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The Dissertation Plotinus and Aristotle on the Simplicity of the Divine Intellect Exam No.: B029330 MSc Ancient Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2013 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Introduction 4 Chapter 1: The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicity’s Role 7 1.1 Aristotle’s Search for the First Principle 7 1.2 Aristotle on Unity and the Simplicity Sought for the First Principle 10 1.3 Plotinus on Unity as the First Principle 14 1.4 Conclusion: Comparing the Unmoved Mover and the One 18 Chapter 2: Divine Intellect and Self-Thinking’s Unity or Duality for Aristotle and Plotinus 20 2.1 Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover as Divine Intellect 20 2.2 Human and Divine Intellection Compared 23 2.3 Plotinus on Intellect 25 2.4 Plotinus on the Necessity for Intellect’s Duality 27 Chapter 3: Comparing Divine Intellect’s Self-Thinking and Simplicity Between Aristotle and Plotinus 33 3.1 The Epistemological Necessity for Identity and Distinction 33 3.2 Reconsidering Aristotle 35 3.3 Conclusion 37 Primary Sources 39 Secondary Sources 40 2 Abstract Aristotle and Plotinus both demonstrate the existence of a first principle as cause of the existence of all things. Aristotle puts forward that this first principle is a divine intellect which thinks on itself, and in being the highest being in complete actuality and without potentiality, it is also absolutely simple. Plotinus, on the other hand, sees reason to assert that the divine intellect can not be absolutely simple but a duality of some sort, and thus the first principle, as a cause of unity for all things, must be beyond the divine intellect and thus beyond being in being, itself, absolutely simple. Comparing Plotinus to Aristotle, Plotinus’ position appears odd at the outset given that he also holds to the divine intellect being completely in act and that it thinks on itself. Why thinking should be dual even when it is self- referential and unified in its activity is not apparent, and so Aristotle’s position seems the more coherent one. Yet, through an analysis of both positions, this dissertation proposes that Plotinus better accounts for the problem of self-intellection as requiring some form of distinction in thought while maintaining an identity between the subject and object of thought. If absolute simplicity is an essential attribute to being the first principle, Plotinus’ position is ultimately more consistent in positing a first principle beyond the divine intellect while also holding to a more coherent understanding of thinking with his understanding of divine intellect as a duality instead of an absolute simplicity. 3 Divine Intellect’s Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Introduction In Metaphysics Λ.6, Aristotle points out the necessity for the existence of a first principle—the unmoved mover—which is completely active and responsible for the motion and subsequent existence of all things. In saying that the first principle must be fully active and without any potentiality, Aristotle concludes that the nature of the unmoved mover must be an intellect which thinks on itself, so that ‘its thinking is a thinking on thinking’ (Metaph. Λ.9 1074b33-34). This follows on Aristotle’s understanding of the activity of thinking as continuous and fully actual when thinking possesses its object, and in the case of the unmoved mover, it is itself both this activity and the object of its own activity. In seeing this, Aristotle also maintains the importance of the unmoved mover’s simplicity in being the simultaneous subject and object of its own activity. Without this simplicity, potentiality in the unmoved mover’s nature would be implied which would no longer make possible the eternal motion of the cosmos and the existence of all things. Plotinus picks up on the theme of simplicity as an essential attribute of the first principle in positing the existence of the ‘One’ as being absolutely simple and without multiplicity. Although he still holds to some form of Aristotle’s divine intellect—the entity of ‘Intellect’—as a principle for the motion and being of things, Plotinus disagrees that this is the first principle, positing rather that the ‘One’ must be something beyond thinking and being. At first glance this may seem puzzling insofar as Intellect is fully active and eternally continuous when it thinks on itself; one might think that it should also be simple in its activity. However, Plotinus disagrees with this Aristotelian conception in concluding that Intellect’s self-thinking implies duality rather than simplicity. As a consequence, Intellect’s existence is maintained only in virtue of the prior existence of the One as being entirely simple and the basis on which Intellect and all subsequent beings have their existence. Certain questions should be posed in looking at Aristotle’s and Plotinus’ conceptions together. On what basis is there multiplicity in Intellect on Plotinus’ account? A few interconnected reasons are given, such as that Intellect is defined by the intelligible it receives,1 and that it contains and contemplates all the forms existing in the world within itself, both of which imply multiplicity.2 When Plotinus looks at the activity of Intellect by itself, however, his primary reason for ascribing multiplicity appears to be that there is a real distinction between the thinker and the object of thought within Intellect’s thinking, even though that object is one and the same with the thinker itself. This can be seen in Plotinus’ Ennead V. 4.2.11-12: ‘It is, certainly, also itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is already two’. 1 Ennead V.4.2.6-8. 2 Enn. V.9.5.1-10. 4 Divine Intellect’s Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus We may wish to pause on this last statement. Given the implication of the last line, why is there duality in thinking by default? On Aristotle’s account of the intellect, thinking implies the possession of the object of thought, so that it is when the intellect acquires and, in some sense, becomes the object of thought that it is thinking. Aristotle would then assert, contrary to Plotinus, that there is not a duality but rather simplicity in thinking, especially when the divine intellect has itself as the object of its own thinking. Plotinus concedes that Intellect is ‘one’ in a sense, but he would disagree with Aristotle by asserting that there is a kind of duality and division needed in all thinking. Given that Aristotle and Plotinus agree on the necessity for a first principle and the existence of a divine intellect on some level, whose account best argues for the simplicity or duality of the divine intellect as reason to posit it as the first principle or as a secondary principle of the cosmos? In this dissertation, I wish to analyze the respective arguments put forward by Plotinus and Aristotle, looking at the philosophical background and context presupposed in each position. I ultimately wish to show that Plotinus’ argument against the absolute simplicity of the divine intellect better accounts for the reality of self-intellection when compared with Aristotle’s account. A review of the nature of the divine intellect’s self-thinking will show that Aristotle’s account, although rigorous in its own right, fails to account for a proper distinction between the subject and object of thought which would otherwise make possible the divine intellect’s full knowledge of itself as the subject of its own thinking. Plotinus, on the other hand, preserves this distinction which makes possible Intellect’s transparent knowledge of itself as the subject of its thinking, thus validating his assertion of Intellect’s duality compared to Aristotle’s assertion of the divine intellect’s simplicity. Given what is to be shown, certain premises need to be elaborated. First, we must clarify the kind of first principle sought by Aristotle and Plotinus in the form of the unmoved mover and the One, respectively, to show in what way the divine intellect factors in with their general inquiry into the first principle (Chapter 1.1, 1.3). It must then be shown how both understand the importance of simplicity and unity in relation to the first principle, especially in seeing how Aristotle prioritizes substance compared to Plotinus placing unity over substance as a prior principle of reality (Ch. 1.2, 1.3). On comparing these latter two conceptions, Plotinus’ account will be shown to have more of a direct causal explanation for all beings as both an efficient and a final cause in comparison to Aristotle’s which causes motion as a final cause; the role of simplicity for each will show how a thinking intellect must match this simplicity (for Aristotle) or must be beyond all being, including intellect (for Plotinus) (Ch. 1.4). An analysis of the divine intellect for both, including a consideration of the nature of intellect and self- intellection as implying simplicity or duality for Aristotle and Plotinus (respectively) must next be shown, (Ch. 2). Afterward, Plotinus’ and Aristotle’s different accounts of the divine intellect must be compared, 5 Divine Intellect’s Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus in which we must consider the question of a distinction between subject and object in all thinking, especially in the case of the divine intellect thinking on itself (Ch. 3). The consequences for this, paired with a consideration of the kind of simplicity required of the first principle, will show how Plotinus’ account is better bourne out in admitting duality in the divine intellect while holding to an absolutely simple first principle above the divine intellect. 6 Divine Intellect’s Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Chapter 1: The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicity’s Role In considering the question of the simplicity or duality of the divine intellect, it will be important to first see how Plotinus and Aristotle understand simplicity and unity (1.2, 1.3), starting with how both see the necessity to assert the existence of a first principle (1.1, 1.3).
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