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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 46106 MASTERS THESIS M-8406
TRUCHIL, Barry Elliot THE STATE AFTER CAPITALISM.
The American University, M.A., 1976 Sociology, socialism, communism and anarchism
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48io6 THE STATE AFTER CAPITALISM
by
Barry E. Truchil
Submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
in
Sociology
Signatures of Committee /
Chairman: ______0
Dean of the College
^ (Vit Date : Date
1975
The American University Washington, D.C. 20016
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 5" / 7 g TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
II. THE STATE IN SOCIOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY . . ; . 3
Origin of S t a t e ...... 3
III. THE MARXIST MODEL OF THE STATE ...... 11
General Marxist Theory of the State ...... 11 Historical Model ...... 13 Conclusion...... 28
IV. THE SOCIALIST STATE IN T H E O R Y ...... 29
Role of P r o l e t a r i a t ...... 29 Withering or Transcendence ...... 31 Dictatorship of the Proletariat ...... 35 Conclusion ...... 40
V. THE PARIS COMMUNE— A NECESSARY FAILURE ...... 43
Introduction ...... 43 Pre-Commune Conditions...... 43 French Working Class Movement ...... 47 The Beginning of the Commune ...... 51 Composition and Influences of the Commune ...... 53 Political Measures ...... 56 Fall of the C o m m u n e ...... 65 Paris Commune as Dictatorship of Proletariat ...... 68 The Effect of the Paris Commune on T h e o r y ...... 70 Conclusion ...... 72
VI. THE BOLSHEVIK EXPERIENCE...... 75
Conditions Leading to the Growth of the Bureaucracy . . . 76 Dictatorship of the Proletariat to Dictatorship of the P a r t y ...... 83 Conclusion...... 100
VII. CONCLUSION...... 103
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... Ill
11 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis will investigate two controversial aspects of the sociological theory of the state. The first aspect is the question of
the "withering away of the state" and the allied notion of the "dic
tatorship of the proletariat." The thesis will also investigate the
relationship between these two concepts in theory and actual practice.
In Marxian social theory, the founders, Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, did not detail out the meanings, analytical usages, and social
implications of these concepts. Successive writers and social theo
rists have since given these two concepts differing and conflicting
interpretations. Marx, writing on the structure and dynamics of
capitalist society, did not spell out, except in outline form, the
character of society and the state after capitalism. The differing and
controversial interpretations of the concept are in part predicated
upon the small attention that Marx and Engels paid to the elaboration
of the two concepts. Thus, the meanings, usages, and applications of
these two concepts will be investigated in the thesis in an attempt to
gain greater clarity in the Marxian sociological model.
This task is to be accomplished by examining three interrelated
aspects: first, the social scientific theory of the state, its origins
and history and its development in capitalist society; second, the
theory of the withering away of the state in socialist society, along with the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its role as a transitional state in the withering away process; and third, an investigation of these concepts in actual practice in historical instances.
In regard to the first task, a review and analysis of the anthropological-sociological literature and data emphasizing the origins and development of the state will be undertaken and will constitute the first part of the thesis. With respect to the second task, a review and analysis of the major theoretical works and correspondence of Marx and Engels in relation to the two concepts will be reviewed. In addi tion, secondary sociological commentary on the subject will be utilized and evaluated. These two efforts will constitute the second section of the thesis. The third task— examining the origins of the socialist state in theory with actual historical events— will constitute the last substantive section of the thesis. The most appropriate method to accomplish this is a thorough review and analysis of the concrete his torical instances— the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Bolshevik revolu tion of 1917— which have been described as dictatorships of the proletariat respectively by Marx and Engels and the later Marxian theorists. This is in essence an examination of the actual putting into practice the transitional state form. In this historical analysis, there will be an attempt to delineate the social conditions facilitating and/or obstructing the process of the withering away of the state.
In the conclusion, there will be an evaluation of these concepts in theory as well as their usage in relationship to these historical events. In addition, proposals for future research will be introduced. CHAPTER II
THE STATE IN SOCIOLOGICAL AND
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY
This chapter focuses on the sociological and anthropological theories on the origin of the state. The conditions upon which the state emerged is a key question if one is to understand how the state can wither away, as hypothesized by Marxist theory. This inquiry will be investigated through a review of the major literature in anthropo logical and sociological theory on the origin of the state.
Origin of State
The literature reveals that there have been stateless societies.
The noted anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan, distinguished social organizations, which were founded on gentes, phratries, and tribes,"^ 2 and political society, which is "founded upon territory and property."
The former deals with members of that society through kinship relations, the latter on a territorial-residential basis (state, city, etc.). This 3 4 view of stateless society is also found in Durkheira, Hobhouse, and
^Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society (Cleveland: World Pub lishing Company, 1877), p. 6.
^Ibid., p. 61. 3 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York; Free Press, 1933). 4 Hobhouse, in T. B. Bottomore, Sociology; A Guide to Literature and Problems (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 152.
3 Malinowski,^ as well as others.^ I. Schapera observes that governments have not always existed in history. Stateless societies were food- gathering societies,^ which "lacked any institutional organization of g the kind found in the modern Western state." This refers to a cen
tralized authority, with the power (as Max Weber argues, the legitimate 9 monopoly of the use of force) to maintain law and order and to regulate
life. Schapera, with Morgan, agrees that in "primitive societies, kin ship is often much more important than among ourselves in the regulation of public llfe."^^
Elman Service establishes a transitional form of political organization— the chiefdom— which is numerous enough in the world to warrant a distinct category. He argues that chiefdoms "are familial
. . . have central direction, but no true (state) government. He overall accepts the dichotomy of societas (kinship society) and civitas
(civil or state society), but he interprets the chiefdom as a possible
^Bronislaw Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (London: Allen and Unwin, 1947), pp. 266, 253.
. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (New York: Schocken Press, 1967), pp. 2-5, is a good summary of this.
^An excellent description of these societies can be found in Gerhard Lenskl and Jean Lenski, Human Societies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). g Schapera, p. 39. 9 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 156.
^*^Schapera, p. 5.
^^Elman Service, Profiles in Ethnology (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. xxvii. 12 transitional stage. Furthermore, Service links the type of political organization of a society with the social structure of that society, specifically the manner in which the members of the society produced their subsistance.
In addition to the finding that the state is not universal in human societies, the state, where it exists, is seen as an entity of domination. Max Weber writes that "the claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of 13 compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous organization." Since this institution is to "enforce its system of order,it is clear that
Weber adumbrated a conflict model of state societies. Oppenheimer, an anthropologist, defined all states "by the fact of the domination of one class over another with the view of economic exploitation."
An opposing interpretation to the above models is offered by
Robert Lowie. He argued that the early societies did understand terri torial ties, in contrast to Morgan's thesis. He notes that co-residents and Ifugao strangers were not treated alike in native law. "A thief, for instance, from the same village was merely fined, where an outsider would be killed.In an earlier work, he attempted to refute Morgan
12 Service's system consists of stateless (bands and tribes), chiefdoms (as transitional link to civil society), and civil society (primitive states and modern societies).
^^Weber, p. 156. ^^Ibid., p. 154. 15 F. Oppenheimer, Per Staat (1907) summarized by George Balan- dier. Political Anthropology (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 151.
^^Robert Lowie, Social Organization (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1950), p. 318. by claiming that there was a "collective mind" (similar to Durkheim*s
concept of collective consciousness)^^ to the stateless societies. "The
universal recognition of some deeds as crimes . . . is decisive proof 18 of the omnipresence of the state." This is not incompatible with
Morgan's thesis, however, because Morgan merely argued that the intro
duction of private property forced a change in the political organiza
tion. As most theorists, Morgan did not deny that there was a
government in all societies. The early societies, particularly the
mobile societies, had traditional forms of organization, where the
eldest had the greatest influence and there was a sanctity of age-old
rules. These leaders directed their society as a whole. Morgan's data
revealed that the introduction of private property created a class sys
tem and a new form of government which replaced the family (gens)
organization. This new government only looked after the ruling class
of the society, rather than all of the society, which the gens system had
practiced. Thus, the Marxist position is that the class-biased nature
of the state is linked to the emergence of classes in society. If the
class distinctions of society are eliminated, Marx and Engels argued
that the government would again serve all of society. Lowie, in his
later works, recognized that "although the bonds of co-residence were
evidently strong (in stateless societies), they did not transcend those 19 of kinship." He even admitted that "a sizeable state presupposes more
^^Durkheim, p. 79. 18 Robert Lowie, The Origin of the State (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1927), p. 114. 19 Lowie, Social Organization, p. 318. 20 than a community." This illustrates that Lowie is not totally adverse to the Marxist model.
Karl Wittfogel reveals that "Asiatic societies" were state societies which existed prior to the development of the Western state, which was the focus of the previous literature. Asiatic society was a socioeconomic formation based on irrigated agriculture.
Since the obligation of seeing to the construction and maintenance of complex and costly canals and waterworks devolved upon the state, in these conditions, the centralizing power of the government expanded very greatly and the state took the form of Oriental despotism.
The hydraulic societies, including early African and pre-Spanish
America, as well as Mid-Eastern and Oriental civilizations, developed much earlier than Athens, which is usually considered the first state in the Western model. They emerged not only with the necessity of irri gation, but as Wittfogel adds, "it is only above the level of an extractive subsistence economy and below the level of a property-based 22 industrial civilization" that societies move toward an hydraulic order of life. Since these societies developed a state apparatus prior to that of Athens and Rome, the Marxist theory on the origin of the state is not a unilinear construct- Marx had concentrated his theories of the state, capitalism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat on
Western Europe (as ideal types), and this thesis will follow his typology.
20 Ibid., p. 319. 21 Robert Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton Press, 1969), p. 67. 22 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New York: Yale Univer sity Press, 1969), p. 12. 8
The form of despotism in these areas, however, deserves closer scru tiny.
Although there is consensus that the state is not a universal institution in society, there have been differing views on how the state emerged. One of the models is of conflict within society whereas the other sees conquest of societies by other societies as the key to understanding the rise of state societies. Robert Lowie argues that
"internal conditions may suffice to create hereditary or approximately 23 hereditary classes," and that the two main factors, unequal differen- 24 tiation and conquest, need not be incompatible with each other. Thus, to Lowie, internal conditions can give rise to a state apparatus, such as the existence of social relations outside kinship and forms of vol untary associations based on inequality. Yet as Georges Balandier observes,
these characteristics are general ones and all societies that pos sess them have very diverse forms of political organization . . . Lowie, then, sees several ways that lead to centralized power but ignores the economic conditions that create the social relations, which in turn make that power necessary. Moreover, his excessively wide definition of the state leads him to recognize an embryonic state power as soon as the 'potential and permanent use of physical constraint' has been 'sanctioned by the community.
Franz Oppenheimer asserts that the state emerged through conquests of certain societies over others. Oppenheimer argues that if economic conditions were to bring about a state, it would have to be a condition of natural scarcity— which still has not occurred.
23 Lowie, The Origin of the State, p. 42. 24 This, too, sounds like Durkheim. 25 Balandier, pp. 153-54. It is true that the class-state can arise only where all fertile acreage has been occupied completely, and since I have shown that even at the present time, all the ground is not occupied economi cally, this means that it has been pre-empted politically. Since land could not have acquired natural scarcity, the scarcity must have been legal. This means that the land has been pre-empted by a middle class against its subject class, and settlement prevented. Therefore, the state, as a class state, can have originated in no other way than through conquest and subjugation.
Morton Fried clarifies the conflict-conquest models. He makes the distinction between primary and secondary states. Primary states 27 have been formed "by means of internal, or regional development," such as those of Mesopotamia, China, and Peru. Secondary (derived) states result "from a response imposed by the presence of a neighboring 28 state." Southall adds that in the latter instance, one of these groups "already possesses an effective large-scale political organiza- 29 tion." Yet these approaches do not grasp the essential task that is necessary to understand the emergence of the state. As Balandier asserts, they fail
to discover within the pre-state societies adequate conditions for the formation of the state, they seek the differential gap that makes possible the establishment of relations of domination outside the societies themselves.
26 Franz Oppenheimer, The State (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Company, 1914), p. 14. 27 Morton Fried, "The Evolution of Social Stratification and the State," reprinted in S. Diamond, ed., Culture and History (New York: Columbia University Press), quoted in Balandier, p. 154. OO Ibid., p. 154. 29 A. Southall, Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), paraphrased by Balandier, p. 155. 30 Balandier, pp. 155-56. 10
The conquest models portray the state as a forced institution by a vic torious group over a defeated group, with the aim of conquering and dominating them. This dominion "had no other purpose than the economic 31 exploitation of the vanquished by the victors." Although conquest has caused forms of domination, it is not the exclusive or dominant form. Most, if not all, of the conquering societies already had a state. Engels and Morgan reveal that the Teutons and Iriquois devel oped states internally. Consequently, the emergence of the state can be linked to the internal developments of social conflict in society.
31 Oppenheimer, p. 14. CHAPTER III
THE MARXIST MODEL OF THE STATE
Introduction
This chapter investigates the Marxist theory on the origin of the state. In addition, it examines the development of the state com mensurate to the development of society. The previous chapter revealed that state societies have not always appeared in history. In addition, state societies are typified by conflict. The remainder of the chapter focused on theories of the origin of the state. It concluded that theories which argued that the conquest of societies by other societies as an explanation for the origin of the state were inadequate. This chapter, hence, studies the internal developments of society for an explanation of the origin of the state.
General Marxist Theory of the State
Power, to Marx, derives from ownership of wealth. The class that owns and controls the means of production possesses a dispropor tionate share of society's wealth by virtue of its ownership. On the individual level, Marx asserts that "the power each individual exer cises over others’ activity or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of . . . money.
^Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. and ed. David McLelland (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 66.
11 12
For Marx, the organized power of the wealthy class, i.e., in capitalist society this would be the capitalist class, takes its major form in the state, "Political power is merely the organized power of 2 one class for oppressing another." Charles Anderson notes that the
Marxist theory of the state recognizes "that the state at times may exercise power as ostensible mediator, acquiring independence from con- 3 flicting, but mutually balancing cli-sses." This occurs only in acute
Instances of class conflict. On the whole, however, the state is an instrument for the dominant class to control society.
Engels, writing on the origin of the state, studied the inter nal transformations of society which gave rise to the state. He relied heavily on Morgan's data. The state is a product of civilized society, and Engels examines how the state as an institution emerged as society developed. Although Engels uses Morgan's data, they differ in their general outlook on human history. Their differences are elucidated by
Emmanuel Terray.^ Terray argues that Morgan was a structural evolu tionist. He also notes that Morgan wrote that "the institutions of man-kind have sprung up in a progressive connected series, each of which represents the result of unconscious reformatory movements to
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton Press, 1972), p. 352. 3 Charles Anderson, The Political Economy of Social Class (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 12-13. 4 Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972).
^Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and Primitive Societies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 13 extricate society from existing evils.Man, to Morgan, was not con scious of this evolution, and Terray comments that "whereas historians see history as the work of man; Morgan saw it as a process of which man is the subject."^ Terray asserts that Marx and Engels viewed human beings as the object as well as subject. He also notes that Morgan had
Marx’ and Engels' admiration because he concluded that "it is accord ingly probable that the great epochs of human progress have been iden
tified, more or less, directly with the enlargement of the sources of g subsistence."
Historical Model
The Marxist tradition argues that there are stages of human
development in history, and the essence of these stages is that they
represent different modes of production— different ways in which human beings relate to each other in society. These stages are primitive
communism, barbarism-ancient communal and state ownership, feudalism,
and capitalism.
Primitive Communism
The first stage Engels called "savage society" and is charac
terized by primitive communism. Primitive communism is significant to
Marxist theory because there were no class distinctions, it had "no
internal antagonisms, and its social organization was controlled by no 9 coercive power other than public opinion."
6 7 8 Morgan, p. 6. Terray, p. 16. Morgan, p. 19. 9 John Eaton, Political Economy (New York: International Pub lishers, 1963), p. 13. 14
Engels argued that there was no centralized political apparatus in these societies, which covered a span of forty thousand years, because material conditions in the base of society— communal property and equality— did not call for a state.
Savage society is based upon the collective ownership of the means of production, co-operative social relations, and complete equality in all spheres of life. Due to the absence of private property, such key institutions of the property system were not existent. Tribal society was a self-governing community in which elected chiefs claimed no superiority to any other members.
Engels adumbrated that the "sharp disproportions of material wealth or
the dichotomy between possessors and dispossessed were absent from the 12 primitive commune." As there were no distinctions of property and propertyless, antagonisms engendered by economic inequalities would not arise.
Barbarism
For Engels, the technical basis for the rise of the state was
the advance made in the period of barbarism, which experienced a change
from the primitive division of labor between the sexes to a new and far more productive social division of labor. With the increasing division
of labor, class distinctions became more apparent.
The cleavage of society into contending classes with opposed inter ests created the need for a public apparatus which could be used to regulate the antagonisms while maintaining the power and privileges of the ruling class.
The state, as well as division of labor between mental and physical
labor (town and country), is predicated upon a goods surplus great
^°Ibid., p. 9. ^^Engels, p. 6. ^^Ibid., p. 14.
^^Ibid., pp. 14-15. 15 enough to support the nonproducing classes. The state, hence, also performs the new function of distributing any surplus that remains
above the immediate needs of consumption.^^ Earlier, Morgan confirmed
a similar proposition that the transformation from social organization
to political organization became necessary when agriculture and the
domestication of animals grew to be sufficiently productive to enable
city living and the development of private property.Therefore the
state as an institution did not exist in early primitive societies but
developed from the ruins of the clan commune.^^
According to Marx, the state varies in complexity with society,
and it originates with the formation of private ownership. The first
form of private ownership, which he called tribal ownership,
corresponds to the underdeveloped stage of production . . . the social division of labor is at this stage still very elementary . . . the social structure is therefore limited to an extension of the family : patriarchal family chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, and finally slaves.
The class relation between citizen and slave is not complete in this
stage, and since this is an "early form of ownership, much of the prop- 18 erty is communal." Thus, the role of the state organization is
rather limited to control over slavery, which was accounted for by bonding 19 prisoners of war into slavery. In this stage, there was increasing
^^Karl Marx, Capital, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1885-94), 1:489-90.
^^Morgan, p. Ilxi. ^^Engels, p. 162.
^^Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Tucker, p. 114. 18 Engels, p. 162. 19 Marx adumbrated that the stage where slavery was the exploited class was not the only possible form that could have evolved. It was 16 wealth (cattle, slaves, treasures) that was captured during hunts and intertribal warfare, which led to systematic raids as means of gaining a livelihood. With this sudden possession of wealth, there became a need for
an institution that would not only safeguard the newly acquired property of the private individuals against the communistic tradi tions of the gentile order, would not only sanctify private prop erty, formerly held in light esteem, . , . but also would stamp the gradually developing new forms of acquiring property, and conse quently, of constantly accelerating Increase of wealth with the seal of general recognition; an institution that would penetrate, not only the newly rising class division of labor, but also the right of the possessing classes to exploit the non-possessing classes and the rule of the former over the latter.
This rather lengthy statement summarizes the need and role of the state in relation with the development of material conditions. The state's form is commensurate with the nature of the property relations. Conse quently, at this stage the state Itself is "primitive" in form.
In this form of ownership, which Marx called ancient communal 21 and state ownership, "private property is developing, but as an 22 abnormal form subordinate to communal ownership." The productive system of this epoch was characterized by slavery, and the class rela
tion between free citizens and slaves was completely developed.
It is important to note that this period was still, in essence. one alternative. See Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (New York: International Press, 1964), pp. 32, 62. 20 Ibid., p. 109. 21 Marx and Engels differed in their terminology. Engels desig nated the term barbarism to this period. Marx used ancient communal and city states. I am linking the two because they roughly represent the same period, particularly the transition from stateless societies to state societies.
22m,arx, German Ideology, p. 115. 17 a union of several tribes. The city states, however, could not continue
to be administered with each tribe having its own government. The gen
tile system— kinship organization— decayed with the inheritance of property within the family. This accumulation of wealth in Individual
families gave them power against the gens and created the "first rudi- 23 ments of a hereditary nobility."" These wealthy families became
powerful and united outside their gens into a privileged class. This
rising aristocracy engaged in commerce and at times piracy and often
used their wealth as principal means for stifling the majority of prop
ertyless classes.
From this point the developing money system penetrated like a cor rosive acid,in the traditional life of the rural communities . . . Creditors' bills and mortgage bonds— for by then the Athenians had also invented the mortgage— respected neither the gens nor the phratries. But the old gentile constitution knew nothing of money, credit, and monetary debt.
The gentile system was inconsistent with the rising money system, part
of a new economic foundation, and its impotence towards the new mode of
production led to its downfall.
Thus there were problems within the old mode of production, and
support for a new system came from within. With the increasing popula
tion, including the number of slaves, the gentry system proved even
more antiquated. There was no means to keep bondspersons in check. As
Balandier confirms, the division of society into classes (especially
when the slaves outnumbered the citizens) facilitated "the substitution 25 of the territorial link for the link of consanguinity." Eisenstadt
also writes that these political developments emerged because class
2^Engels, p. 108. p. 111. p. 156, 18 differentials "created problems of allocation, regulation and integra- 26 tion," which required a centralized organization. The nascent state which quietly grew as a unity of the new nobility had already created organs to protect its interests and gradually replaced the gens.
To protect its interests, they formed "nauceries" (small dis tricts), each armed. Oppenheimer asserts that a society must be cen tralized territorially for the purpose of attack and defense. "It is sufficiently difficult to mobilize the clan or tribe for common 27 defense." This ability of the nascent state further drove the final nails into the coffin of the gentry government.
As Morgan also revealed,
It is evident that the failure of the gentile institutions to meet the requirements of society originated the movement to withdraw all civil powers from the gentes, phratries, and tribes, and reinvest them in new constituencies.
A constitution was consequently adopted, as exemplified in the city state of Athens, centralizing the administration of the first docu mented city state. "This gave rise to a system of general Athenian popular law, which stood above the legal uses of the tribes. It bestowed on the citizens of Athens, as such, certain rights and legal 29 protection." Thus Morgan, as Marxists, saw property as "the new ele ment that had been gradually remolding Grecian institutions to prepare
for political society, of which it was to be the mainspring as well as 30 the foundation." And Elman Service also concurs that the most
26 s. N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (Glencoe, 111.; Free Press, 1963), p. 95. 27 28 Oppenheimer, p. 32. Morgan, p. 263. 29 30 Engels, p. 110. Morgan, pp. 223-24. 19 striking feature of the state, or political organization, "is the 31 crosscutting of the society into political-economic classes."
A further development of the Athenian state was to divide the free people into three classes: noblemen, tillers of the land, and artisans. Although the nobility was the only class to hold public office, no other legal distinctions existed among these classes, which, hence, composed the free citizens of Athens. There were legal distinc tions between free persons and slaves. Although the institution's capacity was somewhat limited, the Athenian state illustrates the role of the state and law in meeting the demands of its dominant class. As
Engels noted.
It shows that the customary holding of office in the gens by cer tain families had already developed into a privilege of these families that was little contested; that these families already powerful owing to their wealth, began to unite . . . into a privi leged class; and that the nascent state sanctioned this usurpa tion. ^2
This statement illustrates how the power of the state evolved at a certain stage of societal development— the emergence of a propertied class. The state, standing as an institution subordinate to society, 33 appeared to transcend the conflicting economic interests in society.
The state acting in behalf of the preservation of order, had a legiti mate monopoly of violence, which enabled the state to enforce its allegations on society. To use Weber's terms, Lenin referred to this
31 Elman Service, Profiles of Ethnology (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. xxvi 32 Engels, pp. 110-11.
^^Ibid., p. 159. 20 as "organized and systematized violence.
Many precedents which the Athenian state initiated have become common aspects in modern civilization. These include territorial boundaries, a legitimate control of the use of violence (army, police), and the establishment of a taxation system. The state also obtained the authority to make laws, for "in possession of the public power and of the right to levy taxes, the officials as organs of society, now 35 stand above it,"
Morgan saw the same changes during the development of the Roman city state as well. In Rome, the government that replaced the gens was based on the propertied classes and on city wards. These propertied classes became "the commanding element, as is shown by the lodgement of 36 the controlling power of the government." The Romans developed out of the gentile society, into one founded upon territory and property.
"Henceforth, the creation and protection of property became the primary 37 objects of the government." Thus, this stage clearly links the emer gence of the state with the development of private ownership. The propertied class controlled the state apparatus and used it to meet its interests.
Feudal Society
The fall of the Roman Empire led to the destruction of a cen
tralized state. In addition to this political event, the development
I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 52.
^^Engels, p. 160. ^^Morgan, p. 348. ^^Ibid. 21 of the productive forces fostered the feudalism of Europe.
In the course of a prolonged period of time new productive forces developed— improved methods of working iron, the iron plough, the loom, and improved methods of farming— and corresponding to these new forces of production a new type of society, feudal society.
The feudal epoch was characterized by the estate as the form of property ownership. The population was sparse and feudal development extended over a greater area than in tribal society.
From these conditions and the mode of organization of the conquest determined by them, feudal society developed under the influence of the Germanic military constitution. Like the tribal and communal ownership, it is based on the community; but the directly producing class standing over it is not, as in the case of the ancient com munity, the slaves, but the enserfed small peasantry.
Feudal society was socially and politically a unit. Political authority, which was controlled by a few, "arose from an authoritarian system of economic production, and found an organizational counterpart in religion, the family, and education.Religion and the legal state were fused in feudalism, and control of religion was limited to the upper class. The linked ownership of the mental means of produc tion helped the ruling class to maintain hegemony.
The class which was excluded from the processes of control in one field was excluded from active control of others. Those who ruled in any field, ruled in every field.
Capitalist Society
In feudal society, the political institution and economic institution were meshed. The serfs were tied to an ordained hierarchy.
38 39 Eaton, p. 16. Marx, The German Ideology, p. 117.
^^Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (New York: John Day Books, 1934), p. 160. 41 Ibid., p. 160. 22
As capitalism emerged, there was a separation, between commerce and industry on the one hand, and the state on the other. There was a dif ferent meaning and function in law in feudalism from capitalism,
"Ownership, which in law means the power of a thing, symbolizes a unit of which the form is typical.Thus, ownership comprised a complex
of things, evolving from entities such as farms to individual items
like goods. The feudal relations changed to capitalist ones by a mere
force of facts. "It was replaced by the private contracts of do ut 43 facias." The form of state a society has reflects the type of eco
nomic foundation within that society. A system such as capitalism, which is based on "free," legally unattached or unrestricted labor,
cannot maintain a state structure which enforces legally ordained
estates. Consequently, the state in capitalist society helped to
remove the shackles which bound the serf to the land.
As with previous epochs, the possession of property (the means
of production) gives the owner the upper hand in society. Marxist
theory argues that the state in capitalist society serves the interests
of the capitalist class. Thus, although it may appear that the state
in capitalist society is merely a mediator between competing groups,
Marxist theory argues this is merely appearance; the essence of the state
is that the class which controls it wields it to serve its interests.
^^Wolfgang Friedman, Legal Theory (New York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 1967), p. 248.
^^Karl Renner, "The Development of Capitalist Property and the Legal Institutions Complementary to the Property Norm," reprinted in Vilhelm Aubert, ed.. Sociology of Law (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 33. 23
There are three different traditions in contemporary Marxist theory which focus on the capitalist state: instrumentalist theory, 44 structuralist theory, and Hegelian-Marxist theory.
Instrumentalist Theory
This approach asserts that the state serves the interests of
the capitalist class because it is controlled by the capitalist class.
A major contributor to this approach, Ralph Miliband, discusses the
capitalist state by first attempting to reject the claim that bourgeois 45 society is pluralistic in nature.
One way the pluralist thesis is refuted begins by questioning
the actual differences at election time. "The assertion of such pro
found differences is a matter of great importance for the functioning 46 and legitimation of the political system." Miliband, however, points
not to the differences of political leaders and parties in relation to
each other, but the similarities they share. The Democrats and Repub
licans have differences in regard to some policies (e.g.. Supreme Court
44 These distinctions were made by David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erick Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review 27 (October 1975):29-43.
^^Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 4. The pluralist thesis states that the state does not depend on the predominance of a particular class, but rather reconciles organized conflicting groups. These competing groups are in a field of competi tion sanctioned by the state itself. This pluralist conception also rejects the Marxist thesis of an organized ruling class, because elites in economic, social, and political institutions lack the degree of cohesiveness necessary to form a ruling class. 46 Miliband, pp. 68-69. 24 appointments), but they all believe in the fundamental, immutable doc trines of private property. The point is that despite any differences, as genuine as they are, the Republicans and Democrats are all bourgeois politicians to Miliband who may have minor disagreements on the degree of state intervention. They share in common "a basic and usually explicit belief in the validity and virtue of the capitalist legal sys tem. Agencies in government have some independence from the execu tive, but not ideological freedom. With this common ideology, the plurality does not exclude the existence of a ruling class; these com peting elites constitute the ruling class.
All political office holders never seriously question the validity of the enterprise system itself. It is this consensus which
ensures the stability of the system.
A good test of the pluralist theory is the treatment of attempts
to challenge capitalist society directly. The Communist Party, which 48 advocated socialism, was once an illegal party in the United States.
The Black Panther Party, which also propagated anticapitalist and anti
imperialist ideology, was the subject of harassment in the late 1960*s
and early 1970’s. These organizations clearly present alternative
socialist relations in their doctrines, which would replace the exist
ing capitalist relations.
*^Ibid., p. 70.
^^See Doug Dowd, The Twisted Dream {New York: Winthrop Press, 1974), and Richard Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America (New York: Doubleday Books, 1970). 25 49 Another proponent of this approach is G. William Domhoff, He explicitly reveals the personal connections between individuals who occupy positions of economic and political power. Through cabinet positions, government committees, contributions, and the Business Coun cil, Domhoff exposes the closeness of the leaders of the business world with political leaders.There is consequently a belief in the sanc tity of the free enterprise system. Beliefs as this will condition beliefs that the fortune and status of the country are directly related to the thriving of the capitalist economy. "In serving the interests of business and helping the capitalist enterprise to thrive, govern ments are really fulfilling their exalted role as guardians of the good of all."^^ Thus, the laws of government in capitalist society would naturally seek to help the business sector, or the capitalist class.
Miliband argues that "the capitalist enterprise depends . . . on the bounties and direct support of the state, and can only preserve its 52 'private’ character on the basis of such public help."
In essence, this approach argues that the state in capitalist society is a regime in which an economically dominant class rules through democratic institutions which support the facade of pluralism.
Because clashing interests are competing within a democratic framework, no class, to pluralists, can appear to be assured of complete lasting
49 G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? ( Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
^^G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).
^Hliliband, p. 75. ^^Ibid., p. 78. 26 control. The instrumentalist approach "pierces the veil of legiti- 53 macy" of this doctrine.
Structuralist Approach
This perspective examines the objective relationship the state has with capitalism and the capitalist class. Nicos Poulantzas writes:
The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objec tive relation. This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reasons of the system itself; the direct participation of members of the ruling class is not the cause but the effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence.^4
Robin Murray argues that functions of the state include the guarantee ing of property rights, standardizing currency and law, regulating business cycles, ensuring the availability, training, and control of the working class, and the directing expansion into foreign countries.
Murray writes that the state performs these functions with the use of military power, foreign aid, government controls, and economic block ades of other countries as well as the traditional properties discussed above.
The structuralist perspective, hence, looks not at the people who comprise the institutions of society, but at the objective rela
tions, or functions, that these institutions (i.e., the state) have.
53 Gold et al., p. 34.
^^Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in Robin Blackburn, ed.. Ideology and Social Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 245.
^^Robin Murray, "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State," New Left Review 67 (1971):86-91. 27
"The structuralist theory of the state attempts to unravel the func
tions the state must perform in order to reproduce capitalist society as a whole.The state, hence, naturally propagates the divisions among the working class and serves the long-run interests of the capi
talist class as a whole.
Hegelian-Marxist Perspective
This approach asks questions such as "What is the state?"
rather than "Why does the state serve the interests of the capitalist
class?"
The basic answer is that the state is a mystification, a concrete institution which serves the interests of the dominant class, but which seeks to portray itself as serving the nation as a whole, thereby obscuring the basic lines of class antagonism.
Hegelian-Marxists study Ideology, consciousness, authority, and insti
tutions which shape ideas and investigate the impact on societal
attitudes. Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony illustrates this type u 58 of approach.
Summary of the Approaches
All three approaches start with the position that the state in
capitalist society serves the interests of the capitalist class. They
differ in the way they approach the link between the ruling class and
the state, but the link is present nevertheless. As in other class
societies, these approaches reveal that the state serves the interests
^^Gold et al., p. 36. ^^Ibid., p. 40.
^^Antonio Gramsci. The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1957), p. 186. 28 of the class which owns and controls the means of production, despite any claim of universality.
Conclusion
The state as an institution evolved as the social relations among members of society evolved. The writings indicate that the emer gence of class divisions led to internal transformations of the social and political organization of society. This transformation was the substitution of a political institution, based on property and terri tory, for kinship relations based on the gens.
The writings also reveal that the state through history has been related to the exploitation of one class by another.
As slavery was the first form of exploitation, peculiar to the world of antiquity; it was followed by serfdom of the Middle Ages, and by wage labor of modern times.
As class distinctions (in relationship to the means of production) occurred in the base of society, the state apparatus, as part of the
superstructure, reflected them. Consequently the link between state and class distinctions in society is crucial for an understanding of
the nature of the state. It is only by recognizing what the conditions
for the emergence and maintenance of the state are that we can under
stand how it can be eliminated.
^^Engels, p. 163. CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIALIST STATE IN THEORY
Introduction
This chapter pursues the theoretical writings of Marx and
Engels on the type of state they envisaged in socialist society. The previous chapter revealed that the emergence of the state is linked to the emergence of different classes in society. From the formation of the state in antiquity to capitalist society, the state was an instru ment of the ruling class for its domination over the other classes. In capitalist society, for example, it is the capitalist class over the middle and working classes. Since the emergence of the state is con nected to the development of class distinctions and private ownership of the means of production, the solution to Marx lies beyond the state to a transformation of class society to a classless society.
Role of Proletariat
Marxist theory distinguishes the base of society— the mode of production, the social relations of production, and conflicts arising from the relations— and the superstructure— the entire cultural and political development,^ The superstructure is not strictly determined
Hlarx presents this crucial component of his theory in "Pref ace," A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, reprinted in Howard Selsam, David Goldberg, and Harry Martel, eds., Dynamics of Social Change (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 52-53. A good secondary source for understanding this relationship can be
29 30 2 by the material base of society, but it corresponds to it. Since the state is in the superstructure, there must be material conditions in the base of society to which the state is homologous. If the state is
to be transformed in communist society, there could not be any class distinctions in societal relations. As there was a change in the class
structure which gave rise to the state, there must be a transformation of societal relations to eliminate the state.
Thus, an important proposition to the Marxist theory of social
ist society is that the exploited wealth-producing class (in capitalist
society this is the working class), which is most concerned with
advancing the productive forces, "stands as the eventual inheritor of 3 political power." Marx wrote that the capitalist class acts as a fet-
ter on the productive forces and has become a reactionary force. The working class "represents and is indispensable"^ to the increasing
development of the productive forces. Although it is not inevitable
that the working class will overthrow the capitalists, it is a neces
sary precondition for the withering away of the state in Marxist theory.
Marx and Engels envisaged a communist revolution as the means
to achieving a society free of class antagonisms.
found in Maurice Cornforth, Historical Materialism (New York: Inter national Publishers, 1954), pp. 83-84. 2 A good illustration of this point can be found in Raymond Wil liams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," New Left Review 82 (1973):4. 3 Anderson, pp. 12-13. 4 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 341.
^Anderson, p. 13. 31
By this act, the proletariat frees the means of production from the character of capital they have thus far borne, and gives their socialized character complete freedom to work itself out.^
The seizure of power by the proletariat would lead to a classless society, in theory, because the proletariat, or laboring class, is the universal class. Whereas all cannot be capitalists, landowners and entrepreneurs, all can be laborers. Since the laboring class is the universal class, then a classless society is in essence a society of one class, which collectively owns and controls the means of production.
It is only in the late stages of capitalism, where the working class has class consciousness that enables them to play a revolutionary role, that a transformation of society can occur.^
Withering or Transcendence
There has been much confusion on the nature of the state in socialist society depicted by Marx and Engels. This confusion lies in
the distinction between a withering away of the state and the tran scending of the state. Traditional sociological literature has often implied that the Marxist dream is of a society that has no government at all. A sociology textbook describes this "dream" as a society
"where everybody wishes the goodwill of everyone else, and governments g wither away." This is a good example of how the socialist state is
^Friedrich Engels, Socialism; Utopian and Scientific, in Tucker, p. 639.
^See Anderson, pp. 134-40; Georg Lukacs, History and Class Con- sciousness (Cambridge; M.I.T. Press, 1971), p. 73; and C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 324-27. g Thomas Ford Hoult, Sociology for a New Day (Random House, 1974), p. 140. 32 misconceived in the literature. Marx and Engels wrote of governing bodies, but the form they take is drastically different from previous
ones (in class societies).
As R. Hunt observed, Marx forecasted some central organiza- g tion. In The Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels wrote
of an association of some kind, although it is very unclear what form
it takes. Nevertheless, it does imply some form of organization.
Shlomo Avineri argues that Marx saw the higher stage of socialist
society with direction and planning, at least in economic production,
"since socialism implies the subjugation of man's creative powers to
his conscious direction.When critiquing the Gotha Program,for
example, Marx did not refute its clause calling for state intervention
of factory workshops and domestic industry. He only added the manner 12 in which state inspectors ought to be removed. Marx deemed it
necessary to control the anarchy of the market which he analyzed in
Capital. Engels also supports this goal through planning in Socialism; 13 Utopian and Scientific.
Although Engels forese.s planning in socialist society, he
writes of the state dying and withering away.
As soon as there is nc longer any social class to be held in subju gation; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for
9 R. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (Balti more: Penguin Books, 1970).
^^Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 203.
^^Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in Tucker, p. 383. 12 13 Ibid. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, p. 605. 33
existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer n e c e s s a r y .
Since the state is defined by Marx and Engels as a mechanism for class rule, as long as there is a classless society without class antago nisms, the state by definition disappears.
With the introduction of the socialist order of society, the state will dissolve of itself and disappear. As soon as it becomes pos sible to speak of freedom, the state . . . ceases to exist. ^5
The state in biological terms would wither because the proletariat would not exploit the bourgeoisie as other "state" societies have exploited other classes, but would rather eliminate the bourgeoisie as a class. What this means is that there would not be any group of people in society who would have private ownership of the means of production.
Although Engels writes that the state will wither away, it is
the state as the Marxist tradition has defined it. There are still
organizational networks.
The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not abolished. It dies out. This gives the measure of the value of the phrase— a free state.
Marx asserted that a free state consists in "converting the state from
an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate
^^Ibid., p. 635. 15 Friedrich Engels, "F. Engels in a letter to A. Bebel, March 18- 28, 1875," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1955), p. 294.
^^Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, p. 635. 34 to i t . " "
The state that withers away is a particularistic state which caters to a small class. The new "association" is merely an adminis tration for the whole population. As Avineri elucidates, "once the proletariat submits the egoism of civil society to the universalism of the state, the traditional dichotomies between state and civil society 18 disappear." Thus, although the state takes a new form, there remains central organization of some kind, although Engels declared the state will cease to exist in a communist society.
Part of the difficulty may be avoided by pointing out that there is a marked difference between the terms Marx and Engels used when discussing the ultimate disappearance of the state under socialism. While Engels in his passage in Anti-Diihring speaks about the state withering away, Marx always refers to the abolition and transcen dence (Aufhebung) of the state.
Engels* abolition of the state was a biological simile, whereas Marx' discussion of transcendence of the state portrayed government of a dif
ferent kind.
The state therefore transforms itself from particularistic
(agent of one class) to universalistic (agent of society as a whole).
This government is "no longer separated from the people's mundane life, 20 rather they are its continuous manifestation and expression." This
expression is maintained by universal suffrage. Universal suffrage is
a necessary condition for the transcendence of the state.
^^Marx, Critique of Gotha Program, p. 394.
^^Avinerl, p. 207. ^^Ibid., pp. 202-3. 20 Loyd Easton, "Marx and Individual Liberty," XV World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria (September 1973), p. 3. 35
It is the basic prerequisite for the establishment of a universally oriented state power dialectically bound to seek its own disappear ance. The abolition of universal suffrage in a revolutionary situation, according to Marx, means reversion to a partial, illu- sionary universalism with one segment of society declaring itself the voice of all society.
Dictatorship of the Proletariat
The transformation of the state in socialist society is not a simple one, as is a transformation toward socialist relations. The development of socialist political organization does not occur imme diately after the proletarian revolution.
Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the pro letariat.
Thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat, in theory, is a state struc ture existing between the abolition of the existing bourgeois state and the communist society where the state apparatus transforms itself from a superordinate to subordinate position. Marx had written in 1848 that
"the class dictatorship of the proletariat is the necessary transition 23 point to the abolition of class distinctions." In a letter to
J. Weydemeyer in March 1852, Marx stated that no credit was due to him for discovering the existence of classes, or of class struggle. In a famous passage, Marx wrote:
^^Avineri, p. 212. 22 Marx, Critique of Gotha Program, p. 395. 23 Marx, quoted in Hal Draper, "The Dictatorship of the Prole tariat," in Michael Curtis, ed., Marxism (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), p. 286 (actual source of cite not given). 36
What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and 3) that this dic tatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.^
Political Nature
The transition period is necessary because there are still
opposing classes which remain in society. Consequently, there is a dual nature to the dictatorship of the proletariat. One part is the
element of coercion. Hunt asserts that in the dictatorship period,
"the state will continue as an organ of coercion, but with the differ
ence that the coercion will be exercized by the proletarian majority 25 against the bourgeois minority." There is still oppressiveness
because the new proletarian state is met by the defeated bourgeoisie,
who make up a hostile counterrevolutionary force. The state in this
stage will include certain features of the existing order, including
inequalities of pay, but more importantly, the state apparatus that is
exclusive to oppressive societies. The provisional government must
begin to establish socialist relations. As Engels notes, "the prole
tariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into 26 state property." The coercive political role of the state can be
seen by Marx' ten regulations, which are general statutes that the
proletariat will enact after the revolution:
^^Karl Marx, "Karl Marx to J. Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852," in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 69. 25 Hunt, p . 103. 26 Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, p. 635, 37
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3- Abolition of all right to inheritance. 4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels. 5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan. 8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of indus trial armies, especially for agriculture. 9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country. 10. Free education to all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factories in its present form. Combination of educa tion with industrial production.
Avineri notes that these decrees all involve the wielding of state power for the attainment of universal aims.
By applying this policy, the proletarian state will be the first state in history to use its political power for universal and not partial ends.
The working class uses its political supremacy to take the instruments of production from the bourgeoisie. Marx argued for this seizure and for the establishment of a planned economy, where the production of commodities for exchange purposes is done away with, as well as the 29 mastery of the products over the producers.
27 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 352.
Avineri, p. 206, 29 See Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, and Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942), pp. 23-28, for a discussion on the differences of products produced for use and products produced for exchange. 38
Thus, the coercion that the provisionary state applies is against hostile forces which attempt to block socialist production and planning. Since the dictatorship of the proletariat is to abolish the bourgeois class, this coercive element is presumably temporary. The dictatorship period is temporary because the capitalist class is eliminated as a class by virtue of the fact that the ownership of the means of production is taken from them and everyone consequently belongs to the laboring class— the universal class.
Democratic Nature
The other characteristic of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the majority rule of the working class, guaranteed by universal suf frage. This element of the dictatorship can be best seen by examining the historical-social context in which the term was employed.
Hal Draper observes that Marx and Engels discussed the concept
"dictatorship of the proletariat" in clusters of three periods:
(1) 1850-52, i.e., after the revolutions in 1848; (2) 1872-75, i.e., after the Paris Commune; and (3) 1890-91, echoing 1875. This chapter focuses on the early writings and leaves those writings which were greatly influenced by the Paris Commune until after a discussion of the
Commune.
Marx seldom used the term "dictatorship of the proletariat."
When he did, it was always in what was then private communication not intended for mass publication. When he did use the concept, it was
"particularly in connection with the BlanquistsMarx had sought
^^Draper, p. 286. 39 joint action on numerous political endeavors with Blanqui and other revolutionary organizations, in spite of theoretical and political dif ferences. In this united front, Marx and Engels "rejected the Blanquist conception of dictatorship, and counterposed it to their own formula- 31 tion of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Whereas the Blanquists envisaged a dictatorship by a revolutionary minority, the emphasis of
Marx and Engels was on class rule, the rule of the proletariat. Thus, the Marxian movement perceived this provisional government as a rule by the majority, not a minority. Engels in retrospect in 1875, wrote on the difference between Blanquism and Marxism:
From Blanqui's assumption, that any revolution may be made by the outbreak of a small revolutionary minority follows of itself the necessity of a dictatorship after the success of the venture. This is, of course, a dictatorship not of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of a small minority that has made the revolution, and who are themselves previously organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals.
Draper argues that Marx and Engels used dictatorship of the proletariat not to unite with Blanqui on political terms, but, in con nection with the Blanquists, to contrast their meaning of dictatorship.
Ordinarily, Marx’ expression for this idea was ’rule of the prole tariat', 'political power of the working class', etc., as in the Manifesto. When, however, it is a question of counterimposing this class concept to the Blanquist-type dictatorship, it is dressed in the formula 'class dictatorship'
Beyond the connection with Blanqui, Marx used the term in a
private letter to J. Weydemeyer, which has already been cited. The
^^Ibid., p. 285. 32 Engels, quoted in Draper, p. 256 (actual cite not given) 33 Draper, p. 287. 40 reason for Marx’ discussion is that Weydemeyer previously had written an article for the January 1, 1852, issue of the New York Turn-Zeitung, entitled "Dictatorship of the Proletariat." That Weydemeyer previously wrote an article on this subject is important even though its contents were merely a replay of the Manifesto.
Indications are that when Marx penned his famous letter of March 5 to Weydemeyer, he had just recently received the latter's own article on the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Draper argues that Marx was giving his American friend sugges tions for future articles, for the next paragraph begins; "From the 35 foregoing notes take whatever you consider suitable." Marx, hence, was giving advice to his associate.
In using 'dictatorship of the proletariat' here, instead of his usual 'rule of the proletariat', etc., Marx was echoing Weydemeyer, who himself was echoing Marx of 1850, Marx was throwing in a phrase that had social connotations and associations for his correspondent. His use of it in a private letter in passing depended on a certain understood background. In this sense, Weydemeyer was not just the recipient of the famous letter, but its begetter.
Thus, the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" was a reluctant term for Marx, and it was never initiated by him, except in private political dialogue. Despite the authoritarian connotation of the word, as Draper writes, "dictatorship of the proletariat is linked 37 to the idea of majority support."
Conclusion
Marx and Engels envisaged a transformation of the state in
socialist society. The state, formerly an agent of the class owning
^^Ibid., p. 290. ^^Marx, "Marx to Weydemeyer," p. 70.
^^Draper, p. 290. ^^Ibld., p. 287. 41 the instruments of production, loses its class character after the proletarian revolution, which in theory leads to a classless society.
The transcended state, hence, becomes an association for the whole society.
The theoretical conclusion drawn by Marx is that the dictator ship of the proletariat must be the transitional stage to the achieve ment of a universalistic association. Since the defeated bourgeoisie would represent a hostile, counterrevolutionary force, there must be a political force to sustain the revolution, and sweep away the old con ditions of production. Since all society owns the means of production,
the bourgeoisie, which as a class exclusively owned them, is no longer a class by definition.
The proletarian state, outside of its confrontation with the
remnants of the capitalist epoch, is characterized by democracy. The
use of universal suffrage must not be confused with the Social Demo
crats' aim of achieving a transformation through universal suffrage.
"Such an attitude fails to take into account the dialectical relation- 38 ship between ends and means." The "reformist" Social Democrats saw
universal suffrage as a means (means toward a proletarian revolution is
not a subject of this thesis) to achieve certain aims. Marx envisaged
universal suffrage as the key to subordinate the state to civil
society.
The dictatorship of the proletariat loses its political element
after the hostile forces are eliminated, and the state as a political
38 Avineri, p. 10. 42 power withers away. This Marx concludes would lead to socialist rela tions .
In the higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving sub ordination of the individual to the division of labor, and there with also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want, after the productive forces have increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly— only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeons right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.
With socialist relations in the base of society, the state, as part of the superstructure, transcends its class character.
39 Marx, Critique of Gotha Program, p. 388. CHAPTER V
THE PARIS COMMUNE— A NECESSARY FAILURE
Introduction
This thesis examines two historical events that can be analyzed in relationship to the theoretical writings of the socialist state.
One instance is the Paris Commune of 1871.
The Paris Commune of 1871 is met with much confusion concerning its political nature and its contribution to socialist development.
There have been contradictory analyses of the Commune within Marxist and non-Marxist camps. Marx' attitude on the Paris Commune was very complex. He defended the actions of the Commune in The Civil War in
France, yet he also wrote that much of the Commune was in no way socialist. The apparent confusion of Marx' writings is alleviated if one separates the Commune's insurrection itself as a political act and what the Commune attempted to do after it was claimed. The distinc
tion, hence, is chat the Commune, "though doomed to failure, introduced some elements of revolutionary significance for the development of
future society."^ Before examining the Paris Commune itself, the con ditions prior to 1871 must briefly be presented.
Pre-Commune Conditions
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx vividly
describes Napoleon Ill's rise to power in 1852. He remained in power
^Avineri, p. 240.
43 44 until 1870. In a country that had not even begun to undergo an exten sive Industrial Revolution which England had experienced, Napoleon III
"skillfully maintained strong support for eighteen years among the masses of the peasantry and most of the middle class." The last two years of the Empire, however, had been marked by a growing opposition to the regime. Louis Napoleon had previously granted greater civil rights and constitutional reform, but the concessions did not satisfy the left and disturbed the right. In 1870, Bismark proposed a Hohenzollern for the
Spanish throne, thus ending French patronage at the throne, and the
Franco-Prussian War began. The smashing defeat of France created con ditions for the emergence of the Paris Commune.
As mentioned, the peasantry gave their support to Napoleon III.
The French bourgeoisie also gave tacit support to their leader, only because they were making high profits and enjoyed the privileges which 3 a dominant class receives. The bourgeoisie interpreted the lost war as "the first sign of the impotent master,"^ giving them access to power. The middle classes of France "had been spoilt under the hot corruption of the Empire."^ During Napoleon Ill's reign, they had iso lated themselves from the proletariat, forming a liberal, reformist force. They had been enemies of the working class. At the end of the
Franco-Prussian War, the middle class also "docilely bent its head and
2 Eugene Schulkind, ed.. The Paris Commune of 1871; The View from the Left (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1974), p. 29. 3 Lissagaray, History of the Commune of 1871 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967 c-1886), p. 4.
\bid., p. 5. ^Ibid. 45 let the foreigner plunge its sword into the very bosom of France,"'*^
The working class, as the Eighteenth Brumaire reveals, strongly opipotsteaS the French regime throughout Louis Bonaparte's reign. Lissagary emstes that the proletariat "continued the struggle single-handed."^ It saw the fall of France as a catalyst towards a revolutionary transfoonatâajim of society.
When word reached Paris of the defeat of Napoleon III on S^»- tember 4, 1870, "the first response of the population was to demamd ttBa® 6 overthrow of the Empire and the proclamation of a republic." The crowds were predominantly working class, but middle-class Parisians took part as well. Republicanism was a sentiment common to most of tBne bourgeoisie as well as the working class.
In hopes for military success, the Parisians formed clubs wM.(cBa were organized to help the war effort. These clubs quickly turned imtm centers of political disaffection. Their formation was spontaneous, and a central committee represented the "arrondissements" in pressurimig 9 the government for democratic measures.
Although the immediate origins of the Commune can be attributesd to Napoleon's defeat at Sedan and a patriotic revolt by Parisians against a national government which had made what many regarded as a dishonorable peace, the degenerating social conditions of Paris as welUl as all of France were also a contributing factor.
^Ibid., p. 7. ^Ibid., p. 8. g Stewart Edwards, ed.. The Communards of Paris, 1871 (Itbaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 17.
^Ibid., p. 19. 46
The Second Empire had more than doubled the national debt, and plunged all the large towns into heavy municipal debts. The war had fearfully swelled the liabilities and mercilessly ravaged the resources of the nation.
Partially due to Bismark*s tactics and partially due to the National
Assembly's inability and unwillingness to remedy the problems confront
ing France, Paris by January 1871 was in economic collapse.
The winter had been the severest in living memory. Food and fuel had been the main problems . . . Unemployment was wide spread.
By late January 1871, the "vigilance committees now joined forces with the Trade Union Federation and the International to form what was called 12 the 'Revolutionary Socialist Party."’ This party was the "organiza tional and ideological culmination of the vigilance committees and 13 clubs" that had developed up to this time.
Although the Revolutionary Socialist Party consisted of the working class and some radical petty bourgeoisie, there is a French his torian's view that the Paris Commune was only an extension of a patriotic 14 revolt inspired by the 1789 revolution. Although nationalism trig gered some Parisians to revolt, the decaying material conditions of
Paris noted above were the major force. The Commune did not appear to be a socialist revolution because the working class was not the only
^^Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, reprinted in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, On the Paris Commune (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 57.
^^Edwards, p. 23. ^^Ibid., p. 20. ^^Ibid.
^^Laronze, a French historian, argued that "the Commune . . . was not socialist; it was not even revolutionary. It became so after its death." Laronze, Histoire de la Commune de 1871 (Paris, 1928), p. 679, reprinted in Schulkind, p. 28. 47 class taking political action. In addition, the French working class movement was not totally revolutionary in character.
French Working Class Movement
Examining the political activity of the French working class prior to the Commune, there appears to be a gradual rise in political maturity. Although some proletarian spokespersons were socialist in their demands for a new society, most of the working class in France was at best quasi-socialist.
The workers* movement in France had grown as industrialization had grown. The workers’ organizations of the 1840*s were predominantly trade associations for artisans and other "craft" occupations. Hobshawm wT-ites, "The labor movement of this period was neither in composition nor in its ideology and programme a strictly 'proletarian' movement.
By the lB60's, with industrialization and deplorable living conditions, the movement included more and more factory workers and "acquired a strength it never had before.Although the proletariat was an active force, it was not necessarily socialist, at least in a comprehensive theoretical program. The documents cited, as well as the following ones, reveal this quasi-socialist fervor.
In the late 1860's, many workers came to believe that the elec tion of workers into the government apparatuses was essential for the attainment of a classless society. The famous "Manifesto of the Sixty"
J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1962), p. 212.
^^Faith Attaguile and Barbara Schwartz, "The Paris Commune," unpublished manuscript, p. 10. 48 expresses the gerw of a working class movement and working class con sciousness .
We have been politically emancipated by universal suffrage, it now remains for us to become socially emancipated . . . It has been said and repeated: there are no more classes; since '89 all French men are equal before the law. Yet for us, who possess nothing but our own two hands, who have to submit every day— whether legiti mately or arbitrarily— to the terms set by Capital . • . which disregard our interests and offend our dignity, it is not easy to believe such an assertion.
The consciousness of the trade unions was channeled into militant patriotic endeavors after the fall of Napoleon III.
Our duty is to drive out the invaders from our borders and to safe guard our rights - - - If we want the Republic to be more than an empty word. If we want to be the advent of Justice and Freedom. . . . In a word, if we want to live and work in freedom, let us adopt the principle that the emancipation of workers can only be achieved through the efforts of the workers themselves. Long live the Social and Democratic Republic.
A proclamation of a working class organization in Macon further illus
trates the nebulous socialist attitudes that surfaced on the eve of the
Commune.
The causes of all revolutions are privileges and the unequal distribution of the fruits of production between Capital and Labor. Labor stuffs the belly of Capitalism, while Capital practically starves Labor. An equitable distribution of profits between Capital and Labor would kill the germ that starts civil wars.
^^"Manifesto of the Sixty," in L*Opinion Nationale, February 17, 1868, reprinted in Schulkind, p. 61. 1.8 "Wall Poster Issued by the Jewelry Workers' Union" (c. Novem ber 12, 1870), reprinted in Schulkind, p. 81. IQ "Proclamation of the Radical Committee of Macon," March 9, 1871, reprinted in Schulkind, p. 92. Note Marx' criticisms of reforms with distribution as the key of social ills (instead of production) in his "Critique of the Gotha Program." 49
Although most of the spontaneous workers' coalitions were only socialist in intention, there were some socialist activists in Paris.
Forty-three socialist candidates proposed that:
France is going to be reconstructed. The workers have the right to find and to take their place in the new order of things which is being prepared . . . Our party must put forth for the establishment of a republic which will guarantee political liberty through social equality— by handing the tools of production to the workers, just as the Repub lic of 1792 distributed the land to the peasants.
The Marxists in the International Working Men’s association had limited
Influence in France. One member, Eugene Varlin, who was also a member of a Parisian union, enjoyed some influence. Varlin wrote:
To be definitive, the coming revolution must not stop with a simple change in the label attached to the government and with a few minor reforms; it must free the worker radically from all forms of capitalist or political exploitation and establish all social relationships on the basis of the principles of justice. ^
Although the working class became more vocal and active, the
Parisian working class at the end of the Empire was hardly an indus trial proletariat. "The 1872 census gave 44 per cent of the working population as industrial, but there were probably only about fifteen 22 factories that employed more than a hundred workers apiece." Thus, the material conditions, namely a small, politically immature prole tariat, did not form a sizeable base for a cohesive socialist movement.
20 "Wall Poster for Election of 43 'Revolutionary Socialist' Candidates to the National Assembly (February 8, 1871), reprinted in Schulkind, pp. 87-88. Of the 43, 29 were later elected to the Commune. 21 Eugene Varlin, in an article in La Marseillaise. March 18, 1870, reprinted in Schulkind, p. 33. 22 Edwards, p. 15. 50
In addition, the preceding decade experienced little parallel develop ment in labor and political organization. Schulkind observes that
"large scale factory production and mining concentrations tended to be 23 located in regions that exhibited no history of political action."
One can understand how the mass of industrial workers were politically inarticulate. The unions that were strong were more likely "craft" unions rather than "industrial" unions. Politically, the Parisian masses had a powerful revolutionary heritage, but as Schulkind notes, they were merely "a latent force.
The French working class movement as a whole can then only be characterized as socialist in the loose sense of the term; it was utopian and theoretically void of any rigorous theoretical direction.
This can best be illustrated by quoting a newspaper on the day before
the establishment of the Commune.
Let's be socialist, at last; that is, let's change the founda tion of the social order, its machinery, its institutions, its laws, its needs, its functioning. Let's build a new world. Let's sow the seeds of freedom, let's emancipate labor, let's establish equality . . . War upon privilege 1 War upon exploitation I War upon ignorance, misery, servitude*. Socialism! In other words, once again change the old social order; but this time entirely, radically, absolutely. That's where the future lies— if there still remains a future. ^
Thus, the working class movement of France at the eve of the Commune
can best be seen as quasi-socialist. Its utopian expectations coupled with diverse political activity hardly prepared it for a successful
experiment in socialism.
^^Schulkind, p. 30. ^^Ibid. 25 "Newspaper Article on Socialism in Le Drapeau, March 17, 1871," reprinted in Schulkind, pp. 100-101. 51
The Beginning of the Commune
The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Paris contained many people, varying in intentions, but it never was a serious threat to the bourgeoisie or the national government. What concerned the bourgeoisie on the eve of the Commune was "the revolution armed in the form of the 26 Paris National Guard." As in 1848, the National Guard, which pre viously was exclusive to upper classes, was forced to permit lower classes to enter the ranks due to the Franco— Prussian War. Over
300,000 joined, but they were inactive during the war. Bismark decided to let Paris starve itself rather than fight it out. Consequently,they were armed, although they had no part in the Franco-Prussian War prior to the defeat of France. The regular French army, however, was dis armed in the terms of a truce with Prussia, and this act left the
National Guard as the only armed group in the city. The Guard, dis tressed at the defeat of France and a humiliating truce, was "left with 27 the feeling it had been betrayed." The national government lost all control over it and the Guard was "no longer reliable as a force on the 28 side of law and order."
The Paris Commune emerged in the wake of a spontaneous uprising of the Parisian National Guard in resisting the government's attempt to disarm it. This rebellion, however, had class connotation. The new
leader of the National Assembly, Adolphe Thiers, not only was a major
leader and advisor of the conservative "Party of Order"— the party which allied the landowner and capitalist class against the other
27 26 28 Edwards, p. 21. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 21. 52 29 classes— but also was antagonistic towards the guard. Thiers was well known for his hostility to the working class. A former colleague of his, M. Besley, himself a capitalist but a devoted member of the
Paris Commune, addressed Thiers in a public placard: "The enslavement 30 of labor by capital has always been the cornerstone of your policy."
It was Thiers who ordered the disarmament of the National Guard. "The government's attempt to capture the National Guard's guns early on the 31 morning of Saturday, March 18, 1871, sparked off the revolution."
Paris fell as Thiers moved the government agencies to Versailles.
Paris fell into the hands of the Guard, and it sought, with pressure from the masses, to legalize itself by establishing elections.
"This search for a return to legality well brings out the moderation of 32 the revolution so far." In addition to its moderation, that the Com- 33 mune was "unplanned, unguided, and formless" indicates that there was no revolutionary vanguard in control. On March 26, 229,167 Parisians elected the Commune, giving much support to the arrondissements and vigilance committees. These elections experienced greater political participation by the Parisians than previously. Edwards adds that the support of the Commune did not indicate a rush of converts to the
socialist line, but that "the Republican majority in Paris was now willing to vote for the Commune as a defensive vote against Thiers and
the monarchist National Assembly.
29 30 Marx, Civil War in France, p. 53. Ibid., p. 55.
^^Edwards, p. 25. ^^Ibid.. p. 26. ^^Ibid., p. 10.
^^Ibid. 53
Composition and Influences of the Commune
The composition of the Commune illustrates that it was not only a proletarian movement. Although the proletariat was a large constitu ency, other classes were represented as well.
The Commune numbered eighty-one members. The average age was
38, five members were over 60. The head of police, Raoul Rigault, was
35 ^ 24. There was one foreigner, Leo Frankel, one of the proletariat's most active spokespersons. The members lacked political experience and political leadership. "This was especially serious because it had to 36 win a civil war in order to survive at all."
About eighteen members came from a middle class background, including Rigault. Approximately thirty members were professionals, or la boheme, half of which were journalists; others were doctors (3), lawyers (3), teachers (3), clerks (11), one architect and a veterinary surgeon. There were thirty-five commune members of working class ori gin. Although this is a large percentage of working class members,
"what is striking is how small numbers came from the heavy indus- 37 tries." Altogether, about half of the Commune had previous associa tion with the French labor movement. Approximately 20 per cent of the members elected to the Commune were members of the International. They were not very influential in organizing leadership for popular activity, but they contributed indirectly since they served on the Central Com mittee and took part in decisions.
^^Edwards, p. 27. ^^Ibid., p. 28.
^^Ibid. 54
lîfcEiîm! the socialists in the Commune, there were different groups imOtmemeing its direction. The Blanquists were in the majority.
They "’^elierccE chat human reason and rationality were the primary insirunnetaCs im Che development of institutions which would lead to the 38 establisBnroefltC 0;f a communist society." They did not see the working class as a revolutionary force, however; hence they did not anticipate any broad-feasedi socialist revolution, but rather a revolution by a trained tmimoriCy. Engels in writing about the Blanquists noted that they were onnly socialist in the general sense that they were prole- 39 tarian, unagimided by theoretical direction or program. Second came the Prondhmmlsts, who believed in the primacy of the individual. They
"opposed a centralized state which imposed uniformity and favored a society based on freely entered self-governing small units joined together im a federation.
Use International, unlike the Blanquists, believed a mass-based organization o*f workers was essential to a revolution. They believed in décentraiiration and the establishment of cooperatives. However, some differences emerged between Marx and the Paris sections of the
Intemaciomal. Marx in 1870, talking to the International, discouraged any actions against the French government.
Use French working class moves, therefore, under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Any attempt at upsetting the new government in the present crisis, when the enemy is almost knocking at the doors of Paris, would be a desperate folly.
38 39 Attagnile and Schwartz, p. 16. Engels, p. 30. 40 Attaguile and Schwartz, p. 15.
Marx, "Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War," 55
Marx thought it was necessary that the working class form a coalition with other classes against the Versailles forces. The Paris section of the International favored a movement of the working class against all forms of capitalism.
That the emancipation of the working class must be conquered by the working class themselves, that the struggle for the emancipation of the working class means not a struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal rights and duties, and the abolition of class rule.^
Jacobinism was another major influence of the Commune. It saw the Paris uprising "as but another stage in the Great Revolution of
1789, and their memroy of the Commune of 1793, guided much of what they 43 did in I87l." As the Blanquists, their support came from the petty bourgeois and artisan classes. They had little support from the prole tariat .
Some historians have argued that the Commune was not a working class government because only a little more than a third of its members were of the working class. Yet Schulkind counters that an argument
that merely examines class composition as the only factor is as super
ficial as asserting that a government consisting of a majority of manual workers is automatically a government striving for proletarian measures. One must analyze the commitment and direction of the Com mune. Schulkind also comments that "one cannot viably interpret
reprinted in Schulkind, p. 67.
^^"The International Statutes As Presented by the Paris Sec tions (1870)," reprinted in Schulkind, p. 67.
^^Edwards, p. 18. 56
Communard, political, and social formulations in terms of present day . ,,44 meanings.
Political Measures
The Commune passed many decrees during its tenure. Some meas ures attempted to deal with the external eneiay— Thiers’ forces from
Versailles— who were planning to restore the national government in
Paris. Other measures focused on reform. Since different classes con stituted the Commune, different measures favored different classes. The
Communards were predominantly middle class; most of the measures favored that class.
Defense Measures
The Commune was "almost immediately faced by the problems of war There was the threat of an attack on Paris. Although the masses defeated a minor attempt of Theirs* forces on April 2, 1871, by early May, Paris was again threatened and a crisis occurred. A Commit tee of Public Safety composed of five men was formed, for "all were agreed that the Commune needed a stronger central power.Although there was some debate over the name (there was a committee of the same name formed by Robespierre in 1789), it was seen as a revolutionary measure, for the Commune had to exert greater energy to assure the suc cess of its revolution. Here we find one part of the "dictatorship of
the proletariat," that of trying to consolidate power against hostile
elements. This undoubtedly calls for centralization, yet it was seen
AA A5 AA Schulkind, p. 47. Ibid., p. 30. Edwards, p. 32. 57 as a revolutionary measure, as a letter by a worker to the Commune illustrates:
The hour has not yet come when our principle will triumph solely because it is right and because it recognizes the worth of man; society must first return to its normal state and it can only do so through the radical application of revolutionary measures.*'
Proletarian Measures
Some socialists in the Commune saw the transcendence of the
state from a structure superimposed on society to one that is subordi
nated to it as a necessary precondition for the establishment of
socialist relations. Any other form would cause failure to the hopes
of the socialists. Eugen- Varlin expresses this conception:
We socialists know from our experience that all the old politi cal forms are incapable of satisfying the demands of the people . . . Until now, governments have been merely an extension of authoritarian rule and the subjugation of the masses . . . Short of placing everything in the hands of a highly centralized, authori tarian state which would set up a hierarchic structure from top to bottom of the labor process . . . we must admit that the only alternative is for the workers themselves to have the free disposi tion and possession of the tools of production . . . through co-operative associations in various forms.
This alternative form of government was a conscious step forward for
some, like Varlin, who sought a transformation of society, but Schul
kind argues that, on the whole, "the majority [in the Commune] seems to
have acted on a general desire for social reform only as it was neces
sary,"^^
47 "Newspaper Article by Eugene Varlin, La Marseillaise. March 1, 1870," reprinted in Schulkind, pp. 63-64.
'^®Ibid. 49 Schulkind, p. 44. 58
This reformist nature can best be illustrated by examining the debate over the abolition of night work of journeymen bakers on
April 20. The support of the bakers* demands was a truly proletarian measure, but the nature of the debate in the Commission of Labour and
Exchange reveals the indecisiveness and mostly reformist approach to
the problem:
J. B. Clement: I asked for the floor on a procedural motion. Yes terday the owners of the bakeries held a meeting on the question of night work; the bakery workers have threatened to smash their windows; and tonight in the 3rd arrondissement there is danger of this hap pening.
Demay: The owners of the bakeries held a meeting in the 3rd arrondissement. They ask that night work con tinue for a few more days so that necessary leavens be prepared. After that, the decree will be observed.
Billioray: We should not have meddled in this question; it is the business solely of the interested parties.
Viard: It is not up to us to intervene in a matter between employers and workers, and I ask that the decree be revoked.
Aurial: A few of them may be objecting, but revoke the decree and you will have even more protests from the workers.
Frankel: You must point out that the class of bakery workers is the most unfortunate section of the proletariat. Indeed, you will not find a more underprivileged trade . . . Every day we are told that the workers should educate themselves, but how can you educate yourself when you work at night . . . You approve of the Executive Commission's decree, however imperfect: you must therefore agree with the reform we wish to introduce in the bakeries.
J. B. Clement: We cannot pass a decree such as this and then order that it is implemented at once. I ask that the decree should not be enforced until the 15th of next month. 59
Vermorel; To put things off until the 15th would be to sacri fice the interests of the workers to those of the employers. It would be against all principles of justice and human right if we were to allow a worthwhile class of workers to remain outcasts of society for the benefit of the aristocracy of the belly.
Billioray: I am opposed to all these rules and regulations you seem to want to institute.
Malon: We are told we should not be concerned with social matters: I must say up to now the state has inter vened often enough against the workers; the least it can do now is to intervene in their favor.
Theiz: Let us send for the employers and the workers and let us say to the former: here are the complaints made by the workers; discard them . . . This is what we should have done rather than take decisions on the matter ourselves.
Ondet: I agree. Before passing the decree we should have consulted with workers and employers.
Frankel: I support the decree because I feel that it is the only truly socialist decree passed by the Commune . . . We are here not only to deal with the usual business of a municipal council, but to make social reforms. To carry out these social reforms, ought we to consult the employers first? No I Were the employers consulted in *92? Was the nobility con sulted? Of course not 1 I have accepted no other mandate than to defend the proletariat, and where a reform is just, I accept it and carry it out with out worrying about consulting the employers! The measure decreed is fair; we must therefore defend it 50
As the debate reveals, the majority of the commission members were not necessarily revolutionary supporters of the proletariat seeking a transformation of society, but were reformists in essence, maintaining capitalist relations.
^^"The Debate on Bakers' Night Work," April 28, 1871, reprinted in Edwards,.pp. 136-39. 60
There were, however, socialist members who initiated other measures which favored the proletariat. One example is the establish ment of closed factories into workers' cooperatives. These programs helped to alleviate the problem of unemployment. The cooperatives allowed for workers' control over their own affairs- Some enactments were:
(1) The diversification of work within each trade to counter the harmful effects of body and mind of continually repeating the same manual operation; (2) A reduction of working hours to prevent physical exhaus tion leading to a loss of mental faculties; (3) The abolition of all competition between men and women workers since their interests are identical and their solidarity is essential.
Cooperatives were only founded in abandoned factories, and there was virtually no effort to change remaining factories into workers' con trolled institutions.
Another political measure favoring mostly the proletariat was free education for all. This was largely elementary education and it was initiated at the local levels. In addition, the religious and clerical elements were removed from all curricula, teaching only sci ence and reason.
The closing of the pawn shops was another decree which favored the working class.
Under all attempts issued by the Mont de Piété before April 25, the pawned clothes, furniture, linen, books, bedding, and impie- ments of labor . . . may be demanded and obtained free of charge.
"Address from the Central Committee of the Women's Union for the Defense of Paris and for the Aid to the Wounded to the Commission of Labor and Exchange," reprinted in Edwards, pp. 135-36. 52 "May 7 Decree," reprinted in Marx, On the Paris Commune, p. 61
Most reforms for the working class were largely initiated by
Frankel and his Commission of Labor and Exchange, which dealt with improving working conditions. The proletarian measures were in reality isolated measures that did not affect life in general. The decree regarding the bakers, for example, was peculiar to the bakers. The measures that favored mostly the middle petty-bourgeoisie classes
tended to have a greater effect on life in general. These middle class measures had a greater impact in the long term, different from the
short-term acts of expedience which characterized the working class
reforms. This is understandable, given the class composition of the
Commune and the small percentage of industrial workers in the popula
tion of Paris. A genuine proletarian movement and consciousness was
present, but it was socially and politically weak in contrast to the middle class reformists.
Middle Class Measures
In the Commune there was a variety of measures aiding the mid
die classes. These measures had great impact because they were long
term decrees affecting and regulating many aspects of life. For
example, rent for houses and apartments for the last three quarters up
to April 1871 were wholly remitted. Prosecution for fallen bills of
exchange were suspended on April 12 of the same year. Undoubtedly
these acts favored the working class as well, but they favored the mid
dle class more.
There were other decrees which favored the middle class in their
daily activities- 62
The notaries, bailiffs, auctioneers, bum-bailiffs and other judicial officers making till now a fortune on their function, were transformed into agents of the Commune, receiving from it fixed salaries like other workers.
Since the "Civil Tribunal of the Seine" as well as other government officials left after the establishment of the Commune, an advocate of the Commune was appointed "to do the most urgent business until the reorganization of the tribunals on the basis of general suffrage."^^
This ensured that the small businesses, lawyers, and other sectors of occupations which needed the maintenance of the courts regularly would have them. In addition, there was a commission appointed for the foundation of a free university system.
General Measures
There were certain features which Marx deemed to be general measures, favoring all classes. The Commune established democracy in
its internal government. This aspect of the Commune was one of its
great achievements. Much of the ideas about democracy and popular sov
ereignty were ideas of 1793: "Those elected to represent the people 55 were to act as delegates, not parliamentary ministers." This
resulted in a transformation of the state from a particular state to a universal one.
Against the transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society— an inevitable transformation in all previous states— the Commune making use of
53 Karl Marx, "The Commune— First Outline," reprinted in On the Paris Commune, p. 140.
^^Ibid. ^^Edwards, p. 31. 63
two infallible means . . . universal suffrage with right of recall . . . and payments equalling those received by workers, which placed barriers on professional careerism.
There were other features which were beneficial to all classes.
On March 29, conscription was abolished. Every able person had to serve in a people's militia. Since the church was separated from the state, the religious budget was suppressed. This, the elimination of the standing army, and the end of the state functionaries created a government requiring few tax revenues for existence.
There were other democratic measures. On April 15, the Journal
Official de la République Française, the official organ of the Paris
Commune, had inaugurated the publicity of the sittings of the Commune.^^
This contrasts with the secretiveness of the previous French govern ment, On May 4, political and professional oaths were abolished.
Earlier, on April 27, there was a decree for the protection of foreign ers against requisitions. Marx commented that "never a government was
5 8 so courteous to foreigners."
Safety Measures
Marx distinguishes measures of public safety as another ana lytical category, which was beneficial for all classes. One act was
the disarmament of the "loyal" National Guard soldiers on March 30.
These were those who remained sympathetic to the Versailles government.
There was also the Decree of Reprisals, in terms of which counterrevo
lutionaries were not to be executed. Some were arrested, including the
^^Engels, "Introduction to The Civil War," p. 33.
^^Ibid., p. 142. ^®Ibid. 64
Archbishop of Paris and incumbents of all the principal churches because they were either conspirators from Versailles or tried to save
church properties from the confiscation of the Commune.
Final Note on Measures
When analyzing the political measures of the Commune, two
things must be observed. First, with respect to the socialists, as
Schulkind notes, "one cannot readily divide the Commune into Proudhon-
ist versus Blanquist, or Marxist on the simple basis of voting pattern
alone since there was no consistent voting pattern that consistently 59 involved a decision along ideological grounds." He argues, for exam
ple, the decree establishing the formation of workers' cooperatives in
abandoned factories by previously unemployed workers, which was unques
tionably socialist in character, was virtually unanimous in support.
One must also keep in mind, however, that this was also an expedient
measure— putting the unemployed to work and raising abandoned factories
to productivity. The establishment of cooperatives was limited to this
context. It did not include privately owned functioning factories. The
debate over the night work of the bakers noted above clearly reveals
differences among the Commune members, although it is difficult to link
each exact position with a specific ideological position.
Second, the failure of the Commune to attain socialism illus
trates the disharmony of base and superstructure in Paris. In order to
be socialist there must be a transformation of the relations of produc
tion. This reiterates the relationship between base and superstructure.
Schulkind, p. 47. 65
As Marx adumbrated, "The political rule of the producer cannot co-exist with the perpetuation of his social slavery.Thus, the Commune had
to Serve as a lever for the transformation of the capitalist economic
formations. Marx claimed that the socialist elements did attempt to
abolish class property, which exploited one class for the wealth of
another. "It wanted to make individual property a truth by transform
ing the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of
enslaving and exploiting labor, into mere instruments of free and asso
ciated labor.This, Marx called "possible communism.Yet
despite this effort, most enactments introduced by the Commune seem to
be reformist rather than revolutionary, Edwards notes further that 63 basically "the right of private property was not questioned."
Any attempts at industrial or educational reform could not
really amount to much, for the Commune's struggle for existence took
priority. "There was too little time, and there was a war to be won if
anything at all was to be retained.
Fall of the Commune
The Paris Commune was an inevitable failure. Without a mass
movement advocating the transformation of society, the disharmony of
base and superstructure caused inherent troubles. "The end of the Com
mune lay in its beginnings: Paris had either to rally the people of
France to its cause, or succumb sooner or later to the National
^^Marx, Civil War in France, p. 75,
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 76. ^^Edwards, p. 34,
^^Ibid., p. 77. 66
Government and its army. SponîianemiB ætttrempts of communes occurred
in Lyon (March 22) and Marseille 'CMamdh 'ES))„ bat collapsed almost as
soon as they were formed. There was chance of rallying the
people, who were predominantly peasants null were not revolutionary.
Relationship between TRown andi Country
The Communards failed to undme cite countryside with the cities.
The Commune had tried to present a modeR whmchi would unite cities with
the rural sectors surrounding them..
In a rough sketch of national! nprpnmzatian which the Commune had no time to develop, it states (cHeffirRy that the Commune was to be the political form of even the snnaRTest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the stanMipg æmujy was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extmemelljf ^hntrtr term of service. The rural communes of every distrrica; wierœ tm adininister their common affairs by an assembly of deiegates im the central town, and these assemblies were again to send idepuftm^ tto> the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be ttirae? evocable and bound by 'mandat impertif' (formal inspnucttiifliræ)) of his constituents. The few but important functions wlhiLdh ættib.TI wauüldî remain for a central government were not to be suppre^edM mæ had! been intentionally misstated, but were to be di^chaipgHd thy Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents
The constitution of the Paris Commune., hcrroaumr,, brought the rural pro
ducers "under the intellectual lead nff tühæ central towns of their dis
tricts."^^
The attempt to bring the peasants; tto) the side of the Communards
was difficult. To unite the counta^ysiûdæ wmthi the city, especially with
extensive Versailles propaganda againmtt tdbæ Chmmune, many circulars
^^Edwards, p. 41.
^^Marx, Civil War in Franoe„ pp.. %-73L.
^^Ibid., p. 74. 67 were dispersed through the neighhorimg twmaR areas. One circular, written in April 1871, allegedly by Andmé states:
Brothers, you are being deoeiL’iœtd _ „ _ Tested interests have tricked you into accusing Paris off ciineairiiag; youv but this injustice is precisely what has led Paris tüo iriLæœ u# andi demand a change in the laws that place all power over rUnœ wwrarfcEHS; in the hands of the wealthy. Paris wants the son off ttfhe ffaanner to be as educated as the son of the rich man, and ai no Circulars as these were mostly initiatted ky members of the Interna tional, and they were often transmiittsd (hagobaizatrdly. A major method was by dropping them from balloons. The nMenaition of the peasants from the Communards' cause hurt the (Ocrmmiim£'_ The Versailles troops entered Taris through an unguarded beach on May 21. Fighting continued for a wedk- The* proletarian 11th arron dissement was the last to hold on in ttiae fff^ting. It was the working class districts tdhmt ffought to the bitter end. It was the working population that W t e tdhs' brunt of the repression that followed.69 The repression that followed was hareih- Eten from the United States, the New York Times condemned the "irihinnam lams; of revenge under which the Versailles troops had been shootSjqg, bayonettingripping up pris oners, women and children during the Hast sHr diays."^^ 6 8 "Circular Addressed by the tDmmnmne' ttO' Farms," reprinted in Schulkind, p. 152. ^^Edwards, p. 42. ^^Schulkind, p. 27 (actual citie nnuptt gfven)^. 68 Paris Commune as Dictatorship of the Proletariat The Paris Commune was not a communist revolution. Althou^ there is confusion because the roots of "commune" and "communism'" are the same, the meaning the French gave to "commune" was unique. The name Commune de Paris had nothing to do with communism or communists but happened to be the historical name of municipal gov ernment in France. But the easily suggested link between Commune and Communism has been a forceful instrument in the creation of dhe myth of the Commune as a communist insurrection.^^ Hal Draper makes the same point: In France commune did not, and does not, necessarily have the meaning of a revolutionary form of government or society. On the contrary, its basic meaning is simply a 'free town', a more or 1-ess autonomously self governing municipality not controlled out of hand by a top-down super centralized national government, such as has been the French tradition since the absolute monarchies. Marx writes that the Commune was "the direct antithesis of the 73 French Empire," for it was characterized by municipal councilors selected by universal suffrage. This alone, to Marx, could not bring forth any changes because material conditions must be present to util ize a free state apparatus, A socialist government does not come into power in a country unless conditions are so developed that it can immediately take necessary measures for intimidating the mass of the bourgeoisie sufficiently to gain time— the first desideratum for permanent action. Perhaps you will refer me to the Paris Commune; but apart from the fact that this was merely the rising of a city under ^^Averineri, pp. 241-42 ff, 72 Hal Draper, ed., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Writings mmi the Paris Commune (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 9. 73 Marx, Civil War in France, p. 71. 69 exceptional conditions, the majority of the Commune was in no wise socialist nor could it be.^^ Within the base, there were not material conditions to give rise to a socialist society. The proletariat was small and inexperienced. Most of the labor movement in France, still a predominantly peasant society In a world where capitalism was not yet fully a world force, was con ducted by the artisans and other petty-bourgeois crafts. Since the uprising was only in one city, Paris had the problem of hostile encirclement, and it was unable to start anything with the noose around the Commune’s neck. Although opposition from Versailles was met at the onset. It was always a threat and an obstacle. It was also the Commune's defeat. Engels, In a letter to Bernstein twelve years after the Commune, wrote that the victorious working class must "keep down its capitalist enemies and carry out the economic revolution of society without which the whole victory must end in defeat and mas sacre . . . like that after the Paris Commune.In a letter to Frankel and Varlin, Marx warned of the danger threatening the Commune's very existence. Prussia is in need of money delayed by the Versailles govern ment until the occupation of Paris gave the Versailles government every possible facility for hastening the occupation of Paris. So be on your guard 1^6 ^^Karl Marx, "Marx to F. Domela-Nieuwenhuis, February 22, 1881," reprinted in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 338. ^^Friedrich Engels, "Engels to E. Bernstein, August 27, 1883,' reprinted in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 362. ^^Karl Marx, "Marx to L. Frankel and E. Varlin in Paris, May 13, 1871," reprinted in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 265. 70 Effect of the Paris Commune on Theory In State amd Revolution Lenin argues that "it Is still neces sary to suppress the bourgeoisie and crush their resistance Edouard Vaillant, a former member of the Commune, stated in an 1897 interview that "onr dominant preoccupation and goal had to be battles with Versailles. For the Commune, to be or not to be was the whole 7fi question." Engels wrote in hindsight that one possible defense the Commune could cried was to seize the Bank of France. The bank was crucial to the functioning of the bourgeoisie and its apprehension "would have meant the pressure of the French bourgeoisie on the Ver- 79 sallies govermmemt in favor of peace with the Commune." The point Lenin, Engels, and Vaillant made was that there are certain implica tions for the state when there is an external threat. There would have to be a centralized defense to overcome any threatening invasion. The establishment of amy form of society is possible only if it can defend against hostile euemdes. The evaluation of the Paris Commune in reference to political writings must he seen two ways. The ternsinm between the evaluation of the Commune as an his torical phemoaneiMiQ and potential seeds of future development inher ent in it also ©nphasizes the dialectical relationship between the abolition of the state (towards which the Commune would have devel oped had it survived) and the fact that the Commune itself was still an expression of political power. Only the Commune of the future . . . would be the positive Aufhebung of the state, creating ^^Lenim, State and Revolution, p. 317. 78 "From am loterviOT with a Former Member of the Commune, Edouard Vaillant, 1897,” reprinted in Schulkind, p. 257. 79 Engels, "Introduction to the Civil Mar," p. 30. 71 unalienated social solidarity. The concrete, historical Commune . . . was a mere prolegomenon, still a political organ. In this sence, the partial 'political* Commune attempted to accomplish what Marx preached in the Manifesto : the wielding of political power, supported by universal suffrage, towards universal ends, making the state a truly universal organ, and thus abolishing it not by mini mizing state activity but by maximizing it which would be self- aufhebung. Engels in another letter to Bernstein asserts that the victori ous working class must "first refashion the old bureaucratic, adminis trative centralized state power before it can use it for its own 81 purposes." The Commune, replacing the Institutions of the bourgeois state (i.e., army, appointed officials) with democratic centralism, created a new form of state. The existing state as a particularistic organization is dismantled and a new government is established. "This only signifies a gigantic replacement of certain institutions by other 82 institutions of a fundamentally different type." Engels referred to the Commune as a state in the usual sense that he and Marx used the term. Lenin adds that "the Commune was ceas ing to be a state since it had to suppress not the majority of the 83 population, but a minority (the bourgeois exploiters)." It is impor tant that the Marxists define state as class rule and not merely as a regulatory organization. Lenin further adds that the state begins to wither away "since the majority of the people itself suppresses its oppressors, a 'special force' for suppression is no longer DA Avineri, p. 243. 81 Friedrich Engels, "Engels to E. Bernstein, January 1, 1884," reprinted in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 366. 82 83 Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 316. Ibid., p. 334. 72 necessary Functions of the state are performed by the people as a whole. Lenin writes that the rudimentary question for any revolution is state power. A proletarian government, as the Paris Commune dis played, has the following characteristics: (1) The source of power is not a Law previously discussed and enacted by parliament, but the direct initiative of the people from below, in their local areas. (2) The replacement of the police and the army, which are the institutions divorced from the people and set against the people, by the arming of the whole people; order in the state under such a power is maintained by the armed workers and peasants themselves. (3) Officialdom, the bureaucracy is either similarly replaced by the direct rule of the people themselves or at least under special control; they not only become elected officials but are also subject to recall at the people's first demand.^5 Although the bureaucracy is to go through a gradual abolition, Lenin writes in State and Revolution that "abolishing the bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely, is out of the question. It is a utopia,Thus, any new socialist society will maintain some of the old forms of the state during its transition stage. Conclusion The Paris Commune must be seen as a living example of how the state can be transformed from a particularistic institution to one which represents all of society. Its existence, however, was destined to be short lived. First, the Commune was surrounded by hostile forces. 84 Ibid., p. 317. Q C V. I. Lenin, "The Dual Power," reprinted in Selected Works 11:48-49. 86 Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 321. 73 and it could not muster support, i.e., the peasantry, to survive. Secondly, the Commune's failure to transform the relations of produc tion caused a disharmony between base and superstructure. It was not revolutionary, but reformist in essence. Since the state in capitalist society serves the capitalist class, a state which attempts to serve all of society while maintaining capitalism Is guaranteed to run into difficulties. The debates on the bakers' night work reflect this. Nevertheless, the Paris Commune illustrates how a society can experi ence a universal form of government. This type of democracy was envisaged by Marx and Engels when they wrote of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in socialist society. The word "dictatorship" now has definite negative connotations. It implies a kind of authoritarianism. This totalitarianism was not meant at all by Marx, Engels, or Lenin. Of late, the Social Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what the dictatorship look like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.®^ This dictatorship is characterized by complete universal suffrage, as well as the actions to close the gaps between mental and physical labor. Perhaps dictatorship should be replaced by hegemony. The Com mune's democratic advancement was how it mainly characterized the dic tatorship of the proletariat. In some ways it was an irrational revolt under impossible con- 88 ditions; yet it broke the "continuum of history." This became the 87 Engels, "Introduction to the Civil W ar," p. 34. 88 Edwards, p. 42. 74 Inspiration of socialists throughout the world. Marx called it the 89 "glorious harbinger of a new society." It was to represent the "first general rejection in history of the belief that ordinary workers 90 were not equipped to govern." Although it was not socialist in the economic sense of the word, it was the "first government ever to face in the most concrete terms the most important problems that in our day inevitably face and simultaneously achieve a democratic and egalitarian 91 social order," In spite of confusion among its leaders. As Marx writes on the Commune, he does not discuss it as it merely was, "but as 92 it could be, not in actu but in potenta." Thus, to Marx and contem porary theorists, the Paris Commune of 1871 is envisaged as an impor tant conception of the state after capitalism. 89 90 Marx, Civil War in France, p. 97. Schulkind, p. 31. ^^Ibid., p. 51. ^^Avineri, p. 240. CHAPTER VI THE BOLSHEVIK EXPERIENCE The Bolshevik state of the 1917 revolution is another histori cal instance we shall analyze, Russia was the first country to undergo and maintain a proletarian revolution. Unlike the Paris Commune, this was a socialist society whose base— the means of production— was socialized, Marx had expected the social revolutions to begin with England, France, and Germany because they were the most industrialized countries in the world. Russia, because of its historical development, would experience the revolution later. Russia was not the strongest, but the weakest link of European capitalism and was trying to catch up to the other capitalist countries at the turn of the twentieth century.^ Although the proletariat was weak, capitalism was a world force, consequently creating the antagonisms that are engendered in capitalist society. The peasantry accounted then for more than 80 percent of the Russian population, and the revolution of October 17, 1917, occurred with the support of the peasantry. Contrary to the Marxist theoretical writings, the Soviet state had become stronger and more centralized in the wake of the socialist revolution. By 1921, the party and state apparatus had become so Although Russia was the weakest link of capitalism, the capi talism which was there was advanced for this period. That it, it was advanced in the type of machinery used; it required a great amount of cooperation. 75 76 complex that it required a full-time specialist in administration at 2 the head of it. There developed a hierarchy of organization of the 3 state. In addition, Lenin established a policy-making structure— the Politburo— a small group which dealt exclusively with matters requiring urgent decision. To comprehend fully the direction of and conditions determining the Russian experience during the early years of the Soviet state, many issues have to be analyzed. These essentials are (1) the conditions leading to the growth of the bureaucracy, (2) the replace ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party, (3) the composition of the party, and (4) the question of democratic centralism. Conditions Leading to the Growth of Bureaucracy As chapter 3 indicated, socialist society is characterized by a planned economy. A planned economy is an insurance against the undu lating cycles which the chaotic capitalist economies experience. Plan ning could be done by workers collaborating to coordinate the economy, or by state functionaries who are bureaucrats, detached from the work process. Bureaucracies are, in essence, a capitalist formation, because they embody the division of labor between mental and manual 2 Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 238-46. Krestinski and Molotov were the first two secretaries. They were too complacent for the job, and Stalin, who was successful as the People's Commlsar of Workers* and Peasants' Inspection, took it over. 3 Ibid., p. 239. This hierarchy in order of importance was: Central Committee; regional (oblast) committees (of national parties); provincial committees; district committees; rural committees; and individual and Red Army party cells in individual institutions. 76 complex ttfcam iit required a full-time specialist in administration at 2 the head it- There developed a hierarchy of organization of the state-^ Œm atMitioa, Lenin established a policy-making structure— the Polithamrœ— a smaTl group which dealt exclusively with matters requiring urgent iecisidCD- TO' comprehend fully the direction of and conditions determimimg the Russian experience during the early years of the Soviet state, maany issues have to be analyzed. These essentials are (1) the coaaiitiioaas JeaÆinüg to the growth of the bureaucracy, (2) the replace ment of n-ihg dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party, O Î the composition of the party, and (4) the question of democratic ceimcralism. Œomditiens Leading to the Growth of Bureaucracy As chapter 3 indicated, socialist society is characterized by a planned ecsnmcray, A planned economy is an insurance against the undu lating cycles which the chaotic capitalist economies experience. Plan ning comlid he done hy workers collaborating to coordinate the economy, or by state fnmctionaries who are bureaucrats, detached from the work pro'cess- Bureaucracies are, in essence, a capitalist formation, because they enfirody the division of labor between mental and manual ■'!> “TLefflimard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Lomdcran: ffiÿre and Spottiswoode Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 238-46. Erestin^iamd üfiœlotov were the first two secretaries. They were too congilajofflnit ff®r the job, and Stalin, who was successful as the People's Commlsar onf Btentkers" and Peasants’ Inspection, took it over. 3 Tfhld., p. 239. This hierarchy in order of importance was; Central CmiiuniTitttee; regional (oblast) committees (of national parties) ; provincial cmmnpfttees; district committees; rural committees; and indivi'dimal amd Red Array party cells in individual institutions. 76 labor and are strictly hierarchical. Russia took the latter route. A state bureaucracy emerged and became strong. The reasons for this deviation rest in the material conditions of Russia. This can best be seen by examining the failure of workers' control and the low level of the productive forces in Russia in 1917. Failure of Workers’ Control By tracing the meanings attached to workers' control in 1917, the relationship between the term and the material conditions of Russia can be seen. In "The April Theses," Lenin wrote that the establishment of the socialist order was synonymous with workers' control over their factories, although the term "workers' control" was ambiguous in mean ing.^ Lenin had written that "state power should be passed into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies or other bodies directly expressing the will of the people."^ This has two meanings. V. I. Lenin, "Resolution on the Soviets of Workers' and Sol diers' Deputies," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 2:132. E. H. Carr adds an important distinction between "political" action and "direct" action. "In theory it divided the communists, who believed in the organization of economic power through a centralized political authority exercized by the workers as a whole, from the anarchists and syndicalists, who believed that the direct and spontaneous eco nomic initiative of the workers was the ultimate form of all effec tive revolutionary action. "In practice, the distribution was between the Bolshevik lead ers, who were planning the major strategy of revolution on the hypothesis of a disciplined and orderly organization of workers, and the workers in the factories, who took piecemeal action as oppor tunity offered" (E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 3 vols. [London: Pelican Books, 1950-53]2:65.) 5 V. I. Lenin, "The 7th (April) All-Russia Conference on the R.S.D.L.P.," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 2:93. 77 Workers' control could have meant supervision by a central congress of Soviets, thus it would be no more than a synonym for nationalization and state control under a workers' and peasants' government. The sec ond meaning could be control by workers' committees, on the factory level, which would involve decentralization. In a resolution on May 30, 1917, Lenin presented a proposal which focused on workers' control. To establish workers' control it is necessary, first, to make certain that in all the basic institutions there is a majority of workers, not less than three-fourths of all votes, and that all the owners who have not deserted their businesses, as well as the sci entifically and technically trained personnel, are compelled to ‘ participate; secondly, that all the shop and factory committees, the central and local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies as well as trade unions, be granted the right to partici pate in such control® Lenin went on to speak of an "all-state organization" for the purposes of large-scale industrial planning to end the anarchic production of capitalism. A month prior to the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin issued a pam phlet, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It." In it Lenin proposed a vague conception of an industrial policy. His measures to combat famine and the wasteful expenditures of Russia's resources gave regulation to the state over various industries. His measures were: (1) Amalgamation of all banks into a single bank and state control over its operations, or nationalization of the banks. (2) Nationalization of the syndicates, i.e., the largest monopolistic capitalist associations (sugar, oil, coal, iron, and steel). (3) Abolition of commercial secrecy. (4) Compulsory syndication (i.e., compulsory amalgamation into associations) of industrialists, merchants, and employees generally. ^V. I. Lenin, in Carr, 2:66 (actual cite not given). 78 (5) Compulsory organization of the population into consumers' societies, or encouragement of such organization, and the exercise of control over it. Carr notes that this pamphlet was written more for propaganda purposes than for actual concrete policies. Lenin's other pamphlet, g "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power," basically proposed the same measures, and also focused on the concept of workers' control. The chief difficulty of the proletarian revolution is the establishment on a country-wide scale of the most precise and most conscientious accounting and control, of workers' control of the production and distribution of goods.^ Lenin, hence, advocated the centralization and planning of the prole tarian state. His measures and plans for central planning are very close to Marx' edicts in the Manifesto. Lenin clearly argues that this form of social relations can realize itself in a dictatorship of the proletariat.^^ However, Carr notes. Workers' control was equated with control by proletarian Soviets and the fine distinction between Soviets of workers acting in a professional capacity and in a political capacity was not clearly drawn. There could be no antithesis between state control and workers' control once the state and workers were the same. Thus, the issue as of October 1, 1917, was still not clarified suffi ciently or resolved. This was still prior to the revolution. It was only after the revolution, where actual problems with workers' control arose, that there was a break between theory and application. ^V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Deal with It," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 2:93. ^Carr, 2:71 ^V. I. Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 2:409. ^°Ibid. ^^Carr, 2:72. 79 In November, the Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) stated that workers' control was instituted in the interests of a planned economy {the state's function) and the organization within the economy, which had an organizational structure similar to the political organi zation of the Soviets. This separation did not last after the first months of the revolution. The All Russian Council of Workers, the national organization made up of councils from local factory commit tees, met only once and failed to get a quorum. Although the resolu tion encouraged the workers to take part in the management of the factories, events varied from factory to factory. "Most frequently, the employers prepared to close the factory and lock out recalcitrant 12 workers." In essence, workers' participation was never really effective, except in Petrograd, particularly in the metallurgical industry, whose workers played a vanguard role in the revolution. Industries throughout Russia were breaking down. The Coats cotton- thread factory in Petrograd "worked without trouble at full pressure until February, 1918, when it was brought to a standstill by the abnor mal accumulation of stocks due to a breakdown in the distributive 13 machinery through failure of communications and transport." Thus workers' control was a failure. In order to avert the economic crisis, something had to be done in the organization of the factories. In December 1917, Bukharin introduced a proposal for the creation of a Supreme Council of National Economy. This new state organ eliminated all other existing economic ^^Ibid., p. 75. l^Ibid., p. 78. 80 organizations, including the All Russian Council of Workers' Control. This was implemented to ensure a planned economy, particularly after the failure of the local factory committees. It is thus a crucial point that extensive nationalization was not an initial program of the Bolshevik regime. The nationalization of industry was treated at the outset not as a desirable end in itself, but as a response to special condi tions, usually for some misdemeanor of the employers: and it was applied exclusively to individual factories not to industries as a whole, so that any element of planning was quite absent from the initial measures. Although some argue that nationalization arose as a method to defeat the resistance and sabotage of the bourgeoisie, Carr asserts that "everything goes to show that the disorderly procedure of workers' con trol was a main source.Indeed, both punitive and practical explanations were used to support centralization. Hence, the original functions of the Soviet state after the October revolution were: (1) to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country, (2) to defend the country from foreign attack, (3) economic organization and cultural education. After it was claimed that the exploiting classes were eliminated in 1921, the first function was changed to "protecting socialist prop er ty"^^ and the second function remained the same. The first two func tions are expected in the dictatorship of the proletariat. The third function was brought on by the failure of workers' control. ^^Ibid., p. 87. ^^Ibid., p. 85. Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 85. ^^Ibid. 81 Low Level of the Productive Forces The Bolsheviks had hoped that the proletarian movements in Western Europe would succeed. After their victories, the Bolsheviks would have expected help in raising the level of their productive forces. Once it was evident that the European socialist movements had failed, the Bolsheviks had to build socialism in one country. This meant that the Bolsheviks had to regress to a level of state capitalism, with bureaucratic central organization, to raise Russia's productive forces. Despite criticisms of a regression to a form of capitalism, Lenin defended this form of central organization, given the material conditions of Russia. He answered critics who claimed that this was capitulating to the bourgeoisie by asserting that Russia lacked "the proper calculation of which saboteurs set to work . . . We lack the 18 organization of our own forces." In spite of a threat of reversal towards state capitalist formations, Lenin urged that this was "a step 19 forward," as compared with the state of affairs the Bolsheviks had. The chief struggle, in essence, was not the question of state capital ism, but against the petty bourgeoisie and private capitalists, who were subordinated to the state's control and accounting. State capitalism is useful for the workers, because victory over economic ruin and laxity is the most important thing, because the continuation of the anarchy of small ownership is the greatest danger . . . Whereas not only will the payment of a heavier tribute 18 V. I. Lenin, "Left Wing Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 2:689. ^^Ibid., p. 690. 82 to state capitalism not ruin us, but will lead us to socialism by the surest road.^O Since Russia was not at the technological level Marx wrote of when he discussed the transcendence of the state, it had to rely on national accounting and control over industries to reach such a level. As long as the state was proletarian, this could be done without a regression towards capitalist relations and antagonisms. The emphasis on production was a Menshevik contention, that Russia must cease to be backward before it can become socialist. "This problem was rendered acute by the failure of the German and Western Europe proletariats, contrary to Lenin's calculations, to come to the 21 aid of the Russian revolution." Whereas Germany, to Lenin, had the most concrete form of state capitalism, it lacked the political revolu tion which Russia had undergone. Both conditions were essential for the attainment of socialism. Since Russia lacked the level of produc tive forces it anticipated from Western Europe, it had to attain a high level on its own in light of the failures of the European socialist 22 movements. Although it was important to stress socialism's hostility to the state apparatus, the need to smash the bourgeois machine, which Lenin wrote of in State and Revolution, "was sacrificed to meet the 23 imperative practical needs to increase and organize production." 20 Ibid., p. 691. ^^Carr, 2:97. 22 The importance of attaining a high level of productivity was realized in the Civil War in 1921, where Russia was invaded by the United States, France, and Great Britain. ^^Carr, 2:102. 83 En. conclusion, the central organization of the state was inevi- tsIhDe gjiTOsn Russia's difficult material conditions after the revolution and afDe- failure of socialist revolutions in Western Europe. Marx, in ttftie Ccimniinmst Mam* f es to, wrote that the capitalist relations acted as a îiÊttttær crai the productive forces. This thesis implied that the produc tive formes- were very advanced. Russia did not have such a high level >0Î pmrfhiK-feiive forces, and the state, consequently, could not wither .awmy itimtriiTi the productive forces were developed. Given the failure of wiüiirftæirs'' control, the political and cultural education of the prole- tariùBtt failed to occur as well. Subsequently, Lenin insisted on state oapiLtrailjlsm, "a regime which would leave owners in possession and man- agemaiit of their industrial enterprises while subjecting them to general BJtatte supervision and direction.Thus, the state in Russia in 1917 ihad toD taire a form different from that which was envisaged in socialist tihaiDiry- Dictatorship of Proletariat to Dictatorship of Party As the material conditions fostered the growth of the state in rSovfet Bhissia, the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictator ship) of the party. The state as part of the superstructure was affected ihm ttflaree- ways. These are the dictatorship of the party, the composi- irffimnn ®ff the parry, and the issue of democratic centralism. In these ihnnee anreas,, there occurred in practice, modification of the socialist tdheimte'tiltaiD writings. m Ibid., p. 93. & à Dictatorship of Party In The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Earaiin strongly criticized Kautsky's thesis that the proleHaarian (cBhhef; "c h u 25 only dominate, but not govern." Lenin’s State and ■FtevoQiurSam iis based on the assumption that the proletariat can govern and m m oniL’y dominate, and that the working class must be able to do iLff dhimtainer- ship of the proletariat is going to be something other ttihen nnare jam- 26 gon. By March 1919, however, Lenin wrote with deep megiKett„ wet with great frankness, that because of the extremely low leveE tf edhu&utimn of the masses, "the Soviets, which according to their were organs of government by the workers, are in fact organs foi sgEnramneur for the workers by the most advanced section of the prolletarrüær,. brut 27 not by the working masses themselves." Through historEtnaTI ævmisrs (revolution, civil war), the proletariat were facing examinraikiin as a class and the concept "dictatorship of the proletarian" amsviitiaihDy had to be modified in practice. In the exercise of power the dictatorship couTkd rmlty cmnmtr on a narrow stratum of advanced workers, and it would mctt Ibæ frihTle- tm maintain itself long on this basis; the party., in wftmnih nfet* woaifcsEs formed no more than a large minority, was sùbstimutæS fihzr nha- proletariat; it became both the arm and the sword ni tdkes HHwraiEn.— tionary state. 2 S Ralph Mi lib and, "Lenin's State and Revolution.,"’ 3hnrhiBy Review 11 (April 1970):79. 26 Lenin, State and Revolution, pp. 366-67. 27 Lenin, Sochieneniya, 38:170, reprinted in Tiodhe Ifflw&n,, Lenin's Last Struggle (New York: Random House Pantheon Birdkæ., IlSjSBi) , p . 5. 28^ ^ . Lewin, p . 6. 85 Miliband argues that this role of the party can be traced back to State and Revolution because of the problem of political mediation. He asserts that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is obviously incon ceivable without some degree at least of political articulation and 29 leadership, which implies political organization." Lenin wrote: By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organizing their social life without the bour geoisie and against the bourgeoisie. The party had to be the vanguard. Deutscher writes, "The Bol shevik Party had the usurper's role thrust upon it. It had become impossible for it to live up to its principle once the working class 31 disintegrated." The leaders of the party had the choice of continu ing a vanguard role or giving Russia back to the bourgeoisie. The party had to build up the proletariat and Russia's productive forces, but it could not totally rely on the working class to play a leading role. The Bolsheviks thought it would be the height of folly on their part to be guided in their actions by the vote of a desperate rem nant of the working class and by moods of accidental majorities which might form themselves within the shadowy Soviets. At last they . . . did in fact substitute their own party for the working class, if such a working class existed. The party held the real power and was responsible for the exer cise of that power. It became clear almost immediately after the 29 Miliband, p. 82. 30 Lenin, cited in Miliband, p. 83. 31 Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), p. 10. ^^Ibid., p. 13. 86 revolution in October, and even before the disintegration of the prole tariat as a class during the civil war, that the working class at this time was incapable of governing, much less running the factories its meniers worked in. Consequently, due to the material conditions facing Russia, there was a breach between theory and practice of the dictator ship of the proletariat even before the civil war. Party Composition With the introduction of capitalist formations in Russia, there were nonproletarian members in the Bolshevik party. This was a neces sity because the proletariat was a weak, politically immature class. By the end of the civil war, it almost disintegrated as a class. At the onset of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, Lenin proclaimed that there were three classes in the Soviet social order. There was the proletariat, "which as a result of its superhuman exer tions in the revolution and civil war was extremely weary, exhausted, 33 and worn out." There was the petty bourgeoisie, which Lenin identi fied with the peasantry and described as "an independent class, that class which, after the annihilation of landowners and capitalists, remains the only class capable of resisting the proletariat."^^ The third class was that of the landowners and capitalists, who were "here . . . at the present nowhere to be seen, but still constitut[ing] a 35 powerful enemy abroad." Two years later, Lenin eliminated the 33 Lenin, quoted in E. H. Carr, Socialism in One Country, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958-64), 1:102. 34 35 Ibid. ^Ibid., 1:101. 87 landoremem* and] capitalists and added a new bourgeois stratum in Russia, nf-t,en nidenttified' as the Kulaks in the country and the Nepmen in the towns.. Elhiam- was another group of "commanding staff and officer corps'" wihs) were the specialists, technicians, and Intelligentsia. They wieme rranpmoietarian, but their expertise was essential to the Bol- shewijfes" ttaste of raising the productive level of the country. (0)ff the four strata, the Kulaks and Nepmen were considered tem porary aodl ouittaide of Soviet society in that they were ineligible for offiLciLalL posditnion; or party membership under the constitutions of the 37 RussiLan Sacüallist Federal Soviet Republic of 1918 and USSR of 1923. The 'Dttihen- three classes— workers, peasants, and Intelligentsia— com prised ttibe dictatorship of the proletariat. determining the class composition of the party was hindered by two rabsttatt-Des:.. First and foremost, there was "a premium on concealing nDn-çpajDDæîræniiani origin and this was often made easy by the confusion of 38 the tpiibMcr recordsThe other obstacle was one of definition. Sta tistics oDff paarty membership were not kept by present occupation but by social (ffitriigiini^ Garr defined this as position born into. Schapiro claims tthsitt it was by the social position which the party member was in at the tfme of the revolution. Thus, in the province of Leningrad in 1925„ it mœæ recorded that 74.8 percent of party members were workers and gxament were peasants. By present occupation, 55 percent were „ i;;103. 377 Bhjssdia did not become the USSR until 1923. ^Schapiro, p. 234. 88 workers and 1.4 percent were peasants. Other efforts were made to increase proletarian percentages. An official class analysis of the party published in January, 1923, put the percentage of the workers at 45%, of peasants 26%, and others at 29%. In an effort to counter the impression that over half the party was non-proletarian, another analysis added to the workers those white collar employees who had no more than a primary education, and they arrived at the conclusion that 'prole tarian elements* made up about two thirds of the party. An examination of the ruling elite of the party during the 1921-22 years reveals striking features. At the policy-making level at the summit, a high proportion of newcomers had emerged on the eve of the seizure of power side by side with Lenin and his close collaborators. Thus, the twenty-two full members of the Central Committee elected at the Sixth Congress in August, 1917, included a number who had recently joined the party, of whom Trotsky was the most outstanding, and several like Bukharin, who though a Bolshevik of longer standing, had never worked closely with Lenin. Schapiro asserts that much of the debate in the early years of the revolution over issues such as the civil war, NEP, and war communism can be explained by this, although there were differences of theoreti cal position which were at the root of the policy differences. Yet Schapiro also observes that the position is quite different when one comes to examine the actual party apparatus, the men in the key jobs. Here Lenin's pre revolution collaborators predominated. What is significant is that the closer one came to the center of power, the stronger became the representation of the older Bolsheviks in the party apparatus, and that the tendency to use old Bolsheviks (those 39 Xzv. ts. K ., no. 1 (49), January 1923, and no. 4 (52), April 1923, reprinted in Schapiro, p. 236. 40 41 Schapiro, p. 236. Ibid. 89 loyal executants of Lenin's policies for years before the revolution, working in the trade unions, underground organizations, and in the Bol shevik press) in the party apparatus in the local organizations was showing a natural increase by 1922. This ensured proletarian measures and direction. In addition to the representation of the old Bolsheviks in the party in key areas, another tactic the Bolsheviks employed to keep bureaucratic careerism to a minimum was through periodic purges. In the five years between the seizure of power in 1917 and 1922, when Lenin retired from active politics, the party went through two phases of growth. The first phase reflected the attractions held out by the party after it became the governing power. But by the Eighth Congress in March, 1919, it was recognized that an open-door policy on recruitment threatened the party with an influx of careerists Therefore a decision was made by the central committee to take a survey of registered party members, roughly 250,000, and to sift out undesir able (careerist) elements. By October, the weeding-out process reduced the party membership to 150,000. The second phase began at the out break of the civil war, when the Bolshevik regime faced a major test and membership in the party involved personal risk on the part of any newcomers to it. Thus the mass recruitment conducted did not present much of a danger attracting "unworthy" types. By March 1920, the party's size was 611,978. By March 1921, it was 730,000. The Tenth Congress of 1921 inaugurated a new stiffening in recruitment policy. 42 Schapiro, p. 231. 90 On the one hand, with the end of the civil war, membership of the party no longer called for self-sacrificing, and the green light was given to careerists. On the other hand, the Kronstadt insurrection and the signals of revolt inside the party placed a premium on proletarian orthodoxy and discipline There was a purge in the party which began on August 1, 1921, and its purpose was to rid those officials who served under the old regime as well as members of other political parties. The Bolsheviks aimed at keeping the peasants in the party, but it purged Kulak (rural land owners) elements. By 1922, 136,386 members, one-fifth of the party, 44 were purged. Schapiro notes that 11 percent of those expelled were excluded for refusing to carry out party directions— mostly opportun ists— 34 percent for passivity, 25 percent for bribe-taking and extor tion. Including defections from the party as well, the party membership dropped from 730,000 to 515,000. The Bolshevik party was a young party. One-half of the members were under the age of thirty, whereas one-tenth of the membership was over forty years old. "Party members were, in their overwhelming majority, young men of little political experience, and with little formal education. It was frequently argued by critics within the party that party officialdom was becoming less proletarian in its composition. Trotsky noted "that the Soviet regime in its first period was undoubtedly far more egalitarian and less bureaucratic than now. But that was an equality of poverty.As Russia began to develop, the bureaucrats. 43 44 45 Ibid., p. 232. Ibid. Ibid., p. 233. ^^Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (New York; Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1972 c .1937), p. 112. 91 to Trotsky, became a privileged class. The bureaucracy arose in the beginning as the bourgeois organ of a workers' state. In establishing and defending the advantages of a minority, it of course draws off the cream for its own use.^^ Trotsky also makes the point that the party largely consists of non proletarian elements. The victorious commanders assumed leading posts in the local Soviets, in economy, in education, and they persistently introduced everywhere that regime which had ensured success in the civil war. Thus, on all sides, the masses were pushed away gradually from actual participation in the leadership of the country. This nonproletarian prevalence, particularly intellectual and white collar communists in the party apparatus, was explained because the machinery of party bureaucracy was growing larger and more com plicated, the range of tasks with which it was called upon to deal was constantly increasing, and higher educational standards than^g those normally found in a manual worker were required to man it. There was a serious and persistent shortage of qualified candi dates. Lenin declared in a speech that "ninety-nine responsible Com munists out of a hundred do not understand that they do not know and that they must learn the ABC of business administration."^^ The trade unions, which in theory had no real place in socialist society, became the school of administration for socialist industry, one of their chief tasks being the promotion and training of administrators from the ranks of workers and the toiling masses 47 48 Ibid., p. 113. Ibid., p. 89. 49 Schapiro, p. 237. I. Lenin, "Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P. (B), March 27- April 2, 1922," reprinted in Lenin, Selected Works, 3:703. ^^Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:109-11. 92 The practice of the promotion of workers to administrative appointments evidently continued to encounter difficulties. Some local cells refused to recommend good workers for promotion since this would mean their transfer elsewhere. The workers themselves were sometimes unwilling to be promoted to a Soviet, trade union, or cooperative post where the rate of pay was usually lower than what workers received. Deutscher notes that "under the partmaximura, a party member, even one who held the highest office, was not allowed to earn more than the 52 wages of a skilled factory worker." Tomsky, a trade union leader, complained that thousands of promoted workers were failures due to their inability to acquaint themselves with their new work, and jour neyed from job to job searching for something which suited them. Yet in spite of its shortcomings, there was a ladder of promotion available to the workers, as well as openings in the party ranks. By 1923, Carr notes that few signs appeared of any widespread proletarian discontent with the new order. The proletariat's weight in the party declined even after New Economic Policy (NEP). Although Lenin envisaged the working class to 53 be the broadest stratum and to build socialism with its own hands, workers' control in the factories failed to raise industrial produc tion. The Red Guard, structured by "soldiers'" control, was helpless in the face of a disciplined army. Thus a hierarchy was introduced in the army as well. The proletariat seemed incapable of "leading a 52 Deutscher, p. 21. 53 Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:113. 93 peasantry which constituted 80% of the population and which it very much depended onAlthough some argue that a leader whose class is not within the balance of forces is "lost irretrievably," as Engels once wrote, Lenin answered: The man who turns his back on the socialist revolution which is going on in Russia by pointing out the obvious lack of balance of forces is like a man who has got set in a mold, who does not see beyond the end of his nose, and forgets that there has never been a revolution of any magnitude without a whole series of examples of unbalanced forces. Lenin therefore concluded that given the material conditions, and the socialist goal, the Bolshevik party "must hold the fort and prepare the conditions in which the proletariat would mature and become ripe for the role assigned to it. The Central Committee and the Soviet government had to serve in the name and interests of the proletariat. This is a modification of the doctrine of "dictatorship of the proletariat." The doctrine refers to the proletariat alone taking political power into its own hands, but the Russian proletariat was unable to take this power at this time. Given these circumstances, the party replaced the rule of the prole tariat and grew stronger. It was a logical continuation of the role of the party before the revolution. Trotsky in 1904 had accused Lenin of seeking by his methods of organization to create a party which would substitute itself for the working class.But this was not a planned ^^Ibid., 1:113. ^^Lenin, quoted in Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:116. ^^Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:116. ^^Ibid., 1:118. 94 development. In the days of desperate struggle prior to the revolution, the party played a vanguard role, acting as trustee for the proletariat and as organizer of its forces. This role should have ceased, but this expectation Included expectations of worldwide revolutions, which all, including Lenin, had thought was "coming nearer and nearer and becoming 58 more probable every month." When this hope was shattered, the party merely established itself, and once more became the vanguard for the 59 proletariat. This was fact by NEP. Supreme decisions were exclu sively in the hands of the highest party organs and representation of workers in these committees was very small. Members of other social strata acted in the workers' name. Lenin had defended the predominance of intellectuals as a means of raising the productive forces. Carr notes that the identification of the party leadership with state government had two important implications.^^ It led to a further concentration of supreme power in a few hands at the top, and a further strengthening of party discipline, which was now reinforced by means of state security. To all appearances, the party leadership became more autocratic than ever. The decisions to be taken were of a kind which required for their execution the active cooperation of important groups of administrators and managers and the passive masses of workers and peasants. However, the leadership was always obliged, when framing eg Lenin, "Left Wing Childishness," p. 686. 59 Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:116. ^*^Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1:28-29. ^^Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1:125. 95 policy, to take into account the interests of the Russian population by the early 1920*s. Carr argues that in this sense, the Bolshevik party had become more responsible and less autocratic since its seizure of power. But it was not exercised by the proletariat itself. Thus, due to the material conditions of Russia, the party was forced to allow nonproletarian membership. This is a modification of socialist theory which envisaged a classless society. The party, how ever, placed veteran Bolsheviks at key posts and had purges to rid the party of self-interested careerists. These measures, which made the party appear to be more autocratic, enabled the party to retain its socialist character. Consequently, the party can still act in the interests of the proletariat even if there is nonproletarian membership. The Issue of Democratic Centralism The issue of democratic centralism illustrates another related deviation from socialist theory. The party was not characterized by democracy of the rank and file as depicted by theory and experienced by the Paris Commune, but by centralism and discipline. Originally this change in party structure was a response to the Kronstadt rebellion, but the issue never left the party. The Kronstadt uprising in March 1921 was "the first concerted 62 internal revolt against the Soviet regime since 1918." This uprising created much discussion at the Tenth Party Congress when it met on March 8, 1921. Faced with this crisis, the Congress "was prepared for 63 drastic measures aimed at party rule," for factions were omnipresent. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 2:181. Schaplro, p. 211. 96 One faction, the Democratic Centralists, demanded that there should be more democracy in the Communist Party. A resolution proposed by Buk harin said that the military form of centralism in the party . . . had been dic tated by civil war conditions and was no longer applicable. All party members must be ensured an active part in the life of the party. Moreover, the nature of workers' democracy excludes every form of appointment in place of election as a system. At this time, the three secretaries of the party, Krestinsky, Preobra- zhenski, and Serebriakov, were replaced, and also removed from the Cen tral Committee. They were attacked by Zinoviev, who blamed them for the dictatorial system prevalent in the party. There had been many different plans in preparation for dealing with party discipline, although many, including Lenin, were not pleased with any of them. On the last day of the Congress, however, Lenin introduced two resolutions: on "Party Unity" and on "The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party." Ironically, Lenin's opening remarks were, "I do not think it will be necessarv for me to sav much on this subject.These proposals were to have a great impact on the party and country. The first resolution on Party Unity drew attention to the fact that there had been signs In the party, even before trade union debates, of the formation of groups with separate platforms and with the determination to a certain extent to become self-contained and create their own group discipline. It went on to suggest that the existence of opposition had given encouragement to the enemies of the revolution . . . and went on to lay down new limits for criticism of party policy by party members . . . The resolution called for the immediate dissolution of all groups with a separate platform, on pain of immediate expulsion from the party. ^^Ibid., p. 212. ^^Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 2:183. ^^Schapiro, p. 211. 97 The second resolution prosecuted the defendants as a petty-bourgeois anarchist element. The deviation was caused by the entry into the ranks of the party of elements (petty bourgeois) which still did not completely adopt the Communist world view.^^ The resolutions concluded that the proletariat was incapable of rising above a trade-union consciousness, and the party argued that the state should therefore be characterized by centralism, discipline, and unity. Trotsky argued that "democratic centralism" was "not in the least contradictory"^^ for the party. It was essential. The party took watchful care not only that its boundaries should always be defined, but also that all those who entered these boundaries should enjoy the actual right of defining the direction of the party policy.'0 He Interpreted the ban on factions as "an exceptional measure to be abandoned at the first serious improvement in the situation,but he claimed that Stalin, with the help of Zinoviev and Kamenev, forming a 72 triumvirate, freed the party from its rank and file members. In essence, Trotsky accused the triumvirate of replacing democratic cen tralism with bureaucratic centralism. In his fight to democratize the party, he made an analogy in The New Course between the army and the party, particularly in reference ^^Robert Vincent Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 531. ^^Trotsky, p. 94. ^^It might be important to note that Trotsky was losing the influence he formerly had in the party, particularly in the Politburo, when his statements on the bureaucratization of the party were made. ^°Ibid., p. 95. ^4bld., p. 96. ^^Ibid., p. 97. 98 73 to attitudes toward tradition. In both cases, the newcomers entered a developed organization characterized by tradition. Yet Trotsky argued that tradition should not be accepted as the eternal truth. "On the contrary, tradition must be worked out by oneself in a critical manner . . . otherwise the whole structure is built on sand."^^ Trot sky recognized that the young workers and party members were politi cally immature, but "it was precisely the bureaucratic tutelage that prevented the masses from growing politically mature.It was only through a democratic framework that the revolutionary fervor of the party could be maintained. The triumvir defended itself and the party with counteraccusa tions. They claimed that it was criminal to cast derogatory criticism on the party's intention and incite the young against the old. "Trotsky equivocated over the ban on factions; he knew that the ban was essen tial to the party's unity and did not dare to demand plainly that it be revoked.Indeed, Trotsky supported the ban on factions. Deutscher contends that the trimvirs exposed and made the most of the weaknesses and contradictions in Trotsky’s position, but they had to resort to falsification as well.He reveals the weakness of Trotsky's argument : Throughout his stand on the Bolshevik monopoly of power; and much more persuasively than the triumvirs did he call on the party to guard it as the sole guarantor of the revolution’s survival; and he reaffirmed his own desire to defend and consolidate it. He only 73 Deutscher, p. 120. 74 Trotsky, The New Course, cited in Deutscher, p. 121. ^^Deutscher, p. 222. ^^Ibid., p. 125. ^^Ibid., p. 126. 99 objected to the monopoly of power which the Old Guard obtained . . . and exercised . . . It was not difficult for his adversaries to demonstrate that the latter was the necessary sequel to the former . . , Trotsky argued that the 400,000 members should be trusted to exercise their judgement and allowed to have a full share in shap ing policy. Why then, his adversaries asked, had the party, with Lenin’s inspiration and Trotsky’s consent, denied the mass of mem bers that trust in recent years?^® The point was that the party was in danger of losing its prole tarian socialist outlook, and in danger of degenerating into a partoc racy, no matter whether the party entrusted its future to the mass of workers or to the Old Guard, To Deutscher the predicament arose from the fact that the majority of the nation did not share the socialist outlook, that the working class was still disintegrated, and from the 79 failures of other revolutions. The possibility of degeneration was inherent, note the possibility of degeneration, and the Old Guard had to decide whether to trust the political instincts of the 400,000 party members, whom Lenin discounted as immature, or limit the democratiza tion of the party. It chose the latter. The issue was not whether the party was bureaucratic, but given the conditions in Russia, the party bureaucracy was the only politi cally organized force in the country, which fought for and carried the tradition of proletarian socialism. As Deutscher observes, it was the 80 "promoter of the country's development towards collectivism" and represented the interests of the socialist sector as opposed to the private sector. Expansion had to proceed for primitive socialist accumulation, but it could do this only through absorption of the resources of the remaining private sectors. Since the party bureaucracy 7fi 7Q Rn Ibid. Ibid., p. 127. Ibid., p. 130. 100 represented the public sector, it could not but defend the foundations 81 of socialism at this time. Conclusion The Soviet state did not meet the anticipations of the theo retical writings of the state after capitalism. The state grew larger and stronger, instead of withering away. In addition, the state did not have the democratic features which the Paris Commune employed. The growth of the Soviet state, however, must be seen in Rus sia's historical context. Since it was the first country in the world to experience a successful proletarian revolution, it was greeted with antagonism by the rest of the (capitalist) world. No other country was willing to help Russia, which was not a highly developed country in 1917. The Bolshevik leaders therefore looked towards the proletariat in the highly developed countries of Western Europe to seize power in their countries and help the Russian economy. After the failure of the proletarian movements in Europe, Russia had to build its economy up itself. Since the working class was unable to increase production, the state had to do it. Socialism in one country forced Russia to build communism with 82 noncommunist hands which consequently created a centralized bureau cracy. The bureaucracy is a capitalist form, for it accentuates the division between mental and manual labor, and a strong hierarchy. ®^Ibid., p. 131. 82 Lenin, "Eleventh Party Congress," reprinted in Selected Works, 3:695. 101 We took over the state apparatus, and that was our misfortune. The state apparatus very often works against us . - . We have now an immense mass of officials.®^ These old officials, who were inherited from the Czar, could con sciously or unconsciously work against the regime. Lenin's incessant preoccupation during the last twelve months of his active life with the problem of bureaucracy was closely connected with his apprehensions of the growing influence of survivors of the prerevolutionary social order in the working of the Soviet administrative machinery. In an essay, "Better Fewer, but Better," Lenin wrote: Our state apparatus is so deplorable, not to say wretched, that we must think very carefully how to combat its defects, bearing in mind that these defects are rooted in the past, which although it has been overthrown, had not yet been overcome. Although he disdained the state apparatus, he also realized that it would be disastrous to assume "we have any considerable number of ele ments necessary for the building of a really new state apparatus, one 85 really worthy to be called socialist." E. H. Carr comments that it was their (non-socialist bureaucrats) qualifications that made them indispensable to the running of both the economic and politi cal machine; only with their help could the handicap of the back wardness of the proletariat be overcome.^6 Consequently, the attempt was made either to control or reconcile the 87 bourgeois intellectuals. There was an "undeclared alliance" between the party representing the proletariat, and the group of intellectuals 83 Lenin, quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 2:132. I. Lenin, "Better Fewer, but Better," reprinted in V. I. Lenin, Selected Works. 111:776. ®^Ibid., p. 777. ®^Carr, Bolshevik Revolution. 2:133-34. ®^Ibid., 2:134. 102 who were survivors of Czarist Russia. It was this alliance, estab lished under the direction and leadership of the party, which provided the ruling group of that society, and hence, modification of "the dic tatorship of the proletariat." This was the dilemma of Russia, for the bureaucracy maintained a form that could easily regress towards capi talist relations. It therefore required keen supervision. From the 1920*s the party and state grew stronger. Today, the bureaucracy is still present in the Soviet Union, despite an advanced proletariat, for the USSR is strong economically, industrially, and militarily. Roy Medvedev, a contemporary Bolshevik, argues that this is a problem for Russia today. It seems to me that the principal contradiction at the present time in Soviet society is the increasing disparity between the requirements of rapid, scientific, technical, and economic progress and the excessively centralized and above all bureaucratic system that governs all sides of economic life.®® This thesis is not aimed at analyzing whether the Soviet Union has now or ever regressed toward a state capitalist formation. Its point is to illustrate why and how the state and party grew after the Bolshevik revolution. The Bolshevik party, in essence, had to act in the prole tariat's name. This modified the doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as developed in the theoretical works. The purpose of the party was to carry on the revolution. As long as this was the aim, it dominated all of society. go Roy Medvedev, "What Lies Ahead of Us," New Left Review 87-88 (September-December 1974):73. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION The subject of this thesis is the nature of the state after capitalism. The state, an important social institution, is theoreti cally and empirically neither categorically imperative nor eternal and unchanging. In the first chapter the literature revealed that there were societies which did not have a state. These early societies had family organizations (gens, phratries) which were responsible to the whole society, rather than certain groups in society. The rulers of these societies were the elders, and their ruling capacity was not a full-time occupation. Unlike the state societies, these societies were linked by kinship relations. Only after the establishment of class distinctions and the development of private property did the state founded on territory and property arise. The literature reveals that these later societies were marked by conflict engendered from class antagonisms, and the state, controlled by the dominant propertied class, curbed the friction. These findings are important to the Marxist thesis of the withering away of the state. They show that the state as an institution is not universal in human societies, thus future societies are not inherently bound to it. In addition, since the rise of the state is linked to the development of class distinctions, and thus the domination of one class over others, the state can be eliminated, in theory, if class divisions are removed. This chapter Illustrates that 103 104 the sociological and anthropological literature on the state supports the preconditions for the Marxist theoretical argument of the precondi tions for the Marxist theoretical argument of the withering away of the state. The proletarian revolution in Marxist theory leads to a class less society. The capitalist state, which is an agent of the proper tied class, loses its class character. Since the state is defined by Marxists as a mechanism for class rule, it "biologically" withers away. Marx wrote that there would be some organization, for socialist society has a planned economy which ends the anarchy of production found in capitalism. ' Because there remains some association, Marx expected that the state becomes transcended (Aufhebung) in socialism from a particu laristic institution to a universal one. This new form of the state is representative to the whole society, guaranteed by universal suffrage and the right of recall. The transition from capitalism to socialism is not an easy one. The social relations found in capitalism do not immediately end after the seizure of the instruments of production. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a transitional form the state takes in the beginnings of socialist society. The proletarian dictatorship period has a dual nature. It is the political power of the proletariat to ward off hos tile elements, particularly the defeated capitalists who may try to take power back or sabotage industries. Except for the protection of the new regime, however, the period is characterized by universalism, ensured by universal suffrage. Once the bourgeoisie is eliminated as a class, for their existence as a class is defined as owners of the means 105 of production which new belmmg, to< all of society, the state, in theory, loses its political ((r-epirœæsiwe}! function. The Paris Connnmme The Commune was an imsurrectimm by the masses after the defeat of Napoleon III by Prussia in 181®. In addition to the war, the degener ating living conditions off Paris were another contributing factor. The proletariat was not the lonnly class supporting the establishment of the Commune. The middle class, imcluding professionals, artisans, and some petty bourgeoisie comprised the majority of the Communards. The Com mune, therefore, was not a predominantly proletarian movement, although its socialist constituents were a large minority. Since the insumectloim was not totally a class-based movement, the hostile elements were mot tetally the Parisian bourgeoisie {although many were antagonistic t® the Commune), but the national Versailles government and its troops, which threatened the Commune. The inability of the Commune to sustainn itself from the Versailles government was its downfall. Although the (Commmme wras doomed to failure because of its encirclement by the natixmmal. army, it established a form of government which follows the theoretical writings of the socialist state. It was characterized by universal sonffffrage, with the right of recall by the electors at any time- ïS® anme working in the government received a salary that was higher tlharni the wages of a skilled worker. The standing 106 army was abolished in fawcir mff a people's militia. The Commune intro duced proletarian reforms, snmch as the abolition of night bakery work, and sought to establish socialist relations by forming cooperatives in factories which had been ahamdactect by capitalists. It was these demo cratic advances which 'characterized, the Commune as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bolshevik revmlatio# of 1917 is the other historical event researched. This was the first sustained proletarian revolution. Rus sia was the weakest link itm capitalist development in Europe in 1917, and the proletariat needed tthe support of the peasantry in the revolu tion. Unlike the Marxian tmodel of revolution portrayed in The Mani festo of the Communist Party, the proletariat was a small proportion of the Russian population. World War I, the rewolmtion itself, and the civil war had a deteriorating effect on the Russian proletariat, which threatened its very existence as a class. Markers in factories were unable to take control of production, amd former workers in the state apparatus were unable to adapt to posts reqmirijmg accounting and other skills. The Bolshevik party had to t u m tt® the intelligentsia to fill these posts. Having to build communism with uoucommunist hands turned the dictator ship of the proletariat lot® a dictatorship of the party. Lenin and loyal vanguard Bolsheviks were in the key positions in the party to maintain keen s up ervis icm ®f the noup role tari an elements. The state bureaucracy, consisting ®ff the ©ffficials who were employed under the Csar, grew larger, contrary to the anticipation of the theoretical writings, but it was their technical and administrative qualifications 107 which made them indispensable to the running of the country's economy and political apparatus. Although Lenin viewed the growing state appa ratus as deplorable, he knew it was essential if Russia was going to raise the level of its productive forces. This was the quandary the Soviets were faced with. With the failure of the proletarian revolu tions in Western Europe, socialism took place in one country, one which was not highly developed, and this caused modifications in the struc ture of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviet Union and the Paris Commune did not exactly apply the theoretical model of socialist society proposed by Marx and Engels. It was inevitable that there would be discrepancies between the theo retical writings and their actual application in practice. The state is part of the superstructure, which is homologous to the base, or material conditions of each particular society. The theoretical writ ings of Marx and Engels on the state after capitalism had tacit assump tions of the material conditions of society which corresponded to their depiction of socialist society. This included a highly developed level of technology, class consciousness of the working class, and an inter national movement. If the material conditions of a country are differ ent in any way from the ideal conditions of Marx and Engels, the form of state will vary as well. Marx and Engels had written in the Mani festo that political measures would be different in each country. This is because the material conditions would vary from country to country. Marx and Engels had in mind only the countries of Western Europe in their ideal type, but this idea of varying material conditions can be extended to countries which they did not consider. 108 The Paris Commune can be seen in this light. It enjoyed a uni- versalistic government, but since most of the Commune was middle class and petty-bourgeois, most of the reforms were beneficial mainly to the middle class and petty bourgeoisie. There was a large socialist con stituency, and this resulted in some proletarian measures. The Commune, however, was not a socialist regime. Except for the cooperatives that were established in abandoned factories, capitalist relations and pri vate property continued intact. The course of the Commune, hence, was limited by the material conditions of Paris. Russia became a socialist regime, but the proletariat was rela tively small and almost disintegrated after the First World War and the civil w a r . These conditions, an exhausted and immature (low class con sciousness) proletariat and technological underdevelopment, differed from the Marxian ideal type. Consequently, the form of the socialist state differed as well. The Soviet state was still socialist, but instead of the proletariat taking control of industries and the state, the party was forced to act in the proletariat's name. The course of the Russian experience, therefore, can be traced to the socialistically underdeveloped material conditions, or base, of Russian society. The Soviet Union has been accused in recent times of reverting back to a form of state capitalism. For example, the USSR has relied on material incentives for workers and there is some evidence of a Kulak class in agriculture.^ Russia has always had a large bureaucracy. Arguments as this are proposed by The Revolutionary Union, How Capitalism Has Been Restored in the Soviet Union (Chicago: Revolution ary Publishing, 1974), and Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), 109 which is a capitalist formation. However, with central direction and acute supervision it can be used for socialist aims. But since the form is there, it can easily regress towards a capitalist road if it is not regu lated carefully. The character of the Soviet Union today, and the issue of whether it has regressed to a form of state capitalism, and the con ditions responsible for it are important research questions for the future. Although the Bolsheviks were faced with underdeveloped produc tive forces, this is not the sole factor which determines the nature of the state in an underdeveloped country which experiences a socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks used socialism to raise the technological level of Russia. China, which was also relatively undeveloped in com parison with Western Europe when it experienced a socialist revolution, chose a different route. For Mao Tse Tung, socialism was not merely a means for rapid industrialization, but an end in itself, "a society 2 with high moral standards and a certain style of collective living." In addition to concentrating on the elevation of the productive forces, the Chinese gave equal importance to the relations of production. Much of contemporary Chinese development can be seen as an attempt to avoid the elite spirit that has characterized other communist regimes, and an attempt also to avoid^the mediocrity of a centralized and bureaucratic power system. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese relied on decentralization of govern ment, "depending upon regional and local initiatives."^ This different 2 E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce Me Far lane. The Chinese Road to Socialism (New York; Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 16. ^Ibid., p , 16. ^Edgar Snow, The long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 175. 110 modus operand! presents an alternative road to socialism, which empha sizes socialist relations as well as industrial development, should be examined in another study. The employment of different socialist strategies, including the Cuban, Albanian, Korean, as well as the Rus sian and Chinese models, need further inquiry to develop proper under standing of the state after capitalism and the forms that it can take. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY The State In Historical Perspective Balandier, Georges. Political Anthropology. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. Bottoraore, B. T. Sociology; A Guide to Literature and Problems. New York: Vintage Books, 1972. 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