Joint Development of the Continental Shelf where Delimitation is Pending: Cooperative Opportunity or Complication in Oceans Governance

Professor Clive Schofield Maritime Zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea e n i l Continental Shelf

e The s

a Sea-bed, Subsoil, Sedentary Species Area B

a (Extended

e Continental Shelf) S

l a i

r Exclusive o t i r

r Economic Zone (EEZ) High Sea s r e e T Water Column, t

a Sea-bed, Subsoil w

l Contiguous a 200 M n 12 M

r zone e t

n Territorial I 12 M sea Sea Level

Shelf Upper Slope Plateu or Lower Terrace Rise Deep Animation by Arsana & Schofield, 2012 Slope Ocean

Source: TALOS Manual (5th edition, 2014) Implications of Creeping Coastal State Jurisdiction

• Extended maritime claims 200 nautical mile claims = 147km2 million (43M2 million) 41% of the area of the oceans PLUS: c.30km2 million of extended continental shelf areas (and counting) • Proliferation in overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, “new” potential maritime boundaries and maritime boundary disputes • c.54% of potential maritime boundaries agreed • BUT: many agreements partial or not in force Continental Shelf and EEZ delimitation

LOSC Articles 74 and 83

3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

The legal rationale for joint development arrangements Key Components of Joint Development

• A formal agreement • Definition of a special zone • Without prejudice clauses • Definition of the resources to which the arrangement applies • Agreement on the laws and jurisdiction governing exploration, operations and revenue sharing • Uncontested sovereignty over the area designated as a joint development zone • Political will Joint Zones as an addition to delimitation

• Bahrain-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (signed 1958) • Qatar-United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) in the Persian Gulf (1969) • France-Spain in the Bay of Biscay (1974) • Colombia - Dominican Republic in the Caribbean (1978) • Australia-Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait (1978) • Iceland-Norway in the North Atlantic (Jan Mayen Island) (1981) • Faroes-UK in the North Atlantic (1999) • Boundaries defined so security/enforcement jurisdiction clear cut Source: International Maritime Boundaries Torres Strait

Source: Geoscience Australia Faroes-UK

Source: International Maritime Boundaries Joint Zones in lieu of delimitation

• Kuwait-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (1965) • Japan-South Korea in the Sea of Japan (1974) • Sudan-Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea (1974) • Australia-Indonesia in the Timor Sea (Timor Gap) (1989) • Malaysia-Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand (1990) • Malaysia-Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand (1993) • São Tomé-Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea (2001) • Australia-Timor Leste in the Timor Sea (2002) The East China Sea Advantages of Joint Development

• Unlocks intractable disputes • Sidesteps sovereignty issues • Allows development/management of resources/ environment to proceed without delay • Without prejudice clauses effectively address concerns over compromising jurisdictional claims (at least in a formal legal sense) Additional Advantages

• Avoids the need for a costly ‘once and for all’ boundary delimitation exercise • Often perceived to be an ‘equitable’ solution • Cooperative – no ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ • Flexible in area, administration, function and duration Can apply to living or non-living resources Can be general or resource-specific Can be permanent or temporary Can be applied to security issues • Consistent with international law • Models exist Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature • The Limits of zones of cooperation • Does using the limits of overlapping claims areas legitimise and encourage excessive maritime claims? • Third party rights – other claimants? • Complexity and Continuity • Intricate arrangements and ongoing costs • Difficult to negotiate and sustain • Need to endure for the long haul • A challenge to State sovereignty • A source of friction in relations? Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature

• Downstream issues • As much of a prize as the marine resources themselves? • Dealing with the impacts of “success” • Gulf of Thailand examples - a concentration of State practice • Gulf of Guinea • Timor Sea arrangements The Gulf of Thailand

Cambodia – Vietnam joint ‘historical waters’ area

Malaysia – Thailand joint development area

Malaysia – Vietnam joint development area

Cambodia – Thailand Memorandum of Understanding

Source: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011 Source: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011 Sao Tomé EEZ São Tomé and Príncipe – Nigeria JDZ Cameroon Claim Line 120° 125° 130° 135°

Sulawesi Kai IRIAN JAYA Buton Islands Selayar I N D O N ESI A Aru Islands

Wetar Babar Tanimbar k Lombo Alor Islands FLORES BAWA OR SUM IM SU T MB 10° A 10° Sawu Roti Arafura Sea

102° 106° 111° I N D I A N O C E A N 5° 5° Sumatra Mercator Projection Central Meridian 106°E IEEZ r Sea Latitude of true scale 10°S Ashmore Timo Islands JAVA A U STRA LI A Scott 8° 8° Z EE Reef I N I N D O N ESI A A IEEZ D I A N O C 15° Z E A E N E A SCALE Mercator Projection Christmas I 0 100 200 300 400km Central Meridian 128°E Latitude of true scale 0° MAP 96/ 523.25 SCALE A U STRA LI A IEE 135°E Z Z 0 160km E E 120° 125° 130° 12° A 12° Agreed extension of the seabed Area subject to 1974 MOU 102° 106° 111° boundary in the area between regarding the operations of Agreed seabed and water column boundary continental Australia and the Indonesian traditional fishermen between Christmas Island and Java (Article 3) Indonesian archipelago (Article 1) within the Australian fishing zone Area of overlap between Australian seabed Agreed exclusive economic zone Zone of Co-operation jurisdiction and Indonesian exclusive economic (water column) boundary in the (Timor Gap Treaty) zone (water column) jurisdiction area between continental Australia Indonesian exclusive economic zone boundary and the Indonesian archipelago Previously agreed seabed (Article 2) boundaries (1971 and 1972) Australian exclusive economic zone boundary Map 5 - Consolidated depiction of all Australian-Indonesian maritime boundaries after entry into force of the Treaty

Overlapping claims in the Timor Sea

Source: Clive Schofield, ‘Minding the Gap: The Australia – East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Volume 22 (2007), No.2: 189- 234. Opportunities and Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature • Great potential merit but… • Not to be entered into lightly, simply because negotiations deadlocked • Significant implementation challenges to overcome • What area? • Third party rights • Institutional issues • Certainty and Continuity • Downstream issues • Political dimensions