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THE PARTY LEADS on EVERYTHING China’S Changing Governance in Xi Jinping’S New Era

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THE PARTY LEADS on EVERYTHING China’S Changing Governance in Xi Jinping’S New Era MERICS CHINA MONITOR THE PARTY LEADS ON EVERYTHING China’s changing governance in Xi Jinping’s new era Nis Grünberg, Katja Drinhausen September 24, 2019 MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | September 24, 2019 | 1 THE PARTY LEADS ON EVERYTHING China’s changing governance in Xi Jinping’s new era Nis Grünberg, Katja Drinhausen MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS As the 70th anniversary of the People´s Republic of China on Extending the CCP’s social reach is a major policy focus. Ideological October 1st draws near, the Communist Party is reasserting its claim and propaganda work and the mobilization of party members are being to all-encompassing “virtuous” leadership. The Xi administration has intensified to shore up popular support. Campaigns to increase the num- completed sweeping institutional reforms of the CCP and state appara- ber and outreach of CCP party cells are making party work and influence tus. The reforms have profound implications for all public affairs in China. an omnipresent force in society at large. The full integration of state and party organizations aims to en- The centralization of power risks over-reliance on key players. It is trench the CCP’s monopoly on political power and ideology more time-consuming to make sure all cadres and public officials know and toe deeply than before. Discussions on institutional separation of party the party line. and state (党政分开) belong to the past. It remains questionable whether the Xi administration’s new sys- Top-down decision making is at the core of the new governance tem will be more effective than previous ones. Officials have incen- model. A cluster of powerful central commissions headed by “core tives to implement even inappropriate policy from the center as they risk leader” Xi and his deputies steer the institutional restructuring of the their careers by not doing so. A societal backlash remains possible if the governance system, issue policy templates on prioritized and strategic governance system and government programs do not deliver outcomes issues and combat challenges to CCP rule. that satisfy the population’s needs. CCP rule and ideology are undergoing an unprecedented degree of codification in laws and regulations, with the aim of cementing the party’s hold on power. In 2018, both CCP leadership and mechanisms for tighter political control were enshrined in the Constitution under the banner of “law-based governance”. MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | September 24, 2019 | 2 How to build the party-state Top-level design is at the core of Xi Jinping‘s governance model 1 Use commissions to centralize power 2 Integrate state institutions Return to the CCP original mission CIMCD CCLBG and make sure that “Core Leader“ the Party leads CNS Xi CCSI State on everything! CFA CCDR TOP LEVEL CFE CNA DESIGN BY XI 3 Use party cells to attach to all layers of society 4 Lock everything firmly into place with laws and regulations Private Sector CCP Civil Society § § § § § 5 Continue CCP rule 党政军民学, 东西南北中, 党是领导一切的! 共产党万岁！ Party, government, army, society and education East, West, South, North The Party leads everything! CCP forever! Party State Private Civil members administration sector society © MERICS © MERICS MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | September 24, 2019 | 3 1. State-party integration drives the new number of local protests and the development of a more organized and proactive civil society, seen as potentially threatening to sustained CCP leadership. Absent a governance system strong and undivided central leadership, so the Xi administration believes, the flip- side of unchecked economic growth and local autonomy was the development of China’s leadership under President Xi Jinping is ramping up efforts to deliver on its strong interest groups and rampant corruption, leading to inefficient governance, promises of a “rich and powerful” China, mindful of two major, legitimating anni- poorly coordinated policy, and the lack of important reforms to the legal code.3 versaries looming – the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic (PRC) in October Xi’s political program is designed to respond to increasingly complex domes- 2019 and the CCP’s own centenary in 2021. The Xi administration is anxious to tic and international challenges, not least by correcting trends identified as det- maintain political stability and the CCP’s capacity to govern China; both are pre- rimental to the CCP’s long-term power and legitimacy. Xi’s appraisal of the most sented as necessities to achieve national material and social goals. It views the pressing dangers to CCP legitimacy are plain in his anti-corruption drive, the ele- integration of state administration and CCP organization as the precondition of a vation of environmental issues to greater prominence, and lately, the shift away more efficient governance system. To this end the leadership launched a massive from chasing “blood tainted GDP” towards a more equitable society.4 This course structural reform program in 2018, which Xi has declared largely completed.1 correction draws on the CCP’s ideological legacy and organizational roots, as dis- Although Xi’s reforms utilize the CCP’s ideological framework and its insti- played in propaganda campaigns ahead of 1st October. tutions, they also represent a distinctive vision for China. Mao Zedong’s one-man Intra-party democracy, which his predecessor Hu Jintao had called “the life Xi wants both a rule channeled all political life through the revolutionary party: the administration of the Party”,5 is sidelined by the focus on hierarchical steering and Xi Jinping monolithic CCP, and state apparatus were cut to a bare minimum. After Deng Xiaoping took the thought.6 The bulky term “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Charac- and a clean, profes- helm, the CCP took a more backseat role, facilitating the development of a techno- teristics in a New Era” now describes his project to ensure the CCP is capable of sional and effective cratic administration alongside market opening and new social groups. giving firm yet nimble direction to the government, thereby building its capacity administration Now Xi is returning the party to the fore by rebuilding a centralized, hierarchi- for long-term rule. Central to this proposition is a vision of the CCP leadership cal system around himself as core leader. This time, however, the party is to be dis- and administrative state bureaucracy fused into one integrated system governing ciplined rather than revolutionary. Instead of dismantling the state apparatus, Xi’s China’s polity, economy, and society. It is as much about CCP adaptability and he- goal is to make it more efficient and to make it serve the party’s agenda. Xi wants gemony as it is a drive to modernize the state administration. both a monolithic CCP, and a clean, professional and effective administration. State-party integration is central to the CCP’s “new era”. The desired out- The CCP under Xi believes a unified governance system under tighter party come is an efficient administration guided and kept in line by top-level steering leadership and ideological guidance is the optimal set-up to deliver on policies and supervision, delivering better services and preempting opposition to CCP rule. to satisfy the population’s needs.2 Their rapid reforms re-set political develop- Xi’s institutional reforms since 2013 have brought a step-change in the consol- ments in a different direction and are more wide-reaching than seen under Xi’s idation of CCP rule by transforming its role in government at home and abroad. immediate predecessors. Under Hu Jintao, the CCP operated a multi-centered Xi’s “new era” is characterized by centralized top-down governance and by more power structure at Politburo level, which enabled the formation of cliques, sti- outward-looking strategies. fling cross-departmental policymaking. In economic policy, the Hu/Wen years saw Ideologically, Xi’s administration has broken with Deng’s deliberately cautious unprecedented growth under relatively autonomous local governments reward- maxim of “crossing the river by feeling for stones” (摸着石头过河) in domestic ed for performance, and a wider opening up of the economy. This more output- reforms. China’s longstanding embrace of pragmatic gradualism has been replaced oriented approach came at the expense of loss of central control. with a more confident tone and much more ambitious targets such as those The downsides of local governments with increased autonomy driving eco- expressed in the industrial innovation strategy “Made in China 2025”. A similar nomic growth and societal opening – in general much praised outside China – were ideological shift can be seen in international relations, where Deng’s low-profile further environmental degradation, poor ethical checks on corrupt officials and loos- principle of “biding time and hiding strengths” (韬光养晦) has given way to bolder er political control by the CCP. This framework is credited with fomenting a large assertions of the need to protect and project China’s interests.7 MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | September 24, 2019 | 4 The decisions of the Third Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in March Exhibit 1 2018 revealed the massive scale of changes to the structure and underlying logic of China’s governance system. One year later, on July 5, 2019, Xi chaired a confer- The “core executive” ence to take stock of progress in state-party integration structural reforms. He Commissions chaired by Xi Jinping described institutional restructuring as complete but emphasized that striving for greater efficiency and higher performance would be a “never ending task”.8 The Start Head of consolidation of CCP leadership throughout China’s administrative institutions Chinese English Chair Deputy Chair(s) Comments date Office would deliver modernized governance, he said. Upgrade to a com- Finance & Xi 中央财经 1980 Li Keqiang Liu He mission after 19th Economy Jinping Party Congress 2.
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