AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

KURDISTAN RISING? CONSIDERATIONS FOR KURDS, THEIR NEIGHBORS, AND THE REGION

DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS:

LUKMAN FAILY, IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES;

JAMES F. JEFFREY, FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ AND TURKEY

MICHAEL RUBIN, AEI

MODERATOR: DANIELLE PLETKA, AEI

3:00 PM – 4:30 PM WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2016

EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/kurdistan-rising-considerations-for- kurds-their-neighbors-and-the-region/

TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION – WWW.DCTMR.COM

DANIELLE PLETKA: Good afternoon, everybody. I thank you so much for your patience. We had some logistical issues getting into the room. So it’s a pleasure for me to welcome you. I’m Danielle Pletka. I’m the senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies. And we are here to talk about Michael Rubin’s new report, but also about a whole variety of issues surrounding it. For those of you who don’t know why you’re here, this is it. There are copies outside, “Kurdistan Rising: Considerations for the Kurds, for Their Neighbors and for the Region,” a really important and I think incredibly timely new report from Michael Rubin.

But, first, let me introduce the panelists who are sitting to my right. I’m sure most of them are known to you, but we’re really honored to have with us Ambassador Lukman Faily. Ambassador Faily is the Iraqi ambassador to the United States. This is his last public appearance as ambassador. And so it’s really with a great deal of sadness, actually, but gratitude for having had you that you join us here today. He was the Iraqi ambassador to Japan. He had a distinguished career in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. And before that, during the bad times, he was an Iraqi exile living and working in industry in the United Kingdom. Ambassador Faily is a Faily Kurd, so not only do we have an opportunity to talk to you about Iraq but also about some of the Kurdish issues that are raised. So I’m delighted to have him.

Just moving, I think everybody knows Michael. Michael Rubin is a resident scholar here at the American Enterprise Institute. He writes on a whole variety of issues, obviously, also including Iraq and regional questions. He was with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Pentagon before that. He teaches for the US military as a valued instructor on aircraft carriers and for the Naval Postgraduate School before that. So, Michael.

And now least but certainly last, Ambassador Jim Jeffery who is currently with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. I’m going to mispronounce this, Jim, the Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute, previously ambassador to Iraq, ambassador to Turkey, special assistant and deputy assistant to the president, also a very long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service.

We did — I want to make a note — invite somebody from the Kurdistan Regional Government, their representative in Washington, to join us on the panel. We really had hoped to have somebody to discuss the Kurdish viewpoint. Unfortunately, they didn’t want to join us. So we’ll have to talk without them, but perhaps if there’s somebody in the audience, we can include a bit of that perspective.

Michael, I’m going to ask you to start, just for everybody’s understanding, we’re going to have a conversation here. The person who gets to talk the longest is always me because I hold the mic. But we’re really going to have a conversation. We don’t have a set piece of presentations.

Michael, maybe you’d just like to start a little bit, just talk about what the big takeaways are that you want people to have just in case they haven’t read this several times cover to cover.

MICHAEL RUBIN: No, I mean, it probably makes sense not to wait for the movie version. But basically the point of the monograph and the point of the work was to basically go beyond the value judgment about whether or not Kurdistan should become independent in any of its constituent parts. Ultimately, I’d say that’s a decision for the Kurds, not a decision for me, but rather to look at some of the complexities that we’re really not talking about. And if we just look at the most recent secessionist states, South Sudan, Kosovo, East Timor, Eritrea, Montenegro, not necessarily in order there —

FORMER AMBASSADOR JAMES JEFFREY: United Kingdom.

MR. RUBIN: Well, perhaps, most of those, and the United Kingdom’s probably not an exception here, haven’t exactly been resounding successes. And oftentimes people could see the slow motion train wreck well ahead of time simply because many of the internal problems were being ignored as people waved the flag of nationalism rather than addressed head on. So the question is — I mean, if the Kurds become independent, or if there’s a broader confederation of regions, for example, how would some of those issues play out?

For example, I mean, just very briefly, and we’re talking about rewriting 70 years of water-sharing agreements in the Middle East, and that’s something that people in the United States don’t often talk about but should raise concern given the fact that we’ve had — that at various times in the ’70s, ’80s and ’90s, some of these threatened to go kinetic.

Other issues — if you don’t have a unified government, how does that play out against the backdrop of independence? What should the basis of Kurdish citizenship be in any Kurdistan that forms? Is it going to be geographic or is it going to be ethnically based? If it’s going to be ethnically based, how do we define what is a Kurd? If it’s going to be geographically based, well, if it’s going to be a broader geography or ethnicity, I’m sorry, what does this mean for dual citizenship? What happens if some of that dual citizenship — I mean, Kurds want dual citizenship, but Turkey, Iraq, Iran, or Syria don’t want dual citizenship.

And one of the broader things, because I don’t want to monopolize this, is also some of the economic discussions. Many people would look at Iraqi Kurdistan and say that the blessing of oil has turned to some degree into a curse. Things haven’t gone as smoothly as people hoped for a variety of reasons. But when you read some of the Kurdish writing specifically coming from Abdullah Öcalan, for example, the leader of the PKK, there seems to be a lingering hostility to free market capitalism and investment. So if you’re going to have a situation like that, how are you going to actually fund and encourage investment into a new Kurdish state if there’s a perception that there’s a hostility towards corporations, for example? Let me leave it there. I’m throwing out the kitchen sink, but should be a lot to discuss.

MS. PLETKA: There is a lot to discuss there but I want to ask one quick question before I turn to the ambassadors because we have a tendency to talk about the Kurds as if somehow, you know, it is a finite group. And I think when most people say the Kurds, what they actually mean is the Kurds of Iraq and the Kurds that are in the region of Kurdistan in Iraq. They don’t mean the Kurds of Southern Turkey or of Northern Iran, of Northern Syria. That’s actually not what they’re talking about. But when we talk about this, when you examined this in your book, what were you looking at?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I mean, ultimately, of course, just by terms of access, most people start with looking at Iraqi Kurdistan. It has been the greatest success of any of the Kurdish regions to date. I mean, people forget, but the Kurdistan Regional Government is going to be nearing its 25th, quarter century anniversary next year from the time it was formed. And, of course, the uprising in 1991 were about — I mean, we’ve marked the 25th anniversary of that already.

But one of the things that struck me was — I mean, I’ve written a lot over the years about some of the internal divisions in Iraqi Kurdistan, but how much broadly they exist as well as some of the indecision about — some of the internal, I guess you will, logical walls. For example, while many people want Kurdish statehood, when it comes to tough questions about, OK. Iraqi Kurdistan and to some degree Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan, have oil. Would you be willing to share that to subsidize Kurds in other regions across borders? The answer becomes no. So some of those, I mean, practical issues that sometimes hide behind the emotional response of we want a state and we want it now.

MS. PLETKA: So, Ambassador Faily, just to sort of bring you into this conversation, I think there’s no doubt that what Michael says about how Kurds, sort of the Kurds are perceived in Washington as in fact that they’re perceived as Iraqi Kurds. Is it your sense, just sort of speaking from the Baghdad perspective, that there is a push away from or to dismember Iraq? And what is the thinking?

AMBASSADOR LUKMAN FAILY: From a US — how the US —

MS. PLETKA: No. How does the — yes, is the US pushing for that, for sure?

AMB. FAILY: Well, there is a recognition in Baghdad that the Kurdish KRG government, the Kurdish entity in the north, have lobbied for independence in Washington. So there’s an internal push from Iraq and there is some level of acceptance here in Washington — (inaudible). For example, from the administration, they talk about unity of the country in all the meetings and everything else, formally, informally. From the congressional perspective, they talk about the Kurdish dream.

Historically, let’s not forget about the 25 years Michael talked about. Even before, even during Saddam, even before formation of the republic, from ’71 onwards there has always been a legal entity for autonomous Kurdistan. That’s always been there, even at the peak of Saddam’s power.

So Iraqis have never questioned the right for the Kurds to have the determination of their identity. That’s not the issue. The key challenge we have now in Iraq and the region, which has to do with a social contract, inter and intra-community social contract. That’s the key issue. The constitution talks about federalism. They have that. They have the majority of the rights of federalism. However, the obligations and the relationship moving forward is a key question here. What are the responsibilities in the inter and intra- community social contract between the Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, Iraqis in total? The government does believe in decentralization. We have no doubt about that. And we think they have more or less got all they wanted from decentralization. I’m puzzled to think about a topic where the Kurds don’t have the right now, whether it’s de facto or in paper, into the issues of decentralization and federalism.

The key question is what are their obligations, of the Kurds toward the remaining of Iraq, if they want to stay in this social contract? Michael’s report is unique in the sense of the first time I heard in Washington after three years where people talk about the practicalities of the issue. When people talk to me about Shiastan, Kurdistan, Sunnistan and so on, which we hear a lot here, much more here than Baghdad. Nobody in Iraq talks about those things. But let’s — (inaudible). I go back to them with the practical issues. Where do you stay in separations regarding infrastructure projects? Or the provinces, how do they relate to each other, airports, ports, all kinds of access? Electricity supply, for example, basic things like that. What about the obligations on Iraq — legal obligations of Iraq? Are you willing to your share of that? And so on, these issues.

I think I might say we are now in a confused state. Let me give you an example. IMF, World Bank loans and what we’re talking about now. Some people in the Kurdish government and officials of the government say, we need 17 percent of that. Is that 17 percent of the right or of the obligation as well associated with it? I think we are in a confusing state. We need to have that dialogue in Iraq. We need others to help us in a win-win situation and not be polarized on the brand of independent or not because I think the question that Michael’s raising is more fundamental to the welfare rather than to the national aspect of it. All Kurds want to have a tick in their mental box say we are independent. And everybody, all Kurds want that, and that’s a right they have. But do they know the cost associated with it? I mean, if we had this discussion last week with — (inaudible) — Brexit, now, this week, a week on, the serious questions about the cost associated with it. We need to think in that mentality in relation to Kurdistan as well.

MS. PLETKA: Just a quick follow-up. If you think about Iraq, is Iraq Iraq without Kurdistan?

AMB. FAILY: Historically it can’t be. Geopolitically it’s needless to be. For us to develop together, we need each other. That’s a fact we need to think about. And the other question is, if you divide Iraq based on this new identity, why would it confine to the current borders? That is if you talk about Sykes-Picot and artificial borders and everything else, let’s for argument’s sake give you grounds for that. Why would it be confined to this new — if it’s identity, what about the Turkish Kurds? What about Syrian Kurds and so on, Iranian Kurds? If it’s that, if it’s Shia, same thing.

So I think the question we have now, can we define a new formula where we can have the right social contract between us? The concept of nation-state is being challenged, not just in Iraq — Great Britain never mind everything else. So that concept needs to be challenged. We need to look at this freshly, from a new 21st-century global perspective. And that’s the tricky question. Iraq is forefront for it as well.

MS. PLETKA: Ambassador Jeffrey, you’ve obviously been through many of these conversations, lived through the tensions and now you’re seeing this — the same thing being replayed even from a Washington perspective. But you were also ambassador in Turkey. It is a little amazing to me that the Turks have taken a variety of different positions on this, that historically they were opposed; in fact, they used to regularly send troops. They still occasionally send troops in across the border as if there were no border between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish Kurdish areas. How do you see all of this challenge?

AMB. JEFFREY: That’s a really good question, Danielle. First of all, thank you for inviting me. Michael, thanks for putting this together. This is the kind of objective analysis that I think that think tanks earn their reputation by doing. And, of course, it’s always an honor to be here with my friend, Lukman Faily.

AMB. FAILY: Thank you.

AMB. JEFFREY: And we’re really going to miss you, Lukman. A couple of basic points to cover your question and the general situation. The first and last will be the core issue of to be or not to be in terms of independence. And the others are the impact within Kurdistan, within Iraq, the region and the United States and then back very briefly to the basic question.

The basic question is if a population that is relatively homogenous occupies a specific piece of territory has a burning desire to become independent, in the end it’s the decision of that population, I believe. And I think that that’s been the experience across the board. But I cited the United Kingdom not simply to get a rise from the audience — and thank you very much — but because from everything I know about the Kurdistan regional government and the people who inhabit it. Pointing out the problems of South Sudan is not going to impress them because they think they are way ahead of South Sudan. I’m not so sure even the Kurds of Iraq think that they’re ahead of London. And so they see those problems. So I’ll just — that’s the first point.

The second point, within Kurdistan, let me just say that you brought me almost to tears, Michael, on the 25-year anniversary of this happy land, but having been on the scene or close to the scene, on year five of that experience, we had the PUK and KDP going at it with artillery, tanks, and massive fighting, inviting in the Turkish Army, the Iranian Army and the Republican Guard, who marched up and took Erbil. So I would like to see more on what the entire span of the Kurdish population and the Kurdish political parties believe really behind closed doors, not what they tell us behind closed doors, what they say publicly, but is this really the direction they want to go for a real thing?

Second, within Iraq — and the ambassador hit on this — from my standpoint, I can’t imagine an Iraq without the role that the Kurds and the Kurdish regional government of Northern Iraq play in a stable Iraq. People look at Iraq and I say, oh, God, the worst decision made by an American president in 50 years. Well, there’s a lot of competition for that. But I will say the country somehow is being held together. It’s just gone through its third replacement of a prime minister by constitutional means, it holds elections, it’s managed to have half million barrels of oil. Something is holding that country together and it’s almost a miracle. And I would be really reluctant to pull that thread to see what can come out of that construct and keep Humpty-Dumpty still together.

The region — when you wake me in the middle of the night and say, your views are a fascinating culturally, absolutely rich Muslim mountain people in the former Ottoman Empire, I might say, oh, the Kurds, or I might say, the Albanians, because I was also ambassador to Albania. And what I learned from my experiences in the Balkans is, we like the — this is a quote — a British or a French diplomat once said about Germany, we like Albania so much, we’re happy that there are about four Albanias in Albanian quasi-autonomous regions around the Balkans as opposed to one Albania. And I think that’s also a factor that we can get into in this discussion about when we say Kurdistan, what so we mean Kurdistan because Masoud Barzani would roll over in his grave were he not still alive and doing well had he heard Öcalan’s quotes being something that would drive the economic policies of the Kurdistan regional government because in every respect I think Barzani and the people around him see themselves as ideologically and politically opposed to them.

To the United States — and, obviously, I’m not in the government anymore, but I have a pretty good sense of how governments react to things like this. So I’m going to say two things that are contradictory because that’s what people in the government do too, so just because I’ve left doesn’t mean I can’t resort to that or return to that.

First of all, we will support a Kurdistan, and I don’t mean that just as boilerplate. Frankly, there aren’t that many success stories in the Middle East. The United States has had a big role in it so, of course, we’ll support Kurdistan. We support Kurdistan right now. But behind closed doors in the White House, in the State Department, defense, Pentagon, CIA, out in the field, the degree of support and how far out you’re going to go on a ledge to support your buddies, to some degree, in a world full of priorities, all of these little friends saying help me, help me, help me, me, me, me, is going to depend to some degree not we’ll answer the phone call, how quickly you answer the phone call is an issue that will depend to some degree on whether our little partner, ally, friend, whatever is doing things that we think are good and make sense or doing things that we think are counterproductive for them and, more importantly, counterproductive for how Washington does its business. So that needs to be kept in mind.

Finally, the last thing, and I get back to the Kurds, looking at the Middle East today, what’s happening next door in ISIS, the looming threat of Iran, the problems of Iraq, the continued presence, as we saw yesterday, of ISIS, you would have to be irresponsible as the leader of an autonomous region with some millions of people, a strong military force and an economy to not at least keep that option open just in case. At a very minimum that is something that any serious Kurd has to think about. So I’ll stop there. I’ll get back to Turkey later.

MR. RUBIN: I may just interject here on a few issues. First of all, I agree with the ambassador. Look, there’s two Romanias today —

MS. PLETKA: Which one?

MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Jeffrey. I agree with both of them. I can be diplomatic sometimes.

AMB. JEFFREY: There’s only one ambassador here. There’s a former official.

MR. RUBIN: OK. But there’s two Albanias, I mean, Kosovo and Albania, not counting the other regions, two independent Romanias, Romania and Moldova. There’s two Palestines when you consider Gaza and the West Bank, each with different governments. And there’s 22 Arab states.

AMB. JEFFREY: Thank you for not saying Jordan.

MR. RUBIN: OK.

MS. PLETKA: I was waiting for that one.

MR. RUBIN: Twenty-two Arab states. The point of this is — I mean, there is an assumption or a debate that it’s just going to be one Kurdistan. And that’s important to pull out. One thing I do want to pull out from Jim, if I may, statement is the Kurds see themselves much more like the United Kingdom than they do South Sudan or Eritrea or East Timor, but this is actually one of the problems that we have and that we’re going to face in that the Kurds seem to have a vision of themselves as much more advanced and privileged than perhaps they are. In the monograph, I quoted one interlocutor saying Iraqi Kurdistan is a land of first-world restaurants and third-world hospitals right now.

Someone else pointed out, someone in the economic sector with whom I was talking, the investment sector, that when you look at the oil-producing nations, none in the top 20 in the world are landlocked. Now, you can say Kazakhstan, which comes in at number 18, but even on the Caspian, they have an outlet in order to get their oil to other countries. They’re not as dependent.

Now, one of the things I do want to bring up to — brought up from what Ambassador Faily said is when it comes to the conversation in Congress especially, where Congress certainly has become — have become cheerleaders in many ways, just for the emotional case for Kurdish independence. The New York Times reported a couple of months back, by the way, that the Kurdistan Regional Government has spent more lobbying in Washington since 2010 than either Pakistan or Kazakhstan have.

But it’s not going to be the United States that is going to be the determinant of whether Kurdistan goes independent or not, nor is it really going to be Turkey for all Turkey once opposed this ferociously. You’re now in a situation that so long as the Kurds make their economic bargain with the AKP and can do business from each other. In effect, if Iraqi Kurdistan can be subordinate to Turkish economic interests, Turkey is not going to respond militarily. We’re not talking about Iran though.

Iran fears, I would argue, strongly the precedent of a change in the status of Iraqi Kurdistan and they’ve made this threat directly through the foreign ministry and indirectly through the Quds force when you had some of the people involved in the 1989 Ghassemlou assassination, showing up in Erbil as note-takers in various meetings with de facto President Barzani. So you have a situation where oftentimes the Washington conversation navel-gazes, and I’d argue this is really no different.

AMB. FAILY: I think from a Washington perspective, the Kurds are the darling they have in the region to a certain extent, which means that, historically, at the peak of the US presence in Iraq, none of Americans were injured or killed in Kurdistan. So they were more comfortable in the Kurdish region and I give them that. And the Kurds worked very hard to attract and get a lot of ticks in the American mindset in relation to how allies should operate with each other. I don’t think that’s an issue here.

The key issue here we have is do the Kurds and others want to think about stability, prosperity, or what? If we had this discussion 100 years ago or nation to nation state, I’m sure we’d have a different argument now. Technology and everything else has changed, transformed what nations are about. If they focus on stability, then with a land- lock on all other arguments, it doesn’t work out, why would they do it? If you already have most of what you want anyway, I mean, more or less. If you’re talking about mentally you want independence regardless of any cost associated with it, then you have a question of are you a responsible ruler and this to help you in your long-term relationship?

The region itself is not democratic. We don’t have the East Europe versus West Europe. We don’t have Germany, East and West Germany embracing each other. We don’t have none of that. The United States is far from the region — geographically it’s far from the region. Even if you have the international support of the United States, it doesn’t mean it allows it — doesn’t give it breathing space for it to work, to function. So here, the Kurds have a major question to ask. How good a relationship do they want to build with the others, the neighbors, and how much are they willing to reflect on their needs versus the situation they’re in?

ISIS in itself — let me give you an example, and this is a problem we have. Prior to the ISIS invasion, prior to ISIS — prior to June 2014, every Iraqi was talking about unity of the country. With the ISIS situation, it made a big fracture in the societies and how do they relate with each other. We’re still trying to resolve this question. How do we deal with the situation post-ISIS because of the damage, irreversible damages ISIS has done to us.

So I think the questions we have in the 21st century should be different to independent or not independent. I don’t think — any nation now can’t say, I’m 100 percent independent. I mean, we could see that because of technology and everything else. So I think the questions are wrong. We need to — the key question should be, do Kurds want stability, prosperity, development, and do they want to be in more harmony in the region or not. Are they willing to put up with the costs associated with it?

MR. RUBIN: But, I mean, if I may, one of the things I did in the course of this work was do a deeper dive in the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, for example, the imprisoned PKK leader. And in recent years, he’s really formulated this idea of Democratic confederalism, which is basically just special relationships among the various Kurdish regions. But the question I still have in the back of my mind, even as every interlocutor who was a supporter of the PYD in Syria or PKK in Turkey or perhaps HDP or whatever would argue, no, no, he means it, I kind of get the sense that there’s a discrepancy between the leadership who might be using this as a cover and just the passions of ordinary people who would say, give us democratic confederalism and we’re going to have four different independent Kurdistan states tomorrow.

MS. PLETKA: You know, in a way, the Kurds are obviously in a rather luxurious position, much of it their own doing. And I think we all sort of need to —

AMB. FAILY: They suffered a lot as well. Let’s not forget.

MS. PLETKA: And, you know, anybody who doesn’t remember the Anfal campaign, anybody who doesn’t remember, absolutely, the suffering of the Kurdish people are the hands of Saddam Hussein but also, frankly, at the hands of other neighbors as well, has forgotten how much the Kurds have gotten through. And so, you know, even as we consider some of these questions and whether, you know, whether it’s good for America, good for the Middle East or not, I think the Kurds absolutely own that.

But there is a reasonable question to be asked coming back to this issue of what is happening in Kurdistan as a matter of governance. You know, we focus a lot on the defects of governance in the area. You know, who has not heard us talk about Erdogan, you know, notwithstanding a terrorist attack in Istanbul that we all are shocked by, the fact is that Erdogan is running an increasingly authoritarian, repressive, Islamist government that has done a lot of damage in the region.

Baghdad, we’ve talked about successive prime ministers, you know, is he doing the right thing? Is he sharing money? Why is he not doing this? Has he done enough of that? I mean, there isn’t a week that goes by that we don’t have an exhaustive investigation of the many faults of the various regional leaders. And, by the way, rightly so. You know, we support them, we have men and women on the ground fighting. We absolutely should be doing that. But we don’t do a lot of that for the Kurdish region.

And for those of us who have spent time there and who have huge affection and admiration for the Kurds, nonetheless, we have a lot of friends there. One of my very good Kurdish friends has described the PUK and the KDP as, you know, as the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta, you know, one mafia against another mafia, indifferent to the interests of the people where they live and more interested in their own power, enrichment, nepotism and everything else. Fair? Not fair? A reasonable question to ask? Should it be a consideration as we think about independence?

AMB. FAILY: I think the key question is here you have an evolution of parties who are in opposition, who are resistance movement into governing. So that takes time. I think you need to be giving the breathing space for it. They need to be monitored. They certainly need to be watched closely because of the opportunity for corruption because they’re not used to in that region, decentralization, the delegation of authority is not there, culturally, tribal society. So, unfortunately, there’s an issue — (inaudible).

However, at the same time, breathing spaces are allowed, have been given to the Kurds, have been given to Baghdad and others which should have gotten its act together with relation to governance, transparency and others as well, investment for companies to come in and so on. These are hard questions which I don’t think we have really reflected hardly on ourselves. What’s the adverse impact if we focus on the small politics and forget the bigger politics, which has to do with stability, prosperity for our people?

These are questions I don’t think we have fully answered yet. Most of our officials were in opposition. They were away from governing. They certainly didn’t know how to go about state-building in that sense. And on the other side — let me say this in as much diplomatically as possible — the Americans picked whom they thought they were comfortable with, not who, what needed to be on the ground. That in itself also didn’t help the situation.

MR. RUBIN: If I may before — I mean, very quickly, before going to Jim, I think the question is fair. One of the differences why I recognize the problem of — I mean, basically fighters, guerilla fighters, freedom fighters, whatever you have being forced into government, and, by the way, this is something that Iraq has experienced, of course, with the Popular Mobilization Units fighting the Islamic state. The difference with the KRG is that you’ve gone from a situation of freedom fighters to hereditary republicanism, and that’s affected not just the KDP, where it might have been more expected since it was much more of a tribal party, but also the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which wants to set itself apart from the KDP by saying, we’re about ideology, not about genetics.

And so this ultimately becomes a problem. And I’d argue — and this is problematic from the point of view of US policy since we still designate the PKK to be a terrorist group in that one of the recruiting tools of propaganda tools which the PKK has is, we’re the only party which isn’t one of these hereditary republican parties.

MS. PLETKA: I want to come back to the PKK in a second, but, Jim.

AMB. JEFFREY: You’re right about the flaws of the parties in the Kurdistan regional government constellation. And I think that the reason that we don’t focus on that too much other than because we’ve really, you know, need, want to have friends and buddies and it’s so hard to find them in the Middle East. And there’s so many disappointments. And I’ve been ambassador to many — not many, but a number of — ambassador or senior official to a number of disappointments.

The Kurds, and I to some degree misspoke when I said, look, we supported them a lot. We actually supported a lot of countries a lot and entities. The point is the Kurds made better use of that support than most did. And that’s one reason why we don’t look too closely at their democratic workings. But while that’s an important subject, I don’t think it’s central to the issue we’re discussing today.

I’m not as interested in the different ruling styles of the two major parties, not to speak of the two Islamic ones in Gorran, although I agree with Michael that you’re bringing to see some similarities with the PUK, which we always thought was — I mean, it’s part of the socialist international, for God’s sake. But I’m more interested in whether they’re in agreement on — what they’re in agreement on on the issue that we’re here today for, independence, and what they’re not in agreement on because despite their different flavors in many respects, there are certain things that they do agree on: the need for a strong Peshmerga force, albeit one that’s mainly divided by parties; the need to share the oil revenues for the great good of the people; and the need to maintain a very significant degree of autonomy. And because there is agreement for those things, they pull together, and I’ve seen this repeatedly on the ground, they pull together when the going gets tough, be it with ISIS or be it with things coming out of Baghdad, or threats from Iran or threats in the past from Turkey. And that’s pretty effective and pretty potent.

To the extent that they can agree on a position, a real position, not what one or another of them says on independence, that has a lot of clout. I’m just not sure I know exactly what that is.

MR. RUBIN: I just want to push back a little bit and we can just agree to disagree. I’m not sure whether I would be as optimistic with the degree to which they pull together at certain times of crisis, especially vis-à-vis Iran or — I mean, when we look at the civil war, you already outlined the players. And what I fear in the future, and this is — what I fear in the future is basically if you have a fragmented Kurdistan that becomes independent, the United States has defined itself in recent years, and it’s not just a matter of the Obama administration, of not necessarily fulfilling its pledges to allies, not necessarily standing by allies when the going gets tough.

So you have a situation where Turkey has — I mean, we’ve seen proxy wars — we’ve seen proxy wars in Libya. We’ve seen proxy wars in Syria. There’s every reason to believe that there are enough people on both sides of the divisions, on all sides of the various divisions in Iraq Kurdistan and Kurdistan writ large, that would be willing to take cash from one side or another, which can make — I mean, can blow this up regardless of what ordinary people believe, hence the frustration.

And the last point I want to make is when it comes to at least the — I mean, you’re absolutely right that the Kurds haven’t — I mean, that the Kurds have distinguished themselves in reality as being very friendly to the United States. But, at the same time, what I worry about, and my introduction to Kurdistan was really with the younger generation, teaching at various universities on both sides of the KDP-PUK divide is that there’s a growing frustration that the United States isn’t standing up to principle, whether it’s support for the free press or, for example, the Gorran has been waiting to get visas to come visit Washington for the last seven months. I mean, what’s with the hold-up there?

MS. PLETKA: I don’t speculate. Michael, I said I was going to come back to the PKK. You keep talking about the PKK and about Abdullah Öcalan more as a sort of a philosophical and spiritual and ideological leader than as a head of a terrorist group. Just help think through that evolution, please, for me.

MR. RUBIN: I mean, basically speaking, PKK — I mean, it started this insurgency. First of all, it became the predominant, if you will, or most talked about Kurdish entity in Turkey in late ’70s, early ’80s by virtue of targeting anyone else who opposed it. So there was an element of a personality cult that was imposed at the point of the gun in there. And that may not be something which the PKK wants to hear, but it’s still the perception out there, and the perception is I believe rooted in reality.

Now, at the same time, Abdullah Öcalan was captured fleeing in Kenya in 1999. He was sentenced to death. Because of the European Court of Human Rights, he was — that sentence was commuted to life in prison. And the Turks subsequently spent the better part of a decade saying how irrelevant he was.

Well, enter Tayyip Erdogan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who as prime minister inaugurated a peace process with the Kurds. We can argue, and historians will argue about whether this peace process was sincere or cynical. But the one thing which I think is unarguable is that by reaching out to Erdogan after a decade of saying he was irrelevant, he bestowed upon — by reaching out to Öcalan after a decade saying he was irrelevant, he bestowed upon Öcalan the mantle of being the indispensable Kurd. And that is something which despite the collapse of the peace process can’t be taken away.

Likewise, in talking with Turks and — I mean, one of the things with regard to this book project, I spent — my criticism writ large of a lot of people that focus on the Kurdish issue is that they surround themselves with the Kurdish issue and don’t really get out and about among those seen as the adversaries of the Kurds.

But in talking to the Turkish military at various high levels, Turkish intel, and Turkish investors, others, I would ask some simple questions. I mean, for example, do you envision peace without Abdullah Öcalan being released from prison? And, universally, the answer to that was no. And if he is released from prison, what do you expect would happen? And the quip that sticks in my hand is, we didn’t fight for 30 years so that he could be mayor of Diyarbakir. I would ask very provocative questions to people in the Turkish general staff, for example, such as, do you believe that a quarter of the flag officers in the Turkish military should be reserved for former PKK fighters? Now, the answer to that is, of course, no. But from the PKK perspective, well, what does a resolution actually mean? So we have this sort of issue.

Now, what the PKK would say — and, yes, after Erdogan reached out to them, I sat down — I disagree with them. They know I disagree with them. I sat down and I talked with them, however. They basically argued, look, yeah. I mean, one of the questions I always ask is — to various people who identify themselves as PKK or one of its offshoot parties — when have you ever disagreed with what Abdullah Öcalan has said? And I’d never get an answer to that because basically there’s the personality cult issue. Well, there’s a personality cult issue across both Turkey, the Kurds of Turkey, the Kurds of Iraq, be it whatever party they want. It’s all about strong men personality cults, and that’s a problem which we need to confront.

MS. PLETKA: I want to bring it back to you, Ambassador Faily, just for a second. In this neo-imperialistic discussion that we’re enjoying here in Washington about how we’re all going to divide up the Middle East again, and we did just have a great event on Sykes-Picot, just in case you think we don’t have the standing to do that. It strikes me that even though we are talking about Iraqi Kurdistan a lot of the time and we are talking about the clear accomplishments of our friends in Northern Iraq, that if in fact we move further towards the de facto treatment of Northern Iraq or Kurdistan as an independent state, that actually does have implications for other Kurds in the region, whether it’s the Kurds in Iran or it’s the Kurds in Syria or in Turkey. So, you know, think about this not so much from the question of the unity of Iraq but what the implications are for the entire rest of the region. Do you see this as — or am I just dreaming? Is they’re not that sort of unity?

AMB. FAILY: There’s not. I mean, the region itself is going through transformation where it’s trying to identify a leveled playing field where all can start from, whether it was before Nasrism, Arabism, Islamism tried for a while, and others as well. So now, the issues of ethno-sectarianism is one of the key identity issues being raised. So people are trying to look at the commonalities or not.

Serious dialogue is not taking place in the region to answer these questions. And, therefore, those who try to polarize the societies are winning over. One problem here we have in a sense is the majority of the political Kurdish leaderships polarize the society so far to the right in relation to independence and what’s associated with it, that now, when they practice the politics, they find that’s not feasible, it’s not beneficial geopolitically if nothing else, like what we talked about before. Then, when they try to bring them back to the center or right of center, they’re finding a problem with it.

And even if people now — here’s a question, for example, regarding the referendum or not for Kurdistan, OK, last one of the examples. It becomes hard when you lock yourself into an argument and then you find the reality that you didn’t think about the various factors adversely impacting that argument. So here we talk about the geopolitics of the region. The geopolitics of the region means Iran would certainly feel threatened and is by having a Kurdish entity alone where it’s not clear what is the relationship with Turkey, what’s the relationship to energy, who has control, who has access to that part of it as well. Bearing in mind more so when you have — you don’t have a unity within the Kurds like what you have now in relations to the parliament, in relation to governance and all aspects of it, governments and so on. So that allows for other countries to think about an opportunity to influence it, so that’s one problem.

You have the same in Turkey. You have the same what we talk about the Kurds in Turkey and so on. Syria, which is more autonomous moving on, and the relationship with the United States it’s trying to have. Unfortunately, without a dialogue of a sense in relation to where is the stability you want to have because it’s a zero-sum game now, unfortunately. Where is the stability which we have to have? Without that dialogue, it becomes an area of instability to the globe, which means more interests and so on.

Here the Kurds have more or less had better ability to access Washington and to influence the discourses than may have been the situation on the ground. That’s another issue. I mean, if this discussion is beamed into a part of Iraq, they would say, why are we having that discussion? This is academic more than anything else. So I think we need to reflect the reality on the ground, rather than for our own purpose or for our own relationship with the Kurds uniquely.

MS. PLETKA: Interestingly. Now, the Kurds have always had really very capable representation in Washington, which I think is reflected in some very positive views of — without that —

AMB. FAILY: I take my hat off to them.

MS. PLETKA: I agree. My hat to them as well, for 30 years I’ve been here. Jim, I guess what I’m trying to press at is the broader implication, and it’s why I brought up the great Sykes-Picot question, is because I don’t think that anyone — you know, you rightly said, if a group of people want independence, you know, it’s kind of hard to argue. On the other hand, historically, of course, the United States and everybody else has argued, yeah, you know, maybe not. Now, the implications are not quite as straightforward. I brought up obviously kind of the ethno, you know, sectarian view of it, which is that the Kurds are here, there, everywhere, although they are reasonably contiguous.

But I don’t understand I guess why stop there. You know, the Houthis have a case in Yemen. The Shia have a case in Southern Lebanon. Frankly, although you weren’t supposed to say this, Michael, the Palestinians have a case in Jordan. You know, at a certain moment, we end up reenacting the Paris Peace Talks and saying yes to certain people and no to certain people. The Kurds were, of course, there and were told no much to I think their shock and perhaps that would have changed history.

But what are the implications here for the United States? Are we opening up a Pandora’s Box? Congress has been very forward leaning on this. You remember last year, there was an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act.

AMB. JEFFREY: Weapons be passed directly to the Kurds.

MS. PLETKA: Exactly, which was really a de facto recognition of sovereignty.

AMB. JEFFREY: And that led to the US government finding ways through the Iraqi government to get weapons to the Kurds a lot more effectively than it had before so it was not without effect on how things happen in Washington.

Well, that’s a tension. The US government — I mean, it may look calm from a distance with these brilliant press conferences and smart folks like Ben Rhodes giving interviews in the New Yorker and such, but inside that government, some of the people in this audience have worked in it or worked in Congress, plugged into it, and it’s chaos on a good day. It’s total chaos. I mean, something happens like yesterday in Turkey, it’s triple chaos because then half the people will go out and say things, discover that they said stupid things, and then the chaos just multiplies. That’s the usual fate of people all the way up to the top in government.

So, therefore, they never sit around in the morning in the National Security Council and hold a meeting on, we need more problems. We need more military deployments. Rather, they’re trying to figure out how they can tamp these things down. And countries breaking off generate an awful lot of — entities breaking off generate an awful lot of work to be, you know, bureaucratic, but also, many unknown ways forward. And the problem is, and we — you have to look into either, you know, hidden in the documents or your nose in front of your face, we’re running a global security system. And we’re running it kind of as an economy of force on the cheap because we’re not spending 20 percent of our GDP on diplomatic aid and on military affairs. We’re spending only about twice as much as a lot of other countries.

And it basically all kind of works but it’s based on the expectation that the wheels don’t keep falling off. Enough wheels fall off, even if some of the wheels feel that it was time to fall off, and the whole thing starts being called into question. And we’re in this right now with Britain. And, therefore, Washington is always going to have this instinctive, we don’t want to have this happen. The devil we know is always better than the devil we don’t know. So you have that tension.

And at the end of the day, you know, populations decide even though Barack Obama went to London and warned them what would happen if, you know, they voted for independence from the EU, they voted for independence. And now we’ve got a new situation and we’re rushing off to embrace the British and telling them we love them. So you have this tension back and forth.

It doesn’t mean Washington isn’t serious. It also doesn’t mean that it won’t try to adapt to the new situation as best it can. It’s just that real things happen as a consequence of this. And I don’t want to pick on the Kurds and what could happen there — or we can get into this in the questions — but, you know, one of the first things that happened after Friday was that a lot of people started talking about revitalizing the European common security and foreign policy, and particularly ESDP and its military wing, which we have always seen as an existential threat to NATO and looked to the British to fix for us, and they’ve done a pretty good job of it all in all. Well, they’re not going to be doing that job much longer. That’s the kind of thing that Washington focuses on.

AMB. FAILY: I think — just a quick point. If you look at issues in a binary way, yes, should they have independence or not, that’s — the question is not straightforward, it’s not that hard to answer. However, managing complexities — (inaudible) — challenge here we have, and in turn the consequences to a lot of actions, the known, unknown — the unknown and known actors, which is bigger, which means that any decisions now in relation to independence or any other, in relationship to inter and intra-community issues in Iraq will have consequences way beyond their — (inaudible).

If the region was put in artificially, then the knock-on effect means it will go to its natural habitat, which means it will go a ripple effect into the whole region. And that’s an area here, for example.

We have issues in Basra, for example. The majority of the issues in Basra have nothing to do with Shia, Sunni, others. It’s to do with governance to do with the availability of services and others. So if you look at it from a prosperity perspective, it’s totally different than the issues of national identity or the issues of independence. Independent in itself will make people happy for 30 seconds, thereafter the consequences associated with it elsewhere.

By the way, let me reverse the issue. In Baghdad, in the south or others, if they say the Kurds let them go in their own way, OK. Even if I foresee that this problem matters for the Kurds, what are the consequences for me thereafter? Why would I want to have a neighbor whom I don’t have — we’re not in sync or we don’t have the right interlocutors associated with it as well? So I think there is a lot of transactional cost associated with it that people don’t see.

MR. RUBIN: If I may, just talking about the emotional case for independence. If you have enough people who live in a fairly contiguous area that want it, from a US perspective, what worries me is what happened with regard to Bosnia. I’m not saying Bosnia shouldn’t have gone to independence, but Washington was pretty much caught flat-footed when Germany had recognized Bosnian independence, then when Bosnia descended into a state of war. Suddenly the situation became much more complicated.

The nightmare situation for me, in short, with regard to Kurdistan is that if Iraqi Kurdistan declares independence without some of the key issues regarding border disputed territories and so forth being addressed, then ultimately there could be chaos but I’m not sure the United States would answer that 3:00 a.m. phone call.

Now, Jim has talked a few times about the British case. And I was on — I was talking to a British commodore on one of the US carrier strike groups who ahead of the initial Scottish referendum basically reminded just from a defense standpoint and all of the United Kingdom submarine bases which are crucial for its nuclear defense are in Scotland and that there is no way that the United Kingdom or the rump United Kingdom would allow those sub bases to devolve along with Scotland — that there are plans to prevent that.

Well, when we look at broader Kurdistan and you have issues, for example, in Turkey, what happens to the F-16 base in Diyarbakir or in Iraq? There’s always been — even though there’s been some recent movements on this, the issue of Kirkuk airfield. So could you have a situation where on one hand you have a new independent state, whatever its borders would be, and then you have a military base from a neighbor which might not be peaceful smack dab in the middle of that rump state. So, I mean, again, I’m just emphasizing that. We can use the British example, and the Kurds can look at the British example, even though they’re not British, and the complications if they want to pursue that are yet to fully become clear, especially on military and defense.

One of the other issues. It’s all well and good to talk about the Peshmerga, and I can criticize the Peshmerga for not being unified, but they do have honorable service over history and whatever you want to call the YPG after the great battle of Kobani or whatever everyone talk — I mean, if the Kurds changed their status inside Turkey, history is written by the victors. And so the description of the PKK will change but whatever one looks at the PKK guerillas, the self-description, the fact of the matter is that if you have a unified Kurdish state, who’s going to pay for the air force? Is it going to be the only country in the region without an air force, surrounded by hostile powers?

And so this is one of those issues, again, that we’re not talking about. Is it going to be just — I don’t want to be too cynical, like so many of the Gulf States, you don’t have enough equipment, we’ll sell you some but if Iraqi Kurdistan is $20 billion in the red, if the rest of Kurdistan isn’t going to be fully floating economically, how are we going to actually manage that sort of aspect of Kurdish defense — again, something that we’re not really talking about.

MS. PLETKA: So I want to turn to the audience for questions. I’m sure you have a lot of them. I have an exit question. Would we be having this conversation and would this be — this question be as alive if Barrack Obama had not withdrawn all US troops from Iraq in 2011?

AMB. JEFFREY: Barrack Obama didn’t withdraw the troops. George Bush withdrew the troops.

MS. PLETKA: No, George Bush agreed to do it.

AMB. JEFFREY: Right. And Barrack Obama actually tried to keep troops on. Now, the level of enthusiasm might have been somewhat less than what George W. Bush would have shown but he actually made a halfway effort to do it. And if we could have gotten the Status of Forces Agreement or if we could have convinced the military to stay on at that time without one, he would have kept troops on.

MS. PLETKA: And —

AMB. JEFFREY: And we didn’t.

MS. PLETKA: Would we be having this discussion?

AMB. JEFFREY: Yes.

MS. PLETKA: Still?

AMB. JEFFREY: Oh, yeah. Sure. Because we certainly had this discussion before 2011. I can’t ever remember going to Kurdistan — and, boy, I went to Kurdistan all the time because it’s so nice — when this discussion didn’t come up. In fact, the famous purple finger election — in Kurdistan, the famous purple finger election of January 2005 was accompanied by a kind of sort of Potemkin Village independence vote which came out, what, 99 percent for and 1 percent against? And so it’s always out there, it’s always the list of things, it’s always in the baggage when you talk with the folks in Erbil.

MS. PLETKA: Michael.

MR. RUBIN: I mean, I would say despite all the talk about referendum, until the Kurds actually say what that the language of that referendum would be, I see it as a nationalist foil rather than a serious move. With regard — I mean, in many interviews in Baghdad, many of the Iraqis and historians who are going to continue to debate this would say they were frustrated with the United States because we wouldn’t take yes for an answer in terms of being offered immunity but then US lawyers telling the Iraqi Parliament that they had to approve, basically telling the Iraqis the procedure by which they needed to go down.

But I do agree with Jim that we would still be having this conversation because, frankly, this idea of independence is a century-old Kurdish dream. It’s not going to go away. And whatever criticisms I have of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the de facto emergency laws inside the Kurdistan Regional Government that we see today and know how well that works in the rest of the Middle East. The fact of the matter is they have done — Kurds in Syria, in Rojava, I’ve had the pleasure of getting to go there, and in Iraqi Kurdistan have done a pretty good job. The question is whether that trajectory is still going to go forward and meet public expectations.

AMB. FAILY: I think just — I mean, first of all, I want to ask Jim who was the 1 percent who didn’t vote for —

AMB. JEFFREY: I don’t know. I thought that they decided nobody would believe us if it’s 100 percent, so I think there were probably some no votes that were printed off, you know —

AMB. FAILY: My point is it’s a century old dream for all the Kurds. The problem is here it’s oversimplification that as much the recent articles talked about Iraq as a problem for every question they had, you know the recent articles in Washington, the question has been always independence is the solution to every problem. That’s the wrong question. That’s the wrong question.

Let me also, as Iraqis and because we were not straightforward in our politics, also add a complexity. They may go for independent for the referendum, but don’t have independence as a leverage. That will complicate the situation more. I would not be surprised if that’s the case.

MS. PLETKA: Yeah. They’re talking about that in the UK too. All of these things are very complicated. So many of you who have been here before know what our rules are. Please raise your hand. When I call on you, identify yourself, and then make your brilliant but very brief statement in the form of a question. This lady up here has her arm up. Here’s a mic coming.

Q: Thank you all very much for this fascinating panel. I’m Dr. Nussaibah Younis from the Atlantic Council and I run the Task Force on the Future of Iraq. So you recently unified — reunified PUK and Gorran, sent a delegation just in the last couple of days to Baghdad. While they’ve been discussing — trying to get Baghdad’s permission for an oil pipeline that could export oil directly from PUK territories, potentially including Kirkuk, to Iran because what they’re really interested in right now is in developing some independence from the KDP and from the KDP’s dominance over the KRG’s economy.

Could you talk a little bit, Michael in particular, about what your research showed you about how serious the divisions are now between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and whether you see the conditions being in place for a new civil war in Kurdistan. And if so, what kind of a role Baghdad would play?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, it’s useful to remember with regard to the last civil war back between 1994 and 1997, it started out over revenue sharing. But putting that aside, one of the key issues I would look at — and, granted, this has been impacted by the decline in the price of oil, but my conclusion first, bottom line up front. I would argue that both Baghdad and Erbil are wedded to the status quote.

MS. PLETKA: She asked about the divide between —

MR. RUBIN: I’m about to say that. Because if Baghdad wanted really to pull back the PUK and Gorran into its fold, Baghdad could pay the salaries of the civil servants in PUK land and Gorran land who haven’t been paid for a variety of reasons. And yet they aren’t willing to do that because they don’t want to formulate that sort of break. So when it comes to the PUK-Gorran meetings in Baghdad, again I see this in terms of leverage and posturing because if I may say with a bit of snideness, everyone else in the world when they engage in negotiations embraces the value of leverage rather than completely ignores it.

MS. PLETKA: I’m sorry. I want to follow up on your question because it really was a very good one. And I’ll come last to Lukman, but, Jim, how do you think the US looks on the idea of a PUK-to-Iran pipeline?

AMB. JEFFREY: That would be even more than most other things that pop up from left to right field something that even this US administration — and, bear in mind, and I’ll be the first to say it here today, we’ve talked about it at various points. We’re not going to have this administration for much longer. I think most American administrations, including at least some people in this administration, look askance at any of our friends doing deals with the Iranians that make the Iranians stronger. But it’s an interesting point because it gets to the whole —

MS. PLETKA: Except Boeing, you mean.

AMB. JEFFREY: Well, I’m not going to — I do believe that that was a specific congressionally mandated cutout, thank you. OK. Anyway, it does get to the issue of Turkey which I ducked the first time around but I’ll dabble at it a bit.

The power balance between the KDP and the PUK, despite some really nifty things about the PUK — Peshmerga units tend to be actually better disciplined and more effective, and there are some interesting things in Sulaymaniyah — it is determined by the fact that the KDP owns the relationship with Turkey. It’s been bad. For the last decade more or less it’s been much better. But Turkey is two things. That is where the F- 16s come from and it’s where the oil and eventually gas goes.

And as I said, the KDP physically owns the border. And so the PUK to some degree is trying to develop — I mean, it doesn’t have a border. It does have a border with Turkey but it’s, first of all, you have to pass through the Qandil Mountains, where the PKK is and it’s really — you know, who wants to have (Takhar ?) Province as your neighbor? I mean, there’s no way out. But it does have a border with Iran. That’s also a mountainous one but it’s — and it’s had a long-term closer relationship with Iran, including in the civil war. So I’m not surprised it’s trying to find a diplomatic buddy, too. One like Erdogan is going to be hard to find in Tehran.

AMB. FAILY: It also gives you a good example of the complexity we’re talking about here which is the situation here, we have historically the gateway for the Kurdish liberation movement was historically on Iran rather than Turkey and other aspects of it as well. So here land-lock does mean ramification relation, what we talk about here.

MR. RUBIN: But I would also just say it does — where the Kurds are making a tactical mistake there, where the PUK and Gorran are making a tactical mistake is the image between the Kurds being pro-American and Southern Iraq being in the pocket of Iran, which isn’t a true image. That’s still the conventional wisdom in the United States. In reality, for anyone that visits both Southern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian influence is about even in both. The biggest difference I would argue is Iraqi Kurdistan can be a lot more dangerous for Americans in this way just because the Americans aren’t primed to perceive the Iranian influence there.

MS. PLETKA: The table over here, this young man.

Q: Brian Garrett-Glaser from the Cipher Brief and former intern of Dr. Rubin. Thank you all very much. It’s been a brilliant discussion. We sit here in the almost a week out after the Brexit vote and we saw what happens when you don’t consider the ramifications before you make a decision like this. So, first of all, thank you for this conversation as I think opened our eyes a little to all of these ramifications we need to talk about and the Kurds need to talk about.

Dr. Rubin, you mentioned briefly the possibility of a proxy war breaking out inside Kurdistan. Could you talk a little bit more about that, how likely that is, how that would play out, because I think that — we kind of rushed past that but that sounds like a huge problem.

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, a proxy war isn’t likely. You’ve had political violence in Iraqi Kurdistan since the 1990s but the Kurds have also learned a lesson of what can happen in 1997 — in the mid-1990s, I should say. When you bring up Brexit, the conclusion you made is that people don’t recognize the consequence until after they voted but another conclusion one can make is when the governments or the bureaucracies become quite arrogant and the distance grows between those bureaucracies and ordinary people, the people can react in strange ways.

And so if I were the Kurdish leadership right now, that might be the factor both PUK and KDP that I would be worried about more. We talked about 1991. We talked about how everyone should remember the Anfal, but according to KRG statistics, the mean age in Iraqi Kurdistan is now 20, which means people weren’t alive even at the time of the Iraqi uprising. And so instead of recognizing — and the people who are graduating from the universities, be it in Baghdad, Basra, or in Iraqi Kurdistan, they weren’t, I mean, politically mature. They were what? Five years old at the time when Saddam Hussein fell.

And so you have the frustration, I would argue, turning against what’s perceived as a lack of opportunity, corruption among the political parties. And this isn’t just a problem for the KDP and the PUK. It’s also a problem for Gorran, which successfully captured the protest vote, if you will, but, at the same time, it needs to now struggle. And people are getting increasingly cynical about it, about whether or not it’s just all the rhetoric of reform or whether they’re actually serious about reform. And then you could — I mean, could you have a Kurdish spring is another question.

AMB. FAILY: I think just a quick — the likely scenario is more for locals to have control over the localities rather than a civil war of any type, and that’s across Iraq. The problem here we have is that people may be content with what they have and there’s enough checks and balances, including the US role, to make sure that there isn’t any fighting. However, that doesn’t mean that they will collaborate closely with each other.

MS. PLETKA: So this is really — it’s a lesson for Baghdad as well. It’s a lesson for — frankly, for us.

MR. RUBIN: Administrative federalism.

AMB. FAILY: Yes.

MR. RUBIN: And, actually, when it comes to administrative federalism, the biggest opponents to that, of distributing the oil wealth on the base of district or sub- district is actually the Kurdistan regional government because they see it as eroding the power of the KRG government.

MS. PLETKA: This gentleman.

Q: Thank you. My name is Farhad Alaaldin. I’m the political adviser to Iraqi president and I’m a Kurd. What I have heard here today is a little bit of more to do with the complexity and the problems that Michael is presenting, although I’m at a disadvantage that I haven’t read his book yet. Yes, the independence of Kurdistan is going to be a hugely complex problem, but we just simply cannot deny a nation to dream about their independence or even we ask them to do so. So the referendum, there’s a lot of people in Kurdistan now says there’s no need for a referendum, as Jim said. There was 99 maybe point nine percent who voted for it.

But is there really a movement today in Kurdistan that asks for independence? Today, until this minute, there has been no project submitted formally by any political party in any part of Kurdistan for independence. There isn’t. Formally, nothing is submitted. There’s talk. There’s a lot of debate. There is a lot of debate within the Kurdistan intellectuals who are talking about independence and how it could be. And be sure that we know the complexity and we know the problems. And there is no need for us to go and compare with Kosovo, South Sudan or whoever because we understand we are land locked. We understand the challenges. We understand — I do need a bit of time because what I have here is quite a bit.

But one thing, if you don’t want me to carry on, I will do that. But definitely there are plenty of challenges. We’re well aware of it. And we will work to make sure. But what is missing from these arguments is what are we talking about time-wise? Are we talking about tomorrow or 10 years or 50 years? Twenty years ago, it was a crime to talk in Kurdish in Turkey. Now we have 60 plus MPs in the Turkish Parliament under the Kurdish banner.

MR. RUBIN: If you want us to respond, you’ve got to give us a chance.

Q: I will give you more than a chance. You have all the floor. But one last point I will make about the civil war. There will never be a civil war again in Kurdistan.

MR. RUBIN: And the panel said that. Basically, what I would argue is you can — very briefly, you can say that people are aware, but there’s nothing reflective in the public conversations or in the political conversations to prepare the public for many of the complexities with which they will have to deal — the decline in revenue, the decline in political representation in Baghdad or some of the other issues. And therefore, what I would strongly urge, like I said before, the Kurds will ultimately make this decision. It’s not for me to advocate one way or another. But the complexities are such that one can’t delay making — having those conversations if you don’t want to end up in a train wreck.

MS. PLETKA: Do either of you want to say anything?

AMB. FAILY: Yeah. Just quickly. I think there is emphasis and responsibility on the leadership in Kurdistan also to know the ramification of talking about independence all the time. The others will say why would you need to talk about it if you have the 2030 plan for it and if you’re not working on the disengagement which we talked about here. (Audio break) — concern when they talk so much about independence without fully pulling their people in the right direction. That’s my concern about it. Do they understand the ramifications associated with such a rhetoric?

Q: Thank you very much. Abbas Kadhim. I’m with the Foreign Policy Institute SAIS Johns Hopkins. Excellent panel and thanks to my friend, Mike Rubin, for putting together this report. I look forward to reading it deeply and see what he has. He always has great things.

My question is about Mosul, and we didn’t talk a lot about it or at all, if any. Mosul and the liberation of Mosul will be — will have two kinds of consequences. One of them, it will require cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil in order to get the battle at least effectively — I mean, it can be done without the Kurds, but it’s going to be much easier and better if they do it. This cooperation will if and when should, I should say, Mosul is liberated, then it will bring the huge questions about the issues that were settled as a matter of fact after Mosul was taken by ISIS disputed areas — (inaudible) — the future of the relations between.

I would like to see what the panel thinks about how that will affect — will the sweetness of the cooperation that will lead to a great nationalist result, liberation of Mosul lead to drawing Baghdad and Erbil together or will the disputes that are century long between the two sides going to kick off right away? And so I would like to hear that. Thank you very much again.

MS. PLETKA: Thanks, Abbas.

AMB. JEFFREY: OK. From my standpoint, there was a de facto situation in Mosul where you had in the eastern half of the city a considerable Kurdish presence, Iraqi-Kurdish police units and others and you had a significant Kurdish population, and there was an understanding that that simply was the way things were. And then, in parts of the province, you had a gray zone where you had both Kurdish forces and Iraqi Army forces with American overwatch that then went away in 2011, but nothing changed.

If both sides are willing to restore something like that to Mosul and can agree to something beforehand, then you can have the happy solution that you talked about. Otherwise, there will be a lot of tugging and pulling as we see at — I always pronounce it wrong — Tuz Khurmato — and other places where you have either Iraqi government forces or particular the Popular Mobilization Forces coming up against Kurdish security forces. So it is something that people worry about. It’s just that it shouldn’t delay unnecessarily the takedown of Mosul.

AMB. FAILY: I think on a security perspective cooperation with the Kurds, others, I think they are all on the same page. I don’t see an issue there. Everybody decided ISIS no longer should be there or have the breathing space. So to that effect, I’m not worried about the security collaboration in relation to the liberation of Mosul.

There is concern about the post-liberation politics. However, my perspective on this is, unfortunately, as Iraqis, the Kurds and others, we have not had what you might call closure on a lot of issues prior to 2014, prior to the — (inaudible) — situation, whether it’s Kirkuk or disputed territories as well. Now we have bigger areas to worry about in relation to disputed territories.

De facto status may also be an element. Turkish incursion may be another element of it. Tribes — Kurds from Syria situation also became a factor. PKK became a factor. So, unfortunately, it’s more complicated. I don’t think we yet have had a formula for the dialogue, let alone for the solution. I think we’re a long way away from finding a stable solution where — or a platform where we’ll have a dialogue how to address these disputed territories. To that effect, I think I am concerned about it, yes.

MS. PLETKA: The gentleman over here and then we’ll take one more question so we’ll keep it quick, you keep it quick, too.

Q: Homam Zani, analysis at Ernst & Young. Thank you for this wonderful panel. My question is, in 2014, Yazidi, Syrian, and Turkmen towns were abandoned by the Peshmerga in the ISIS advance. What would be the status of minorities in the independent Kurdistan?

MR. RUBIN: That’s a very good question. And what I would also — and it’s one of those questions that isn’t fully resolved, one of those issues for a further dialogue. One of the — generally speaking, Iraqi Kurdistan can be very tolerant so long as you subordinate yourself to the powers that be. If you have other political viewpoints, that’s another issue. And one issue that comes off of that which also isn’t fully addressed is the issue of transitional justice. In every conflict in which the Kurds have been part, they’ve been fighting on both sides of that conflict.

So whether we’re talking about Daesh or not-Daesh versus Peshmerga in Iraq, whether we’re talking about village guards versus PKK fighters in Turkey, whether we’re talking about people fighting in Sinjar versus those that abandon their posts without even giving weapons to Yazidis. That hasn’t been fully addressed. And all of these, if left unaddressed, have a bad habit of metastasizing.

MS. PLETKA: Let’s take one last question from over here, this gentleman. And you’re it.

Q: Thank you for a very exciting panel. I look forward to reading this work. And I just want — I’m Shlomo Bolts with the Syrian-American Council, a researcher. I wanted to ask about the Syria component which was not focused on as much for obvious reasons. But as was pointed out at the beginning, when you say arm the Kurds in Washington, you’re mainly thinking Peshmerga. But the PYD, the Syrian Kurds, have arguably been the main beneficiaries of the US campaign to arm the Kurds against ISIS. And they have a very different record from the Peshmerga. I can tell you they are a lot less in favor of the Syrian revolution, a lot inferior in terms of human rights. So how do you see that relationship going forward between the PYD in Syria and the Peshmerga in Iraq?

MS. PLETKA: I’m so glad you asked that question. That was the one thing I wish I had asked.

MR. RUBIN: Very good. Actually, in the course of doing research for this, I had the opportunity to go to Syrian Kurdistan to Qamishli, Amuda, Malikiyah and some other towns there. It’s a great question. The YPG has been the most effective fighting force. When one criticizes some of the human rights issues, the answer I would get would be much the same as I heard in Iraqi Kurdistan at other points in time when you’re facing a greater crisis, these things happen, but we aspire to be better. One of the metrics for Washington to pay attention to is whether the trajectory still stays as positive on increasing democratization.

I have to say I was very impressed by what I saw when I was in Syrian Kurdistan. And unscientifically, and there’s no scientific polls in these regards, unscientifically, I would say that Syrian Kurds tended to favor the YPG/PYD much more than they favored the Barzani affiliated political parties. And that’s one of the reasons I would argue that one of the policy recommendations for this, however the debate goes, is the United States needs to have a much more serious discussion about how it’s going to interact with the PKK.

Now, the State Department will sometimes try to conduct intellectual somersaults and say that the YPG is functionally different from the PKK, but every office I would go into Qamishli would have a big picture of Abdulla Öcalan so many of the locals might beg to disagree with that sort of diplomatic smoke and mirrors show.

Ultimately, the discrepancy and the conflict between the YPG and the Kurdish Peshmerga is also something with which we need to be more aware for two reasons. First of all, at the battle for Kobani, it didn’t seem like much aid was coming from either the Turks or — I mean, quite the contrary there — or the Peshmerga until it looked like the YPG might actually pull this off, at which point they wanted to share the victory.

The other problem here, however, is that if the United States goes in for emotional reasons, for moral reason and says, we want to help the Kurds, we risk getting tied down into what continues to be quite an internecine conflict, political if not military. I would point out that the day before President Barzani’s term in office expired, last August, he convoyed through Erbil a good deal of military equipment, which in theory was supposed to be off fighting the Islamic State but had been warehoused back in Erbil. And that only highlights the problem of people putting political power and short-term concerns above the long-term strategic concern. And that impacts not only Syria and Rojava but also regions of Iraqi Kurdistan as well.

MS. PLETKA: Any final words from you, Jim or Lukman?

AMB. JEFFREY: On certainly the Syrian Kurds, the YPG, the key issue is what are they going to do in the majority or even minority Arab areas that they are now either effectively in or will soon be effectively in? I haven’t seen a good answer to that. There isn’t. The whole separate issue of — on relations with Barzani in Iraq, but that’s an issue that you can almost put on the shelf, but it’s a much more urgent issue to figure out how they’re going to deal with the Sunni-Arab tribes that they’re coming up against.

MR. RUBIN: Could I just thank my interns?

MS. PLETKA: You could.

MR. RUBIN: I mean, there’s several interns and also — I want to thank the interns, former interns who are here, all of whom have gone on to bigger and better things; my research assistant, Tara Beany. I also do want to thank — there are several people in the audience who are acknowledged in the book. Some people chose to remain anonymous so I won’t call them out here. But several people, unfortunately, again, not the KRG, accepted invitations to go over previous drafts of the work to basically be a murder board, to basically push back on certain issues, to force me to qualify, to convince me that I was wrong on this, that, or the other thing. And I want to thank them for the time. Many of them came in from significant different distances to do that.

So I just want to — this wasn’t a study group. I bear full responsibility for the conclusions, but at the same time, I got a lot of help so I just want to give a shout out to about a dozen people in the audience here.

MS. PLETKA: Well, and let me thank you too, Michael, and Ambassador Jeffery, Jim, Ambassador Faily, Lukman. Godspeed to you in your future endeavors. We’re really, really going to miss you but I hope we’ll at least have you in Washington some of the time. And thank you to the audience for joining us in this discussion. Grab a copy of Michael’s really very fine work outside. And for those of you not celebrating Ramadan, we have some wine and cheese outside if you’d like to join us. And you can yell at Michael then too. So thank you all. With that, we’re done. (Applause.)

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