2 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1998-2002 7 MAP 8 I – FROM 1998 UNTIL THE CEASE-FIRE 9 THE WARRING PARTIES MAKE USE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AS A WEAPON IN “GREY AREAS” 9 A) T HE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR : CIVILIANS CAUGHT IN A TRAP 9 a. A population on the run 9 “The troops came, so we went to hide in the mata” 9 “We would stay beneath a tree, without moving” 10 Surviving on what we could find in the forest: “ Too much suffering ” 10 No access to health care: “ People started doing very badly” 10 b. Civilians seen as “useful objects” 11 Forced recruitment and child soldiers: “We trained with the soldiers” 11 Sexual abuse : “I was a prisoner and my punishment was to do everything” 11 Slavery and human shields: “ They took our clothing so that we couldn’t escape” 11 Violence and retaliation : “We were given up to 500 lashes of the whip” 12 B) S ECOND PHASE OF THE WAR : EXACERBATION OF THE TERROR 12 a. The government’s major offensives, Unita’s withdrawal and the endlessly displaced populations 12 “They knew no rest” 12 Free-for-all looting : “At first, they took cattle, then corn, then clothing, and then kitchen utensils.” 13 b. A captive population stripped of its possessions 14 Systematic pillaging of civilians’ belongings: “Not even the clothes on their backs” 14 c. The government’s systematic scorched-earth policy 14 “They burned the houses, the harvest, the corn, the potatoes, everything.” 14 Forced displacements 15 “ Many, many deaths” 15 II – SINCE THE CEASEFIRE 16 THE WAR ZONES GRADUALLY OPEN UP, REVEALING A POPULATION IN DANGER OF DYING 16 A) T HE V ARIOUS G ROUPINGS AND E MERGENCY R ESPONSE 16 a. Forced regroupment areas: death sites under army control 16 “In Bunjei, there were only birds and trees left” 16 A Measles Epidemic 17 Aid Gets Underway 17 b. Demobilization of former Unita soldiers and the quartering areas 18 B) T HE EXTENT OF THE CRISIS 18 a. Regroupment camps: the examples of Chipindo and Bunjei 18 b. Grey zones: examples of quartering camps and areas of recently-arrived displaced persons 19 In Chitembo, Bie province 19 Cuando Cubango province 19 c. The current and future food situation 20 Irregular and inadequate supplies 20 An Uncertain Future 20 CONCLUSION 21 3 4 Introduction On 4 April 2002, a ceasefire agreement between the Luanda Government and Unita forces brought a temporary halt to more than 27 years of war. All over the country, families were reunited after many years of separation. The country’s major highways were reopened to traffic, enabling people both to find their loved ones again and return to their home cities, towns or villages. Ernesto, a 48-year-old widower interviewed in Mavinga, summed up the general feeling: “Here in Angola, we lost much of our wealth because of the war. We don’t want any more war. We never want to hear the word again. Now the problem’s hunger: when people are hungry, they’ll do anything”. This immediate post-war phase, mingling hopes and fears for the future, can never obscure the realities of a recent past marked by acts of brutality against civilians and a present that seems to want to pay little attention to the very same people. Looking back now at the fighting and the military strategies employed since 1998, we can gauge the extent of the criminal contempt expressed by the two conflict participants towards the vast majority of Angolans. It was the people of Angola who were condemned to endure the outrages of this war. The tragic results of these political choices were witnessed in the field over many years by Médecins Sans Frontières’ teams. When the fighting resumed in 1998, we were active in most of the country’s provinces, but were then forced to halt several projects. MSF teams gave their last consultations at the health centre in the town of Bunjei (Huila Province) in January 1998 and were not able to resume their work there until March 2002. For almost four years, much of Angola was inaccessible. Only the end of the fighting that followed the ceasefire enabled us at last to move around in the grey areas and uncover the extent of the tragedy that had been unfolding, undetected, during all those long years. The gathering of witness accounts is central to the work of MSF volunteers. We began to gather these accounts as soon as we were able to enter the previously inaccessible areas. The interviews were carried out over a period of several weeks in four provinces (Huambo, Huila, Cuando-Cubango and Lunda Sul). Our intention was not to produce a picture of the whole country or to represent all of Angolan society. The survey involved 145 heads of household (fathers or mothers), who were interviewed at medical facilities supported by MSF. It represents an attempt to understand our teams’ working environment, as well as the causes of the distress of people who were exhausted by four years of relentless fighting. All the witness accounts agree about the nature of the violence suffered by the victims of Government forces and Unita. Some people were kept in the brutal grip of Unita forces, compelled to work for them and, in most cases, obliged to abandon their homes whenever troop movements made it necessary. Others were gradually displaced, by Government forces – either on a voluntary basis or by force – from territories previously controlled by Unita. Here, the aim was to deprive the rebels of human and logistical support. The displaced were resettled in advanced positions of the national army, where they were abandoned to their fate and mostly denied the right to move about freely. This military strategy was used by both warring parties, and effectively used civilians as a weapon. It could not fail to have tragic consequences. Having become hostages of one side or the other, these people were no longer able to see to their own needs. Because the first phase of the war (1998-1999) was fought around front lines that were to be defended or broken, some population groups were able to go on living their lives away from the daily violence. But the second phase, which began in 2000 when the national army entered regions previously sheltered from the fighting (thus provoking Unita’s withdrawal), truly marked a hardening of the two enemies’ attitude towards civilians. Although MSF workers were denied access to a large part of Angolan territory, they were confronted daily with civilians who were able to escape into the secure zones. The disastrous general condition (medical, nutritional, etc.) of these people enabled us to guess at the plight of those who remained prisoners of the fighting. And yet, we were powerless to intervene. Once the ceasefire was in place, MSF was able to access the formerly disputed areas. Our teams then began 15 exploratory missions in order to evaluate the people’s needs and set up medical programmes to deal with their most urgent necessities. Over a period of five months, at 23 intensive feeding centres, more than 16,000 children have been able to escape certain death. However, a retrospective mortality survey revealed that the number of deaths due to lack of food or medical care in the months before our missions began was very high (see Chiteta/Bunjei survey). As was the case with all the other humanitarian agencies, our intervention came too late to meet these people’s glaring needs. Today, the situation remains desperate for all those who survived the years of war in the grey areas. The numerous nutrition programmes or general food distribution programmes are still not enough to deal with the situation brought to light following the ceasefire. 5 The military and political agreements finalized by the two former warring parties several months ago, beneath the approving gaze of the United Nations, Russia, Portugal and the United States, ignore the history of the people trapped by a war that the two parties to the conflict desired and organized. Several thousand civilians were sacrificed in a futile effort to win an illusory victory. Others were able to survive under horrifying conditions, but still today they must wait, day by day, in the hope that they will find enough food to live on. The responsibility of the Angolan Government and Unita for the suffering of the Angolan people is undeniable. During the fighting, these two former enemies made strategic choices that were wholly contrary to the principles of humanity. Furthermore, they obstinately refused to allow humanitarian organizations access to the people most deeply affected. Having used those civilians as a weapon, they now “forget” to take their vital needs into account. The testimonies in this report document how during fighting between 1998-2002 both Unita and the Government of Angola carried out deliberate acts against civilians, including forced displacement of populations, rape, involuntary recruitment, and violence, that were clear violations of International Humanitarian Law and constitute war crimes. The United Nations, the diplomatic community, and other members of the international community failed to intervene to avert this tragedy. Denied access to the war zones, humanitarian organizations were powerless to aid civilians caught in the conflict. The representatives of the international community involved in the Angolan crisis for many years showed themselves to be totally powerless to intervene decisively among the warring parties throughout the long years of conflict, even to ensure respect for the civilians trapped by the war. Since the end of the conflict, they have appeared just as incapable of dealing with the suffering endured by the civilians or of understanding the urgent need to act now in order to help them regain their basic human dignity.