THE FUTURE OF : DEMOCRACY, CIVIL WAR, OR CHAOS?

*By Michael Rubin

Pessimism regarding Iraq's future is unwarranted. Iraq faces many challenges, but success is still within reach. After 35 years of dictatorship, Iraqis have embraced a political process emphasizing compromise and coalition. They have successfully held elections and drawn up a constitution. Political brinkmanship is not necessarily a precursor to civil war. That said, Iraqi democracy faces many challenges. First and foremost is the insurgency. Premature reconciliation and concessions offered in the face of violence, however, will backfire. Neighboring states also may undermine Iraq's security, necessitating a long-term U.S. military presence.

This article was originally written for a project and conference on "After the : Strategic and Political Changes in Europe and the ," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.

More than eight million Iraqis braved bombs Iraqis move toward their constitutional and bullets to vote on January 30, 2005, in referendum and national elections for a full- Iraq's first free elections in a half-century. term government, the greatest threat they face President George W. Bush praised the Iraqi will be from outside powers seeking to people from the White House, declaring, "In destabilize Iraq by proxy. The key for success great numbers, and under great risk, Iraqis will be to abide by, without exception, a have shown their commitment to democracy. timeline for specific political milestones. By participating in free elections, the Iraqi Washington and the should people have firmly rejected the anti- not bend to pressure, be it from factions democratic ideology of terrorists."1 But in within Iraq or from interests outside, to alter subsequent weeks, talks bogged down, first the agreed framework. Milestones matter. over the formation of the government and more recently over the constitution. IS IRAQ READY FOR DEMOCRACY? While internal tensions will not dissipate U.S. officials and public commentators anytime soon, Iraqis have shown a resiliency have consistently underestimated Iraqis. Two which suggests that while the path to months before Iraqis went to the polls, Leslie democracy might be arduous and marred by H. Gelb, former president of the Council on violence, that they are nevertheless dedicated Foreign Relations, and , a to making the political process work. As former American ambassador to and

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) 125 Michael Rubin a lobbyist for the Regional promised "a bright future and a strong and Government, penned a commentary in the competent Iraq." entitled, "Why Jan. 30 U.S. allies , Tunisia, and Yemen Won't Work" in which they argued that Iraq hold presidential elections, but restrict was not ready for elections. 2 In his weblog, opposition campaigns to the point where , the president-elect of the Middle incumbency is guaranteed. 8 In Iraq, Allawi East Studies Association, argued that "The found the benefits of incumbency limited. 1997 elections in ," in which the The U.S. military and private security Guardian Council disqualified 234 out of 238 contractors helped transport Allawi to candidates, "were much more democratic." 3 campaign rallies across the country, and the Like Cole, his fellow bloggers, and interim prime minister used the bully pulpit commentators, many of the fiercest critics of of his office to grant interviews to al-Iraqiya Bush Administration policy have never television and the al-Arabiya satellite visited Iraq. They treat Iraq as a template channel. But, he could impose no restrictions upon which to impose a political agenda on his competitors, many of whom adopted a often shaped more by partisan disdain for the grassroots campaign. Shi'a politicians Bush Administration policy rather than by the broadcast their messages by radio so as to situation in Iraq. Rashid Khalidi, an Arab reach ordinary Iraqis who had no generators studies professor at Columbia University, for with which to run television during the example, authored a critique of U.S. policy in frequent power outages, but could operate Iraq relying upon secondary sources.4 radios by battery. Council on Foreign Relations scholar David In , mosques run by firebrand Phillips pilloried the failure of the post-war cleric Muqtada al-Sadr urged their flocks to 5 reconstruction in Losing Iraq. In its review embrace the ballot. Many Shi'a politicians of his work, revealed adopted a grassroots campaign. On January that Phillips did not visit Iraq in the course of 9, 2005, tribal shaykhs from the outskirts of his research, and lifted descriptions of Iraqi hosted a rally in the town of cities directly from secondary newspaper Mushkhab. Among those attending was Abd accounts.6 Others seek credibility by visiting al-Karim Muhammadawi, known as the Coalition forward operating bases or the "Robin Hood of the Marshes" for his high-security International Zone, but do not resistance against Saddam's army prior to the venture outside the security bubble to meet American occupation. Former Governing ordinary Iraqis.7 Council members Ahmad Barak and Ahmad Despite the pessimism emanating from Chalabi drove down from for the Washington and the academy, the January event. On the streets of Baghdad, campaign 2005 Iraqi election campaign demonstrated posters jockeyed for wall space. just how far Iraqis had come. Political Significantly, though, rival parties did not advertisements on ash-Sharqiya, Iraq's most obstruct or deface their opponents' posters. popular television channel, were slick and, Iraqis embraced political pluralism. but for language, would not be out of place in Because forbids its an American political campaign. Amid reporters to travel outside daylight hours9 and pictures of flags, ballots, and Iraqi children, other journalists rely on stringers,10 and the Interim Iraqi Prime Minister U.S. embassy's security officers restrict the

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The future of Iraq: Democracy, Civil war, or Chaos? ability of diplomats to exit the heavily- remain rife, but power-sharing created checks fortified security zone,11 much of the and balances. Within the administration, campaign occurred outside the notice of the ministers, deputy ministers, and directors- Western audience. general might all derive from different parties or factions. Their mutual distrust has AN ELECTORAL MILESTONE obstructed ministerial power and created Many commentators were therefore mechanisms for various constituencies to surprised by the high turn-out in the January voice dissent to power. The central 30, 2005 elections. The polls marked a government in Baghdad may not be as watershed in Middle Eastern politics for two efficient, but it is more democratic than the reasons: one-party regions of which First, they marked the first time in Iraq's are ruled from and . history that that country's Shi'a community After several weeks of negotiations, achieved a political voice proportional to Ibrahim Jaafari, leader of the Da`wa party, their majority status. For more than eighty emerged as the United Iraqi Alliance's years, successive Iraqi governments had nominee for prime minister. The slate's worked to marginalize and disenfranchise the caucus was an indication of a growing Shi'a. The rise of the community to real acceptance of democratic norms. Within the political power after more than eight decades slate, four candidates put forward their of systematic oppression is no less names. While many United Iraqi Alliance momentous than the 1994 victory of Nelson members expressed reservations about Jaafari Mandela in South Africa's first multiracial and his pro-Islamic law positions, he presidential elections. outlasted his three competitors to emerge as Second, and just as important, no party the nominee. won a strong, working majority. The United True to Iraq's new political realities, other Iraqi Alliance won a bare majority with 140 parties and interests issued demands in return seats in the 275-member National Assembly; for political support. The Kurdish Alliance, the Kurdish Alliance took 75 seats; and for example, insisted that their support for Allawi's Iraqi List won 40. Nine small parties Jaafari would be contingent upon his support divided the remaining 20 seats.12 Iraqi for federalism. Engaging in political political powerbrokers had to administer by brinkmanship, they threatened to cobble coalition. While a king or strong president together an opposition slate to the United rules every other Arab country, no single Iraqi Alliance with minority parties and ruler or party can dictate in Iraq. defectors from the United Iraqi Alliance itself Parliamentarians have been forced to unless Jaafari acceded to their demands. negotiate and compromise rather than Trading of support for different issues is impose. Corruption and abuse of power may likewise a backbone of politics. It implies a

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Michael Rubin leader's accountability to interests other than middle-class families in the his own. of Baghdad and academics and professionals Whereas Iraqi politicians once served only in Sulaymaniyah gather in clubs and enjoy to rubberstamp their leader's decisions, a whisky, beer, and the local ouzo-like arak. decade of opposition conferences and the 15- Iraqis compromised on questions of the month American interregnum encouraged exclusivity of Islam as a source of legislation. political tolerance. After sunset, in Baghdad While many Islamists argued that Islam and across governorate capitals and rural should be considered "the source" of tribal diwans, generators hum and reception legislation rather than the less exclusive "a rooms are abuzz with local notables. In back source," Islamists and liberal compromised rooms, politicians from across Iraq make upon a non-exclusive treatment of Islam "as a deals and exchange gossip. In the run-up to main source." While this is ideal to no group the August 15 constitutional deadline--and within the Iraqi political and religious the August 22 extension--they debated spectrum, such is the nature of compromise. whether religious or civil courts should judge Similar compromises may allow Iraqis to opt family law, the division of national wealth to adjudicate matters of family law in civil under federalism, and political restrictions rather than religious courts. Many women's upon members of the Ba'th party. groups fear the latter because of the inherent inequality of women in matters of divorce THE CONSTITUTIONAL MILESTONE and inheritance under prevalent The Iraqi National Assembly greeted with interpretations of Islamic law. 16 applause the August 22, 2005 announcement Disagreements over federalism have by its speaker Hachim al-Hasani that the become a more serious stumbling block constitutional commission had submitted a across Iraq. But Kurdish political draft constitution. While the National organization--and the morality of their cause- Assembly agreed to discuss the draft and -will undercut any attempts to roll back de possibly offer amendments, the successful facto federalism. Federalism is not a new submission of a constitution undercut outside concept for Iraq. Prior to the Ottoman pundits who argued that the Iraqis should Empire's defeat in World War I, what became delay the constitutional process.13 The Iraq was three separate Ottoman provinces: hurdles overcome by Iraqi politicians were in the south, Baghdad in the center, and significant. Debates over federalism and the in the north. Even after the 1921 role of Islam in the constitution polarized establishment of monarchy, the final shape of Iraq. While militiamen loyal to Muqtada al- Iraq rema ined in dispute as the nascent Sadr attacked University of Basra students Turkish Republic laid claim to Mosul. The for socializing at a mixed-sex picnic,14 1920 Treaty of Sevres promised an students flirt and socialize in the University independent state, but the 1923 Treaty of of Salahuddin cafeteria in Erbil. Likewise, Lausanne rescinded this commitment three while vigilantes have firebombed liquor years later. In 1925, a League of Nations stores in Basra and Salam Maliki, the commission arrived to adjudicate the dispute; minister of transportation, has forbidden they found in favor of Iraq, awarding the liquor sales at the once-popular Baghdad predominantly Kurdish province to the new International Airport duty-free shop,15 government in Baghdad, on condition that,

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"Regard must be paid to the desires expressed Iraqi military and the Iraqi people [should] by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race take matters into their own hands and force should be appointed for the administration of the dictator to step aside," 19 their country, the dispensation of justice, and the Kurds and Shi'a rose up against Saddam's teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish authoritarian rule. Within a matter of days, should be the official language of all these the central government lost control of 14 out services."17 Such conditions were never of Iraq's 18 governorates. But the Iraqi fulfilled. government fought back, and neither the Successive governments in Baghdad failed nor other outside powers to implement autonomy. While there were intervened. The Iraqi government used sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence, helicopter gun ships and armor to suppress throughout Iraqi history, a full-scale Kurdish the revolt. As more than a million Kurdish revolt erupted in 1961. Years of low-intensity refugees streamed toward the Turkish border, guerilla warfare led to a March 11, 1970 President Turgat Özal of , urged the autonomy accord between the Iraqi creation of a "safe haven" in northern Iraq. government and its Kurdish opposition, but While the safe haven was initially quite Baghdad never fully implemented the small--only 36 square miles centered on the agreement. Disputes over the extent of northern Iraqi town of Zakho--it soon Kurdistan (namely whether should be expanded to incorporate Dahuk and included) and Saddam's own effort to encompassed 3,600 square miles. When, in undermine the accords as the Ba'th party October 1991, Saddam Hussein withdrew his consolidated control, caused the collapse of government's administration from Iraqi Arab-Kurdish federalism and the resumption Kurdistan in an attempt to blockade and of low-intensity civil war. Nevertheless, the starve the restive Kurds into submission, the willingness of the Iraqi government to area of de facto Kurdish control grew to embrace federalism has had lasting impact in almost 15,500 square miles. Iraq's collective memory. The Kurds scrambled to create a political Iraqi Kurdish history subsequent to the authority. They did so largely by democratic collapse of the autonomy accords is well means, despite interludes of factional and known. During the late 1980s, Kurdish- tribal squabbles. Following elections in May populated northern Iraq was the scene of near 1992, the region's major political parties total destruction, the Iraqi government having formed the Kurdistan Regional Government. devastated more than 4,000 of the 4,655 Split by civil war in 1996--and still not Kurdish villages.18 integrated despite the symbolic unification of Following Saddam's 1991 defeat in a powerless parliament in June 2005--the Operation Desert Storm and President George region has been effectively independent of H.W. Bush's February 15, 1991 call that "The Baghdad's control for almost 15 years. Iraqi

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Kurdistan has its own ministries, budget, officials and diplomats have urged Iraqis to taxes, and army. It functions primarily in embrace and engage former Ba'thists and Kurdish; college age students in Arab Sunni rejectionists. If the Sunnis can be Sulaymaniyah and, increasingly in Erbil, can brought into the fold, the conventional no longer speak . The region flies its wisdom goes, peace and reconciliation will own flag, runs its own television stations, and prevail. conducts its own foreign policy. While some Evidence does not support such an Sunni politicians may oppose Kurdish assertion. Many of the insurgents are federalism,20 any debate is undercut by the rejectionists with no desire to be a part of a reality on the ground. The central government new political process. They have neither has little sway in Iraqi Kurdistan, and little voiced a political vision nor contributed to ability to impose its will through force, all the the well-being or safety of ordinary Iraqis. more so because the Shi'a also favor Their chief victims are not U.S. soldiers, but federalism in southern Iraq.21 rather other Iraqis. A case in point was the While federalism may be a fait accompli August 19, 2005 murder of three Sunni Arab in Iraq despite the threats of some Arab election workers in Mosul who were nationalist and Islamist interests,22 it is not kidnapped as they put up election posters.23 without its dangers. Regional political leaders While terrorists alone bare responsibility may be tempted to cheat in the sharing of for their actions, flawed U.S. policy has resources. As occurred under Saddam undermined stability and undercut Iraqi Hussein's government, corrupt officials may attempts to rectify security. Many Iraqi siphon off oil to sell separately. The sharing politicians, be they Arab Shi'a, Arab Sunni, of water may be more complicated than or Kurdish, correlate the upsurge in insurgent allocation of oil proceeds. Should the attacks to the April 2004 decision by Kurdistan Regional Government fail to Coalition Provisional Authority administrator release water from the Dokan and L. Paul Bremer to reverse de-Ba'thification. Darbandikan dams, crops in the Iraqi Arab In effect, Bremer traded the good will of heartland could whither; the newly-restored Iraq's 14 million Shi'a and six million Kurds southern marshes could again evaporate. In for the sake of perhaps 40,000 Ba'thists. Iraqi Kurdistan, the failure of the Kurdistan Since the transfer of sovereignty, diplomatic Democratic Party to share revenue from the pressure upon Iraqis to reintegrate former lucrative Ibrahim Khalil customs post Ba'thists has become even greater. One senior sparked the outbreak of the three-year embassy official confided in an April 2005 e- Kurdish civil war. Nevertheless, careful mail that re-integration of former Ba'thists auditing can alleviate the danger until trust had become a mantra among U.S. diplomats. can build. The American strategy has backfired for several reasons: First, by trumpeting a Sunni DOES U.S. STRATEGY UNDERCUT strategy, the Coalition Provisional Authority SECURITY? deepened sectarianism and furthered the false While Iraqis have made significant perception that de-Ba'thification targeted political and economic progress, the security large numbers of invidivual Sunnis on the situation in central Iraq remains poor. As the basis of their religious beliefs rather than insurgent violence has spiked, senior military because of their past complicity in terror as

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The future of Iraq: Democracy, Civil war, or Chaos? government and party officials. Many former Ba'thist, to lead the interim Iraqi Ba'thists were Shiites and Kurds; many Sunni intelligence service. Shahwani has employed Arabs also ended up in Saddam's mass proportionately fewer Shi'a in the new Iraq's graves. intelligence service than during the time of Second, the reconciliation policy has Saddam Hussein. enabled Ba'thists to infiltrate into sensitive Third, insurgents interpret premature positions where they can work to undermine reconciliation as rewarding violence. On security. 24 No place has this occurred as March 31, 2004, following the murder and starkly as in Mosul. Shortly after the collapse mutilation of four American security of Saddam Hussein's regime, the 101st contractors in , Bush declared, Airborne took charge of Mosul and its "America will never be intimidated by thugs environs. The division's commander, General and assassins."27 After a month-long siege, , pursued a policy of though, the U.S. officials struck a deal with reconciliation with both Ba'thists and the insurgents whereby U.S. officials Islamists. "The coalition must reconcile with empowered the insurgents to form a Fallujah a number of the thousands of former Ba'th Brigade. Not only did the decision fail to co- officials…giving them a direct stake in the opt insurgents, but it also allowed them safe- success of the new Iraq," he argued. 25 But his haven. Car bombing increased 600 percent in strategy failed. He appointed Colonel Ya'rob, the following month. The insurgents the supervisor of checkpoints in the Nineweh absorbed the message that they could win governorate under the previous regime, to through violence what they could not through head the police guarding the Mosul the political process. The insurgency quickly governor's office. On July 14, 2004, spread to cities like and Mosul. assassins--likely with the benefit of inside Diplomatic pressure throughout April 2005 to information regarding schedules and increase Sunni representation on the movements--ambushed the governor's car. A Constitutional Drafting Committee resulted more extreme example involved the in an additional 15 Sunni members, but rather appointment of another former Ba'thist, than placate the community, it only increased General Muhammad Kha'iri Barhawi to be its demands. Violence, now perceived as the Mos ul's police chief. Barhawi kept a low- way to win concessions, increased. profile but used the space created by Petraeus The U.S. embassy nevertheless repeated and his successors to organize insurgent cells its mistake in June 2005, when word leaked and lead a November 2004 uprising which that both U.S. diplomats and military officials briefly handed Iraq's second largest city over had approached Iraqi insurgents in order to to insurgents. 26 Many Iraqi Shi'a remain upset encourage them to renounce violence and that the U.S. officials appointed Major- join the political process.28 A National General Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, a Security Council senior director rationalized

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Michael Rubin the approach by differentiating between THE THREAT FROM OUTSIDE talking to and negotiating with insurgents. POWERS The drew no such distinction. A The positive evolution of Iraqi politics and June 28, 2005 Al-Sharq al-Awsat cartoon economy may not be enough to ensure Iraq's depicted Uncle Sam, surrounded by barbed security. Iraq's military is too weak to defend wire, with an insurgent leader blocking the itself against threats from its neighbors, and it only path to escape. The perception was one retains poor control over its borders. The of weakness, not magnanimity. Violence intentions of countries like Iran, Jordan, again spiked. , and remain far from If the West wants Iraq to continue on the uncertain. The Turkish military is path to stability, security, and democracy, increasingly agitated about the presence of they should listen to the Iraqis. U.S. officials Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists in should not interfere with Iraqi politicians who Iraqi Kurdistan29 and Iraqi Kurdish intentions aim for sweeping de-Ba'thification. Iraqis toward the disputed city of Kirkuk. While all understand the nuances of their history, of Iraq's neighbors wanted the United States security, and politics better than any diplomat to succeed militarily in Iraq, none want serving a six-month tour, or serviceman liberated Iraq to be successful or democratic. without personal connection to their country. The Turkish government fears any precedent Several Iraqi politicians have suggested which benefits Iraqi Kurds. The Iranian that they may consider a policy under which leadership suspects any independent Shi'a former party members might still work in voice it cannot control. Iraq's other neighbors government, but be prohibited from assuming fear the empowerment of a Shi'a majority.30 any position of command authority; i.e., Furthermore, a stable Iraq is in the interest of colonel or above in the Iraqi military, or neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran, neither of director-general or above in civil service. whom can afford to lose the supplemental oil American diplomats and intelligence officers production they undertook following the may not want to see their contacts lose their 1990 United Nation's sanctioning of Iraq. jobs or suffer demotion, but such may be the As a result, with the possible exception of price not only of security, but also of Kuwait, Iraq's neighbors sovereignty and democracy. Reversing the have sought to undermine the country's insurgency--and enabling Iraq's fragile stability. For instance, the Turkish democracy to take root--will require listening government has bankrolled the to Iraqis. While the Multinational Forces, the Front. Before the war, the Iraqi Turkmen European Union, and the Jordanian Front consistently took a rejectionist position. government may run training programs for It demanded inclusion in the Iraqi opposition the Iraqi recruits, Iraqi officials--not leadership, but refused to recognize the foreigners--should decide who should take legitimacy of any other group. While the part. Iraqis are capable of building a better Iraqi Turkmen Front claims to represent life, should they not be hampered by Iraq's nearly two million ethnic Turkmen, American naïveté, however well-meaning it only a small number of Turkmen give the may be. party their allegiance. When the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan subsidized the distribution of Kurdish flags to mixed

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The future of Iraq: Democracy, Civil war, or Chaos? communities south of Kirkuk, most Turkmen Iranian Revolutionary Guards "brought in responded by raising Shi'a banners rather radio transmission equipment, posters, than the Turkmen Front's white crescent on pamphlets printed in (the Iranian holy city of) pale blue flag. As Kurds, long displaced from Qom, and huge amounts of money, some of Kirkuk migrated back to the city, the Turkish which was used to buy weapons for the Badr military, egged on by the Iraqi Turkmen Corps."32 Front, threatened violence. Many Kurds point While the Iranian government often seeks to the July 2003 infiltration of a Turkish plausible deniability by acting through proxy, Special Forces team, allegedly on a mission has made no secret of its intentions in to assassinate Kurdish politicians in Kirkuk, Iraq. Iran's charge d'affaires in Baghdad, as a sign of malicious Turkish intentions. Hassan Kazemi Qomi, was not actually a Likewise, many Iraqis interpreted the Turkish diplomat but rather a member of the Islamic Foreign Ministry's decision to approach Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose job has directly the 101st Airborne with a request to been to export jihad; Qomi previously served construct a second border crossing as a as a liaison to Hizballah.33 Meanwhile, Italian deliberate attempt to bypass the Iraqi interior intelligence reports show that many members and foreign ministries. of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard moved Continuing suspicion and disunity into southern Iraq in early 2004 to organize between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and and train firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, meanwhile, militia.34 provides an opening for neighboring powers By January 2004, the Badr Corps, trained to fight by proxy, much as they did during the and financed by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, 1994-1997 Kurdish civil war. With so many had painted murals commemorating militias now operating throughout the whole Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of of Iraq, the country may be even more Iran's Islamic Revolution, and displayed a susceptible to the ill-will of outside powers. banner declaring, "No to America, no to Both the Iranian and Syrian governments Israel, no to occupation." The Iranian have facilitated infiltration of men and government has not limited its support to a materiel to aid the insurgency. The Iranian single faction or party. Rather, Tehran's security apparatus challenged the United strategy appears to be to support both the States almost immediately in Iraq. As radicals seeking immediate confrontation Coalition forces advanced on Najaf in March with the U.S. occupation and Islamist 2003, Badr Corps units poured into northern political parties like the Supreme Council for Iraq from Iran, provoking a strong warning to Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Tehran by Secretary of Defense Donald Ibrahim Jaafari's Da'wa Party. During the Rumsfeld. 31 Well-connected Iranian February 2005 United Iraqi Alliance journalist Ali Reza Nurizadeh reported elite negotiations to nominate a prime minister, the

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Iranian government exposed its strategy when against the de-Ba'thification which so many it ordered SCIRI's Adel Mehdi to step aside Iraqis demand. Jordan may be a key U.S. so that Jaafari could win, thereby implicating ally, but Amman has its own regional both SCIRI and Da'wa as Iranian clients. The interests which do not necessarily correlate August 2, 2005 abduction and murder of with the interests of either Washington or independent journalist Baghdad. If Iraq is to succeed, American highlighted the growing problem of Shi'a policymakers should compartmentalize their militias and death squads in southern Iraq. diplomacy, and give greater weight to Iraqi While the Iranian government may wish to input rather that of Iraq's neighbors. To do subvert Iraq's democracy to prevent a free otherwise would both create a perpetually Shi'a state from undercutting Iran's social and weak Iraq and encourage external religious foundations, the Syrian government interference in the country. has sought to undercut Iraqi security in order With the exception of Turkey, none of to amplify its own political importance and Iraq's neighbors are democratic. Strength bog down American forces which it feels matters in the Middle East. Autocrats prey on might otherwise threaten the Syrian regime. weak neighbors. If Iraq is to succeed, it must After months of internal U.S. debate about be allowed to develop an independent policy the degree of Syrian complicity in the that, at times, may put it at odds with its insurgency, General Richard Myers, neighbors. This requires strength. While the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, newly-trained Iraqi security forces can "We know for a fact that a lot of them increasingly patrol the streets of Baghdad, [foreign fighters] find their way into Iraq Basra, and Mosul, U.S. forces remain in the through Syria for sure."35 country, albeit in the background. A long- As the elected, Shi'a majority government term U.S. military commitment, albeit one assumes power, the political conflict between that is non-intrusive to most Iraqis, will Baghdad and Amman will likely grow. Iraqi enable Iraq the space to develop its own antipathy toward Jordan is already high, identity and better immunize Iraqi society because of a widespread belief that the from the interference of its neighbors. For a Jordanian government colluded with Saddam continued U.S. presence to be palatable to Hussein's regime in order to receive Iraqis, U.S. officials should formalize a discounted oil. Clumsy Jordanian interference Status of Forces Agreement governing the in Iraqi politics also backfired. King presence of foreign troops. Many Iraqis Abdullah II has spun his theories at the White would be amenable to such a presence. In House, letting his personal animus to Ahmad contrast, calls for a commitment to withdraw Chalabi color Jordanian policy toward Iraq. completely from Iraq undercut stability and The King's attempts to subsidize Arab security on one hand by encouraging nationalist politicians led Iraq's interim insurgents that they can outlast the United governing council to revoke the license of States in Iraq, and also by reinforcing the Jordan's Arab Bank to operate in Iraq. In Iraqi psychosis of abandonment that has December 2004, he raised hackles in Iraq remained ever since President George H.W. when he spoke of the danger of a "Shi'a Bush's decision not to support the 1991 Iraqi crescent," and, in a Spring 2005 Middle East uprising which he helped spark. Quarterly interview, he again spoke out

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CONCLUSION respect the primacy of the rule of law. For The future of Iraq is anything but bleak. Iraqi political factions--especially the Newspapers carry headlines of devastating predominantly Sunni Arab parties which may suicide bombings. But as tragic as these feel themselves the losers in the new Iraq--to events are, Iraq has demonstrated a great deal uphold the rule of law, it is essential that U.S. of stability. Concerted efforts to launch policymakers do not pressure Iraqis to popular rebellions have fallen flat. The compromise or reach consensus. In politics insurgents still must enforce discipline and democracy, some factions win, others through intimidation rather than win converts lose. So long as each has a chance to reverse through ideology. While Iraq's road to their political fortunes through the ballot box, democracy is anything but assured, Iraqis there should be no need to threaten, let alone from a wide range of backgrounds appear resort to violence. By responding to threats determined not to revert back to dictatorship. and seeking to impose a political solution to The fracturing of Saddam Hussein's security Iraq's insurgency, U.S. policymakers system may have made returning to encourage violence, enable factions to dictatorship impossible. Many Iraqi political augment their demands, and generally leaders recognize the futility of civil war to undercut Iraq's political development. impose one ethnic or sectarian group's will Democracy need not be forever a foreign upon other Iraqi regions, especially concept in the Arab (and Kurdish) world. since Kurds and Shi'a both increasingly favor Culturally, Arabs are as capable of regional federalism and many Arab Sunnis, democracy as were Germans, Japanese, and even if they say they oppose the idea, Koreans. If Bush holds true to democracy as nevertheless endorse its principles when they a goal in Iraq, though, his administration insist they do not want Kurds or Shi'a to should accept that Iraqis may pursue some govern their daily lives. policies which contradict the desires of the Iraq has come far in the two and a half U.S. foreign policy elite. Washington should years since the fall of Saddam Hussein. There not seek to impose re-Ba'thification or has been considerable political progress in interfere in internal Iraqi purges of insurgents Iraq, evident not only in the electoral and and their sympathizers. The complaints of constitutional milestones, but also in the Iraqi outside parties like King Abdullah II are willingness to compromise and complain. irrelevant; he is not Iraqi. Defeating the The political process may not be efficient, but insurgency can be tough; it may require a most democracies are not. Rhetoric may be decade. But if U.S. policymakers listen to the shrill. The politics of brinkmanship often Iraqis, the future can be bright. invites such positions. Brinkmanship in and of itself is not a threat to Iraq's stability, so long as Iraqis political factions ultimately

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*Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor of the 8 See, for example, Neila Charchour Middle East Quarterly. Hachicha, "Tunisia's Election was Undemocratic at All Levels," The Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2005). NOTES www.meforum.org/article/732.

9 1 "President Congratulates Iraqis on Comments by a Baghdad-based New York Election," January 30, 2005. Times correspondent in an interview with an www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/ Iraqi political figure. Baghdad, January 8, 20050130-2.html 2005.

10 2 Leslie Gelb and Peter Galbraith, "Why Christine Chinlund, "Dateline: Baghdad," January 30 Won't Work," The Los Angeles The Globe, June 21, 2004.

Times, December 3, 2004. 11 Michael Rubin, "Less is More in Iraq," The 3 Juan Cole "Informed Comment" weblog, Washington Post, August 9, 2005. www.juancole.com/2005_01_01_juanc ole_ar www.washingtonpost.com/wp- chive.html. dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR20050808 01147.html. 4 See Michael Rubin, "Academic Standards, RIP," Frontpage Magazine, June 14, 2005 12 Paul Delgrado, "Shi'a Alliance Declared www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.as Winner of Iraq Election," The Times, p?ID-18419 February 17, 2005.

(Review of Rashid Khalidi's Resurrecting 13 Empire: Western Footprints and America's See, for example, Marina S. Ottaway, "Iraq Perilous Path in the Middle East (Boston: Calls for Unhurried Negotiations,F" Beacon Press, 2004). Financial Times, July 20, 2005.

14 5 David Phillips, Losing Iraq (Boulder, Anthony Shadid, "Picnic is no Party in the Colorado: Westview Press, 2005). New Basra," , March 29, 2005. 6 Robert Pollock, "The Armchair Analyst,"

Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2005. 15 Ellen Knickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, 7 See, for example, Jessica Mathews, "Iraqis "Alcohol Banner in Baghdad Airport," The Can do More," The Washington Post, Washington Post, July 30, 2005. September 29, 2003; and Jessica Mathews,

"Match Iraq Policy to Reality," The 16 Washington Post, September 23, 2004, both See for example, the website of the multi- of which were based on a Defense ethnic, multi-sectarian Women's Alliance for Department-sponsored trip subject to Defense a Democratic Iraq, www.wafdi.org. Department security regulations. 17 League of Nations, Report submitted to the

Council by the Commission instituted by the

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Council Resolution of September 30th , 1924. Policywatch #855, April 9, 2004. The Document C.400, M.147, vii (Geneva, 1925), Washington Institute for Near East Policy. as cited in David McDowall, A Modern www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.p History of the Kurds. (London: I.B. Tauris, hp?CID=1733. 1996), pp. 145-46. 26 Richard Oppel and James Glanz, "More 18 "Interview with Nasreen Mustafa Sideek, Dead Found in Mosul," The New Kurdistan Regional Government Minister of York Times, November 23, 2004. Reconstruction and Development," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 7 (July 27 "Remarks by the President at National 2001). www.meib.org/articles/0107_iri.html. Republican Congressional Committee Dinner," Office of the Press Secretary, April 19 "Excerpts from Two Statements by Bush 1, 2004. on Iraq's Proposal for Ending Conflict," The www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/ New York Times, February 16, 1991. 20040401-7.html

20 "Iraq Delays Vote on Draft Constitution," 28 "Many Say only Political Solution Possible CNN.com, August 22, 2005. in Iraq," Detroit Free Press, June 13, 2005.

21 Bartle Breese Bull, "Islam, Federalism, and 29 "Ankara 'directionless' as US row over Oil," The Wall Street Journal, August 17, PKK deepens," Turkish Daily News, August 2005. 24, 2005.

22 Dan Murphy and Jill Carroll, "Why Iraq's 30 See, for example, King Abdullah II, "Iraq Sunnis fear Constitution," Christian Science is the Battleground: The West against Iran," Monitor, August 24, 2005. Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005). www.meforum.org/article/688. 23 Dexter Filkins, "3 Sunni Election Workers Seized and Killed in Mosul," The New York 31 "Rumsfeld tells Syria and Iran to stay out Times, August 20, 2005. of Iraq war," Agence France Presse, March 28, 2003. 24 Hannah Allam, "Saddam's Baath Party is Back in Business," Knight Ridder/Tribune 32 Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, April 25, 2003. News Service, September 7, 2004. 33 Al-Hayat, April 6, 2004. 25 David Petraeus, "Lessons of the Iraq War and Its Aftermath" (Summary of Remarks),

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Michael Rubin

34 Candito Mimmo, "La Repubblica Islamica Muove le Sue Pedine Tentando di non Scoprirsi con Washington I Lunghi fili dei burattinai di Teheran Un Confine Senza Controlli e un Inviato Speciale di Khamenei," La Stampa, April 8, 2004.

35 Robert Burns, "Marines said to have Tightened Iraqi Border with Syria, but Taken More Casualties," Associated Press, April 16, 2004.

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