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STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 Key Developments in Global Affairs Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Jonas Grätz, Michael Haas, Prem Mahadevan, Martin Zapfe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland © 2015, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich All images © by Reuters (except p. 63, © by US Navy) ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-48-6 CHAPTER 4 Vulnerable frontier: militarized competition in outer space Michael Haas Critical dependencies on space-based infrastructure have grown dramati- cally in recent decades, and now extend to small states and the global economy as a whole. However, as geopolitical rivalries re-emerge in more traditional domains of interstate conflict, the prospects for future stability in space appear increasingly dim. While the consequences of a great-power clash in space could be ruinous, a shared understanding of the perils in- volved has yet to take hold. Strategic interaction along the ‘final frontier’ is set to enter a period of considerable danger. An SM-3 interceptor modified for the anti-satellite mission is launched from the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie during Operation Burnt Frost, 20 February 2008. 63 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 Among the various environments into reckless behavior on the part of both which humans have expanded their commercial and governmental enti- economic, military, and scientific ac- ties. Instances of overcrowding are tivities, outer space is easily the most already in evidence within certain or- unwelcoming and inhospitable. Im- bital planes, increasing the likelihood possible to access except through mas- of serious accidents, such as the 2009 sive expenditures of energy per unit collision between the Iridium 33 and of mass to be placed into orbit, and Cosmos-2251 communications sat- utterly hostile to human life as well as ellites in low-earth orbit. Decades of to many types of man-made machin- ill-regulated activities in space have ery, the maintenance of a permanent created millions of pieces of orbital presence outside Earth’s protective debris, many of which have sufficient atmosphere remains a highly ambi- kinetic energy to permanently disable tious undertaking. Despite various a satellite. complications, however, this presence – which, in most cases, has entailed However, the most serious threat to the placement of unmanned artificial the continued accessibility of the satellites in earth-centric orbits – has space environment by far is the pros- become an essential pillar of the global pect of a military confrontation, in- economic and security systems in the volving the use of kinetic anti-satellite late 20th and early 21st centuries. From (ASAT) weaponry by any of the grow- highly specialized scientific and com- ing number of states that now possess mercial services to everyday applica- the technological wherewithal to field tions of information technology (IT), such capabilities. space-based infrastructures now form part of the life-support system of a As was rather vividly demonstrated civilization that has tied its economic by the Chinese test of a direct-ascent well-being and, indeed, its very sur- ASAT missile in January 2007, which vival to global connectivity. is estimated to have created more than two million pieces of debris up to ten However, while the economically most centimeters in size as well as 2,500 developed societies in particular have larger objects that can be routinely come to accept this state of depend- tracked by earth-based sensors, such a ence on space-based systems as fairly conflict would probably result in mas- natural and unproblematic, the space sive environmental damage. Depend- domain is, in fact, highly vulnerable ing on the number and position of to the direct and indirect effects of satellites destroyed, the utilization of 64 VULNERABLE FRONTIER affected orbital planes could be severe- – including the US and China in East ly impaired. In a worst-case scenario, Asia, the US and Russia in Eurasia, these orbits could become virtually and potentially the China-India-Pa- unusable for extended periods of time, kistan triangle in South Asia. With as most of the debris would remain in the exception of Pakistan, all of these place for decades or even centuries, states have already demonstrated a ba- with serious implications for both sic anti-satellite capability, and the US commercial and military users. and China in particular are integrat- ing space warfare scenarios into their Unfortunately, several trends point in military planning. the direction of an increased risk over the next 10 – 20 years of terrestrial con- Moreover, the ongoing diffusion of flict that may involve attacks on space underlying clusters of technologies – systems, including the use of kinetic which include ballistic missiles and ASAT weaponry. These trends are pri- space launch vehicles (SLVs), ad- marily the results of the re-emergence vanced radar and seeker technologies, of sustained strategic rivalries among conventional and micro-satellites, some great and medium-sized powers solid-state or chemical lasers, as well 65 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 as battle management networks to co- multilateral governance instruments ordinate attacks – will further increase in regulating these activities. It will the number of states with a latent then outline in considerable detail anti-satellite potential. It is entirely the current geostrategic and military possible that the pace of technology trends that increase the likelihood of diffusion will accelerate further in the military confrontations and render coming decades. space an ever more vulnerable do- main. Finally, it will review several Against this backdrop of renewed stra- ways in which states can mitigate tegic rivalry and continuing prolifera- their dependence on vulnerable space tion, the specter of space conflict will systems and provide an assessment of be a prominent feature of global poli- their potential effectiveness. tics in the coming decade and prob- ably beyond. This chapter will first Irresolvable entanglements discuss the problematic, but largely Over the last several decades, space- irresolvable entanglement between based services have become a critical civil and military activities in space, component of the global econom- as well as the limited effectiveness of ic system as well as of the civilian 66 VULNERABLE FRONTIER infrastructure of government. Long- advanced nations and private enti- range communications, public and ties, the number of stakeholders has commercial broadcasting, imaging grown exponentially over the past 50 and remote sensing, positioning and years. In its early stages, the utilization navigation, meteorology, and a host of of space was the exclusive domain of specialized scientific applications are the Cold War era superpowers. Today, all highly dependent on the smooth only half of the more than 1,200 ac- functioning of satellites and their di- tive satellites are still operated by the verse payloads. Vital sectors of the glo- US or Russia, and in the case of the balized economy, including finance, US almost half of those are owned by shipping, and civil aviation, rely on private businesses. Overall, more than these space-based infrastructures, as 50 nations now have one or more sat- do agricultural planning, urban plan- ellites operating under their flag. ning and surveying, disaster manage- ment, and environmental monitoring. While the direct stakes of the leading spacefaring nations still exceed those The provision of these various servic- of less capable or newly emerging ac- es is valued at over USD 300 billion tors, small states that are tightly in- per year, and has remained a growth tegrated into the global economy are industry even in the aftermath of now nearly as vulnerable to disrup- the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis. The tions of the orbital environment as are overall economic contribution of the great powers. At the same time, space-based infrastructure in terms the capacity of most of these actors to of establishing global connectivity, unilaterally hedge against a loss of ser- reducing transaction costs, and pro- vices without incurring unacceptable viding unique sources of information economic costs is rather limited. about terrestrial activities is much more difficult to quantify. However, it This state of vulnerability, which is undoubtedly makes a substantial con- a product of states’ dependence on tribution to the current gross world space-based services and the current product of more than USD 74 trillion lack of viable alternatives to such and thus likely exceeds the direct prof- services, is compounded by the fact its garnered by space-related industries that the infrastructures in question many times over. are inherently fragile. Due to the dif- ficulty of placing them in orbit and While space activities are still primar- keeping them in working order in ily conducted by a small number of the stringent conditions of the space 67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 environment, space assets tend to be has been ever since the 1950s, a thor- expensive, scarce, and difficult to re- oughly militarized domain. place. As a result of constraints in weight and size, they also typically lack This entanglement of civil and mili- physical
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