Distribution A: Approved for Public Release

Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen John P. Jumper Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Donald G. Cook http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen John F. Regni Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Col David S. Fadok

Editor Lt Col Paul D. Berg http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Senior Editor Lt Col Malcolm D. Grimes Associate Editor Maj Donald R. Ferguson Editor and Military Defense Analyst Col Larry Carter, USAF, Retired Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor http://www.au.af.mil Philip S. Adkins, Contributing Editor Mary J. Moore, Editorial Assistant Debbie Banker, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Chronicles Luetwinder T. Eaves, Managing Editor http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil The Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of na tional defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc tion of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or Visit Air and Space Power Journal online in part without permission. If they are reproduced, at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. or e-mail to [email protected] Image of Jaguar aircraft on back cover reproduced by permission, Crown Copyright. Winter 2004 Volume XVIII, No. 4 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective Past Trends and Future Plans ...... 6 Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF Dr. Christopher J. Bowie

Features The Tale of the C/JFACC: A Long and Winding Road ...... 18 Dr. Stephen O. Fought Aspects of Anglo-US Co-operation in the Air in the First World War ...... 27 Sebastian Cox Air Lines: Anglo-American Tactical Air Operations in World War II ...... 34 Dr. Thomas Alexander Hughes Anglo-American Strategic Air Power Co-operation in the Cold War and Beyond ...... 50 Group Capt Christopher Finn, RAF Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF British Commonwealth Carrier Operations in the Korean War ...... 62 Cdr David Hobbs, MBE, RN Post–Cold War Development of United Kingdom Joint Air Command and Control Capability ...... 74 Wing Cdr Redvers T. N. Thompson, RAF Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations ...... 87 Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner, RAF Dynamic Followership: The Prerequisite for Effective Leadership ...... 102 Lt Col Sharon M. Latour, USAF Lt Col Vicki J. Rast, USAF

Departments Prelaunch Notes Introducing the Arabic ASPJ ...... 10 Flight Lines British-American Cooperation in Airpower and Space Power ...... 11

Ricochets and Replies ...... 12 Vortices The Current Battle Damage Assessment Paradigm Is Obsolete ...... 13 Lt Col Hugh Curry, USAF PIREP The British American Forces Dining Club ...... 46 Col Larry G. Carter, USAF, Retired Doctrine NOTAMs Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations “If You Work with Friends, Bring It Along!” ...... 72 Lt Col Malcolm D. Grimes, USAF Maj Donald R. Ferguson, USAF New USAF Doctrine Publication: AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations ...... 100 Lt Col Paula B. Flavell, USAF Net Assessment Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm ...... 111 John Andreas Olsen Reviewer: Group Capt Chris Finn, RAF Tedder: Quietly in Command ...... 112 Vincent Orange Reviewer: Sebastian Ritchie Surprise, Security, and the American Experience ...... 113 John Lewis Gaddis Reviewer: Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired The Iraq War: A Military History ...... 114 Williamson Murray and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales Jr. Reviewer: Col (sel) Merrick E. Krause, USAF Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989–1991 ...... 116 Diane T. Putney Reviewer: Maj Gen David A. Deptula, USAF The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States ...... 117 Reviewer: Col (sel) Merrick E. Krause, USAF C3: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation ...... 119 Valery E. Yarynich Reviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 ...... 120 Henry G. Gole Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America ...... 121 Lt Gen William E. Odom, USA, Retired Reviewer: Maj Gary Pounder, USAF, Retired

Mission Debrief ...... 125 Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Lt Col Merrick E. Krause US Army War College Special Assistant to the Chairman Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired Joint Chiefs of Staff Melbourne, Florida Dr. Charles Krupnick Dr. Kendall K. Brown US Army War College NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth RAND Brig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, Retired Monument, Colorado Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun US Army War College Dr. Karl P. Magyar Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Mark Clodfelter National War College Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. James Corum USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Jerome V. Martin Command Historian Dr. Conrad Crane Headquarters US Strategic Command Director, US Army Military Studies Institute Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Dik A. Daso Northrop Grumman Corporation National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution Prof. John H. Morrow Jr. University of Georgia Dr. William L. Dowdy Dr. Daniel Mortensen Alabama State University USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired and Education USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Prof. James Mowbray Brig Gen Charles Dunlap Jr., USAF USAF Air War College Staff Judge Advocate Dr. Karl Mueller USAF Air Combat Command RAND Dr. Stephen Fought Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF Air War College USAF Air Command and Staff College Col David M. Glantz, USA, Retired Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Journal of Slavic Military Studies Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF Dr. Reina J. Pennington USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Norwich University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Thomas R. Searle Ohio State University Headquarters US Special Operations Command Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. James Smith Center for Strategy and Technology USAF Institute for National Security Studies Air University Col James Spencer, USAF, Retired Prof. Daniel Hughes USAF Academy USAF Air War College Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Thomas Hughes Toffler Associates USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. James Titus Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF USAF Academy Commander, 614th Space Operations Group Director of Operations, Fourteenth Air Force Col Mark Wells, USAF USAF Academy Dr. Tom Keaney School of Advanced International Studies Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell Johns Hopkins University Christiansburg, Virginia Prof. Theodore Kluz Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air War College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

3 Foreword

Last year the RAF and the US Air Force were once again side by side over the skies of Iraq. During 21 days of combat, we demonstrated the power of organized and integrated air and space forces in joint and coalition warfare. We did not do it alone, but we contributed more than our fair share to enable the rapid success of ground forces. At the same time, we were able to join with our special operations forces—air and land—to keep activity in western Iraq from interfering with the main effort. In close coordination with ground forces, air- power prevented enemy attempts to mount coordinated or coherent resistance. These efforts on the part of coalition Airmen were largely outside the media spotlight and beyond public recognition. But make no mistake; our Airmen were key to the swift and overwhelming military victory. What made it work, and what must we do to get better? We can point to three major leveraging capabilities. First, we must make integration work. Integration is more than being “net-centric” or a “common operat­ ing picture” or “information sharing.” It’s about the ability of machines to direct the Gen John P. Jumper activities of other machines to produce Chief of Staff rapid target location and identification. We United States Air Force are far from having this right, but we did make tremendous progress during the dust storm in Operation Iraqi Freedom, where traditional stand-alone platforms—manned, unmanned, and space—were lashed to­ gether in a real-time network that located and destroyed Iraqi forces moving to rein­ force depleted Republican Guard divisions. Second is our growing ability to predict and persist. We are at the infant stages of prediction, but better tools will produce

4 the “battlefield forensics” for us to analyze patterns and draw logical conclusions about enemy options. Persistence is a tremendous leveraging capability. The evolution of re­ motely piloted and unmanned vehicles will give us 24-hour persistence to stare at an area and study patterns of activity, as well as deliver precise target location and identifi­ cation to manned aircraft. Our third com­ petitive advantage is our people and our training. Fifty years of NATO interoper­ ability and bilateral advanced training have allowed us to minimize the nagging barri­ ers to communications, terminology, and basic airmanship. Fourteen years of contin­ gency operations have kept our skills fresh, our tactics current, and our mutual respect strong. Bonds between the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force have never been stronger. Especially in the past 14 years, we have shared the skies during all major con­ tingency operations. Practice and hard work have built this partnership, and we re­ quire more practice and hard work to keep it strong. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup You will note that the current editions of Chief of the Air Staff both RAF Air Power Review and Air and Space Royal Air Force Power Journal contain the same lead articles. These articles are meant to stimulate our thinking, encourage frank dialogue, and make us all better. Airmen have always ac­ cepted the realities of changing conditions with adaptable tactics and flexible doc­ trine. In our ever increasingly complex and dynamic world, we will rely on agile think­ ing more than ever. With that in mind, we commend this publication to you.

5 APJAPJ

Past Trends and Future Plans

LT GEN DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF DR.CHRISTOPHER J. BOWIE

HEN CONDUCTING AIR Force Air Force and government over a tumultuous strategic planning, we pay par­ half century. This stack of bands tells the epic ticular attention to key historical story of dramatic, strategic shifts: the end of trends. The powerful forces driv­ the New Look and the beginning of flexible ingW these trends may prove difficult to change response, the Vietnam conflict, the Reagan or deflect, so analyzing the direction in which buildup in the 1980s, the demise of the Soviet these vectors are moving may offer a window Union and end of the Cold War, the first Gulf into the Air Force’s future. This short analysis War, the Serbian conflict of 1999, the terrorist examines historical tendencies in Air Force attacks in 2001, and the recent operations in resource allocation to mission/capability areas, Afghanistan and Iraq. We believe that the chart the implications they hold for future invest­ provides revealing insights into the changing ment and policy decisions, and policies the nature of Air Force resource-allocation patterns Air Force might pursue to increase future US over this turbulent period and the difficult joint -force capabilities more efficiently and strategic-investment decisions that lie ahead. effectively. To create this relational, historical look, we In an unprecedented parsing of Air Force organized the data into three broad capability spending patterns from 1962 to 2009 (the end areas: of our current detailed-planning horizon), 1. Foundations (activities underpinning the the Air Force’s Strategic Planning Directorate overall organization but not attributable categorized nearly 900 individual programs to a specific capability or system, such as into broader, more telling mission and func­ headquarters, training, health care, gen­ tional areas.1 The result is a single, simple chart eral research and development, security, (fig. 1) that depicts the net result of thousands base-operating support, and environ­ of decisions made at the highest levels of the mental and quality-of-life programs)

6 PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PLANS 7

100 Special Operations Forces Fighter 25

31 Forces 80 Bomber Joint Combat ICBM Munitions 2 60 Space Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C ISR) 33 45

Air C2ISR Enablers 40 Airlift QualityQuality ofof Life/Other Life/Other Support Support Defense Health ProgramTankers Maintenance 20 36 Base Operations Support Environment 30 Percent of Total Obligation Authority Obligation Authority of Total Percent Test and Training Foundations Foundations Joint-Support 0 Headquarters FY62–71 FY72–81 FY82–91 FY92–01 FY04–09

Figure 1. Five decades of USAF resource allocation. Reductions in joint combat forces and foundations paid for increased emphasis on joint enabling forces.

2. Joint-support enablers (capabilities used striking illustration of the Air Force’s growing by all the services and the Office of the investment in joint-support forces, such as air­ Secretary of Defense, such as airlift; refu­ lift, refueling, and air-breathing/space-based eling; and command, control, communi­ C4ISR. These accounts grew from 33 percent cations, computers, intelligence, surveil­ to 45 percent of the Air Force budget. lance, and reconnaissance [C4ISR]) The growth in these mission areas has come at the expense of the “foundations” and 3. Joint combat forces (such as fighters, what we traditionally think of when we con­ bombers, special operations, ballistic sider airpower: combat forces. Current, con­ missiles, and munitions) ventional combat forces are far more lethal, To highlight broad trends, we aggregated by thanks to advanced aircraft, precision weapons, decade and displayed the results as a function and modern C4ISR, but spending on these of percentage of the total Air Force budget. forces has declined from 31 percent of the Looking at the broad capability areas— total Air Force budget in the 1960s to about foundations, joint-support enablers, and joint 25 percent in this decade. At the same time, combat forces—we found several interesting our combat-force capability has increased by features. For example, spending on founda­ several orders of magnitude. tions has declined from about 36 percent of The layperson (or even an informed the total budget in the 1960s to about 30 per­ observer) who contemplates the future of the cent in the current decade. So the constant Air Force tends to look at force levels of combat drives for efficiency that characterize Air aircraft, such as the number of fighter wings or Force operations have had substantial payoff. the inventory of such aircraft. In reality, this The two remaining categories—joint-support capability area represents only a small percent­ enablers and joint combat forces—provide a age of the Air Force budget. Taken to its logical 8 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 extreme, for example, cutting all combat air­ C4ISR systems will place additional pressures craft, munitions, and ballistic missiles in the Air on other elements of the Air Force. Force would reduce its total budget by about Our combat forces face similar pressures. only one-fourth—and would undermine US We will need to replace (or substantially refur­ joint-combat capabilities. (For example, bish) our intercontinental ballistic missiles, inability to control the air would greatly most of them procured in the 1960s, within 20 increase risks to any future joint operation.) years or so. The bomber force is showing its Looking out several decades, we see that age, even as demand for long-range strike these trends hint at the issues likely to chal­ grows—and development of a new strike sys­ lenge future decision makers. We will continue tem would demand a substantial increase in to strive to increase peacetime operating effi­ resources. The legacy fighter force is aging out ciency in the foundations, but the data indi­ fairly rapidly due to the procurement “holi­ cates that the “low-hanging fruit” has already day” in the 1990s and heavy usage in forward- been plucked. Gaining additional increases presence and combat operations since the Gulf in efficiency will undoubtedly become more Wars. As the F/A-22 and F-35 enter service and difficult. planners begin to exploit the exciting new On average, Air Force resource allocation opportunities offered by unmanned combat to the joint-support area has grown by 0.26 aircraft, spending in this area will also likely percent per year.2 If this trend continues, in grow. another 20 years spending on this area would Overall, we are seeing modernization consume more than half of the Air Force requirements for almost all capability elements budget—a likely prospect, given future mod­ over the next several decades. This situation ernization needs in joint support. Specifically, will pose many problems for Air Force decision airlift is critical to the rapid deployment and makers in the coming years—difficulties that the anticipated fiscal environment will only supply of US forces around the world; the exacerbate. For instance, by 2010 or so, retire­ ongoing C-17 and C-130J programs show little ment of the first wave of baby boomers will indication of a decline in spending for some drive up entitlement spending substantially. time to come. Similarly, tankers are essential From 2010 to 2030, an estimated 30 million to deployment and combat operations of all Americans will pass the age of 65 but only 10 the services. The aging condition of the KC-135 million new workers will enter the workforce. fleet means that the currently planned KC-767 As the largest discretionary account, defense lease or buy is likely only a first step in tanker- spending could come under intense pressure force recapitalization that will require sus­ to meet entitlement demands. tained spending in this area. How should the Air Force move ahead? 4 Air C ISR comprises such air-breathing One obvious place to start is seeking addi­ assets as RC-135s, E-8 ground-surveillance tional efficiencies in the foundations area. platforms, E-3 airborne warning and control The upcoming efforts of the Base Realign­ systems, U-2s, the Global Hawk and Predator ment and Closure Commission will play a key unmanned aircraft, and the E-10 multimission role as we adjust our basing infrastructure to command and control system. Space C4ISR match forces and strategy. As noted previ­ includes satellite constellations for weather, ously, however, we will probably encounter missile warning, global positioning, commu­ limitations on the potential to achieve further nications, various spaceborne sensors (such dramatic reductions in infrastructure. as the proposed space-based radar), and the Determining the right balance of capabili- launch systems to put these craft into orbit. ties—both old and new—lies at the core of Ground, naval, and air forces all require these the Air Force’s capabilities-based planning capabilities to transform and conduct effec­ process, which utilizes concepts of operations tive operations. But developing and fielding to determine investment priorities. Broadly PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PLANS 9 speaking, our strategy involves transforma- how we do mobility that, to meet increased tion—using concepts of operations, divestiture, requirements, we now plan to purchase 180 reorganization, exploitation of technology, C-17s—perhaps even more. and fully resourced modernization. By divest­ Such an approach could apply equally to ing selected legacy systems that are relatively combat and joint-support forces. For example, inefficient and resource-intensive, and then increasing the crew ratios for fighter, airlift, implementing innovative organizational con­ tanker, and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft would structs (such as more tightly integrating maximize operational potential. Fully sup­ active, Guard, and Reserve units), we can use porting air operations centers with sufficient technology to upgrade some of these systems numbers of trained personnel and expanding to do new things. We can also fully resource the “reachback” capabilities to evaluate data the new capabilities with crews, maintenance collected by unmanned aircraft and orbiting personnel, spares, and other support to take satellites would also dramatically increase full advantage of our investment. joint capabilities. Maximizing these future We are certainly using legacy systems in capabilities will require increased integration ways rarely considered before. For example, of our active, Guard, and Reserve components combining technology such as the global to ensure that we have the right people in the positioning system and the Joint Direct Attack right place at the right time. Munition with the expert skill of Airmen on the Balancing legacy-force upgrades/reductions ground, B-1s and B-52s successfully neutralized with modernization will be difficult. But the and destroyed enemy forces in Afghanistan direction of the trends outlined here indicates and Iraq—even those close to friendly forces. that this is the best available option in the face The new systems coming online—the C-17, of emerging resource constraints. If we hold on F/A-22, F-35, KC-767, E-10A, Global Hawk, to the whole range of legacy systems, increasing Predator, air operations center, transforma­ operations/support costs will consume our tional communications, and others—will offer scarce modernization funding, and decreasing much higher reliability, availability, and capa­ availability will limit our ability to support US bility than current legacy elements. We must national security. We need to transform. Specifi­ meet the challenge of taking full advantage of cally, we must utilize capabilities-based planning these new capabilities. to establish priorities, upgrade some legacy sys­ The C-17A offers a useful example. In the tems to do new things, divest other “legacy” ele­ 1990s, we decided to procure 120 of these air­ ments to free up resources, modernize, and craft to replace our 265 C-141s; at the time, then fully resource new capabilities by using organizational changes to active and Reserve many people expressed concerns regarding units to maximize their potential. Such an the ability of a smaller, more capable fleet to approach will increase the capability of the Air substitute for a larger, less capable force. Force’s joint-combat and support forces—and Today, however, no one would want to trade the capability of the joint force as a whole. ■ the C-17s for the C-141s. The new aircraft fea­ tures much higher availability rates, requires a much smaller number of backup aircraft, Notes and offers substantially lower operating costs 1. Our thanks to John P. Wykle of Science Applica­ overall to transport the same amount of cargo. tions International Corporation and to Lt Col Peter Bonanno, Lt Col Micah Killion, and Maj Leanne Henry To exploit the capabilities of the new system, of the Air Force’s Long-Range Plans Directorate (XPXP). the Air Force increased the crew ratio for the 2. In the 47 years considered, the percent of the Air C-17 to 5.0 (compared to the C-141’s ratio of Force budget spent on joint support has grown from 33 3.6) and enhanced a host of support functions to 45. Dividing the difference (12 percent) by 47 yields that enable the new system to provide much an average of 0.255 percent per year. 3 3. Even if we increased the C-141 crew ratio, the greater capability than did the C-141s. The older aircraft’s limited availability and decreasing relia­ program proved so successful in changing bility prohibit us from taking a similar approach. APJ

LT COL PAUL D. BERG,EDITOR Introducing the Arabic ASPJ

IR AND SPACE Power Journal has pub­ countries in Latin America, Europe, and Africa lished editions in English, Spanish, for decades. Allied air forces, armies, and and Portuguese since the 1940s. We navies often use ASPJ International articles for are excited to announce the appear­ instructional purposes in their academies and Aance of an Arabic edition, scheduled to begin staff colleges. Officials of foreign governments publication in January 2005. The editors of the also find them useful. We hope that the Arabic ASPJ International journals, who are regional ex­ ASPJ will prove equally valuable to at least 22 perts and native speakers, select articles for Middle Eastern and African nations. each issue, tailoring the content to their par­ Join the thousands of readers worldwide ticular audience. Typically, some of these pieces who have signed up for free e-mail subscrip­ are translations of English ASPJ articles, but tions to the English or Spanish ASPJ ! Sub­ many are written by Spanish or Portuguese scribers receive quarterly e-mails containing a authors. A native of Colombia, Lt Col Lou table of contents with links to full-text articles Fuentes, USAF, retired, who edits the Spanish in each new issue. The service is perfect for de­ ASPJ, served in US Southern Command and ployed Airmen who want to keep up with the maintains numerous high-level military con­ latest thought in airpower and space power. tacts throughout Latin America. Mr. Almerisio E-mail subscription is easy. For the English Lopes, a native of Brazil and editor of the Por­ Journal, log on to the “Subscription Center” at tuguese ASPJ, is well connected with senior the Air Force Link Web site http://www.af.mil/ leaders in the Brazilian and Portuguese air subscribe, select the “sub[scribe]” radio button forces. The editor of the Arabic ASPJ, 2d Lt for Air and Space Power Journal, enter your name Basma Abdul-Hamid, possesses equally impres­ and e-mail address, and then click the “submit” sive credentials. A native of Baghdad, she grew button. You will immediately receive an e-mail up in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, immigrated to the asking you to reply in order to confirm your United States in 1989, and became an Ameri­ subscription. You won’t receive your subscription can citizen. Highly educated and experienced, unless you reply to that message. For the Spanish she holds a master’s degree from Northeastern Journal, select “Air and Space Power Journal (en University in Boston and formerly served as a español).” Of course, you may subscribe to security forces officer at Keesler AFB, Missis­ both editions if you wish. sippi. For the inaugural edition of the Arabic The ASPJ editorial staff is always seeking in­ ASPJ, Lieutenant Abdul-Hamid has selected sightful articles and book reviews, so you have and translated previously published English many opportunities to contribute to your Jour­ ASPJ articles about the formulation of US na­ nal. We offer both hard-copy and electronic- tional security strategy, military strategy, and air publication opportunities. To submit an article and space strategy. She is soliciting articles from for publication, please refer to the submission Arabic-speaking airmen worldwide and will instructions at http://www.airpower.maxwell. publish them in upcoming quarterly issues as af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. To write a they become available. book review, please refer to the guidelines at The Spanish and Portuguese ASPJ editions http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air have met the needs of military services in 24 chronicles/bookmain.html. ■

10 APJ

GROUP CAPT CHRISTOPHER J. FINN, RAF, EDITOR, RAF AIR POWER REVIEW LT COL PAUL D. BERG, USAF, EDITOR, AIR &SPACE POWER JOURNAL British-American Cooperation in Airpower and Space Power

LLIANCE AND COALITION opera- differences in page layout as well as the inclu­ tions—a long-standing, important sion of articles and reviews unique to each one. aspect of military affairs—remain To view Air and Space Power Journal online, go vital in today’s global war on terror. to http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air SomeA alliances and coalitions have succeeded, chronicles/apje.html. RAF Air Power Review is but others have failed miserably. The United available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/ States and United Kingdom have enjoyed a documents.html. mutually beneficial partnership for a consid­ The editors hope that these special issues erable time but have also suffered significant give British and American Airmen fresh in­ tensions and disagreements. Such problems sights into the dynamics of alliance and coali­ seem as endemic to international alliances as tion operations. To make those discernments they are to marriages. Successful alliances and meaningful, the feature articles point out the coalitions, like good marriages, overcome dis­ rough spots as well as the happy times in agreements and find ways to cooperate in Anglo-American relations. Sustaining a suc­ pursuit of common goals. As today’s American cessful coalition military effort requires that and British Airmen ponder how best to coor­ leaders adopt a long-term strategic perspec­ dinate their activities with colleagues from al­ tive to help them focus on the really impor­ lied nations, they will find it useful to study tant things and discount short-term distrac­ how their predecessors integrated operations tions. Consequently, the feature articles span over the years. nine decades of war and peace, giving today’s Toward that end, the editors of RAF Air Airmen an appreciation of how their ante­ Power Review and Air and Space Power Journal cedents’ experiences have shaped the current have prepared this special joint issue. Both journals contain the same feature articles Anglo-American relationship. written by a mixture of British and American Some people have called the US-UK part­ authors. To retain the articles’ unique national nership “special,” perhaps because of shared flavors, the British contributors convey their historical experiences, culture, language, and thoughts in “the King’s English,” complete personal friendships. Yet some of the trends with British spelling and terminology, while evident in the ways British and American Air­ the American authors employ US spelling men have cooperated can help both nations and style. Since both ASPJ and RAF Air Power become more successful in forming coalitions Review traditionally include book reviews, with other nations. The future of US-UK rela­ readers will find that these issues have four re­ tions in airpower and space power looks views in common—two by US and two by UK bright. Let it serve as an example of what writers. However, they will also note that the other Airmen can do together if they set their journals are not identical, a fact reflected by minds to it. ■

11 APJ

We encourage your comments via letters to the editor or com two operations, my squadron mates exempli­ ment cards. All correspondence should be addressed to the fied the highest example of integrity first and Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault service before self. In either rescue, the author’s Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. You can also send limited situational awareness did not allow your comments by e-mail to [email protected]. We re him to perceive that members of the downed serve the right to edit the material for overall length. aircrews’ formation supported them until they THE REST OF THE STORY were recovered. As for my own rescue, my wingman—with no gun and no ordnance— My compliments to Dr. David Mets on his ex­ repeatedly made 100-foot dry passes, dropping cellent review of Ed Rasimus’s book When his wing tanks and lighting his afterburner Thunder Rolled: An F-105 Pilot over North Vietnam over enemy ground forces in an attempt to in your spring 2004 edition (124–25; see also keep their heads down and slow their progress http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air toward me and my weapons-systems operator chronicles/bookrev/rasimus.html). I have until Jolly Green pilot Leland Kennedy and read the book twice and, with the exception his crew picked us up. We were not, as Rasimus of chapter 16, agree with Dr. Mets’s assessment described us, “another abandoned Phantom that it is a good one. In his introduction, crew.” Rasimus states that “this is a memoir, not a I also feel obligated to comment on the au- history. It is my recollection of the people, the thor’s denigration of members of his own places, and the events. These stories are all squadron, although this matter is not directly true. . . . I’m telling you what I felt and related to correcting errors about mine. Maybe thought. . . . Others may view the events from when we were a bit immature, we made fun of another perspective, but this is mine.” I view a some person who was an easy target. Perhaps couple of the events he describes in chapter that was part of our culture, but it is not some­ 16 from a decidedly different perspective, thing that ages well. That kind of behavior was having participated in one and having sub­ not good then and should be considered a foul stantial knowledge of another. when it is documented in a public record that As an Air Force officer, now retired, I know will forever disparage a person’s memory to his that our institution has long recognized the friends and family—even more so when that timeless military ethic of integrity, honor, loy­ someone paid the ultimate price in service to alty, and selfless service. In 1966 I was a mem­ our nation. ber of the 433rd Tactical Fighter Squadron I hope that your readers who examine (TFS), flying F-4Cs out of Ubon Air Base, When Thunder Rolled will be more comfortable Thailand. My squadron is the subject of two knowing that the ethics that our institution stories that describe the shootdown and rescue currently values are timeless and commanded of “Tempest Three” and “Avenger Three,” both respect during this particular era of our air- in October 1966. I still have a good memory power history. From this fighter pilot’s point of those events, having been a squadron mate of view, the great heroes of the Vietnam War to the aircrews of Tempest Flight and the pilot were our POWs, who kept their faith, resolve, of Avenger Three. and patriotism, as well as the rescue guys from Ed Rasimus’s storytelling, which I choose all the services, who flew low in slow-moving to believe represents the truth as he knew it, helicopters, A-1Es, and forward-air-controller unfortunately impugns the honor and integrity aircraft. They epitomized our core values. of the 433rd TFS Airmen. My purpose is to set Col Lacy W. Breckenridge, USAF, Retired that part of the record straight. During the Lufkin, Texas

12 APJ

I just want to say this. I want to say it gently, but I want to say it firmly. There is a tendency for the world to say to America, “The big problems of the world are yours; you go and sort them out,” and then to worry when America wants to sort them out. —Prime Minister Tony Blair The Current Battle Damage Assessment Paradigm Is Obsolete

LT COL HUGH CURRY, USAF*

URING OPERATION IRAQI Freedom, the reporting of battle damage assessment (BDA) was neither fast enough nor adequate for operational commanders to make timely, informed decisions.1 This problem is nothing new. Although we saw the Dsame sort of debilitating core difficulties with BDA in after-action reporting from Operations Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, and Allied Force, we cannot blame the folks doing the job. The BDA analysts do the best they can to produce timely, accurate, and relevant assessments. The problem lies with the current BDA standard, which evolved from the attrition-based warfare conducted during World War II. Issues with BDA in Iraqi Freedom— nearly identical to findings identified in after-action reports of operations over the last 13 years—include inadequate tracking of mission execution; lack of a common BDA database; lack of BDA education and training; problems created by modern warfare’s unprecedented speed, scope, and scale; and the low priority of BDA collection. Unfortunately, we had not resolved these matters by the time Iraqi Freedom began, although much well-intended time, effort, and money had gone into solving problems associated with legacy doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The type of warfare waged during Iraqi Freedom—characterized by technology- enabled effects-based planning and execution in a hyperoperations-tempo battlespace—has made the current BDA paradigm obsolete. In short, modern warfare begs for a new effects-based assessment approach, which the current BDA paradigm cannot provide.

*The author is chief of the Intelligence Requirements Certification Office, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC. A former enlisted member of the US Army Infantry, he is a career USAF intelligence officer, having served as a targets- intelligence officer or targeteer since 1995.

13 According to Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, dated 17 January 2002, which describes the assessment terms and processes used by the joint community, the combatant command’s staff members are responsible for all assessments produced during campaigns executed in its theater of operations (III-1, -4, -7). They typically assign teams of analysts to validate all assessments, including tactical assessments produced by the components. These processes described in current doctrine have their origins in World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War legacies of slow, deliberate, nonintegrated, sequential, attrition-based campaigns. Such a mind-set has unnecessarily forced the joint force commanders’ (JFC) staffs into confirming tactical, kinetic attacks at the expense of evaluating whether or not missions have produced broader lethal/nonlethal operational- and strategic-level effects that meet theater objectives. This legacy depends upon “pictures” or electro-optical images to definitively confirm kinetic attacks on targets. Historically, analysts rely on the delivery of images that normally come from national technical means, which typically causes assessment to lag behind the pace of modern operations. Thus, the combatant commander might unnecessarily delay operations while waiting on individual images of tactical targets. To speed up delivery of the product, we can compress the process timeline by decentralizing responsibility for tactical assessment down to the component designated by the JFC to produce specific tactical effects. The component analysts, including weapons-effects experts, have more familiarity with effects generated by their own organic kinetic and nonkinetic weapons and rely on empirical evidence gathered in near real time by their organic sensors. Using predetermined tactical indicators, they can then make more timely assessments, based on how well attacks achieved the predicted tactical effects. In turn, the JFC staffs, integrating component tactical assessments, can concentrate on evaluating the production of higher-level operational effects, based on predetermined operational indicators. This has always been the intent. However, because the JFC staffs stay busy confirming tactical attacks on targets, they cannot concentrate on verifying higher-level lethal and nonlethal effects. Clearly, at a minimum, we need to reevaluate doctrine in light of the modern capability to create operational effects at a faster pace. Collaborative system-automation tools can resolve many of these problems. After Desert Storm, we emphasized development of an automated, collaborative targeting-database software application that included access to BDA data and reporting, independent of the location of users and distributed BDA producers. Regrettably, after a decade of work, the application has not yet met all user requirements. We must continue the development, certification, and deployment of an assessment- database application interoperable with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Modernized Integrated Database and databases resident in the Theater Battle Management Core Systems, as well as other component command

14 and control systems. Such an application is vitally important to the combatant commands and those distributed BDA producers tasked with supporting them. It will enable BDA-production organizations to deconflict production, making them more efficient and timely. Following certification and deployment of the database, we must populate the data fields not only with assessments but also mission-related data. After the removal of Saddam Hussein, staff members at US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) have repeatedly stated that if they had just had a reliable way to track every executed air-to-ground mission, they could have completed some rudimentary but timely assessments, based on the reliability and accuracy of modern precision weapons. The dynamic nature of the battlespace further exacerbated the situation. Coalition ground forces maintained constant, close contact with the enemy from the first day of the war. To support the ground scheme of maneuver, CENTAF planners continually changed preplanned targets and scheduled on-call missions that launched without such targets. Since we had no effective automated system or process to fully track the hundreds of changed targets or those attacked by on-call missions, members of the CENTAF assessment staff became overwhelmed early in the war when they attempted to track missions manually—the first step in assessment. BDA production immediately fell behind and never fully recovered. Therefore, an automated air-mission tracker system that autopopulates the assessment database with mission- related data by communicating machine-to-machine with weapons and sensor platforms is essential to the conduct of efficient and timely BDA. This type of system will also help alleviate the BDA-collection issue. However, it will not completely solve it since we cannot preplan and task collections for these dynamic missions. Current methods and capabilities will never be effective for a war like Iraqi Freedom. Obviously, we need to explore and develop other approaches to gather postattack information, including self-assessing weapons, platforms not typically associated with assembling postattack data, and sensors other than those used for electro- optical imaging. Following an attack, after mission-related data from sensor platforms is parsed into the assessment database—independent of method or platform—and autocorrelated with the air-to-ground, mission- related data, BDA analysts can “pull,” fuse, and exploit collected data on high-priority targets. This procedure has the added benefit of giving planners and targeting personnel better situational awareness of attacked targets, making ongoing planning more effective. Another automated-assessment solution involves computer-modeling entire target systems. Most combatant commands and supporting intelligence agencies produce some type of analysis product used to model such systems with software-application tools already developed by the military and private industry. Modeling can provide better insight into the location of critical nodes and vulnerabilities, making predictive-effects analysis a reality and target selection more effective. Relying on analysts’

15 interpretations of these nodes and vulnerabilities, the models could run simulated missions and packages based on documented weapons effects to predict the operational-level cumulative and cascading effects of air operations across the theater. These models could also come into play after a day’s worth of dynamic missions, involving aircraft launching with no preplanned targets, to provide at least a basic assessment of how well the missions cumulatively met operational-level objectives. Of course, this depends upon knowing the location of all mission taskings in the first place, which, as mentioned previously, requires automation. In the future, long-term assessment will compare how well the computer model predicted actual tactical, operational, and strategic effects, thus producing more reliable data points that we can use to correct the models and make them more accurate. Conceivably, a computer-modeled predictive assessment may represent the only short-term appraisal available in the integrated, hyperoperations-tempo battlespace of the future. Having some sort of measured, near-real-time, operational predictive assessment is better than no assessment at all (usually the case under the current paradigm). We have always had concerns about education and training in BDA. Since this type of assessment occurs only in wartime, peacetime training is usually nonexistent or sporadic at best. During most peacetime training, BDA-related reporting follows a script, and dissemination occurs in near real time so the event doesn’t get bogged down while we wait on the report. Additionally, we make no attempt to do analytical-assessment training since, routinely, an experienced control group performs assessment to keep the event moving and focused on the primary learning objectives, which typically don’t include BDA. This scenario tends to create unrealistic expectations in the minds of commanders as well as the planning and execution staffs. More realistically, BDA scripting for war games and exercises should make the commander realize that in-depth assessment will not be timely and that short-term assessment, depending on the commander’s time constraints, may not be wholly complete or accurate. However, in a time crunch, analysts must learn the importance of making the best assessment possible, based on the limited information available— and commanders need to know this. We should make these principles major learning objectives of both war games and exercises. Furthermore, we should incorporate tactical- and operational-assessment analysis, including weapons-effects training, into continuation training for intelligence-production centers tasked with producing wartime assessments—and then we should evaluate such training during inspections. Doing so will force leaders in the chain of command to ensure that their personnel have the proper time, tools, and education to fulfill a primary wartime task. In the hyperoperations-tempo battlespace of the future, long-term, in-depth assessment may have no relevance to commanders by the time they receive it, since operations probably will have moved on. However, intelligence-production centers

16 should prepare themselves to carry out this task since we will still need long-term, in-depth assessment at the conclusion of operations or in the event that they stall. Iraqi Freedom moved too fast and furiously for our cumbersome assessment paradigm, currently based on an attrition-based mind-set, stressing the entire cycle to its breaking point. Combatant commands and their assigned functional components should face the fact that our assessment doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures need an effects- based, technology-enabled revision to go along with effects-based planning and execution. Since no one has ever deemed BDA particularly successful, we have no “best practices” to emulate and record in doctrine. While we still have time before the next crisis and while the problem has the attention of senior military leaders, we should move immediately to change the current BDA paradigm, in accordance with the type of warfare waged in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the next war, every assessment could become crucial since America might not enjoy the asymmetric advantages of air superiority and seemingly unlimited stockpiles of precision weapons. By developing new assessment processes in doctrine, leveraging automation, creating innovative predictive-modeling tools, and providing accountable education and training, we can provide the boss with more timely, actionable effects-based assessments. The key word here is actionable. If the current assessment paradigm produces nonactionable assessments, then it is obsolete and of no use to the twenty-first-century war fighter who will operate in a time-compressed, hyperoperations-tempo battlespace. ■ Washington, DC

Note 1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 9 June 2004), defines BDA as “the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective” (63). This article uses BDA, the common designation for assessment, interchangeably with the latter term.

17 APJ

The Tale of the C/JFAC C A Long and Winding Road

DR.STEPHEN O. FOUGHT

Editorial Abstract: Although the Royal Air Force and US Air Force followed different paths, they reached similar conclusions about how best to command and control airpower. The British ser­ vice settled the issue early, but the American air arm had to resolve internal debates along the way. Dr. Fought describes how both air forces concluded that expeditionary air forces and a lash-up of the combined/joint force air compo­ nent commander and combined air operations center provided the right structure.

HE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the ciated organizations that possessed air forces. United States and British military This approach, therefore, looks at problems forces endures as one of the most that arose in managing organizational change visible elements of a long-standing during the evolution of service and joint doc­ Tbond between the two countries. Whether this trine by focusing on the various pulls and tugs comes from a common heritage, a reasonably among the players as they sought to bring unity common language, or the fact that our two of effort and unity of command to airpower. nations have fought alongside each other in Since organizational change serves as the all of the major wars of this and the last cen­ guiding principle of this article, one should tury, the net result is a well-developed linkage, briefly discuss that framework. Such change forged from a number of shared understand­ may prove the most difficult task for senior ings and based on mutual trust and respect. leadership. A mature organization—a bureau­ This article explores that linkage with regard cracy with established operational proce- to the air forces of each country, especially as dures—develops a kind of inertia that causes manifested in today’s concept of the com- it to do what it has always done, often without bined/joint force air component commander regard to the responsiveness of that behavior (C/JFACC). to a new situation. A combination of three fac­ The question under examination asks how tors usually precipitates organizational change: both the British and Americans determined (1) looming disaster, especially one accompa­ that central command of air was viable and nied by a shortage of resources (this scenario how they made that finding acceptable to asso­ sometimes forces individuals to set aside orga­

18 nizational [political] differences, albeit only units became groups (I Corps Observation temporarily); (2) abject failure, if it is recog­ Group in April, the 1st Pursuit Group in May, nized and admitted internally (unfortunately, and then a next-higher level called the Ameri­ all too often those who could influence change can Expeditionary Forces [AEF]). By the end from within the organization do not recognize of that year, the AEF had 14 groups, including that failure has occurred); and (3) a powerful observation, pursuit, and two new bombard­ outside force, capable of forcing internal ment units. Slowly but surely, unity of effort change by strength of personality, quantity of emerged through unity of command under resources, or other mechanisms. All of these the AEF. aspects will play out in the long and winding Had the AEF remained extant after the war trail that leads to the modern-day C/JFACC. ended and had the Air Service redeployed to the States, one might have witnessed the gene­ sis of an air organization along the lines of the World War I and RAF (i.e., an independent air arm) and, even­ the Interwar Years tually, a full-fledged, unified/consolidated command and control capability. However, US The tale begins by noting that the US Air forces demobilized after the war (as did the Force (USAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) British); for the Air Service, this process meant sprang from different roots and matured on reabsorption into the lower ranks of the Army opposite sides of the world under different and the partitioning of air assets among the circumstances. The British had the gift of pre­ nine standing Army corps. science, and the RAF leadership demonstrated For the next 10 years, little changed in its skill in organizational survival. Their fore­ terms of unity of command/effort for the Air sight is obvious: the founding of the RAF Service except its name, when the air arm marked “the first time an Air Force had been became the Air Corps in 1926. By 1942 a created anywhere in the world with the inten­ series of gradual changes within the Army tion of conducting air war without reference 1 effected a restructuring in the War Department or subordination to Army or Navy command.” to accommodate three Army commands— British leadership proved equally impressive: Ground, Service/Supply, and Air. At the same even though the RAF was “created with the aim time, naval air remained part of the Depart­ of the strategic bombing of Germany,” Air ment of the Navy. The United States entered Marshal Hugh Trenchard, the first RAF chief World War II with this arrangement, and the of staff, brilliantly kept the fledgling service unity of command/effort issues that surfaced out of an internal squabble with the British in each theater would frame the debate over Army, holding it tightly to the close air support airpower for the next 50 years. (CAS) mission while he changed the essence of the organization from a defensive to an offen­ sive force.2 Because of Trenchard’s genius, the World War II: The Pacific Theater RAF could spend its organizational energies and political capital resolving the problems of In the European theater, the organizational operating with other nations’ air forces—the problem took the form of creating a CFACC US Army Air Corps in particular. (i.e., learning to work with air forces of other On the US side of the pond, the air element nations), and in the Pacific, was dominated by of the armed forces remained embedded in the problems of creating a JFACC (i.e., get­ the Army as the US Air Service, which per­ ting US air to operate in concert). Of the two formed briefly but well in World War I along­ theaters, the Pacific provides the richer set of side its British counterparts. During the war, cases for describing the difficulties the United the Air Service found itself attached to lower- States experienced in achieving the same level units—a factor that presented a challenge degree of success in terms of organizational in terms of unity of effort. In 1918 these air design that the British enjoyed from the out-

THE TALE OF THE C/JFACC 19 set. The Pacific theater, therefore, serves as a Army air assets ashore at Midway under Capt useful basis for examining the organizational Cyril T. Simard (commanding officer of Naval change that led to an independent Air Force Air Station Midway). Most of the robust col­ and, eventually, to the watershed Goldwater- lection of literature on the Battle for Midway Nichols legislation that codified “jointness.” indicates that the two air components (land The United States entered (and exited) and sea) could not coordinate their efforts.3 World War II—in particular, the Pacific the- The question of whether or not better orga­ ater—with its services holding three distinct nization, planning, and training would have views of airpower. Considering airpower inte­ made a difference is moot. The simple fact is gral to naval operations, the Navy maintained that the air assets were in place to achieve that air should remain under the purview of some sort of unity of effort, but no mecha­ the fleet commanders. Further, given the nism existed for causing the pieces to move mobility of naval forces, naval air should fol­ together in an orchestrated manner (air and low suit (i.e., it should not be tied to a particu­ sea-based forces) or even for exploiting rela­ lar land campaign or be subjugated to a ground tive advantages among the land-based forces. commander). The Army’s view of airpower mir­ As a result, the three air elements fought as rored the Navy’s: since air supported ground three independent—although deconflicted— operations, a ground commander should con­ forces. On the positive side, deconfliction trol it. Within the Navy, the Marine Corps had represented an important first step, and the taken exception to the Navy’s concept of opera­ United States earned a dramatic victory. tions from the outset; indeed, after the expe­ In the Solomon Islands, Vice Adm Robert L. rience at Guadalcanal (see below), the Corps Ghormley commanded three task forces—two would have a dedicated air arm for the fore­ afloat and one ashore.4 This lash-up, especially seeable future. Members of the Air Corps, of with its unfortunate geographical proximity course, took a different view—opting for an to MacArthur’s forces, set out a dual chal­ air arm independent of land and sea forces, lenge for Ghormley: coordination of his own with unity of command determining the unity land- and sea-based air forces and coordina­ of effort for the air campaign. In addition to tion between theater commands. Withdrawal these perspectives, three other factors com­ of the carriers from Guadalcanal at D+2, leav­ plicated the use of airpower in the Pacific: (1) ing marines ashore with no air cover for the division of forces (air forces in particular) nearly two weeks, except for the far-distant between Adm Chester Nimitz, commander in aircraft based in the New Hebrides, exacer­ chief of the US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean bated the problem. The Marine Corps has Area, and those of Gen Douglas MacArthur, never forgotten this. The air forces that would commander in chief of the Southwest Pacific eventually arrive at Guadalcanal were a mix of Area; (2) the division of air forces between Marine and Army Air Forces (AAF) fighter- and the Navy and Army; and (3) a lack of either dive-bombers, eventually known as ComAir- training or doctrine from which one could Cactus, commanded by Gen Roy S. Geiger, build a learning curve, leaving joint air opera­ USMC, with headquarters in the New Hebrides. tions in the realm of the ad hoc. These forces operated ashore at Guadalcanal, Stung badly at Pearl Harbor and short on reporting to both Adm John S. McCain (for combat resources, Admiral Nimitz marshaled air) and Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift (as a his forces around the Midway Islands to meet marine in the Solomons). Perhaps surprisingly, and, hopefully, beat the next wave of Japanese it worked reasonably well from the outset and attacks. By coincidence, he controlled two provided partial relief to the crisis situation at major air organizations—the fleet (at sea) Guadalcanal. As the war proceeded, the origi­ assets under the immediate command of Adm nal ComAirCactus concept managed to adapt Frank Jack Fletcher (USS Yorktown and USS its organizational structure and operational Enterprise) and a grab bag of Marine, Navy, and approaches.5

20 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Although beyond the scope of this article, compromise, however, by coining the new term the story of the Solomons is (as before) worth coordination control and by creating a new orga- telling and knowing, especially how ComAir- nization—the joint operations center (JOC). Cactus morphed into ComAirSols; how its Unfortunately, the term coordination was not command alternated among marines, naval compelling, leaving the services free to offer aviators, and AAF Airmen; and how the AAF up for “coordination” whatever excess sorties viewed being under the command of Navy or existed and to accept as “coordinated” those Marine aviation. ComAirSols laid the founda­ sorties they wished to fly in the first place. tion for resolving unity of command/effort Problems with the arrangements for air were because it established a single commander for further compounded over differences in the air who could direct a considerable level of services’ approach to CAS and as the Marine effort toward the broader (theater) campaign. Corps (with its memories of Guadalcanal) Further, the position of single air commander entered the war (the Marines provided air to was not a function of the service-of-origin but 6 the JOC only when the Corps’ assets clearly was accepted by the combatant commanders. exceeded Marine requirements). Unfortunately, the lessons provided and the Nonetheless, the JOC matured over time. framework offered by ComAirSols vanished at Initially formed to address the problem of the end of the war. When the United States coordinating the efforts of Fifth Air Force and began its traditional demobilization, the armed Eighth Army, the JOC would eventually “man­ forces returned to their usual battle over the age” (an intentionally vague term) the air assets budget, but this time the United States added a competitor (a new service—the Air Force) of each service by giving naval air a choice of at a time when resources were shrinking dra- targets; the Marines, as mentioned above, matically.7 The roles, missions, and budget offered air to the JOC when it became avail­ battles that ensued, especially over aviation able. This arrangement allowed each of the assets, would plague US war-fighting efforts services to operate under its concept of the for the next 40 years as each service with air use of air with some modicum of deconflic- assets sought to engrain and protect its own tion—but it clearly fell well short of applying view of airpower. One can again divide the US air in an integrated or synergistic manner to side of the story on unity of command/effort the ground campaign or having a single for airpower into two parts: the Cold War and ground commander control it. a string of “hot” wars (a couple of them, once As in the Solomons, necessity and crisis again, in the Pacific theater). created the opportunity for innovation. Fol­ lowing the massive Chinese assault in late 1950, one would have expected the war-fighting Korean War organizations to find a way to put differences At the outset of the Korean War, a single aside and work together on the issue of scarce commander—Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer, resources (air assets). Such was the case with USAF—had responsibility for air (since only respect to unity of effort but not unity of com­ the USAF was available). However, within a mand. Indeed, operational necessity dictated month, naval air—under Vice Adm C. Turner that the Navy dispatch an officer to the JOC Joy, as MacArthur’s commander of Naval to coordinate air actions and to select targets Forces Far East, which included the US Seventh for naval aviation (still under Navy control). Fleet—entered the fray. Joy resisted incorpo­ The Navy officer in the JOC, however, did not ration under Stratemeyer, insisting instead have the authority to commit naval assets— upon a separate area for naval air, arguing the only to relay requests back to the fleet for reso­ possibility that other events requiring the use lution. On the other side of the coin, Marine of Navy forces in the Pacific made this arrange­ air (ashore) worked fairly smoothly at the ment necessary. They reached a degree of operational level, with Marine air tasked

THE TALE OF THE C/JFACC 21 (daily) through an annex to the Fifth Air end, the war laid open the entire military Force frag order. apparatus for all to examine. The central Though a reasonable idea, the JOC eventu­ argument in both cases concerned the com­ ally fell victim to service cultures. Even under batant commander’s lack of control over com­ the utmost strain, the JOC simply served as a bat operations—but in particular the problems coordinating organization. The most severe dif­ associated with having multiple air forces. ficulties occurred between the Navy and the Air The period following Vietnam was punctu­ Force, the Navy stubbornly holding to its posi­ ated with military and national-security-policy tion that naval air served a higher priority in disasters, including the USS Mayaguez, Desert the theater than the ongoing war and the Air One, the loss of marines in Beirut, and the Force (equally stubbornly) arguing that only a near-chaos (but mission success) in Grenada. single (USAF) air commander could effectively Critics circled the Department of Defense employ air assets during the war effort. (DOD) like vultures, some decrying the Air Force as the problem and claiming that the United States had not won a war since the Vietnam War creation of that service. Dr. Carl Builder, the From 1965 forward, the US effort in Viet­ dean of RAND scholars, noted in his book The nam ramped up sharply. With respect to our Icarus Syndrome that the Air Force seemed to themes of unity of effort/command for air- have lost its way—and certainly its culture—in power, the war represents a dismal failure to the post-Vietnam period. Some, more rational, unite under either banner. Indeed, the war observers blamed “the system,” in that the was a conglomeration of internal battles: over needs of the combatant commanders could CAS and rotary-wing aircraft among the Air only fall victim to interservice rivalries by Force, Army, and Marines; over strategy, target virtue of the organizational structure within selection, and overall priorities among Mili­ the DOD itself. In any case, out of these dol­ tary Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), drums came a powerful outside force—the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which forced the White House; over operational and tactical change upon the DOD (against the will of the control between Strategic Air Command (SAC) services, according to some observers). and Tactical Air Command (TAC) (manifested as a running duel between Seventh Air Force Goldwater-Nichols Act in-theater, charged with prosecuting the air war, and Eighth Air Force in Guam, which The Goldwater-Nichols Department of exercised control over the B-52s through Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 gave con­ Headquarters SAC at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, siderable power to the combatant commander, with no control by Seventh Air Force); and especially in terms of allowing him or her to over “strike” between the USAF and the Navy. organize and employ available forces.8 In the­ To paraphrase our cartoon friend Pogo, “We ory, this gave commanders authority to resolve had met the enemy, and he was us.” issues involving unity of command/effort—and Compromises allowed each participant to it most certainly gave them independence from preserve its mode of operation in lieu of creat­ the service chiefs and, consequently, service ing solutions that better accomplished mission rivalries in favor of conducting the joint fight. objectives. Along the lines of the Korean War’s Furthermore, the act gave the Joint Chiefs of coordination control emerged the concept of Staff responsibility to develop joint doctrine—a mission direction—a term no better defined than level of thought intended to reside above ser­ the earlier one. Predictably, the results proved vice doctrine and one that would define the equally poor. At best, the USAF and Navy joint war fight. achieved a modicum of deconfliction through For the Air Force, Goldwater-Nichols pre­ the route-package (route-pack) system. In the sented a combined threat and opportunity in

22 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 the same bundle. On the one hand, increas­ Desert Storm finally saw a vindication of the ing the power of the combatant commander, “single-manager” concept for the command traditionally from the Army or Navy (the for­ and control of airpower. The success of the mer a doctrine-oriented service), could have JFACC approach came close to capturing the essence of . . . centralized coordination of all relegated the Air Force to a subservient role. air assets under the control of an autonomous On the other hand, the act invited the Air air force command, freed of its dependency Force to come up quickly with a new command on the army. . . . concept—the JFACC—around which the ser­ vice could develop its ideas for unity of com- . . . All of the services accepted, at least in prin­ ciple, the need for a single jurisdiction over mand/effort on the same tier as naval and allied airpower in Desert Storm.10 ground forces. To the betterment of all, oppor­ tunity overcame threat, and the Goldwater- Although the concept worked imperfectly, Nichols legislation moved the US armed ser­ it worked well.11 Perhaps even more impor­ vices down a path toward jointness. tantly, a broad spectrum of the service leader­ As US armed forces performed their various ship accepted the idea of unity of com- organizational minuets, our British colleagues mand/effort, all with an eye toward meeting entered a period during which they too the joint force commander’s (JFC) objectives. appreciated the need for change. Elsewhere in According to Lambeth, this issue, Wing Cdr Redvers T. N. Thompson, As General [Merrill A.] McPeak [chief of staff of RAF, argues that during the Cold War the the Air Force] was quick to note after the shoot­ forces of the United Kingdom (UK) had ing stopped, [Gen H. Norman] Schwarzkopf as become too focused on the North Atlantic the CINC set the cadence of coalition operations, Treaty Organization (NATO) scenario and, and all of the pieces of the war plan were “his with respect to the RAF, too dependent on concept, including the air piece.”. . . As early as November Schwarzkopf was clear about his bless­ main operating bases. Operation Desert Storm ing of the JFACC concept and who had final generated a full realization of the need for authority for making air tasking decisions. He change and caused the term expeditionary to instructed his division commanders, “There’s reenter the RAF vocabulary. In turn, UK forces only going to be one guy in charge of the air: opted for a Permanent Joint Force Head­ [Gen Charles A.] Horner. If you want to fight quarters, within which the RAF would opt for the interservice battles, do it after the war.” a US-like model for command and control Drawing from Williamson Murray’s work Air (the JFACC); this, in turn, would lead to the War in the Persian Gulf, Dr. Lambeth adds one RAF’s developing a fully trained battle staff and other extremely important point: “Even army organizational process—the joint air opera­ generals like Schwarzkopf and [Gen Colin] tions center (JAOC)—to implement the air Powell were looking for broader applications 9 portion of a joint operation. In the meantime, of air power than just supporting ‘the ground we rejoin the story of how the United States commander’s scheme of maneuver.’ ”12 managed to orchestrate the changes directed and facilitated by Goldwater-Nichols. Frames of Reference Gulf War of 1991 Force application had moved from the days of independent air and ground/naval opera­ The first real test of the combatant com­ tions, through a period when deconfliction was manders’ new authority, in terms of resolving the best that one could hope for, and on to a airpower disputes, came in Operations Desert point where integration became possible on a Shield and Desert Storm. As Dr. Ben Lambeth regular basis. In the process, airpower (and notes in The Transformation of American Air space power) began to hold its own and, quite Power, possibly, become the mechanism for true syn-

THE TALE OF THE C/JFACC 23 ergy—the shining hope of joint warfare. In despite what advocates from each command order to achieve this level of capability, both the espoused. When General McPeak took down Air Force and the joint community had to cre­ SAC and TAC in one blow, replacing them ate some new frames of reference. with Air Combat Command (ACC), he did In the joint community, the frame of refer­ the Air Force a service and set in concrete an ence was effects-based operations (EBO). Plac­ institutional structure that could finally con­ ing the JFC’s guidance in terms of creating cer­ centrate on warfare in all its dimensions. tain effects dramatically changes the dialogue Moreover, subsequent USAF leaders could between the JFC and political leaders and begin to develop an expeditionary air force between the JFC and subordinate command­ structure—a design more suited to the needs ers. The change becomes far more significant of a post–Desert Storm world. than taking targeting and weaponeering out of In conjunction with the changes just dis­ the hands of the politicians (as some people cussed, the United States took the opportu­ have suggested). Because EBO is a broad state­ nity after Desert Storm to create a new orga­ ment of intent (rather than a specific choice of nization. Beginning in 1993 and using the method), it actually increases the number of organizational landscape of NATO’s Atlantic options a JFC might present to the political Command (a Cold War creation comprised leadership. Going in the other direction, when of Navy and Marine Corps forces), assets of a JFC communicates via EBO to subordinate the Army (Forces Command) and Air Force commanders, the participants can debate the (ACC) merged with those of the Navy air, ground, and naval approaches on a level (Atlantic Fleet) and Marine Corps (Marine playing field directly related to the mission Forces Atlantic) under Atlantic Command. (i.e., not service parochialisms). EBO is power­ Further, the command was charged with ful stuff and probably key to the synergy of joint training, integrating, and providing forces forces; thus, it is extremely important to the worldwide—the first US-based force to have application of airpower. that responsibility (a force logically parallel The second frame of reference entailed to the United Kingdom’s new Permanent the Air Force’s finding a more flexible mech­ Joint Headquarters). Atlantic Command anism for commanding and controlling its became Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in forces than the mechanical air tasking order 1999—the only unified command with both (ATO) process that mindlessly (some say geographic (closely aligned to NATO) and unresponsively) serviced an infinite target functional responsibilities, the latter being list with a finite set of resources. The “push “transformation” and experimentation. CAS” system developed by General Horner The loop was now complete—there existed during Desert Storm was certainly a start, as a forged concept of operations (EBO), a was the “Black Hole,” but the more robust, mechanism (AOC), and an organizational more accessible air operations center (AOC) structure (JFCOM/ACC) through which air- concept, which developed after the war, power could merge into the joint fight on an fleshed out the process. equal footing with land and sea warfare. Per­ Finally, the Air Force had to settle its internal haps coincidentally (but perhaps not) the two differences between SAC and TAC, a struggle great air powers—the United States and the that colored the service’s contributions to United Kingdom—reached the same conclu­ more serious dialogue with respect to joint sions, albeit via different paths. warfare. By the time the Cold War ended, whatever differences that existed between Implications and Conclusions strategic and tactical airpower had vanished: throughout the hot conflicts of the Cold War, At this point, it is reasonable to propose strategic aircraft bombed tactical targets, and that airpower had run the gamut of attempts tactical events had strategic consequences— at organizational change and had finally

24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 become institutionalized. The seeds planted analysis (i.e., measurement and evaluation over by Billy Mitchell and others at the beginning time). Further, it is likely to be multidimen­ of the century, which grew so naturally in the sional. Unlike observing craters, collapsed United Kingdom under the care of Air Marshal areas, or other damage following attack on a Trenchard, had finally taken root in the United revetment or runway, evaluating effects involves States. They first sprouted in the Solomons, a wide range of considerations. The latter in the face of a looming disaster and shortage include whether or not military operations of resources, but withered in the drought of have succeeded in eliminating (or reducing) demobilization. Over time, culminating in the an adversary’s ability to maintain the support abject failure of Vietnam, even airpower advo­ of the army, the relative cohesion of local cates admitted that something was terribly political leaders, or even the continuity of the wrong—with the US military structure and internal power grid. The bottom line is that most certainly with airpower. Then a powerful we must channel much intellectual energy into outside force, through the instrument of the figuring out how to conduct assessment in Goldwater-Nichols legislation, forced change. order to keep the C/JAOC cycle moving. The world saw the net result in the joint war­ fare of Operations Enduring Freedom and Organizing, Training, and Equipping Iraqi Freedom—and it was awesome. In the end, having traveled a long and wind­ If airpower and the JFC’s plan do in fact come ing road to achieving unity of command/effort together in the C/JAOC, then it is a place for for airpower, the Air Force has three respon­ polished professionals—it is not a pickup sibilities on the horizon—three major-league game. The RAF has wisely recognized and tasks that will prove crucial to institutionaliz­ acted upon this fact, and the USAF cannot ing these hard-fought changes. First, the afford to let it languish, even though taking mechanical aspects of the C/JAOC have to the proper steps will prove very difficult for a work. Second, we must populate the C/JAOC service already feeling the stressful effects of with well-trained individuals who are properly personnel tempo. The ongoing dialogue on organized, trained, and equipped (and reshaping the numbered air forces holds attuned) to the JFC’s requirements. Finally, promise, but no matter how many ways one we must share the C/JAOC with our joint/ arranges the beans, there are still only so coalition/alliance partners. many beans. Counting them isn’t much fun for a bunch of pilots, but at some point they Mechanics have to do it to see if there are enough to fill the task jars sitting on the shelf. If EBO is the framework for synergy at the JFC level and if the AOC (C/JAOC) is the Air Sharing the Wealth Force’s method of achieving unity of com- mand/effort, then assessment is the linchpin Finally, if the AOC (C/JAOC) is the key to com­ that keeps the mechanisms moving together. manding and controlling airpower, then will Otherwise the system comes apart, and the the USAF allow members of another service to C/JAOC defaults to the earlier ATO system of command it? In short, does the C/JAOC mindlessly servicing an endless target list with belong to the JFACC or the commander, Air a finite set of resources. The crux is that assess­ Force forces (COMAFFOR)? Once again, our ment of EBO is very difficult—wholly differ­ British friends seem to have thought this out ent than the traditional problem of conduct­ and arrived at the right answer: their JFACC ing battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA is headquarters, including the JAOC, would be a static measure taken instantaneously (e.g., assigned under the Permanent Joint Head­ photo recce, etc.); either a target is damaged quarters. However, as it stands now in the (to a specified degree) or it is not. As a dynamic United States, the relationship remains unclear. process, EBO lends itself better to trend Certainly, though, when a USAF Airman serves

THE TALE OF THE C/JFACC 25 as the JFACC, then he or she commands inde­ USAF fought internal battles, some of pendent staffs to support COMAFFOR and legionary proportions, eventually arriving at JFACC duties. But if, say, a marine is designated the same answers. as the JFACC, would the C/JAOC be brought In the post–Cold War era, both face the up for that marine’s use? One hopes that is the problem of building expeditionary air forces. case, but both joint doctrine and Air Force doc­ Therefore, it should come as no surprise that trine need to make that clear. both nations have reached the conclusion We now return to the original proposition that the C/JFACC concept and the accompa­ that the relationship between the British and nying J/AOC mechanism represent the right American armed forces (in particular, that way to go. Now, having reached the same con­ between the RAF and USAF) is special and clusion, they have an obligation to make it why this is so. In the case of the air forces, the stick—and that means resources. After all, to two nations have faced similar questions with paraphrase a central point made by Com­ respect to achieving unity of command and mander Thompson in his article, “A vision unity of effort. The RAF came up with the without resources is an illusion.” The time has right answers, and it stuck to its positions. The come to press the question of resources. ■

Notes

1. See “13 May 1918,” RAF History Timeline: 1780 to frame of reference (the legislation), and after the legisla­ 1918 Overview, http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/line1780. tion passed, in terms of implementation. Even more inter­ html. esting, a battle ensued within the new Air Force between 2. Ibid. fighter and bomber advocates. This issue may never see 3. One finds many possible reasons for this lack of total resolution, but at least it reached a partial one with the coordination, including problems with operations secu­ creation of Air Combat Command in the early 1990s. rity, a lack of training, and a general unfamiliarity with 8. In addition to the authority to organize and direct each other’s operations. Whatever the reasons, the land- forces, Goldwater-Nichols imbued combatant command­ based air assets launched (on 4 June) in order to survive ers with a more forceful voice in the resource-allocation the Japanese attack; once launched, aircraft characteris­ process, implemented through the Joint Requirements tics (range, payload, etc.) determined their operational Oversight Council. Equally important, it implemented a use. In contrast, the sea-based assets fought a more con­ long-term program for joint education (joint profes­ ventional air-naval battle based on the enemy’s known sional military education [JPME]) and a structure for position. Within the land element, Army, Navy, and Marine adding joint experience (the joint service officer posi­ air fought according to those services’ own doctrines, tions), all of which combined to become wickets through against targets appropriate to their operating procedures. which officers had to pass on their way to promotion to 4. Task Force 61 had three carriers; Task Force 62 general or admiral. Although some services resisted these consisted of an amphibious force with marines embarked; moves, they institutionalized jointness across the spec­ and Task Force 63 included land-based US Navy, Marine, trum of service activities. and Army air forces alongside Royal New Zealand air 9. Readers should study Commander Thompson’s forces. article in detail, paying particular attention to the RAF’s 5. An axiom of organizational decision making decision to permanently staff and train a JFACC head­ under pressure (crisis) holds that professionals usually quarters instead of just a J/AOC. Once again, this issue find a way to make things work, in spite of the organiza­ illustrates the prescience of our British colleagues; we tional structure. Said another way (more appropriate to Americans would do well to follow suit. combat ops), it’s time to put aside pettiness when you’re 10. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of Ameri­ getting your backside shot off. Find time to fight each can Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), other later (and they did). 130. 6. A considerable amount of literature covers the air 11. One certainly encountered a number of imple­ war in the Pacific and the associated command and con­ mentation issues. For instance the daily air tasking order trol issues. The point of reference for the discussions had to be flown out to the fleet since compatible com­ here is James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson’s Joint munications did not exist. However, these sorts of issues, Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, although ugly and difficult to manage, do not refute the 1942–1991 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993). value of the overall concept of a JFACC and an AOC. 7. A “powerful outside force” (i.e., Congress) gener­ 12. Lambeth, Transformation of American Air Power, ated this change with the Defense Reorganization Act of 132–33; and Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian 1947. However, as with any sort of organizational change, it Gulf (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of encountered resistance—at the outset, in terms of the America, 1995).

26 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Aspects of Anglo-US Co-operation in the Air in the First World War SEBASTIAN COX

Editorial Abstract: The United States Army entered the First World War with an air ser­ vice of just over 1,000 men and 200 aircraft, not one of which was suitable for combat. US officers quickly recognised that their new Allies possessed a wealth of resources and experience which could be of great benefit to America’s Airmen. This article recounts the early steps in what was to become a long and continu­ ing history of Anglo-American air power co­ operation in the First World War.

HE HISTORY OF co-operation be­ for combat.1 By September of 1917, Gen John tween Airmen of the British and “Blackjack” Pershing was already planning an American air services in the First air service of 260 frontline squadrons by 30 World War falls very broadly into June 1919.2 If the United States was to build Tthree categories: training and combat opera­ an effective air arm of this size, it was obvious tions, theory and doctrine, and production. to American officers that they should seek to As latecomers both to the war itself and to the obtain the maximum benefit not only from organisation and operation of air forces on a their Allies’ firsthand experience of war, but large scale, the Americans were anxious to also from their military organisations them­ benefit from the hard-won lessons and expe­ selves. In addition, of course, some spirited rience of their British and French Allies. On Americans had entered the service of the Al­ entering the war, the United States had only lies before the US declaration of war in April 130 officers and some 1,000 enlisted men in 1917. The most famous of these served with its aviation service, together with 200 aircraft, the Lafayette Escadrille of the French Air Ser­ not one of which could be deemed suitable vice, but others, as we shall see, had made

27 their way across the Canadian border and and give them initial ground training and found their way into the British Royal Flying basic flying instruction. They would then be Corps (RFC). sent to Britain to complete their training be­ An organisation of the small size of the US fore moving on to combat units.3 aviation section clearly could not expand, using As the Canadian official historian has com­ its own resources rapidly enough to produce mented, “The key to the success or failure of an air arm of sufficient size to meet US wartime RFC Canada lay in recruiting.”4 Hoare had requirements, without drawing on the already always sought to recruit Americans into the large and well-established resources of its Al­ RFC even before US entry into the war, but lies. Furthermore, as the Americans had no US legislation, notably the Foreign Enlist­ aircraft suitable for war, they were also going ment Act of 1818, prevented recruitment on to rely on their Allies to a large degree for ma­ US soil, and potential recruits had to be en­ teriel, and this gave further impetus to the ticed across the Canadian border if they were need to train US personnel not only to fly, but to join up. More remarkable still, however, also to maintain foreign equipment. While were his actions after the US declaration of Americans made strenuous efforts to develop war. On the face of it, the United States’ entry training programmes and facilities in the con­ into the war threatened to turn off the flow of tinental United States, including co-operative US recruits for Hoare’s scheme since patriotic efforts with industry, these were never going Americans might reasonably be expected to to be sufficient to support the rapid expan­ enlist in their own nation’s air service to fight sion and were always hampered by lack of the war rather than that of an Allied country. equipment and instructors. In these circum­ Such was not the case, however, and Hoare stances, US officers turned to their Allies for successfully continued to recruit Americans. assistance. In Britain’s case, this took various The seeds of his success were sown when the forms, but one of the earliest initiatives came United States entered the war and the British from a remarkable British officer—Lt Col ambassador in Washington asked him to meet (later Brig Gen) Cuthbert Hoare, commander with US officers and officials to give them the of the RFC in Canada at the time. Remark­ benefit of his experience in military aviation. ably, Hoare, despite the title of his organisa­ At this meeting, Hoare met Brig Gen George tion and its location in Canada, reported not O. Squier, then the chief signal officer of the to the Canadian government but to the War US Army, but more importantly the man with Office in London. Hoare did not run a Cana­ overall responsibility for the US Army’s nascent dian RFC but was, in effect, operating an en­ air service. A number of initiatives flowed tirely autonomous British military organisation from this initial meeting. Subsequently, in in another nation, and although the Canadian May 1917, Squier visited Hoare in Canada government gave him its co-operation and and told him that the US Air Board would not support and was in turn kept abreast of his ac­ object to the British opening a recruiting of­ tivities, it did not exercise any real control fice in the United States. A British recruiting over these activities. With an officer less able mission was established in New York, ostensibly or less diplomatic than Hoare, national sensi­ to recruit British citizens resident in the United bilities and the sometimes prickly indepen­ States. Hoare went one step further, however, dence, which unthinking British officers could and, working with the mission, opened an of­ all too readily ignite in Dominion nations, fice on Fifth Avenue which actively, if quietly, might well have created friction and conflict. sought to recruit Americans. Hoare himself Hoare’s remit was to establish 20 training units was well aware of the tenuous nature of his in Canada, with their supporting organisation, operation. He told London in September in order to provide a steady stream of man­ 1917, “The situation is this: the British Re­ power for the British frontline Air Service. cruiting Mission has given a written undertak­ His organisation was to recruit the personnel ing not to recruit American subjects; that I

28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 can do so is entirely due to personal influence the military flying-training schools which were at Washington, and though I think I can carry scheduled to open in the States were, unsur­ it through, I cannot possibly give you a defi­ prisingly, very short of instructors and asked nite assurance.” Eventually and inevitably, his whether the RFC in Canada might offer any activities drew the attention of others in assistance. The imaginative Hoare immediately Washington who were not so well disposed as saw the possibility of an arrangement which Squier, and in February 1918, Hoare was forced would help both parties with their differing by the State Department to cease his recruit­ training problems. He told the War Office in ment activities.5 The exact number of recruits London of his plan to train 100 US cadets enlisted via Hoare’s unorthodox activities is during the summer of 1917 in exchange for unknown, but some 300 Airmen are believed facilities for a Canadian training wing (later to have entered the RFC through enlistment increased to two wings) at a southern US train­ via Canada.6 We might legitimately ask why ing base, complete with machines, during the Squier would apparently so readily agree to winter months, when the Canadian schools suitable candidates for his own air service would be all but closed by the weather. Hoare’s being “poached” by the British after the entrepreneurial spirit did not stop there, how­ American entry into the war. The answer, in ever, and he was soon scheming with American all probability, lies in the fact that Squier officers over cocktails at the Raleigh Hotel in knew his own training organisation was inad­ Washington before appearing before the US equate and thought it better to have Ameri­ Aircraft Production Board with a proposal cans trained to fight with the British than not for a far more ambitious reciprocal-training to fight at all. He may have calculated that scheme. Under this scheme, the RFC agreed some at least would become available to the to train 300 pilots; 2,000 ground-crew mem­ American service in due course, and in this bers; and 20 equipment officers, all in addi­ he must have been encouraged by the fact tion to the original 100 pilots from the first that the British agreed to release five experi­ agreement. The trained personnel would then enced US pilots from their own service and be shipped to the United Kingdom (UK), transfer them to the US Army, where they where they would be issued with aircraft and were promptly appointed as squadron com- equipment before proceeding to France, manders.7 Furthermore, through one route where they would come under the control of or another, between 900 and 1,100 Americans the RFC. The original agreement was to lapse ultimately flew with the RFC. These men not in February, but it was extended to April, and only provided a very welcome influx of high- the total number to be trained was now to be quality personnel to the British Air Service sufficient for 18 squadrons.9 but ultimately proved of even more value to Three US squadrons commenced training their homeland, since most of the survivors in Canada and transferred with the Canadians ultimately transferred to the US service, bring­ to three airfields (Benbrook, Hicks, and Ever- ing with them a priceless injection of front­ man Fields) at Camp Taliaferro, near Fort line experience.8 Worth, Texas, in the autumn of 1917. The In addition, Squier did not come away from Canadian cadets occupied Benbrook and his meetings with Hoare fortified only by Everman Fields while the US cadets and the promises—far from it. A more obviously mu­ Canadian aerial gunnery school went to tually beneficial, and thus more sustainable, Hicks.10 An outbreak of influenza and associ­ agreement was also reached between the two ated medical quarantine precautions meant men. Hoare had a problem in that the flying that a proportion of the additional eight US programme at many of his RFC Canada schools squadrons never arrived before the Canadians in Ontario could expect to be badly affected left in April. Nevertheless, there is little doubt by the severe Canadian winter. In his visit to that the scheme was of great benefit to both Hoare in May 1917, Squier had mentioned that the American and British Commonwealth air

ASPECTS OF ANGLO-US CO-OPERATION 29 forces. As a result of the Hoare/Squire agree­ trained in the United Kingdom. The Bolling ments, by April 1918 some 4,800 personnel Commission, led by Maj Raynal Bolling, was were trained for the US air arm. This total in­ despatched from the United States to Europe cluded 408 fully trained US pilots along with in June 1917 to discuss US materiel and equip­ a further 50 who had been partially trained. ment needs, and Bolling discussed the train­ Two thousand five hundred ground personnel, ing of American mechanics with the British officers and men, had been fully trained, with during his visit.16 The first contingent of 53 a further 1,600 part way through their train- men arrived at Liverpool in early September ing.11 The first American squadron left Texas 1917, and others soon followed, including for England on 19 December 1917 with its some diverted from France and Italy.17 The full complement of 25 pilots, and three more 34th Aero Squadron and detachments of 50 followed in each of the next three months, men from an initial seven squadrons, followed thus completing the original agreement to soon after by a further five flying squadrons, train 10 squadrons. The first squadron (17th all landed on the shores of the United King­ Aero Squadron) transferred to France in early dom. Eventually the demand became so great February 1918 and was attached by flights to that a more formalised system was put in frontline RFC squadrons to gain combat ex- place, and in December 1917, the British perience.12 In addition, some 1,500 flight signed a formal Mechanic Training Agree­ cadets had been trained for the British Com­ ment which laid down that 15,000 US me­ monwealth air services. The new chief of the chanics would be shipped across the Atlantic United States Air Service informed Hoare for training by 1 March 1918. The expecta­ that these programmes had “conferred great tion was that the Americans would be trained and practical benefit on the United States Air more quickly than could be arranged in the Service.”13 The methods used in the Canadian United States and that they would enable a gunnery school were subsequently in large similar number of British mechanics to be re­ part adopted by the US Air Service when it leased for service with the RFC in France. opened its own school at Ellington Field, Once trained in the United Kingdom, the Texas.14 Although the original agreement American mechanics would be released for provided for 10 fully trained US squadrons to service in American Expeditionary Force serve with the RFC/Royal Air Force (RAF) in (AEF) units in France at the same rate that re­ Europe, this did not come to pass. Only two placement trainees arrived in the United US Air Service squadrons—the 17th and 148th Kingdom from the United States. These ex­ Aero Squadrons—saw active service with the pectations were never met, largely because British, flying with them until November the problem of shipping 15,000 men safely 1918, when they were absorbed into the US across the Atlantic was never satisfactorily re­ Air Service. One other interesting fact is solved, and by 1 March only some 4,000 had worth noting regarding the Canadian train­ arrived in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, ing scheme: the very first cadets to arrive in however, the programme based in the United Canada for training were from the US Navy Kingdom trained 22,059 men, of whom very and not the Army, and 20 of them completed nearly half were sent on to frontline squadrons their entire training in Canada and did not in France. In the words of one US historian, therefore transfer to Fort Worth. Amongst this programme “made an absolutely vital this initial party of US Navy cadets was James contribution to the development of Air Service, Forrestal, later a distinguished secretary of the AEF, capability in France.”18 The programme Navy and secretary of defense.15 also proved of great benefit to the British—so The Hoare/Squier agreements were not the much so that when the Americans, faced with only mechanisms by which US personnel were a shortage of mechanics in France in May trained by the British Commonwealth, with 1918, sought to post personnel from England, both pilots and ground-crew members being the British pointed out that under the terms

30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 of the agreement, this could not be done be­ Force was also formally tasked with support­ fore replacements had arrived in the pipeline ing the Americans in the subsequent Meuse- from the United States. An American officer Argonne offensive. In both instances, the familiar with the workings of the programme main target of the British bombers was the wrote, “I am firmly convinced that if tomorrow rail networks supporting the German front, the vast majority of American Squadrons were particularly in the area of Metz-Sablon.22 to be removed from England the Royal Air Whilst the links between Mitchell and Force [in the United Kingdom] would be se­ Trenchard resulted in some very obvious and verely crippled and at certain stations their direct co-operation and influence, there were training would come to a complete standstill.” other examples of British influence on US air Eventually the British agreed to the immediate power thinking which are generally less well release of 3,500 mechanics whom the United known but in the longer run perhaps equally States would replace as soon as possible with important. In particular, and in the light of further drafts from the States.19 The first five the shared experience though divergent doc­ squadrons of trained personnel left the United trines of the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) Kingdom for France in June 1918, and there and the RAF in the Combined Bomber Of­ seems little doubt that this could not have fensive in the Second World War, it is of par­ been achieved through any purely US-based ticular interest to note the way in which training programme. American doctrine relating to strategic air If co-operative schemes with the British war against economic targets, so famously ex­ Commonwealth forces made a major contri­ pressed in the Air Corps Tactical School’s inter­ bution to the practical training of the US Air war theorising, had its roots in British think­ Service in the course of the war, the former ing from the First World War. In particular made an equally important contribution to the influential 1917 expression of American the intellectual development of the infant US strategic-bombardment doctrine expounded air arm. William “Billy” Mitchell, a colonel at by Maj (later Col) Edgar Gorrell borrowed di­ the time, was in the vanguard, both in terms rectly and extensively, though without ac­ of developing US air power thinking and in knowledgement, from the writings of Lord establishing links with influential practition­ Tiverton, at the time an officer in the British ers in Europe. Mitchell came to Europe very Air Ministry. Gorrell was appointed as the chief soon after the US entry into the war and spent of the Technical Section of the Air Service, some days with the influential commander of AEF, in August 1917. He developed a strong the RFC in France, Sir Hugh Trenchard. When interest in the concept of strategic bombard­ Mitchell sent two papers on air organization ment and in November 1917 submitted a plan back to General Pershing’s headquarters, he to the new chief of the Air Service, Brig Gen sent with them a copy of a memorandum by Benjamin Foulois, who approved the plan and Trenchard of September 1916 on the primacy made Gorrell head of “Strategical Aviation, of the offensive in air warfare.20 According to Zone of Advance, AEF.”23 Gorrell’s work re­ Trenchard’s biographer, Mitchell met with lied so heavily on a similar plan written by Trenchard on several occasions during the Tiverton in early September that large parts summer of 1918 and even went so far as to ask of it were simply lifted verbatim. As US air the Briton to cast his experienced eye over power historian Tami Biddle has noted in her Mitchell’s tactical plan for the Saint-Mihiel thoughtful work on American and British offensive. Moreover, Trenchard gladly co­ strategic air power, this was somewhat ironic operated more directly in the offensive by ac­ since “what came to be known as the ‘Gorrell ceding to Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch’s re­ Plan’ was later considered paradigmatically quest (undoubtedly prompted by Mitchell) to American: the ‘earliest’ and ‘clearest’ state­ support the Americans with the bombers of ment of ‘the American concept of air his Independent Force.21 The Independent power.’ ”24 Gorrell later wrote a further essay

ASPECTS OF ANGLO-US CO-OPERATION 31 entitled “The Future Role of American Bom­ prefabricated parts sufficient to build aircraft to bardment Aviation,” which drew not only on equip 30 bomber squadrons. The prefabri­ Tiverton, but also on a paper written by Tren­ cated materials would then be transhipped to chard in November 1917. In drawing so readily the United Kingdom, where they would be sent on these British influences, “Gorrell infused to assembly facilities in disused Lancashire cot­ American air power thought with Tiverton’s ton factories. An agreement to this effect was emphasis on analytical planning and systematic signed in January 1918.27 In fact the British had implementation, as well as Trenchard’s em­ sent a complete set of drawings for the Handley phasis on the moral effect of bombing.”25 Page to the United States as early as August In the event, neither Gorrell’s plan nor 1917. However, subsequent design changes other similar US doctrinal forays into the realm meant that two further sets of drawings had to of strategic bombing came to very much dur­ be sent, necessitating in some cases the scrap­ ing the course of the war. Although this was in ping or reworking of existing parts. As the part due to the influence of senior Army offi­ Handley Page aircraft had more than 100,000 cers anxious to maintain the focus of the Air individual parts, this was a major undertaking, Service on tactical support of the Army, it was and the US subcontracting companies quickly also in large part due to production difficulties. fell behind schedule.28 Although the assembly As we have seen, the United States did not facilities and five training airfields in the enter the war with a single combat-ready air­ United Kingdom were to be prepared by a craft type, and the Americans were perforce small army of labourers sent from the United compelled to equip their squadrons with States, only about 60 per cent of the additional proven Allied types. This meant that of 6,364 manpower arrived before the armistice. In ad­ aircraft delivered to the Air Service in France, dition, poor weather and labour conflicts with 19 were of Italian origin, 258 came from the British trade unions, which led to frequent Britain, and 4,874 from France. Only 1,213 strikes, further delayed the project. By the end were sent from the United States.26 The at­ of the war, only 50 engines and 95 per cent of tempts to produce Allied designs in the United the parts to complete 100 aircraft were avail­ States were not entirely successful. Hampered able in the United Kingdom.29 Thus, although in part by the rapid developments in design— the US Army had two squadrons of Handley such that, for example, the de Havilland DH4 Page night bombers in training in the United which was ordered in large quantities was al­ Kingdom on 11 November 1918, “not a single ready obsolete before entering production— night-bomber manufactured in the United and partly by the difficulty of producing highly States during World War I reached the front.”30 complex aircraft designed elsewhere, much Unfortunately, the one part of the programme treasure, effort, and heartache were expended which worked smoothly was the transfer of the for surprisingly little tangible result. The most several thousand men who were intended to interesting of these attempts from the perspec­ maintain the aircraft. These unfortunates tive of Anglo-American co-operation was the waited in vain in the United Kingdom for Handley Page twin-engine, long-range night their charges to arrive. Henry “Hap” Arnold, bomber, which went into UK production in July a colonel at the time, was moved to comment 1917. Although the Italian Caproni heavy that “the only result was that the American air bomber appeared to possess better perfor­ outfits in France were deprived of their mance, there appeared to be technical and bu­ needed services.”31 reaucratic obstacles to its rapid production in It would nevertheless be wrong to end this the United States. Thus, the War Department very brief and far from comprehensive survey plumped for the Handley Page design powered on a downbeat note. The assistance given by by American Liberty engines. Aware that no air­ the RAF and its predecessors in helping to es­ craft at that time was capable of flying the At­ tablish American air power on a firm footing lantic, the plan was for US companies to build was more than repaid, both by the exploits of

32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 American Airmen flying with the British at least 12 US citizens flew with the RAF during Commonwealth forces and by the assistance the Battle of Britain, more than a year before given to the Canadian training programmes. Pearl Harbour, and by early 1941 the RAF was The links that were established during the able to establish three fighter squadrons whose First World War, though they lay dormant for pilots were almost exclusively American. As two decades, were very quickly reestablished with an earlier generation, most of these men during the second great conflict a generation subsequently transferred to the USAAF, where later. Large numbers of UK Airmen were they were once more able to provide a leav­ again trained in Canada, and once again as soon as America entered the war, training fa­ ening of experience which was of incalculable cilities were made available in Texas and benefit to forces going into combat for the other southern states. Yet again, free-spirited first time. These strong links have endured Americans, convinced that the cause was a over subsequent generations and conflicts, just one, sought to join the RAF and Com­ but their foundations lie in the bonds estab­ monwealth air forces even before the United lished in the world’s first truly global war of States entered the Second World War. Thus, 1914–18. ■

Notes

1. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: Government Printing Office, 1978), 108–11, http:// The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic permanent.access.gpo.gov/airforcehistory/www.airforce Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University history.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/us_air_service_ Press, 2002), 50. ww1-vol2.pdf. For a flavour of Trenchard’s memorandum, 2. Rebecca Hancock Cameron, Training to Fly: Military see Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), Flight Training, 1907–1945 (Washington, DC: Air Force 186–88. History and Museums Program, 1999), 143. 21. Boyle, Trenchard, 300; and Jones, War in the Air, 3. On Hoare and the establishment of the Royal Fly­ vol. 6, 148–49. The Independent Force was a force of ing Corps in Canada, see S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen in British bomber squadrons established under separate the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Cana­ command arrangements from the rest of the British air dian Air Force, vol. 1 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, forces in France and intended to undertake independent 1980), 76–82. strategic operations against Germany. Trenchard was 4. Ibid., 83. placed in command of the force and reported back to 5. Ibid., 89–91. the Air Ministry in London, rather than the British High 6. Roger G. Miller, “The Tail to Tooth Ratio: Royal Command in France. In fact Trenchard allocated far Flying Corps and Air Service Co-operation in Mainte­ more of his effort to bombing French railways and German nance Training during WW1,” Journal of the Royal Air Force aerodromes than he did to attacking targets in Germany. Historical Society, no. 32 (2004): 11. For more on the Independent Force, see Biddle, Rhetoric 7. Wise, Canadian Airmen, 94n. and Reality, 40–48. 8. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 11. 22. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 149; and Maurer, vol. 9. Wise, Canadian Airmen, 91–97. 3, The Battle of St. Mihiel, 57–59, http://permanent.access. 10. Ibid., 94 gpo.gov/airforcehistory/www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/ 11. Cameron, Training to Fly, 108–10. Publications/fulltext/us_air_service_ww1-vol3.pdf. 12. H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the 23. Maurer, vol. 2, Early Concepts, 141. The plan is re­ Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 5 (Ox­ produced in this volume on pages 141–57. ford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 466. 24. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 54. 13. Wise, Canadian Airmen, 95. 25. Ibid., 55. 14. Cameron, Training to Fly, 130. 26. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 23. 15. Wise, Canadian Airmen, 93. 27. Ibid., 20. 16. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 17. 28. Ibid.; and I. B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons: Ex­ 17. Cameron, Training to Fly, 158. ploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States during 18. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 18–20. World War I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 19. Ibid., 19. 144–45. 20. Mitchell’s papers are reproduced in Maurer Mau­ 29. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 21. rer, ed. and comp., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol. 30. Holley, Ideas and Weapons, 145. 2, Early Concepts of Military Aviation (Washington, DC: 31. Miller, “Tail to Tooth Ratio,” 21.

ASPECTS OF ANGLO-US CO-OPERATION 33 Air Lines Anglo-American Tactical Air Operations in World War II

DR.THOMAS ALEXANDER HUGHES

Editorial Abstract: A look at tactical air operations in World War II illuminates important aspects of coalition warfare and the command and control of airpower. Dr. Hughes suggests how lessons learned in the past might help today’s joint war fighters use airpower as a com­ bat arm with distinct capabilities and perspectives.

N THE ANGLO-AMERICAN tradition, fight wars free of such earthly limits. Liberated aviation enthusiasts have championed from the tyranny of terrain and unfettered by airpower’s inherent “flexibility and versa­ maritime matters, pilots retain a capacity to tility” as one important advantage Airmen move quickly and freely, complicating the Ienjoy over their brethren on the ground and enemy’s action and defeating his strategy. at sea.1 Soldiers and sailors, the thinking goes, Or so the thinking goes. Undoubtedly more must face war’s challenges bound by two- flexible and probably more versatile than other dimensional geometry and the slow algebra combat arms, airpower is both informed and of surface movement. For them, demarcations constrained by the same map that influences like army-unit boundaries and naval vanguards ground and sea operations—partly because not only rationalize the battlespace but also air forces are often used in joint and com­ limit the elasticity of military options. To draw bined contexts. Furthermore, Airmen them­ loosely from the great theorist Henri Jomini, selves have been unwilling to free operations to the man with a bayonet or the skipper on from the boundaries of battle that emerge the foredeck, strategy is on a map. But flyers from ground or sea perspectives. Airpower’s

34 flexibility and versatility depend to some ex­ imaginations of airpower enthusiasts and fu­ tent on a seamless battlespace, yet air leaders eled debate about its future on both sides of have often demonstrated an inclination to the Atlantic. In broad terms, flyers advocated draw lines in the sky to codify the airspace, co­ inventive, independent bombing missions for ordinate actions of different units, and man­ aviation while more conservative adherents in age coalition air operations. In other words, ground and sea uniforms envisioned a role for instead of implementing true integration that aviation in support of traditional forces. In the capitalizes on the wide-open sky, Airmen have interwar period, these points of view became often opted merely to deconflict one air op­ associated with strategic or tactical airpower, eration from another—and in the process have respectively. In Great Britain and the United fragmented their battlespace like their com­ States, notions of strategic aviation grabbed rades in armies and navies have done. Airmen, despite differences in national cir­ Anglo-American tactical aviation in World cumstance and the organizational status of War II serves as a case study in the tantalizing their respective air arms. Over time, airpower promise of integration and the eventual tri­ thought in England and America charted umph of deconfliction to orchestrate airpower similar courses as pilots championed strategic among services and between nations. Great aviation and situated tactical airpower in an Britain and the United States began their Al­ important, though clearly subordinate, role. lied effort in World War II with a strong com­ A disposition toward strategic aviation led mon purpose and sufficiently similar views of Airmen in both nations to similar assessments aviation. In the laboratory of North Africa and of military operations elsewhere. Royal Air Sicily, air leaders moved to amalgamate differ­ Force (RAF) officers denounced the tactical ent air forces and to demark the sky along func- character of air operations during the Spanish tional—not geographic or national—lines. Civil War as “a prostitution of the Air Force” Human, strategic, and political matters, how­ and warned that the conflict did not fit ex­ ever, made this objective too difficult. By the pected conventions of general European war- time of the invasion of Normandy, the Anglo- fare.3 In America, Brig Gen Henry Arnold Americans had settled on strict air boundaries added that the fight had seen airpower used marked not only by national identity but also “promiscuously and indiscriminately to sup­ by army, corps, and division demarcations. This plement artillery actions” instead of employ­ inclination to draw lines in the sky carried for­ ing it behind enemy lines, “where it can exert ward through the Cold War and beyond, sug­ power beyond the influence of your other gesting that despite the rhetoric of airpower’s arms, to influence the general action rather flexibility and versatility, Airmen themselves 4 sometimes adopt operational concepts that than the specific battle.” Pilots in America hinder the elasticity of military aviation.2 and Britain held steadfast to these beliefs, even after German blitzkrieg operations in Poland revealed tactical aviation’s potential Tactical Aviation before prowess. Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, the great British practitioner of tactical opera­ World War II tions, recalled how the RAF refused to imitate The United States and Great Britain came the Luftwaffe’s use of the Stuka, despite its to World War II with comparable if not uni­ status as “the pin up weapon of modern war­ form ideas about the proper development fare. . . . Our Air Marshals were criticized at and application of airpower. Their respective times but they knew the Stuka was a most in­ aerial traditions from the Great War were op­ efficient aircraft of value only as a specialized erationally analogous, even if the British had weapon under selected conditions.”5 more experience. In the war’s last year, avia­ Anglo-American air arms did not entirely tors from both countries participated in em­ ignore aviation’s tactical functions. After En­ bryonic bombardment missions that fired the gland decided to raise an army capable of

AIR LINES 35 campaigning on the Continent, officers there among ground and air leaders—in many ways had to work out a system of air support. Pilots the nub of tactical air operations. In Britain and soldiers agreed on air superiority as air- teasing out the nuance between “contingent” power’s first priority before it turned to three and “component” aviation fueled bickering other tasks: tactical reconnaissance, air trans­ among air and ground leaders until Prime port, and air attack, including interdiction and Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed the close air support (CAS). But air and ground situation “helpless.” In the end, however, even leaders floundered on arrangements for the his forceful persuasion could not broker a so- command and control (C2) of air forces in a lution.8 In the United States, disputes over tactical role, in part because Airmen held little the C2 of air did not reach the White House, confidence in a soldier’s ability to orchestrate but prewar doctrine reflected nearly unten­ airpower in modern war. In the end, before able compromise on the issue: WDTR 440-15 their baptism of fire in North Africa, the British allowed for independent air operations when could muster only an “awkward and compli­ ground troops were not in close contact with cated” arrangement whereby both an “air the enemy but made no provision for the de­ component” under the direct command of a tachment of air units from ground control for 9 soldier and an “air contingent” under the con­ such missions. Just how one might conduct trol of an Airman participated in the battle.6 independent operations within dependent Such fragmentation did not effectively leverage command arrangements was a matter appar­ the flexibility of airpower, but at least the tac­ ently left for soldiers and flyers to clear up tical use of aviation had attracted some atten­ during some future debut in war. tion in England before the war. Up until they found themselves together in In America, where the air arm remained World War II, then, Britain and America had under Army control, tactical aviation remained similar enough experiences and ideas about a standard Air Corps function. Although airpower to suggest a reasonable chance of in­ many Airmen championed strategic concepts, tegrating their air forces into one team for ground officers who ran the Army insisted on a the fight. Certainly, variation existed, but both nations came to World War II with doctrinal force structure and doctrine that enabled tac­ and cultural expressions of airpower well rec­ tical airpower. The 3rd Attack Group became ognized by the other. Once the war began, the world’s first peacetime unit dedicated to not even the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor CAS, and throughout the interwar period the dissuaded the Allies from a common strategic Army Air Corps’ makeup reflected a formal in­ cause to defeat Germany first. Side by side po­ sistence on tactical aviation. In fact, during the litically and strategically, akin in the beliefs two years before Pearl Harbor, heavy bombers and methods of war, and analogous in the or­ constituted less than 2 percent of the Air chestration and execution of military aviation, Corps’ aircraft purchases. As for doctrine, suc­ the Anglo-Americans entered the war with high cessive iterations of War Department Training expectations of building an integrated team, Regulation (WDTR) 440-15, Employment of the knowing only partially the great challenges Air Forces of the Army, generally identified avia- that attended their journey. tion’s primary mission, after air superiority, as destruction of “the most important enemy forces on the surface of the land or sea” (1923 Operations in North Africa and version), and adhered to the age-old dictum that the “land campaign” was “the decisive fac­ the Mediterranean tor in winning war” (1935 update).7 No prewar strategist in either Britain or Even as both nations drew closer to tactical America had thought of the Mediterranean aviation with the approach of World War II, Sea’s south coast as a likely place for a clash, they left for the battlefield the difficult and despite its awesome history as a battleground delicate matter of command relationships between civilizations. This lack of foresight

36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 proved especially true of air officers busy de­ studied at Andover. His entire career was veloping the ideas and machinery of strategic practical.”10 Unencumbered by prewar notions, airpower. The North African sand harbored Air Vice-Marshal Coningham came to North no large enemy populations to bomb, no vital Africa in the summer of 1941 with a relatively enemy infrastructure to destroy, and no im­ open mind, able to counter the challenges of portant enemy capital to level. But the fact the desert with creative innovation. that armies in the Sahara Desert needed sup­ The problems were legion, many of them port placed enormous, unanticipated demands stemming from materiel shortages or the lack on tactical air operations in the war’s early of battle experience—conditions that would going. Each nation faced a steep learning curve right themselves with the passage of time. Oth­ for such tasks. ers were squarely the product of interservice The English came first to the war and first cooperation and doctrinal ambiguity. Keenly to Africa, where they encountered Field Mar­ aware of the tensions in England that had at­ shal Erwin Rommel’s famed Afrika Corps. tended efforts to develop tactical aviation, The Desert Fox, as the British called Rommel, Coningham nevertheless believed that these schooled the English Army in modern mobile labors had suffered from peacetime malaise warfare, nearly pushing Commonwealth forces and “could only be done on an academic basis” from the continent. In August 1942, Lt Gen until war came.11 Now, in the thick of the fight, Bernard Montgomery inherited command of he used the desert tableau as an anvil on which the dispirited, defeated British Eighth Army he shaped the machinery of CAS. and in October brilliantly evened the battle Heeding the advice of Air Marshal Arthur ledger with the Germans at the Second Battle Tedder, his immediate superior in the air war, of El Alamein. There ensued a series of see­ to “get together” with the Army, Coningham saw battles as the British marched from Egypt swiftly established a joint headquarters with to Tunisia. Haltingly at first, the drive gained ground commanders in the Western Desert. momentum with each passing week until Axis Looking back after the war, Coningham be­ forces occupied a shrinking piece of African lieved that collocating headquarters “was of real estate by January 1943. This turn of for­ fundamental importance and had a direct tune had many fathers, including a refusal in bearing on the combined fighting of the two Berlin to reinforce German troops on the Services until the end of the War.”12 From there continent. But growing British competence he fleshed out the mechanisms of tactical air- in tactical air operations played a part. One power. Deficiencies existed in the tactics for man’s contributions in that regard stand to air support, techniques in the placement of this day as a signal achievement of the war in bomb lines, and procedures in the allocation the west. of targets. As always, the C2 of aircraft under­ Raised in New Zealand on the edge of the lay all other matters because soldiers wanted empire, Arthur Coningham had in some ways to divvy up air units to ground commanders, operated on the periphery of the RAF during and pilots insisted on a more unified approach his prewar career. While students attending to the conduct of the air war. courses at RAF Staff College in Andover de- With success at El Alamein came recogni­ vised—and officers in the Air Ministry cham- tion for Coningham’s ideas, which included a pioned—strategic bombing theory, Coning- trinity of exhortations to guide air operations: ham was busy in the field. “Of all the RAF’s “The strength of air power lies in its flexibility senior commanders in the Second World and capacity for rapid concentration; it fol­ War,” wrote Coningham’s biographer, “he was lows that control must be centralized in an Air unique in that he received no formal, theo­ Commander and command exercised through retical service education. By the end of the Air Force channels; [and] Air forces must be war, he was inordinately proud of the fact that concentrated in use and not dispersed in he had neither served in the Air Ministry nor penny packets”—the British expression for sol-

AIR LINES 37 diers’ preference to assign specific air units to manded by President Roosevelt’s son Elliot. specific ground commands.13 In time, promi­ Each of these forces, in turn, consisted of units nent generals such as Montgomery came to from both nations. By mixing US and British parrot Coningham’s ideas, and the notions forces up and down the chain of command, found expression in the widely circulated Air the Northwest African Air Forces set a radical Ministry pamphlet Air Power in the Land Battle.14 precedent in Allied cooperation—one not British prestige and Coningham’s ideas rode mirrored in either the ground or naval com­ high as the Americans experienced their battle mands. It was a bold move but one that, in debut in Africa. Operation Torch brought US theory anyway, best leveraged the flexibility of and British forces under the command of airpower. Time alone would tell how well the Gen Dwight Eisenhower to the continent in arrangement worked. November 1942. Like the previous efforts of Initial air operations went well. Enough the British, early operations produced despair doctrinal similarity existed between US Army and defeat: the Americans’ failure to reach Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Air Ground Opera­ Tunisia before the winter rains and a debacle tions, and British Army Training Instruction in air-ground operations at the Battle of Number 6 regarding air-support control cen­ Kasserine Pass ensured a long, hard campaign ters and liaison parties to ensure smooth pro­ in the spring of 1943. Fortunately, by then cedural operations within and among lower- Montgomery and Coningham had completed echelon units.16 Although some national their march from Egypt and were south of cleavage developed in Doolittle’s Strategic Air Tunis, ready to join hands with Eisenhower in Force, integrated air operations existed in an Anglo-American vise to squeeze the last both Coningham’s Tactical Air Force and in Axis troops from Africa. Lloyd’s Coastal Air Force. In those units, air This linking required a combined com­ assets often took on tasks regardless of na­ mand, to be led by Eisenhower, whom Pres. tionality and always in close coordination; Franklin Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed Coastal Air Force, for example, did not always upon. As supreme commander, Eisenhower delineate nationality on its daily operations tended to view unity of command from a the­ orders.17 Late in the campaign, in April and ater point of view, a position that dovetailed May 1943, the US Twelfth Air Force began to with Coningham’s notions of a single Airman concentrate on support to American troops, leading all air operations within a given the- but this was an ad hoc exception to the emerg­ ater.15 A consensus builder by inclination and ing, if still newborn, pattern of amalgamated willing, at first, to look to the more experienced air operations. By early May, Allied troops had British, Eisenhower also accepted the English cornered the last of the enemy soldiers in the concept of dividing air-mission responsibilities port of Tunis, and on 10 May the remaining by function rather than nationality. Hence, Germans surrendered. Air-support operations, when he created the Mediterranean Air Com­ especially interdiction missions, played a part mand and named Tedder its leader, Eisen­ in the triumph. In the end, Axis shortages of hower worked to ensure truly combined air materiel were so acute that some high-ranking organizations. Below Tedder’s command sat Wehrmacht officers could make their escape the Northwest African Air Forces, commanded only after finding a lone barrel of aviation fuel by the American general Carl Spaatz, who in that had washed in from the sea.18 turn split his force into five subordinate com­ Continuing to follow British footsteps, the mands: Strategic Air Force, led by the Ameri­ Americans refined US aviation doctrine, en­ can general James Doolittle; Tactical Air Force, couraged by their success in the desert. Based led by Coningham; Coastal Air Force, led by in part on British practices, the new doctrine— the English air vice-marshal Hugh Lloyd; Train­ FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air ing Command, led by the American general Power—“acknowledged Coningham’s emphasis Joe Cannon; and a reconnaissance wing, com­ on the flexibility of air power and the need

38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 for centralized control under a knowledgeable power’s versatility and optimism that it could air force commander.”19 It embodied many work elsewhere. lessons of desert warfare, especially the im­ But success does not always translate from portance of joint planning, liaison officers, and one circumstance to another. By the summer adequate communications. Although much of of 1943, the Americans constituted an increas­ the document’s innards reiterated earlier doc­ ing share of the Allied force structure. More­ trine, FM 100-20 included a novel clarion call over, having acquired combat experience of for airpower equality in joint warfare: “LAND their own, they were less likely to accept a role POWER AND AIR POWER ARE COEQUAL subordinate to that of the British in the AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEI­ wartime partnership. This shift influenced re­ THER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER” lationships and affected decisions at every (capitalization in original).20 American pilots, level of war, including the matter of air orga­ conditioned by the struggle for air autonomy in nization in the Mediterranean. Lt Gen George the interwar years, saw in the document Patton, the senior American field soldier for independence for the air force, with one future the Sicilian invasion, believed that British air four-star general calling it the “emancipation leadership was now disproportionate to their proclamation of air power.”21 Viewed in the rank-and-file strength, starting with Spaatz’s context of its birth, however, the new doctrine English superiors in the Mediterranean Air was not a scheme to widen the gulf between pi­ Command: “Tedder controls the air with lots and soldiers but a move toward better and Spaatz, a straw man, under him,” Patton com­ greater air-ground cooperation, based in part plained to Eisenhower. “Conyngham [sic] com­ on experiences gained in North Africa. mands the tactical air force [while] . . . our close support force is commanded by a colonel.” In the summer of 1943, the Anglo-Americans Although Patton was wrong about a colonel hastened to chase the Axis powers across the controlling American CAS, he forcefully Mediterranean, invading Sicily in July and pressed his point home, concluding that “the Italy proper in September. Spaatz’s combined U.S. is getting gypped.”23 Northwest African Air Forces bore the brunt Patton was not alone. Other Americans in­ of air responsibility for these assaults, and air creasingly believed that the British pushed for tasks fell into an increasingly familiar catego­ integrated air commands in order to retain rization for tactical aviation in support of am­ positions of leadership that their force struc­ phibious operations: neutralize the enemy air ture alone could no longer support. This view force, destroy enemy communications, isolate was at once cynical and somewhat true, chal­ the battlefield, and provide close support to lenging even Eisenhower’s consistent inclina­ invading ground troops. Consistent with views tion to find harmony among his subordinates: of airpower’s flexibility, plans for the Sicilian “The American Air Force and principal com­ invasion called for aviation integration and a manders,” he reported in July, “do not have “high degree of coordination” among Spaatz’s that prestige that should be theirs” in the cur­ air forces. This was especially true for Con- rent command setup.24 ingham’s tactical and Doolittle’s strategic air More than prestige was at stake. The inter­ commands, since “depending on the situation, national flavor of air commands in North either force might come under control of the Africa may have heightened airpower’s opera­ other.”22 This daring design required the re­ tional elasticity, but it complicated the adminis­ spective commanders to work effectively with­ trative lines of control that must necessarily out regard to national insignia on shoulder pass through national channels. This problem boards or national boundaries on battlefields. became especially apparent in the Coastal Air More than anything, the success of combined Force, where disciplinary action within an as­ commands in North Africa fostered beliefs signed American fighter group became entan­ that such a fluid arrangement maximized air- gled in RAF legalities.25 To remedy this defi-

AIR LINES 39 ciency and appease bruised egos, Eisenhower planes with Doolittle’s bombers. In a curious formulated plans to make Spaatz the com­ rejection of his own ideas of airpower’s adapt­ manding general of all US Army Air Forces ability, Coningham never thought much of (AAF) units in the Mediterranean and give interchanging fighters and bombers when cir­ him responsibility for the administrative over­ cumstance demanded, and even his sympa­ sight of US flyers. Eisenhower felt that doing thetic biographer refused to muster much of so gave Spaatz the “strength, prestige, and in­ a defense for Coningham’s failures late in the fluence” he deserved and provided for the Sicilian campaign.29 “absolute continuity of American command British commanders had always believed of all American units from top to bottom.”26 that the fusing of the RAF and the AAF had As long as the new arrangement was lim­ “been a very tricky job” requiring delicate ited to administrative command prerogatives, hands and deft politics. Now, in the late sum­ it did not violate the animating spirit of the mer of 1943, they felt that “nationalism has Allied admixture of forces in the operational reared its ugly head.”30 Under such conditions, and tactical conduct of the war. But Spaatz they foresaw a time when national identity soon set his sights on wider authority. In the trumped function in the organization and middle of July 1943, he moved to ensure his employment of airpower. No doubt, Americans influence over US sorties via a separate, secret would have agreed. That summer represented communications net known as Redline, telling a signal moment in the history of combined his principal subordinate US commanders “to air operations. For a brief time above the North have officers in training so that you will have African sand, the promise of integrated coali­ them ready to take over . . . [when] the Ameri­ tion air operations lived in an embryonic stage. cans are in complete control.”27 A close ex­ But it was stillborn over Sicily’s rugged ter­ amination of Redline suggests it “grew into a rain, unable to overcome powerful personal swift and effective all-American communica­ and national forces. After the war, Coningham tions system” used to circumvent Coningham’s tried to put a happy face on this death, telling control of US units in the Tactical Air Force.28 audiences that Mediterranean operations had If Redline did not quite constitute a whole­ bequeathed to the Anglo-Americans “processes sale repudiation of combined air commands, of Allied Command, staff structure, [and a] it was at least a rascal’s way of undercutting dove-tailing of the three services of each nation their effectiveness. into a team.”31 In further retrospect, members National and personal pride motivated of the Western Alliance undoubtedly grew in Spaatz, but he also acted out of sincere con­ strength and prowess in the years before the cern for the effective running of the air cam­ invasion of Normandy, but their combined ef­ paign. He established Redline only after a forts also testified to Winston Churchill’s be­ British practice of bypassing him became clear, lief that fighting without allies was the only especially in messages between Tedder and thing worse than fighting with them. Coningham. Moreover, Spaatz hoped that Redline would not so much usurp Coningham as encourage him to act more decisively in D-Day and Operation Overlord the employment of his command and in his There was a slight pretense of integrated coordination with Doolittle’s Strategic Air air operations by the time the Anglo-Americans Force. Operational effectiveness had become began planning in earnest for the liberation a real issue late in the Sicilian campaign, when of France. Many principal commanders from German troops retreated en masse across the the south, including Eisenhower, Tedder, Strait of Messina to Italy. Instead of imple­ Spaatz, and Coningham, came to England in menting aggressive action to interdict a flee­ the winter before D-day to participate in Op­ ing enemy, Coningham moved cautiously and eration Overlord. They brought from the with great reluctance to synchronize his fighter Mediterranean their collective competence

40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 and great experience. Each amphibious land­ ests of the American component” and protect ing in Europe occupied a distinct point on a “the operational use” of US planes. In Spaatz’s learning curve for the Anglo-Americans, and scheme, Vandenberg would also become the Normandy represented the pinnacle of com­ conduit through which Spaatz might exercise mander expertise. Despite their success, how­ de facto control over Brereton’s Ninth Air ever, these leaders also brought heavy baggage Force, rendering Leigh-Mallory a nominal with them to England. In Overlord’s planning commander of American forces.33 Eisen- and execution, they failed to shake emergent hower’s tacit agreement to this bit of skull­ patterns of organizational and operational duggery eliminated any chance that the AEAF conflict in the conduct of air war. Moreover, could integrate air operations across national their scheme of air support for the invasion lines. After that, air integration became only actually compounded difficulties in the inte­ a red herring, obscuring more realistic hopes gration of air operations and accented differ­ of deconflicting air operations, which became ences among men and nations. the true purpose of Leigh-Mallory’s command. A thin facade of Allied integration shrouded This objective was manifest in his command’s the air setup for Overlord. Reprising his role internal structure: the US Ninth Air Force as supreme commander, Eisenhower again would provide support to the Americans land­ tapped Tedder as his deputy. In the normal ing in France; the British Second Tactical Air fashion, Eisenhower’s command had major Force would concentrate on Commonwealth land, sea, and air components. The English troops wading ashore; and the two would meet air chief marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, one only in extraordinary circumstances. Down of the few senior leaders in Overlord who had the chain of command, air operations were not seen experience in the Mediterranean, delineated further by linking specific air units commanded the Allied Expeditionary Air to specific ground commands, a procedure Force (AEAF). As had been the practice in the that basically repudiated Coningham’s ideas south, his deputy was an American, Maj Gen and the notions enshrined in FM 100-20. Hoyt Vandenberg, who had only very limited The role of strategic air forces in support experience in North Africa. Leigh-Mallory’s of Overlord complicated the whole matter of force consisted of units from both nations or­ air synchronization for the Normandy cam­ ganized into two air forces: the US Ninth Air paign. Although Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Force and the British Second Tactical Air Arthur Harris, commander of British Bomber Force, commanded by Lt Gen Lewis Brereton Command, recognized obligations to assist in and Coningham, respectively. In the weeks the invasion, they were deeply committed to before and after D-day, Coningham, working strategic bombing and refused to cede com­ directly for Leigh-Mallory, exercised super­ mand prerogatives to Leigh-Mallory, whom numerary authority over both tactical air forces they did not trust to direct bomber forces. in an effort to maximize coordination across Since the bomber forces were attached and national boundaries.32 In appearance, all this not assigned to Eisenhower’s command, the looked like the beginnings of a renewed effort supreme commander had to step lightly in ef­ to integrate air operations. forts to coordinate the various air organiza­ It was not. The Leigh-Mallory/Vandenberg tions. Weeks of intense negotiations and a pairing was designed to further delineate op­ threat to resign bought for Eisenhower an in­ erations rather than conjoin national forces. formal scheme of control centered on his Spaatz—who now led American strategic air deputy. “I will exert direct supervision of all air forces in the bombing of Germany and who forces—through you,” he explained to Tedder, remained the senior administrative air com­ “authorizing you to use headquarters facilities mander throughout Europe—had lobbied for now existing to make your control effective. Vandenberg’s appointment because Vanden­ L. M.’s [Leigh-Mallory’s] position would not berg could be trusted to safeguard “the inter­ be changed so far as assigned forces are con-

AIR LINES 41 cerned but those attached for definite periods boundaries. In the weeks after D-day, Coning- or definite jobs would not come under his ham used his supernumerary authority over command ” (emphasis in original).34 the tactical forces to deconflict missions, and Eisenhower had managed to place the both tactical air forces developed an awesome strategic air forces within his orbit yet beyond capacity to assist ground troops. Free from is­ the reach of Leigh-Mallory—but at a high sues of national pride and prejudice, each air price since this scheme left Eisenhower with­ force concentrated on increasingly successful out a single air commander. Henceforth, the battlefield interdiction and CAS operations. supreme commander coordinated his air op­ By late June, Allied fighter-bomber effective­ erations through three clearly independent ness had led to a rare confluence of views at air organizations: US Strategic Air Forces in all levels of the German field command: the Europe, British Bomber Command, and the senior German commander in France, Field AEAF. The absence of a single air commander Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, described his resulted in an air plan that integrated various rear areas as a “traffic desert”; Rommel, his invasion tasks in an uncertain and tentative immediate subordinate, told Berlin “there was manner. A mere week before the invasion, simply no answer” to Allied airpower in Nor­ Leigh-Mallory felt obliged to remind Spaatz mandy; and rank-and-file Wehrmacht soldiers of the D-day targets “which it is desired you at­ took to calling Allied fighter-bombers the tack,” recalling that “you or one of your rep­ “most terrible weapon.”37 To anyone who cared resentatives have agreed” to supply convoy to look, tactical air operations in Normandy cover and armed reconnaissance for the land gave the lie to the idea that only heavy bombers forces. Furthermore, Leigh-Mallory under­ could exert a strategic influence on the course stood that Spaatz had “agreed” to participate of the war. in deception operations and, “weather per­ Two young flag officers working along the mitting,” had acquiesced to striking railroad seams between operational and tactical com­ centers in the three days prior to D-day.35 mand made much of this possible. In the Such language resembled treaty negotiations British zone, Air Vice-Marshal Harry Broad- among sovereign entities—not military com­ hurst, who commanded the 83rd Group within mands under unified direction. Coningham’s air force, was instrumental in This command setup sometimes led to in­ smoothing air-ground relationships that had effective performance. On D-day, 1,200 Eighth soured among Commonwealth commanders. Air Force bombers blasted Omaha Beach with Leigh-Mallory, who never gained the confi­ a faulty plan: the planes dropped undersized dence of fellow air leaders, felt that Tedder bombs, and most bombardiers delayed their and Coningham often bypassed him in a con­ bomb drops over the coast anywhere from spiracy to deny the British Army the air sup­ five to 30 seconds, ensuring that most ord­ port it deserved. That perception was a stretch, nance fell far inland of aiming points. Al­ but Overlord’s convoluted air setup made it though many people understood that such a difficult to keep strict faith with the chain of plan would render the bombing impotent, command, even within a national sector. For Overlord had no Airman who could leverage his part, Montgomery, who now commanded command authority to change it or cancel the the 21st Army Group, sometimes blamed poor bombers’ participation. As a result, “the im­ air support for his troops’ sluggish pace of ad­ mediate beach areas showed only limited evi­ vance, eventually concluding that Coningham dence of bombing damage,” and the strike was “a bad man [and] not genuine and terribly failed to impair seriously the first line of Ger­ jealous.” In Montgomery’s view, all this bick­ man defenders—its professed objective.36 ering usually came to naught, but not before After Allied forces reached the far shore, “several hours a day are wasted in argument each nation’s tactical air operations worked with the opposing camps, and in ensuring that well as long as sorties conformed to national the air jealousies do not lose us the battle.”38

42 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 More often than not, it fell to Broadhurst to by the teamwork which had been perfected smooth over these quarrels. A fighter pilot of between the 9th Air Force and the 2nd [Tac­ great experience, Broadhurst “earned the af­ tical Air Force].”41 fection and respect of all” with whom he Yet the battle at Mortain represented an worked. He was as responsible as anyone for emergency demanding an Allied reaction; in the effective marrying of air and ground op­ battles of their own choosing, the Anglo- erations in the British sector.39 Americans rarely integrated their tactical air Maj Gen Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada was forces in Western Europe. This neglect some­ Broadhurst’s analog along the American front. times had disastrous consequences. In the Like Coningham, he had come to the Euro­ middle of August, the Allies tried to bag a large pean fighting with an open mind about air- salient of German forces near Falaise. Tight­ power’s place in war. Once there, he fostered ening the noose around the Germans required myriad innovations in tactical aviation, includ­ Patton’s force to swing around and come up ing the development of armored-column cover against Montgomery’s Commonwealth troops, that aided Patton’s breathtaking pursuit of re­ a delicate move that flirted with fratricide on treating Germans in August. Like Broadhurst, a large scale. Because Anglo-American pilots Quesada nurtured good relations with ground had worked side by side rather than together, the commanders. Lt Gen Omar Bradley, the senior British and American CAS schemes were dif­ American ground soldier in Normandy, be­ ferent enough to court tragedy as the Allies lieved that Quesada was a “jewel,” and others closed on each other. On 16 August, Cana­ agreed: “Nothing conventional about Que­ dian troops who had marked their positions sada,” remembered one soldier. “When he talks with red smoke were bombed by American power, he means everything but the kitchen aircraft because in the US scheme, such a sig­ sink.” Three weeks into the Normandy fight­ nal denoted enemy targets. Two days later, a ing, the consensus within the American Army British unit reported 40 instances of accidental in Normandy was that “Quesada was a fine un­ attacks by American flyers. With no effective pretentious field soldier who has done more integration of air forces, the Allies proved in­ than anyone else to bring air and ground closer capable of pressing the air battle into the together in this operation.”40 salient. Partly for this reason, Allied leaders Broadhurst and Quesada were responsible called off attempts to cut retreat routes and for one of the very few instances of effective capture the Germans. As a result, nearly air integration in Normandy. In early August 100,000 enemy soldiers escaped to fight an­ 1944, as Patton raced into Brittany, the Ger­ other day. mans nearly cut his supply lines at Arro­ Integrated aviation could have mitigated manches. Reacting to the emergency, Broad- this debacle by blurring the seam between na­ hurst and Quesada devised a plan whereby tional boundaries. Instead, air operations British Typhoons interdicted German armored based on deconfliction made airpower as sen­ columns and American P-47s provided close sitive to army boundaries as ground combat, support to US troops suddenly surrounded and the potential for mistaken killing in the near the small town of Mortain. Together air became as great as that from friendly fire with dogged determination from the soldiers, across infantry units—in this case, more real. Allied fighter-bombers succeeded in safe­ After the war, Coningham deemed it “unfor­ guarding Patton’s communications. Looking tunate that a national Army Group boundary back, Coningham believed that the battle con­ coincided with the pocket.”42 But failure at stituted one of the war’s best examples of tac­ Falaise was not so much a matter of fortune as tical aviation: “It proved that a Tactical Air design. Air leaders codified their operations Force may be a decisive battle-winning factor, along national lines, just as the soldiers had and it showed the smooth coordination of air done, in a misguided attempt to provide ef­ effort which could be achieved at short notice fective close support. In the process, pilots

AIR LINES 43 made airpower more—not less—like ground istry made Coningham head of Training Com­ power, robbing the joint and combined cam­ mand, a move that many commentators found paign of the synergy that overlapping instru­ curious. Opined the London News Chronicle, ments of war can bring to the battlefield. “One of the greatest air generals Britain has The Allies never did fix this problem in produced is being relegated to a comparatively World War II. Instances of close cooperation minor command and will not have a voice on occurred, as during missions supporting Op­ the Air Council”—the RAF’s policy body.45 In eration Market Garden or during the Battle the United States, Pete Quesada held a suc­ of the Bulge, when Montgomery took com­ cession of gratuitous, dead-end jobs after a mand of an entire American army and its sup­ brief stint leading Tactical Air Command. He porting air forces. But these were either fail­ finally resigned his commission in frustration ures or emergencies—sometimes both. As a after the newly independent Air Force assigned matter of method and design, the Anglo- him the suicidal task of folding the Air National Americans hewed to the belief that separating Guard and Air Reserves into one organization. tactical air forces along national lines best Throughout much of the Cold War, the air leveraged airpower. Throughout the war, the forces in Britain and America hewed fast to Allies never had a mechanism by which the the idea of deconfliction in air operations. For broad and varied activity of an air campaign the United States, this inclination extended to was centrally conceived, planned, executed, joint as well as combined operations. In Korea and assessed. The RAF’s official historian be­ and Vietnam, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine lieved that the air setup in place demon­ Corps divvied airspace among them in a man­ strated “the weakness of the committee tech- ner that denied airpower’s flexibility. More re­ nique.”43 According to official American cently, technology promises both to enable and chroniclers, the system worked “not so much deny integrated operations: the digital battle- because of its structure as because of the space potentially makes air operations more good sense and proper spirit of top British malleable by making airspace more seamless, and American commanders.”44 but the technological divide between prospec­ tive coalition partners fosters an enduring prac­ tice of nation-specific air tasking orders in the Conclusion manner of World War II’s Redline. This view is overly sympathetic. Certainly, Today, it is commonplace to proclaim air- tactical aviation was important to Allied suc­ power’s inherent adaptability in war, and cess in World War II—it is hard to imagine flexibility and versatility are ubiquitous in de­ victory without it. Still, air operations in sup­ scriptions of airpower. But the history of tac­ port of ground forces could have been better, tical air operations in World War II suggests especially when circumstances required opera­ that this elasticity is not intrinsic to airpower— ting across national boundaries. Perhaps this even as it is undeniably one of aviation’s great amounts to quibbling with success, but nations capacities. Flexibility and versatility do not re­ with traditions of military victory must nitpick side naturally or inherently in air operations. if they hope to learn from the past. They must be nurtured within sound C2 Unfortunately, in the case of tactical air arrangements, appropriate organizational operations, neither country did so in the years forms, relevant concepts of operations, and following World War II. The emergent Cold suitable applications of technology. Airpower War put a premium on strategic airpower and has great adaptive facility, but it is not innately consigned practitioners of tactical aviation to adaptive. That connection must be made pur­ backwater commands. In Britain the Air Min­ posefully. ■

44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Notes

1. Both US Air Force and British Royal Air Force doc­ 20. FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 21 trine use these terms. In the American view, flexibility and July 1943, 3. versatility are fundamental “tenets of airpower”; for the Eng­ 21. William Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washing­ lish, they are “enduring factors” of military aviation. Air ton, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1978), 10. Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 22. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The 17 November 2003, iii; and AP3000, British Air Power Doctrine, Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Point- 3rd ed., 1999, 1.2.3–1.2.4. blank, August 1942 to December 1943 (1949; new imprint, Wash­ 2. Generally, in this article tactical aviation refers to air ington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 444. operations in support of ground forces, a definition com­ 23. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: mon in the 1930s and 1940s. Specifically, the article concerns Houghton Mifflin, 1972–1974), 254. itself with close air support and interdiction missions—less so 24. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. et al., eds., The Papers of Dwight with airborne, troop-transport, air-supply, and reconnais­ David Eisenhower, vol. 2, Eisenhower to Marshall, July 18, 1943 sance operations. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 1263–64. 3. John Kennedy, The Business of War: The War Narrative of 25. “Notes on Africa.” See also Hughes, Over Lord, 87–94; Major-General Sir John Kennedy, ed. Bernard Fergusson (Lon­ and “Minutes of the Air Officer Commanding, Northwest don: Hutchinson, 1957), 107; and memorandum for record, African Coastal Air Force,” n.d., Air 24/1239, PRO. 21 November 1939, Air 35/214, Public Record Office, Kew, 26. Chandler et al., eds., Papers of Dwight David Eisen­ England (hereafter PRO). hower, vol. 2, Eisenhower to Marshall, 1263–64. 4. Arnold cited in Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” 27. Spaatz cited in Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Ben­ the Air War in Europe (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institu­ jamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: Office of Air tion Press, 1992), 248. Force History, 1990), 48. The US Army Air Corps also largely 28. Ibid. ignored the US Marine Corps’ rich and varied experience 29. Orange, Coningham, 166–68. with air support in Nicaragua during the interwar period. 30. Ibid., 165. 5. Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air 31. Coningham, “Development of Tactical Air Forces,” Forces,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) 216. Journal 91 (1946): 212. 32. Orange, Coningham, 187. 33. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz, 355. 6. Will Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army, 34. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. et al., eds., Papers of Dwight 1939–1943,” Military Affairs, December 1982, 174. David Eisenhower, vol. 3, Eisenhower to Tedder, 29 February 1944 7. Both versions of WDTR 440-15 cited in Frank Futrell, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 1755–56. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United Sates Air 35. Leigh-Mallory to Spaatz, letter, 1 June 1944, US Air Force, vol. 1, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL (here­ 1989), 41, 77. Similarly, the last peacetime version of Field Man­ after AFHRA), 521.451, June 1944. ual (FM) 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, 15 April 1940, 36. After-Action Report, “Eighth Air Force: Tactical Opera­ stressed operations designed to “defeat important elements of tions in Support of Allied Landings in Normandy, 2 June–17 the enemy armed forces” (quoted in Col Phillip S. Meilinger, June 1944,” 9, AFHRA, 521.451, June 1944. This and the pre­ USAF, retired, Airpower: Myths and Facts [Maxwell AFB, AL: Air ceding three paragraphs are drawn largely from Dr. Thomas University Press, 2003], 19). For a close explication of prewar Alexander Hughes, “Normandy: A Modern Air Campaign?”Air US Army doctrine relating to aerial operations, see Daniel R. and Space Power Journal 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 16–29. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air 37. Rundstedt cited in POW Interviews, “Rundstedt,” 20 Support, North Africa (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force His­ May 1945, Sheffield Edwards Papers, US Army Military His­ tory and US Army Center of Military History, 1987). tory Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; others cited in Hughes, 8. Churchill cited in Will Jacobs, “Air Support for the Over Lord, 151. British Army, 1939–1943,” Military Affairs, December 1982, 179. 38. Montgomery cited in Nigel Hamilton, Master of the 9. Mortensen, Pattern for Joint Operations, 7, 20. Battlefield: Monty’s War Years, 1942–1944 (New York: McGraw- 10. Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography of Air Marshal Hill, 1983), 692–93. Sir Arthur Coningham (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force 39. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Nor­ History, 1992), 34. mandy, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 271. 11. Coningham, “Development of Tactical Air Forces,” 40. All cited in Hughes, Over Lord, 157. 213. 41. Coningham cited in Orange, Coningham, 208. 12. Ibid. 42. Coningham, “Development of Tactical Air Forces,” 13. Ibid., 215. 216. 14. Orange, Coningham, 134. 43. Hilary St. George Saunders, The Royal Air Force, 15. Mortensen, Pattern for Joint Operations, 63. 1939–1945, vol. 3, The Fight Is Won (London: Her Majesty’s 16. Ibid., 50. Stationery Office, 1954), 82. 17. “Notes on Africa,” photo album, box 1722, Hugh 44. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Lloyd Papers, RAF Museum, Hendon, England. Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 3, Europe: Argument to V-E 18. Thomas Alexander Hughes, Over Lord: General Pete Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (1951; new imprint, Washing­ Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II ton, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 83. (New York: Free Press, 1995), 94. 45. London News Chronicle, 31 July 1945, cited in Orange, 19. Mortensen, Pattern for Joint Operations, 78. Coningham, 240.

AIR LINES 45 APJ

Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to use this department to let readers know about air and space power items of interest.

The British American Forces Dining Club COL LARRY G. CARTER, USAF, RETIRED*

In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with Allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own.

—Sir Winston Churchill —The Hinge of Fate

ITTING IN THE reviewing stands that Nuffield—an English philanthropist and auto­ overlook the main parade yard inside mobile manufacturer who produced aircraft the ancient walls of the Tower of Lon­ during the war. General Eisenhower, who had don, HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edin­ replaced Adm Harold Stark as overall com­ Sburgh, leaned over and explained the maneu­ vers of a British military marching band to Brig Gen Kurt B. Anderson.1 Commander of the United States Air Force’s 48th Fighter Wing, based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, General Anderson was the senior American of­ ficer in attendance that day. Prince Philip’s act underscored the very special relationship be­ tween the United States and Britain—the prod­ uct of a long history between the two countries, conscious decisions, and much nurturing. That day the Duke of Edinburgh, the queen’s con­ sort, hosted one of those nurturing institu- tions—a meeting of the British American Forces Dining Club (BAFDC). The club began on 1 March 1943, during the dark days of World War II, under the pa­ The BAFDC crest, designed by the College of Heralds tronage of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and (the British heraldic authority—also known as the College William Richard Morris, first Viscount of Arms), features the American eagle and British lion.

*The author is an editor and military defense analyst at the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

46 mander of US forces in the European theater in June 1942, assumed responsibility for the daytime US strategic bombing campaign against Germany just as it began. In close co­ operation with the British staff, he also di­ rected initial planning for the land invasion of occupied Western Europe.2 Hailing from “two countries divided by a common language,”3 officers of the combined staff who planned Operation Overlord found that their different cultures, experiences, and military traditions adversely affected their knowledge of each other’s staffing processes and procedures, thus straining relationships Courtesy of the National Archives and creating distrust. Seeking to reverse those Prime Minister Churchill and General Eisenhower misgivings and this growing animosity, in the latter part of 1942 several senior British and forces in North Africa as part of one theater American officers—some of whom became that should remain under a single command.) original members of the BAFDC—had drinks Viscount Nuffield was the guest of honor at together, and “after about the fourth round that initial BAFDC dinner attended by 12 se­ they began to feel much more sympathetic to nior British and American officers, including each other’s point of view—and regular din­ UK representatives Adm Sir Dudley Pound, ners were suggested.”4 Field Marshal Sir Alan Francis Brooke, and At the time of that first BAFDC dinner in Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles “Peter” Portal, 1943, General Eisenhower and his staff were as well as Admiral Stark and General Andrews in Algiers; his combined forces found them­ of the United States. The senior British naval selves at an operational turning point in officer, Sir Dudley Pound had served as Ad­ North Africa; and planning proceeded apace miral of the Fleet and First Sea Lord since for follow-on operations in Sicily and Italy. In 1939 and would continue to do so until his November 1942, the Allies had executed Op­ death in October 1943. Field Marshal Brooke, eration Torch, the invasion of North Africa, chief of the Imperial General Staff (the head with Eisenhower as the combined-forces com­ of the British Army), was the foremost military mander. Until the Casablanca conference in advisor to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. January 1943, the general had remained com­ Dominating British military leadership by mander of all US forces in Europe and in that virtue of his intellect and personality, he re­ capacity continued to encourage activities to portedly was the only senior British officer help build trust and confidence in the com­ able to challenge Churchill’s sometimes bined forces. At that conference, Gen George volatile and impetuous military judgments.6 C. Marshall, US Army chief of staff, announced The leaders of the Casablanca conference the establishment of a separate European the­ had selected Air Chief Marshal Portal, the ater of operations in the United Kingdom led senior British Airman, to coordinate the Com­ by Gen Frank Andrews, who attended the first bined Bomber Offensive against Germany. A BAFDC dinner as commander of US forces in strong supporter of daylight precision bomb­ Europe.5 (Marshall’s directive ran contrary to ing, he had helped American Airmen con­ the positions of Eisenhower and American vince a skeptical Prime Minister Churchill of generals Henry H. Arnold and Carl A. Spaatz, its value. Winning Churchill’s confidence and who saw the bombing efforts of Eighth Air establishing friendships with senior Allied Force in England and the operations of US leaders allowed Air Chief Marshal Portal to

PIREP 47 contribute significantly to the war effort. He became Marshal of the RAF in January 1944. Admiral Stark had served as the eighth chief of naval operations prior to assuming command of US forces in the European the­ ater in April 1942. Replaced by General Eisenhower in June of that year, he became commander of US naval forces in Europe, di­ recting the Navy’s buildup and participation in the Normandy invasion. Talented diplo­ matically, Admiral Stark built and maintained close relationships with all leaders—British civilian and naval as well as those of other Al­ Courtesy of the Eisenhower Presidential Library lied powers—a critical trait in coalition lead­ Operation Overlord commanders at a meeting in Janu­ 7 ary 1944. Left to right: Lt Gen Omar Bradley, Adm Sir ership, particularly at that time. The first Bertram Ramsay, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Gen Airman to head a War Department general- Dwight D. Eisenhower, Field Marshal Bernard Mont­ staff division, General Andrews had served as gomery, Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Lt Gen head of Army G-3 (operations) under Gen­ Walter Bedell Smith. eral Marshall. His decisions and close profes­ Bradley noted that “[Eisenhower] could work sional relationship with the chief of staff re­ with British and Americans and keep them sulted in virtual autonomy for the Army Air both fairly happy. If Ike had not had that fac­ Forces. As theater commander of US forces in ulty we might have been fighting each other the Middle East in 1942, he established Ninth more than we were. When you get two Allies Air Force—the first US tactical air force to working as closely as we were with the British, taste combat. At the Casablanca conference, where you were brought up under different General Andrews received overall command systems, there were potential cliques, but Ike of US forces in the European theater of opera­ kept that to a minimum. That is one of his tions, becoming responsible for directing the 9 American strategic bombing campaign against greatest contributions.” His leadership in­ Germany and planning the land invasion of cluded investing time and energy in activities occupied Western Europe. Two months after such as the BAFDC that broke down barriers the initial BAFDC dinner, General Andrews and increased trust and cooperation. died in a B-24 crash in Iceland—a loss of im­ During the 50th anniversary of the D-day mense proportions. General Marshall had invasion, Prince Philip noted that considered Andrews one of the nation’s few the success of that massive combined multi­ great captains and later selected General national operation was due in no small measure Eisenhower as his successor. In January 1944, to the personal friendships and understanding Roosevelt and Churchill added to Eisenhower’s that developed between the members of the responsibilities by making him the supreme club at a crucial period in the planning of Op­ commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force eration Overlord. It says much for the spirit of for the invasion of France.8 the club that, in spite of many dramatic changes When Eisenhower returned to England, he in the world since those days, a succession of members has continued to appreciate its value continued to support activities that helped and kept it flourishing for over 50 years.10 build and maintain crucial trust and coopera­ tion among Allies. As did most members of The BAFDC met regularly at the Nuffield Club the BAFDC, the general demonstrated out­ until it closed in 1975. After dining at various standing coalition leadership that turned the venues, it began a long-term relationship with Allies into an effective fighting force and man­ the Honourable Artillery Company (the old­ aged its large-scale operations. Gen Omar N. est regiment in the British Army, led by Her

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Majesty the Queen as its captain general) and also diplomatically in demonstrating the legiti­ its ceremonial subunit, the Honourable Com­ macy of their purpose. The importance of ef­ pany of Pikemen and Musketeers, both of forts such as the BAFDC to building trust and which organizations continue to host the cooperation between forces that make up those BAFDC dinners. In May 2000, the BAFDC coalitions is well recognized. The observation formed a chapter in Washington, DC, to fur­ that Prince Philip made about the club 10 years ther professional relationships between British ago remains appropriate and relevant to simi­ and American personnel serving on the west­ ern side of the Atlantic. lar efforts: “The original purpose of the club Having established their value in the wars may have faded over the years, but there can of the past century, coalitions should become be no doubt about its continuing significance even more important in current and future in this disturbed world. I very much hope that conflicts. Coalitions are useful not only mili­ it will go on making friendships and creating tarily in fielding superior military power, but understanding for many years to come.”11 ■

Notes 1. Born 10 June 1921, His Royal Highness Prince (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1996); and “Alan Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (Philip Battenberg adopted Brooke,” NationMaster.com, http://www.nationmaster.com/ the family name of Mountbatten when he became a nat­ encyclopedia/Alan-Brooke. uralized British subject in 1947), is the consort of Queen 7. “Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (1880–1972)—8th Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Chief of Naval Operations, 1 August 1939–26 March 1942,” 2. “The Birth of the BAFDC: Our History and Heri­ Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, http://www. tage,” British Defence Staff (Washington), http://www.bdsw. history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-s/h-stark.htm. org/bafdc; and Edgar F. Puryear Jr., Nineteen Stars (Orange, 8. Dr. Henry O. Malone, “Paving the Way: Remember­ VA: Green Publishers, 1971), 167. ing Frank Andrews,” dcmilitary.com, http://www.dcmilitary. 3. Attributed to George Bernard Shaw. com/airforce/andrews/2_09/local_news/14609-1.html; 4. “Birth of the BAFDC.” and Puryear, Nineteen Stars, 171. 5. DeWitt S. Copp, Frank M. Andrews: Marshall’s Airman (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Pro­ 9. Puryear, Nineteen Stars, 170. gram, 2003), 25. 10. HRH Prince Philip, “Early Years Recalled,” British 6. Lt Col Michael Lee Lanning, The Military 100: A Defence Staff (Washington), http://www.bdsw.org/bafdc. Ranking of the Most Influential Military Leaders of All Time 11. Ibid.

PIREP 49 Anglo-American Strategic Air Power Co-operation in the Cold War and Beyond GROUP CAPT CHRISTOPHER FINN, RAF LT COL PAUL D. BERG, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Air power co-operation between the Royal Air Force and US Air Force serves as an excellent model of successful coalition relations and reflects the evolution of cur­ rent concepts such as expeditionary air power and effects-based operations. The authors trace strategic air power relations between the United States and United Kingdom since World War II, explaining how past experience has shaped today’s alliance.

50 RITISH AND AMERICAN Airmen guage has also facilitated friendly relations. have been co-operating extensively Yet none of these explanations really accounts in the field of strategic air power for the depth of the special relationship be­ since before World War II when tween British and American Airmen. The Bshared endeavours, such as the Combined RAF-USAF partnership has experienced vicis­ Bomber Offensive against Nazi Germany set a situdes over the years but, like a healthy mar­ precedent for close partnership. After World riage, has weathered the storms. As both na­ War II, the Cold War framed air power rela­ tions seek coalition partners today and in the tions between the two countries, and the future, their Airmen can profit from a retro­ Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Air spective study of their affiliation. Force (USAF) were the key players. The Cold This article will examine Anglo-American War shaped the relationship until about 1990, strategic air power relations since World War II but the two services continue to enjoy an ex­ by considering the areas of planning and op­ ceptionally close affiliation today. Anglo- erations, organization and basing (particu­ American air power co-operation serves as an larly of US units in the United Kingdom), excellent model of successful coalition rela­ equipment (especially aircraft, missiles, and tions and reflects the evolution of current munitions), and finally joint training. How­ concepts such as expeditionary air power and ever, the term strategic air power requires clari­ effects-based operations. fication. During the Cold War the idea that The Anglo-American alliance is perhaps “strategic meant nuclear” was prevalent, but the ultimate example of a “coalition of the US-UK air power activities have shown the willing,” but why have British and American limitation of that notion.1 The United States Airmen had such an enduring propensity to has indeed often stationed nuclear-capable work together? On one level their friendship bombers and missiles at British bases since has reflected the long-term political alliance the 1940s. In a remarkable display of trust, the between their two countries based on shared United States even equipped the RAF with strategic interests. Within alliances, British and bombers and, later, nuclear weapons whilst American Airmen have pooled their resources the United Kingdom built its own nuclear ca­ to oppose common enemies ever since they pabilities. Today’s Airmen understand that the fought the Central Powers in World War I. term strategic refers not to particular weapon The Axis was their common foe during World systems, but to the level of effects those sys­ War II, and the Soviet Union filled that role tems produce. This article discusses air and during the Cold War. However, the Anglo- space power capable of producing effects that American air power relationship transcends “influence activities at the strategic level of opposition to shared enemies. In today’s com­ war and focus on national and multinational plex world, foes are less clearly defined, yet military objectives.”2 For example, today’s RAF the two air forces still integrate their opera­ and USAF doctrines recognize the 1948–49 tions closely. Several factors might help ac­ Berlin airlift, a combined Anglo-American count for the ongoing rapport. Simple force operation, as an example of how non-combat of habit is one possible explanation. The ser­ air operations can produce strategic effects.3 vices have co-ordinated closely for so long Indeed, non-combat activities such as training that they became habituated to working to­ and equipment have been central to US-UK gether. Personal friendships may be another air power co-operation since World War I. As contributing factor. Generations of Airmen Sebastian Cox explains in his article in this have served together and formed close bonds journal, America provided training bases for during exercises while stationed in each the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) (renamed the other’s countries. Personnel-exchange tours RAF in April 1917) in return for British equip­ have long been a staple of the relationship ment and assistance with squadron combat between the two air forces. A common lan­ work-ups of US Army Air Service squadrons

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 51 on the western front in 1917 and 1918.4 First of Boeing B-29 Superfortresses and B-17 Fly­ World War co-operation set the precedent for ing Fortresses went to RAF Marham to take Second World War co-operation, when, for part in Trial Ruby alongside the Lincolns of four years, the RAF and the US Army Air the RAF Central Bomber Establishment. Trial Forces (USAAF) worked together in North Ruby was to lead to the development of the Africa, Sicily, Italy, and finally, the invasion of radio-controlled Azon, Razon, and Tarzon Europe. The so-called strategic air forces— bombs, the last of which was based upon the Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force— 12,000-pound RAF Tallboy bomb casing.7 started working together in 1942 on what came These early precision-guided munitions were to be called the Combined Bomber Offensive. subsequently used against bridge and reser­ The Visiting Forces Act of 1942 established voir targets during the Korean War.8 The 18 the wartime status of US forces in the United September 1947 establishment of the US Air Kingdom and was eventually followed by Force was a momentous event for American other agreements. Airmen but had little obvious effect on Anglo- Anglo-American air power activities waned American air power relations. in the immediate aftermath of the war. By the General Spaatz’s and Lord Tedder’s fears end of 1945, there were 740 military airfields about Soviet intentions were vindicated on 1 and dispersed operating sites in the United April 1948 when the Soviets imposed a block­ Kingdom, of which 159 were at some time oc­ ade on Berlin. The Berlin airlift that followed cupied by USAAF units. By the end of 1946, fostered a dramatic renaissance in Anglo- the last USAAF unit departed for the United American air power relations, but the fact States; however, the Visiting Forces Act of 1942 that the two nations flew almost all the airlift remained extant. The first significant instance missions to Berlin was only the most obvious of postwar US-UK air power co-operation oc­ part of the story. Whilst the story of the Berlin curred in January 1946 when Gen Carl Spaatz, airlift is generally well known and was cov­ commanding general of the USAAF, and the ered in a recent article in Air Power Review, 9 new chief of the Air Staff (CAS), marshal of what is less well known is the deployment of the Royal Air Force (MRAF) Sir Arthur SAC B-29s to the United Kingdom in a display William (Lord) Tedder, were visiting USAF of Anglo-American resolve.10 On 17–18 July bases in Britain that were about to close. Al­ 1948, B-29s of the 29th and 307th Bomb ready worried about the looming Soviet Groups arrived at RAF bases Marham, threat, Lord Tedder agreed to General Spaatz’s Scampton, and Waddington, with another request to have five RAF bases—Marham, Bomb Group arriving at RAF Lakenheath in Lakenheath, Scampton, Bassingbourne, and August. Whilst the B-29s were not nuclear Mildenhall—prepared for possible use by equipped, the Soviets saw them as nuclear ca­ USAAF B-29s if required. The RAF would use pable. The 3rd Air Division (Provisional) was its own funds to do the necessary construc­ formed to command these units for what was tion work.5 Duncan Campbell, who puts the expected to be a detachment of only 30–60 date of the General Spaatz and Lord Tedder days. However, it soon became apparent that visit as June–July 1946, makes the point that the deployment would be long-lasting, so on 23 the “agreement was struck between the offi­ August 1948 the Provisional title was dropped. cials without public discussion or political de­ The 3rd Air Division moved into Bushey Park bate of the momentous issues involved.”6 The Air Station on 8 September.11 During the formation of the US Strategic Air Command build-up, the British supplied the Americans (SAC) on 21 March 1946 marked another with airfields and facilities free of charge with significant milestone because SAC would the proviso that the expenditure should not soon become a focal point for US-UK nuclear exceed the normal costs of RAF requirements co-operation throughout the Cold War. Coin­ and standards.12 On 13 November 1948, the cident with the formation of SAC, a number temporary status of USAF units in Britain

52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 ended with the agreement between the Air competition. The competition was a very Ministry and the USAF that the long-term simple one where each crew was required to American use of stations in Britain should be drop three visual and three radar-laid bombs assumed.13 This arrangement was regularised from 25,000 feet. The disappointing results, on 4 January 1949 when Maj Gen Leon W. with groups’ circular-error averages ranging Johnson, commander, 3rd Air Division, re­ from 1,065 feet to 2,985 feet, led Gen Curtis ceived the “financial agreement for supplies E. LeMay, when he took command of SAC in and services in the United Kingdom” from October 1948, to embark on his hard-driving the Air Ministry.14 During the same period (on professional reforms to ensure the accurate 12 November 1948), the CAS wrote to the delivery of nuclear weapons, which was to be head of Air Force Staff/British Joint-Services’ the command’s primary role in case of war.16 Mission, Washington, asking him to investi­ The SAC bombing and navigation competi­ gate the possibility of obtaining some B-29s tion became an annual event but was a US- for the RAF as interim replacements for the only affair until 1951 when two RAF Washing- Lincoln bomber.15 The new USAF’s Military tons (B-29s) participated. At the end of 1951, Air Transport Service and the RAF’s Trans­ SAC aircraft deployed to RAF Sculthorpe to port Command bore the brunt of the Berlin participate in the Bomber Command bomb­ airlift, so SAC bomber deployments were rela­ ing competition.17 Meanwhile, the two air tively “small beer.” Yet, few air operations in forces conducted combined air exercises, history can boast of greater strategic success such as Operation Dagger, the first joint RAF­ than the Berlin airlift. Recognizing that USAF air defence exercise, which happened British-American air power could supply in the United Kingdom in September 1948.18 Berlin indefinitely while portraying the West­ The Korean War punctuated the second ern allies as feeding people the Soviets were half of the Cold War’s B-29 era, but a number trying to starve into submission, the Soviets of British-American air power events preceded ended their blockade in 1949. At about that the outbreak of fighting. In October 1949, time, the United States, United Kingdom, the ABC Conference in Washington reached Canada, and nine other nations established a significant decision when the American, NATO, the military alliance that would form British, and Canadian representatives agreed a centrepiece of the Cold War. Indeed, the that the air defence of Great Britain would be Berlin airlift set in motion Anglo-American an RAF responsibility, whilst the USAF would air power arrangements that would endure increase the number of bomber units operat­ for many years. ing from UK bases. This decision was made Although airlift planes flew the Berlin air­ only days after the first Soviet atomic explo­ lift, most American and British Airmen sion was reported.19 On 22 March 1950, the viewed the B-29, the plane that had bombed first B-29s to be provided to the RAF under the Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the symbol of Mutual Defence Assistance Programme ar­ strategic air power during the incipient phase rived at RAF Marham. The following month, of the Cold War. Therefore, Airmen sought to US ambassador Lewis Douglas and UK under demonstrate their bombing prowess with the secretary for air Aidan Crawley agreed that, B-29. In May 1948, shortly before the Berlin because East Anglian bases were deemed too airlift began, Maj Gen Clements McMullen, vulnerable to Soviet air attack, four Midlands SAC deputy commander, announced the in­ bases at Upper Heyford, Greenham Com­ ception of a bombing competition to encour­ mon, Brize Norton, and Fairford should be age SAC crews to develop their navigational developed for SAC use. Whilst the initial and weapon-aiming accuracies. In June 1948, tranche of 70 B-29s was delivered, the second three crews from each of SAC’s 10 B-29 groups tranche was reduced from 124 to 17 due to the met at Castle Air Force Base (AFB), California, demands of the Korean War, which started in to compete in the command’s first bombing June 1950, and the entry into service of the

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 53 Canberra bomber in 1951.20 This latter aircraft use of British-based US forces. The act was the was to provide a rare example of American li­ British part of the NATO Status of Forces cence production of a British aircraft; as the Agreement and remains in effect today.28 Martin B-57, it saw service in Vietnam. On 16 The period from 1952 to 1966 was charac­ January 1951, six of SAC’s new B-36 strategic terized by nuclear co-operation and the intro­ bombers were deployed to the United King­ duction of jet aircraft. The first example was dom in just four days.21 the loan, actually starting in 1951, to the RAF of The Korean War era coincided with the four RB-45Cs for what was known as the Spe­ commencement of strategic reconnaissance cial Duties Flight.29 In April 1952 and again operations from the United Kingdom, initially two years later, this reconnaissance unit per­ using the RB-36D model, that sometimes formed radar photography over the Soviet staged through Mildenhall, Lakenheath, and zone of Germany and latterly over the Kiev Sculthorpe.22 Aerial reconnaissance of the area of the USSR itself, gathering informa­ USSR and Eastern Europe quickly became a tion that would have helped bombers find tar­ perennial Cold War activity that entailed very gets in the event of war. June 1953 saw the close Anglo-American co-operation. In May first SAC B-47 Wing (306th Bomb Wing) de­ 1954, B-47 reconnaissance operations com­ ployed to RAF Fairford, marking the end of menced from RAF Fairford, solidifying the the B-29 wing rotations. Three months later, a pattern of Cold War reconnaissance operations UK-US agreement was signed by the UK sec­ from the United Kingdom that would con­ retary of state for air and the US ambassador, tinue with aircraft such as the U-2, SR-71, which consolidated previous construction RC-135, and specially modified C-130s.23 These agreements and, perhaps more importantly, planes fought a protracted and sometimes established a cost-sharing basis.30 The end of deadly war in the shadows to gather informa­ the Korean War in 1953 had little noticeable tion about military developments in Soviet- effect on the USAF’s build-up in Europe. controlled territory. American concerns that the aftermath of the The increasing US presence in the United Korean War could escalate into a nuclear con­ Kingdom was recognised by the inception of flict with China and the USSR, stimulated by the Special Construction Programme in Feb­ the destruction of two US reconnaissance air­ ruary 1951 and the Visiting Forces Act of craft by Chinese fighters in the summer of 1952. The Special Construction Programme 1954, caused the USAF to be placed on a called for an additional 26 USAF bases to be high-alert state. The alert posture generated established in the United Kingdom.24 On 20 tensions between the USAF and its British March 1951, the 7th Air Division (SAC) formed hosts. The intensity of flying and the potential at South Ruislip as a SAC command in the for disastrous outcomes were exemplified United Kingdom.25 More importantly, on 1 when a B-47 crashed one-and-one-half miles May 1951 the 3rd Air Division was upgraded from RAF Upper Heyford, leading to consid­ to the Third Air Force, and the subsequent erable protest from local communities.31 At “Joint Transfer Agreement” established the re­ the same time, USAF nuclear weapons were lationship between the United States Air Forces brought to the United Kingdom for the first in Europe (USAFE) and SAC responsibilities time and stored on USAFE and SAC bases. in the United Kingdom.26 As a result of the ad­ However, as the American nuclear deter­ ditional bases programme and the USAFE­ rent became established, Cold War tensions SAC split, the runways at Upper Heyford, shifted, and there were significant changes in Greenham Common, and Brize Norton were the USAF posture between 1955 and 1958. In extended, and B-36 deployments to those bases Britain the emphasis was much more on the commenced in 1952.27 The Visiting Forces tactical forces of USAFE, and because of con­ Act of 1952 stemmed from a 1952 Churchill- cerns about the vulnerability of the United Truman protocol for joint consultation on the Kingdom to Soviet attack,32 the 7th Air Divi­

54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 sion’s strength was reduced by almost half. In the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force 1955 90-day SAC bomber rotational opera­ and with General Lauris Norstad (SACEUR) tions switched to much shorter ones, simulat­ [Supreme Allied Command, Europe] the ing poststrike recovery to UK bases.33 One re­ arrangement for implementing measures: sult was Plan 57-3, the “Big Shuffle,” which 1. To furnish the Royal Air Force with United States atomic bombs in the event of general involved closing 10 bases in a consolidation war; and of USAFE and SAC operations onto main op­ 2. To co-ordinate the atomic strike plans of the erating bases and returning a myriad of other United States Air Force with the Royal Air units to Air Ministry control.34 The final step Force.39 in this process was the 8 January 1958 com­ mencement of the SAC Reflex operations at This offer was then followed up by an ex­ RAF bases Greenham Common and Fairford, change of memoranda between the CSAF to which involved small numbers of aircraft from the RAF CAS and more detailed discussions including plans for providing US nuclear several wings rather than complete wing de- 40 ployments.35 B-47s involved in these deploy­ weapons for NATO. As a result of these ments took part in two major air defence ex- meetings, a fully integrated nuclear war plan ercises—Buck Board and Grab Hook—in was produced by Bomber Command and SAC which B-47s flying at 35,000–40,000 feet ap­ staffs “taking into account Bomber Command’s proached the United Kingdom on realistic ability to be on target in the first wave several hours in advance of the main SAC force op­ threat axes to be intercepted by the Hawker erating from bases in the United States.”41 In Hunter F6s of Fighter Command.36 Whilst US this initial plan, which was to be reviewed an­ nuclear weapons were being deployed in the nually, Bomber Command was allocated 106 United Kingdom and the SAC posture was targets. However, Anglo-American nuclear shifting, things were finally changing for RAF planners faced the problem that neither SAC Bomber Command with the 1955 entry into nor Bomber Command was willing, or indeed service of the first of the strategic jet bombers able, to reveal to its partners the yields of the or “V-Bombers,” the Valiant, and with the de­ weapons allocated to specific targets, leading cision in July of the previous year that a UK to a comment in 1960 by Air Marshal Sir Ken­ thermo-nuclear bomb should be produced.37 neth Cross, the air officer commanding in If the two air forces were to gain maximum chief, Bomber Command, that “in this area advantage from increasing RAF bombing ca­ alone there is a barrier to co-ordination and pabilities, they needed closer co-ordination of duplication and wastage is inevitable until their nuclear planning. A September 1955 American legislation is altered.”42 What made meeting between the CAS, MRAF Sir William this co-operative venture even more remark­ Dixon, and his opposite number, Gen Nathan able was that it proceeded despite the 1956 F. Twining, chief of staff, USAF (CSAF), sowed Suez Crisis when Britain, France, and Israel in­ the seeds for integrated Anglo-American nu­ tervened in Egypt to prevent Egyptian presi­ clear targeting, not least to avoid wasteful du­ dent Gamal Abdel-Nasser from nationalizing plication of effort. Subsequently, a team of the Suez Canal. American president Dwight D. senior USAF officers visited the Air Ministry Eisenhower strongly condemned the venture, in London to discuss the provision of Ameri­ and following American diplomatic and fi­ can nuclear weapons for the V-Force in the nancial pressure, the British, French, and Is­ event of war and the co-ordination of nuclear 38 raelis aborted the operation. The Suez Crisis strike plans. These offers were finalised in a was clearly a rough spot in US-UK relations but note from Charles Wilson, the American secre­ fortunately proved only a temporary problem. tary of defense, to his opposite number Dun­ One brighter aspect of weapons co-operation can Sandys: was “Project E,” by which US nuclear weapons I agree that it is appropriate for you to authorize would be provided for carriage on the Valiant the Chief of the British Air Staff to discuss with and the Canberra. The Valiant Force of 72

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 55 aircraft at RAF bases Marham, Waddington, and missiles’ effectiveness, training firings of mis­ Honington was equipped with the US Mk 5 siles from the manufacturer and, later, proving weapon.43 The Mk 7 weapon was also provided firings of missiles drawn from operational RAF for Canberras operating both within Bomber sites were conducted in the United States. A Command and RAF Germany.44 This arrange­ non-nuclear parallel to the Thor Agreement ment continued until 1963 for the weapons in was the US funding of RAF Regiment Rapier Bomber Command and 1969 for those in RAF short-range air defence squadrons from the Germany. However, the weapons had to be mid-1970s to the mid-1990s to defend USAF under US national custody, which limited the main operating bases in the United Kingdom. ability of Bomber Command to disperse its as- A year after the Thor Agreement was signed, a sets.45 This problem became significant when further inter-governmental agreement permit­ in response to the October 1962 Cuban missile ted one of the three ballistic missile early warn­ crisis, the RAF’s tactical bomber force, which ing system (BMEWS) stations to be built at then comprised the three SACEUR-assigned Fylingdales in North Yorkshire.49 Paradoxically, Valiant squadrons at RAF Marham, was to be Fylingdales became operational on 1 Septem­ loaded with nuclear weapons. It rapidly be­ ber 1963 just as the Thor sites were being de- came apparent that there were insufficient activated.50 American custodial officers to maintain control Additional changes took place in the air of the weapons. In this case the commanding power realm during the late 1950s and early general of USAFE allowed the weapons to be 1960s. The B-52 bomber had taken over as handed over to the station commander of SAC’s primary nuclear-alert aircraft, and the RAF Marham, an act that exemplified the re­ B-47s were now seen, rather like the Valiants, markable trust that had grown up between as medium bombers on 15-minute ground the two air forces by that time.46 alert.51 The new KC-135 jet-powered aerial- Nuclear weapons co-operation extended be­ refuelling tankers replaced the propeller- yond aircraft systems. In what was perhaps a driven KC-97 tankers, greatly extending unique arrangement, the United States loaned bomber range. The B-52s took part in the Britain 60 Thor intermediate range ballistic SAC bombing competition for the first time missiles (IRBM) from 1959 to 1963, as covered in 1956, and after a four-year break, the RAF in an inter-governmental agreement of 22 Feb­ returned in 1957 to compete with Valiants ruary 1958.47 Twenty-four IRBM sites, all and Vulcans.52 The following year two Valiant ex–World War II airfields, which in some cases teams, each comprising two aircraft and four had for a second time been requisitioned from crews, competed with the B-52s and did par­ their owners, were established in the United ticularly well, one placing seventh overall and Kingdom. The agreement provided that the the other 20th out of 41 teams.53 However, in missiles would be manned and operated by RAF 1959 and 1961, RAF Valiants and Vulcans, and units, that the nuclear warheads would again then Vulcans only, participated in Exercises remain in American custody, and that a joint Eye Washer and Sky Shield respectively, these decision by both governments was required to being United States and Canadian air defence launch the missiles. Whilst the United States exercises. In Eye Washer, only one of the six would supply the missiles and specialised RAF aircraft flying over Canada at 42,000 equipment and training for the RAF person­ and 48,000 feet was intercepted.54 Clearly, nel, the British would provide the infrastruc­ American and Canadian Airmen had more ture at an estimated cost of £10 million.48 The work to do in the air defence realm. agreement was to last for only five years and in If Project E and Thor marked the zenith of effect covered the gap while Britain fielded its Anglo-American nuclear-weapon co-operation, own thermonuclear weapon. The Thor IRBM we now come to the nadir—Skybolt. In 1960 had a range of some 1,500 miles with a nominal the British and American nuclear programmes one-megaton warhead. To demonstrate the were becoming subject to the same constraints

56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 of cost, survivability of static missile sites (par­ Department of the Air Force had committed ticularly in the United Kingdom and Europe), both parties to the co-operative development and survivability of aircraft at high level due of the Skybolt missile but interestingly stated to steadily improving Soviet surface-to-air mis­ that “it is understood that at this time this is siles (SAM) and air defence fighters. A further purely a research and development pro­ concern for the British was the maintenance gramme, no production having been autho­ of an independent nuclear capability. If one rised by our authority.”60 Having burnt their is to understand the significance of Skybolt, a bridges with regards to national alternatives, brief explanation of the status of UK airborne the British enthusiasm for the Skybolt project nuclear weapons is necessary. As previously is understandable, but the programme con­ explained, the Valiants of the SACEUR- tained high-technological and cost risks. Sub­ assigned tactical bomber force were equipped sequently in an aide memoire to UK minister of with American nuclear weapons. These air­ defence Peter Thornycroft, US secretary of craft were soon to be withdrawn from service defense Robert McNamara explained why the due to airframe fatigue. The other V-bombers, US government had reached a “tentative con­ the Vulcans and Victors, were armed with clusion” that the Skybolt programme should British-built bombs, such as Blue Danube and be abandoned. Whilst other options, such as the megaton-yield Yellow Sun Mk 2.55 Other a UK-only Skybolt programme or an Anglo- Vulcan and Victor squadrons were equipped French collaborative programme, were con­ with the air-launched, nuclear-tipped Mk 1 sidered, the project was effectively dead Blue Steel stand-off missile. An extended-range once the Americans had decided to withdraw Blue Steel was cancelled in January 1960, as funding; thus, Polaris was the only alternative. the United Kingdom did not have sufficient The implication for the RAF was that it lost research and development capacity to develop the UK strategic-deterrent role on 1 July 1967 that weapon and bring the Mk 1 Blue Steel into when the submarine-launched Polaris missile service simultaneously.56 Four days after the became operational. Furthermore, because of cancellation of the extended-range Blue Steel, the very short range of the Mk 1 Blue Steel— the British ballistic missile, Blue Streak, was also only 100 nautical miles from high altitude— cancelled on grounds of cost and obsoles- it was clear that a British-built bomb suitable cence.57 The cancellation of Blue Streak was for low-altitude delivery would be required also influenced by the potential of the Ameri­ for the Vulcans and Victors.61 Finally, in July can Skybolt design, an airborne-launched bal­ 1965, an order was placed for 158 General listic missile, to provide a nuclear-deterrent Dynamics lightweight, terrain-following radars weapon launched from outside of Soviet- for those aircraft, confirming the shift from fighter and SAM cover from airborne alert high-altitude to low-altitude operations that aircraft. After talks between Prime Minister was to become the hallmark of the RAF nu­ Harold Macmillan and President Eisenhower clear and conventional attack forces for the on 28–29 March 1960 at Camp David, during next 25 years. which the Americans indicated their willing­ The early 1960s also saw changes in the ness to provide Britain the Skybolt and po­ planning and organization of nuclear opera­ tentially the submarine-launched Polaris mis­ tions, the first of these being the formation in sile as well, the British government confirmed August 1960 of the Joint Strategic Target the cancellation of Blue Streak.58 Yet little more Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Headquarters SAC, than two years later, at the Nassau Conference Offutt AFB, Nebraska. The JSTPS’s role was to in December 1962, Pres. John F. Kennedy for­ produce and maintain a national strategic tar­ mally notified Prime Minister Macmillan of get list and the Single Integrated Operational Skybolt’s cancellation.59 The technical and fi­ Plan (SIOP). UK systems were included within nancial agreement of 27 September 1960 be­ this plan.62 Furthermore, on 23 May 1963, the tween the UK Ministry of Aviation and the US RAF V-Force was formally assigned to SACEUR

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 57 for targeting, planning, and co-ordinating exe­ War in 1973 removed a point of US-UK ten­ cution of nuclear missions, in the NATO sion. When the USAF began its Red Flag ex­ equivalent of the SIOP.63 On 1 April 1965, ercises, the RAF was invited to participate for the SAC Reflex operation detachments in the the first time in August 1977 and has contin­ United Kingdom were terminated.64 As a re­ ued to do so ever since. That same year Soviet sult of this, RAF Brize Norton was returned to deployment of mobile SS-20 missiles upset RAF control, but RAF Upper Heyford was re­ the whole nuclear balance in Europe, leading tained for Third Air Force operations. The to a NATO decision in 1979 to replace the end of SAC’s large-scale operations in the Pershing IA nuclear missiles based mostly in United Kingdom was marked on 30 June West Germany with the far more accurate Per­ 1965 with the disbandment of SAC’s 7th Air shing II. In addition 464 ground launched Division.65 However, just before this, on 18 cruise missiles (GLCM) were to be deployed April 1965, for the second successive year, in a number of NATO nations, including the the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Sun­ United Kingdom.66 The 1979 Soviet invasion of day protest march passed the South and West Afghanistan contributed to Pres. Jimmy Carter’s Ruislip USAF bases. These antinuclear protests withdrawal from the SALT II negotiations, were foretastes of what was to come. embargoing of wheat and technology exports, The late 1960s witnessed continued change and finally, in 1980, commencement of a and turbulence. US basing in the United King­ massive force build-up, spelling the end of dé­ dom became a key issue again on 13 March tente. 67 The Pershing II and GLCM deploy­ 1966 when France announced its decision to ments were entirely in accord with the poli­ withdraw from the NATO-integrated military cies of President Carter and Pres. Ronald structure, which meant all NATO headquar­ Reagan, who came to office in January 1981. ters and forces were to leave France by 1 April As part of President Reagan’s policy to force 1967. Many of the US units displaced from the Soviets into an unwinnable arms race, the France relocated to UK bases. Meanwhile, on planned deployments of GLCMs to RAF bases 30 April 1968, RAF Bomber Command merged Greenham Common and Molesworth met with Fighter Command to form a new Strike with significant protests, in particular the so- Command. That RAF reorganization did not called peace camps, which were not limited appreciably alter Anglo-American air or space to these two sites. RAF Regiment, RAF police, power co-operation, but did foreshadow a Ministry of Defence police, and civilian police similar USAF reorganization that would occur forces all participated in extensive security 24 years later. American involvement in the operations around RAF Greenham Common Vietnam War was unpopular in Britain, yet in particular, which received its first GLCMs Anglo-American air power relations re­ in May 1983. Reagan’s strategy eventually suc­ mained cordial. Adjustments made in the late ceeded. Following the signing of various arms- 1960s established the USAFE basing structure reduction agreements, the GLCMs were with­ that remained almost unchanged for the final drawn in 1987, foreshadowing the end of the 25 years of the Cold War. One notable change Cold War. was the June 1972 movement of Third Air Anglo-American air power co-operation Force to RAF Mildenhall, where it remains continued during the Cold War’s final years. today. However, the last move of new US The 1982 Falklands War between Argentina forces into the United Kingdom would be en­ and Great Britain was a delicate matter for tirely strategic in nature. the Americans because it involved two nations East-West tensions moderated slightly dur­ that were friendly to the United States. How­ ing the early 1970s as Pres. Richard Nixon en­ ever, the United States provided the United gaged in a policy of détente and arms-control Kingdom with weapons such as the Aim-9L negotiations with the USSR, but the thaw Sidewinder air-to-air missile and the Shrike proved temporary. The end of the Vietnam anti-radiation missile. It also upgraded the

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 infrastructure at Wideawake Airfield on Ascen­ co-operation continued in response to crises sion Island and provided 12.5 million gallons in Bosnia and Kosovo. of jet fuel. The United States also discretely The decade between the dissolution of the provided intelligence data.68 Finally, it de­ USSR in 1991 and the fateful events of 2001 ployed KC-135 tankers to RAF bases Fairford turned out to be an interwar era that ended and Mildenhall to cover the gap in NATO with American and British Airmen once again forces left by the UK deployment of Victor confronting a common enemy—this time in tankers to Ascension Island.69 The quid pro the war on terror. The RAF has continued to fly quo came just four years later on 14 April 1986 with US Airmen and provide US access to bases when the British supported the US Operation in the United Kingdom, Cyprus, and Diego El Dorado Canyon bombing raid against Libya. Garcia during Operation Enduring Freedom A response to a series of Libyan-sponsored ter­ in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. rorist attacks, the operation involved the US A number of trends emerge from the Anglo- Air Force and Navy and included the deploy­ American air power co-operation record of ment of 38 KC-10 and KC-135 tankers under accomplishment since World War II. For one the guise of a NATO exercise. In addition to thing, the two countries have enjoyed an un­ the tankers, the UK-based attack force com­ commonly close partnership for a long time. prised 15 F-111s and three EF-111s.70 The Common strategic interests in opposing foes highly successful mission, which lasted over like the USSR and international terrorists go 12 hours, was only mounted after joint con­ a long way towards explaining the partnership. sultation and with the express permission of Combined planning, personnel exchanges, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 71 and training events like bombing competitions The end of the Cold War did not dim Anglo- and Red Flag war games have honed US-UK American strategic air power co-operation but co-ordination to a fine edge. British willingness did change its nature. Nuclear co-operation to host US forces on their territory decade received less emphasis as attention shifted to after decade and both nations’ willingness to handling regional contingencies. American share equipment have reflected the depth of and British Airmen seldom flew combat mis­ co-operation between the two nations. Only sions together during the Cold War, but they truly close friends share their ballistic missiles, did during the 1991 Gulf War to eject Iraq bombers, and nuclear warheads. The weapons from Kuwait. Here the years of training to­ were often of American design, but the gether, particularly on exercises like Red Flag, British Canberra bomber, which served in the paid dividends with composite RAF/USAF USAF as the B-57, was an exception. 72 formations being the norm and RAF aircrew Anglo-American air power relations have integrating easily into the USAF Air Compo­ successfully weathered serious political ten­ nent Headquarters in Riyadh. The United sions because leaders have focused on strate­ Kingdom also permitted US bombers and gic goals. Basing US bombers and missiles on other aircraft to use British facilities in the British soil certainly made Britain a target in United Kingdom and on the British-owned is­ the event of a nuclear war. British voters voiced land of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. their concerns, so British politicians had to ex­ Then on 1 June 1992, in a move reminiscent of ercise strong leadership to follow through on the 1968 merger of RAF Bomber and Fighter agreements to host US aircraft and especially Commands, the USAF Strategic Air Command GLCMs. The bombers and tankers flew fre­ merged with Tactical Air Command to form a quently, generating noise and air-traffic con­ new Air Combat Command. Like the 1968 gestion. Risky American reconnaissance flights RAF reorganization, that change had little ap­ flown from British airfields also tested the parent effect on US-UK relations. Although mettle of British political leaders. The GLCMs the USAF and RAF underwent significant force were a lightning rod for antinuclear protes­ cuts and base closings during the 1990s, close tors. Unfortunate political incidents like the

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 59 1956 Suez Crisis and the Skybolt missile can­ dom to permanent bases in the United States. cellation in the 1960s tested relations yet also Geography determined that most expedi­ proved the durability of the partnership. Other tionary aspects of US-UK air power involved potentially disruptive events such as the es­ USAF units operating from British territory, tablishment of the USAF in 1947, the Vietnam but the RAF routinely flew exercises such as War, formation of Strike Command, and for­ Red Flag from US territory. The war on terror mation of Air Combat Command had minimal has featured US air units staging from for­ effect on US-UK air power relations. These ward bases, sometimes in British territory, for facts suggest senior US and UK political and short periods in a style reminiscent of the military leaders have been focusing on the Berlin airlift era. Whether the war on terror long-term strategic effects they wish to create devolves into a protracted Cold War–style af­ in the world and have been able to overcome fair with the USAF again settling into fixed short-term problems. forward-operating bases remains to be seen. The partnership has also reflected changes in the USAF view of expeditionary air power. The United States and Great Britain are The Berlin airlift included combat units de­ true friends with continuing mutual interests, ploying to forward operating locations for so the future of their air power relationship short periods. However, as the Cold War be­ looks bright. The USAF-RAF example is a use­ came entrenched, forward-deployed bomber ful model of international co-operation that units transitioned to permanent forward gar­ illustrates what can happen when two nations risons. Ballistic missiles and longer-range air- and their air forces choose to work together refuelled bombers heralded another shift in and may prove instructive to those who seek the 1960s when US bomber units redeployed to build “coalitions of the willing” composed from permanent bases in the United King- of Airmen from other nations. ■

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.2, 12. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 13. Strategic Attack, 30 September 2003, 29. 13. Third Air force Historical Brief, 10. 2. US Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces Command 14. Ibid., 11. Glossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#S. 15. Humphrey Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, RAF 3. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, vii and 6. Nuclear Deterrent Forces (London: HMSO, 1994), 586. 4. Sebastian Cox, “Aspects of Anglo-US Co-operation 16. Andrew J. Birtle and Robert D. Brunkow, Proud in the Air in the First World War,” Air and Space Power Shield: SAC Bombing and Navigation Competition, 1948–1986, Journal 18, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 29. SAC Historical Study no. 213 (Offutt AFB, NE: Office of 5. Dr. Charles H. Hildreth, “A Short History and Tril­ the Historian, HQ SAC, 1987), 2. ogy of the USAF in the United Kingdom,” Third Air Force 17. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 70. Historical Brief (RAF Mildenhall, England: Historical Divi­ 18. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 10. sion, Third Air Force [Office of Information], May 1967), 19. Ibid., 11. 2. Hereafter referred to as Third Air Force Historical Brief. 20. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 21. 6. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: 21. Ibid., 26. The Implications of American Military Power in Britain (Lon­ don: Michael Joseph, 1985), 28. 22. Ibid., 44. 7. Along with the larger 22,000 lb Grand Slam, Tall­ 23. Ibid., 45. boy was a World War II penetration weapon for attacks 24. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 13. on targets such as German U-boat pens and V2 missile- 25. Ibid. preparation bunkers. 26. Ibid. 8. Robert Jackson, United States Air Forces in Britain: Its 27. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 32. Aircraft, Bases and Strategy since 1948 (Shrewsbury, UK: Air- 28. Ministry of Defence, “Replies to Written Questions life Publishing, 2000), 9. Following the Oral Evidence Session before House of Com­ 9. Sebastian Cox, “Britain and the Berlin Airlift,” mons, Defence Select Committee on 8 December 1999,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Spring 2004, 25–44. Fifth Report, HC 100, 10 April 2000, http://www. 10. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 2. parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/ 11. Ibid., 10. cmselect/cmdfence/100/9120810.htm.

60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 29. Sqn Ldr John Crampton, “Russian Photo-Shoot,” 54. Ibid., 310. Air Pictorial, August 1997, 431. 55. Ibid., 571. 30. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 14. 56. Ibid., 613. 31. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 51. 57. Ibid. 32. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 298. 58. Ibid., 398. 33. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 5. 59. Ibid., 403. 34. Ibid., 16–18. 60. Ibid., 412. 35. Ibid., 17. 61. Ibid., 423. 36. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 58. 62. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 82. 37. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 598. 63. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 622. 38. Ibid., 254–55. 64. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 1. 39. Ibid., 257. 65. Ibid., 22. 40. Ibid., 605–7. 66. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 117. 41. Ibid., 275. CAS Memorandum, 5 June 1958. 67. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 42. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 279. 1945–1996, 8th ed. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 298–99. 43. Ibid., 263. 68. Christopher Bluth, “Anglo-American Relations 44. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 272. and the Falklands Conflict,” in International Perspectives on 45. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 262. The United the Falklands Conflict: A Matter of Life and Death, ed. Alex States had successfully tested an H-bomb in 1952. Danchev (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 217–18. 46. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 87. 69. Rodney A. Burden et al., Falklands, the Air War 47. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 17. (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986). 48. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 291. 70. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 123. 49. Third Air Force Historical Brief, 19. The other two 71. J. A. S. Grenville, The Collins History of the World in BMEWS radars were built at Clear, AK, and Thule, the 20th Century (London: HarperCollins Publishers, Greenland. 1998), 866. 50. Ibid., 20. 72. The Harrier VSTOL (vertical short takeoff and 51. Jackson, US Air Forces in Britain, 68. landing) aircraft was another example, but that plane is 52. Birtle and Brunkow, Proud Shield, 6. not considered a “strategic” asset for the purposes of this 53. Wynne, Nuclear Deterrent Forces, 308. article.

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIR POWER CO-OPERATION 61 British Commonwealth Carrier Operations in the Korean War CDR DAVID HOBBS, MBE, RN

Editorial Abstract: The Korean War was also a major maritime effort in which the United Nations de­ pended on control of the sea for the transport of troops, their logistical support, and for the provision of tactical air power. One Australian and five British light fleet carriers alternated to carry out strike operations against tactical targets ashore and to enforce the sea blockade for three years. Their re­ markable performance brought many squadrons, and their people, to a high pitch of professionalism and efficiency, the most conspicuous aspect of the Commonwealth contribution to the United Nations.

Background though those deployed to the Far East were more capable than those on the home station. In 1950 the Royal Navy (RN) was still re­ Naval air squadrons were short of aircrew and covering from a shortage of manpower fol­ maintainers and were still using up stocks of lowing the rundown after World War II. Few obsolete wartime aircraft as production of ships had their war complement embarked al­ new types moved slowly. Fortunately, a number

62 of people with war experience had been re­ On hearing of the invasion, Admiral tained. The Far East Station covered a vast Andrewes sailed on his own initiative at 0130 area with significant responsibilities. on 26 June, giving orders to his force to con­ The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) formed centrate in southern Japanese ports. On 27 its Fleet Air Arm in 1948 with a great deal of June, the UN Security Council described the British help and only recently had taken de­ NKPA attack as “a breach of [world] peace” livery of its first carrier and embarked air and authorised member nations to assist the group. Many of its aircrew had wartime expe­ Republic of Korea.1 The British government’s rience with the RN or Royal Australian Air decision to support the security resolution Force (RAAF). was announced by Prime Minister Clement The Royal Canadian Navy had also recently Attlee in the House of Commons on 27 June. formed a Fleet Air Arm with a light fleet car­ On the next day he announced that British rier on loan from Britain but did not deploy naval forces in Japanese waters were placed at it to Korea. A potential plan to embark a the disposal of US authorities to act on behalf Canadian Sea Fury squadron in a British car­ of the UN Security Council. The Canadian rier was not acted on. government immediately offered naval sup­ port, followed on 29 June by the governments of Australia and New Zealand. Orders from the The Outbreak of War Admiralty were sent directing the commander The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in chief Far East “to place the Royal Navy at advanced, almost at will, through the South present in Japanese waters at the disposal of Korean defences after its surprise attack on the US Naval Command.”2 Admiral Brind 25 June 1950. On 27 June, Pres. Syngman had already offered the use of his fleet to Ad­ Rhee and his government left Seoul, and it miral Joy for “any humanitarian mission” and must have seemed to the Communist com­ warned Admiral Andrewes that he might soon manders that the war was already won. How­ be called on for action under the UN Charter. ever, in their plans they had left one factor Commonwealth naval units were rapidly out of their calculations that was to prove assimilated into the US command structure. their ruin—sea power. The reaction of the COMNAVFE, Admiral Joy, placed Admiral United Nations (UN) to this aggression was Andrewes in command of Task Group 96.8, swift and unambiguous, allowing allied navies the West Korean Support Group, which com­ to exert relentless pressure on North Korea. prised mainly Commonwealth and allied ships. In the summer of 1950, the British Far East Rear Adm John M. Higgins, USN, was placed in Station was commanded by Adm Sir Patrick command of the mainly USN East Korean Brind, RN, who flew his flag at a shore head­ Support Group. HMS Triumph joined Task quarters in Singapore. Much of the operational Force 77 of the US Pacific Fleet off Okinawa fleet, fortuitously, was in Japanese waters under where Rear Adm John M. Hoskins, USN, the operational control of Rear Adm Sir commander Carrier Division 3 in USS Valley William G. Andrewes, RN, flag officer second Forge (CV-45), took tactical command of the in command, Far East Fleet (FO2FEF), in the force. Planning for a combined strike against cruiser HMS Belfast (C35). They had recently targets in North Korea started at once, and the carried out a number of exercises with US Navy task force moved to the operating area. Ameri­ (USN) warships under the command of Vice can signal procedures were adopted at once, Adm C. Turner Joy, USN, commander US Naval and no difficulty was found in working with the Forces Far East (COMNAVFE). The British USN. Admiral Andrewes later wrote, “It all Task Force included the light fleet carrier seemed so familiar as it was just what we had HMS Triumph (R16), the cruiser HMS Jamaica done so often before during the exercises in (C44), and a number of destroyers, frigates, March with very similar forces.” Also, it was only and logistic ships including a hospital ship. five years since the US and British Pacific fleets

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CARRIER OPERATIONS 63 had worked together so successfully in the final on the incident, COMNAVFE later said, “The phase of the war against Japan. calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted.” The First Carrier Strike Carrier Operations The first naval air strikes of the war were flown off between 0545 and 0615 on 3 July Like all wars in the modern era, this was a from USS Valley Forge and HMS Triumph. Six­ maritime war with the UN utterly dependent teen F4U Corsairs, 12 AD-4 Skyraiders, and on the sea for the transport of troops, sup­ eight F9F-2 Panthers from USS Valley Forge at­ plies, and, to a very large extent, air support. tacked Pyongyang and other airfield sites, de­ Control of the sea allowed a firm beachhead stroying 15–20 aircraft on the ground and two around Pusan to be established and main­ in the air. Twelve Fireflies and nine Seafires tained. HMS Triumph suffered a leaking stern from HMS Triumph armed with rockets at­ gland and was replaced in Task Force 77 by tacked Haeju Airfield, damaging hangars and USS Philippine Sea (CV-47), a more potent strike buildings, but no aircraft were sighted. All the carrier. After repairs, she joined the West aircraft returned safely; flak had been negli­ Coast Task Force where British and Australian gible, but slight damage had been inflicted carriers were to operate for much of the re­ on some aircraft by small-arms fire. mainder of the war. Although less capable Both navies had been at pains after 1945 to than her USN counterparts, HMS Triumph work out common operating procedures, and played a key role in the war by being in the these, enhanced by cross-deck operations in right place at the right time, and her contri­ the recent exercises, worked well. On 4 July, bution was, thus, more significant than that of aircraft from USS Valley Forge attacked two forces who were too far away. gunboats in the Taedong estuary, destroying In September HMS Triumph played a small one small railway bridge, damaging another, part in the covering force during the landings and destroying 15 railway locomotives and a at Inchon that transformed the war. By then significant amount of rolling stock. Aircraft her elderly air group had become increas­ from HMS Triumph attacked the railway be­ ingly difficult to maintain, and she was due tween Yonan and Haeju, scoring two hits on a for replacement. bridge. Targets of opportunity, including a Relieving her was HMS Theseus (R64), a sis­ column of marching troops, were attacked. ter ship which carried the 17th CAG equipped Two American and one British aircraft were with squadrons of very capable Sea Fury and damaged by flak. Firefly FR5 aircraft. Her squadrons were kept The choice of targets for the British air­ busy flying combat air patrols over inshore craft was severely limited by the poor radius forces, strafing mine-laying junks, and support­ action of the early mark of Firefly operated by ing troops ashore. By November it seemed HMS Triumph’s 14th Carrier Air Group that the war was nearly over, and Theseus was (CAG) and the limited strike capability of the allowed to leave the combat zone when UN Seafire 47 that was primarily an air defence forces moved close to the Yalu River. She was fighter. An unfortunate incident occurred on hastily recalled when Chinese troops infil­ 28 July 1950 when the Fleet Air Arm suffered trated into Korea and struck hard at UN its first casualty of the war. Commissioned ground forces. Pilot White of 800 Naval Air Squadron was A pattern of operations emerged in which shot down in his Seafire by a USAF B-29 “for the British carrier off the west coast alter­ no very apparent reason.” Mr. White was nated with a USN light carrier, and friendly ri­ picked up, suffering from burns, from his valry led to a constant improvement in both dinghy by a USN destroyer and transferred to navies’ war-fighting capability. When not on HMS Triumph later in the day. Commenting patrol, the British ship would return to the

64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 British bases at Singapore and Hong Kong, used her extensive workshops to repair battle- damaged aircraft, and transported thousands of Commonwealth troops to and from Korea. She even carried out a bombardment of NKPA positions ashore with her four-inch guns on one sortie. Despite her largely second-line tasking, she had a fully functional flight deck and often gave deck-landing practice to replacement pi­ lots and acted as a “spare deck” for the opera­ tional carriers. Replacement aircraft were fer­ ried from the United Kingdom to the Far East in the light fleet carrier HMS Warrior (R31). Sea Fury aircraft In April 1951, HMS Theseus was relieved by HMS Glory (R62) having carried out 3,500 op­ Commonwealth base port at Sasebo to take erational sorties in 86 flying days over seven on replacement aircraft and ammunition and months. The light fleet carriers were built to give leave for the rest and recreation of the an austere specification in World War II and ship’s company. A patrol typically comprised had many disadvantages including lack of 10 days at sea with a day refuelling and re­ speed, liveliness in rough weather, and recur­ arming at sea in the middle. rent trouble with the single catapult. Despite HMS Theseus operated throughout the bit­ that, they succeeded in operating with an in­ terly cold winter of 1950–51 despite gales, hail, tensity and skill which Rear Adm Alan K. snow, and poor visibility. In December the air Scott-Moncrieff, RN, who had relieved Admiral group was only able to fly on 17 days but man­ Andrewes as FO2FEF on his promotion to vice aged 630 sorties without accident. By February admiral, was able to report to his commander the sortie tally had risen to 1,500, testimony in chief as being praised highly by the USN. to the ruggedness of the aircraft and the skill of the pilots. The 17th CAG was awarded the Boyd Trophy for 1950. This was instituted by Rear Adm Sir Denis Boyd, RN, the wartime captain of HMS Illustrious (R87) of Taranto fame, and is awarded for the most outstand­ ing feat of naval aviation in a given year. Until his death in 1965, Admiral Boyd usually pre­ sented the trophy in person. As spring succeeded winter, less wind and a heavy swell gave deck landing a lively interest, but the accident rate remained commendably low. The loan of a USN helicopter for combat search and rescue (SAR) duties in place of the obsolete Sea Otter biplane flying boat had an HMS Glory (R62) outstanding effect on aircrew morale. Five air- crewmen were rescued within minutes of HMS Glory, another of the ubiquitous light ditching in its first few weeks of operation. fleet carriers, carried the re-formed 14th CAG This is an appropriate point to mention equipped with Sea Furies and Firefly FR5s, the maintenance carrier HMS Unicorn (R72), which were to be the standard Commonwealth which served throughout the war in support carrier fighter-bombers for the rest of the war. of the operational carriers. She ferried hun­ Her first patrol coincided with the Chinese dreds of replacement airframes from the main spring offensive in which the 1st Battalion of

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CARRIER OPERATIONS 65 the Gloucestershire Regiment was almost an­ coast occupied by allied forces as well as in­ nihilated defending a position of the Imjin terdiction, spotting for shore bombardment, River and the British 27th Brigade, and the blockade enforcement, and close support of US 5th Cavalry Regiment fought memorable the Commonwealth Division. By the end of her delaying actions near Kapyong. In the summer, second deployment in the war zone, HMS Glory talks about an armistice began, and the land had completed nearly 5,000 operational sor­ war became static, based on lines of trenches ties for the loss of nine aircrew and 27 aircraft. reminiscent of the First World War. Her Sea Furies, armed with two 500-pound In September 1951, HMS Glory was relieved bombs, had become deadly accurate dive- by Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) bombers using a 45-degree dive technique. Sydney (R17), the first Commonwealth carrier For the remainder of the war, HMS Glory to go into action and a great credit to the RAN, alternated in the operational area with yet an­ which had only established its own Fleet Air other light fleet carrier, HMS Ocean (R68). By Arm in 1948. Her squadrons were equipped the summer of 1952, the first Communist jet— with the same type of aircraft as her British sis­ ter ships, and, indeed, many replacement air­ the MiG-15—engined with a copy of the Rolls- craft came from British Far East reserve stocks, Royce Nene, appeared. They had a consider­ lent to the RAN while HMAS Sydney was in the able edge in performance over the Sea Fury, war zone. Aircraft maintained the coastal block­ but fortunately their pilots did not. Sea Fury ade and kept a watchful eye on the building sections stayed together, kept their eyes peeled, up of Chinese troops by rail and road. Dur­ used the available cloud cover, and survived. ing October HMAS Sydney had to move away Some pilots did more than that. A World War from the war zone to avoid Typhoon Ruth. II veteran pilot, Lt Peter Carmichael, always She still encountered storm-force seas, which known as “Hoagy,” and his flight from 802 destroyed six aircraft in the deck park. Naval Air Squadron, embarked on HMS Ocean, shot down a MiG-15 on 9 August 1952. They “inconvenienced” several others. Looking back on the war, Carmichael re­ called that oxcarts were one of the main road targets to go for. It was amazing how many of them blew up when you hit them with cannon fire! This was a manifestation of the allied policy of interdiction in which both heavy bombers of the USAF and the bomb- and rocket-armed carrier fighter-bombers at­ tempted to halt enemy troop and supply move­ ment. It was not entirely successful, and the Communist armies were able to launch a HMAS Sydney in Typhoon Ruth large-scale offensive in the spring of 1953, as the possibility of a truce became stronger in In four months of operations, while HMS the hope of making it appear as if the UN was Glory was away refitting in Australia, HMAS suing for peace in order to avoid defeat. Sydney’s 21st CAG flew 2,366 sorties in 43 op­ During this final period, Sea Furies and Fire­ erational flying days. Casualties included flies covered large areas of country and at­ three pilots killed and 15 aircraft lost. She was tacked anything that moved and much that relieved, in turn, by HMS Glory, who “fell back did not. For a time, three night-fighter Fire­ into the routine as if she had never been flies were put ashore at the request of the US away” in January 1952. Flying operations now Fifth Air Force to counter night-nuisance included the defence of islands off the west raids by Communist propeller-driven aircraft.

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 They operated with success from an airstrip three-inch rocket projectiles; and 1,441,000 south of Seoul. rounds of 20 mm cannon ammunition. At last, on 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed at Panmunjom. For some months after the war, light fleet carriers continued to oper­ People ate close to Korea in case there was a resump­ Individual accounts of war operations are tion of hostilities. They included a tour by beyond the scope of this article, but I have se­ HMS Warrior, returned to operational duties lected two as being illustrative of the Com­ after her time as a ferry carrier, and HMAS monwealth carrier operations. Sub Lt Neil Sydney, which left Korea for the last time in MacMilland and CPO Philip Hancox of the June 1954. RAN were shot down in the Firefly near Sari- The Commonwealth carrier that saw most won north of Haeju. HMAS Sydney had Sea action in the Korean War was HMS Glory. Furies in the air, and they were sent to pro­ Table 1 shows examples of the type of sorties vide cover, as the downed aircraft was well in­ flown. She had equalled a record of 123 sorties side enemy territory. The carrier captain found in a single day set by HMS Ocean, a feat which it difficult to make the decision to send the SAR helicopter, loaned by the USN with a involved every pilot, including Commander USN crew, for them because it was doubtful if “Air” flying four sorties, which resulted in the they could fly the 75 miles and clear enemy destruction of seven bridges, 28 buildings, territory before nightfall. He approved the and five oxcarts. After leaving the United sortie, and the helicopter set off. Meanwhile Kingdom in May 1951, she steamed 157,000 Meteor fighters of 77 Squadron RAAF joined miles and flew 13,700 sorties, of which 9,500 the Sea Furies, and the downed aircrew helped were operational. Her aircraft destroyed 70 to keep the encircling enemy troops at bay bridges, 392 vehicles, and 49 railway trucks with their Owen submachine-gun. At 1715 the for the loss of 20 aircrewmen. Weapon ex­ Meteors had to go, but the Sea Furies, flown penditure for this ship alone totalled 278 by Lieutenants Cavanagh and Salthouse, de­ 1,000 lb bombs; 7,080 500 lb bombs; 24,328 cided to stay despite being low on fuel. At 1725 the helicopter arrived and landed, having Table 1. Examples of sorties flown from flown at 120 knots—some 20 knots above the HMS Glory accepted legal maximum. Its observer, CPO June 1951 Sea Furies flew close air support over the Callis Gooding, jumped out and shot two allied lines. Fireflies used 1,000 lb bombs enemy soldiers who crept within 15 yards of against bridges, and both types spotted the downed aircraft. An hour later, the heli­ for bombardments by frigates. copter, with the two rescued aircrew and still July 1951 Attacks concentrated on railway trucks, escorted by the Sea Furies, landed at Kimpo junks, and barracks. Several “moving haystacks” caught fire after being hit. Airfield just as darkness fell. Sept. 1951 Set a new record of 66 offensive and 18 During a patrol by HMS Glory in January defensive sorties in a day with 100 per­ 1953, a different form of interdiction was tried. cent serviceability. With the rivers and ground both frozen hard, Feb. 1952 Operated in defence of allied-held islands road transport could easily drive around any including Cho-do and Paengnyong-do. damage inflicted. It was well known that rail­ Mar. 1952 Lieutenant Fraser’s Sea Fury suffered an engine failure “slotting” to starboard of the way bridges were always quickly repaired, and carrier, and he ditched. He was immedi­ so attacks were directed at railway lines at in­ ately rescued by the USN plane guard accessible parts of the routes. A total of 33 helicopter, which had him on deck in 1.5 cuts were made, and, at first, repair activity minutes, quicker than he would have been there in his own aircraft! was slow. On 5 January a Sea Fury piloted by Mar. 1953 Equalled the record of 123 sorties in a Lt D. G. “Pug” Mather was hit by enemy flak single day set by Ocean. after an attack on a railway line north of

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CARRIER OPERATIONS 67 The value of the helicopter as a combat SAR vehicle was amply demonstrated on land and at sea. As a “plane guard” during flying operations, it was unrivalled for efficiency by day, but a destroyer operating close to the car­ rier was still necessary at night. At different times, RN aircrewmen were rescued by heli­ copters operating from bombarding cruisers at Wonsan and Inchon, from the landing-ship- tank minesweeping tender, from USAF air­ fields, as well as their own carriers. Their morale value was important, but their limitations had to be appreciated. These included a small ra­ dius of action, made even smaller by strong Rescue behind enemy lines headwinds and a reliance on dead-reckoning navigation with its potentially large errors. Chaeryong. It caught fire, and he baled out, but Instrument-flying capability was minimal, and his section failed to see where he landed. For the range of their very-high-frequency radios 90 minutes aircraft searched for him without was limited. For these reasons the ubiquity of success, and a USAF helicopter, escorted by basing was an important factor, and some of two Sea Furies, was sent to the scene. Unfor­ the aircrew that were rescued would not have tunately, bad weather forced it to turn back, been recovered if only the carrier-borne heli­ and Lieutenant Mather was taken prisoner by copters had been available. the NKPA. One of the escorting Sea Furies, HMS Ocean instituted pre-dawn missions, flown by Sub Lt B. E. Rayner, lost radio contact and these proved very productive of targets as and was never seen again. Later in the day, a the aircraft found enemy road transport that Sea Fury flown by Sub Lt B. J. Simonds, Royal was still on the move. Many lorries were de­ Navy Volunteer Reserve, spun from 3,000 feet stroyed in this way, and the experience gained and exploded on hitting the ground. Lieu­ by aircrew from this type of operation was of tenant Foster made a wheels-up landing at great value. The enemy was not slow to react, Paengnyong-do due to a rough-running en­ however, and HMS Glory’s aircraft soon had gine and electrical failure in his Sea Fury. On difficulty finding targets after the enemy in­ the next day, a Firefly, flown by Lt W. R. troduced a simple but effective air-raid warn­ Heaton, was hit by flak and ditched north of ing system. This comprised warning fires, lit Kirin-do. He was rescued from his dinghy by on the ground, which appeared from two to a USAF helicopter from Paengnyong-do. three miles ahead of the aircraft—on looking back, pilots could see a long line of fires stretching behind them! A low approach was Some Lessons Learned then adopted to deceive the enemy radar, but Photography was used extensively, being the foggy season intervened before the effec­ particularly useful for harbour reconnaissance tiveness of this method could be fully gauged. in the enforcement of the blockade and for In general, pilots had not been trained in assessing the results of interdiction missions. night deck-landing techniques, and so night in­ In mid-1952 a photographic-interpretation terdiction was not possible throughout the war. officer was appointed to the operational car­ rier. His services were described as invaluable, and the hundreds of images, when expertly Command and Control interpreted, revealed many ingeniously cam­ It was clear from the outset that the United ouflaged targets. States would bear the heaviest share of the

68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 fighting, and since there was an existing US submarine screening and co-ordination be­ command structure in Japan, it was natural tween forces might result, and the RN view that the naval contributions from the Com­ was that non-flying factors might suffer in monwealth navies should fit into it. Opera­ consequence. The fact that none of the tional command was the most significant since British flag officers were aviators made it dif­ the British Far East Fleet had its own logistic- ficult for the commander 7th Fleet to under­ and type-support structure. This was able to stand how they could command a task group support the Australian, Canadian, and New that contained two light fleet carriers. At one Zealand units since they all operated ships stage it was suggested that they should be taken and equipment of British manufacture. Per­ out of Task Force 95 and, though continuing sonal relations between American and British to operate in the same area in the Yellow Sea, officers were, throughout the war, effective placed under the command of Task Force 77, and cordial. Misunderstandings and differ­ the heavy carriers, which usually operated in ences of outlook were inevitable but were al­ the Sea of Japan. The British vetoed this. ways overcome. Many arose simply because of the difficulty of arranging verbal contact with the American operational commanders, most Communications of whom exercised their commands afloat. In The rigidity of the US system of command contrast, the three British admirals who acted threw a heavy strain on communications. Op­ as FO2FEF during the war exercised their com­ eration orders and plans reached prodigious mand from Sasebo in Japan, only proceeding dimensions and contained so much detail that, to the operational area with a small staff on from a British perspective, “some of the wood special occasions. could not be seen for the trees.” Time was The chief difference between the American wasted while orders were passed down the long and British systems lay in the rigidity of the chains of command, and “Americanisms” such former. Orders were extremely detailed, and as ready for sea initially caused confusion. On direct communication on a junior level with the whole, Commonwealth warships had little another service or even task force was frowned difficulty in using the US system but had to upon. All communication was supposed to go augment the equipment and manning levels in back up the chain of command, through the order to cope with the increased signal traffic. top, and down again. Information addressees The strain on communications was ampli­ did not take action until told to comply by the fied by the large number of situation reports, immediately superior authority, even when it reports of intentions, action taken, and so on was obvious that such action would have to be required from ships at sea by US commanders. taken. Practically no discretion was left to the Great importance was placed on operational “man on the spot.” In the British Common­ summaries, known in the USN as “opsums,” wealth command structure, anticipation and intended for the benefit of the press. This initiative were expected and exercised. USN was something new to the British at the time, ships attached to the West Coast Blockade although it was to become familiar to a later Group very much appreciated the reduced generation during the Falklands War. reliance on signals, instructions, and demands for situation reports. Later relations between the USN and RN benefited greatly from the British Perception of the perceptions of mutual confidence that grew Interdiction Campaign from these operations. Another difference was a rule in the USN Complete interdiction of a battlefield has that the officer in tactical command of a carrier always proved difficult, but circumstances in task force or group must be an aviator. It ac­ Korea seemed to offer special opportunities. cepted that less-efficient anti-aircraft and anti­ The complete blockade enforced by the over-

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CARRIER OPERATIONS 69 whelming UN naval forces entirely ruled out have done in a war of movement. The enemy supply by sea; the meagre rail and primitive was allowed to fight on his own terms, and road communications of North Korea seemed many of the advantages possessed by the allies vulnerable to the almost-undisputed UN air were negated. power. Additionally, important road and rail When it was initiated in January 1951, the centres on the east coast were open to naval interdiction campaign had the object of im­ bombardment. The vulnerability of the rail­ peding the Communist advance and was un­ ways seemed to be enhanced by the large doubtedly justified, although opposed by number of bridges and tunnels forced on Adm Arthur D. Struble, USN, CTF 77, who them by the mountainous terrain of North felt that his aircraft would be better employed Korea. For example, the eastern network, the providing close air support for the Army. Its scene of most naval interdiction effort, in­ continuation throughout the long armistice cluded 956 bridges and causeways and 231 negotiations savoured dangerously of trying tunnels in 1,140 miles of track. to win the war by air power alone, while the After the limitation of the Chinese offen­ Army and Navy were relegated to compara­ sive, the main effort of UN air operations was tively static and defensive roles. It is difficult directed at interdiction. This was the primary to resist the conclusion that this strategy, responsibility of the US Fifth Air Force, sup­ which certainly suited the Communists, was ported by allied contingents and all available continued for too long and that better results naval and USMC aircraft. The efforts of the would have been obtained by the adoption of USAF and USN were never co-ordinated at a more aggressive strategy implemented by theatre level, one result from the lack of a the three services working together in the unified joint command. Gradually, it came to closest co-operation in support of each other. be accepted that, broadly speaking, the USN With hindsight, the exertion of the mobility would deal with the east coast railway and and flexibility given to the UN forces by their highway systems, and the USAF dealt with the command of the sea and the air should have west coast where it interacted with the Com­ been used to force a war of movement that monwealth carrier efforts. Except when cir­ the enemy could not have sustained. This cumstances dictated other temporary em­ might well have compelled the enemy to ac­ ployment of aircraft, this policy continued for cept more satisfactory armistice conditions at 20 months. Immense damage was unques­ an appreciably earlier date. tionably inflicted on the enemy communica­ tions systems, and all movement by rail or road was confined to the hours of darkness, Summary and Comment but full interdiction of the battlefield was At the outset, Admiral Andrewes had stated never achieved. Throughout the campaign, that it would be wrong to regard a single light the Communists were always able to launch fleet carrier as representative of what naval an offensive if they wished to do so. aviation could achieve in any theatre. Even The causes of this failure, in British eyes, taking into account the conditions under were primarily due to inhibitions accepted by which the war was fought, the endless coast­ the UN for political reasons and partly to tac­ line around a narrow peninsula, and the lack tical and operational conditions. In the for­ of naval and air opposition, the performance mer category the ban on sources of supply in of the Commonwealth carriers was, however, Manchuria robbed aircraft of targets which remarkable. The intensity of flying, the opera­ might well have been decisive. The static war, tional lessons, and the length of the war, accepted during the protracted armistice throughout which the Commonwealth main­ negotiations, enabled the Communists to tained a carrier on station, brought many keep their strongly fortified front lines suffi­ squadrons and their people to a high pitch of ciently supplied in a way they could never professionalism and efficiency matched in

70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 few other arms of the British services. In turn, Statistics this produced a corps of experienced aircrew and maintainers who were well equipped to During the war, 76 ships of the Common­ handle the new generation of aircraft, such as wealth navies and their fleet auxiliary services served in the combat area for varying periods. the Buccaneer, and to use the new equipment The 32 warships of the Royal Navy included and techniques that were being developed in five carriers, six cruisers, seven destroyers, the United Kingdom that would revolutionise and 14 frigates. The nine warships of the Royal carrier aviation. Australian Navy included one carrier, four de­ The light fleet carriers provided the most stroyers, and four frigates. The RAN suffered conspicuous aspect of Commonwealth opera­ a total of 191 casualties. tions in the Korean War. Their performance A combined 17,000 officers and men of the was admitted on all sides to be outstanding Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and Royal Fleet but was possible only because of the lack of se­ Auxiliary Service served afloat in Korean wa­ rious naval and air opposition. Had these ex­ ters, and 4,300 more served ashore in Japan. isted on an appreciable scale, more ships would Of this number, 165 officers and men were have been needed, and more effort would decorated for gallantry, and 289 were men­ have been required for fighter defence and tioned in despatches. British warships steamed escort to the detriment of offensive operations. 2,100,550 miles and used 632,150 tons of fuel. The results achieved were the result of hard Carrier aircraft dropped 15,200 bombs of work, much improvisation, and the driving of various sizes and fired 57,600 rockets and machinery, in some cases, beyond the limits 3,300,000 rounds of 20 mm cannon ammuni­ tion in 23,000 operational sorties. for which it was designed. A total of 4,507 officers and men of the The signing of an armistice on 27 July 1953 RAN served afloat in the war zone. Of this ended hostilities that had lasted 1,128 days number, 57 officers and men were decorated and had involved naval forces from Australia, for gallantry. Australian warships steamed Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, over 419,000 miles, and carrier aircraft New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, dropped 802 bombs of various sizes, firing the United Kingdom, and the United States. 6,359 rockets and 269,249 rounds of 20 mm The seal of Royal approval was set on the cannon ammunition in 2,366 sorties. ■ Commonwealth effort two days after the armistice was signed when the following mes­ sage from Her Majesty the Queen to the Board of Admiralty was signalled to the Fleet: Notes 1. UN, Security Council Resolution 83, Document S/1511, Please express to all serving in the Commonwealth 27 June 1950. Fleet my deep appreciation of the splendid service they 2. US Navy, Korean War: Chronology of U.S. Pacific Fleet Op­ have given throughout the fighting in Korea. erations, June–December 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval His­ torical Center, 28 June 1950), http://www.history.navy.mil/ (Signed) ELIZABETH R wars/korea/chron50.htm.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CARRIER OPERATIONS 71 Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations “If You Work with Friends, Bring It Along!”

LT COL MALCOLM D. GRIMES, USAF MAJ DONALD R. FERGUSON, USAF

S FORCES FIGHTING in the peace­ national force commander’s] objectives. Unity making and peacekeeping operations of effort is necessary for effectiveness and effi­ of the twentieth and twenty-first cen­ ciency. Centralized planning is essential for con­ turies have done so alongside the trolling and coordinating the efforts of all avail­ Uforces of allied and coalition countries. In fact, able forces. Decentralized execution is essential to most recent American military operations have generate the tempo of operations required and involved an ally or coalition partner. Some to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and flu­ prominent examples include World Wars I and idity of combat. (ix, italics added) II; the Vietnam War; and Operations Desert A nation involving itself in a coalition (an ad Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and hoc arrangement between two or more nations Iraqi Freedom. The current version of Joint for common action) or an alliance (a formal Publication (JP) 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multi agreement between two or more nations for national Operations, 5 April 2000—based on our broad, long-term objectives) must adhere to corporate knowledge, experience, and lessons certain fundamentals, a commitment that re­ learned—provides the doctrine our command­ quires close coordination with the other member ers use as a starting point to plan and execute nations to ensure that they operate in the most current and future combined operations. One efficient manner. Conducting multinational of the keystone-level or above-the-line publica­ operations at the highest levels of efficiency tions, JP 3-16 is intended for use by combatant, requires that the different nations fully use subunified, and joint task force commanders; their strengths but minimize their weaknesses. service chiefs; and Joint Staff directors. As part Through coordination, they can attain this high of the third tier of the operational series in the level of performance across the spectrum of joint-publication hierarchy, it delineates inter­ multinational operations, from all-out war to faces with allies and serves as a launching point operations short of war. into multinational operations. Its 106 pages in­ Organizations comprised of different ele­ clude four chapters that provide joint doctrine ments, such as coalitions and alliances, must for participation in multinational operations, have a command structure that takes into ac­ describing our best current (and partially futur­ count differences in doctrine, types of equip­ istic) ideas on the art of war. Airmen should ment, training philosophies, and customs. It is quickly recognize the similarity between their vital, therefore, to establish a liaison to lessen own Air Force doctrine and its description of the confusion associated with these differences. multinational air operations: Commanders at all levels in the multinational Air operations gain and maintain control of the force must be sensitive to such variations in air and exploit its use to achieve the [multi­ order to command effectively; they must also be

72 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16 73 knowledgeable of the overall mission of the specific examples of multinational operations coalition or alliance, its associated risks, and the involving both countries: rules of engagement (ROE). Other critical con­ cerns of the commander include operational • In the early 1900s, British and American control, foreign operational control, tactical forces fought together in the Boxer Rebel­ control, support, and the chain of command. lion, World War I, and in the Bolshevik Published 17 months before the terrorist at­ Revolution. tacks of 11 September 2001, JP 3-16 proved use­ • During World War II, US forces found ful to US commanders when their forces joined themselves working closely with the British, with militaries of several countries to plan, co­ both in a commanding role and in a sub­ ordinate, and execute operations on various tar­ ordinate position to British commanders. gets in response to those strikes. The multina­ That coalition was decisive in defeating the tional commanders of combined operations take Axis powers, thus reinforcing the United political, military, and economic factors into States’ continuing desire for a coalition ap­ consideration when conducting their mission proach to warfare. analysis and assigning tasks. The many other fac­ tors they need to assess include intelligence and • During Desert Storm, an air commander information gathering, host-nation support, for the British forces and a US Air Force and language and cultural barriers that could commander (US Central Command Air easily confuse the overall planning. When draft­ Forces) were heavily involved in planning ing the ROEs, they also must consider the im­ air activity at the operational level. pact of international law and the laws of armed conflict. In conflicts involving coalitions and al­ Both the United States and the United King­ liances, such as Iraqi Freedom, each nation dom are extremely active in standardization with must enforce the discipline of its own forces to other allies and friendly nations, in order to adhere to the ROEs because, particularly in achieve the highest cooperation among their these conflicts, the entire world watches and militaries. They are also working towards the takes note if those forces fail to act in a certain most efficient levels of research and develop­ proper and prescribed way. ment of resources to help nations get the most No current plans exist to update JP 3-16. out of their militaries. Both countries are mem­ However, an associated document—JP 4-08, bers of NATO’s standardization forums; the five- Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational nation Air Standardization Coordinating Com­ Operations—appeared on 25 September 2002. mittee; and the American, British, Canadian, That document and, when appropriate, other Australian Armies Standardization Program. NATO publications provide logistic guidance to The bottom line is that JP 3-16 contains a multinational commanders and their staffs. wealth of information for our commanders Nevertheless, like a multinational coalition or al­ about how US forces should interface with al­ liance, multinational doctrine is very situational lied and coalition forces. Although written for in nature. For that reason, beyond the broad more senior commanders, it can be adapted overview and structure shown in JP 3-16, hard- and used effectively by leaders at lower levels to and-fast doctrine can prove problematic to de­ guide operational- and tactical-level interactions velop, awkward to use, and difficult to maintain and operations. By using JP 3-16 judiciously, we as the world situation changes. can anticipate the enemy’s plan and beat him at With respect to this special edition of Air and his own game. We can keep peace in the world Space Power Journal and RAF Air Power Review, JP and help persuade rogue nations to change their 3-16, appendix B, makes reference to several modus operandi, as well as their worldview.

To Learn More . . . Joint Publication 3-16. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000. Joint Publication 4-08. Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, 25 September 2002. Post–Cold War Development of United Kingdom Joint Air Command and Control Capability

WING CDR REDVERS T. N. T HOMPSON, RAF

Editorial Abstract: The United Kingdom re­ ceived a “wake-up call” from Operation Desert Storm when that country’s unpreparedness for “expeditionary” and indeed joint warfighting was highlighted. The mid-1990s brought exten­ sive consequential changes to the United King- dom’s joint operational command structures, in­ cluding the organizational development of its air command and control capabilities that en­ compassed the eventual formation of the UK Joint Force Air Component Headquarters.

Coming out of the Cold War Mikhail Gorbachev met in Washington to sign a nuclear weapons treaty. In December 1988 In the mid-1980s, the focus of both the President Gorbachev gave more freedom to Royal Air Force (RAF) and the rest of the the states of Eastern Europe, and a month United Kingdom’s (UK) military forces was, as later he withdrew the Soviet military from it had been for nearly four decades, almost Afghanistan. By the end of 1988 President exclusively on their respective contributions Gorbachev renounced the use of force in to the defence of NATO’s Central Region and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, whose the UK mainland. The RAF’s aircraft were pri­ communist regimes had fallen. Then on 9 marily located and operated from main operat­ November 1989 the world watched in amaze­ ing bases (MOB), with many permanently de­ ment as Germans tore down the Berlin Wall. ployed in Germany where they were expected In May 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to train and fight. These MOBs were collocated met in Washington and signed treaties that with both their required support infrastructure called for a reduction of nuclear weapons and and well-defined national and NATO com­ a ban on chemical weapons. Later that year, mand and control (C2) organizations. Then President Gorbachev met with German chan­ in the late 1980s the political/military status cellor Helmut Kohl, signed a nonaggression quo changed at an amazing pace. In 1987 US pact, and initiated the withdrawal of Soviet president Ronald Reagan and USSR president troops from Eastern Germany.

74 However, through this period of funda­ that the RAF was dependent on an operational- mental and rapid change in the grand and level legacy system of fixed C2 and infrastruc­ military-strategic realpolitik, little if anything ture that had very limited adaptability, and changed in the United Kingdom’s military therefore in fact possessed no effective deploy­ focus.1 As the RAF entered the 1990s, while re­ able air C2 capability whatsoever. Equally, there maining honed to an extremely fine edge at was an equivalent lack of C2 capability pos­ the tactical level of war, at the operational sessed by the other UK services, and as no UK level of war it was still psychologically wedded environment had any national, operational- to a Central Region “bunker mentality” em­ level C2 capability worthy of note, it is not sur­ bodied in the fixed operational-level NATO prising that there was no effective doctrine or C2 organization; fixed NATO infrastructure procedures for operational-level coordination and logistic support; fixed MOBs, with their between them. Indeed, the other word that hundreds of hardened aircraft shelters proofed was not widely prevalent in the UK opera­ against nuclear, biological, and chemical at­ tional lexicon at this time was joint. While tack; and fixed “play-book” of war plans. With following the lessons of the Falklands War, a a Royal Navy focused largely on the Soviet submarine threat, a British Army focused on Joint Force Operations staff was established, its defensively orientated “heavy-metal” ar­ and the doctrine for a Joint Headquarters moured divisions, and an RAF dependent on (JHQ) and Joint Force HQ (JFHQ) was de­ fixed infrastructure and, most pertinent to veloped. There was little in the way of single- this article, fixed operational-level NATO C2, service doctrine regarding the operational- it is likely that it was only with Iraq’s invasion level planning and integration of air/land/ of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the United maritime operations. It also became clear Kingdom’s subsequent deployment for and that nationally little was provided by the way execution of the coalition operations of Desert of operational-level C2 training; this was es­ Shield and Desert Storm (United Kingdom’s pecially true in the case of air C2 training, Operation [Op] Granby), did the full realiza­ where there was no effective operational tion hit the UK political/military establishment training at all for air commanders or their that its extant Cold War posture was in need battlestaff. Understandably, as the RAF had of change. little need to undertake operational-level planning or C2 outside of a NATO context, it had largely abrogated the responsibility for Operation Desert Storm—The the training and provision of operational- Dawn of Realization level air C2 expertise to NATO. The result was that at the time of Op Granby, the RAF had And so it was that at some time during or little or no air C2 expertise, and not surpris­ shortly after Desert Storm did the term expe­ ingly therefore the UK air input to the US-led ditionary suddenly drop into the lexicon of the RAF. The author of this article can vouch air planning and C2 process was marginal. In that as part of an operational, front-line air­ 1992, taking account of some of the air C2 les­ crew the only time the term expeditionary was sons from Op Granby, the Department of Air used was in the context of a week’s walking Warfare at the RAF College Cranwell re­ excursion to the Scottish Highlands! How­ vamped the Air Battle Management Course ever, as a result of the Gulf War and its associ­ (ABMC) and instituted the “estimate” process ated US after-action reports and UK lessons- as a formal air campaign planning process learnt processes, and the subsequent doctrinal both in the course and in the new Air Opera­ stocktaking, UK attention was drawn to some tions Manual (AOM). However, without an significant problem areas related to the RAF’s identifiable Air HQ, neither the ABMC nor ability to execute air C2 on a national, expe­ the AOM could be targeted at any specific ditionary basis. Firstly, it came into stark focus audience.2

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 75 Preparing for United Kingdom combat or non-combat missions, mounted nationally or as part of any contribution to Deployed Joint Operations operations mounted by NATO, the European In January 1994 the UK government drove Union, or the United Nations. While it was a Ministry of Defence (MoD) Defence Costs stated that the JRDF-earmarked units would Study (DCS) that inter alia identified a num­ “conduct extensive training on a regular ber of shortcomings with the C2 of UK mili­ basis, thereby increasing their ability to come tary operations overseas. As one result, on 1 together quickly and operate together as an April 1996, a Permanent Joint Headquarters effective and cohesive package at short no­ (PJHQ) for joint military operations was es­ tice,” there was no explicit detailing of any fa­ 4 tablished at Northwood, in northwest London. cilitating, deployable in-theatre C2 capability. This HQ brought together on a permanent basis intelligence, planning, operations, and logistics staffs. The establishment of PJHQ United Kingdom Combined Air was intended to provide a truly joint force Operations Centre—The First Air HQ that would remedy the problems of dis­ Command and Control Steps ruption, duplication, and the somewhat ad hoc way in which previous recent operations Despite the realizations highlighted above had been organized. MoD officials described and the fact that the RAF had been engaged the primary role of PJHQ as constantly after the Gulf War in support of the air operations Warden and Jural over working proactively to anticipate crises and monitoring developments in areas of interest to northern and southern Iraq, respectively, few the UK. The establishment of PJHQ has set in practical forward steps were made in terms of place a proper, clear and unambiguous connec­ air C2 by the RAF over this four-to-five-year tion between policy and the strategic direction period that followed Op Granby. The catalyst and conduct of operations. Because it exists on that finally promoted action in the air C2 a permanent basis rather than being estab­ arena was the tragic events of 14 April 1994, lished for a particular operation, PJHQ is in­ when two US Black Hawk helicopters with 26 volved from the very start of planning for a pos­ personnel on board and operating in support sible operation. It will then take responsibility of Op Provide Comfort were engaged and de­ for the subsequent execution of those plans if stroyed by two USAF F-15Cs operating from necessary.3 Incirlik AB, Turkey, on Op Warden. In the af­ Commanded by the chief of joint opera­ termath of the analysis of this “blue-on-blue” tions (CJO), the PJHQ’s primary role is to be incident, that overlaid in time the work al­ responsible, when directed by the UK chief of ready ongoing as a result of the United King- Defence Staff (CDS), for the planning and exe­ dom’s DCS mentioned above, and ongoing cution of UK-led joint, potentially joint, com­ operations in the Balkans (e.g., Op Deliber­ bined, and multinational operations. CJO is ate Force), it was realized by the UK chiefs of also responsible for exercising operational staff (COS) that if the United Kingdom were command of UK forces assigned to combined to try to mount a national-only deployed op­ and multinational operations led by others. eration similar to any of those currently on­ Commanding at the operational level, PJHQ going, it would need to significantly develop is responsible for directing, deploying, sus­ the United Kingdom’s own operational-level taining, and recovering forces on operations. deployable C2 capability. As a result, inter alia, It was envisioned that the forces employed the UK COS directed that the United King­ would be drawn from a Joint Rapid Deploy­ dom should “adopt the US JFACC [joint force ment Force (JRDF) that would become opera­ air component commander] concept,” as the tional on 1 August 1996 and would be de­ underpinning doctrine for national C2 of de­ signed to be able to fulfill a wide range of ployed operations.5

76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 The RAF took this COS direction forward, emerge were moves towards more rapidly de­ and in 1995 the RAF’s Air Force Board Stand­ ployable armed forces and “jointery.” The SDR ing Committee endorsed a paper entitled identified that, in addition to maintaining ex­ “Command and Control of STC [Strike Com­ tant standing commitments, the United King­ mand] Assets” that reviewed the UK structure dom should also be able to do the following: for air C2 and recommended the permanent 1. Respond to a major international crisis. establishment in peacetime of a UK com­ This might require a military effort of a bined air operations centre (CAOC). By April similar scale and duration to the Gulf 1997 this new air C2 organization had been implemented in full alongside the RAF’s STC War. peacetime HQ at RAF High Wycombe. It sub­ 2. Undertake a more extended overseas sumed the NATO defensive operations capa­ deployment on a lesser scale while re­ bility that had existed at Sector Operations taining the ability to mount a second Centre (SOC) United Kingdom, at nearby RAF substantial deployment if this were Bentley Priory, and became responsible for made necessary by a second crisis. We the vigil over UK national and NATO airspace would not, however, expect both de­ and the monitoring and control of the UK Air ployments to involve WF [warfighting] Surveillance and Air Control System (ASACS). or to maintain them simultaneously for In addition to the very real-world SOC respon­ longer than six months. sibilities, the UK CAOC went on to achieve a 3. Rebuild, given much longer notice, a big­ capability to plan, task, and control offensive, 7 defensive, and combat support air operations. ger force as part of NATO’s collective. Surprisingly, however, given the genesis of the SDR also identified that, other than under a decision to form it, the UK CAOC was not ini­ warfighting (i.e., significant military) threat tially tasked with, nor equipped for, the con­ to the United Kingdom, the RAF would al­ duct of C2 of deployed operations. Notwith­ most certainly deploy overseas and operate standing a lack of higher HQ guidance, an from host-nation airfields or ships in support in-house UK CAOC initiative developed an in­ of national, allied, or coalition operations terim deployable capability that was in place under a range of possible C2 arrangements; by late 1997, although this was limited to an this observation manifested itself in the draw­ ability to host the “initial CAOC capability” air down of RAF squadrons in Germany and re­ battle-management system (ABMS) (NATO’s constitution on the UK mainland. equivalent to the Contingency Theatre Auto­ SDR addressed the fact that NATO was re­ mated Planning System/Theater Battle Man­ sponding to the evolution from static to ex­ agement Core System) on a limited number peditionary warfare by establishing Reaction of deployable laptops. Forces with the capability of countering pos­ sible short-notice threats to its flanks, and stated that the United Kingdom had devel­ Strategic Defence Review oped its own Joint Rapid Reaction Forces Pushes Forward (JRRF)—a pool of highly capable units from “Deployability” and “Jointery” all services that is maintained at high readi­ ness for contingency operations. The estab­ In July 1998, the UK government an­ lishment of the JRRF was probably the most nounced its Strategic Defence Review (SDR), important joint initiative in the SDR and is which it labeled as “a radical review of the still central to current UK defence planning. UK’s defence requirements, with the aim of PJHQ’s CJO became responsible for the JRRF, modernizing and reshaping the UK’s Armed although until deployed, operational com­ Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st Cen- mand (OPCOM) of units is retained by the tury.”6 The two central pillars that were to single-service commanders in chief (CinC).

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 77 Units within the JRRF are trained to joint “to be able to deploy one fully manned standards and would be deployed in joint JFACHQ while identifying the core elements force packages, tailored to meet the opera­ of a second HQ,” with the additional “im­ tional requirement. To command the JRRF plied” task that the envisioned JFACHQ had in-theatre, a fully resourced JFHQ was estab­ to be able to act as a Combined Force Air lished at Northwood, under PJHQ’s command, Component HQ (CFACHQ).10 While the and is permanently held at 48 hours’ notice above defined well the task, the resources for to move. meeting that task were being addressed as part of the RAF’s STC Structure Beyond 2000 Study.11 It became obvious to the JFACHQ Deployable Air Command and ProjO that there was an organizational “dislo­ Control—The Need Is Established cation of expectation” when he discovered that this study assumed that no additional re­ To reflect the earlier introduction of the sources were to be made available and had JRDF, AOCinC STC had previously, on 1 April scoped the manning level for the R1 core 1998, tasked UK CAOC to provide, at 48 hours’ JFACHQ cadre at just 28 personnel, the num­ notice (R1), the core air C2 element of a de­ ber having been derived from the anticipated ployable Joint Force Air Component Head­ provision of a group captain (O-6) director, an quarters (JFACHQ) for JRDF operations. executive officer, and just a core combat plans However, this significantly enhanced tasking and combat ops—that is, a skeletal air opera­ was not matched at the time with any provi­ tions centre (AOC). With echoes of the earlier sion of additional personnel, computer infor­ lack of resourcing of the expanded UK CAOC mation systems (CIS), infrastructure, training resources, or budget. Notwithstanding the task, the ProjO was given to recall a US saying: lack of facilitating resources, a new concept of “Vision without funding is hallucination.” operations (CONOPS) was developed for the The author believes that it was fortuitous UK CAOC and issued in September 1998. In timing (if that can be said of any conflict) that parallel, the development of a CONOPS for at this point in the RAF’s restructuring, the this “deployable JFACHQ” began and achieved Balkans erupted once more, in the guise of a one-star circulation by March 1999; this was Kosovo, with the resulting execution of Op the genesis of the UK’s JFACHQ. Allied Force. Without addressing the exten­ The initial development of this new sive number of lessons that fell from this op­ JFACHQ CONOPS, undertaken by its STC eration, it is sufficient to state that many were project officer (ProjO) in early 1999, was related to the C2 of this primarily air opera­ driven by the SDR that had redefined the tion, and many lessons were carry-overs from RAF’s operational C2 responsibilities, re­ Desert Storm some nine years earlier. In the quirements, and structures and introduced context of this article, principal among these the JRRF.8 A significant consequence of which was that the assumption that a medium-scale was that STC was now required to “be able to air operation could be executed just by the deploy, at very short notice, responsive, co­ elements of an AOC (i.e., combat plans and herent Composite Air Expeditionary Forces, combat ops) was proven to be erroneous. commanded centrally at the tactical level While undertaken with the best military en­ through a JFACC.”9 SDR had also identified deavour by all those personnel involved, the the need to mount, on a unilateral basis, two consequential expansion of the Vicenza AOC concurrent medium-scale operations, one into an operational-level JFACHQ was a case warfighting and one non-warfighting. More­ study in ad hoc crisis management. Only after over, it also stated that the United Kingdom the belated formation of a strategy division was to be able to assume a leadership role in was a form of a joint air operations plan coalition operations with other European (JAOP) developed and signed off by the CFACC forces. SDR therefore drove a requirement on the 40th day of air operations along with

78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 the first air operations directive. Similarly, it was In early December 1999, a final STC “justifi­ to be another five to 10 days before a guid­ cation” paper was submitted and approved.13 It ance, apportionment, and targeting process stated that PJHQ had confirmed that it may be was established. Across the whole range of essential for the JFHQ to deploy with a com­ HQ staff cells (A1–A9), augmentors were plete JFACHQ and that the JFACHQ should being thrown in together, often without cadre mirror the JFHQ’s availability and readiness at personnel or identified procedures to follow. R1. The paper supported both these lines, not­ As a result of his experiences at Vicenza, ing that with so many JRRF air assets at R1, the JFACHQ ProjO argued that the SDR remit there was a prima facie case for holding a C2 would only be met with the provision of a element at the same readiness. The paper went core JFACHQ and not just a core AOC. The on to state that “the need for an efficient need for the “command” element of C2 of CAOC has also been reinforced by the Kosovo any JRRF air element was highlighted, along operation” and identified the need to have a with the likely need, given the understand­ “full range of expertise and staff functions A1–7 able political realities of delaying decisions to from the outset.”14 It also drew on common ex­ commit forces, of air C2 elements being able perience from Ops Desert Fox and Allied Force to “hit the ground running.” It was also iden­ that the UK’s Defence Crisis Management tified that C2 augmentors require a core Organization (UK equivalent of US Depart­ cadre framework of personnel around which ment of Defence and Joint Staffs) required sig­ to form and establish standard operating pro­ nificant reinforcement for the operational-level cedures (SOP) to reference. As well as identi­ planning stages of an operation. The paper fying deficiencies, a positive highlight was therefore recommended that it should be the identified as being that the RAF’s ability to JFACHQ A5 (strategy division) that supported provide even a limited number of experi­ this, thereby enabling the maintenance of enced and trained personnel to the coalition continuity from operational-level planning to AOC (from Air Warfare Centre, UK CAOC, tactical-level execution.15 On 26 January 2000 and other RAF elements) had enabled a sig­ STC’s policy for the introduction of the UK nificant degree of influence to be exercised JFACHQ was issued, with the intention of form­ within the Allied Force air C2 processes. These ing the UK JFACHQ at RAF High Wycombe on “lessons” manifested themselves in a November 3 March 2000.16 1999 paper on the proposed structure and es­ tablishment of the UK JFACHQ, which iden­ tified the following main lines to take: United Kingdom Joint Force Air 1. UK JFACHQ is absolutely pivotal to STC Component Headquarters: provision of effective expeditionary air Air Command and Control Leads power capability. the Component Field 2. Proposed structure and establishment When the UK JFACHQ officially formed in provide expertise in all essential C2 areas March 2000, its mission spanned a wide range but at skeletal or digital manning levels: of tasks in peace, crisis, and war. Its raison any “thinning” will result in the loss of d’être and primary tasks were identified within core expertise and capability. this still extant mission statement: 3. National 82-man UK CAOC to be re­ To provide a UK core JFACHQ for the com­ placed by 66-man UK JFACHQ. mand and control of expeditionary air op­ 4. UK JFACHQ should be viewed as STC’s erations, and to develop, and provide train­ C2 “jewel in the crown”: requires same ing in, the command and control of joint priority in manning as other front-line air operations in order to maximise UK’s R1 operational units.12 operational air power capability.17

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 79 This mission was broken out into three that were to be enabled included the follow­ substantive tasks: ing: simultaneous deployment of two JFACHQs in support of a medium-scale warfighting 1. To develop, exercise, and maintain, at Rl, (MSWF) operation and a non-warfighting op­ a deployable core JFACHQ for the C2 eration; single JFACHQ collocated with a of national or coalition expeditionary JTFHQ afloat; small forward JFACHQ in- air operations in order to maximise the theatre supported by “reach-back,”19 and UK United Kingdom’s deployable joint air JFACHQ providing framework for a CFACHQ capability. supporting a UK-led European operation. 2. To develop and document the United The UK JFACHQ’s situation within the joint Kingdom’s operational joint air C2 operational structure is shown in figure 1. processes, procedures, and CIS in order The co-ordination linkages shown in this or­ to maximise the United Kingdom’s air ganizational structure resulted from the UK power potential. JFACHQ’s initial leadership fully grasping, from the unit’s inception, the vital need for 3. To sponsor, provide, co-ordinate, and vertical and horizontal operational integration standardise air C2 training in order to and liaison, and subsequently institutionalizing ensure the United Kingdom has suffi­ it within its CONOPS and manning docu­ cient fully trained JFACCs, core and ments. Thus, air operations co-ordination augmentor air battlestaff, and joint centres (AOCC), comprising a senior liaison component liaison personnel to meet officer (the JFACC’s personal representative) the JRRF air C2 commitment.18 and other air operations staffs, were identi­ The UK national C2 CONOPS for the de­ fied as being required for every joint-force ployment of UK forces on joint national op­ component HQ; similarly, the need for the re­ erations assumed the appointment of a joint ciprocal hosting of other components’ liaison commander (Jt Comd), who exercises OPCOM elements (e.g., battlefield co-ordination de­ at the military strategic and operational levels, tachment and maritime liaison element) was and a joint task force commander (JTFC), codified. The later peacetime implementation who normally exercises operational control of some of these UK JFACHQ co-ordination (OPCON) over assigned forces throughout a and liaison elements and their operational theatre of operations. The JTFC is responsible debut during Op Iraqi Freedom was but one for planning and executing the joint campaign clear demonstration that the UK JFACHQ was and normally directs operations from a Joint in the vanguard of the development of UK Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) in-theatre. and coalition joint and air C2 processes.20 Within the JTF, joint force component An operational JFACHQ’s size would be commanders would normally be appointed. tailored to the scale of the operation it was These would include a JFACC, who is respon­ supporting, and the C2 specializations involved sible to the JTFC for developing and executing (defensive, offensive, maritime, etc.) would be the JAOP to best support the JTFC’s overall matched to the operational tasks. As the campaign plan. The JFACC is also the JTFC’s JFACHQ was intended to be fully scaleable, principal air advisor and responsible to the dependent upon the size of operation to be latter for the co-ordination of all theatre air supported, its actual size and shape would de­ operations. It was intended that the JFACC pend upon a number of criteria but princi­ and his or her HQ would normally be collo­ pally would need to take into account the in­ cated with the JTFHQ on land or afloat but, if creased level and detail of planning required geographically separated, it was to be capable for offensive sorties. In particular, there would of stand-alone operations—usually at the air be additional focus on the requirements for component’s primary deployed operating base. targeting, weaponeering, calculation of col­ However, the other deployment scenarios lateral damage expectancy, composite air

80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 AWC PJHQ HQ STC

JFSFCHQ JTFHQ JFLogsCHQ AOCC(SF) JFACC’s LO Air Staff

JFMCHQ JFACHQ JFLCHQ

AOCC(M) SFLE AOCC(L) MLE BCD

SF Air CAG/MPA DOB GLOs DOB ASO SHF HQ

Legend AOCC - Air Operations Co-ordination Centres JFMCHQ - Joint Force Maritime Component HQ ASO - Air Support Operations JFSFCHQ - Joint Force Special Forces Component HQ AWC - Air Warfare Centre JTFHQ - Joint Task Force HQ BCD - Battlefield Coordination Detachment L - Land CAG - Carrier Air Group LO - Liaison Officer DOB - Dispersed Operating Base M - Maritime GLO - Ground Liaison Officer MLE - Maritime Liaison Element HQ - Headquarters MPA - Maritime Patrol Aircraft HQ STC - HQ Strike Command PJHQ - Permanent Joint HQ JFACC - Joint Force Air Component Commander SF - Special Forces JFACHQ - Joint Force Air Component HQ SFLE - Special Forces Liaison Element JFLCHQ - Joint Force Land Component HQ SHF HQ - Support Helicopter Force HQ JFLogsCHQ - Joint Force Logistics Component HQ Figure 1. Joint operational C2 structure. (Adapted from UK JFACHQ CONOPS.)

operations (COMAO) packaging, airspace ence between the US and UK operational-level management, and combat support. It was command structures is worthy of highlighting. considered that, as a worst case (i.e., most This is the absence from within UK doctrine manpower-intensive), during UK MSWF op­ of the concept of single service commanders erations on a 24-hour basis, a JFACHQ should of deployed forces. Under US doctrine, de­ be capable of handling approximately 180 of- ployed USAF elements would have a com­ fensive/defensive counterair sorties per day mander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). The plus an equal number of combat support sor­ COMAFFOR is the USAF-designated service- ties (i.e., up to approximately 400 total sorties). component commander responsible to the JFC In looking at the generic structure above, for organizing, training, equipping, sustaining, one sees that one significant point of differ­ and, when delegated, exercising OPCON for

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 81 employing USAF forces in support of JFC ob- The permanent peacetime structure of the jectives.21 This commander may also be nomi­ UK JFACHQ was based directly on the in­ nated the JFACC, but this could be a separate tended operational JFACHQ structure, shown individual altogether. Under UK doctrine, the in figure 2. This HQ would support a nomi­ responsibilities of the COMAFFOR are broadly nated JFACC of “any cloth” (i.e., of any ser­ shared between the deployed JFACC and vice) within the above national joint C2 struc­ AOCinC STC acting as a supporting com­ ture. To achieve its mission, the UK JFACHQ mander to the operation’s Jt Comd (normally structure was intended to provide the JFACC CJO). It is to meet the UK JFACC’s portion of with an HQ that could plan air operations his AFFOR-type responsibilities that he has a from the provision of input to the national support division within his HQ, typically military-strategic and operational-level plan­ staffing all theatre A1, A4, A6, and A8/9 issues. ning processes; the joint air estimate process,

JFACC

Senior CC LOs Deputy (Maritime/Land/SF) JFACC A9 JFACC/DJFACC POLAD Personal Staff

A5 Director of Ops A3/A9 Director of Support Strategy (OF-5) Legal (SO1/OF-5)

A2 A3 Ops Sp and A1 A4 Intelligence Secretarial Staff Admin Logistics A3 Maritime/Land/SF A6 Tac HQ 12 AS Bde Combat Plans Coord Staff CIS Infrastructure Sp A3 JNBCR A8 Combat Ops Sqn HQ Budget/Finance JAOC

Legend Admin - Administration JNBCR - Joint Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Regiment AS - Air Support LO - Liaison Officer Bde - Brigade Ops - Operations CC - Component Commander POLAD - Political Advisor CIS - Computer Information Systems SF - Special Forces DJFACC -Deputy Joint Force Air Component Commander Sp - Support HQ - Headquarters Sqn - Squadron JFACC - Joint Force Air Component Commander Tac - Tactical JAOC - Joint Air Operations Centre Figure 2. Generic deployed UK JFACHQ, UK national/UK framework for medium-scale warfare. (Adapted from UK JFACHQ CONOPS.)

82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 through to JAOP development; and, once in- on cadre JFACHQ personnel to form ad hoc theatre, the development of air operations di­ JFACHQ entities as required by the prevailing rectives, air tasking orders, and airspace control scenario. However, it was quite rightly identi­ orders through execution and both combat fied that “available air C2 CIS equipment, is and operational assessment. The cadre UK likely to limit the number of concurrent na­ JFACHQ was comprised of the functional tional operations that can be supported.”23 areas outlined in figure 3, with core person­ The significant potential deficiencies in terms nel representing all JFACHQ divisions and of both CIS and support manpower were a cells and, in addition, an A7 Doctrine and major driver toward the intended collocation Training Division.22 of the JFACHQ with the JTFHQ. Again, with This cadre UK JFACHQ was configured to the intention of keeping the deployed foot­ enable the immediate provision of a deploy­ print to a minimum, elements of the HQ, able, coherent core of expertise representing such as A2 and A4, would employ “reach the majority of divisions and cells required back” to the maximum extent possible. How­ for a UK JFACHQ conducting MSWF. For op­ ever, despite the potential of some small sav­ erations of a lesser scale, or for multiple ings in deployed manpower, deployment small-scale operations, it was planned to draw planning envisaged that the 66-strong cadre

DIR JFACHQ

EXO

STRATEGY SUPPORT DOCTRINE DIVISION (A5) BCD, MCE, and CCE DIVISION and Strategy Cell A1 - PANDA Cell TRAINING GAT Cell INTELLIGENCE A4 - Logistics Cell DIVISION OA Ce ll DIVISION (A2) COMBAT PLANS COMBAT OPS OPINTEL Cell (A7) DIVISION DIVISION Targeting Cell Doctrine Cell (A3 [Plans]) (A3 [Ops]) Cbt Assessment Cell Training Cell MAP Cell Current Plans Cell CIS ATO Cell Current Ops Cell DIVISION Airspace Cell C2RM Cell (A6) EW Cell CIS Ops Cell JAOC Force Protection Cell CIS Sp Cell

Legend ATO - Air Tasking Order JFACHQ - Joint Force Air Component HQ BCD - Battlefield Co-ordination Detachment MAP - Mission Area Plan C2RM - Command and Control Resource Management MCE - Major Combat Element CBT - Combat OA - Operations Analysis CCE - Command Centre Element OPINTEL - Operations Intelligence CIS - Computer Information Systems Ops - Operations EW - Electronic Warfare PANDA - Personnel and Administration EXO - Executive Officer Sp - Support GAT - Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting

Figure 3. UK JFACHQ permanent cadre organization. (Adapted from UK JFACHQ CONOPS.)

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 83 would need to be reinforced by up to 350 aug- ing area, the JFACHQ’s peacetime director mentor personnel to man a stand-alone was nominated as the operation’s JFACC, and JFACHQ to support an MSWF operation. he and eight other cadre JFACHQ personnel deployed. By 13 May, having visited en route Operation Palliser— the JTFC at his HQ in Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, the JFACC and his small HQ estab­ United Kingdom Joint Force Air lished themselves on board the CVS (see Component Headquarters’ photo). While, by 12 May the NEO had Trial by Fire largely been accomplished and was being scaled down, the nature and scale of the op­ In the first week of May 2000, after only eration developed to meet an increasing some eight weeks of existence, the JFACHQ threat posed by the rebel forces of the Revo­ was called on to support Op Palliser in Sierra lutionary United Front. On 17 May, fixed- Leone. This operation was initially a non­ combatant evacuation operation (NEO) that wing operations began over Sierra Leone, un­ quickly developed into an intervention/ dertaking three main lines of operation: (1) peace support operation. Although small in “friendly” or “hostile” air-presence missions in scale, the significant challenge posed by the support of the JTFC’s information operation, operation was well met by the embryonic HQ. (2) tactical air recce, and (3) training and es- The tempo of the operation was exhilarating tablishing local SOPs for close air support. for those involved. The A5 Division was called Over 23–26 May, 42 Commando Brigade con­ to support the strategic estimate at PJHQ on ducted a relief-in-place with 1 Para, and, with 5 May and an air estimate undertaken on 7 the situation significantly more stable, over May. Meanwhile, UK 1 Para (1st Battalion, 7–8 June the CVS covertly left the joint oper­ The Parachute Regiment), having been warned only on 6 May, successfully secured ations area, and the JFACHQ recovered back Lungi airfield in Sierra Leone over 7–8 May to the United Kingdom. and began the NEO. On 9 May the air esti­ The Op Palliser deployment proved to be mate was revisited to allow for the employ­ a highly successful “proof of concept” for the ment of seven RAF GR7 Harriers and six RN JFACHQ at the national-only, small-scale level FA2 Harriers from the CVS HMS Illustrious of operation. It also reinforced many known (R06), eight C-130s, and a mix of 12 helicop­ C2 truisms or already known issues. Most sig­ ters. On 11 May as the CVS entered the operat- nificant among them was the reinforcement that whenever possible, the JFACC—along with, if not his whole HQ, then at least his A5 staff—should be collocated with the JTFHQ. In hindsight the positioning of the JFACC and his A5 on the CVS proved to be a mistake, for they were never able to “be in the JTFC’s mind,” and a full understanding of the JTFC’s intent and CONOPS could never be gained. This location issue was compounded by the recurrent issue of a lack of operational-level communications; the CVS had only a tenuous single route for secure communications with the JTFHQ only some 50 nautical miles away JFACC HQ on board CVS HMS Illustrious in Freetown.

84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 United Kingdom Joint Force Air have included the following: the 10 percent manning cut applied to the UK JFACHQ (as Component Headquarters— part of an HQ staff review) on the same day it An Air Command and Control was declared as being FOC; the persistent fail­ ure of the UK JFACHQ to be designated and Capability That’s Here to Stay? treated as an operational force element (as, With the significantly added advantage of for example, the USAF does with its Falconer its experience and lessons from Op Palliser AOCs and air operations groups/squadrons); “under its belt,” the UK JFACHQ was declared the unit’s recent re-brigading under a train­ as having an initial operating capability in ing grouping within the peacetime staff struc­ October 2000. During the course of the next ture of Headquarters Strike Command; and, year, it continued to train its cadre personnel during the course of researching this article, and procure its CIS and deployable support the author was unable to find on the RAF’s infrastructure (the main deployable fabricated Web site among its listing of order of battle HQ system is shown below). The development and organisations, any reference to its only of capability continued and was marked with operational-level C2 entity: the UK JFACHQ.24 a declaration of full operational capability However, notwithstanding the concerns (FOC) in October 2001. raised above, since its FOC declaration, the While this declaration of FOC marked a UK JFACHQ has been a leading and pivotal very significant step in both the RAF’s and element in the RAF’s contributions to the United Kingdom’s warfighting capability, the coalition air C2 organizations that planned author believes that the continued provision and executed Ops Enduring Freedom and of a robust air C2 capability still has some doc­ Iraqi Freedom, and has been involved in trinal and organizational fights ahead of it. nearly all significant UK joint and US coali­ He would also argue that there are still lin­ tion C2 exercises and training events. Almost gering indications that, even within the RAF, from the outset, the capability and perfor­ the acceptance of the need for, and the con­ mance of the UK’s JFACHQ and its cadre per­ comitant cost of, providing a national air C2 sonnel have demonstrated that it and they capability that could effectively execute a UK were fully living up to the RAF’s vision of MSWF air operation is far from ubiquitous or being: “An Air Force that strives to be first yet fully institutionalized. These indications

Deployable fabricated HQ system

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT 85 and person for person remains second to pertise, the absolutely essential need to pro­ none.”25 In the experience of the author, it is vide an air C2 capability is not yet institution­ accepted widely at home and in the United alized in the RAF as it is within the USAF. To States that the RAF’s JFACHQ certainly is per­ date, advocacy for the effective implementa­ son for person, second to none in the provision tion of an air C2 capability within the RAF of operational-level component C2. Indeed, has, in the main, been a “bottom-up” process, the author believes that the UK JFACHQ has al­ while in the USAF, air C2 advocacy starts un­ ready all but achieved the five-year vision he equivocally at the very top with successive USAF helped draft for it: chiefs of staff personally directing its develop­ ment and resourcing. The author’s fear is that To become the UK’s recognized centre of ex­ until a similar situation of “top-down” advocacy cellence for both the development and execu­ and ubiquitous understanding of operational- tion of all aspects of the command and level air C2 prevails within the RAF, the above control of joint air operations.26 vision that is so close to being delivered is over So while it could be argued that the RAF does time in danger, through lack of resourcing as lead the international field in the provision of a front-line force capability, of atrophying rapidly deployable operational-level air C2 ex- into hallucination. ■

Notes 1. German for “politics of reality”; foreign politics 14. Ibid. based on practical concerns rather than theory or ethics. 15. Ibid. 2. Ministry of Defence, AP 3000: British Air Power Doc­ 16. HQ STC, Policy for the Introduction of UK Joint Force trine, 3rd ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Air Component Headquarters, JFACHQ/101/1/Pol, 26 Janu­ [HMSO], 1999), 1.3.8. ary 2000. 3. “Permanent Joint HQs (PJHQ),” The Management 17. Ibid. of Defence, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/mod/listings/ 18. Ibid. l0006.html. 19. The capability of a forward-deployed command 4. Secretary of State for Defence UK, Statement on the to “reach back” to tap into data banks, intelligence, and Defence Estimates 1996: Defence Policy; Joint Rapid Deployment imagery. Force, Cm. 3223 [Command Paper] (May 1996), par. 164, 20. The need for significantly enhanced horizontal http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/ and vertical integration and liaison during the US plan­ mod/defence/c1tx4.htm. ning for Operation Iraqi Freedom was to be one of the 5. RAF Board Standing Committee Paper first observations of the United Kingdom’s air-liaison AFBSC(95)11, Command and Control of STC Assets, team (drawn from UK JFACHQ) when it joined the now STC/9096/53/1/2/CP. coalition air-planning effort at HQ US Central Com­ 6. Secretary of State for Defence UK, Strategic Defence mand Air Forces. While, as discussed, the need for liaison Review, Cm. 3999 (July 1998), http://www.mod.uk/issues/ and co-ordination is well institutionalized in UK air C2 sdr/intro.htm. doctrine and practice, the USAF’s air coordination ele­ 7. Ibid., par. 89. ment (ACE) concept was only to manifest itself in the 8. This ProjO was the author of this article. He had immediate run up to Iraqi Freedom’s execution. also been the squadron leader (O-4) ProjO for the intro­ 21. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-8, Com­ duction of the earlier UK CAOC working as the junior mand and Control, 16 February 2001, 25. member of a three-man team with a group captain and 22. Figure 3, Combat Service Support Division, is wing commander. broken into “Support” and “CIS.” 9. UK Joint Force Air Component HQ, “Policy State­ 23. HQ STC, Policy for the Introduction of UK Joint Force ment,” UK CAOC/121/FP, 17 November 1999. Air Component Headquarters, JFACHQ, par. 12, 26 January 10. Ibid. 2000. 11. UK STC, STC Structure beyond 2000 Study, STC/ 24. RAF, Royal Air Force Equipment Strength, http:// 101/CINCSEC, 22 February 1999. www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/strength.html. 12. UK JFACHQ Proposed Structure and Establishment, 25. RAF, “The Royal Air Force Vision Statement,” JFACHQ/101/1/POL, 23 November 1999. March 2000, http://www.raf.mod.uk/info/statement.html. 13. Justification of the Establishment and Infrastructure for 26. HQ STC, Policy for the Introduction of UK Joint Force a Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (JFACHQ), Air Component Headquarters, JFACHQ, par. 8, 26 January JFACHQ/101/Pol, 13 December 1999. 2000.

86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Operations

SQUADRON LEADER SOPHY GARDNER, RAF

Editorial Abstract: The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom between March and May 2003 marked the culmination of many years of cooperation between US and British forces in the Middle East, brought together for Operation Desert Storm and remaining for 12 years policing the northern and southern no- fly zones over Iraq side by side. In this article, the author attempts to identify the issues and challenges posed by coalition operations in Iraq as a way of understanding how to maintain and best nurture the close professional military relationship that exists between the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force as we look, collectively, to the future.

T IS JUST 22 months since the US-led Britain decided not to take part in military ac­ coalition entered the final planning tions, adding, “To the extent they [Britain] are phase in the run-up to Operation Iraqi not able to participate, there are works around Freedom. At the time, the debate was and they would not be involved.”2 In the Iraging about whether the United States was United Kingdom (UK), the prime minister was going to be forced to “go it alone.”1 In a press facing significant opposition from within the briefing on 11 March 2003, Secretary of De­ Labour Party and from the general public, with fense Donald Rumsfeld said that the United demonstrations in London in mid-February States had alternative plans to invade Iraq if 2003 drawing an estimated (and record) one

87 million people. These political problems cre­ mand [CENTCOM] Forward). The Australians ated a febrile atmosphere in the run-up to a will have their own perspective, although they potential operation (and gave US military may well have similar observations on the planners a task that, to say the least, was ex­ challenges of participation in this coalition tremely challenging). Nevertheless, it was endeavour. Indeed, there were many more widely recognised that the United States layers of complexity to the “coalition” context would attract greater international legitimacy of this operation, given the dozens of other if it could form a coalition, particularly if this nations that were involved in some way could be garnered under United Nations (whether in providing overflight rights, bas­ (UN) auspices.3 Also, the UK military contri­ ing rights, or logistic support).7 Secondly, in bution on the table, though small in relative order to address the subject holistically, I will numbers, provided some capabilities which look at the operation from the joint perspec­ were particularly valuable and included key tive. But, where possible, I will tease out some top-up forces in areas where the United States air-specific issues and examples, and later 4 was stretched. Going it alone was certainly consider the evolving United States Air Force 5 not the preferred course for the United States. (USAF)/Royal Air Force (RAF) relationship Of course, Iraqi Freedom was ultimately in the aftermath of Iraqi Freedom. Thirdly, I conducted as a coalition operation, with troops will focus specifically on lessons from phase from the United Kingdom and Australia in three (the combat phase that culminated in combat alongside the US military. But no UN the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime— mandate was forthcoming. In the aftermath “the conventional combat portion”).8 At the of combat operations, military commentators time of this writing, it is plain that phase lined up to analyse the operation, its per­ four—still ongoing—has many further lessons ceived successes and failures, and the lessons for us, but, nevertheless, there is still much to that could be learnt for the future (not least be gained by analysing phase three and the in the context of the operation as a coalition preparations for it as a discrete package. enterprise). As the British chief of the De­ Fourthly, it is also important to acknowledge fence Staff (CDS) said, “As an example of a coalition operation in modern times, it [the the implications that the refusal of Turkish operation in Iraq] has just about everything support had for the UK experience. Apart for the analysts to scrutinise and the arm­ from the obvious time-critical challenges of chair generals to comment about.”6 The aim the late decision to abandon the possible use of this analysis is to identify the issues and of Turkey and the necessary redirection of challenges that coalition operations pre­ significant quantities of troops and equip­ sented during phase three of Iraqi Freedom ment, the demise of the “Turkey option” took and extrapolate from these the wider lessons US European Command (EUCOM) out of the which we need to identify if we are to move command and control (C2) equation. Having forward in order to prepare ourselves for fu­ both CENTCOM and EUCOM in the opera­ ture coalition operations. But firstly, five tion would have added an extra dimension, caveats. I intend to concentrate on the UK/US and an already complex situation would have relationship, despite the fact that there was been even more so. Thus the investigation of also a considerable Australian presence— coalition operations here, by definition, con­ around 2,000 personnel, comprising ele­ siders coordination and cooperation with ments such as special forces, commando only a single US command headquarters. Fi­ units, FA/18s, frigates, and a diving team, as nally, it is important to recognise that “what well as a national headquarters similar to, you see depends on where you sit” (here I though smaller than, the UK National Con­ quote the UK national contingent commander tingent Headquarters (NCHQ) at Camp As [NCC]),9 and my perspective will no doubt be Saliyah in Qatar (alongside US Central Com­ shaped in part by my experience at the NCHQ.

88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Why is it important for us to understand ship, I would opine that we are at a critical and make progress in our thinking on coali­ point in our development. Having spent 12 tion operations? The conflicts we now face, years policing the skies over Iraq and working after the Cold War and 9/11, are very differ­ alongside the United States for more than ent to those for which our senior command­ 4,000 days of continuous operations, we now ers were trained when they began their ser­ face a period of potentially limited opera­ vice. Now, in the early twenty-first century, the tional contact. Indeed, progress in Iraq may untethering of states from their Cold War al­ lead to that contact reducing further. Thus we legiances has brought benefits for some but must now identify what work we need to do to uncertainty (economically and politically) for prepare for future challenges—particularly as many as well. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 the only certainty is that there will be more. were the most violent of the shocks which As just mentioned, the preparation and confirmed the arrival of the era of asymmetric planning for Iraqi Freedom took place conflict—we now live in a world where asym­ against a backdrop of continued coalition en­ metric weapons are increasingly effective, forcement of the Iraqi no-fly zones (man­ have a potentially huge destructive impact, dated under UN Resolution 687) with the yet are increasingly accessible to nonstate ag­ USAF and RAF operating alongside each gressors for use worldwide. And we have also other, both in the northern and southern entered an era when wars (for potential coali­ combined air operations centres and in the tion partners in the West, at least) are in­ air. Planning, operating, and living side by creasingly engagements of choice, ideally side for 12 years ensured a level of integration fought in coalitions of “willing” participants. between the USAF and the RAF that was to From the UK perspective, the likelihood of prove invaluable. Although UK involvement going it alone for high-intensity combat opera­ in planning for a potential Iraqi operation tions is now remote—we envisage fighting in only started in mid-2002, all three services an alliance of coalition partners, which, for had had staff embedded alongside their US larger operations, will invariably be alongside counterparts in US headquarters since 9/11, the United States. In December 2003, the and Operation Enduring Freedom had US Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) white paper and UK personnel planning and operating stated that “the most demanding expedi­ alongside each other from late 2001. The UK tionary operations, including intervention staff at CENTCOM, based at Tampa, Florida, against state adversaries, can only be plausibly was led by a three-star initially and then by a conducted if US forces are engaged, either two-star from May 2002. In the autumn of leading a coalition or in NATO.”10 In this 2002, Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge was des­ context, the cohesion of a coalition, particu­ ignated NCC and began strengthening al­ larly in the asymmetric environment, will be ready established relationships at the highest fundamental to the success of an operation— levels.11 Below him, the UK contingent com­ and a competent enemy will recognise that as manders were also working alongside their our potential centre of gravity. Even an op­ counterparts. This early planning work al­ posed but nonhostile third party can disrupt lowed the United Kingdom visibility of, and a prospective operation by attacking potential increasing involvement and influence in, US fault lines between different coalition mem- planning, with the UK planning teams (the bers—in “wars of choice,” there are many ob­ “embedded” staff)12 gaining credibility with stacles facing a coalition even before it their US counterparts and superiors, such that reaches the enemy. So the better our under­ they were later to form the core of the UK standing of the dynamics and challenges of embedded staff within the deployed US head- coalition operations, the better our prepara­ quarters.13 As time moved on, personal rela­ tions for the future. From the perspective of tionships developed, trust was established, understanding the UK/US military relation­ and staffs increasingly appreciated the funda-

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 89 mental concept of shared risk in a coalition RAF deployed over 8,000 personnel with air operation. Of course, with the political diffi­ assets tailored to US requirements (fielding, culties in the United Kingdom in late 2002 for example, precision weapons; intelligence, (and into the new year of 2003), the embed­ surveillance, and reconnaissance and C2 plat­ ded UK planning staffs faced the challenge of forms; defensive counterair; and air refuel­ maintaining momentum in the planning ing). “The Plan” had gone through many it­ process, against a backdrop of uncertainty erations, and as possible conflict drew closer about any UK involvement. Established links, and with no-fly-zone operations still ongoing, through these embedded staffs, were essential it became apparent that events would have to in keeping UK military planners alongside be synchronised in a number of areas.15 Here, their counterparts through these difficult coalition relationships at the higher military times. Widely acknowledged by US and UK levels were critical, as the commanders tai­ commanders as critical to the development of lored and reworked plans to accommodate the campaign plans were the exercises and re­ the shifting realities of the final critical weeks. hearsals that took place in the last few months The prospect of particular enemy actions— of preparations. “Rock drills” and “chair flies” use of Western Desert Scuds, potential actions (depending on the colour of one’s cloth), in­ in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, and the cluding Exercise Internal Look in December threat of sabotage to the southern oilfields— 2002, were vital in shaking down planning coalesced into an imperative to compress the and C2 issues. “shaping” phase to the bare minimum. The integration of the coalition staffs ensured that the coalition moved together “as one” in these final planning stages.

Coalition aircraft patrol an Iraqi no-fly zone.

The UK force structure was announced by the secretary of state in January and February 2003, with the final announcements taking place just a month before the operation even­ tually began. The UK contribution was to consist of over 100 fixed-wing aircraft and 120 helicopters, an army division comprising Challenger tank three brigades and over 100 Challengers, and an amphibious task group, along with mine- So within the context of the coalition, what clearance vessels, Tomahawk land-attack mis­ were the issues and challenges we faced— sile shooters, and a hospital ship. The MOD’s what worked and what didn’t? First of all, al­ First Reflections report stated that “the UK con­ though subject to ongoing debate, I believe tribution was taken into the US plan where it coalition military C2 relationships worked could best complement and enhance US ca­ well (see figure). This diagram shows how C2 pabilities, both political and military.”14 The was delegated within the UK military and how

90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 MOD XXXX Delegation: Upper to Lower

Operational Command Operational Control PJHQ Tactical Command Red Card Level 1 XXX Tactical Control Direct Liaison Authorised US C2 UK NCC CENTCOM Co-ordinating Authority XXX

UK Maritime UK Land UK Air Joint Force Logistics Joint Force Special Forces a Red Card Contingent Commander Contingent Commander Contingent Commander Contingent Commander British Forces Cyprus Contingent Commander Subordinated XX XX XX X X Lt Col

Coalition Joint Force Coalition Joint Force Coalition Joint Force 377th Theater Coalition Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Land Component Commander Air Component Commander Support Command Special Operations XXX XXX XXX XX Commander X

Senior British CENTCOM Military Advisor

Chief of the Defence Staff Pentagon Liaison Officer

aCommander British Forces Cyprus is a supporting commander and is given priorities in support of Operation Telic (British military operations in Iraq) by the NCC.

Figure. UK C2 construct and relationship with US C2 that aligned with the US military construct. area in the south of Iraq, reducing reliance Within the United Kingdom, planning and on integrated C2 technological capability. oversight of the operation was led by the In terms of linkages between the deployed MOD and the Permanent Joint Headquarters commander and the United Kingdom, the (PJHQ), which jointly form the Defence Crisis NCC worked through the CJO to the Defence Management Organisation. The CDS ap­ Staff, with the CJO and the PJHQ acting as a pointed the chief of joint operations (CJO) at buffer between London and the NCC in- the PJHQ as the joint commander, with opera­ theatre, allowing the NCC to concentrate on tional command of deployed forces. With coalition military issues and his relationships some exceptions (such as special forces), with the US military and his national environ­ operational control of committed forces was mental contingent commanders. If the CJO, delegated by the CJO to the NCC, who in turn as joint commander, had deployed forward, subdelegated tactical command to UK envi­ as had been mooted, the combined tasks of ronmental contingent commanders (who the CJO and the NCC (looking up to London, could then in turn delegate tactical control to across and up to CENTCOM, and looking their US counterparts).16 The NCC sat along­ after national interests at the command head­ side Gen Tommy Franks, CENTCOM com­ quarters level) would all have been vested in mander, at Camp As Saliyah in Qatar. At the a single individual/location. Considering the national and environmental levels in-theatre, workload required solely for the NCC to stay the UK commanders were responsible for alongside General Franks and the CENTCOM harmonising coalition activity with national battle rhythm, it seems certain that other vital political intent and legal requirements, and linkages would have suffered. During the op­ ensuring the effective employment of UK as­ eration, the NCC was reported in the Daily sets. They also held a national “red card.” Telegraph as having made “the surprising reve­ However, the use of that red card was avoided, lation” that he had never spoken to the prime on more than one occasion, because the trust minister.17 “ ‘I have never spoken to Tony that existed at all levels of command allowed Blair,’ he said, ‘I answer to the Chief of the informal dialogue to pre-empt any potential Defence Staff and the Secretary of State.’ ”18 formal action. This approach was absolutely Journalists may have found this surprising, but pivotal in minimising friction. The way in the NCC—and indeed the prime minister— which the different national contingents inte­ had no need for direct contact, relying in­ grated into their components was determined stead on the C2 chains which were already both by the nature of their environments and well defined in UK doctrine—and with com­ by their contributions. Both the UK air and munication routes up the levels of command maritime elements were fully integrated into to the MOD already well trodden during re­ their US contingent; indeed, for air, the very cent operations. The US military had a differ­ nature of the environment demands full inte­ ent and more fluid construct, with direct gration. The land environment is somewhat communication regularly taking place between different. From early on, the challenges of in­ CENTCOM and the Defense Department tegrating UK land forces into a US digitised (Donald Rumsfeld and General Franks were land formation were recognised. To the British in daily direct contact—often via video tele­ command, operating in a discrete geographical conference with the NCC alongside General area would be prefereable (i.e., the southern Franks—and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the option rather than the northern option). The Pentagon made direct calls to the US compo­ change of plan following Turkey’s decision not nent commanders).19 The differences be­ to grant basing rights meant that the UK land- tween the US and UK C2 constructs, particu­ contingent plan changed to having a UK divi­ larly the political-military interface aspect, sion operating with the 1st Marine Expedi­ were debated by the House of Commons De­ tionary Force within a discrete geographical fence Select Committee (HCDC) which, in its

92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Third Report, recommended that “the MOD coalition (bearing in mind the centre of grav­ consider whether the highest levels of British ity issue), “crossed the line” together. It was command structures might be made more not long before this was put to the test when adaptable so as to be able to operate more a US Patriot battery shot down a UK Tornado closely in parallel with their American counter­ GR4, with the tragic loss of the crew. Al­ parts, when UK and US forces are operating though the ultimate causes of the accident together.”20 They expanded by saying, “It were established later on, it was known almost might be argued that the British system should immediately that a US Patriot had brought be able to adapt to deal with the more direct down the aircraft. At the national headquar­ political-military interface practised by the ters in Qatar and in the air component head­ Americans.”21 However, in its response to the quarters (ACHQ) in Saudi Arabia, the senior HCDC’s observations on differing UK/US US and UK commanders understood that this structures, the government firmly stated, “We incident was an important test of our rela­ do not agree. The Coalition command struc­ tionship. Both in the national and air head­ tures were closely integrated.”22 In reality, re­ quarters, the US commanders contacted their lationships in-theatre were excellent, and the UK equivalents to offer apologies and condo­ NCC was able to provide comprehensive feed­ lences. The morning after the shootdown, at back daily to the CJO. It is worth noting that a prescheduled interview, the NCC vowed that, our experience with US C2 during Kosovo following the tragedy, relations with the United was very different, with direction to senior US States were as strong as ever: “A military cam­ military commanders in-theatre filtering down paign is probably the most intimate alliance a more traditional chain (more similar to the you can implement. We have two nations who UK construct). These differences are driven share the risks, share the dangers and share as much by the personalities involved as by the rewards. You develop a bond of trust be­ the mission and environment, and it is, there­ cause you are taking responsibility for each fore, likely that the personalities involved will other’s lives.”23 On the same day, General have a significant bearing on future US com­ Franks, in an interview with George Pascoe mand relationships. We cannot, obviously, Watson of the Sun, was asked about his views predict the nature of future US administra­ on the accident and insisted that any sugges­ tions and the characteristics that might per­ tion that friendly-fire incidents would drive tain during future conflicts (or, indeed, UK the United States and the United Kingdom government working practices which are, per­ apart was misguided: “I disagree in the haps to a lesser extent but more so than in the strongest terms. When there are friendly-fire past, also personality driven), but our C2 con­ incidents across coalition boundaries it brings struct is robust and, whilst clearly defined, has allies closer together.”24 These were not empty proved itself flexible enough to accommodate words—in private, the commanders expressed such nuances. identical views. The UK view that participating in a coali­ One of the first hurdles to face us was the tion operation meant sharing the burden in synchronisation of the use of information in terms of commitment of troops and assets the campaign, particularly given the multi­ and sharing the responsibility for the opera­ faceted nature of the “audiences” that we tion and sharing the risk—to our forces and were communicating with.25 In-theatre, the ap­ to the outcome—formed the central tenet of proach of our militaries to the media was a mutual understanding between the UK and case in point. In the run-up to the operation, US commanders. Our willingness to commit coalition staffs worked hard to align our to training and planning together, and US media strategies and define the daily rhythm trust in placing UK military personnel in key (with important audiences spread across the positions within the US organisation, also world’s time zones), but the different national contributed to our strong stance as we, as a approaches were more difficult to coordi-

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 93 nate. For the ACHQ, journalists were banned dance on the podium. None was given a speak­ from Saudi Arabia, and so the focus for jour­ ing part in a conference that lasted well over nalists following the air campaign turned an hour, and the impression given was not the away from there and dispersed to the press one that we wanted to project. Nor did it re­ centre and bases in Kuwait. At the national flect reality, for the NCC had anything but a contingent level, there was a Combined Press solely “walk-on part,” and it was decided after Information Centre in Qatar (with a confer­ this that unilateral media handling was likely ence “set” described as having “a passing re­ to be the better option. No doubt, the differ­ semblance to the deck of Starship Enterprise” ing attitudes of our national press had a great and designed by a Hollywood art director),26 deal to do with the way that we viewed media and the cultural challenges of working side by handling—the US military was certainly sur­ side with our coalition partners and the vari­ prised at the relatively hostile treatment we re­ ous media outlets were soon obvious. Even ceived from the UK media,32 while the patient before we “stood up” in Qatar, the stated con­ and sometimes supine attitude of the US press cept of “shock and awe” had sat uncomfort­ to some fairly poor treatment (in comparison ably with the United Kingdom’s emphasis on to what we knew our UK press would expect) the future rebuilding of Iraq.27 Although the by the US military media handlers was a source phrase “shock and awe” was studiously of some surprise to us.33 Perhaps Paul Adams’s avoided by our US colleagues in-theatre,28 description of our differences seems harsh, but General Franks’s first news conference after it also sums up the perceptions of the press the conflict commenced referred to a cam­ with which both militaries were attempting to paign “characterised by shock,” delivery of grapple: “decisive precision shock,” and “the introduc­ Reporters desperate for facts swarmed every time tion of shock air forces” in his initial pream- 29 a clean-cut, polite American military spokesman ble. But this was as much due to a cultural, ventured into the crowded corridors. But the rather than doctrinal, difference in presenta­ constraints imposed by “operational security” or, tion. As Paul Adams (BBC correspondent) just as often, a reluctance to speak out of turn, put it, meant we always came away disappointed. . . . A small team of British media handlers worked The tall, imposing, jug-eared Texan seemed just hard to fill the void. . . . It was an adult way of the man to inflict a dose of shock and awe on doing things, and one that the Americans could Iraq, while his shorter, bespectacled British not, or would not, emulate.34 counterpart appeared to embody something a little more nuanced. But while it was tempting to In terms of information, there was also an draw distinctions between the two major coalition issue of marrying our military objectives for partners, “shock and awe” and “effects-based war­ the operation. The published UK government fare” were essentially the same thing. . . . “There military-campaign objectives for the operation are other ways of doing shock and awe than by cited the prime objective as “to rid Iraq of its breaking things,” Burridge said.30 weapons of mass destruction and their associ­ In any case, as an Air Force Magazine article put ated weapons programmes and means of de- it, “It was not the job of the Department of livery.”35 For the United States, the prime ob­ Defense [in the context of shock and awe] to jective was to “end the regime of Saddam correct expectations generated by others. In­ Hussein.”36 The US objectives referred to ter­ deed, not doing so may have been a form of rorism in their third and fourth objectives, yet passive disinformation.”31 This was, however, the United Kingdom referred to terrorism the first and only coalition conference in only under “wider political objectives in sup­ Qatar. While General Franks and his media port of the military campaign.”37 The key to spokesman, Gen Vincent Brooks, presented marrying these two perspectives under one to the media, the UK, Australian, Danish, and coalition banner was, of course, our united at­ Dutch national commanders stood in atten­ titude to Saddam Hussein’s regime. As the UK

94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 government articulated it, “The obstacle to vast that up to 1,700 sorties a day were being Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obli­ launched.40 Of course, there were occasions gations under relevant [UN Security Council when our UK viewpoint on how an “effect” resolutions] is the current Iraqi regime. . . . It would be interpreted differed from the US is therefore necessary that the current Iraqi viewpoint. In the case of Iraqi Freedom, regime be removed from power.”38 The two where the United Kingdom saw the potential perspectives were as one on that aim, but it for disagreement over the national accept­ still required a careful approach by the US ability of a particular course of action, resort and the UK national commands to ensure to red cards was not the preferred option, that that fact was fully understood. and at the NCHQ level, differences of opin­ An early (precampaign) issue that has crys­ ion were routinely resolved through debate tallised into a “lesson learnt” for coalition op­ and discussion. In fact, the United Kingdom erations was that of basing of assets. The was able to offer—and the United States was United Kingdom and the United States comfortable being offered—British advice agreed that the United States would lead in even when the United Kingdom was not di­ negotiating host nation (HN) support for rectly involved. As Air Marshal Burridge said coalition assets. In the early stages of plan­ in evidence to the HCDC: “Where I believe ning, this seemed a pragmatic approach, but the interesting bit occurs—and I think this is as time passed and HN views hardened, it be­ where we added considerable value—was in came apparent that, at least from the HN’s saying, yes, okay, this is an American target, view, one country’s aspiration for HN support American platform, no British involvement, would be considered in isolation from any but actually let me just say how this might other’s, regardless of how the request had look viewed in Paris, Berlin or wherever.”41 been submitted. This may seem an obvious Sharing of information and the interop­ strategy from the HN with hindsight, but at erability of information systems were among the time a united coalition approach seemed the greatest challenges facing the coalition. to be the most appropriate course. As it turned Thankfully, the limited extent of the Iraqi out, it probably did neither the United States Freedom coalition made information and in­ nor the United Kingdom any favours. At short telligence sharing easier than it would have notice, the flip side of the coalition equation been in a larger coalition. However, the shar­ came into play, with the United States’ assis­ ing of information is at the centre of the rela­ tance and flexibility enabling our deployment tionship of trust that is needed in a coalition, by accommodating our changing plans (due and during Iraqi Freedom, the frustration to the HN issue) for air and land basing within came in translating the trust engendered at their own plan. the highest levels into sensible information Another challenge that benefited from sharing at the lower levels. The issue was not much thought and application before the one of releasability per se—more that each campaign started was the issue of national individual in the chain felt beholden to check rules of engagement and delegation given to the releasability of the information before ac­ commanders in-theatre. During Kosovo, Gen tioning any requests. The system was there­ Wesley Clark had expressed his frustration fore slow and cumbersome, rather than re­ with laborious coalition approval processes.39 sponsive and agile. Computer information Both the NCC and the air contingent com­ systems (CIS) were also a problem, with the mander agreed after Operation Iraqi Free­ United States operating on its infinitely supe­ dom that, for this operation, the final delega­ rior Secret Internet Protocol Router Network tions were infinitely more flexible and (SIPRNET) system, which was not releasable coherence across the coalition in terms of dele­ to UK eyes without US supervision, while the gations was critical to UK credibility in a United Kingdom operated its myriad CIS’s high-tempo campaign with an air effort so and had access to CENTRIX, a US CIS, with

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 95 Australian/UK access, onto which Australian-/ that our military contribution can demonstrate UK-releasable SIPRNET information could be commitment and determine the value in which transferred. However, the process was manual we are held (and the influence which we can rather than automatic, requiring our US bring to bear). counterparts to find the time (in a high-tempo We must also recognise the value that sensi­ operational environment) to decide on and ble delegations had in the trust that the United implement the transfer of information. States put in the United Kingdom. These dele­ Again, these challenges tended to be over­ gations allowed us to participate in some high- come through face-to-face dialogue and the importance, time-critical targeting decisions development of good working relationships, and ensured that we were included fully in de­ although not without costs to efficiency. cision making. The marriage of political ends is So where do our experiences during phase a similarly critical but extremely sensitive area three leave us 22 months on? Notwithstand­ of coalition cooperation, and we will always ing ongoing events in Iraq, there are some need to be alive to the need to ensure that important lessons from Iraqi Freedom for the coalition members’ political ends (if different United Kingdom and the United States, just or differently prioritised) are understood, en­ as there is a recognition that our operational meshed, and met. These political coalition is­ interoperability (both in terms of how we sues will always be sensitive and challenging to think we fight and how we technically fight) planners, but they are critical to the successful must be maintained, or we may suffer for it execution of a coalition operation. next time. There are no guarantees, if there is Most pressingly important to the United a next time, that we will have as much plan­ Kingdom and the United States is the chal­ ning time (even though the political will to lenge of replacing the operational linkages allow us to engage in planning, even if future which already existed (particularly between intent is uncertain, can give us crucial influ­ our navies and air forces) as a result of the 12 ence at the earliest stage possible),42 and it is years of coalition work leading up to Iraqi almost a given that we will not have just spent Freedom. We need to stay alongside each other 12 years side by side in-theatre in the run-up by training and exercising together, develop­ to a large-scale operation. In fact, recognition ing doctrinally together, and war gaming as a that things will not be the same “next time” is coalition. From the RAF’s and the USAF’s a key lesson in itself. perspective, this has been a priority since phase Importantly, we must offer capabilities three of Iraqi Freedom finished. The two forces which are of utility and influence, and which have established an engagement initiative de­ can fill gaps in and complement US capability. signed as a forum to take forward work on Tactical recce and the Stormshadow cruise interoperability issues under the RAF chief of missile are good examples from the air contin­ the Air Staff and the USAF chief of staff to en­ gent of capabilities that the United Kingdom sure that we are working and training together alone could offer, while tankers and E-3s are to prepare for the future. Some of this is examples of assets which we could offer that practical—ensuring that our exchange pro­ were in short supply. If the United Kingdom grammes develop over time and ensuring can perform valued tasks that the United States that we maximise opportunities to exercise requires (and other allies may not be able to together—and some is technical, and in this field), our influence will be felt: “The signifi­ area equipment procurement and develop­ cant military contribution the UK is able to ment are central. As the CDS outlined, make . . . means that we secure an effective Whilst there are real opportunities for interop­ place in the political and military decision- erability as forces modernise, there is equally the 43 making processes.” Sharing contentious and risk that this very modernisation could under­ dangerous activities, not just those which are mine the unity of effort in any coalition. The “niche” or in short supply, is another vital way technological gap between digitised and ana­

96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 Tornado armed with Stormshadow cruise missiles

logue contingents will impact severely on the The RAF has to maximise its presence along­ principal advantage of digitisation—that of a side the USAF as they develop interoperabil­ force’s ability to rely on tempo as a major in­ ity priorities and policies. It is also recognised gredient of combat power—and in warfighting by the USAF/RAF initiative that the cultural this could impact to a point where two elements become operationally irreconcilable.44 and intellectual aspects of fighting together are fundamental to progress. As well as inter­ In the USAF, “plug and play” is becoming action at senior levels (in meetings, at confer­ (quite understandably) the mantra. Command­ ences, at war games, etc.), it is important to ers are not interested in new equipment develop closer links further down the chain which cannot integrate into the battlespace of command. There are several initiatives and, importantly, cannot talk without a “man now in their developmental stages which aim, in the loop” to the next piece of equipment. 45 across the ranks, to develop our understand­ As Lt Gen Ronald E. Keys states, ing of each other’s cultural ways of doing Whatever is on the inside of your widget or business and grow a new generation of Air­ gadget can be proprietary, but what comes out men who see their US counterparts as natural of the little plug in the front or back of it must and familiar partners.47 This approach should speak the language of Airmen, and must work complement our commitment to the policy with my other equipment or systems without any third party translation or integrators of embedding UK staffs in US command staffs needed. This is the rule for the 21st century for future operations—a policy which will re­ USAF and if you can’t abide by it . . . we won’t main absolutely key to successful cooperation buy it.46 in the future.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 97 We, the US and UK militaries, left the end operability—it is mutual cooperation and con­ of phase three of Operation Iraqi Freedom tact which will provide us with the best chance having worked successfully as a coalition and of staying in step. This will allow us to under­ having faced practical challenges along the stand what we can offer each other, how we way. We can see that these were largely over­ can best move forward together, and in which come through a combination of fortuitous areas we need to concentrate our efforts in timing (an extended planning period), strong order to maintain momentum. Most impor­ personal relationships (particularly at the tantly, a strong and close professional rela­ senior levels), mutual dependence and bur­ tionship will be the key—as it was for Opera­ den sharing (in terms of the United Kingdom tion Iraqi Freedom. As the MOD concluded providing capabilities which were of unique in its First Reflections report, value to the coalition effort and the recogni­ Working in a coalition brings political, diplo­ tion, on both sides, that this was a journey we matic and military advantages, including the ag­ would travel together as a coalition “for better gregation of capabilities, flexible war-fighting op­ or for worse”), and a motivation to find com­ tions and the sharing of intelligence and risk. . . . mon ground and to engineer solutions to any At the operational and tactical levels, the plan­ problems that threatened the coalition’s in­ ning and conduct of the operation was facilitated tegrity. Most importantly, trust was established by the close professional relationship that has grown up between the UK and the US.48 at all levels. For the future, whether we con­ sider either mindset, doctrine, and culture, or We must ensure it is maintained—future coali­ equipment, concept of operations, and inter- tion operations will depend on it. ■

Notes

1. E. MacAskill, R. Norton-Taylor, and J. Borger, “US “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” http://www.white May Go It Alone As Blair Is Caught in Diplomatic Dead­ house.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html. lock,” The Guardian, 12 March 2003. 8. Robert S. Dudman, “The Three Week War,” Air 2. “US Willing to Go It Alone,” 12 March 2003, http:// Force Magazine, March 2004, 2. aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2003%20News%20 9. Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge: “I should preface archives/March%202003%20News/12%20news/US%20is all my remarks with ‘What you see depends on where you %20willing%20to%20go%20it%20alone%20aljazeerah. sit.’ ” Oral evidence to House of Commons Defence Select info.htm. Committee (HCDC), 11 June 2003, Q. 225. 3. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tac­ 10. Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence tics, and Military Lessons (Westport, CT: Praeger, pub­ White Paper (United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, De­ lished in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and cember 2003), par. 3.5. International Studies, 2003), 487–91. 11. Now air chief marshal, commander in chief, 4. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Strike Command. Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 12. Air Marshal Burridge: “[The UK embedded staff] Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 132. were members of General Franks’ staff, so instead of an 5. General Franks: “I would honestly say to the people of Great Britain, thanks for committing this magnificent American officer doing a particular job, there would be a UK force to be part of this coalition. It’s powerful, it’s ef­ British officer. That gave us linkage and connectivity be­ fective and I’m glad to march forward beside the Brits.” tween our two headquarters.” Oral evidence to HCDC, George Pascoe Watson, “I’m Proud to March with Brits Says 11 June 2003, Q. 217. General Tommy Franks,” The Sun, 24 March 2003. Simi­ 13. “We were able to work closely with the US and in­ lar sentiments also witnessed personally in conversation. fluence the campaign from initial planning to execution 6. “The Military Challenges in Coalition Opera­ through high-level political contacts . . . as well as by the tions,” CDS address to Defence Systems and Equipment presence of a significant number of embedded UK offi­ International (DSEI) Conference, 11 September 2003, cers in key US headquarters.” Operations in Iraq: First Re­ http://www.deso.mod.uk/archive (accessed 29 May 2004). flections (United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, July 2003), 7. President Bush confirmed on 19 March 2003 that par. 6.2. more than 35 countries were supporting the coalition. 14. Ibid., 19.

98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 15. “Too many to list!” as Gen T. M. Moseley com­ 31. Correll, “What Happened?” 57. mented. Speech to Royal Air Force Air Power Confer­ 32. At a CENTCOM press conference, after another ence, 11 May 2004. aggressive question from a BBC reporter, General Franks 16. Air Marshal Burridge: “I sat below [the CJO] and commented, “Boy, there’s a lot of you BBC guys” (witnessed I had operational control, so I was given the tasks and the personally on 23 March 2003). forces and then I just had to match them into the Ameri­ 33. Adams, “Shock and Awe,” 106–8. can plan. Tactical command, in other words executing 34. Ibid., 110. the individual tasks, was held by the UK 2* officers who 35. “Iraq: The Military Campaign Objectives,” 17 were contingent commanders within each environment, March 2003, http://www.number-10.gov.uk (accessed 30 air, land, maritime. They handed tactical control to their May 2004). opposite number who was in all cases a 3* American, who 36. “Briefing with CENTCOM Commander General would actually be the person who owned that part of the Tommy Franks.” plan.” Oral evidence to HCDC, 11 June 2003, Q. 220. 37. “Iraq: The Military Campaign Objectives.” 17. N. Tweedie and M. Smith, “There’s No Hiding 38. Ibid. Place, Say Allied Military Chiefs,” The Daily Telegraph, 15 39. “A brief assessment of the political-military inter­ March 2003. 18. Ibid. actions that took place during Operation Allied Force 19. Moseley, speech. shows an existing ‘delta’ between the technologically in­ 20. George Bruce, Lessons of Iraq: Third Report of Ses­ spired greater operational speed capabilities that were of­ sion 2003–04 (United Kingdom: Parliament, House of fered and used by NATO and the tortuously slow politi­ Commons Defence Select Committee, 16 March 2004), cal decision-making mechanisms of the North Atlantic par. 84. Council. . . . In consequence, General Clark was unable 21. Ibid. to unleash more sophisticated capabilities and thereby 22. First Special Report: Lessons of Iraq: Government Re­ obtain a greater degree of operational speed.” T. D. Young, sponse to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2003–04 “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition Opera­ (United Kingdom: Parliament, House of Commons De­ tions: Problem Areas and Solutions,” Defense and Security fence Select Committee, 26 May 2004), par. 25. Analysis 19, no. 2 (2003): 111–30. 23. Witnessed personally during television interviews 40. Air Marshal Glenn Torpy, UK air contingent com­ with the NCC, 23 March 2004—subsequently widely mander: “What was different was that we were given quoted. greater delegation on this occasion because we knew that 24. Watson, “I’m Proud to March with Brits.” the tempo of the operation would demand decisions to 25. Not just the United Kingdom and the United be taken quickly and I could not go right the way back States, but the “Arab Street,” other nations, the Iraqi through the process, back to the PJHQ and MOD, which people, and, of course, the Iraqi regime. we could do when we had the luxury of time for our 26. “Iraq War: Franks Enters the Fray of ‘Hollywood’ southern no-fly zone operations.” Oral evidence to HCDC, Briefing Room,” Birmingham Post, 24 March 2003. 5 November 2003, Q. 1256. 27. Harlan K. Ullman, principal architect of the 41. Air Marshal Burridge, oral evidence to HCDC, 11 “shock and awe” concept said, “The phrase [shock and June 2003, Q. 251. awe] as used by the Pentagon now, has not been help- 42. “Come early and a nation can influence the plan ful—it has created a doomsday approach—the idea of as we did with CENTCOM albeit with no commitment to terrorizing everyone. In fact, that’s not the approach. military action. Come late, and the plan is in concrete.” The British have a much better phrase for it: effects- Air Marshal Burridge, address to DSEI Conference, 11 based operations.” John T. Correll, “What Happened to Shock and Awe?” Air Force Magazine, November 2003, 55. September 2003, http://www.deso.mod.uk/archive (ac­ 28. “The Department of Defense did not officially or cessed 29 May 2004). explicitly endorse Shock and Awe, but traces of it could 43. Delivering Security in a Changing World, 8. be discerned in statements by top leaders.” Ibid., 52. 44. “Military Challenges in Coalition Operations.” 29. “Briefing with CENTCOM Commander General 45. Formerly deputy chief of staff for air and space Tommy Franks,” 22 March 2003, http://www.centcom. operations, USAF. General Keys has been selected for re­ mil/CENTCOMNews/news_release.asp?NewsRelease= assignment as commander of Air Combat Command. 20030344.txt. 46. Lt Gen Ronald E. Keys, quotation, 23 June 2004. 30. Paul Adams, “Shock and Awe: An Inevitable Vic­ 47. Cultural visits, mini-exchange tours, and an over­ tory,” in The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the haul of the exchange programme are just some of the War against Saddam and a New World Agenda, ed. S. Potter projects established under USAF/RAF engagement. (London: BBC Worldwide Limited, 2003), 106–8. 48. Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, par. 7.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 99 New USAF Doctrine Publication AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations

LT COL PAULA B. FLAVELL, USAF

ECAUSE OF THE importance of and collection/processing of space-systems in­ space superiority, the Air Force pub­ telligence provides the planner, commander, lished new doctrine on 2 August and executor the ability to develop counter- 2004: Air Force Doctrine Document space courses of action. B(AFDD) 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations. Gen Like counterair operations, counterspace John P. Jumper, US Air Force chief of staff, as­ operations have offensive and defensive com­ serts that “space superiority is as much about ponents. On the one hand, according to AFDD protecting our space assets as it is about 2-2.1, offensive counterspace (OCS) operations preparing to counter an enemy’s space or “deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy ad­ anti-space assets” (1). The new publication versary space capabilities” at a time and place (pub) defines key terms characteristic of of our choosing through attacks on the space counterspace operations and highlights fac­ systems, terrestrial systems, links, or third- tors that Airmen must take into consideration party space capabilities (2). The early initia­ when they plan/execute those operations. tion of counterspace operations, ranging from AFDD 2-2.1 defines the key term space su dropping ordnance on space-systems nodes periority as “the degree of control necessary to to jamming enemy-satellite uplink or down­ employ, maneuver, and engage space forces link frequencies, can result in an immediate while denying the same capability to an ad­ advantage in space capabilities and control of versary” (55). The pub reinforces existing the space medium. On the other hand, defen definitions found in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic sive counterspace (DCS) operations are “key to Doctrine, 17 November 2003, which states that enabling continued exploitation of space by “counterspace involves those kinetic and non- the US and its allies by protecting, preserving, kinetic operations conducted to attain and recovering, and reconstituting friendly space- maintain a desired degree of space superiority related capabilities” (3). by the destruction, degradation, or disruption AFDD 2-2.1 addresses the need to consider of enemy space capability” (42). both offensive and defensive actions, noting AFDD 2-2.1 highlights the linkage between that “counterspace operations are conducted the concepts of space situational awareness across the tactical, operational, and strategic (SSA) and counterspace operations, explain­ levels of war by the entire joint force. . . . ing that SSA “is the result of sufficient knowl­ Within the counterspace construct, any ac­ edge about space-related conditions, con­ tion taken to achieve space superiority is a straints, capabilities, and activities . . . in, from, counterspace operation” (2). toward, or through space” (2). SSA accom­ As this pub points out, denying an adver­ plished by space surveillance, reconnaissance, sary access to space can carry many intended the monitoring of the space environment, and unintended consequences by transcending

100 NEW USAF DOCTRINE PUB 101 military operations, thus potentially affecting 1. All satellite-systems ground stations and a nation’s economic and diplomatic position. low-orbit satellites are subject to attack. Tactical actions must support operational- and strategic-level objectives and strategies. Plan­ 2. Satellite links are vulnerable to jamming. ning and executing counterspace operations Looking to the future, AFDD 2-2.1 notes require different levels of approval authority, that depending on the type of operation, poten­ tial collateral effects on civilian and/or third- the US’s space advantage is threatened by the party populations, ownership of the target, growth in adversary counterspace capability and and the policy regarding the type of opera­ the adversary’s increased use of space. In the past, tion. Furthermore, any counterspace opera­ the US has enjoyed space superiority through tion must be deconflicted with other friendly our superior technology development and ex­ operations to minimize unintended effects. ploitation, advanced information systems, and Other planning and execution considerations robust space infrastructure. The ability to sus­ that accompany counterspace operations in­ tain this advantage is challenging and may be clude the following: eroding as our adversaries close the gap through technology sharing, materiel acquisition, and 1. Airmen require a long lead time for purchase of space services. (4) SSA in order to develop a good course of action. Well aware of these future challenges, Gen­ 2. Space centers of gravity are not clear cut. eral Jumper, again using AFDD 2-2.1 as a forum for emphasizing the importance of 3. The enemy may have his own counter- space, states that “counterspace operations, space capabilities. both defensive and offensive, supported by Airmen must also note certain targeting con­ situational awareness, will ensure we maintain siderations: our superiority in space” (1).

To Learn More . . . Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1. Counterspace Operations, 2 August 2004. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_ pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2. Space Operations, 27 November 2001. http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/afdc/ dd/afdd2-2/afdd2-2.pdf. Department of Defense Directive 3100.15. Space Control. Classified (see SIPRNET). Joint Publication 3-14. Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ jp3_14.pdf. Presidential Decision Directive–National Security Council-49/National Space Technology Council-8. National Space Policy, 14 September 1996. http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/fs/fs-5.html. Air Force Doctrine Document 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp. Department of Defense Directive 5101.2. DoD Executive Agent for Space, 3 June 2003. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/pdf/d51012_060303/d51012p.pdf. Dynamic Followership The Prerequisite for Effective Leadership

LT COL SHARON M. LATOUR, USAF LT COL VICKI J. RAST, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Rather than encouraging leaders to mentor followers to “follow me” as an imitation learning imperative, leaders may mentor to specific and objective abilities/traits to create dynamic sub­ ordinates. These dynamic follower competencies form a foundation from which follower initiative can grow to leader initiative more naturally. The identified follower competencies help leaders focus their mentoring efforts. This approach encourages followers to develop fully, based on their personalities, strengths and weaknesses, and situational factors.

We have good corporals and good sergeants and some good lieutenants and cap­ tains, and those are far more important than good generals. —Gen William T. Sherman

RE YOU A leader? A follower? The nition, followers more often than leaders. Few reality is that we fulfill both roles si­ professional-development programs—includ- multaneously from the day we enter ing those of the US military—spend time de­ military service, throughout our ca­ veloping effective follower cultures and skills. reer,A and well into our “golden years.” We are Instead, commissioning sources, college busi­ followers—following is a natural part of life ness programs, executive seminars, and pro­ and an essential role we play in fulfilling our fessional military education curricula focus war-fighting roles and missions. Since most in­ on developing leaders. Some people would stitutions conform to bureaucratic or hierar­ argue that the various military technical chical organizational models, the majority of schools fill the gap in follower development any military institution’s members are, by defi­ for career-minded Airmen, both commissioned

102 DYNAMIC FOLLOWERSHIP 103 and noncommissioned. This approach only percent.2 Air Force efforts to boost these diminishes the value that followers contribute numbers tend to focus on “quality of life” is- to war fighting. If technical training and con­ sues—a catchall category that includes proj­ tinuing education/leadership development at ects such as better pay, housing, and base fa­ the right time in a person’s career is an ac­ cilities. All of these initiatives are important cepted “booster shot” for developing effective and appreciated, but they fail to address the followers, why not implement a similar strategy role individuals play in accomplishing the to shape effective leaders? The answer is that unit’s mission as followers. Rather than focus­ most of us intuitively know that such mea­ ing on the negative aspects of worker dissatis­ sures fall far short of the requirement to at­ faction, follower-development programs should tract and retain people of the caliber the Air take advantage of opportunities to instill/ Force needs in the future. In other words, our reinforce institutional values, model effective service expends most of its resources educat­ follower roles and behaviors, and begin the ing a fraction of its members, communicating mentoring process. their value to the institution, and establishing Developing dynamic followership is a disci­ career paths founded on assessing selected pline. It is jointly an art and a science requir­ leadership characteristics—while seemingly ing skill and conceptualization of roles in ignoring the vast majority who “merely” fol­ innovative ways—one perhaps more essential low. This strategy is inadequate for honing to mission success than leader development. warrior skills within the rapidly transforming Without followership, a leader at any level will strategic environment that will prevail for the fail to produce effective institutions. Valuing foreseeable future. followers and their development is the first The present formula promotes the illusion step toward cultivating effective transforma­ of effectiveness, but it does not optimize insti­ tional leaders—people capable of motivating tutional performance. How do we know this? A followers to achieve mission requirements in cursory review of retention rates among Air the absence of hygienic or transactional re­ Force members indicates that among “follow­ wards (i.e., immediate payoffs for visible ers,” instilling institutional commitment con­ products). This shift away from transactional tinues to be a persistent problem. For example, leadership demands that we begin develop­ according to Air Force Personnel Center sta­ ing and sustaining transformational follower- tistics, the service seeks to retain 55 percent of ship to enhance transformational leadership. first-term Airmen, 75 percent of second-term A dynamic followership program should pro­ Airmen, and 95 percent of the career enlisted duce individuals who, when the moment ar­ force. With the exception of fiscal year 2002 rives, seamlessly transition to lead effectively when stop-loss measures prevented separation while simultaneously fulfilling their follower actions, the Air Force has not met these mod­ roles in support of their superiors. This goal est goals for all three noncommissioned cate­ helps us identify a strategy for follower devel­ gories since fiscal year 1996.1 For crucial officer opment. Just as studies have identified desir­ specialties, the story is not much better. able characteristics for effective leaders, so can The Air Force’s rated career fields (pilots, we propose follower competencies upon which to navigators, and air-battle managers) consis­ base follower development in terms of spe­ tently retain approximately 50–70 percent of cific skills and educational programs to ad­ their officers. Active duty service commitments vance critical thinking toward sound judg­ and career incentive pays, however, tend to ment. This approach demands that leaders skew retention data in the aggregate. Non­ recognize and fulfill their responsibilities in rated operations officers (space, intelligence, developing specific follower attributes or compe­ and weather) retain 48–65 percent of their tencies within their subordinates. Leadership- members, while mission-support officers elect development experts have proposed models to stay in the service at an average rate of 44 for identifying desirable traits in leaders; simi­ 104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 larly, followership studies can benefit from for producing capable followers within our the discipline inherent in model development. Air Force. A model that concentrates on institutional According to Robert E. Kelley, a prominent values and follower abilities would provide a social scientist in followership studies, “What starting point for synergistically integrating distinguishes an effective from an ineffective leader-follower development programs. As follower is enthusiastic, intelligent, and self- leaders capitalize on their followers’ compe­ reliant participation—without star billing—in tencies, they will equip their organizations’ the pursuit of an organizational goal.” Zeroing members to achieve the visions they articulate in on the task of developing followers, Kelley for mission effectiveness. argues that “understanding motivations and perceptions is not enough.”4 He focuses on two behavioral dimensions for determining Revolutionizing Traditional follower effectiveness: critical thinking and Leader-Follower Roles participation. Critical thinking involves going beyond Institutional changes in leader-follower roles collecting information or observing activities and relationships lie at the root of why the Air passively. It implies an active mental debate with Force needs to engage in dynamic follower- things or events that we could otherwise ship programs to enhance its warrior culture. process at face value. The active, independent These shifts mirror similar shifts in business mind confronts the situation and scrutinizes and industry. One researcher noted it closely, as if to stand it on its head or on its increasing pressure on all kinds of organiza­ side, conducting a thorough examination of tions to function with reduced resources. Re­ its far-reaching implications or possibilities. duced resources and company downsizing have Many current, successful leaders cite critical reduced the number of managers and increased thinking as a behavior they expect of their their span of control, which in turn leaves fol­ most valued followers. As for the concept of lowers to pick up many of the functions tradi­ tionally performed by leaders. . . . Furthermore, participation, a person engaged actively and the nature of the problems faced by many or­ comprehensively brings to mind an image of ganizations is becoming so complex and the someone “leaning forward” into the situation at changes so rapid that more people are required hand. This posture enables the person and to solve them. . . . In general, making organiza­ those he or she affects to be in a position to tions better is a task that needs to be “owned” by anticipate requirements and plan accordingly. 3 followers as well as leaders. Conversely, passive individuals remain trapped Corporate downsizing, increased pressure to in a perpetually reactive mode, placing them­ deliver results, and increasing span of control selves at the mercy of the prevailing current for leaders are familiar concepts to military rather than preparing for impending tidal members. What some businesses and military changes. In combination, critical thinking and institutions have missed as these pressures ex­ participation generate four follower patterns. erted themselves on leader-follower cultures Kelley argues that effective followers tend is that leaders have ample opportunity to learn to be highly participative, critical thinkers. strategies and techniques for coping with This type of person courageously dissents when change in the workplace. Followers, however, necessary, shares credit, admits mistakes, and generally face two choices: (1) undergoing habitually exercises superior judgment. Kelley on-the-job learning that levies leadership re­ suggests that this follower possesses several sponsibilities on them without commensurate essential qualities: self-management, commit­ authority or (2) entering a defensive crouch ment, competence (master skills) and focus, against the increasing workload. Both choices and courage (credibility and honesty).5 Al­ erode individual morale and institutional mis­ though many people would recognize these sion effectiveness—neither proves effective traits as leadership competencies, according DYNAMIC FOLLOWERSHIP 105 to Kelley, they remain paramount to the sup­ Table 1. Follower types porting role a follower plays. This type of fol­ lower represents the essential link between High leader and follower cultures. As leaders de­ Alienated Effective velop and transmit the institution’s “big pic­ Followers Followers ture,” they naturally turn to such individuals Critical Thinking to help them communicate that vision to the rest of the institution. The effective follower’s Sheep Yes People invaluable perspective permits others to sepa­ Low rate the essential tasks required for mission accomplishment from the minutiae. As the Passive Participation Active leader leads, the follower actively participates in task completion toward mission accom­ Adapted from Robert E. Kelley, “In Praise of Followers,” in Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, 3rd ed., ed. Robert L. Taylor plishment; the leader-follower relationship and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), produces the dynamics necessary for the team 137. to accomplish the mission. Those who prove able to follow effectively usually transition to on high performance and recognize they formal leadership positions over time. More share the responsibility for the quality of the than any other measurable attribute, this phe­ relationship they have with their leaders. . . . nomenon clarifies the interactive nature of They know they cannot be fully effective unless the leader-follower relationship. they work in partnerships that require both a Kelley characterizes the other three follower commitment to high performance and a com­ types (table 1) as follows: mitment to develop effective relationships with partners (including their boss) whose collab­ “Sheep” are passive and uncritical, lacking in ini­ oration is essential to success in their own tiative and sense of responsibility. They perform work.”7 This perspective illuminates two ideal tasks given them and stop. “Yes People” are live­ follower-competency dimensions—“perfor- lier, but remain an equally unenterprising group. Dependent on a leader for inspiration, they can mance initiative” and “relationship initiative.” be aggressively deferential, even servile. . . . Within those dimensions are descriptors (or “Alienated Followers” are critical and indepen­ subscales) we could call competencies. They dent in their thinking, but fulfill their roles pas­ suggest that the ideal follower would act like sively. Somehow, sometime, something “turned a partner in the leader-follower relationship. them off,” prompting them to distance them­ Performance initiative, a commitment to the selves from the organization and ownership of its highest levels of effort, includes the following: mission. Often cynical, they tend to sink gradu­ ally into disgruntled acquiescence.6 • Working (effectively) with others. Followers balance personal interests with the inter­ Kelley offers an important observation ests of others and discover a common with regard to some followers’ influence on purpose. They coach, lead, mentor, and some leaders, cautioning that the latter re­ collaborate to accomplish the mission. main comfortable with—or even embrace— the “yes people” or other less effective follow­ • Embracing change. Followers are commit­ ers. Follower development is a leader’s utmost ted to constant improvement, reduction responsibility. Willingness to move beyond of all types of waste, and leading by ex­ ample. They are change agents. comfort zones is fully expected of tomorrow’s leader. Emerging security threats demand • Doing the job (competence). Followers know that we do so. what’s expected, strive to be the best, and Other researchers describe a somewhat derive satisfaction from applying the similar approach to followership studies. From highest personal standards. To them, this perspective, effective followers are “intent work is integral to life. 106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004

• Seeing one’s self as a resource (appreciating Table 2. More follower types one’s skills). Followers understand their value to the organization and care for High themselves as assets/investments. Politician Partner These competencies point to team builders Relationship who “lean enthusiastically into the future” and Initiative always strive to be the best. Relationship initiative, which acknowl­ Subordinate Contributor edges that followers share the responsibility with leaders for an effective relationship and Low Performance High work to increase openness and understand­ Initiative ing to increase perspective around informed choices, includes the following: Adapted from Earl H. Potter, William E. Rosenbach, and Thane S. Pittman, “Leading the New Professional,” in Military Leadership: In • Building trust (core values; their word is their Pursuit of Excellence, 3rd ed., ed. Robert L. Taylor and William E. bond). Followers invite honest feedback Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 149. and share plans and doubts. They are re­ liable and earn their leader’s confidence. horses and often a creative force. However, • Communicating courageously (honest, timely they could maximize their inputs if they put feedback). Followers tell unpleasant truths energy into understanding the boss’s per­ to serve the organization. They seek the spective, gained through relationship build­ same from others and risk self-exposure. ing. It is the “partner” who blends excep­ tional work performance with perspective • Identifying with the leader. Followers are gained from healthy relationships to both the loyal to their “partner in success” and leadership and peer group. take satisfaction in the leader’s success. If we summarize what these prominent re­ • Adopting the leader’s vision (seeing the big search approaches offer followership studies, picture from the boss’s perspective). Followers we might characterize effective followers in know the limits of personal perspective these terms: individuals with high organiza­ and actively seek others’ perspectives for tional commitment who are able to function greater team effectiveness. They have a well in a change-oriented team environment. clear understanding of priorities. Additionally, they are independent, critical thinkers with highly developed integrity and Combining this dimension’s competencies sug­ competency. Thus, effective followers exhibit gests a follower whose honest integrity earns loyalty to the boss by endorsing organiza­ the leader’s confidence. This is a follower tional vision and priorities. A true-life example (partner) whose loyalty creates an atmo­ illuminates these observations and makes the sphere wherein the team members share in point even more effectively. the leader’s success by adopting the organiza- In his book American Generalship, Edgar F. tion’s vision as their very own.8 Puryear Jr. interviewed Secretary of State These dimensions allow us to characterize Colin Powell and asked him why he believed additional follower types (table 2). The he was selected to be chairman of the Joint “politician” possesses interpersonal qualities Chiefs of Staff. Powell replied, that might be misdirected and underappreci­ Beats me. I worked very hard. I was very loyal to ates job performance. “Subordinates” are tra­ people who appointed me, people who were ditional followers, content to do whatever under me, and my associates. I developed a repu­ they are told. They might be disaffected or tation as somebody you could trust. I would give simply unaware of the possibilities for greater you my very, very best. I would always try to do contribution. Lastly, “contributors” are work- what I thought was right and I let the chips fall DYNAMIC FOLLOWERSHIP 107

where they might. . . . It didn’t really make a dif­ Leader priorities become follower priorities. ference whether I made general in terms of my The leader transmits those items of concern self-respect and self-esteem. I just loved being in by many means—some directly but others in­ 9 the army. directly or according to context. As long as So the question becomes, How do we develop followers clearly understand the leader’s ex­ such individuals? pectations and necessary levels of competence, the actual amount of face-to-face time is gen­ erally not critical. Of paramount importance The Case for Effective is leaders’ awareness of how their priorities Follower Development and actions will set standards for their follow­ ers’ behaviors and values. There may well be legitimate disagreements A mentoring culture is necessary to pass on about which follower competencies should the obvious and subtle values, priorities, be­ have priority over others or which competen­ haviors, and traditions in an organization. In cies belong more to leader development versus another interview in American Generalship, follower development. Nevertheless, it is useful Puryear speaks with Gen Bill Creech, credited to talk about the prime mechanism by which fol­ with revolutionizing the way Tactical Air lowers learn behaviors or competencies impor­ Command (TAC, forerunner of Air Combat tant to their success: mentoring. Command) went about its mission when he Edgar H. Schein discusses the ways that served as commander from 1978 to 1984. leaders create cultures, including expected General Creech describes several of the 25 behaviors, through six “embedding mecha­ bosses he had during his 35-year career: nisms,” one of which is “deliberate role mod­ Only four of those bosses went out of their way eling, teaching, and coaching.” He relates a to provide any special mentoring . . . to those of story that illustrates how to teach desired be­ us who worked for them. And far and away the haviors by example: best of those four was General Dave Jones, The Jones family brought back a former manager whom I first worked for when he was the CINC as the CEO [chief executive officer] after several [commander in chief, known today as the re­ other CEOs had failed. One of the first things gional combatant commander] of the United he (the former manager) did as the new presi­ States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). . . . He dent (CEO) was to display at a large meeting his painstakingly taught leadership skills, . . . draw­ own particular method of analyzing the perfor­ ing on his own experiences over the years, and mance of the company and planning its future. he would take several days in doing so. . . . He He said explicitly to the group: “Now that’s an provided lots of one-on-one mentoring that example of the kind of good planning and helped me greatly both then and over the years. It was those examples that I used as a baseline management I want in this organization.” He 11 then ordered his key executives to prepare a in setting up the mentoring system in TAC. long-range planning process in the format in Essentially, General Jones established a which he had just lectured and gave them a tar­ mentoring culture within USAFE when his get time to be ready to present their own plans followers emulated what he modeled. Reflect­ in the new format. ing upon our own experiences, we can con­ By training his immediate subordinates this clude that not every member of our Air Force way, he taught them his level of expectation or is mentored actively by his or her leaders. We a level of competence for which they could have some evidence of efforts to establish the strive. This overt, public mentoring tech- importance of mentoring, but as of this writ­ nique—or as Schein would characterize it, “de­ ing, a visible endorsement of mentoring by liberate role modeling, teaching, and coach- uppermost leadership remains in its infancy. ing”—is key to developing effective followers.10 Fundamentally, the most important contribu­ Effective leaders acknowledge that their tion leaders make to their units and the Air perspective influences their subordinates. Force is to ensure that the mission can continue 108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 without them. Our culture has a tendency to re­ development—to provide their followers with ward individuals who publicly stand in the realistic evaluations of their performance and limelight and to overlook those who do the potential and to create goals to realize that “heavy lifting” behind the scenes. For that potential. Importantly, the instruction encour­ reason, embracing this contribution as the ages informal mentors: “The immediate su­ baseline for mentoring and translating it to pervisor . . . is designated as the primary men­ everyday practice will remain problematic. tor. . . . This designation in no way restricts In this vein, one of the coauthors of this ar­ the subordinate’s desire to seek additional ticle tells an interesting story. As a second lieu­ counseling and professional development ad­ tenant, she encountered great difficulty with vice from other sources or mentors.”13 her supervisor, a first lieutenant, in aircraft Therefore, mentoring relationships are vital maintenance. Their squadron commander— to followers who seek to understand the sub­ an “old school TAC” major—called them both stance behind their leaders’ actions. What into her office one day and conveyed this mes­ were the leaders’ options? Why do bosses elect sage: “Ollie, your job is to teach Vicki every­ to do what they do and when they choose to thing you know. If she fails when you leave the do it? Asked how one could become a decision bomb dump, then you’ve failed. [Rast], your maker, Dwight D. Eisenhower responded, “Be job is to learn. Dismissed!” That 45-second in­ around people making decisions. Those offi­ teraction, literally, was the end of that particu­ cers who achieved the top positions of leader­ lar “mentoring” session (there would be many ship were around decision-makers, who served others!), but it had profound effects on both as their mentors.”14 young officers in terms of the way they viewed their roles as leaders, followers, teachers, and mentors. Dr. Schein would suggest that this Hands-on Follower Development transformation in conceptualizing the leader’s Let’s get more specific. Discussions of leader­ role as one of developing followers—in ship development tend to focus on acquiring essence, working one’s way out of a job—is a key, separate competencies rather than imitating prerequisite for mentoring to take root. a leader’s style. We suggest that followers can Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-3401, Air develop themselves in much the same way.15 Force Mentoring, provides guidance to all Air Traditional leader styles (e.g., autocratic, bu­ Force members. It specifically charges all su­ reaucratic, democratic, laissez-faire, etc.) are pervisors to serve as formal mentors to their inadequate in dynamic, changing environ­ subordinates. There is room for robust infor­ ments. Can any organization really afford to mal mentoring once the culture formally takes have a bona fide laissez-faire manager at the root. According to the instruction, “Air Force helm when the head office or major command mentoring covers a wide range of areas, such mandates an overnight overhaul? Developing as career guidance, technical and professional leadership competencies gives up-and-coming development, leadership, Air Force history and leaders a tool kit from which to draw, no mat­ heritage, air and space power doctrine, strate­ ter the situation they might encounter. gic vision, and contribution to joint warfight­ Dr. Daniel Goleman, the leading advocate ing. It also includes knowledge of the ethics of emotional intelligence, identifies five cate­ of our military and civil service professions and gories of personal and social competence: understanding of the Air Force’s core values (personal) self-awareness, self-regulation, mo­ of integrity first, service before self, and ex­ tivation, (social) empathy, and social skills. cellence in all we do.”12 Looking more closely into, say, empathy, one In concert with General Creech’s observa­ finds specific competencies: understanding oth­ tions, AFI 36-3401 states that mentoring is the ers, developing others, acquiring service ori­ responsibility of leaders, requiring them— entation, leveraging diversity, and cultivating through direct involvement in subordinate political awareness.16 He makes the point that DYNAMIC FOLLOWERSHIP 109 each of us has areas in which we are more or maintains the highest performance stan­ less naturally competent. Some of us are more dards, admits mistakes) empathetic than others (because of early so­ cialization, emotional disposition, etc.) and Our research leads us to believe that follow­ therefore more proficient in empathy’s spe­ ers learn most effectively by observing the ac­ cific competencies. But the less empathetic tions (modeled behavior) of an organization’s individual is not a lost cause because mentor­ leaders. As Goleman points out, however, im­ ing by senior leaders can enhance areas that pelling adults to adjust their behavior often re­ need improvement. quires an individualized approach. Whether it’s If we use our hypothetical but plausible set called coaching (skill-specific training) or men­ of follower competencies as a template (leaders toring (a longer-term relationship), in order can adjust the competencies included here to for leaders to correct follower-competency meet their own cultural norms and values), deficits, they must pay deliberate attention to we can extrapolate a follower-competencies devel­ development opportunities for each individual. opment approach based on Goleman’s discovery Tracking progress can occur through both work in leader-competencies development. He formal and informal feedback. A mentor can says that the follower requires behavior modifi­ ask the follower and his or her peer group cation, monitored by the mentoring leader. how team-dependent things are going. How Organizations must “help people break old often is the suggestion box used? Are the sug­ behavioral habits and establish new ones. That gestions well thought out? (Are they relevant not only takes much more time than conven­ to things on the boss’s mind?) One can use tional training programs, it also requires an in­ customer-satisfaction forms to measure some dividualized approach.”17 So which follower competencies . . . and the list goes on. Cer­ competencies need deliberate development? tainly, the most important check is the ongo­ ing evaluation the boss makes throughout the developmental relationship with each follower. Plausible Follower Competencies and Components Conclusion After examining a variety of research, this We have explored followership, the one article has distilled several follower compe­ common denominator we all share as members tencies: of our culture, by briefly examining plausible • Displays loyalty (shows deep commitment competencies germane to effective following. to the organization, adheres to the boss’s We determined that these competencies should vision and priorities, disagrees agreeably, enable followers to become leaders almost ef­ aligns personal and organizational goals) fortlessly. By employing Schein’s discussion of the establishment of cultures, we made a case • Functions well in change-oriented environ­ for leader involvement in the development of ments (serves as a change agent, demon­ subordinates. Drawing on the followership strates agility, moves fluidly between studies by Kelley and others, we culled follower- leading and following) specific competencies along the theoretical • Functions well on teams (collaborates, shares model of emotional intelligence suggested by credit, acts responsibly toward others) Goleman’s competencies for leaders. Most im­ portantly for further study, we established the • Thinks independently and critically (dissents need for Air Force mentoring—the vehicle by courageously, takes the initiative, prac­ which our service can pass on its culture to new tices self-management) generations. • Considers integrity of paramount importance In our look at the specifics for developing (remains trustworthy, tells the truth, better followers, we discovered the existence 110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 of many overlapping requirements between their subordinates. In the future, communi­ effective leader competencies and dynamic cation, appreciation, and efficiencies be­ follower competencies. By considering these tween leaders and followers should vastly im­ thoughts about follower-unique opportunities to prove as complementary and overlapping support the mission and by naming follower- role requirements are articulated more effec­ specific traits and abilities, leaders may now tively in terms of a competencies-based devel­ focus on deliberate development plans for opment approach for all. ■

Notes

1. “Talking Paper on Air Force Military Retention,” 8. Ibid., 149–50. http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/afretention/Retention 9. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., American Generalship: Character Information/Pages/General.asp (accessed 4 March 2003). Is Everything: The Art of Command (Novato, CA: Presidio 2. Ibid. Special thanks to Col Chris Cain for offering Press, 2000), 229. this data and commentary. 10. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and 3. Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordon Leadership, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), J. Curphy, Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 230, 241–42. 3rd ed. (Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 1999), 32–34, 39. 11. Puryear, American Generalship, 218–19. 4. Robert E. Kelley, “In Praise of Followers,” in Military 12. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-3401, Air Force Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, 3rd ed., ed. Robert L. Mentoring, 1 June 2000, 2. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview 13. Ibid. Press, 1996), 136–37. 14. Quoted in Puryear, American Generalship, 188. 5. Ibid., 138–41. 15. See Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional Intel­ 6. Ibid., 137. ligence (New York: Bantam Books, 1998). 7. Earl H. Potter, William E. Rosenbach, and Thane S. 16. Ibid., 26–27. Pittman, “Leading the New Professional,” in Military 17. Daniel Goleman, “What Makes a Leader?” Harvard Leadership, ed. Taylor and Rosenbach, 148. Business Review, March–April 2000, 97. APJ

paralysis” on the regime and, to a lesser extent, on the counter-Scud operations. In chapter 1, Olsen looks at the political and air power doctrinal background, explaining the pri­ macy of the air/land doctrine within the US tacti­ cal air forces. Chapter 2, “The Genesis of the Strategic Air Campaign Plan,” is also, to some ex­ tent, a scene-setter as it covers the philosophical differences between the standpoints of the author of the Instant Thunder plan, Col John A. Warden, who saw air power as providing a war-winning and indeed regime-toppling capability, and those of Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who in August 1990 only wanted a retaliatory option, and his air com­ Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm by John Andreas ponent commander, Gen Charles A. Horner, who Olsen. Frank Cass (http://www.frankcass.com), saw the forthcoming air war primarily in terms of Taylor & Francis Group, 11 New Fetter Lane, providing support to the inevitable land battle. London, EC4P 4EE, United Kingdom, 2003, Chapter 3 covers the evolution of the strategic air 256 pages, $36.95 (softcover). campaign plan, from the production of the Instant Thunder plan in August 1990 through its evolu­ The debate as to whether offensive air power tion into phase one of a much broader campaign armed with conventional weapons can, indepen­ plan that was finally executed the following year. dently of land or maritime operations, achieve Olsen also addresses the problems that the Check­ strategic effect is as old as the application of air mate team had selling their plan both to the the­ power itself. The first phase of the debate started atre commanders and within Washington, and why with the creation of the Royal Air Force’s Inde­ in the end only a couple of Checkmate staff mem­ pendent Force in 1918 and culminated in the ar­ bers, not including Colonel Warden, remained in guments about the effectiveness of the combined Riyadh to contribute to the in-theatre planning and bomber offensive against Germany and the strate­ execution of the final campaign. As a necessary gic bombing offensive against Japan in World War precursor to chapter 5, which examines the effec­ II. For the next 45 years of the Cold War, strategic tiveness of the strategic air campaign itself, chapter was synonymous with nuclear. However, all this was 4 is a detailed analysis of the Iraqi regime’s political to change in the autumn of 1990 with the Iraqi in­ power structure. In his analysis of the strategic air vasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Operation campaign itself, Olsen concludes that whilst attacks Desert Storm in early 1991 to restore Kuwaiti sov­ on leadership and command and control amounted ereignty. Whilst a number of books have been writ­ to only 2.4 percent of the overall effort, and those ten on the use of air power in Desert Storm, not on Scuds to a further 4.2 percent, “the strategic air the least being the authoritative Gulf War Air Power campaign, in conclusion, contributed strongly in Survey, all have concentrated on the war or the air rendering the Iraqi leadership largely ineffective campaign as a whole. In addition, all characterised as a strategic entity.” He also makes the point that the strategic air campaign as being against the overthrowing the Iraqi regime was not a coalition leadership, power generation, fuel and lubricants aim, although one that was certainly in the minds production, transportation infrastructure, and tar­ of the Checkmate team when they planned Instant get sets of the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System. Thunder. His conclusions reiterate the preceding What is different about John Olsen’s treatment of point but suggest that, more importantly, the de­ the subject is that he concentrates only on the velopment of the Instant Thunder campaign plan genuinely strategic aspects of the air campaign— by the Checkmate team marked a radical shift in that is, those attacks that tended to induce “strategic air power doctrinal thinking away from the air/land

111 112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 battle of the central region of NATO to a broader ning of the first of the pre–Second World War RAF understanding of the potential of air power in expansion programmes. In 1936 he became AOC post–Cold War expeditionary conflicts. Far East, based in Singapore; he was promoted to Olsen’s book is both well written and very read­ air vice-marshal in 1937 and returned to the Air able, in particular in his treatment of personal and Ministry in 1938 to become director general of re­ organizational dynamics. The book also provides, search and development, during which time he although somewhat implicitly, a good analysis of helped to initiate such war-winning aircraft as the what has now come to be regarded as the doctrine de Havilland Mosquito and actively promoted the of “effects-based operations,” particularly in his development and production of Sir Frank Whittle’s treatment of the political and psychological aspects jet engine. After some difficult months under of coercive operations at the strategic level. This William Maxwell Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, in the book, therefore, is highly recommended for those Ministry of Aircraft Production, he was promoted interested in gaining a deeper understanding into to the acting rank of air marshal and sent to the both the concepts and practicalities of using con­ Middle East as deputy AOC in November 1940; he ventional air power to achieve strategic coercion; it was then appointed AOC in June 1941. would be an interesting exercise to apply Olsen’s Although tipped as a future chief of the Air Staff methodology to the 2003 Iraq conflict. in the mid-1930s, it was to be in the desert war be­ tween 1941 and 1943 that Tedder first proved his Group Capt Chris Finn, RAF exceptional qualities as a high commander. Assum­ Shrivenham, England ing his appointment under immensely difficult op­ erational circumstances, with scarce resources and Tedder: Quietly in Command by Vincent Orange. under constant criticism from the other armed Frank Cass Publishers (http://www.frankcass. services, Tedder transformed the RAF in the Mid­ com), Taylor & Francis Group, 11 New Fetter dle East into a formidable fighting machine—flex- Lane, London, EC4P 4EE, United Kingdom, ible, highly mobile, and capable of winning and 2004, 480 pages, $55.00 (hardcover). maintaining control of the air, as well as of provid­ ing ample support to land and maritime forces. In­ As Eisenhower’s deputy and air commander deed, he proved a master of the joint environment, during the liberation of Europe between 1943 and ultimately winning the backing of his army and 1945, and as air officer commanding (AOC) Middle navy counterparts to uphold the fundamental East from 1941 to 1943, Marshal of the Royal Air principle of centralised command and control of Force Lord Tedder fully earned his reputation as air assets. Under Eisenhower, first as deputy one of the outstanding Allied high commanders of supreme Allied commander Mediterranean and the Second World War. Although an early biography then as deputy supreme commander Allied Expe­ by Roderick Owen was published in 1952, and ditionary Force (in North-West Europe), Tedder Tedder’s memoirs, With Prejudice, appeared in 1966, would subsequently display a no less exceptional there has long been a need for an updated biogra­ ability to operate in a coalition environment. In­ phy drawing on archival sources released since the deed, Orange shows that Tedder was in many ways 1960s and on the enormous volume of research and the linchpin of the Allied high command in Europe writing about the war undertaken since that time. between 1943 and 1945. The importance of his role Vincent Orange’s eagerly awaited study—Tedder: in integrating Allied air power into Operation Over­ Quietly in Command—will therefore be welcomed lord and in resolving interservice tensions and throughout the military-history community, particu­ strained relations within the alliance (which became larly by students of air power history. acute late in 1944) can hardly be exaggerated. Arthur Tedder was born in 1890 and was edu­ Tedder was promoted to air chief marshal in cated at Whitgift School and Cambridge Univer­ 1942 and became a Marshal of the Royal Air Force sity, where he read history. He was commissioned in September 1945. In January 1946, he succeeded into the Dorsetshire Regiment in 1915 and joined Charles Frederick Algernon, 1st Viscount Portal of the Royal Flying Corps in the following year. He Hungerford, as chief of the Air Staff and afterwards, was appointed squadron leader in the Royal Air in conditions of desperate economic stringency, Force (RAF) in 1919 and then rose steadily through presided not only over the postwar contraction of the ranks during the 1920s and early 1930s to the wartime RAF, but also over the beginning of its reach air commodore in 1934, when he became adaptation to the demands of the Cold War. After the Air Ministry’s director of training at the begin­ his retirement in December 1949, he became a NET ASSESSMENT 113 governor of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Let’s examine the framework before judging chancellor of Cambridge University, and chairman the book. Gaddis’s thesis is that “deep roots do not of the Standard Motor Company. He died in 1967. easily disappear” and that America’s roots are well In this very important and highly readable bi­ established (p. 38). When confronted with rude ography, Vincent Orange set himself the difficult surprises or unexpected threats to national secu- task of portraying Tedder the man—childhood, rity—the aforementioned attack of 1814 and the character, and private life—as well as Tedder the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the second commander. But the result is an eminently balanced attack on the homeland—historically, we have ex­ narrative which succeeds in its principal objective. panded rather than retracted our response. In our It was clearly not the author’s intention to upset deep roots reside the historical responses of pre­ this balance by embarking on a particularly detailed emption, unilateralism, and hegemony. analysis of the command techniques and processes After 1814 preemption took the form of expan­ that lay behind Tedder’s remarkable accomplish­ sion into the territory of derelict or failed states, ments. For the most part, the reader is left to draw nonstates (pirates and tribes), and states that conclusions about how and why Tedder achieved might fail. Unilateralism followed the precept that what he did. This book nevertheless adds much to the United States cannot rely on the goodwill of our understanding of the British and Allied high others. Our history, as Gaddis deftly shows, does commands in the Second World War, of relations be­ not reflect a tendency toward isolationism but an tween Allied high commanders, and of the top-level avoidance of entanglements—those complications direction of operations, particularly in the desert that partners can bring to a mix. Hegemony first and broader Mediterranean theatres. The lessons took the form of continental (less Canada and all that it contains on joint and coalition warfare re­ of Mexico) sovereignty; then slavery; then no slav­ main supremely relevant to today’s commanders. ery; and then the expansion into nonwhite territo­ ries to restore the economic advantages of slavery. Sebastian Ritchie Given these roots, Gaddis asserts that the presi­ Air Historical Branch (RAF) dent did nothing new after the events of 11 Sep­ tember 2001; instead, he returned to a set of be­ Surprise, Security, and the American Experience haviors that emerged after the attack on by John Lewis Gaddis. Harvard University Press Washington in 1814, perhaps without learning all (http://www.hup.harvard.edu), 79 Garden Street, that he could have gleaned from President Franklin Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, 2004, 160 Roosevelt’s strategic maneuvers, occasioned by the pages, $18.95 (hardcover). collapse of homeland security in 1941. The genius of Roosevelt, on the one hand, lay in his reasonable- I wish to make three points about Surprise, Secu­ ness—that “proclaimed interests should not exceed rity, and the American Experience. First, it is well writ­ actual capabilities”—and, on the other, in his ability ten and thought provoking. The book fits neatly to gain hegemony by apparently rejecting preemp­ into a jacket pocket, and one can easily devour it tion and unilateralism (p. 58). The grand strategic on a flight from, say, Washington, DC, to Los An­ maneuvers embodied in the Marshall Plan and geles. Second, it introduces a framework for US containment stayed the course that Roosevelt set security policy that, as asserted by the author, and prevented dangerous excursions into nuclear- emerged in the wake of the first attack on our armed preemption. (Gaddis would be pleased to homeland in 1814 when the British attacked Wash­ learn about Project Control—Air University’s little ington, setting fire to the White House and Capitol. known sortie into thinking about preventive nu­ This framework—preemption, unilateralism, and clear war, initiated in 1953. It eventually led to the hegemony—persists today. Understanding it is in­ resignation of the Air University commander.) structive because Gaddis intends the framework to The 1814 and 1941 attacks on our homeland be both descriptive and predictive, using events fol­ saw us dealing “with an identifiable regime led by lowing the third assault on our homeland—the un­ identifiable leaders operating by identifiable means challenged air attacks on the World Trade Center from an identifiable piece of territory,” but the and Pentagon—to prove its validity. Third, histori- 2001 attack was different (pp. 69–70). According ans—particularly those persuaded by the politics to the author, the Clinton administration might of the Democratic Party—likely will assert that the have seen it coming. That administration sought evidence cited by the author does not support his engagement rather than the spread of democracy conclusions. and missed the effects that a revolution in global 114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 transportation had on our security by diminishing city, and that Gen Eric Shinseki’s prescient estimate one of our most important strategic assets: geo­ of the troops required to subdue a postwar Iraq may graphical separation from threats. have been too high. Things change. Gaddis suspects that the Bush administration’s So why the author’s optimism? A valued, well- difficulty in preserving consent for its antiterror educated, and well-traveled academic as well as a campaigns is that it brings a nineteenth-century fellow of the Hoover Institution from 2000 to 2002 American vision—preemption and unilateralism— (a designation that includes Richard Allen, Newt to an early twenty-first century that still appreciates Gingrich, Edwin Meese, George Shultz, and Con­ Roosevelt’s multilateralism and self-restraint. Even doleezza Rice, now on leave), Gaddis remains a re­ so, the author seems to stand at a higher place than spected scholar of Cold War history. Appreciating do most of us and, at least when the book appeared, the risk, he published Surprise, Security, and the sees a rosier future than we do. This point may be American Experience while the jury of time—the tri­ significant. The date that one reviews a published ers of fact—was still empanelled. The framework book can have just as much importance as the date may perform admirably, and history and time may that one publishes it. Martin L. van Creveld, for ex­ well prove our ability to escape the strategic situa­ ample, lamented that his book The Transformation tion in which we find ourselves. As the author con­ of War was released just as the first untransformed, fesses, “It is . . . presumptuous to speculate about conventional war with Iraq began. Prepublication those consequences so soon after the event [9/11], reviewers had a less advantageous position than did but it’s also necessary. For although the accuracy of those who assessed the book shortly after its publi­ historical writing diminishes as it approaches the cation. Similarly, the people who reviewed Surprise, present—because perspectives are shorter and there Security, and the American Experience in the euphoric are fewer sources to work with than in treatments wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s early successes of the more distant past—the relevance of such writ­ likely reached different judgments than did the ones ing increases” (p. 5, emphasis in original). who stand hip-deep in the present election year. My judgment of this book? It is, to paraphrase Thus, one cannot help being puzzled to read the author, relevant.

that the United States would then nonetheless, with Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired the help of Great Britain, go ahead and attack Iraq Isle of Palms, South Carolina anyway, in the face of the direst warnings about the risks of military resistance, the use of weapons of mass destruction, the eruption of outrage in the The Iraq War: A Military History by Williamson Arab world, a new outbreak of terrorism, a huge Murray and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales Jr. Belknap increase in the price of oil, and astronomical esti­ Press of Harvard University Press (http://www. mates of the human and material costs of the op- hup.harvard.edu), 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, eration—only to have none of these things happen. Massachusetts 02138, 2003, 368 pages, $25.95 . . . Finally, that much of the rest of the world (hardcover). would find itself amazed . . . over one of the most surprising transformations of an underrated na­ The Iraq War hit the streets while many of the tional leader since Prince Hal became Henry V. coalition troops who fought the war were still over­ (pp. 81–82) seas, patrolling the streets of Baghdad and Basra. A well-documented book including color photos and None seems a word that we should caution ourselves maps, it provides analysis of the major combat about using, even if we cannot avoid using transfor­ phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the short but mation. When the early reviews of Surprise, Security, successful battle against the armies of Iraqi dictator and the American Experience appeared, many individu­ Saddam Hussein in 2003. Although the study stands als in the United States and elsewhere believed that as a worthwhile contribution to the field of military “mission accomplished” was authoritative if not true, history, it is important to examine the book criti­ that Iraqi insurgents had not yet used sarin against cally in the context of the continuing global war on our troops, that most Arabs did not revile us, that terrorism. Spain remained in the coalition, that gas wasn’t two Initially, I regarded The Iraq War’s “lessons dollars a gallon, that the price of oil wasn’t increas­ learned,” written 3,000 miles removed from a battle­ ing as production controlled by the Organization of field still warm, with some skepticism. I paused sev­ Petroleum Exporting Countries went down, that eral times at unsupported assertions or editorializing Abu Ghraib was just a prison, that Fallujah was just a that seemed to go beyond historical reporting. But NET ASSESSMENT 115 this “quick look” at the war has some merit. Noted net assessment, the failure to understand the enemy author John Lewis Gaddis describes its value well where he lives—his culture, his values, his political when he writes that it is “presumptuous to specu­ system—quickly leads up a dark path where any as­ late . . . so soon after the event, but it’s also neces­ sumption will do” (pp. 182–83). The authors do sary. For although the accuracy of historical writing not seem to weigh Iraqi Freedom as a battle in the diminishes as it approaches the present—because greater war on terror or credit the coalition cam­ perspectives are shorter and there are fewer sources paign in Iraq with involving allies, several US gov­ to work with than in treatments of the more distant ernment agencies other than the Defense Depart­ past—the relevance of such writing increases” (Sur­ ment and, effectively, all of our instruments of prise, Security, and the American Experience [Cambridge: national power. They miss an opportunity to delve Harvard University Press, 2004], p. 5) (emphasis in into the interesting and extensive red teaming and original). war gaming conducted by US Central Command, The authors bring credibility to The Iraq War. by the Air Staff’s Checkmate directorate, by the Air Well known in military-history circles, Williamson Force Studies and Analyses Agency, and by the US Murray is a professor at the Army War College. An Navy and Army—among others—between 1991 extensively published historian trained at Yale, he and 2004. wrote a significant portion of the Gulf War Air The Iraq War also overlooks some tremendous Power Survey (Washington, DC: Department of the advancements made in warfare since Desert Storm: Air Force, 1993) over a decade ago. General Scales, the progression of air and space power theory, the formerly commandant of the Army War College promulgation of EBO doctrine to the joint com­ and now retired, headed the US Army’s Desert munity, the rise of new space organizations and ca­ Storm Study Project and authored Certain Victory: pabilities, huge improvements in communications The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, and command and control (C2), and improved DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1994), the official US Army ac­ mastery of the operational level of war at the com­ count of its performance in the Gulf War, origi­ bined air and space operations center. The authors nally published by the Office of the Chief of Staff, do mention C2 and upgrades to unmanned aerial US Army, 1993. He too is well published and appears vehicles, but they pigeonhole them to some extent frequently on the academic and lecture circuits in as air-component improvements rather than assess Washington, DC. their effect on the support of surface warriors. Among the first of many analyses of Iraqi Free­ For the Airman or joint officer who studies this dom, this book provides a strong recounting of book, the lessons learned, outlined in the “Air what one war fighter I know calls the “major muscle Campaign” chapter, testify to some of the common movements” of the battle. However, it is not a com­ misperceptions about air and space power. Murray prehensive examination of an integrated joint coali­ and Scales correctly describe the C2 capabilities tion campaign, and it is not in the same league as used by the coalition to tie together sensors and the Gulf War Air Power Survey, researched by a dedi­ shooters as “particularly impressive” (p. 182), ac­ cated analytical team and published in several vol­ knowledge the devastating psychological effect of umes about a year after Operation Desert Storm— airpower on Iraqi combatants (p. 180), and char­ the first Gulf War. In fact, perhaps a more accurate acterize the coalition’s limited human-intelligence subtitle for The Iraq War might have been A Soldier’s capability in Iraq as a shortcoming. Certainly, those Perspective instead of A Military History. opinions and observations are balanced and de­ In the prologue, devoted to Desert Storm, the fensible. Unfortunately, by emphasizing isolated authors assert that the “aerial assault was an exer­ details, taken out of context, the authors tend to cise in overkill and lasted far too long” (p. 13)—an miss the larger strategic picture (and virtually interesting suggestion for which they provide no everything in modern warfare is strategic). evidence. Such a statement illustrates the book’s One particular assertion, based on a false as­ greatest failing: lack of depth and balance regard­ sumption, may proceed from a lack of detailed in- ing joint air and space power. Indeed, the analysis formation—understandably difficult to come by a seems very two-dimensional and “surface-centric.” scant few weeks after the war. Specifically, Murray As readers move forward to the 2003 conflict in and Scales write that “there is considerable irony Iraq, they will find that the analysis of the joint air here, because most military theorists of the 1920s component’s planning and execution is thin. Ac­ and 1930s posited that air power was a weapon that cording to Murray and Scales, “For all the talk of should attack exclusively the morale of the enemy” effects-based operations [EBO] and operational (p. 179). That statement, of course, is not exactly 116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 true. Giulio Douhet’s vision of huge formations of military culture has created a philosophy that ex­ bombers crushing cities (and even using chemical ploits precision capabilities and takes advantage of weapons) to create terror and defeat the enemy’s technological and organizational improvements, morale peaked with Billy Mitchell—and largely as well as the revolution in military affairs, to re­ faded with him. The rationale was that causing nu­ duce the need for brute force and avoid long-term merous casualties up front would curb the number devastation. This stance is intrinsically linked to of deaths in the long run by forcing the adversary postconflict planning. to back down. Flaws with Douhet lie in the laws of The authors also fail to address the fact that our war, in the moral repugnance toward the idea of joint air and space capabilities—particularly speed, killing innocents intentionally, and in anticipating power, and precision—have redefined mass, a his­ the weakness of a populace under aerial siege. The toric principle of warfare, while retaining the moral resolve of the British during the zeppelin raids of high ground. We don’t always need tens of thou­ World War I and then again during the Battle of sands of troops to take an airfield, fort, or village; Britain serves as an example. US Army Air Corps in fact, air and space power, assisted by special strategists were watching and learning. forces, was certainly effective in Afghanistan and By the 1930s the Air Corps Tactical School, lo­ western Iraq. Airpower planners realize—and smart cated at Maxwell Field, Alabama, began promul­ joint officers recognize—that although technology gating strategic bombardment and the industrial- will never make war antiseptic, collateral damage web theory, thus presenting a more nuanced vision can and should be reduced as much as practical. of airpower. Daylight precision bombardment be­ Overall, The Iraq War is worth reading. Although came the goal, but the lack of adequate technology well-read Airmen may be troubled by several points, made such doctrine difficult and costly to execute the book is thought provoking and provides a solid effectively, resulting in the firebombing and de­ background of surface-force movements in Iraqi struction of cities even though the aiming points Freedom—hopefully the last large ground cam­ for most US bombardment missions in World War paign we’ll see for a few years. The authors’ remark II were military or dual-use targets. Obviously, by about the implications of the Iraq war deserves one today’s standards the collateral damage may have final comment: “Cultural and geopolitical com­ been unacceptable, but Ploesti and Operation Over­ plexities will make the securing of Iraq far more of lord serve as good examples of industrial-target a challenge than virtually anyone had foreseen be­ sets designed to stall military operations—not just fore the conflict began” (p. 254). If they believe that kill civilians, as some assert. Others might disagree the “securing of Iraq” began in 1990, I might agree. with US nuclear motives, citing escalation in the If they refer only to the major combat operation Pacific theater, firebombing raids, and nuclear- that began in 2003, I have to say, “Absolutely not bomb attacks, but even then, the mass killing of true.” I don’t know of any planner of any rank— civilians was not the goal of the Army Air Corps— joint, interagency, and air—who said that captur­ and never has been the Air Force’s goal, even in ing Saddam and fixing Iraq would be easy. Without the Cold War. a doubt, joint and air planners considered many EBO, criticized by the authors, is now a widely scenarios that are worse than the reality we face embraced joint operational concept. Finally, mod­ today. Perhaps the latest war in Iraq provides a les­ ern technologies allow joint air and space power to son to planners at all levels that the “best case” realize the dream of the early Air Corps theorists. might present significantly different challenges than Planners apply information-age strategies and the “worst case” we usually anticipate. strenuously attempt to minimize direct civilian ca­ sualties. We even attempt to minimize inconveniences Col (sel) Merrick E. Krause, USAF for civilians as we try to achieve specific effects that Washington, DC link directly to strategic objectives. There is no “considerable irony,” as the authors suggest, that the coalition did not flatten Baghdad or kill pow­ Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air erless people in a futile attempt to coerce a tyrant Campaign, 1989–1991 by Diane T. Putney. Air (p. 179). Although the US military may need to re­ Force History and Museums Program (http:// organize in the area of postwar planning, cam­ www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/publications.htm), paign planners deliberately selected or spared tar­ 200 McChord Street, Box 94, Bolling AFB, gets during Iraqi Freedom to set the conditions to Washington, DC 20332-1111, 2004, 481 pages win the peace following major combat. An ethical (softcover). NET ASSESSMENT 117

I have read most of the literature on the planning and rendered intelligence support of the overall of the Gulf War air campaign (GWAC). Relative to effort less than optimal. At the same time, we learn other documents on the subject, Diane Putney’s Air- how the integration of intelligence and operations power Advantage is the most accurate, complete, and might enhance their efforts. unbiased account available to date. A lucid writer In addition to addressing the influence of differ­ and meticulous researcher, the author substantiates ent players, the author accurately captures the mag­ her statements with references to firsthand docu­ nitude of the tasks that General Horner, as JFACC, mentation of critical events. The book uniquely ties adroitly wove into a cohesive air campaign. Such in­ together the key decisions and briefings that oc­ sights validate the utility of a JFACC, an organiza­ curred in Saudi Arabia; Tampa, Florida; Washing­ tional construct first employed in Desert Storm. ton, DC; and locations around the Southwest Asia From General Horner’s example we learn that a theater. Although Putney wrote this account shortly great commander does not micromanage but leads after the Gulf War, it has taken 10 years to declassify best by providing operational-level guidance. the text, gain publication-release authority, and The real-world evidence found in this book— make available the book’s critical insights. especially the challenges and elements involved in The author provides a tutorial on how planning designing a campaign plan—will prove invaluable a major theater war unfolds and discusses its key ele­ to the professional military education and training ments: limiting factors, logistical concerns and re­ of our country’s future leaders. For that reason, I quirements, command relationships, and the im­ almost wish Putney had given it a different title be­ portance of personalities—specifically, the role of cause the insights found therein do not limit them­ leadership in putting together an executable plan selves to airpower but address the concerns of all from disparate pieces. Readers gain complete and leaders and planners in each of our military ser­ accurate understanding not only of the design and vices. Clearly, Airpower Advantage merits inclusion development of the GWAC, but also of the com­ in the required reading lists of anyone with an in­ batant commander’s creation of his overall cam­ terest in campaign planning. paign plan and the integration of service compo­ nents. Unlike some of the more myopic accounts Maj Gen David A. Deptula, USAF of Operation Desert Storm, this book merges a Hickam AFB, Hawaii number of viewpoints into a balanced, coherent whole, thus lending insight into the variety of plan­ The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the ning elements, perspectives, and inputs that other National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon books have either missed or avoided. It is also the the United States (official government edition). first study to capture the importance of the effects- US Government Printing Office (http://www. based planning approach used to design the GWAC. gpoaccess.gov/index.html), 732 N. Capitol Street, One finds here a wealth of perspectives and NW, Washington, DC 20401, 2004, 588 pages, case studies that can assist future planners. For ex­ $8.50 (softcover). http://www.9-11commission. ample, with respect to the role of the joint force air gov/report/911Report.pdf. component commander (JFACC) as area air defense commander, Putney summarizes Gen Charles A. The stakes in the war on terrorism are very Horner’s action as follows: “Grafting onto the host high—nothing less than our nation and way of life. nation’s organization precluded other [US Central The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Command] components from establishing their upon the United States was charged not only with own area air defense system,” that would have in­ analyzing one of the most horrendous events ever hibited the development of an integrated and ef­ to occur on American soil and the dire threat it fective theaterwide system (p. 108). Putney also al­ represents to our nation, but also with making rec­ lows readers to examine the effective style employed ommendations to prevent a recurrence. This re­ by General Horner as he worked with other services view of the commission’s report, however, may gen­ to meet objectives (p. 114). Chapters 6 and 9 offer erate more questions than answers. Desert Storm case studies of the failure of intelli­ In terms of readability, some of the report’s gence institutions and architectures to adapt to the chapters resemble a dry intelligence estimate, oth­ demands of precision warfare and effects-based as­ ers an engaging political history such as Barbara sessment. Unwavering adherence to an established Tuchman’s The Guns of August, and still others a intelligence process, regardless of the demands of painful PowerPoint briefing. The writing, vetting, the situation, hampered bomb damage assessment publishing, and distributing of the report proved 118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 atypical for a US government publication. Cer­ malevolent Weltanschauung (worldview) becomes tainly not a transparent process, the writing and simplified and homogenized. A better study would publishing proceeded under a curtain of secrecy; include a historical review, perhaps beginning with nevertheless, many of the interviews conducted by early Middle Eastern history and the emergence of the commission turned into public show-trials, and Muhammad. Certainly it should have included a a number of commission members regularly ap­ summary reaching back to the region’s colonial past. peared on television, voicing some blatantly parti­ Following an opening chapter on the details of san agendas. A dense tome of nearly 600 pages, the the 9/11 hijackings, chapter 2, “The Foundation text appeared on the Internet and was available for of the New Terrorism” (pp. 47–70), recounts the public purchase even before most Pentagon per­ ascendancy of Osama bin Laden. Disappointingly, sonnel received copies. Furthermore, the compo­ the authors never really tell us about “old terrorism,” sition of the commission—an unusual mix of senior part of that missing history. One might argue that statesmen, partisan politicians, and serious schol- the genesis of modern Islamic extremist violence ars—and the influence of its staff were extraordi­ extends from the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when nary and controversial. Bizarrely, some members the Levant, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, behaved (and still act) like celebrities on tour— and Iran enjoyed an abundance of both culture— appearing on the lecture circuit, television, and Muslim, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Christian—and the Web; promoting their own books; and lobby­ science. Extremists use the Crusades, which oc­ ing for their positions (even during the commis- curred a millennium ago, as an excuse for modern sion’s interview process). Overall, the commission Islamic violence. Another common, though illogical and its report took the form of a hybrid mix of poli­ and naïve, excuse for terrorism is poverty. But we tics and policy, research and drama. In the end, it have always had both poor and rich, and most of recommended a vector similar to one that the US the 9/11 terrorists, including Osama, were middle government is already pursuing, with some struc­ class, fairly intelligent, and educated—certainly ca­ tural changes in the bureaucracy. pable of contributing to society in meaningful, A strength of the report is its great detail con­ productive ways. Yet, they chose mass murder. Why? cerning the execution of the attacks (pp. xv–46 and Indisputably, after the British redrew the maps, 145–324). Readers will find the chapter “Terrorist after the balance of power changed in the region Entrepreneurs” especially provocative; take, for ex­ with the creation of the new state of Israel in 1948, ample, its description of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and after decades of Cold War politics, coexistence (KSM): “Highly educated and equally comfortable in the region gave way to the embracing of radicals. in a government office or a terrorist safehouse, Islamic extremists, including those who assassi­ KSM applied his imagination, technical aptitude, nated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and those and managerial skills to hatching and planning an violently crushed by King Hussein I of Jordan and extraordinary array of terrorist schemes” (p. 145). Pres. Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, among others, fo­ Perfectly capable of leading a normal, productive mented rabid hatred of Israel and then of the life, this particularly twisted murderer instead made United States. As fourth world countries gained ac­ a conscious decision to kill innocents in cold blood. cess to the wide distribution of images and signals, Such psychoanalysis of the terrorists is mildly in­ media began to play a growing part in the promul­ teresting but should be more chilling—rather than gation of hate, expanding it to encompass all of apply their energies to helping their people build Western civilization (except, of course, for tech­ a better life, terrorists prefer to destroy and kill. nologies useful in keeping the region’s powerful Fortunately, the 9/11 report points out that Islamist strongmen comfortable and secure) (pp. 47–55). terrorism is “the catastrophic threat” (p. 362), rep­ There is a long history of states supporting terror­ resenting a way of thinking that completely op­ ism in the region, particularly since the 1980s: Iraq poses American values and Western civilization. It and Saudi Arabia have done so with “charity” also validates the assertion that we must vigorously telethons and donations to the families of suicide guard against mirror imaging in war planning and bombers in Israel; Saddam Hussein gave refuge to homeland defense. terrorists such as Abu Nidal; mullahs in Iran sup­ The report’s explanation of terrorist motiva­ ported Hamas and other terror groups who regu­ tions, however, suffers from the lack of any re­ larly attacked Americans and Israelis; Syria used gional, political, and religious history that underlies Lebanon as a base of operations; and Libya trained the terrorist threat. Without a sense of continuity, terrorists and destroyed American aircraft in inter­ the full texture of the terrorist psyche and their national airspace. By the beginning of the twenty­ NET ASSESSMENT 119 first century, easily accessible media had become of the political dynamics and the complex strategic integral to the tacit acceptance of terrorists as part environment will be narrower. Our proximity to of Middle Eastern Islamic society. Even today, the 9/11 makes the dense subject matter susceptible to United Nations and many European capitals fail to individual interpretation. So why read this report? condemn terrorism with any sort of consistency, Rather than relying on an executive summary or, seeking instead to find moral equivalence between worse, media “experts,” we should read it because, murder and self-defense where none exists. in the words of Yale professor John Lewis Gaddis, Because the report does not fully consider the “It is . . . presumptuous to speculate about those huge impact of the Information Age, a temporal consequences so soon after the event, but it’s also perspective can prove helpful in examining this necessary. For although the accuracy of historical gap critically. We know that slaughtering or enslav­ writing diminishes as it approaches the present— ing the inhabitants of a town was not an unusual because perspectives are shorter and there are practice in the classical world. Rumors of brutality fewer sources to work with than in treatments of increased the cache of despots, augmenting their the more distant past—the relevance of such writing income through the collection of protection increases” (Surprise, Security, and the American Expe­ money and taxes. The war on terrorism differs sig­ rience, p. 5, emphasis in original). nificantly from previous conflicts with respect to Unique but not authoritative (I would have titled this tradition of violence and aggrandizement, in it A 9/11 Case Study), the 9/11 report stands as a no small part because of today’s obsequious media. piece of living history with which members of our Obvious to all who watched, 9/11 became a media armed forces, defense community, and citizenry at event—precisely the effect desired by the terrorist large must become familiar. Readers should analyze leadership, who sought not only to commit murder, it critically, augmenting it with other sources to but also to create mass panic and hysteria, culmi­ obtain a more complete picture of our dynamic nating in the cracking of the Western world. Clearly, international-security environment. Regardless of the media has become an essential and willing tool whether or not one considers the report legiti­ of the terrorists. mate, it will take years for the controversies to sub­ In the past, the media did not push live pictures side and for the facts to rise slowly to the top. With­ of battlefield action into every American’s home, out the proper context and background, the let alone hundreds of millions of homes around information presented as fact and the recommen­ the world. Beginning with Vietnam, a pervasive dations presented as essential are insufficient to media gained power. By 2001 we learned it had the guide America’s defense policy and international ability to rivet helpless onlookers with images of affairs. But don’t trust me, and don’t trust “ex- planes crashing into the World Trade Center or, by perts”—read the report yourself. 2004, to do so with footage of terrorists gruesomely beheading innocent civilian captives. Of course, it Col (sel) Merrick E. Krause, USAF is easier to find this type of coverage in open soci­ Washington, DC eties such as the United States, Israel, or Spain. Atrocities that occur in dictatorships (e.g., Saddam’s C3: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation by Iraq or present-day North Korea) generate little Valery E. Yarynich. Center for Defense Infor­ fanfare or international reaction because the images mation (http://www.cdi.org/index.cfm), 1779 are not as available to the wired West or to repressed Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC populaces. As Eric Larson notes in his RAND study 20036-2109, June 2003, 291 pages, $35.00. entitled Casualties and Consensus, the influence of the media, including the Internet, on policy—es- C3 examines how the United States and Russia pecially in the West—has made it a critical variable control their nuclear weapons and what steps exist that terrorists understand and that counterterrorists for managing nuclear deterrence. Bruce Blair— need to understand quickly (pp. 99–103). author of the book’s preface, president of the Cen­ Without having actually experienced the 9/11 ter for Defense Information, and a nuclear strate­ media barrage and without an appreciation of the gist in his own right—asserts that the form of greater context of the commission’s report, future Russian negative control is more stable than the historians will certainly interpret it differently than American system of permission, action, links, and those of us who lived through these events. Their codes. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, nu­ perspective of the polarization and controversies merous questions have arisen as to the reliability of will be less acute than ours, and their understanding the Soviet command, control, and communica­ 120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 tions (C3) infrastructure. Author Valery Yarynich, just as they do in the United States. This type of in­ who served in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces formation sheds light on the similarity of Cold War and then advised members of the Russian Duma developments in both the United States and USSR. on defense matters, is a well-known figure on the The text does have a few shortcomings. Yarynich American academic-lecture circuit. In C3 he de­ provides no information about permissive action scribes the workings of Soviet nuclear command links (PAL) in the Soviet Union, and Russian and control, from its origins in the intermediate weapons-release procedures are not explained in missile force in the 1950s to its maturity in the 1970s. the same detail as those in the United States, which Operating under the principle of launch-on- has more open literature on its nuclear structure warning, the Russian command system is poised and practices. Nevertheless, C3 is required reading to obtain authority for the release of nuclear for strategic nuclear analysts and Soviet-era histori­ weapons within 10 minutes from the president, ans. Modern national-security and military analysts defense minister, or chief of the General Staff. will find it useful for its contribution to understand­ Physical control of the unlock-and-launch autho­ ing how other countries could develop nuclear- rization codes resides with the military, but the weapons safeguards. Although its conclusions about General Staff has direct access to them and can American systems may seem unusually harsh, the initiate a missile attack with or without the per­ book will prove helpful to specialists in both the mission of political authorities. Russian and Soviet strategic forces. Finally, because The General Staff has two methods for launch­ C3 includes work by such Americans as Frank von ing. Following the American pattern, the unlock- Hippel and Bruce Blair, it offers the most current and-launch authorization codes held by the General information available concerning strategic nuclear Staff at its command bunkers can be sent directly to command, control, and communications. individual weapons commanders, who would exe­ Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired cute their launch procedures. Alternatively, the Fairfax, Virginia General Staff could direct missile launches directly from command bunkers in the vicinity of Moscow The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global or from other sites. This remote launch of land- War, 1934–1940 by Henry G. Gole. Naval Institute based ICBMs would bypass the subordinate chain Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), of command and missile-launch crews. The early- 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, warning system uses Kazbek, an automated process 2003, 256 pages, $34.95 (hardcover). consisting of cables, radio signals, satellites, and re­ lays that make up the heart of Russian command Pearl Harbor proved that American strategy mak­ and control. Tied to this automated electronic web ers were pygmies when the Japanese decimated the are the three nuclear suitcases or Chegets. Once US battle fleet. North Africa proved that American activated, these systems can start a countdown to strategy makers were hayseeds who had to learn launch nuclear weapons in the event the entire their trade from the British. Hogwash! Henry Gole’s Moscow command structure is destroyed. Further­ fine little book works to undermine those myths. more, an automatic feature exists for raising the nu­ Dr. Gole is certainly qualified to issue a defini­ clear force-readiness level; strategic aviation as well tive judgment on such issues. He fought in Korea as naval units are tied into the General Staff network. as an infantryman, served in the special forces, and The book also addresses how the USSR incorpo­ did five overseas tours. Starting as an enlisted man, rated mobile SS-25 and SS-27 units as well as ballistic- he retired as a colonel with more than 30 years of missile submarines, which represented new chal­ service. Gole also served in Vietnam, as an attaché lenges to C3 systems. Mobile ICBMs posed their own in Germany, and on the Pentagon staff in Wash­ problems since they could not be constantly field- ington. Moreover, he had teaching tours at West exercised to prevent excessive wear and tear. Point and the Army War College in Pennsylvania. American readers will be struck by how some He also has fine academic credentials, as attested defense relationships remain the same in every by his PhD from Temple University; a good writing country and regime. For example, Yarynich details style; and a record of book reviews and articles that how defense contactors influenced Soviet thinking demonstrates his willingness to “tell it like it is.” about C3 and technology, fostered close ties to in­ Colonel Gole’s research for this book focused dividual components, and laid the foundation for on documentation found in the archives of the decades of work. Research institutes, design bu­ American Military Institute at Carlisle Barracks, reaus, and factories establish close relationships, Pennsylvania, especially that available in previously NET ASSESSMENT 121 unused sources from the classes of 1934–40 at the America to prevail if a war lasted long enough— Army War College, then in Washington, DC. One even against the formidable coalition of Germany, of his major points maintains that an intimate con­ Japan, and Italy in a two-ocean context. Thus, US nection existed between the War College and the vulnerability to defeat would exist almost exclu­ Army General Staff, especially with the latter’s War sively in the first months of a war. Once the mobi­ Plans Division. Frequent written and personal con­ lization began to bear fruit, the victorious outcome tacts occurred between members of the college and became inevitable. the staff, the greater part of the college graduates Even though the French-British combination going on to serve with that staff both then and was not as effective at holding off the Axis as the later. Gole argues that this relationship produced War College had assumed, America had more than huge benefits, including fine strategists and com­ two years of grace for building a great armed force bat leaders for the United States during World War and preparing giant industrial plants. Between II and well beyond. Munich and Pearl Harbor, the US Army grew from The nexus between college and staff guaran­ about 150,000 men (including its Air Corps) to a teed that the students would remain connected million and a half. The students of the War College with the “real world” instead of isolating them­ who had planned for mobilization in their many selves in the academic ivory tower. Yet, the War exercises assumed the role of decision makers who Plans Division necessarily immersed itself in the brought all that about. “here and now,” which inhibited the projection of Why should air warriors trouble themselves to its planning far into the future. The students, on add The Road to Rainbow to an already long reading the other hand, could consider strategies involving list? Well, all of our wars have demonstrated that the huge potential forces that the United States airpower is but one part of the national strength. could ultimately generate; thus, their planning ex­ Airmen must understand the context in which it ercises laid the groundwork for what would come. exists, including the economic, political, psycho­ The classes of about 80 officers were divided into logical, naval, and ground factors, as well as public groups and assigned different scenarios for their opinion and domestic political concerns. Colonel planning exercises. Usually, some addressed one- Gole’s book provides an excellent vehicle for ex­ on-one wars with potential (and not so potential) amining that context and for enhancing one’s un­ enemies. From 1934 onward, one of the groups derstanding of the importance of strategic plan­ worked on a plan for fighting as a member of a ning and the kinds of knowledge and assumptions coalition against an enemy coalition. one needs to achieve excellence in that work. The seven groups that studied the problems of True, Gole’s story has high praise for the Army War fighting in the company of Allies did so with some College, but his other writings on leadership and remarkable foresight—which stood them in good his many book reviews demonstrate that he is no stead when the war with the Axis came to pass. Yet, company man. His work will help build a world- others assigned to the one-on-one wars that did view that more closely approximates reality than it not materialize also gained enormous benefits. otherwise might. Airmen should read it soon. One group often drew an assignment to plan a war Dr. David R. Mets against “Red” (Britain) even though the notion of Maxwell AFB, Alabama a British invasion of North America seemed pre­ posterous. Yet, the various assumptions and studies Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America by made in connection with that scenario indoctri­ Lt Gen William E. Odom, USA, Retired. Yale nated the participants in the research, planning, University Press (http://www.yalepress.yale. and necessity of thinking at the national-strategy edu/yupbooks), P.O. Box 209040, New Haven, level. That, too, proved vital. Connecticut 06520-9040, 2003, 230 pages, $24.95 Everyone involved was aware of the old axiom (hardcover). that no scheme survives the first contact with the enemy, yet they considered the planning process The need for intelligence reform is indis­ valuable. Gole declares that one of the most im­ putable. In the wake of 9/11, many Americans portant lessons of World War I taught the United were shocked to learn that intelligence and law- States about the complex and time-consuming enforcement agencies either ignored the growing process of mobilizing for total war. An assumption al Qaeda threat or were unable to piece together running through all the planning at the War College all the available clues into information that might held that the huge US economic base would allow have prevented the attacks. 122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004

Clearly, intelligence reform is an idea whose counterintelligence (CI), despite the abysmal time has come—again. Revelations from the 9/11 record this arrangement has produced. In the Commission have put the issue back on the front world of imagery intelligence (IMINT), Odom burner, and the panel’s final report contains rec­ writes, virtually every agency is a “player,” with little ommendations for fixing our intelligence and se­ regard for the overlap and duplication that in­ curity shortfalls. Congress and the president are evitably result. Under Odom’s plan, CI would be­ expected to address these proposals after the No­ come the domain of a new federal agency, melding vember election. Emerging reforms are difficult to elements of the CIA and FBI. IMINT, on the other forecast; however, one thing is certain—“the devil hand, would be consolidated under the National is in the details.” Efforts to correct the intelligence Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Both organiza­ failures that contributed to 9/11 will require a tions would serve as national managers for their re­ major shift in organizational roles, responsibilities, spective disciplines. His model also envisions a and resources. slightly downsized CIA, focused on human intelli­ Making these required changes is the focus of gence (HUMINT) and paramilitary operations. Fixing Intelligence by Lt Gen William E. Odom, who Outside the HUMINT realm, much of the agency’s served as director of the National Security Agency analytical capabilities would be absorbed by an ex­ (NSA) during the Reagan administration. In a sur­ panded National Intelligence Council, which would prisingly slim volume (only 230 pages), General play a key role in areas such as collection manage­ Odom presents a clear and concise plan for intel­ ment and the production of national intelligence ligence reform, built around a “national manager” estimates. The Defense Intelligence Agency would concept for the intelligence community as a whole, concentrate on analysis, with clear delineations be­ as well as its major disciplines. tween enemy threat assessments and analysis sup­ Odom believes that our intelligence woes begin porting our own weapons-procurement programs. at the top and proposes a major realignment for the He also offers concrete ideas for restructuring the director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Under his NSA and military intelligence and creating a uni­ plan, the DCI would no longer serve as both CIA di­ fied intelligence doctrine—requirements that are rector and overall leader of our intelligence com­ long overdue. munity. Splitting the post into two positions would, Creating a more “streamlined” intelligence com­ according to Odom, allow the DCI to serve as an ad­ munity is a controversial idea, and it is unclear how vocate for the entire community and not merely as a much support the Odom plan would actually re­ defender of parochial CIA interests. This concept ceive. His proposed reforms clearly step on some has been discussed before and warrants renewed bureaucratic “toes,” particularly those of the once- consideration as part of intelligence reform. secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)—the General Odom also believes that the various in­ long-time developer and procurement authority for telligence methodologies (signals intelligence, im­ overhead intelligence systems. According to Odom, agery intelligence, human intelligence, etc.) would the NRO exerts too much influence. During his benefit from more centralized control, under the tenure at NSA, he discovered that the NRO con­ aegis of a single agency. The directors of these or­ trolled about 40 percent of the nation’s signals in­ ganizations would, in turn, function as national- telligence (SIGINT) budget, a staggering amount level managers for that discipline, with greatly ex­ for an organization with 90 percent fewer person­ panded control over operations, budget, personnel, nel than NSA. Not surprisingly, he advocates a and procurement functions. smaller NRO, which would serve as a technical and This “national manager” concept is hardly new. procurement advisor for the agencies that use its As NSA director in the late 1980s, General Odom overhead platforms. Needless to say, his plan won’t exercised many of the powers outlined in his re­ get much support in the hallways of the NRO. form plan. He is correct in his assertion that wider While Odom’s proposals have obvious merit, they use of this model would eliminate much of the are not without their flaws. His book makes only two wasteful redundancy that has long permeated our references to measurement and signatures intelli­ intelligence community. gence (MASINT), a rapidly growing discipline that To underscore these problems and support his will have a profound effect on the future of intelli­ reform plan, he cites examples that are painfully gence and war fighting. Should MASINT also have a familiar to anyone with a working knowledge of single national manager, and, if so, which agency our existing intelligence system. As the author should assume the lead role? He never resolves that notes, the FBI and CIA still share responsibility for issue and fails to address an underlying considera­ NET ASSESSMENT 123 tion: will the central-manager concept work for dis­ side the beltway? General Odom clearly believes his ciplines like MASINT, which draw upon the re­ program would work, but practical experience raises sources of multiple intelligence methodologies? some doubt. It’s worth noting that the author’s old Additionally, General Odom offers no sugges­ agency (NSA) has long been hampered by a short­ tions for organizing intelligence support for infor­ age of linguists, despite the power, influence, and mation warfare (IW). The author (who retired from effort of past directors, who have long functioned active duty in 1988) freely admits that he lacks ex­ as de facto national managers for SIGINT. If the pertise in IW, but that’s a hollow argument, given Odom plan can’t solve this sort of fundamental the countless books and articles that have been problem, it would amount to little more than a bu­ published on the subject. Using this material, he reaucratic exercise—something the intelligence could have formulated potential guidelines for in­ community can ill afford at this time. telligence support of IW. As it stands, failing to ad­ Despite these shortcomings, General Odom has equately address the intelligence role in IW be­ written a provocative book, producing a useful comes a serious deficiency for Odom’s reform template for genuine intelligence reform. Amid plan and his book. the efforts to make our intelligence agencies more responsive (and prevent another 9/11), the ideas Finally—and perhaps most important for any advanced in Fixing Intelligence deserve serious and reform plan—the Odom book glosses over the thoughtful consideration. bottom-line question: will the reorganization actu­ ally “fix” the problems plaguing our intelligence Maj Gary Pounder, USAF, Retired system, or simply lead to more empire building in­ Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

APJ

In this section of “Net Assessment,” you will find additional reviews of aviation-related books and CD- ROMs but in a considerably briefer format than our usual offerings. We certainly don’t mean to imply that these items are less worthy of your attention. On the contrary, our intention is to give you as many reviews of notable books and electronic publications as possible in a limited amount of space.

That Others May Live: USAF Air Rescue in Korea that allowed us to recover our isolated personnel. by Forrest L. Marion. Air Force History and Mu­ Introduced late in World War II, this aircraft saw seums Program (http://www.airforcehistory.hq. employment as a recovery vehicle in Korea after we af.mil/publications.htm), 200 McChord Street, developed the necessary doctrine and techniques. Box 94, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20332­ Marion documents this process well, but he also 1111, 2004, 57 pages, $5.25 (softcover). does an excellent job of highlighting the innova­ tive use of other aircraft such as the SA-16, SB-17, In this tightly packaged treatise, Forrest Marion, L-5, and SB-29 as we adapted them to this mission a historian assigned to the Air Force Historical Re­ area as well. In fact, he notes several items that have search Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an become basic staples of rescue operations: (1) the Air Force Reserve lieutenant colonel, presents us need for, development of, and use of survival radios; with a focused look at rescue operations in the Ko­ (2) the need for centralized command and control; rean War. He proceeds chronologically through the (3) the development of the task-force concept; (4) activation and deployment of rescue units into the rescue as a coalition asset; (5) the need for support theater and then presents vignettes and anecdotal aircraft other than recovery vehicles; and (6) recog­ data that highlight the heroic efforts of our rescue nition that combat rescue is not just an add-on to air crews to recover downed Airmen, perform countless combat operations but a specialized mission that re­ medical evacuations, and support special operations. quires its own focus and family of experts. This is rich history. Key to the story is the evo­ Marion presents all of these issues as they oc­ lution of technology, particularly the helicopter, curred, using well-focused research and interviews 124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2004 with actual participants to show how they evolved year as an agricultural student at Louisiana State and how we dealt with them creatively. One quota­ University and a year at a teachers’ training school), tion is especially telling. After being recovered, he nevertheless developed a sophisticated under­ one troop declared, “When I saw that helicopter standing of Chinese culture. Although Chennault is land it looked like a mechanical angel coming—it an easy-to-read biography of a famous Airman, it was the answer to a man’s prayer.” About 51 years leaves the reader with a great deal to ponder. How later, a Navy flyer expressed that sentiment almost does one successfully advocate within a large bu­ exactly after a helicopter plucked him out of the reaucracy without antagonizing the leadership? How desert of Iraq. The result, then and now, is the do people who aspire to lead and mentor others same. When we send our young men and women deal with the Chennaults of the world—those dif­ into combat, we do not expect them to die for ficult subordinates who may have a great deal to their country. We want them to come home, and offer? Individuals who would successfully advocate our propensity to develop and sustain a rescue ca­ airpower and space power in the twenty-first cen­ pability clearly symbolizes that desire. tury can find food for thought in Byrd’s Chennault: I do have one criticism. The study needs more Giving Wings to the Tiger. It is good to have this clas­ maps. Marion explains many of the actions in geo­ sic biography back in print. graphical terms, but without detailed maps, a reader at times has difficulty following the narrative. Re­ Col John Albert, PhD, USAF, Retired gardless, That Others May Live was a pleasure to Montgomery, Alabama read. Korea proved critical to the development of our rescue forces in their current form. Marion has captured a fundamental part of that heritage, I Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories of and I highly recommend the fruit of his efforts to the Korean War, 1950–53 by Linda Granfield. anyone looking for a more detailed knowledge of Clarion Books (http://www.houghtonmifflin rescue operations or just good flying stories. books.com/clarion), Houghton Mifflin Com­ pany, 222 Berkeley Street, Boston, Massachusetts Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired 02116, 2003, 128 pages, $16.00 (hardcover). Fairfax, Virginia Published by Houghton Mifflin’s Clarion divi­ sion, a department that targets children and teens, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger by Martha Byrd. University of Alabama Press (http://www. I Remember Korea contains just over 30 first-person uapress.ua.edu), Box 870380, 20 Research Drive, accounts from veterans of that “forgotten war.” Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0380, 2003, 472 Linda Granfield partitions her book into four sec­ pages, $27.95 (softcover). tions, the first covering 12 stories from veterans who fought in the initial stages of the war—from Martha Byrd’s Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger, the opening North Korean onslaught through first published 1987, has long been regarded as the MacArthur’s counterattack and the Chinese inter­ best biography of this colorful Airman. Thus, I vention. The second section, “Food, Fun, and Fi­ commend the decision by the University of Alabama nally Rest,” includes five stories of veterans from Press to reissue it in paperback. (For a detailed 1951. The third switches from stories of combat analysis of available Chennault biographies, see and everyday life to equally poignant accounts of Col Phil Meilinger’s Airmen and Air Theory [Maxwell soldiers leaving their families and losing brothers AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001], 26–29, http:// in the war; it even includes a chapter written from www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Meil- the North Korean perspective. The last section of­ Airmen/Airmen.pdf.) Byrd’s book is not a simple, fers six stories about how the war affected the vet­ glorified portrayal of the leader of the “Flying erans after their return home. I Remember Korea is Tigers” or of the mistreated advocate of fighter an excellent book for junior- or senior-high stu­ aviation in 1930s; rather, the author paints a com­ dents who wish to understand war as recounted by plex picture of Chennault. At times he could be a the people who fought it. For that reason, it would most difficult man, but at other times an endear­ be a useful addition to the reading material for an ing, sympathetic character. Despite his frequently Air Force Junior ROTC detachment. tense relations with his superiors, he engendered fierce loyalty among many of his subordinates. Al­ Lt Col Jim Gates, USAF though Chennault had little formal education (a Washington, DC APJ

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125 OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb (USAFA; MS, Uni­ Dr. Christopher J. Bowie (BA, University of Dr. Stephen O. Fought (BS, Georgia Institute versity of Southern California) is the director Minnesota; PhD, Oxford University), a mem­ of Technology; MS, University of Southern for Logistics (J-4), the Joint Staff, Washington, ber of the Senior Executive Service, is deputy California; PhD, Brown University) is a profes­ DC. He previously served as deputy chief of director of Air Force Strategic Planning, sor in the Warfighting Department, Air War staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters US Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and a former Air Force, Washington, DC. He has held com­ Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. dean of academics at that school. He is also a mand and staff positions at squadron, wing, Previously, he served at Northrop Grumman member of London’s International Institute major command, and Department of Defense Corporation as senior analyst with the Analysis for Strategic Studies. During an earlier tour at levels. During Operations Desert Shield and Center; manager of Strategic Planning, Inte­ the Naval War College, Dr. Fought held the Desert Storm, General McNabb commanded grated Systems Sector; and manager of Strate­ Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, recognized gic Studies, B-2 Division. He was affiliated with and served as a department director, course as Military Airlift Command’s Airlift Squadron the RAND Corporation as both a senior staff chair, and professor. During his 20-year Air of the Year in 1990. The general commanded member and an associate program director. He Force career, he carried out operational and the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air also served as an issues and policy analyst with headquarters assignments related to his expe­ transportation of our nation’s leaders, includ­ the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. riences as a B-52D pilot. A senior arbitrator and ing the president, vice president, secretary of Dr. Bowie is the author of The New Calculus mediator, Dr. Fought is a graduate of two state, and secretary of defense; the 62nd Airlift (RAND, 1993), which examines airpower’s courses offered by the Harvard-MIT Program Wing, which earned the Riverside Trophy in changing role in US national security strategy, on Negotiation, a distinguished graduate of 1996 as Fifteenth Air Force’s outstanding wing; and Trends in the Global Balance of Airpower Squadron Officer School, and a graduate (with and the Tanker Airlift Control Center, where (RAND, 1995), which analyzes historical and highest distinction) of the Naval War College. he planned, scheduled, and directed a fleet of projected trends in the world’s air and missile more than 1,400 aircraft in support of combat forces. delivery and strategic airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical operations around the world. General McNabb is a graduate of Squadron Of­ ficer School, Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Air War College.

Group Capt Christopher Finn (MPhil, Cam­ bridge University) is director of Defence Studies, Royal Air Force (RAF), based at Shrivenham, England. After navigator training and conversion to the Buccaneer aircraft, he Dr. Thomas Alexander Hughes (BA, Saint Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner (MA, MPhil, served with the 809th Naval Air Squadron John’s University; MA, PhD, University of Hous­ University of Cambridge) is officer command­ (HMS Ark Royal), XV Squadron (RAF Laar­ ton) is an associate professor at the School of ing, Operations Squadron, Royal Air Force bruch), 237th Operational Conversion Unit Advanced Air and Space Power Studies, Maxwell (RAF) Cottesmore. She worked in the United (RAF Honington); Headquarters 18th Group, AFB, Alabama. He formerly served as associate Kingdom’s (UK) National Headquarters, collo­ 208th Squadron (RAF Lossiemouth); and the professor and deputy chair in the Department cated with US Central Command in Al Udeid Central Tactics and Trials Organisation. A of Strategy and International Security, Air War Air Base, Qatar, during phase three of Opera­ specialist in electronic warfare, weaponry, College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and held the tion Iraqi Freedom as the military aide and per­ and tactics, he has over 3,200 flying hours— Ramsey Chair in Naval History, National Air and sonal staff officer to the commander of UK 2,240 of those in the Buccaneer. During the Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, Wash­ forces. She has subsequently been closely in­ Gulf War, he served in Air Headquarters, ington, D.C. A previous contributor to Air and volved in the USAF and RAF engagement ini­ Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Group Captain Finn Space Power Journal, Dr. Hughes is the author of tiative, which seeks to ensure that our vitally im­ also spent 20 months as an airpower special­ Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of portant relationship continues to flourish and ist on the directing staff of the Joint Services Tactical Air Power in World War II (1995). develop into the future. Command and Staff College.

126 CONTRIBUTORS 127

Lt Col Paul D. Berg (BS, USAFA; MA, Uni­ David Hobbs is curator and principal histo­ Wing Cdr Redvers “Red” Thompson (BS, versity of North Dakota; MA, University of Ala­ rian of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Royal Manchester Institute of Science and Tech­ bama; PhD, Auburn University) is chief, Pro­ Naval Air Station Yeovilton. Before retiring as nology; MS, Cranfield University) is an RAF fessional Journals Division, at the College of a Royal Navy commander in 1997, he flew exchange officer and has the post of deputy Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education. both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters commander (academics) of the 505th Training Previously, he served on the Air Command ashore and afloat. His service afloat included Group, 505th Command and Control Wing, and Staff College (ACSC) faculty where he di­ the aircraft carriers Victorious, Hermes, Albion, Hurlburt Field, Florida. Previously he served rected the Air and Space Power Studies Bulwark, Centaur, Ark Royal (IV), and Ark in billets directly involved in the operational course. Colonel Berg is a command pilot with Royal (V). His publications include Aircraft delivery of air C2 on both national UK and over 5,800 flying hours, mostly in B-52 and Carriers of the Royal and Commonwealth Navies coalition operations (Desert Fox, Allied Force, RC-135 aircraft. He is a graduate of the ACSC (1996), Aircraft of the Royal Navy since 1945 Palliser [Sierra Leone], Enduring Freedom, resident program and the Air War College (1982), Naval Staff Study–The Invincible Class and Iraqi Freedom). Wing Commander nonresident program. and their Air Groups (1997), and Ark Royal–The Thompson is a fast-jet navigator and qualified Name Lives On (1985). He has contributed to weapons instructor with both overland and The Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945 (1994), maritime strike/attack experience gained on Men of War: Great Leaders of World War II five operational flying tours. His flying expe­ (1992), and The Face of Naval Battle (2003). rience included a previous USAF exchange He has established a reputation as a broad­ on F-111s at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. caster on naval aviation matters on UK radio Wing Commander Thompson is a graduate and television. of RAF Basic Staff Course and Royal Navy Ad­ vanced Staff College.

Lt Col Vicki J. Rast (USAFA; MPA, Troy State University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff Sebastian Cox (BA, University of Warwick; MA, College; PhD, George Mason University) is an Kings College, University of London) has been Lt Col Sharon M. Latour (BA, MA, University assistant professor of political science and chief a member of the staff of the Air Historical of California–Santa Barbara; MS, Troy State of the Core Courses Division at the United Branch (Royal Air Force) in the United King­ University; PhD, University of Southern Cali­ States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, dom Ministry of Defence since 1984, having fornia) serves on the faculty of the Department Colorado. She has served as director of opera­ previously been on the staff of the Royal Air of Leadership, Command, and Communica­ tions, Joint Warfare Studies Department, Air Force Museum, Hendon. He was appointed tions Studies at Air Command and Staff Col­ Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, the head of the Air Historical Branch in 1996, lege, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. She previously Alabama, and as aircraft maintenance and mu­ becoming only the ninth incumbent of the served as chief of protocol at RAF Mildenhall; nitions officer, Shaw AFB, South Carolina. She post since the branch’s inception in 1918 and assistant professor in the Behavioral Sciences led a munitions unit during Operations Desert the first not to have held a commission in the Department at the US Air Force Academy; sec­ Shield and Desert Storm and controlled plan­ British forces. He has written widely on many tion commander in the 555th Fighter ning and deployment of the 363d Fighter Wing aspects of airpower history and has lectured to Squadron, Aviano, Italy; faculty member at during Operation Southern Watch. A distin­ military and civilian audiences in Britain, the Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB; and guished graduate of Squadron Officer School United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, chief of professional military education policy and Air Command and Staff College, Colonel France, Germany, Norway, and the Czech Re­ at the Pentagon. Colonel Latour is a graduate Rast is the author of Interagency Fratricide: Policy public. He currently edits two book series on of Squadron Officer School and Air Command Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (Air Uni­ airpower subjects. and Staff College. versity Press, 2004). Order Processing Code: *5679

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