com. nautical miles (7.4 to 124km) offshore. “Piracy and armed rob- 149 “UN says piracy off Africa’s west coast is increasing, be- bery against ships, report for the period 1 January – 31 Decem- coming more violent”, The Washington Post, 28 February ber 2011”, op. cit. 2012. 144 Crisis Group interview, IMB officer, London, 8 December 150 Crisis Group interview, shipping company staff, Cotonou, 2011. 31 January 2012. 145 Crisis Group interview, academic, Lagos, 3 February 2012. 151 Benin collects about 100 billion CFA francs (about $218 During an attack on a tanker off Cotonou on 24 November 2009, million) or some 40 per cent of government revenues from port the only one reported to the IMB that year, crew members cap- activities each year. “Benin acquires three new coastal patrol tured one of the attackers, an individual from Seme-Krake craft”, Defence Web, 3 April 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 17

pealed to Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy.152 On 28 among the navy and government departments hinders the September 2011, Nigeria and Benin together launched creation of a cohesive security response.158 There is no Operation Prosperity to deter pirate attacks. Abuja quick- consensus on how to move forward and progress towards ly mobilised and was willing to invest heavily in the op- a national maritime security strategy has been slow.159 eration because piracy is as much a problem for Nigeria as it is for Benin and large quantities of goods are imported 2. Togo within range to Nigeria through Cotonou.153 Operation Prosperity was initially intended to last six months, until the end of March Piracy off the coast of Benin has boosted shipping in To- 2012, but it has been extended indefinitely. golese waters and business at Lomé port, but piracy as well.160 A spate of attempted attacks in September-October Nigerian navy ships and helicopters created a relatively 2011 on many tankers, an attempted attack in February effective deterrent that has generated a drop in pirate at- 2012 and a successful hijack of an oil tanker on 28 April 154 tacks in Benin’s waters. The joint operation also regu- show Togolese waters are not safe.161 The government re- lates shipping. For the first time, ships moor off Cotonou sponse has been more coordinated than in Benin with the in designated areas, making it easier for the navies to pro- navy and the transport ministry working together relatively 155 tect them. Shipping companies can also pay the Benin smoothly.162 But Togo is still sorely unprepared.163 If the navy for escorts and armed guards on board. Vessels found problem grew, it would be unable to cope. With pirates to be violating the law are handed over to the Benin navy, operating nearby in the waters off Nigeria and Benin and fined 25 million CFA francs (about $50,000) and escorted a healthy fuel smuggling network in the country, pirates from Benin waters.156

The operation is supposed to give Benin time to reinforce its own maritime security capabilities. The navy and air force are waiting for several boats and planes to be deliv- 157 ered. However, a lack of coordination and leadership 158 In September 2011, Benin created an inter-ministerial maritime security committee but the military, transport ministry and port authorities still vie for the lead. Crisis Group telephone in- 152 Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Cotonou, 30 January terview, military adviser, Brussels, 16 January 2012. 2012. 159 The operation continues because Benin is unable to exercise 153 About half the goods that transit through Cotonou Port go to control of its territorial waters. The region’s governments also Nigeria. Congestion in Lagos Port and higher import taxes on plan to extend the operation to Togolese waters. Crisis Group goods such as rice, cooking oil and fabrics intended to help local email correspondence, Nigerian navy officer, 2 April 2012. industry cause importers to use Cotonou Port. Much then goes 160 70 to 80 ships crowded the waters off Lomé from August to through Niger to reduce taxes further. Crisis Group interviews, September 2011. Operation Prosperity enabled some ships to shipping company staff, Cotonou, 31 January 2012. return to Benin so that number had dropped to less than 50 by 154 The operational zone runs from the fairway buoy off Lagos early 2012. Crisis Group interview, Lomé harbour master, Lomé, to Benin’s maritime border with Togo (85 nautical miles or about 25 January 2012. Togolese authorities have made the most of 157km) and extends 20 nautical miles (37km) out to sea. The the new traffic. Since mid-2011, they charge ships mooring or Nigerian navy has assigned to the operation one war ship, three carrying out ship-to-ship transfers offshore a fee of one million ballistic boats and two Augusta maritime helicopters fitted with CFA francs (just under $2,000) each two weeks. Crisis Group cameras. NIMASA also provides two vessels. The Benin navy interview, shipping agent, Lomé, 25 January 2012. has devoted its two Defender patrol boats and one patrol ship, 161 The IMB says there were more attacks and attempted attacks recently repaired. Crisis Group interviews, Nigerian defence off Togo between January and September 2012 than during the attaché, Benin navy chief, Cotonou, 1 February 2012. previous five years. “Report for the period 1 January – 30 Sep- 155 Ships pay between €2,500 and €3,500 for fourteen days tember”, op. cit.; “Togolese Navy thwarts pirate attack”, De- moorage. Crisis Group interview, shipping agent, Cotonou, 30 fence Web, 13 February 2012; and “Pirates hijack oil tanker off January 2012. Togo”, Defence Web, 4 May 2012. 156 Half the money goes to the treasury, a quarter to the navy 162 Crisis Group telephone interview, military adviser, Brussels, (enabling its recent office refurbishment) and a quarter to the 16 January 2012. civilian maritime administration. Crisis Group interview, head 163 The navy is composed of several hundred men, has two 30 of the Benin navy, Cotonou, 1 February 2012. to 40-year-old patrol boats that rarely leave harbour and two 157 At France’s encouragement, Benin bought three 32-metre- Defender boats donated by the U.S. with which it carries out long patrol ships from French manufacturer OCEA. France will night patrols. It provides onboard armed guards if ship owners help train the navy on how to use its new boats. Benin has also are willing to pay. The gendarmerie’s fifteen-man maritime bri- requested a third Defender boat from the U.S. and bought two gade also has a small boat with which to patrol close to shore. Grand Duc surveillance aircraft to increase maritime domain Crisis Group interviews, head of the navy and maritime bri- awareness. Crisis Group interviews, head of the Benin navy, gade, French defence attaché, Lomé, January 2012. The U.S. Cotonou, 1 February 2012. See “Benin acquires three new coastal will provide another patrol boat slightly larger than the Defenders. patrol craft”, Defence Web, 3 April 2012. Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Lomé, 25 January 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 18

could develop their connections and operations in Togo if one area the nickname of “Little Lagos” and police inves- it remained a weak spot.164 tigations have revealed organised crime networks linking the two countries.170 3. Ghana at risk Government and international oil companies also risk Pirates have not yet launched an attack off the coast of feeding a perception among local communities that the oil Ghana, Togo’s western neighbour, but the country has al- is bringing more harm than good. Antagonism is growing ready suffered collateral damage from piracy and its new- between fishermen who want to catch fish attracted to the found oil resources puts it at risk.165 A pirate attack dam- light from oil rigs and the navy and oil companies intent aged a pipeline in Togo and caused important power cuts on keeping them outside a one nautical mile (1.85km) ex- in Ghana.166 In late 2010, the Jubilee field, 106km off- clusion zone. The navy has also been heavy-handed in en- 171 shore near the maritime border with Côte d’Ivoire, came forcing fishing regulations onshore. These hostilities on-stream just three years after its discovery. Well aware could cause the government to lose valuable allies in the that realising Ghana’s oil potential is critical for his coun- fight against maritime crime – fishermen can be the eyes try’s development, the late president, John Atta Mills, had and ears of limited law enforcement agencies – and make decided to beef up the navy and air force.167 However, a locals more likely to collaborate with foreign criminals or dispute with Côte d’Ivoire over their shared maritime take the initiative themselves. Avoiding these risks is the 172 border already threatens to tie up the oil in lengthy nego- responsibility of government and foreign oil companies. tiations,168 and a lack of clarity remains on the share of responsibilities between military and civilian actors including the navy, police, defence ministry and Ghana Maritime Authority.169

The development of Ghana’s oil industry will attract man- power from throughout the region, including Nigeria, which will create security problems. The high concentration of Nigerians in the port city of Takoradi has already earned

164 Besides the overland traffic of fuel from Benin, smugglers also go out to tankers to buy fuel. They often come ashore at the uncontrolled shoreline near the Benin-Togo border. Crisis Group interviews, maritime administration, Lomé, 23 January 2012; navy head, Lomé, 23 January 2012; fisherman, Lomé, 26 January 2012. 165 In 2011, the IMB reported two minor security incidents off Takoradi, one of Ghana’s two main ports, in which thieves with machetes boarded and stole ship’s stores. “Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2011”, op. cit. 166 “Pirates cut off the gas”, Africa Energy Intelligence, 12 Sep- tember 2012. 167 On 20 February 2012, the navy commissioned four new Chinese-made fast patrol boats and it is waiting for two ex- German navy fast attack craft currently being refitted in Ger- many. The air force is buying three new surveillance aircraft and a new maritime police force is being created. To improve maritime domain awareness, the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) is setting up a Vessel Traffic Management Information 170 “Ghana says seized guns and ammo headed to Nigeria”, System (VTMIS). Crisis Group interviews, GMA director, Ac- Reuters, 11 January 2012. cra, 17 January 2012; diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012. See 171 Crisis Group interviews, diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012; “Four new vessels for navy to secure country’s maritime bounda- academic at the Regional Maritime University, Accra, 2 March ries”, Ghana government press release, 21 February 2012. 2012. Commercial fishing in zones close to shore reserved for 168 Relations between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are strained artisanal fishing is straining local livelihoods. Crisis Group in- since the Ivorian post-election crisis, during which Ghana did terviews, international researchers, Accra, 20 March 2012. not support the elected president, Alassane Ouattara, in his battle 172 Tullow Oil, the company part running the Jubilee field, is with the deposed president Laurent Gbagbo. “Oil: Nation eager helping the Ghana Maritime Authority, which in turn is sup- to remain master of its own destiny”, Financial Times, 14 De- porting the navy, including with human rights training. Crisis cember 2011. Group interview, Tullow security manager, Accra, 19 January 169 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012. 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 19

V. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND Guinea Commission and ECOWAS.175 ECCAS’s strategy INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT has six objectives: information sharing and management; joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonisation of actions at sea; introduction of a regional maritime tax; ac- The regionalisation of piracy and maritime crime in the quisition of equipment for joint use; and the institutionali- Gulf of Guinea highlights the need for a collective re- sation of a periodic maritime conference. CRESMAC was sponse. The vulnerability of the countries concerned is a established in Pointe-Noire in the Republic of Congo, and consequence of weak national institutions, a lack of co- is funded with a regional maritime tax, the modalities of operation and the absence, until recently, of any involve- which remain to be decided, and with budgetary contribu- ment by the regional institutions responsible for peace tions from member countries. and security. The nature of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, which takes place in the territorial waters of Because of the immensity of the area that requires protec- coastal states, means they have to be at the forefront of tion, ECCAS has divided it into three geographical zones, the fight because external actors can only intervene in in- A, B and D, stretching from Angola to the maritime borders ternational waters. In this context, regional cooperation of Nigeria and Cameroon.176 Zone D, which covers Came- with international support is the best possible response. roon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Prín- However, cooperation will not suffice without a clear and cipe, is the most at risk from maritime insecurity. In May coherent direction. 2009, the main countries concerned signed an agreement on maritime surveillance in the zone. The agreement was followed by the beginning of joint patrols and the adoption A. UNEQUAL REGIONAL COOPERATION of a plan called SECMAR1, followed by SECMAR2.

Although the Economic Community of Central African According to ECCAS, the SECMAR plans facilitated an States (ECCAS) has made some progress in terms of in- inventory of naval resources of member countries and the stitutional development and pooling of resources, the opening of a multinational coordination centre in Douala, same cannot be said of the Economic Community of West responsible for liaison between the radar stations of par- African States (ECOWAS), where turf wars and a general ticipating countries and their marine operational centres.177 distrust of Nigeria hold back the emergence of a clear and In the long term, the SECMAR plans aim to open up ter- firm regional response to maritime insecurity. ritorial waters to the ships of participating countries (anchorage, the right of hot pursuit and the use of arms against 1. The beginning of a strategy in Central Africa pirates) as well as to carry out joint operations involving international partners.178 In accordance with its mandate to promote peace and se- 173 curity, ECCAS began work on formulating a security The security operations planned for zone D include coop- 174 strategy for the Gulf of Guinea in October 2009. Its eration between navies, whose capacities nonetheless re- strategy is based on two elements: first, the creation of a main limited. The four countries in zone D only have four Regional Coordination Centre for the Maritime Security patrol boats between them179 while the Corymbe mission of Central Africa (CRESMAC), which is tasked with pooling the military and civilian skills of member countries and, second, the promotion of “synergy” between the Gulf of

175 See “Protocole sur la gestion de la stratégie de sécurisation des intérêts vitaux en mer articulée autour du COPAX et favo- 173 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) states that risant une synergie avec la Commission du Golfe de Guinée et la one of the organisation’s objectives is to “coordinate and har- Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique occidentale”, monize the policies between the existing and future Regional ECCAS, Kinshasa, 24 October 2009. Economic Communities (RECs) for the gradual attainment of 176 See Appendix C. the objectives of the Union”. The AU informally maintains the 177 Crisis Group interview, expert on Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS, principle of subsidiarity by virtue of which it should give way Libreville, 23 January 2012. to RECs when its expertise is not necessary. In Central Africa, 178 Operations called “Obangame express” organised by the ECCAS is supposed to contribute to the continental peace and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) form part of its African security architecture, for example, by establishing one of five Partnership Station (APS). Nigeria, France, Belgium and Spain brigades in the AU’s future peacekeeping force, under consid- also participate in these operations, which take the form of emer- eration since 2002. See article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the gency simulation exercises: hostage taking, pursuit of arms or AU, 11 July 2001 and Crisis Group Report, Implementing Peace drug traffickers, securing oil platforms, etc. The latest exercise and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, op. cit. took place in February 2012. 174 On the history of this sub-regional security initiative, see 179 Crisis Group interview, expert on Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS, ibid, pp. 15-16. Libreville, 23 January 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 20

deployed by France alone has the same number of vessels.180 Cooperation on maritime governance in West Africa is Joint patrols, surveillance and the right of hot pursuit be- limited by some of the same factors that hold back broad- tween member states also require greater complementarity er regional economic and political integration. West Afri- of naval and air management resources in the Gulf of Guinea can leaders are anxious to maintain their sovereign rights and the creation of a regional training school. to govern within their territory. Weaker countries are wary that stronger neighbours, in particular Nigeria, the regional 2. West Africa plays catch-up hegemon, would take advantage if they were to concede elements of national sovereignty for the sake of regional ECOWAS is far behind its sister body, ECCAS, in foster- integration. The region’s many conflicts, including those ing cooperation among its members on maritime affairs. that have caused insecurity to spill across borders, high- The sudden rise of piracy off Benin in 2011 was a reality light the need for regional integration in security matters check; it proved maritime security is not just a problem but also provoke among states a knee-jerk reaction to dis- for Nigeria but also for other member states, both coastal tance themselves from their neighbours’ problems for fear and landlocked. of contamination.

With support from partners such as the UK, the ECO- Tense relations between some neighbouring coastal states WAS Commission is taking its first steps to stimulate and hamper information sharing. The maritime border dispute harmonise its members’ maritime policies.181 Its recently between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire makes cooperation on established maritime security office is drafting a strategy maritime governance and security particularly difficult. that highlights the need for member states to “embrace a Coastal states, some colonised by France, others by Brit- more integrated governance approach to maritime af- ain, have different working languages, bureaucracies and fairs”.182 Encouragingly it emphasises continuous infor- cultures that hinder communication and trust between mation sharing and underlines the need to improve oil and elites, even if the same tribal groups live on both sides of gas governance as a means to prevent conflict. ECOWAS, the border. Since navies often have more boats and there- actively trying to replicate the ECCAS model, also plans fore greater capacity to act on the sea than civilian author- to delineate three operational zones with a coordination ities, they tend to take the lead on maritime affairs. Oper- centre within each. Zone E, the pilot zone or “laboratory ational problems between different communications sys- zone”, created in early September 2012 in Lomé, includes tems and a military culture of confidentiality also impede Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Niger.183 The plan envisages that information exchange between coastal states.185 countries in each zone will pool resources and take joint responsibility for their maritime security.184 ECOWAS should provide an institutional forum in which member states can find solutions to overcome some of these problems. However, it has limitations of its own. The ECOWAS Commission, as an intergovernmental secretariat, has very little leeway to shape its members’ 180 Since 1990, France has maintained a permanent presence in maritime policies and practices. Its draft strategy is merely the Gulf of Guinea, within the framework of Mission Corymbe. “a set of guidelines and common principles” from which The mission’s dual objective is to maintain cooperation with members may take inspiration.186 With bilateral and trilat- the region’s countries, especially those with which Paris has eral efforts already underway to stop the rise in piracy, defence agreements, and defend France’s economic interests heads of state may be worried that elevating the response (including its oil companies). Crisis Group interviews, French to the regional level would divert the influx of extra inter- military adviser in the Gabon navy, Libreville, 21 January national support to ECOWAS.187 Donors too, conscious 2012. 181 The UK provided funding for an ECOWAS maritime security that achieving consensus for a regional response will take officer for two years. A Nigerian naval officer took up this position in November 2011. The UK also funded an ECOWAS maritime security seminar in early 2012. Crisis Group interview, UK diplomat, Abuja, 9 February 2012. 182 The ten strategic areas are maritime awareness; maritime security; maritime safety; environmental issues; establishment 185 That some neighbouring navies are poorly prepared to com- of a maritime governance framework; maritime surveillance municate with each other was illustrated in November 2011. network; information network; maritime education, training and The Ghanaian navy received a distress call from an oil barge on development; maritime research; and other maritime related is- fire off the coast of Benin and wanted to inform the Togolese sues. “A draft ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy”, version navy. It did not have the right telephone number and had to call shared with Crisis Group mid-March 2012. the airport control tower in Lomé, which informed the navy. 183 See “Côte ouest-africaine: vers la création d’une zone pilote Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Lomé, 25 January 2012. de sécurité maritime”, Afriquejet, 2 September 2012. 186 “A draft ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy”, op. cit. p. 3. 184 Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS maritime security officer, 187 Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS maritime security officer, Abuja, 9 February 2012. Abuja, 9 February 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 21

a long time, doubt the organisation’s usefulness in the against the tacit opposition of other countries who fear short or medium term.188 this troublesome partner.

However, the proximity of Nigeria to zone D has made B. NASCENT INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS necessary, especially in cases where individuals commit crimes along The institutional frameworks for inter-regional coopera- the coasts of ECCAS countries and find refuge in Nigerian tion in maritime affairs have had difficulties to move be- waters. As other countries distrust Nigeria, a political so- yond agreements on paper. Aiming to ensure a cost-effec- lution depends on making arrangements between the three tive shipping service high on safety and low on pollution, regional institutions – ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa Guinea Commission – rather than between the states in (MOWCA) was set up in 1975 – first as a Ministerial zone D and Abuja.192 In this respect, the Gulf of Guinea Conference of West and Central African States on Mari- Commission has recently organised a conference on the time Transport (MINCONMAR), and then institutional- issue and is supportive of a regional peace, security and 189 ised as such in 1999. It has been working with the In- development strategy.193 ternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) since 2003 to establish an “integrated coast guard function network” to The advantage of such a configuration would be to neu- facilitate regional coordination. But MOWCA has been tralise the hegemonic desires of a country by imposing unable to implement the project because it works primari- community rules, but also to make agreements concluded ly through transport ministers whose voices in maritime between states that are members of the three institutions affairs are weaker than those of the militaries, and who immediately applicable, notably with regard to the pursuit fear that the creation of coast guards would diminish their of criminals outside maritime borders. It also aims to de- own responsibilities and budgets. MOWCA’s attempt to fine the modalities for extradition as well as facilitating set up a Regional Maritime Development Bank in Nigeria judicial procedures against criminals, whatever their na- has also stalled due to a lack of will among members to tionality. However, until now, discussions between ECO- provide the start-up money.190 WAS and ECCAS have not resulted in an agreement on a legal and operational framework for cooperation. Meanwhile, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) established in 1999 aims to harmonise the policies of mem- C. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT: IN SEARCH OF ber states on peace and security, the management of oil and natural resources, transport and the free circulation of COORDINATION people and goods. Its founding treaty focuses on open and latent conflicts over natural resources.191 However, the Given the strategic interests of both rich and developing Commission is struggling to be more than a declaration of countries in the Gulf of Guinea, the recent deterioration in intent. Its creation had been held up by the Bakassi dis- maritime security has provoked a rapid increase in sup- pute between Cameroon and Nigeria, and its institutional port from foreign partners. Through a plethora of initia- development has been blocked since then by political ten- tives, traditional donors, the U.S., UK and France in par- sions. Cameroon was not very interested initially by an ticular, and emerging ones, including China and Brazil, have demonstrated their will to help local powers counter institution that it suspected would be used by Nigeria to 194 resolve border conflicts in its favour. The other member the threat of violent crime at sea. But not all encourage countries feared the hegemony of Nigeria and Angola, the right approach to the problem and a lack of coordina- powers likely to influence the sharing of resources to tion undermines good intentions. their advantage. Nigeria would like to play a leadership Support often comes in the form of capacity building for role in the Gulf of Guinea, but such ambitions come up naval forces, including training, equipment and boats to boost their maritime domain awareness and capacity to deter attacks and respond rapidly. Nigeria refused to host 188 Crisis Group interviews, donor representatives, Accra, Lo- a base for the U.S.’s Africa Command (AFRICOM), but mé, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January and February 2012. 189 See MOWCA’s website: www.amssa.net/framework/ MOWCA.aspx. 190 “Regional maritime development bank headquarters wasting 192 Which has already taken part in “Obangame express” exer- away”, This Day, 18 February 2012. cises. 191 Article 2 of the Treaty defines the Commission as “a frame- 193 Luanda declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of work … for cooperation and development as well as for pre- Guinea, Luanda, 29 November 2012. vention, management and resolution of conflicts relating to the 194 China has funded the purchase of boats while Brazil was in- economic and commercial exploitation on natural resources volved in the multinational training exercise, Obangame Ex- within territorial borders and in exclusive economic zones of press 2012, organised by the U.S. in Calabar, Nigeria in Febru- member states”. ary 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 22

the U.S. navy regularly visits the country to train Nigerian ruary 2012. U.S. and French warships stationed in the counterparts through its Africa Partnership Station pro- Gulf of Guinea to train local navies also deter piracy and, gram. Since 2007, the U.S. has been improving the coun- on some occasions, offer assistance to ships attacked by try’s Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) pirates.201 by helping to set up radar, radio equipment and Automated Identification Systems (AIS) at several sites along the coast. Discussions at the UN Security Council and the Novem- The U.S. has also donated at least five boats, most recently ber 2011 report of a UN assessment mission to the region the former U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Chase, commissioned have helped draw attention to the problem.202 The UN as NNS Thunder in February 2012.195 It also supports mari- plans to provide technical support to coastal states and time security exercises, like for example the recent Opera- shipping companies through the IMO and the UN Office tion Hot Pursuit involving the navies of Togo and Benin.196 on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It also plans to help mo- bilise resources and organise a summit at which heads of France supports its former colonies bilaterally, including all Gulf of Guinea states are to agree on a comprehensive through the work of advisers to military chiefs. In mid- strategy to counter maritime insecurity.203 The EU, in ad- 2011 it also began a three-year project to help Benin, To- dition to commissioning many studies on Gulf of Guinea go and Ghana draw up national maritime security strate- piracy, also leads a Port Cooperation Programme (SEA- gies, train civilians and armies and improve coordination COP) in several West African countries, which aims to between the three neighbours. Called ASECMAR (Support curb drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe by for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea), the project strengthening national and regional maritime control.204 was later enlarged to include Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea.197 It seeks to strengthen state sovereignty by im- With a variety of donors working on multiple projects at proving the capacities of their internal security administra- national and regional levels, a lack of communication and tion and their maritime capacities by promoting regional coordination among them limits their impact. It risks du- coordination.198 plicating efforts, concentrating too much on some elements and causing incoherence in beneficiary countries’ The UK, in addition to bilateral support, is backing the approaches to maritime security. In order to benefit as much Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), an as possible from donors’ heightened interest, coastal states association of oil companies that ship hydrocarbons, in its efforts to set up a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) in Ghana. The centre collects and dis- seminates information on security incidents in the whole of the Gulf of Guinea via a secure website. The public- private partnership model is based on experience of man- 201 199 On 13 March 2012, a French warship off Lagos received a aging shipping in the waters off Somalia. In September broadcast from the IMB that armed pirates had attacked a bulk 2011, China gave Benin €4 million for the purchase of a cargo ship 110 nautical miles (about 204km) off Lagos and patrol boat.200 went to help. On arrival the French found the pirates had already left but escorted the ship to Lagos port. On 22 March 2012, a The U.S., UK and France have all tried to encourage U.S. warship offered assistance to a tanker being chased by pi- stronger cooperation among Gulf of Guinea states. The rates about 100 nautical miles (about 185km) south west of U.S. has organised two multinational naval training exer- Bonny Island, Nigeria. www.icc-ccs.org. 202 cises called Obangame Express: one at Douala, Came- In October 2011, while Nigeria held the presidency of the roon in March 2011, another at Calabar, Nigeria in Feb- UN Security Council, President of Benin Boni Yayi wrote let- ters to all members to ensure the smooth passing of resolution 2018 on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The Secretary-General sent an assessment mission to the region in November 2011 to 195 Crisis Group interviews, U.S. diplomats and defence attaché, examine the piracy threat. In late February 2012, the Security Lagos and Abuja, February 2012. Council under the Togolese presidency met again on the issue 196 “Les bases marines du Togo et du Bénin se préparent à faire and put out a second resolution. See Security Council Resolu- face à la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée”, Afriquinfos, 19 Sep- tion 2018, S/RES/2018, 31 October 2011; “Report of the United tember 2012. Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7 197 France is putting €800,000 into the project. Crisis Group in- to 24 November 2011)”, S/2012/45, 19 January 2012; and Se- terview, French defence attaché, Lomé, 24 January 2012. curity Council Resolution 2039, S/RES/2039, 29 February 198 Crisis Group interview, official responsible for coordinating 2012. the fight against piracy, French foreign ministry, Paris, 9 May 203 “Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy 2012. in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 24 November 2011)”, S/2012/45, 19 199 Crisis Group interview, OCIMF staff, London, 20 December January 2012, p. 9. 2011. 204 Crisis Group telephone interview, EU military official, 16 200 “Nigerian, Benin navies capture pirates; to receive gunboats”, January 2012. See “Long-term responses to global security Defence Web, 17 November 2011. threats”, European Commission, 2011, pp. 12-13. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 23

do not divulge other sources of support. Foreign partners VI. MOVING BEYOND A PURELY 205 recognise their efforts could be better coordinated. SECURITY-BASED APPROACH Support from multiple international actors makes it harder to ensure local ownership of strategies and initiatives to As demonstrated by the general consensus on the need to increase maritime security.206 This is more a problem in organise a regional summit on the problem, the region’s smaller countries which have less experience at sea. The states clearly consider the fight against piracy as a priority, prospect of substantial donor support is also causing de- but this requires addressing the root causes of the violence. partments in cash-strapped governments to compete for Long-term policies are indispensable in order to improve resources,207 which hinders inter-agency cooperation, gives economic governance of industries that fully or partly take external support the form of organised chaos and under- place at sea, boost economic development along the coast mines work toward a multi-sectoral approach to maritime and strengthen maritime law enforcement. Efforts must governance and security. focus on Nigeria, the epicentre of maritime violence, and especially on the Niger Delta, where poverty, corruption It is clearly necessary to build capacity among the region’s and crime create a fertile ground for piracy. underdeveloped navies and maritime police forces. But overemphasis on defence treats piracy purely as a security Violence in the Gulf of Guinea has reached today’s wor- problem rather than a form of organised crime and a symp- rying levels because affected countries have neglected or tom of deeper governance problems onshore, namely short- ignored their maritime domains. They must no longer re- comings in the distribution of resources, economic inequity strict their approach to land and take responsibility for all and corruption. Oil and gas companies generally respond that takes place within the 200 nautical mile limit of their to piracy by strengthening their defences, which also en- exclusive economic zones (EEZs). courages a narrow, security-minded approach. Heads of state should take the lead in launching a strategic, multi-sectoral and comprehensive response in their countries that addresses both the root causes and manifestations of maritime crime. They should set up and preside over inter-ministerial maritime affairs committees capable of developing and implementing national maritime security strategies. The committee should at a minimum include ministers of social affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior, transport, economy, labour, environment, fishing and natural resources and ensure that relevant agencies and departments coordinate fully at the policy and operational levels.

To tackle piracy, Gulf of Guinea states need to see it not just as a security problem but as a form of transnational organised crime. They must work with the private sector to mitigate the risk to maritime traffic and proactively investigate and prosecute pirate gangs. The crime’s transnational nature demands close bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation. Regional maritime security strategies should guide national actors and provide the basis for coordinated support by the international community.

A. THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM REFORMS

Violence in the Gulf of Guinea is a symptom of profound

205 and complex governance problems. The states of the re- Some partners are unaware of what the others are doing. gion have failed to manage the industries that partly or Crisis Group interviews, British, French and U.S. diplomats, Accra, Lomé, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January-February 2012. fully operate at sea, guarantee the socio-economic welfare 206 Nigeria does not want a situation like that in the Gulf of of coastal communities or enforce the law in territorial or Aden in which Western powers plan and execute the security international waters. These failures have encouraged and response. Crisis Group interview, Nigerian delegation to the created opportunities for pirates. To address the root causes UN, New York, 28 November 2011. therefore requires long-term policies that are closely re- 207 Crisis Group interviews, donor representatives, Accra, Lomé, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January-February 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 24

lated to each other: economic governance, development most engrained, but all coastal states need to take steps to and law enforcement at sea. improve living standards and create job opportunities along the shore. This means investing in services that enable eco- 1. Improving economic governance nomic growth such as roads, electricity, water, health and education. Coastal states should ensure that the strength- Poor economic governance of the hydrocarbons and ship- ening of the maritime domain is a central tenet of their de- ping industries has allowed the development of illegal velopment plans in order to benefit both coastal communi- offshore trade in crude oil and refined petroleum. It has ties directly and state revenues. The potential of this sector, also enabled the elites to grow rich, often through corrup- as in much of Africa, remains largely untapped.211 tion, while the majority remain poor. Such inequality is a major cause of crime along the coast and, according to Gulf of Guinea states should encourage artisanal and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, “there is a link between commercial fishing. Artisanal fishing provides employ- oil trafficking and the rise of violent pirate attacks in the ment for thousands along the coast and, as the main source region”.208 A core part of gulf states’ maritime security of protein for coastal communities, plays a crucial role in strategies should be focused on eliminating opportunities ensuring food security. With declining fish stocks and oil for corruption and ensuring that proceeds benefit those and gas exploration and production limiting access in some most in need. Nigeria, where most of the stolen oil and areas, governments need to ensure fishing benefits the fuel comes from, is at the heart of the problem, but regu- poorest and most vulnerable, notably by preventing local lations should also be tightened in other producer and and foreign commercial fishers from encroaching on zones consumer countries to close down opportunities for sell- close to shore set aside for artisanal fishing. In addition, ing and refining stolen goods. Following the example of governments should work to build trust and communication Nigeria, which is trying to clean up its oil industry, the between fishery authorities and community stakeholders other countries should form a commission of inquiry into to better understand the challenges the latter face and im- 212 their national oil market and introduce controls over the plement reforms to overcome them. To support commer- provenance of fuel in order to identify smuggling networks cial fishing for export, states should encourage and support and dishonest economic actors. local companies in the fish processing industry to achieve international standards thereby increasing export profits. Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)209 has begun an overhaul of the distribution sector Coastal states and international oil and gas companies and made arrests, but the extent of corruption and misman- have a shared responsibility to guarantee natural resource agement in the energy sector demands a complete over- extraction directly benefits local communities through job haul of the sector. The National Assembly should finalise creation, infrastructure projects and social welfare. In the and pass the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and implement Niger Delta, creating jobs is the only way to ensure for- recommendations in KPMG’s 2010 audit of the Nigerian mer militants who have benefited from vocational train- National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).210 Given Nige- ing in the amnesty scheme do not return to crime. The rians’ strong resistance to an eventual subsidy removal, the amnesty program should work with the oil and gas indus- government should do this gradually and accompany the try to create apprenticeships. State governments and oil move with a clearly communicated strategy to reinvest sav- companies should provide entrepreneurial training for ings in popular and visible development projects. former militants and other jobless youth.

2. Boosting development on the coast 3. Strengthening maritime law enforcement

Poverty and the lack of a viable livelihood push those liv- Weak law enforcement in the Gulf of Guinea has allowed ing in coastal communities to turn to crime. The need is maritime crime to proliferate. Trafficking in oil, petrole- most urgent in the Niger Delta where a criminal culture is um products, arms, drugs and people and illegal fishing create a favourable environment for violent crime. To curtail these activities, gulf states’ maritime security strate-

208 Luanda declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea, op. cit., article 14, p. 3. 209 For more information on the commission, see www.efcc 211 See Mthuli Ncube and Michael Lyon Baker, “Beyond pirates nigeria.org. and drugs: Unlocking Africa’s maritime potential and economic 210 The government presented the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) development”, Africa Security Review, vol. 20, no.1 (March to the National Assembly in 2008. It is designed to replace out- 2011), pp. 60-69. dated legislation, much of which dates from the 1960s and 1970s, 212 For an in-depth case study of the challenges involved in and comprehensively reform the oil sector. Vested interests in fisheries management and appropriate policy responses in west- the Nigerian oil sector threatened by the bill have delayed its ern Ghana, see Finegold et al., “Western region fisheries sector passage. review”, World Fish Center, December 2010. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 25

gies should prioritise the strengthening and professionalisa- ment or sell goods. To reduce incentives and opportunities tion of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies, port for piracy and safeguard the livelihoods of fishing commu- authorities and maritime administration agencies. In part- nities, the navies and civilian administrations of gulf states nership with donors, states should build capacity in these as well as international partners should increase efforts to organs through transparent recruitment, training (including eliminate illegal fishing. This means using advanced tech- at regional maritime universities in Accra and Abidjan) and nology and the help of artisanal fishermen to locate and ap- the purchase of up-to-date and technologically advanced prehend illegal foreign fishing vessels. Perpetrators should tools. The heads of all such bodies should enforce a zero- be tried in the countries where they are caught or sent for tolerance policy to corruption. prosecution in their country of origin.

In Nigeria, EFCC should create a special unit dedicated to investigating corruption in the maritime sector. The ship- B. FIGHTING PIRACY ON LAND AND SEA ping industry, civil society and foreign partners should also closely scrutinise the alleged growing role played by The international community’s experience in fighting pi- security companies as they take on duties assisting the racy off the coast of Somalia illustrates that preventing navy and NIMASA. pirates from attacking commercial vessels is only part of the solution.215 Reducing piracy requires dissuading and In order to extend the rule of law onto the sea, all states arresting the organised criminal groups that finance, or- need to develop comprehensive maritime domain aware- chestrate and execute attacks. This means solid intelligence 216 ness. They need to enhance monitoring in their exclusive and police work on land and sea. The Gulf of Guinea economic zones to detect faster illicit activities and secu- states are in a better position than Somalia to work on their rity risks. Each state should prioritise developing its own security and the onus is on them to play a leading role in national surveillance system so that navies, maritime po- the fight against piracy. lice, port authorities and maritime administration agencies can provide a full picture of activity on the country’s 1. Dissuading pirates: A joint task of state waters. In Nigeria, the navy and PICOMMS should merge and private actors their parallel surveillance systems. The most urgent challenge for coastal states is mitigating Naval staff and civilians should be trained in the use and the risk of pirate attacks so that commercial traffic can upkeep of this equipment and analysis of the information continue to operate. To dissuade attacks, state and private it provides. Operators should be trained to identify possible actors (oil, shipping and fishing companies) need to work pirate boats by their type and behaviour.213 The air force together and in good intelligence. The former must pro- and navy should be involved in information sharing. vide permanent surveillance of their territorial waters and the latter must adopt defence systems for their vessels. To suppress illegal fuel trading, gulf states should insist all tankers in their exclusive economic zones prove the Operational surveillance legal provenance of their cargo and refuel from accredited Naval forces should protect commercial traffic as best as suppliers. The Nigerian government should also pursue they can and deter attacks by means of a visible presence work with major oil companies to investigate the possibility on the water and a rapid response to attacks when they of “fingerprinting” oil, enabling companies and authorities happen. They should maintain patrols in mooring zones to identify and trace stolen oil.214 and territorial waters especially at night. Given that pirate To limit the opportunities for pirates to conduct recon- attacks are happening farther and farther out, those navies naissance operations, port authorities and maritime agen- with capable ships should also patrol in international wa- cies should carefully control the passage of small boats ters. Regular surveillance flights should also be used to shuttling between shore and ships to deliver crews, equip-

215 See Appendix E. 213 By studying normal shipping and fishing patterns, authorities 216 The naval force protecting the Gulf of Aden recently decided can better identify suspicious behaviour. Crisis Group inter- to strike pirate strongholds on the shore. “EU navy, helicopters view, maritime expert, Regional Maritime University, Accra, 2 strike pirate supply center”, Associated Press, 15 May 2012. March 2012. The president of Djibouti emphasised that the roots of piracy 214 See the Legal Oil website (www.legaloil.com). Research are on land: “La piraterie maritime au large de la Somalie ne institutes and major oil companies have worked on their own peut être combattue qu’à partir de la terre et c’est la seule façon methods of identifying and tracing crude oil but to date none d’éradiquer cette menace globale”, quoted in Hassan Djama has proven sufficiently reliable to use on a large scale. Judith Farah, “Djibouti : un hub anti-piraterie et un acteur principal de Burdin Asuni, “Blood oil in the Niger Delta”, Special Report la médiation dans la crise somalienne”, Diplomatie, no. 56 229, U.S. Institute for Peace, August 2009, pp. 8-9. (May-June 2012), p. 45. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 26

deter pirates. Navies and maritime police forces should guards.219 The IMO takes no position but leaves the deci- prepare to respond rapidly when attacks are reported. sion to flag states in consultation with ship owners.220 This means ensuring that officers are listening to the distress channel 24 hours a day and that emergency response The perceived success of private armed guards off the procedures are well-practised. Navies should keep fast Horn of Africa is likely to encourage coastal states in the launches ready at all times to respond to attacks close to Gulf of Guinea and ship owners, charterers and captains shore. operating in the region to seriously contemplate this op- tion.221 It should nonetheless remain a last resort because Commercial traffic can help state forces by communi- of the risk that more arms at sea will escalate violence and cating frequently with the local navy and port authorities in light of the questionable legality of ships carrying armed by radio and by ensuring their Automated Identification personnel. To mitigate the risk, the IMO in consultation System (AIS) is turned on at all times. This will enable with the shipping and maritime security industry should authorities on shore to monitor their passage. They should set up an international accreditation process through which report all attacks, security incidents and sightings of sus- private security companies can prove their experience and picious craft to local navies, national maritime authorities reliability.222 and the IMB piracy reporting centre. This is the only way coastal states and the international community can under- 2. Arresting pirates stand the full extent of the security problem and mount an appropriate response. In addition to protecting maritime traffic, gulf states should proactively seek to apprehend and imprison those Dissuasive measures by private companies involved in piracy. This includes small groups who carry out opportunistic raids close to shore as well as transna- Ship owners should take measures to defend their ships tional organised criminal networks capable of sophisticat- against attacks. Best practices identified by the shipping ed hijack operations. Navies, maritime police, other law industry include 24-hour watch keeping, on-deck lighting, enforcement bodies and the judicial system must establish razor wire around the ship and a fortified safe room or smooth working relationships to imprison perpetrators. citadel to which crew can retreat in case pirates manage The Somali experience has shown the crucial role of co- to board. Ships coming to port or anchorage should re- ordination between states and between military actors and main at least 50 nautical miles (93km) offshore until a pi- the oil industry, but also the importance of information lot and berth are available. The IMO in consultation with sharing between all actors. Gulf states should consider the shipping industry and naval forces should agree on setting up a dedicated multi-service anti-piracy task force best practices and a code of conduct tailored to the threats including naval intelligence and the police. Recognising in the Gulf of Guinea. In the meantime, industry should that pirates move freely across borders, state authorities refer to the Best Management Practices 4 (BMP 4) that must cooperate. advise how to avoid, deter or delay attacks off the coast of Somalia.217

Seafarers should not carry arms themselves but where possible, as in Benin and Togo, ship owners should pay 219 On 30 October 2011, the UK said it would change its policy armed naval personnel to keep guard on board. Despite of forbidding UK flagged ships from carrying private armed the risk of starting an arms race with pirates and private guards in the high-risk area off Somalia and on 6 December security companies, the U.S. and NATO have cited an in- 2011 the department for transport issued guidance for doing so. crease in the use of privately contracted armed guards by “Change in UK policy on employing armed guards to protect against Somali piracy”, press release, UK Department for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden as a critical factor in the 218 Transport, 6 December 2011. decrease of successful hijacks in the region in 2011. 220 See “Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the The UK has also recently reversed its policy to allow UK coast of Somalia”, IMO, Resolution A.1044 (27), 20 December flagged ships off the coast of Somalia to carry armed 2011, p. 5. 221 Nigeria is taking steps to domesticate the necessary international laws to allow the carriage of armed guards in its waters. “FG moves to improve maritime security”, Daily Times, 13 April 2012. 222 The UK is setting up its own national accreditation system for UK-based maritime security companies and those working on UK flagged ships. Several maritime security industry asso- 217 This manual is available at www.imo.org. ciations are also developing their own schemes. However, an 218 “US sees armed guards as deterrents to EA piracy”, The East international system endorsed by the IMO is necessary to set a African, 31 March 2012. “Guards, razor wire help keep Somali universally recognised standard. Crisis Group email correspond- pirates at bay – NATO”, Reuters, 3 April 2012. ence, UK Foreign Office expert, 14 May 2012. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 27

Investigations on land and sea should aim to discover pi- way, should be held as soon as possible in the presence of rates’ land bases, stores of boats, arms and means of com- the heads of state concerned. munication and identify sources of equipment, finances and intelligence. In order to collect as much information 1. Making the region take responsibility as possible, investigators should establish strong relations for its own security with all maritime operators including oil, shipping and fishing companies, shipping agents, maritime security com- The transnational nature of maritime crime in the Gulf of panies and in particular artisanal fishermen. The latter live Guinea makes bilateral, regional and inter-regional coop- and work in coastal communities and are well placed to eration essential components of a comprehensive response. provide valuable information on criminal activities. To ensure close working relationships between naval forces, law enforcement bodies and civilian agencies between di- In the Niger Delta, security forces and law enforcement rect neighbours, heads of state should hold bilateral talks agencies should work to break up both pirate gangs and and sign cooperation agreements. This demonstration of po- organised criminal networks that bunker oil from pipe- litical will at the highest level is critical to ensure smooth lines for local refining or sale offshore. Profits from this information sharing at the operational level. Bilateral talks business feed the delta’s criminal economy. The Joint Task between heads of state are also necessary to achieve agree- Force’s Operation Pulo Shield should work closely with ment on sensitive matters that bear on state sovereignty the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to expose such as the right to pursue criminals into the waters of neigh- the masterminds and financers behind the bunkering and bouring states and extradition agreements. piracy syndicates.223 ECCAS and ECOWAS should lead on regional and inter- The successful prosecution and imprisonment of arrested regional collaboration. The Gulf of Guinea Commission is pirates is essential to deter others. Coastal states should neither effective nor sufficiently inclusive.225 The initia- accede to all necessary international legal instruments that tive of MOWCA and the IMO to set up an integrated coast outlaw piracy, including the 1982 UN Convention on the guard network has come up against seemingly insurmount- Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocols to the able obstacles. However, ECCAS and ECOWAS should Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against espouse MOWCA’s goals and seek to achieve them through the Safety of Maritime Navigation. They should integrate their own regional strategies.226 these conventions into national law. It is also crucial that they have the judicial capacity needed to try suspected pi- As ECCAS and ECOWAS are political forums in which rates.224 They should ask the IMO and international mari- heads of state are the highest authority, they can ensure time law experts for assistance in updating their anti-piracy maritime security is elevated to the political level. By legislation. Coastal states should also ensure that naval bringing together all member states affected by maritime forces, law enforcement agencies and civilian agencies are violence, both coastal and landlocked, they provide an kept abreast of new legislation and enforce it accordingly. opportunity for members to agree on a common vision for fighting maritime crime that should lead to concrete projects and coordinated security efforts for high-risk zones. C. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND Regional cooperation is also necessary for countries of EFFICIENT COOPERATION varying capacities to pool resources.227 Strengthening maritime cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea includes three main objectives: quickly operationalise cooperation within regional institutions (ECCAS and ECO-

WAS), develop genuine inter-regional synergy between the 225 two organisations and achieve more effective coordina- The Gulf of Guinea Commission does not include Benin and tion of international support. The international conference Togo, both of which have witnessed pirate attacks in their waters. The headquarters of the commission is located in Luanda, which on piracy in the region, for which preparations are under- is why it is seen as being under Angola’s influence. 226 The goals of the integrated coastguard function network include the enhancement of maritime safety, security, environmental protection, law enforcement and economic development. 223 For more detailed discussion on how to solve the delta’s many “Report of IMO/MOWCA meeting to progress the implementa- problems, see Crisis Group Africa reports listed in footnote 4. tion of an integrated coast guard function network for West and 224 Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN- Central African countries, Accra, Ghana, 13-17 December 2010”, CLOS), any state can assert jurisdiction to try suspected pirates IMO, January 2011. in their courts but it must have up-to-date legislation consistent 227 In South East Asia, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on with international law. See “Piracy off the coast of Somalia”, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 January (ReCAAP) has proved critical in allowing stronger states to help 2012, p. 46. less equipped states with training, equipment, technology and The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 28

Defining a common vision Similarly, Nigeria and Cameroon should strengthen without delay security and law enforcement in their border The two regional organisations should prioritise the much zone. The recent commitments made during discussions anticipated summit of Gulf of Guinea heads of state. Be- of the joint Cameroon-Nigeria commissions were im- fore the summit, which is currently being prepared, member portant stages, but must be translated into action. In July states of ECOWAS and ECCAS should agree on two key 2011, the two countries agreed to definitively resolve the documents to be signed by heads of state: the Memoran- issue of the demarcation of their land and maritime bor- dum of Understanding between ECCAS and ECOWAS ders and strengthen cooperation against armed groups and on Maritime Security in the Central and Western Maritime criminal networks. Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa.228 Pooling resources CEEAC’S SECMAR plans, for example, should be ac- ECOWAS should quickly finalise its maritime strategy, companied by the creation of a regional maritime security which involves the demarcation of operational zones and school in order to improve and pool the knowledge and a maritime security coordination centre in West Africa. intelligence of the seas. In time, this school, which should As with ECCAS, this centre should improve knowledge be located in Pointe-Noire to promote maximum coopera- of the maritime domain in the western part of the Gulf of tion with CRESMAC, could welcome nationals from all Guinea. Gulf of Guinea countries.

With the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the two regional In order to improve surveillance and the prompt dissemi- organisations should also start a joint discussion on fund- nation of security information to interested parties, ECCAS ing regional maritime security. In Central Africa, the and ECOWAS states should seriously consider adopting countries in zone D, which are all oil producers, should the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC), create a mechanism to fund the SECMAR plan in addi- to be set up in Ghana, as an inter-regional information shar- tion to the budgetary contribution of states, the payment ing centre. It uses a model of collecting information from of which is sometimes irregular.229 An alternative solution state and industry sources that has proved successful off the could be the creation of a tax on hydrocarbon exports or a coast of Somalia. regional maritime tax to be used to durably fund joint security operations at sea. This solution, which has already been advocated by ECCAS countries, should be quickly 2. Coordinating international support implemented in order to make SECMAR plan operational; and ECOWAS could also consider it. The Gulf of Guinea states cannot overcome maritime security challenges without the support of international partners. To render that support most effective and long- Coordinating security efforts by using special zones lasting, partners should help them address the root causes Operation Prosperity, while not preventing all pirate at- of violence at sea. Donors should therefore not restrict tacks, has improved security in Benin’s waters. Given the themselves to a purely security-based approach but should weakness of Benin’s and Togo’s navies and recent attacks broaden their cooperation strategies with gulf states to in- off Lomé, the operation should be extended to include clude economic governance, development, law enforcement Togolese waters after getting some feedback and pro- and security, while involving all concerned ministries and longed until the countries’ navies are able to take over. agencies. States and donors should collectively identify capacity building needs and distribute tasks according to donors’ willingness and areas of expertise. reducing once high levels of piracy. Crisis Group interview, In addressing the root causes of maritime crime, partners IMB official, London, 8 December 2011. should concentrate development efforts along the coast, 228 ECCAS and ECOWAS delegations discussed these two doc- particularly by supporting job creation in the Niger Delta. uments at the two joint meetings in Germany in July 2011 and They should demand greater transparency in the oil and in Benin at the end of March 2012. At the latter, they decided gas industry. The UK and U.S. in particular should press to continue internal consultations before starting the adoption the Nigerian government to pass the Petroleum Industry process. “Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Bill (PIB) as a foundation for sector-wide reform and in- Africa, Executive Summary”, summary of issues raised at the ECCAS-ECOWAS Maritime Safety and Security seminar on vest more in the country’s refineries. In addition, donors 27-29 March 2012 in Cotonou, Benin, Africa Center for Strategic should cooperate with the region’s countries that are inves- Studies, April 2012. tigating economic operators whose companies and assets 229 For more on the funding problems of ECCAS, see Crisis Group are in the northern hemisphere. Report, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, op. cit., p. 13. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 29

In supporting a comprehensive regional response to piracy, VII. CONCLUSION partners should impress upon Gulf of Guinea states that piracy is a form of organised crime and, therefore, will not be solved simply by increasing states’ military presence Each new discovery of oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea at sea. Consequently, their maritime security support pro- increases its geostrategic importance. But until now coun- grams should be designed like the ASECMAR project, and tries in the region and international oil companies have include assistance with training and equipment for all agen- paid no attention to the effect poor governance of the cies responsible for regulating and maintaining order at sea business is having on the social and economic environ- (maritime administration agencies, port authorities, navies, ment. The rapid increase of violence at sea in recent years maritime police forces, the courts). is the natural outcome of decades of neglect, social ma- laise and economic disorder that characterise Nigeria’s The UNODC and INTERPOL should help gulf states, coastline. For coastal states and their international part- and especially Nigeria, in their fight against transnational ners, mitigating the risk of pirate attacks on shipments is organised crime networks. In particular, they should ad- a very small part of the challenge. They must accept that vise and assist with tracking financial flows. INTERPOL’s unless they make headway in addressing root causes on Maritime Piracy Task Force, which already works on evi- land and introduce long-term reforms, piracy will continue dence collection, data exchange and capacity building to to plague the Gulf of Guinea for many years to come. bring Somali pirates to justice, should expand its operations to the Gulf of Guinea. Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2012

To ensure that all partners share this same vision, speak with a unified voice and provide coordinated support, they should form multinational maritime affairs committees in each country and, in discussion with host states, decide how to make their efforts complementary in order to avoid duplication and competing offers of materials and training.

The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 30

APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE GULF OF GUINEA

The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 31

APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA

The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 32

APPENDIX C

MAP OF THE ECCAS MARITIME ZONES

Source: “Rôle des organisations régionales dans le maintien de la paix – expérience de la Ceeac”, ECCAS presentation. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 33

APPENDIX D

NIGER DELTA TIMELINE

1937 – British colonists began oil ex- 1993 – MOSOP’s activities caused delta, taking nine more hostages and ploration in Nigeria. Shell to cease oil production in Ogoni destroying part of an export terminal. citing intimidation of its employees. The militants claimed to be partly 1956 – Shell discovered Nigeria’s first The federal government subsequently fighting for the release of Dokubo- oil deposit in what is now Bayelsa state created the Rivers State Internal Secu- Asari and demanded from Shell $1.5 in the Niger Delta. rity Task Force Unit and launched a billion in compensation for environ- 1960 – Nigeria became independent crackdown on Ogoni dissenters. mental damage. from the UK. 1995 – A special military tribunal tried September 2007 – Suspected militant 1966 – Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, the sixteen MOSOP members for killing leader Henry Okah was arrested in An- delta’s first post-colonial rebel, led a four faction leaders. It convicted nine, gola, prompting MEND to pull out of small and unsuccessful revolt under the including Saro-Wiwa, who were exe- peace talks with the government. banner of the “Niger Delta People’s cuted. Human Rights Watch said the February 2008 – Okah was extradited Republic”. trial’s procedures “blatantly violated to Nigeria to face treason charges. international standards of due process”. 1971 – Nigeria became a member of 19 June 2008 – Delta militants at- the Organisation of Petroleum Export- 2001 – The Niger Delta Development tacked Bonga, a $3.6 billion floating ing Countries (OPEC) after nationalis- Commission (NDDC) was established production, storage and offloading ing the oil industry via the creation of to alleviate the developmental and eco- (FPSO) vessel and deep-water sub-sea the Nigerian National Oil Corporation logical problems facing oil-producing facility 120km off the coast. (NNOC). communities. 14 August 2008 – Nigeria completed 1973 – The “oil price shock” and sub- August 2003 – The Joint Task Force’s the handover of the disputed Bakassi sequent sustained rise in the price of oil “Operation Restore Hope” was offi- Peninsula to Cameroon. caused Nigeria’s economy to boom. cially established in the Niger Delta. It Nigerian revenue from the oil industry consisted of men from the army, navy, 10 September 2008 – The federal leapt from $2.1 billion in 1972 to $11.2 air force, police, mobile-police and the government created a ministry of Niger billion in 1974. Since then the coun- State Security Service (SSS). Its man- Delta affairs. try’s economy has depended heavily on date was to stop violence, secure oil 13 September 2008 – A government oil exports from the Niger Delta. installations and neutralise the threat to raid on three villages in Rivers state – the oil industry. 1975 – The federal government raised Soku, Kula and Tombia – sparked an its share of mineral wealth from 50 per September 2003 – Delta militant Mu- escalation of violence to levels only cent to 80 per cent. Subsequent gov- jahid Dokubo-Asari responded to seen during the initial phases of the in- ernments further centralised oil reve- flawed elections in Rivers state by ini- surgency. nues so that by the 1990s the federal tiating a campaign of insurgency. 14 September 2008 – After two days government’s share was over 97 per October 2004 – Following govern- of gun battles with security forces, cent. ment peace accords with rival militias, MEND declared an “oil war” in the 1979 – President Obasanjo issued the Dokubo-Asari agreed to disarm, rather delta. Land Use Decree stating all subsoil than face the government alone. October 2008 – A chief in Forcados, minerals, including oil, were the prop- 2005 – Asari and civilian activists ac- Delta state, called on the Economic and erty of the people of all Nigeria, not cused President Obasanjo of presiding Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) just those from the mineral’s area of over a “civilian dictatorship”. Nigerian to investigate the Joint Task Force’s origin. authorities alleged that Asari called for past and present leadership, which, he 1989 – The first Gulf War led to an- the disintegration of the Nigerian state claimed, had been collaborating with other spike in Nigerian oil revenues, in a newspaper interview. He was sub- oil thieves. reaffirming the delta’s strategic im- sequently arrested. 15 May 2009 - MEND declared an portance. 2006 – Delta militants calling them- “all-out war” in the Niger Delta and 1990 – Writer and businessman Ken selves the Movement for the Emanci- repeated its call for oil firms to evacu- Saro-Wiwa helped to establish the pation of the Niger Delta (MEND) be- ate staff following what it claimed was Movement for the Survival of the gan attacks on oil facilities. In January, a campaign of aerial bombardment on Ogoni People (MOSOP) which adopt- they kidnapped and later released four suspected MEND camps by the mili- ed a bill of rights calling for political foreign hostages. In February, militants tary. autonomy. stepped up attacks in an apparent retal- iation against military operations in the The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 34

25 June 2009 – President Yar’Adua offered an amnesty to gunmen in the Niger Delta, including Henry Okah. 12 July 2009 – MEND launched their first attack outside the Niger Delta, dy- namiting the Atlas Cove Jetty in Lagos. August 2009 – The Niger Delta Am- nesty Programme was launched. From August to October just over 26,000 young people registered for training. 1 October 2009 – Ateke Tom, whose men had carried out frequent attacks on oil installations, agreed to halt fighting and take an unconditional pardon. Oth- er commanders, Government Tompolo, Soboma Jackrich, Ebikabowei Victor Ben and Farah Dagogo, also laid down their arms. 16 October 2009 – MEND ended its three-month old ceasefire and threatened to resume attacks. Nine days later the group reinstated the ceasefire to allow peace talks with the government. 30 January 2010 – MEND called off its ceasefire, threatening to unleash an “all-out assault” on the oil industry. 5 May 2010 – President Yar’Adua died after months of incapacitation. Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, former Governor of Bayelsa state, as- sumed the presidency. 18 April 2011 – Goodluck Jonathan, born in what is now Bayelsa state, won presidential elections. Violence in the north of the country ensued. 1 January 2012 – The government removed the fuel subsidy. 9-13 January 2012 – Protesters marched in protest against the fuel subsidy removal until the government agreed to partially reinstate it. 4 February 2012 – A militant group claiming to be MEND blew up an offshore oil pipeline belonging to an Ital- ian company, Eni.

The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Africa Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page 35

APPENDIX E

PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Now that some are calling for a strategy for continental Guinea.236 By using motherships, Somali pirates have maritime security,230 an analysis of efforts to counter So- been able to launch attacks more than 1,700 nautical mali piracy can provide important lessons that can help miles (3,148km) from their land bases, as far as the Indi- Africa and the international community fight piracy on an and Mozambican coasts.237 The farthest that attacks the west coast. have been recorded off Nigeria is around 120 nautical miles (about 222km). Over the last decade, pirate attacks have risen dramatically off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden, the Ara- The international community realised from the start that bian Sea and the Indian Ocean.231 Some pirates maintain Somalia was in no position to counter the piracy threat they began as fishermen who took up arms to protect their itself. Over 30 states are now involved in three multina- livelihoods from irresponsible foreign fishing vessels op- tional naval operations (led by the EU, NATO and the erating in Somali waters. While this narrative may con- U.S. respectively) and a number of independent unilateral tain a grain of truth, most of the estimated 1,500 to 3,000 initiatives to deter and suppress piracy. As Gulf of Guinea young Somalis involved in piracy are more likely oppor- states have greater capacities than Somalia, the interna- tunistic criminals lured by the large profits to be made tional community is keen that they should take the lead in from hijacking and holding for ransom the crews of designing and implementing their own counter-piracy commercial vessels in one of the world’s busiest shipping measures. lanes.232 Somali investors put up the capital that pirates need to launch attacks and reap their share of the spoils.233 In 2011 the number of attempted pirate attacks off Soma- Ransoms, demanded in cash, have increased from an av- lia continued to grow but the proportion of successful hi- erage of $600,000 in 2007 to close to $5 million in jacks fell.238 A combination of stronger patrolling and a 2011.234 reinforcement of ships’ self-defence have proved effective but these measures are not addressing the root causes The rapid rise in the frequency, audacity and geographic of the problem.239 Indeed, while combined naval efforts spread of Somali piracy drew international attention away have created a safe corridor for ships through the Gulf of from already poor maritime security off Nigeria’s coast. Aden, pirates have responded by launching more attacks Attacks off Somalia are much more frequent than in the further offshore, in particular on oil tankers towards the Gulf of Guinea. In 2011 the IMB reported 237 ships at- Gulf and Middle East.240 tacked off Somalia and 28 successfully hijacked com- pared to 53 acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.235 The area affected by Somali piracy is also far greater than the danger zones in the Gulf of

230 “Security. Is Africa’s maritime strategy all at sea?” IRIN, 22 October 2012. 231 For more see, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°64, Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, 12 August 2009. 236 The internationally recognised high-risk area extends from 232 About 28,000 ships (40 per cent of world shipping) pass the Suez Canal and the straits of Hormuz in the north to latitude through these waters each year. “Piracy off the coast of Soma- 10°S (just north of the Tanzania-Mozambique border) and lon- lia”, UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 gitude 78°E (in line with the tip of India). “Piracy off the coast January 2012, pp. 13-15. of Somalia”, op. cit., p. 23. 233 For an example of how profits are split, see “Annex 4.3: 237 “Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the Case study: pirates and finances – the Hobyo-Harardheere coast of Somalia”, International Maritime Organisation, op. cit., ‘business model’”, in “Report of the Monitoring Group on So- p. 5. malia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 238 “Piracy off the coast of Somalia”, op. cit., p. 30. (2010)”, S/2011/334, 18 July 2011, pp. 228-229. 239 The International Maritime Bureau has produced a “best 234 “Piracy off the coast of Somalia”, UK House of Commons practices” manual on how to improve defence against pirates. Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 January 2012, p. 55. See www.imo.org. 235 Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2011”, In- 240 “The economic cost of Somali piracy 2011”, One Earth Fu- ternational Maritime Bureau, op. cit., 2012. ture Foundation, 2012, p. 37. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2012 Page 36

This experience bears important lessons and warnings for those tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The effec- tiveness of the multinational naval operations points to the critical importance of coordination between nations and between the industry and military actors. Information sharing and dissemination through the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai have provided effective early warning and rapid response mecha- nisms. Industry has played its part by developing Best Management Practices (BMPs) for ships transiting the area.

In 2011, more and more ships opted to carry armed guards to deter and repel boarders; a measure widely seen as cardinal in reducing the number of successful hijacks.241 The growing acceptability and recognised effec- tiveness of carrying armed private security personnel off Somalia is likely to influence the shipping industry’s response to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.242 However, allowing the carriage and use of arms by private security companies carries grave risks which, in a weakly gov- erned environment such as the Gulf of Guinea, could be fatal. National and international actors need to be alert to this and take steps to mitigate the risk.

The Somalia experience clearly shows the solution to piracy lies on land.243 While international efforts have reduced the risk of hijack,244 the lack of state authority and rule of law in Somalia has allowed investors to continue financing pirate attacks and pirates to maintain land bases. This underlines the importance of tackling the root causes on land of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, namely poor governance.

241 “US sees armed guards as deterrents to EA piracy”, The East African, 31 March 2012. “Guards, razor wire help keep Somali pirates at bay –NATO”, Reuters, 3 April 2012. 242 In late 2011, the UK, having previously opposed the carriage of armed guards, adopted a neutral stance and issued guidelines to shipping companies for doing so in exceptional circumstances. 243 On this issue, see Hugues Eudeline, “Contenir la piraterie : des réponses complexes face à une menace persistante”, Institut français des relations internationales, Focus stratégique no. 40, November 2012. 244 “IMB reports drop in Somali piracy, but warns against com- placency”, IMB, 22 October 2012.