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MEETING THE CHALLENGE MEETING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT THE CHALLENGE : U . S . POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT a project of · BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER report of an independent task force sponsored by the bipartisan policy center 1225 i street, nw suite 1000 senators daniel coats and charles robb, co-chairs washington, dc 20005 michael makovsky, project director phone: 202.204.2400 september 2008 www.bipartisanpolicy.org a project of The development of nuclear weapons capability by the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most critical national security challenges facing the United States. Over the past months, we co-chaired a bipartisan group charged with reaching consensus on a set of recommendations for U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic’s nuclear development. Th e group was convened by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), a new institution in Washington devoted to craft ing prudent policy solutions to complex problems and, then, working to implement them. In the years we have spent in government, we learned that matters of such grave national importance must be met with thorough analysis, sober deliberation, and bipartisan cooperation. Aft er much deliberation, we have arrived at a series of fi ndings and policy recommendations that we believe to be realistic, prudent and comprehensive. We have also elected to include a primer on the complex historical, political, social, economic, military, legal and technological issues that underlie and infl uence the current situation. We present this report to help inform public opinion, provide a comprehensive source of information for policymakers, advise the next president and his administration, and, above all else, avoid what we believe would be a strategically transformative event—Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. Daniel Coats Charles S. Robb 50921_TextX2.indd 1 9/25/08 12:52:42 AAMM task force AMBASSADOR DANIEL COATS DR. EDWARD MORSE members co-chair Managing Director and Chief Energy Economist, Senior Counsel, King & Spalding; Former U.S. Lehman Brothers Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany; Former U.S. Senator, IN MR. STEVE RADEMAKER Senior Counsel, BGR Holding, LLC; SENATOR CHARLES ROBB Former Assistant Secretary of State co-chair Former U.S. Senator, VA; Former Governor, VA AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute on Near East Policy; Former Special Middle East DR. ASHTON CARTER Professor, Harvard University; Former Assistant Coordinator Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education ADMIRAL (RET.) GREGORY JOHNSON Senior Military Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; Center; Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Dept. of Defense Joint Force Command GENERAL (RET.) CHUCK WALD Vice President – International, L-3 Communications; GENERAL (RET.) RONALD KEYS Senior Military Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command Former Commander, Air Combat Command DR. KENNETH WEINSTEIN CEO, Hudson Institute task force DR. MICHAEL RUBIN DR. KENNETH KATZMANN consultants Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute Middle East Specialist, Congressional Research Service bipartisan DR. MICHAEL MAKOVSKY NOAH WOLFE policy center project director Policy Analyst project Executive Director, National Security Initiative staff EMILY HAWKES BLAISE MISZTAL Administrative Assistant Senior Policy Analyst MEETING THE CHALLENGE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 50921_TextX2.indd 2 9/25/08 12:52:43 AAMM We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of several outside experts. We are indebted to Michael acknowledge- Rubin who was the primary draft er of the report and faithfully incorporated the collective views ments of the Task Force. We also want to thank Adam Sieminski of Deutsche Bank for his insights regarding Iran’s economy, Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy for his discussion of U.S. fi nancial tools, Greg Jones of RAND for contributing to our analysis and understanding of nuclear enrichment methods, Christopher Ford of the Hudson Institute for reviewing our discussion of Iran’s legal obligations under the NPT, as well as Terry Snell of King & Spalding, Aaron Lobel of America Abroad Media, and General (ret.) William Crouch for their comments on various portions of the draft paper and executive summary. Th e section on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps activities in the political and economic spheres borrows heavily upon the path breaking work of Ali Alfoneh at the University of Copenhagen. Th e section on Iran’s economy draws from Patrick Clawson’s work in Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave, 2005), which he co-authored with Michael Rubin. A bipartisan array of current and former U.S. government and military offi cials also contributed comments and suggestions, but cannot be acknowledged by name either because of their current positions or because they requested anonymity. Finally, we thank Blaise Misztal of the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), for his most diligent and insightful research and analysis, as well as Noah Wolfe, Emily Hawkes, Karrie Pitzer, David Carlisle, and Ben Small of the BPC for their various important contribu- tions. Jeff rey Azarva of the American Enterprise Institute assisted in proofreading successive draft s of this report. Th is report is the product of a bipartisan Task Force of eleven members with diverse expertise disclaimer and affi liations. Consensus was diffi cult. No member may be satisfi ed with every formulation in the report, or any given recommendation if in isolation. We have reached consensus on the report and recommendations as a package, which taken as a whole off ers a balanced and compre- hensive approach. Th e fi ndings and recommendations expressed herein are solely those of the Task Force and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the Bipartisan Policy Center, its Advisory Board, or its Board of Directors. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 50921_TextX2.indd 3 9/25/08 12:52:43 AAMM table of 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... i contents 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 2 a. background ......................................................................................................2 b. demographics and diversity............................................................................7 c. religious diversity ..........................................................................................8 3. CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN ........................................................................................10 a. power centers ................................................................................................10 b. social tensions ...............................................................................................11 c. engines of dissent .........................................................................................13 d. interplay of religion and politics ...............................................................15 e. economy ..........................................................................................................17 f. do iran's energy needs justify its nuclear program? ..................................19 g. iran's economy and economic vulnerablilites ...........................................20 h. politics of reform .........................................................................................24 i. geopolitical state of play ..............................................................................25 4. THE MILITARY BACKGROUND .........................................................................................28 a. geography .......................................................................................................28 b. iran's strategic capabilities ..........................................................................28 5. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM ...........................................................................................36 a. history of iran's nuclear program ...............................................................36 b. iran's ability to produce weapons-grade uranium .....................................40 c. legality of iranian nuclear activity ...........................................................48 d. responses to iranian enrichment .................................................................51 e. the strategic threat of a nuclear iran .......................................................52 MEETING THE CHALLENGE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 50921_TextX2.indd 4 9/25/08 12:52:43 AAMM 6. POLICY OPTIONS .................................................................................................................54 a. engagement ....................................................................................................54 b. alliance building ...........................................................................................56 c. leverage building ..........................................................................................58 d. regime change ...............................................................................................65 e. military options .............................................................................................68
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