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Home , Aristotelian theology, Unmoved mover

Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Humanities

DOCTORAL THESIS

George Balikó

Theology of

Doctoral School of (cond .: Dr. Gabor Boros, professor) Antique Philosophy Program (cond .: Dr. Kornel Steiger, DSC, professor emeritus)

Budapest, 2016.

CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 3 1. Anaximander and Xenophanes ...... 4 2. Aristotle ...... 6 Bibliography ...... 14

2

Introduction

My dissertation is a historical reconstruction. Its object is the origin and first culmination of philosophical (also known as ). The process of the beginning can be captured by examining the teachings of two Presocratic thinkers, Anaximander and Xenophanes, while the climax can be linked to the name of Aristotle.

Although the word "theology" is displayed first in , the philosophical research of this area, which was named after this word, existed before naming it. It is so old as Greek philosophy, which from the beginning, by its very , is characterized by theological inquiry. The Greek philosophy begins with the problem of the beginning. The early philosophers were looking for the original source of all existing things. According to their teachings of which only paraphrases have survived, they thought to be behind the diversity we have perceived some sort of unit, and they explored the nature of this unit and the problem of how everything came into being from it. The available sources marked this original stuff by the word „arkhé”, which in the classical and pre-classical Greek language means beginning and starting point. This research inevitably led to the emergence of a new concept of . First of all I would like to show the process of how the philosophical concept of arkhé opens the door to the concept of beginning without beginning, which can be considered to be the germ of a new god-concept, and later will be of fundamental significance for both the philosophy and the field of theology. Then I examine that in what way the criticism of the representation of that appears in the epic tradition has contributed to the growing of the new concept of God. Then I turn my attention to my dissertation's main topic: the presentation of the . Analyzing the 12th book of the I try to show how the previous two thoughts is linked with one another in the teaching about the first unmovable mover.

3

1. Anaximander and Xenophanes

Based on the texts available to us Anaximander of Miletus seems to have been the first to recognize that the arkhé has to be basically different from everything else. In the text of Aristotle's III.4 there is a remarkable place, where we read:

 Anaximander named the arkhé by the greek word „apeiron”  he considered its existence can be neither beginning nor end  the arkhé encloses the cosmos and governs all things  the term „to theion” was used about it

All these points lead to the emergence of a new concept of God. The arkhé as to theion is fundamentally different from the Greek gods represented in the epic tradition. The main differences are summed up in four points: 

 since its existence has no beginning, it is not only immortal but also eternal.

 it exists not in a region of the world, but encompasses the cosmos.

 it governs primarily the cosmos as a whole; so it is in direct contact not with people, but rather with the cosmos: a cosmic god.

 finally the neutral is suggesting that it is an impersonal god, that can not be addressed. It is impossible to turn to it with requests, to present offerings to it, or even to raise sanctuaries to its honor.

On the basis of the only survived fragment of Anaximander, the governor function of the arkhé is examined more closely. In my dissertation I present the interpretations of Vlastos (1957) and Freudenthal (1986). The two interpretations apply two different models: while, according to Vlastos, in the wake of polis operation, the cosmos can be considered as a self-regulated, closed system, Freudenthal starts out from the functioning of living organisms, and the cosmos is described as an open system constant interacting of its environment. In the

4 first case the arkhé appears as the „wall”, in the second case it plays the role of the „doctor”. Holding up the weaknesses of these two interpretations, I suggest a third approach, according to which the operation of arkhé is close to the arkhón's activities. This interpretation tries to grasp the cosmos on the basis of polis-model, but as an open system, in which dynamic equilibrium is enabled by the constant interference of extra-cosmic apeiron.

In Xenophanes' fragments the new concept of God was linked with the critique of the traditional image of gods shaped by Homer's and 's poems. Xenophanes rejects the anthropomorphic representations of the gods, and does not accept that they are caracterized by any moral weakness. In addition to the negative approach, in the extant fragments the outlines of a constructive theology were unfold, which is considered to a certain extent an antecedent of Aristotle's theology. 

 the fragments focus on the concept of heisz theosz. In contrast to the interpretations tending to of Xenophanes, I try to list arguments that the one God is not the only God, his relationship with the rest is preparing the relationship between the first and the movers of the heavenly spheres.

 God understands or thinks as a whole (ulosz noei). This formulation can be considered as a forerunner of the nusz-theology.

 God's still, he controls or influences the cosmos „by the power of his mind” (nou phreni panta kradainei). In this idea, starting out from some of Homer's antecedents, the image of unmoved mover can be discovered.

 in Xenophanes God is still corporeal, but his body is basically different than human; some kind of shape (demas) or appearance (phüé) belongs to him, but he could hardly carved in stone or in bronze. He is located in the periphery of the corporeal existence, pushing its boundaries thereof, and in this respect he points to the emergence of the concept of a disembodied god.

During the comparison, however, we should be careful. The epic form and the vocabulary of surviving fragments suggest that Xenophanes theology - despite all the critical remarks - is closer to Homer than Aristotle's abstract theory on the unmoved mover.

5 Gerson (1990) following Szimplikiosz (in Phys. 22.26-8), who refers to , says that Xenophanes assumed only one arkhé. He makes likely that heisz theosz in B23 and the arkhé are the same. On the basis of B29 and B33 this interpretation did not consider well founded. The relationship between the one god and the other gods and mortals are not the same relation which can be postulated between the first unmoved mover and the movers of the planetary spheres; it is a subordinate relationship, but it can be defined in a different way than the one between the arkhé and other existing things. I also do not think that the aiei d'en tautó mimnei kinumenosz uden in B26 would mean a God full unchanged; Homer's poem, and Xenophanes' other fragments suggest that it is only a rejection of locomotion.

2. Aristotle

The 12th book of Metaphysics is Aristotle's only sytematic essay in theology. The research assumes that it was originally an independent treatise under the title Peri tész usziasz (On Substance) and was inserted into the text known as the Metaphysics later. The treatise consists of three parts: an introduction, a section on sensible substances and a section on eternal, non-sensible substances. The whole treatise deals with some fundamental problems of the so-called "first philosophy". According to Aristotle, first philosophy is a universal concerning with the being qua being. Theology has its own object: the eternal, non-sensible substance. Therefore, theology is not the same as the first philosophy, it is the , or rather the fulfillment of the science of being qua being, but because of the imperfection of the nature of human knowledge, we have to begin our metaphysical inquiry with the sensible substances around us. So theology is only dealt with in the second part of the treatise.

The main topic of the dissertation, the Aristotelian theology is put forward in four chapters. First, I examine the arguments proving the existence of the first unmoved mover (chapter 3), then the discussion of the nature of the unmoved mover (chapter 4) and the presentation of its activities follow (chapter 5), and finally analysis of the number of unmoved movers on the basis of astronomical considerations looking for an answer to the question that the theology of

6 the 12th book of Metaphysics would be regarded as a monotheism, and if so, to what extent (chapter 6).

In 12.6 Aristotle attempts to prove that beyond the visible things there must be an eternal, non-sensible, unchanging being. Since the eternal, non-sensible and unchanging being was called God in the text later, the argument is usually considered as an argument of God that traditionally belongs to the cosmological arguments. The thesis I argue are the following: 

 in the strict sense of the word, the argument we are dealing with is not an argument of God, because the argument does not prove the , but the first unmoved mover, about which the text shows, that this being is - according to Greek use of the word theos - in fact God.

 the argument with which Aristotle tries to prove the existence of the first mover in 12.6 is generally called a , but reading the text of the chapter attentively, we will notice that it does not contain any reference to the cosmos The language of the argument is quite abstract, Aristotle does not mention neither the heavenly bodies nor the movements of the spheres. The starting point is not a concrete, sensible phenomena (eg. the movement of the first ), but rather the eternal circular movement in general. We will be said just in the next chapter that the eternal circular motion is the motion of the first heaven, and that the mover of which the existence is proved is the mover of the heaven. The argument can be therefore called a cosmological one only in retrospect.

 In connection with the argument Aristotle raises the problem of the priority of potentiality. Contrary to the reading of Elders (1972), I try to argue that Aristotle's argument is not an anticipation of St. ' tertia via. First: according to the argument ex contingentia rerum, if everything were contingent, there would be nothing. From the premiss that everything is contingent it is not correct to deduce the consequence that there will be a time when there is no things, but only the consequence that there may be a time when there is no things. Hence the argument of St. Thomas Aquinas contains a logical mistake which the argument suggested by Aristotle does not contain. Second: the two arguments are based on different metaphysical concepts. Aristotle's argument deals with the relation of the possible and

7 the actual existence. To exist potentially is not the same as to exist contingently. Morover the problem of the priority of potentiality has at least two interpretations. According to the weaker version, each real being is preceded by its own potentiality; by contrast, the stronger version claims that the potentiality of the existence precedes the totality of real beings.Three arguments lined up to prove that Aristotle used the stronger version.

In 12.7 the nature of the first unmoved mover is discussed. It has been proved that the first mover is necessarily immobile, the question arises: how could the Prime Mover be the origin of heavenly movements, if he is unmovable? Aristotle's answer is summarized in the famous formula: kinei de hósz erómenon. Berti (2000) is of the oppinion that this formulation is mere a metaphor: an unmoved mover moves in a similar way as the object of love. Hence, in fact, it does not mean that the first mover would be an object to any kind of loving, it just means that he "moves without being moved." On the basis of 1074b4-11, I think this interpretation is not satisfactory. The last sentence of the section cited above - héi kai anankéi kalósz, kai hutósz arkhé - suggests that the first unmoved mover may be arkhé, only because his mode of existence is nice. This means that the first mover moves by the beauty of his existence. In this case, the famous formula can not be considered as a metaphor; the unmoved mover is really the object of desire.

The Aristotelian formula connects at several points to the teaching of Diotima, which can be read in Plato's Symposium. 

 the love generated by the first unmoved mover is vertical

 it can be described both as a desire for the good or as a striving for the completeness of the existence

 the object of love is a disembodied being.

One of the most important statements about the nature of the first unmoved mover is that the first mover is nusz, that is, understanding of divine nature. In 12.7 the train of thought leads from the unmoved mover as noéton to the unmoved mover as nusz and God. In my paper I am trying to place Aristotle in the tradition of nusz-metaphysics. My theses are the following:

8 

 the starting point of Aristotle is the teaching of the late Plato about nusz, and his own (especially De anima III.4).

 the formulations of Peri eukhész and the last book of Eudemian (god is "beyond" the intellect, and "stronger" than the intellect) do not necessarily represent a break with the nusz-metaphysics, but rather the difference between the divine and the human mind.

 comparing with the earlier nusz-metaphysics, in Aristotle an important shift of emphasis can be found. The first unmoved mover as nusz differs from the human intellect not only because he is a separate being which is independent of inferior abilities, but beacuse he is free of any potenciality, therefore constantly active. The activity of thinking is not only additional but a substantial capacity.

 according to Menn (1992) in Aristotle's theology „nusz” belongs to the names of the essence of God. In the light of 1074b17-21, it is more accurate if you say that God can be grasped in terms of „noészisz”. The essence of God that he is thinking.

12.9 deals with the operation of divine noészisz, which is tried to grasp approaching from the human mind. According to the traditional interpretation of the chapter, the activity of the first unmoved mover is self-. His knowing aims necessarily to what is the best, and because the best is no other than himself, the subject of the first mover's knowledge is the first mover - and nothing else. Norman (1976) regards this interpretation as absurd, because it suggests that „the Prime Mover is a sort of heavenly Narcissus”. According to Norman, when Aristotle describes the Prime Mover as thinking itself (hauton noei) he is not referring to any activity that could be called 'self-contemplation'. The Prime Mover's self-thinking is the same as human abstract thought. Arguing against Norman's "anti-narcistic" reading, I think that the divine intellect is not the same as human abstract thinking. Arguments are as follows:

 when Aristotle enumerates the alternatives along which the divine intellect can be described, the "thinking itself" and "thinking about something else" are exclusive. According to Norman's reading the two is made simultaneously.

9  the two options "it thinks himself" and "now one thing and now another” do not appear with each other.

 while in the course of abstract human thinking self-knowledge is only acidentally (kata szümbebékosz) or secondary (en parergói), the divine intellect should primarily think of itself.

 M.M. 1212b38-1213a8 is not be used as an argument against the "narcistic" reading. Aristotle's position here is that the argument based on the analogy between God and man is not justified: from the fact that the constant self-contemplation is a sign for human stupidity, we can not conclude that the self-contemplating God would also be stupid.

Another important text is 1074b33-35. It contains two statements, the first of which applies to the intellect, the second to the activity of the intellect:

 the intellect: hauton noei - thinks itself.  its activity: noészeósz noészisz - thinking of thinking.

Following Plato's Charmides, Brunschwig (2000) thinks that the first statement indicates a centripetal and the second a reflexive cognition, and that the first type is the result of the second one. In my view, it would be a misunderstanding if we applied the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge discussed in Charmides to 1074b33-35. 

 Aristotle's divine nusz is identical with the noészisz. However, if the two are the same, it makes little sense to talk about two separate knowledge, one of which is the consequence of the other.

 1074b35-36, in contrast with the interpretation of Brunschwig, does not necessarily imply the suspension of the identity of divine nusz and noészisz. Aristotle here calls the primarily reflexive nature of human noészisz in question, while the divine intellect is not addressed.

 according to Brunschwig from the identity we can conclude that in 1074b33-35 the second of the two statements just repeats the first. I rather think that Aristotle based on the identity makes explicit the true contens of the first statement (hauton noei). The

10 divine intellect is described as an activity of which subject, object and activity itself coincide with each other.

From all these we can come to the conclusion that human self-awareness is different from the divine one. The man is not capable of direct self-contemplation – quoting Magna Moralia: "We are not able to contemplate ourselves". Therefore, the human self-knowledge is forced to make a detour, we are always looking for something else, in which - as in a mirror – we can contemplate ourselves. This may be something in the realm of intelligible beings, a sensible object or a different person. On the other hand the first unmoved mover does not need any different thing to be conceivable for himself. Its knowledge is not obliged to go through neither the path of "something else" nor the "someone else". The first unmoved mover is not just to know himself. He is none other than self-knowledge.

According to the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, in the course of the understanding of an immaterial thing the subject will be the same as the object of cognition. The question may be arised: at this time is the status of noészeósz noészisz realized? The answer is that the two cognitive status is undoubtedly similar to each other, but there is an important difference between them. In the case of the human mind noészeósz noészisz always supposes a different intelligible object, but in the case of the first mover the act is totally direct. In other words, the human consciousness is always a consciousness of some object, while the consciousness of the divine nusz is always an untroubled, clear knowledge of itself.

At first glance cosmological assertions of 12.8 constitute a foreign body in the text of a theological treatise. In fact, the problem, which the chapter deals with, a relevant one from the theological point of view too: it deals with the number of the unmoved movers. Monotheism or politheism of Aristotle's theology is a controversial issue. What makes it difficult to decide is that the theological chapters of 12th book seem to be not uniform. Using the phrase of Merlan (1966), strange fluctuation of the monotheistic and polytheistic positions can be observed in them. It is chapter 8 in which polytheistic tendencies appear. Jaeger (1948) assumes that 12.8 is a late interpolation in the text. Against Jaeger I argue that the 12th book can be read as a coherent text; parts which seem contradict with each other (for example: chapter 8 and the other chapters, or in 12.8, 1074a31-

11 38 and the rest of the chapter) can be weave into the texture of a unified monotheistic discourse. However, this does not result monotheism in the relegious sense of the word. Based on 12.8, it is clear that Aristotle commited himself to the existence of several unmoved mover.

 the number of unmoved movers will depend on the number of concentric spheres which we need to postulate to give all the movements of celestial bodies.  based on astronomical considerations, the movement of celestial bodies can be described applying 47 or 55 spheres.  consequently, the number of unmoved movers is 47 or 55.

How can we reconcile the pluralism of 12.8 with a monotheistic theology? To answer this question, the key is 1074a31-38. In this passage, Aristotle rejects the possibility of many worlds, starting from the consideration that if there were many worlds, a first unmoved mover should belong to each of them. They would belong to the same species (eidosz) - all of them would be movers of the outermost celestial sphere – and they would be different from each other only numerically. But the numerical multitude of individuals which belong to the same species, assume a corporeal component. However, the first unmoved mover is an immaterial existence, so it can not be numerically many.

 the argument of 1074a31-38 is not apply to the movers of planet's spheres and their plurality, and therefore it does not conflict with the rest of the chapter.  The argument shows that the first unmoved mover as arkhé may not be numerically many.

On this basis, we can say that 12.8 organically fit into the framework of Aristotelian theology. This theology is not monotheistic in the religious sense of the word. The first unmoved mover owes its special status not to its divine nature (besides him there are other gods), but rather to the fact that it is an arkhé. Therefore, it would be more accurate, if Aristotle's theology is called not monotheism, but monarchism.

12 The essence of monarchism as a theological position: there are many unmoved movers, they are all gods, but the first unmoved mover has a special status among them. The latter is different from the other movers in many respect: 

 the first unmoved mover is not merely a mover of a heavenly sphere, but the first principle of the as a whole.

 the first unmoved mover is the ultimate explanation of the universe: it is directly or indirectly the final cause of all existing things.

 in the strict sense of the word only the first unmoved mover can be called unmoved: it is still in every respect: in itself, and accidentally as well.

 without the first unmoved mover the other unmoved movers do not exist.

 as arkhé, it is single, eternal and necessary; its and necessity is of a higher order than the other unmoved movers'; their eternity and necessity is ultimately derived from the first unmoved mover.

Aristotle's theology has a significant impact on the medieval Christian thinkers. However, it is important to keep in mind that there are essential points in which this theology differs from Christian teaching. 

 in addition to the first unmoved mover, there are other gods too.

 the first unmoved mover is not a creator; Aristotle strongly rejected the ideas of the beginning and the creation of the world.

 its activity is a continuous self-contemplation, it is not a provident god .

 because its thinking is always aimed at the best, that is at itself, it does not know about the world's existence, and therefore it does not have emotional relation to the world, and its inhabitants: it is not a God of love.

13 Bibliography

Primary works:

Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935.

Aristotle: Magna Moralia, trans. G.C. Armstrong, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935.

Aristotle: Metaphysics I-II., trans. H. Tredennick, Cambridge, Harvard Universitiy Press, 1933,1935.

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Elders, L. (1972) Aristotle's Theology, Assen, Van Gorcum&Comp.

Frede, M.-Charles, D. (2000) Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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14 Arisztotelész: Eudémoszi etika – Nagy etika, ford. Steiger Kornél, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 1975.

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