Letter from

Balochistan insurgency is led, according to the government, by three disgruntled ‘Counter-insurgencies’ Baloch sardars (tribal chiefs) who are opposed to development. The official view on the Waziristan operation is that it is in aimed at foreign Al Qaida terrorists and their local supporters. At a time when insurgencies have been making headlines across It might be argued that most of the south Asia, it is useful to identify some historical and geographical “insurgencies” share some project of ethnic patterns of such conflicts in Pakistan. State security forces have been sub-nationalism, aimed ultimately at se- cession. Both leftist and rightist versions engaged in counter-insurgency operations for 20 out of the last 35 of this argument have been implicitly years, and currently face two sets of insurgencies. A review present in how protagonists have posi- suggests that there are a few positive commonalities between the tioned themselves in these conflicts. In the various insurgencies in terms of the identity of the insurgents and their two Balochistan insurgencies, the 1980s support bases, their organisational structures, ideologies, demands or MRD movement in , and to some extent in the conflict in the 1990s, methods. There are interesting patterns, however, in the state’s the “national self-determination” rhetoric approach to counter-insurgency, and in where these otherwise of the left was certainly present on the side disparate insurgencies fit into the broader body politic of the country. of the “insurgents”. Some outsiders have even interpreted the Taliban and their HARIS GAZDAR particularly on the districts of Khuzdar supporter insurgents in the Pashtun tribal and Kohlu, but with widespread support. belt of Pakistan as Pashtun nationalists in n the 35 years since the birth of the The insurgency was sparked off by the Islamic garb. There is a right wing view “new” Pakistan – following the libera- dismissal of the elected provincial govern- that concurs – by labelling all of these Ition of Bangladesh in 1971 – the ment. From 1983 till around 1989, the various movements as wanting to “break” military has ruled the country for nearly army was on counter-insurgency mode in or “territorially weaken” Pakistan. 19 years. These were years when a serving rural Sindh, even though there was no In fact, while ethnicity is an important army chief was the effective chief executive well-defined insurgency in progress. The political variable across Pakistani politics, of the state. Elected civilian leaders were military action started with the suppres- apart from the two insurgencies in in charge for around 15 years, and various sion of civil non-violent protests known Balochistan, “national self-determination” interim and transitional governments ac- popularly as the “MRD movement” (Move- has not figured as a significant demand counted for about one year. This is well ment for Restoration of Democracy), and anywhere. The MRD movement in Sindh known and much commented upon. ended up as operations against “outlaws” in the 1980s was substantially a protest What is less well acknowledged, how- and “dacoits”. Then there was a continu- against general Zia’s military dictatorship. ever, is the fact that in 20 out of these last ous string of military operations in Karachi Ethnic Sindhis were at the forefront and 35 years, there were military operations between 1992 and 1996 against the MQM, Sindhi nationalist slogans were popular, between Pakistan’s security forces and known at the time as the Mohajir Quami but the leadership was firmly in the hands segments of the citizenry. Taking a delib- Movement. Currently, there are separate of ’s federalist PPP. The Karachi erately conservative definition of “mili- active counter-insurgency operations in conflict of the 1990s was quite largely tary operations” one might exclude army Balochistan and in the Pashtun tribal area about ethnicity – or the assertion of takeovers and the associated violence per- of Waziristan. These date, roughly speak- ethnicity-based claims on the part of the petrated on civilians in order to sustain ing, from 2003. -speaking community. But here too those takeovers. The use of the military for While there are some apparent com- the main sources of unrest were percep- the “policing” of class, ethnic or sectarian monalities between the five “insurgen- tions of unfair resource allocation and conflicts also does not automatically qualify. cies” identified here, these do not survive ethnic discrimination against the Urdu- “Military operations” are defined here to scrutiny. Apart from the inevitable claims speaking Mohajirs. The current conflict in exclude situations when security forces of the ubiquitous but invisible foreign Waziristan is “ethnic” only insofar as it have been deployed as armed policemen, hand – which cannot be analysed precisely is linked to the power struggle between or to provide emergency cover, but to refer because it remains invisible – even the and non-Pashtuns in Afghani- to active “counter-insurgencies”. official version does not show up any stan. It does not really implicate ethnic obvious patterns. Balochistan 1973-77 was politics in Pakistan. Diverse Range of Conflicts dubbed a separatist movement, Sindh 1983- Even in the two Balochistan conflicts 89 as a fight against banditry, and Karachi “national self-determination” has remained Between 1973 and 1977 there was an 1992-96 as a campaign against ethnic an outside option – a rallying cry, or a insurgency in Balochistan, focused terrorism and urban crime. The current warning – on the part of the insurgents and

1952 Economic and Political Weekly May 20, 2006 their supporters. While Baloch ethnic implications. It requires the belief that important thing is that the state’s response identity and perceptions of injustice with violent rebellion is the principal activity has rarely, if ever, made the transition to the are recurrent themes, all of the other side, and that the primary “counter-insurgency” mode. of the concrete demands of the parties in actors on the other side are armed com- There might be any number of reasons conflict remain within the constitutional batants. It requires the suspension of any for this. The bulk of the security forces are framework of Pakistan. These demands meaningful distinction, as far as the other recruited in Punjab, and that is where most are about strengthening the provincial side is concerned, between political de- of the officers come from. Another argu- government, ensuring more favourable mands and civil conflicts on the one hand, ment often made is that Punjab is relatively resource transfers, the withdrawal of co- and military tactics on the other. well looked after in terms of resource ercive state agencies, and the guaranteeing Most importantly, the boundaries be- allocation and does not have much to of the collective interests of the ethnic tween combatants and civilians are blurred, complain about. This is obviously not true, Baloch community. and concern for civilians goes only as far as empirical analyses of poverty and social In fact, the five cases of conflict are so as claiming to restrict collateral damage. development show that the conditions of diverse that it is arguable if they all even While discussing the deaths of women and the people of Punjab are not dramatically qualify for the label “insurgency”. Even children in a Waziristan village in the different from other parts of the country. if these conflicts were not all insurgencies, course of an interview, general Musharraf In fact given its sheer size, Punjab accounts however, it is clear that the state response referred to those losses as “collateral for most of the poverty and backwardness in each case was certainly of the “counter- damage”. During the 1990s Karachi con- in Pakistan. If the establishment of a stable insurgency” type. The matter, in each case, flict, idle chatter about inflicting “thou- democratic system promises to bear social was perceived as a threat to state security. sands of casualties” did not raise too many and economic fruit – and there is much to Political possibilities were quickly aban- eyebrows in Islamabad drawing rooms. say that it does so in Pakistan – then Punjab doned in favour of coercive action. Most What allows a state to perpetually treat has more to gain than most. importantly, however, the analysis of internal political conflicts as though they Whatever the reasons for it, an analysis conflict moved effortlessly to the implicit were insurgencies? How is it possible to of the political implications of the rela- condemnation of an entire community. go from one segment of the citizenry to tively lighter hand on Punjab may aid a the next, declaring each disparate group better understanding of state power in Military Response a permissible target for collective punish- Pakistan. Punjab is, for obvious demo- ment? Pakistan, of course, is not the only graphic and historical reasons, seen as the The response inevitably involved the state in south Asia to have to answer this “core” of Pakistan, and the rest of the large-scale deployment of troops, the question. Much of what is said here is true country as the “periphery”. It is Punjab and setting up of operational bases, and the use of all of the major countries in the region. not all the other “trouble-spots” that would of heavy military equipment. Air power Another look at the pattern of counter- be the principal site of political contention. has been used in all of these counter- insurgencies in Pakistan, however, reveals Any significant mobilisation in Punjab insurgency campaigns except the one in something about the dynamics of state against the military, or any other form of Karachi, though other military equipment power in the country. status quo for that matter, would lead to such as armoured personnel carriers were decisive change. The rest of the country, used here. They have all led to large Dynamics of State Power including Karachi, matters much less, and numbers of civilian casualties that have can be dealt with much more harshly. often gone undocumented. Families and There are three noticeable features about Paradoxically, the perpetual “counter- entire communities have been displaced, the review of counter-insurgency in Paki- insurgency” in the rest of Pakistan has and large numbers of people arrested and stan. First, counter-insurgencies have been been an unwitting prop of the military’s tortured. There have also, inevitably, been present during military as well as civilian political power in the country. There is a numerous casualties among security per- governments. There were only six years balance of fear in which political players sonnel, and it is often alleged that many in the last 35 when there was a civilian in the “periphery” are taught to acquiesce of these have been concealed for propa- government and there was no counter- to the coercive power of the state. Political ganda purposes. During all of these counter- insurgency. Second, the counter-insur- classes in Punjab, on the other hand are insurgencies, including those in urban areas, gency mode of response has been intrin- taught to fear the unruly “peripherals” who local civil administrations have lost their sically linked to the political legitimisation are always ready to challenge the state, and writ to the “insurgents”, the security forces of the military even during periods of civil by extension threaten Punjab. It is this fear or to both. government. Third, every single case of of the peripherals that prevents the politi- Perhaps the most striking commonality counter-insurgency has occurred outside cal classes in Punjab from challenging the between the two Balochistan insurgencies, the province of Punjab. status quo. This does not mean, of course, the MRD movement in Sindh in the 1980s, The absence of counter-insurgency in that the people in the periphery will stop the Karachi operations of the 1990s, and Punjab can be interpreted in a positive raising their political demands, or even the Waziristan conflict is the nature of the light. Punjab, after all, is home to around that “counter-insurgency” will always response. It is remarkable that the state has 56 per cent of the country’s population, prevail over “insurgency”. A system of been willing and able to elevate diverse and the fact that a majority of the citizens governance built upon a balance of fear political and civil conflicts to the level of has been protected against the counter- will always be unstable even if it happens “insurgency” almost by the virtue of adopt- insurgency mode of the state is certainly to have endured thus far. EPW ing a posture of “counter-insurgency”. The a good thing. There are, of course, con- transition to counter-insurgency has grave flicts as well as dissent in Punjab, but the Email: [email protected]

Economic and Political Weekly May 20, 2006 1953