Marcus P. Chu Politics of Mega-Events in ‘s Hong Kong and Macao Politics and Development of Contemporary China

Series Editors Kevin G. Cai University of Waterloo Renison University College Waterloo, ON, Canada

Pan Guang Shanghai Center for International Studies Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Shanghai, China

Daniel C. Lynch University of Southern California School of International Relations Los Angeles, CA, USA As China’s power grows, the search has begun in earnest for what ­superpower status will mean for the People’s Republic of China as a nation as well as the impact of its new-found influence on the Asia-Pacific region and the global international order at large. By providing a venue for exciting­ and ground-breaking titles, the aim of this series is to explore the domestic and international implications of China’s rise and transformation through a number of key areas including politics, development and ­foreign policy. The series will also give a strong voice to non-western perspectives on China’s rise in order to provide a forum that connects and compares the views of academics from both the east and west reflecting the truly international nature of the discipline.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14541 Marcus P. Chu Politics of Mega-­Events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao Marcus P. Chu Political Science Department Lingnan University Hong Kong, China

Politics and Development of Contemporary China ISBN 978-3-030-13867-7 ISBN 978-3-030-13868-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13868-4

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This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Preface

Since the handovers, Hong Kong and Macao, under the One Country Two Systems principle, continue the capitalist practice and order left by their British and Portuguese colonizers. They, meanwhile, also derive vari- ous all-out supports from China. Therefore, while the former retains itself as one of the freest economies in the world, the latter has become the wealthiest casino city on the planet. In this context, the two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) are zealous in staging mega-events, which are extensively viewed as a means to benefit the economy of the hosts and/or demonstrate their cultural attractiveness. Paradoxically, the atti- tudes of the Chinese and SAR authorities toward the events vary from case to case. To understand the reasons behind, a total of 24 cases—including 14 conferences and 10 sporting games overseen by the prominent interna- tional organizations and multinational corporations—are investigated. The findings reveal that the central and local governments enthusiastically give backing as long as the gatherings are able to raise their popularity, facilitate the domestic stability of China, Hong Kong, and Macao and their international engagement, boost the three regions’ profile and com- petitiveness in the global stage, and/or deepen the two cities’ integration into the Mainland. Otherwise, they hold neutral, indifferent, and even opposite stances, although the galas may generate lucrative profit. In short, this book provides an in-depth account of how the mega-events are leveraged for defending the all-round political interests of both China and the SARs.

Hong Kong, China Marcus P. Chu

v Acknowledgments

I firstly would like to thank Brian Bridges, Annie Chan, Chan Che-po, Gerald Chan, Chen Hon-fai, Francis Cheung, Lawrence Ho, Agnes Lam, Alan Lee, Simon Li, Vic Li, Sonny Lo, Vivian Lun, Ma Yuhuai, Eric Man, Paul O’Connor, Thomas Voon, Shalendra Sharma, Wong Yiu-chung, Eilo Yu, and Raymond Yuen for their advice and help during my journey of drafting this monograph. I am also grateful to Taylor and Francis for allowing me to use some parts of my three published articles—(1) “Post-handover Hong Kong’s international sporting bids: a win-less-lose-more journey,” International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(10), 2016, 1193–1208, https://doi.org /10.1080/09523367.2016.1267149; (2) “From Integration with China to engagement with the world: mega-sports events at post-handover ,” International Journal of the History of Sport, 33(11), 2016, 1254–1267, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2016.1264390; and (3) “Extravagance and its decline: China’s triple East since the 2000s,” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science, 6(1), 2017, 19–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/21640599.2016.1277083—in this book. To meet the publication requirement of Palgrave, they have been all rewritten. The last section of Chap. 5 was presented in the 2018 International Conference on Sports History and Culture hosted by the School of Physical Education, Shaanxi Normal University. I appreciate Professors Fan Hong, Paul Lu, Shi Bing, Yang Jing, and Zhang Jinqiao for their invitation and hospitality.

vii viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Lastly, my deepest gratitude is extended to late Professor Ming K. Chan for his encouragement, guidance, and support. I dedicate this book to the memory of him. Contents

1 Introduction 1 1.1 Hong Kong’s Application for 1997 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings 3 1.2 Macao’s Application for 2005 EAG 8 1.3 Objectives 13 References 16

2 International Conferences in China’s Hong Kong 21 2.1 Hong Kong 1997 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings 22 2.2 Hong Kong 2001 FGF and 2002 WCOA 26 2.3 Hong Kong 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference and 2006 ITU Telecom World 33 2.4 Hong Kong’s Bid for 2011 IOC Session 40 2.5 Hong Kong’s Discontinuation to Host 2014 APEC Finance Ministerial Meeting 44 2.6 Summary 46 References 49

3 International Sporting Games in China’s Hong Kong 61 3.1 Hong Kong’s Bids for 2006 Asian Games and 2006 FESPIC Games 62 3.2 Hong Kong 2008 Summer Olympics Equestrian Events and 2009 EAG 67

ix x Contents

3.3 Hong Kong’s Bids for 2023 Asian Games and 2015 FINA World Championships 76 3.4 Hong Kong’s Bid for 2022 Gay Games 81 3.5 Summary 84 References 87

4 International Conferences and Sporting Games in China’s Macao 99 4.1 Macao 2005 EAG 100 4.2 Macao 2007 AIG and 2012 OCA General Assembly 105 4.3 CLCECCF Ministerial Conferences since 2003 and Macao 2006 Lusophonia Games 111 4.4 Macao 2014 APEC Tourism Ministerial Meeting 116 4.5 Summary 122 References 123

5 Conclusion 133 5.1 Hong Kong and Macao 134 5.2 China 136 5.3 Looking Ahead 138 References 143

Index 147 Abbreviations

ACOLOP Association of the Portuguese Speaking Olympic Committees AFC Asian Football Confederation AIG AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AL Legislative Assembly APEC Asia Pacific Economic and Co-operation CCP Chinese Communist Party CEPA Closed Economic Partnership Agreement CGAS China General Administration of Sport CLCECCF China-Lusophone Countries Economic and Commercial Co-operation Forum COC Chinese Olympic Committee CODM Sports and Olympic Committee of Macao, China CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference DAB Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress DPP Democratic Progressive Party EAG EAGA East Asian Games Association EOC Equal Opportunity Commission FESPIC Games Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled FGF Fortune Global Forum FGG Federation of the Gay Games FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association FINA Fédération Internationale de Natation HKASA Hong Kong Amateur Association HKICPA Hong Kong Institute of Certificated Public Accountants HKJC Hong Kong Jockey Club

xi xii Abbreviations

HKMA Hong Kong Monetary Authority HKSAPD Hong Kong Paralympics Committee and Sports Association for the Physically Disabled HKSI Hong Kong Sports Institute HKTB Hong Kong Tourism Board IEF International Equestrianism Federation IFA International Federation of Accountants IMF International Monetary Fund IOC International Olympic Committee ITU International Telecommunication Union LegCo Legislative Council LOCPG Central People’s Government Liaison Office MFA Macao Football Association MFN Most Favored Nation MOC Macao Olympic Committee MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NPC National People’s Congress OCA OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China SAR Special Administrative Region SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SF&OC Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization WBG World Bank Group WCOA World Congress of Accountants WTO World Trade Organization CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part is a histori- cal retrospect regarding Hong Kong and Macao’s applications for the 1997 World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meetings and the 2005 East Asian Games (EAG) during the colo- nial era. It confirms that to realize the broader political goals of Beijing, London, and , both the colonial and Chinese governments give all-out support to the projects. Based on the above findings, this book aims to explore the inter-nexus between politics and the two cities’ mega-­ events after the handovers. An elaboration of the research objectives is presented in the second part.

Keywords 1997 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings • 2005 EAG • Colonial Hong Kong • Colonial Macao • Chinese government

On 19 December 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Chinese counterpart Zhao Ziyang, in the presence of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration which promised that after reverting to China on 1 July 1997 Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the One Country Two Systems formula in the next 50 years. The People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese authorities, subsequently published an editorial article, stressing that making this agreement was a successful milestone, because it safeguarded

© The Author(s) 2019 1 M. P. Chu, Politics of Mega-Events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13868-4_1 2 M. P. CHU the interests of both Beijing and London and guaranteed the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong after the sovereignty transfer (“A major,” 1984). Nevertheless, given their constant skepticism over the Communist regime, the promises in the Declaration were unable to cease the apprehen- sion of the Hong Kong people about the future of their hometown. Thus, some of them emigrated. The confidence of the local residents declined further after the stock market crash in October 1987. To restore the morale of their fellows and retain its status as an interna- tional financial and commercial center after the British retreat, Stephen Cheong, a London-educated entrepreneur and lawmaker, together with a group of business elites, in April 1988, suggested that Hong Kong should stage a five-month World Expo in 1997 straddling the 1 July political handover (Leung, 1988). Since the proposed mega-event was estimated to be able to bring in an HKD 4.4 billion/USD 571.4 million economic activity, 25,000 additional jobs, and over 5.9 million overseas and mainland Chinese visitors (Ho, 1988a), the local chambers of commerce and profes- sional associations successively expressed support to this innovative idea (“Association backs,” 1988; Daswani, 1988). The majority of the legisla- tors and district board members also stood out backing Cheong and his compatriots (Lee, 1988; “Official report,” 1988). However, the London side did not readily give endorsement. Instead it asked the colonial govern- ment to make a judgment about this issue on its own (Quon, 1988). Although he personally deemed that Cheong’s suggestion was interest- ing and encouraging (“Governor cautious,” 1988), Governor David Wilson—a moderate diplomat and senior sinologist—was reluctant to reg- ister Hong Kong’s hosting intention to the Bureau International des Expositions, the governing body of the World Expo, partly because the existing Kai Tak Airport was unable to handle the estimated over five mil- lion non-local visitors (“Kai Tak’s,” 1988) and partly because the event, which was estimated to cost HKD 3 billion/USD 390 million (“Too many,” 1988), was believed to inevitably trigger setbacks in the major development projects that had already been in the pipeline (Ho, 1988b). In view of the firm position of the executive, some Expo proponents changed their mind (“Government challenged,” 1988). On the other hand, the Beijing side also had reservations against Cheong and his fel- lows’ proposal due to the complexity of operating this five-month gala with the British (Leung & Lee, 1988). Eventually, this imaginative plan was rejected by the colonial authorities in October 1988 (“Government slams,” 1988). INTRODUCTION 3

However, after stepping in the 1990s, Hong Kong’s application for holding their 1997 Annual Meetings was submitted to the WBG and the IMF with the support of both Beijing and London. Macao, a seaside casino city that would be returned to China in December 1999, also acti- vated the bid to host the 2005 EAG by the blessings of Beijing and Lisbon, despite the fact that it rarely participated in international sporting affairs during the over 400-year Portuguese rule. Their subsequent success in being awarded the hosting rights indicated that the curtains had opened for the two cities to stage mega-events in the post-handover era.

1.1 Hong Kong’s Application for 1997 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings In the 1989 Policy Address, David Wilson unveiled his administration’s plan to build an HKD 127 billion/USD 16.5 billion airport in Chak Lap Kok. Since the entire construction was scheduled to be completed in the first half of 1997, the colonial government, under the supervision of London, initially decided not to consult Beijing, but instead to process the project solely by itself. This decision later was revised because the local banks and financial companies bluntly stated that without China’s involve- ment as the loan guarantor, their money would not be lent to the govern- ment for the construction (Chung, 2001, pp. 182–183). The Chinese government, despite demanding Hong Kong to have a new airport, was unwilling to accept the proposed project of the colonial authorities due to the apprehension about the city’s financial reserves in 1997. In view of this, the London side realized that if no significant con- cession was made, the Chinese would not change their mind. Former British Ambassador to China Percy Cradock, on behalf of the British gov- ernment, subsequently initiated the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Construction of a New Airport in Hong Kong and Related Questions—which particularly stated that the colonial authorities would leave at least HKD 25 billion/USD 3.2 billion to the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government—with his Chinese counter- parts. He also pledged that the newly incumbent Prime Minister John Major would sign the memorandum with Chinese Premier Li Peng at Beijing in September 1991 (Cradock, 1999, pp. 237–243; Lu & Qian, 2009, pp. 73–79). 4 M. P. CHU

Major fell into a dilemma. On the one hand, he was supposed to continue to boycott China together with the leaders of the other Western states for the sake of penalizing the brutality of the communist regime over the people in summer 1989. On the other hand, he understood that visiting Beijing was the key to not only settle the new airport issue, but also facilitate the long-term prosperity of Hong Kong and defend the interests of Britain. Eventually, the host of the Number 10 chose the latter (Major, 1999, p. 505). The interests here were not only about Britain’s monetary gain, but also about its image and reputation. In fact, since the Tiananmen incident caused the Hong Kong people’s collective anxiety over the handover, Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet, in the consideration of moral respon- sibility, granted full British passports to 50,000 local households (Cradock, 1999, pp. 233–236; Thatcher, 2011, pp. 494–495). Nevertheless, they still hoped the members of these households and the other Hong Kong people could stay at their hometown with confidence during the transition period and even after the handover, so that the retreat of Britain on 30 June 1997 could be with honor, glory, and respect. To this end, the British government determined to not only create more job opportunities in the colony and enhance its international competitiveness, but also consolidate the city’s legal foundation for protection of human rights and push for- ward its democratization. Therefore, London, aside from signing the Memorandum for the building of the new airport, led the colonial govern- ment to introduce a bill of rights and negotiated with Beijing for giving more democracy to the local citizens (Tsang, 2004, pp. 251–252). Through secret diplomacy, the Chinese government agreed that of the total 60 members of the Legislative Council (LegCo)—the lawmaking body of Hong Kong, 18 could be from direct election in 1991, 20 in 1997, 24 in 1999, and 30 in 2003. It also allowed the lawmakers elected in 1995 to sit through the sovereignty transfer and automatically become the members of the first SAR LegCo in 1997, despite the fact that the agreement regarding the number of the directly elected seats in 1995 remained unsettled (Cradock, 1999, p. 232; Loh, 2011, p. 203). In September 1991, the candidates who demanded to democratize Hong Kong and China won a landslide victory in the LegCo direct election. Shortly after Major finished his China trip, Hong Kong announced its intention to hold the WBG and IMF Annual Meetings—in which over 10,000 finance ministers, central bank governors, commercial bank and media representatives, and academics would discuss the issues related to INTRODUCTION 5 worldwide poverty reduction, global economic development, and interna- tional finance—in September 1997, three months after the sovereignty transfer. As expected, this initiative was warmly welcomed by the local business community, because hosting this nine-day event would benefit the city’s tourism industry and affirm its status as an international financial center. However, given their pessimism about the Sino-British relations in the remaining transition period, some political commentators thought that staging the Annual Meeting was a risky attempt and suggested the relevant parties to abandon this intention at once (Moreira, 1991). Nevertheless, the London side believed that helping Hong Kong to obtain the hosting rights for this financial gathering, like building the airport, introducing the bill of rights, and expanding the city’s democracy, could further benefit the image and reputation of Britain. Therefore, it was very enthusiastic about this proposal (“HK may,” 1991). Since the 1997 Annual Meetings were to be held on behalf of China and the application documents were to be submitted by its officials to the WBG and the IMF, gaining the approval of Beijing was also a necessity. The Chinese authorities were believed to be willing to show the green light, simply because the project, unlike the construction of the new air- port, would not potentially cause the government of Hong Kong to incur massive debts after the handover. The following two factors also deter- mined them to favor this hosting plan. First, although the Chinese authorities constantly promised that Hong Kong would be ruled under the One Country Two Systems principle after the reunification, the distrust of the local people and the interna- tional society for this unprecedented entitlement never ceased. The trag- edy that occurred in Beijing in the summer of 1989 even caused them to despair of the city’s post-handover institutional arrangements. In this situation, gaining the permission of the WBG and the IMF to hold their Annual Meetings in the second half of 1997 was crucial. Not only was it a sign of the two prestigious international organizations’ trust in, and reliance on, the Chinese takeover, but it was also a useful prescription to restore the confidence of the locals and the international society to the future of Hong Kong. Second, in January 1992, Deng Xiaoping undertook a one-month tour in the southern provinces of China with the aim of carrying forward the reform and opening up as well as shoring up his political legacy. Subsequently, the state authorities abandoned the conservative economic policies (Baum, 1994, p. 341; Vogel, 2011, pp. 669–684). China also proactively adopted