STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Center for Security Studies

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Jonas Grätz, Michael Haas, Prem Mahadevan, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

All images © by Reuters (except p. 63, © by US Navy)

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-48-6 CHAPTER 4 Vulnerable frontier: militarized competition in outer space Michael Haas

Critical dependencies on space-based infrastructure have grown dramati- cally in recent decades, and now extend to small states and the global economy as a whole. However, as geopolitical rivalries re-emerge in more traditional domains of interstate conflict, the prospects for future stability in space appear increasingly dim. While the consequences of a great-power clash in space could be ruinous, a shared understanding of the perils in- volved has yet to take hold. Strategic interaction along the ‘final frontier’ is set to enter a period of considerable danger.

An SM-3 interceptor modified for the anti-satellite mission is launched from the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie during Operation Burnt Frost, 20 February 2008.

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Among the various environments into reckless behavior on the part of both which humans have expanded their commercial and governmental enti- economic, military, and scientific ac- ties. Instances of overcrowding are tivities, outer space is easily the most already in evidence within certain or- unwelcoming and inhospitable. Im- bital planes, increasing the likelihood possible to access except through mas- of serious accidents, such as the 2009 sive expenditures of energy per unit collision between the Iridium 33 and of mass to be placed into orbit, and Cosmos-2251 communications sat- utterly hostile to human life as well as ellites in low-earth orbit. Decades of to many types of man-made machin- ill-regulated activities in space have ery, the maintenance of a permanent created millions of pieces of orbital presence outside Earth’s protective debris, many of which have sufficient atmosphere remains a highly ambi- kinetic energy to permanently disable tious undertaking. Despite various a satellite. complications, however, this presence – which, in most cases, has entailed However, the most serious threat to the placement of unmanned artificial the continued accessibility of the satellites in earth-centric orbits – has space environment by far is the pros- become an essential pillar of the global pect of a military confrontation, in- economic and security systems in the volving the use of kinetic anti-satellite late 20th and early 21st centuries. From (ASAT) weaponry by any of the grow- highly specialized scientific and coming number of states that now possess mercial services to everyday applica- the technological wherewithal to field tions of information technology (IT), such capabilities. space-based infrastructures now form part of the life-support system of a As was rather vividly demonstrated civilization that has tied its economic by the Chinese test of a direct-ascent well-being and, indeed, its very sur- ASAT missile in January 2007, which vival to global connectivity. is estimated to have created more than two million pieces of debris up to ten However, while the economically most centimeters in size as well as 2,500 developed societies in particular have larger objects that can be routinely come to accept this state of depend- tracked by earth-based sensors, such a ence on space-based systems as fairly conflict would probably result in mas- natural and unproblematic, the space sive environmental damage. Depend- domain is, in fact, highly vulnerable ing on the number and position of to the direct and indirect effects of satellites destroyed, the utilization of

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affected orbital planes could be severe- – including the US and China in East ly impaired. In a worst-case scenario, Asia, the US and Russia in Eurasia, these orbits could become virtually and potentially the China-India-Pa- unusable for extended periods of time, kistan triangle in South Asia. With as most of the debris would remain in the exception of Pakistan, all of these place for decades or even centuries, states have already demonstrated a ba- with serious implications for both sic anti-satellite capability, and the US commercial and military users. and China in particular are integrating space warfare scenarios into their Unfortunately, several trends point in military planning. the direction of an increased risk over the next 10 – 20 years of terrestrial con- Moreover, the ongoing diffusion of flict that may involve attacks on space underlying clusters of technologies – systems, including the use of kinetic which include ballistic missiles and ASAT weaponry. These trends are pri- space launch vehicles (SLVs), ad- marily the results of the re-emergence vanced radar and seeker technologies, of sustained strategic rivalries among conventional and micro-satellites, some great and medium-sized powers solid-state or chemical lasers, as well

65 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 as battle management networks to co- multilateral governance instruments ordinate attacks – will further increase in regulating these activities. It will the number of states with a latent then outline in considerable detail anti-satellite potential. It is entirely the current geostrategic and military possible that the pace of technology trends that increase the likelihood of diffusion will accelerate further in the military confrontations and render coming decades. space an ever more vulnerable domain. Finally, it will review several Against this backdrop of renewed stra- ways in which states can mitigate tegic rivalry and continuing prolifera- their dependence on vulnerable space tion, the specter of space conflict will systems and provide an assessment of be a prominent feature of global poli- their potential effectiveness. tics in the coming decade and probably beyond. This chapter will first Irresolvable entanglements discuss the problematic, but largely Over the last several decades, space- irresolvable entanglement between based services have become a critical civil and military activities in space, component of the global econom- as well as the limited effectiveness of ic system as well as of the civilian

66 VULNERABLE FRONTIER infrastructure of government. Long- advanced nations and private enti- range communications, public and ties, the number of stakeholders has commercial broadcasting, imaging grown exponentially over the past 50 and remote sensing, positioning and years. In its early stages, the utilization navigation, meteorology, and a host of of space was the exclusive domain of specialized scientific applications are the Cold War era superpowers. Today, all highly dependent on the smooth only half of the more than 1,200 ac- functioning of satellites and their di- tive satellites are still operated by the verse payloads. Vital sectors of the glo- US or Russia, and in the case of the balized economy, including finance, US almost half of those are owned by shipping, and civil aviation, rely on private businesses. Overall, more than these space-based infrastructures, as 50 nations now have one or more sat- do agricultural planning, urban plan- ellites operating under their flag. ning and surveying, disaster management, and environmental monitoring. While the direct stakes of the leading spacefaring nations still exceed those The provision of these various servic- of less capable or newly emerging ac- es is valued at over USD 300 billion tors, small states that are tightly in- per year, and has remained a growth tegrated into the global economy are industry even in the aftermath of now nearly as vulnerable to disrup- the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis. The tions of the orbital environment as are overall economic contribution of the great powers. At the same time, space-based infrastructure in terms the capacity of most of these actors to of establishing global connectivity, unilaterally hedge against a loss of ser- reducing transaction costs, and pro- vices without incurring unacceptable viding unique sources of information economic costs is rather limited. about terrestrial activities is much more difficult to quantify. However, it This state of vulnerability, which is undoubtedly makes a substantial con- a product of states’ dependence on tribution to the current gross world space-based services and the current product of more than USD 74 trillion lack of viable alternatives to such and thus likely exceeds the direct prof- services, is compounded by the fact its garnered by space-related industries that the infrastructures in question many times over. are inherently fragile. Due to the dif- ficulty of placing them in orbit and While space activities are still primar- keeping them in working order in ily conducted by a small number of the stringent conditions of the space

67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 environment, space assets tend to be has been ever since the 1950s, a thor- expensive, scarce, and difficult to re- oughly militarized domain. place. As a result of constraints in weight and size, they also typically lack This entanglement of civil and mili- physical robustness beyond what is tary infrastructures in space has im- absolutely necessary to keep them op- portant implications as far as future erational over their specified lifecycle. security dynamics are concerned. Consequently, the human foothold in On the one hand, in case of a seri- the space domain is fundamentally less ous confrontation, their potential resilient than is our hold over other military relevance may require that more easily accessible components of a large number of foreign-operated the global system, such as the mari- spacecraft be considered as targets. time domain. Otherwise, an opponent would be al- lowed to immunize essential services The situation is further complicated from attack by outsourcing them to by the fact that any distinction be- commercial entities or third parties. tween the civil and military spheres On the other hand, attacks on such of space activity is at best porous, and third-party satellites would likely be in many cases non-existent. Not only perceived as particularly escalatory, are most space programs military in requiring that fragile and ambiguous origin, they also tend to embody the distinctions be upheld during a crisis very essence of dual-use technology, as or conflict. This would seem to create their civil components are either direct considerable opportunity for miscal- corollaries of military services (as is the culation and miscommunication. case with the US Global Positioning System, or GPS) or can be employed At the same time, entanglement also for military purposes with no, or only accentuates the fact that civil and mili- minimal, modifications (which is the tary infrastructures are equally vulner- case in many commercial communica- able to any large-scale environmental tion and imaging applications). In fact, effects of kinetic space warfare. Even among some 500 satellites that are not if distinctions between enemy and directly related to a governmental or ‘neutral’, as well as between military military agency, a substantial major- and commercial, spacecraft could be ity provide services that potentially upheld, attacks would inexorably en- have military applicability. As a result, tail some amount of collateral damage debates about the perils of ‘militariza- within that particular orbital plane. tion’ are largely moot – space is, and While some military satellites are

68 VULNERABLE FRONTIER already designed to weather specific which has recently been updated, and types of adversarial effects, such as the a non-binding code of conduct sup- electromagnetic pulse (EMP) created ported by the EU. by high-altitude nuclear explosions, and could perhaps be better protected Unfortunately, hopes for a compre- against other effects as well, a comprehensive scheme of governance that hensive program of satellite hardening ensures the military inviolability of would almost certainly entail prohibi- the space domain are largely based on tive costs. Therefore, the prevention of extravagant extrapolations from the destructive anti-satellite warfare would limited achievements of Cold War seem to constitute the only viable space diplomacy, or of more recent course of action if major risks to the ex- civil-commercial governance instru- isting infrastructures are to be avoided. ments. While the former were made possible by a specific set of political- The hollow promise of military conditions that no longer ap- comprehensive governance ply, the latter fail to provide a work- Among the options available to poli- able template for regulating military cy-makers to ensure that space does activities in space, which are among not become the scene of serious mili- the most sensitive and least transpar- tary confrontation, the institution of a ent aspects in the military policies framework of binding rules and norms of the great powers. As a result, it is that underwrite the status of space as unlikely that multilateral governance a non-weaponized ‘sanctuary’ that is will be able to effectively prevent ter- off-limits to any direct military inter- restrial rivalries from spilling over ventions would seem to hold consider- into space. Far from offering any deci- able appeal. If such a framework were sive solutions, it should be regarded as embraced and collectively upheld by one of a number of mechanisms that all the relevant space powers, the pos- may be able to make a limited contri- sibility of space conflict would almost bution to a stable space environment. certainly diminish, and access to the space environment would continue to Historically, space governance has be relatively unproblematic for dec- enjoyed some success only where the ades to come. In fact, several initia- great powers had a shared interest in tives with the declared goal of achiev- preventing a further escalation of on- ing such an end state are currently on going activities, notably where weap- the table, including a draft treaty pro- onization in the very narrow sense of posed by Russia and China in 2008, permanently deploying specific types

69 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 of weapons in orbit, was concerned. The return of strategic rivalry and This was laid down in the 1967 Outer the rise of space denial Space Treaty, which remains to this As the unrivalled military and eco- day the most significant legal docu- nomic predominance of the US, ment regulating activities in space, and which has been the hallmark of the the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile post-Cold War era, begins to wane, (ABM) Treaty, ratified in 1972. While geopolitical competition with China such partial achievements remain a in the Asia-Pacific and with Russia in possibility, trust in comprehensive Eurasia is inaugurating a new era of multilateral governance would appear rivalry in an increasingly multipolar to be largely misplaced where mili- global system. Intermittent tensions tary competition is perceived by one in the East and South China Seas, or both sides as providing important which from a US perspective largely strategic or political advantages. amount to confrontations by proxy over the future regional order, and the To the extent that effective govern- acute crisis in NATO-Russia relations ance remains elusive, space will once over Ukraine are but the most visible again become – and likely remain – a crystallization points of these growing contested zone of influence, and po- fault lines in great power relations. As tentially a zone of conflict, between scenarios of conventional or ‘hybrid’ the great powers. Governance efforts, interstate warfare begin to reshape the in the form of confidence-building horizon of military planning, these measures and arms control initiatives, rivalries are also increasingly finding could be instrumental in regulating their expression in outer space. But the more escalatory or destabilizing as- the strategic conditions under which pects of militarized competition. The the next round of militarized interac- stationing of weapons in orbit, in par- tion in space will take place differ very ticular, will remain a distinct and per- considerably from those of the Cold haps more manageable concern. That War competition, and in ways that said, the re-emergence of strategic indicate a much greater potential for rivalries between several of the great conflict escalation. powers and the persistence of rivalry in other settings indicate a heighten- Of course, space has been an arena of ing of competition in the near- and geostrategic antagonism and jostling medium-term that any existing or from the very inception of human proposed mechanisms of governance orbital activities. Throughout the first are unlikely to prevent. half of the period since 1957, when

70 VULNERABLE FRONTIER the civil and military utilization of limited conflicts. It was thus expected space began in earnest, great-power that, should attacks on spacecraft ever relations were dominated by an en- occur, they would almost immedi- trenched militarized rivalry between ately be eclipsed by far more serious two largely incompatible systems of events. government. However, alone among the environments into which humans It was only during the 1991 Gulf have extended their economic and War that the current paradigm of military reach, space has never seen a space operations in support of con- direct military clash between hostile ventional force deployments began political actors. This outcome might to take hold. In the quarter-century be seen as an encouraging sign of the that followed, the contribution of great powers’ ability to regulate their space-based services to conventional interactions even in the absence of military operations has increased to comprehensive space governance or, at the point of becoming the chief rai- the very least, to successfully ‘muddle son d’être of space power, with other through’. It appears increasingly un- advanced military forces clearly seek- likely, however, that this run of good ing to emulate the US in this regard. fortune will hold indefinitely. As a result of these developments, the perspective of potential ASAT A strong case can be made to the effect users on space denial operations has that space conflict during the Cold changed completely. Far from being a War was of limited importance be- prelude to an all-out nuclear assault, cause it was viewed almost exclusively space warfare is now seen primarily as through the prism of space systems’ a means of denying information sup- intimate association with the strategic port and C2 to the opponent’s con- nuclear balance. Throughout the bi- ventional forces, thereby depriving polar standoff, satellites were utilized them of vital force multipliers. Such mainly for strategic command and considerations are particularly promi- control (C2), early warning, and re- nent in the warfighting concepts of connaissance. As a result of this close armed forces that view the highly integration of space and the nuclear space-enabled and space-dependent sphere, attacks on spacecraft were gen- US military as a likely opponent. erally seen as a corollary of, or prelude to, full-scale nuclear war, and consid- As a matter of fact, concerns about erably less attention was paid to space US conventional military superiority warfare as a serious issue during more have been the main driver behind the

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renewed interest in anti-satellite capa- to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. bilities. Attempts at offsetting the US It was only in the aftermath of Chi- advantage in space – and thereby di- na’s much-noted shoot-down of its minishing the US armed forces’ over- Fengyun-1C weather satellite in early all margin of superiority in a future 2007, however, that the issue began conflict – are now quite prominent to reenter the public consciousness. It in Chinese and Russian conceptions was this rather dramatic event, which of future warfare, and are manifest- drew a thinly-veiled US riposte in the ing themselves in a number of devel- destruction of the defunct USA-193 opment programs and tests not seen reconnaissance satellite in an ASAT since the 1980s. With space warfare test known as Operation Burnt Frost gaining currency in the doctrinal de- in February 2008, which reestab- bates of some of the world’s most ca- lished the prospect of space warfare as pable armed forces, other nations are a prominent global security concern. beginning to take an interest in military counter-space options as well. In the eight years that have passed since the Fengyung intercept, a The remarkable rebirth of ASAT wealth of evidence has emerged that In retrospect, the developments that points to renewed efforts by several of placed space warfare back on the the great powers to develop a capac- agenda of great power politics were ity for effective space denial by both the direction taken by the Chinese kinetic and non-kinetic means. Of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its these, China’s development of the di- modernization drive, which finally be- rect-ascent missile system, known as gan to gather some steam in the early the SC-19, which was first observed 2000s, and the US decision in 2002 in two non-destructive tests in 2005

72 VULNERABLE FRONTIER and 2006, and also employed in the geostationary orbits. Meanwhile, the 2007 destructive test, has understand- GPS constellation in medium-earth ably received the greatest amount of orbits is generally considered relative- public attention. Four additional tests ly robust, due to its distributed na- with a suspected ASAT background ture. Bringing the system to its knees have been reported in 2010, 2013, and for an extended period of time would most recently in July 2014. According require the coordinated expenditure to one notable technical analysis, one of perhaps a dozen or more weapons, of two tests observed in 2013 may which would almost certainly draw an have utilized a more advanced missile extremely robust – possibly nuclear – and reached much deeper into space response from the US. than did earlier tests, with an apogee in excess of 10,000 kilometers. The same In addition to its direct-ascent, hit- may have been true of the test report- to-kill system (or systems), China is ed in 2014. Should the PLA be able also reported to be testing systems for to consolidate such an extended-range co-orbital attack. This is based on the capability, it will be able to threaten a observation of a number of unusual much greater number of satellites than maneuvers by satellites Shiyan-7, Shi- has hitherto been the case. jian-15, and Chuangxin-3, which are thought to have begun in July 2013. One significant feature of theSC -19 The exact extent and implications system is that it has been tested in a of this additional path to an ASAT road-mobile configuration, which capability are currently difficult to points to the development of an op- fathom. Moreover, the PLA is known erationally credible and survivable ca- to also have engaged in the ‘dazzling’ pability that may already be deployed or ‘blinding’ of US imaging satellites in small numbers with the Second by means of terrestrial laser systems, Artillery Force (SAF), which also has and has likely acquired GPS jammers, responsibility for the land-based com- which can be effective in protecting ponent of China’s nuclear deterrent. critical installations from certain types Even a few SC-19s could do consid- of precision-guided munitions (PGM). erable damage to selected high-value It may also be developing a range of military assets in low-earth orbits, and other space warfare techniques based the same could be true of the extend- on microwave, electronic attack, and ed-range system purportedly tested in cyberspace capabilities. Given the 2013 and 2014 if it is targeted against considerable breadth and depth of relatively vulnerable constellations in its space warfare programs, the PLA’s

73 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 activities are currently the main driver defense system, which Moscow per- of a burgeoning arms dynamic in this ceives as a potential threat to its nu- area of strategic interaction. clear deterrent, as well as by Chinese and US ASAT testing. The most recent The US, meanwhile, is not known example of such activities is what may to be operating or developing dedi- amount to a reactivation of the co-or- cated anti-satellite weapons, which is bital attack programs that constituted explained in part by the much lower the backbone of Soviet space warfare dependence on space-based services of during the Cold War. According to even the most capable among its poten- media reports, a satellite launched tial opponents. The US military does, in May 2014 and known as Cos- however, field several types of missile mos-2499 has been engaging in unu- defense interceptors, some of which sual approach maneuvers that may are inherently dual-use capable, as constitute a series of ASAT-related was successfully demonstrated in Op- tests. Russia has also maintained and eration Burnt Frost. Its ballistic missile recently updated the ground-based defense (BMD) programs thus provide sensors that used to support its co- the US with what is probably the most orbital attack programs. In addition extensive and most widely distributed to its traditional focus on co-orbital ASAT potential among the great pow- attack, Russia may be reviving its air- ers. However, the reach of this arsenal launched Kontakt system as well as an is currently limited to low Earth orbits. airborne laser that could be employed Moreover, while the BMD and anti- to temporarily dazzle, and perhaps satellite missions are fundamentally even permanently disable, satellites in very similar, and satellites are much low Earth orbit. Russia is also a leading less operationally demanding targets, manufacturer of GPS jammers, which substantial technical modifications are it has exported to various countries. nonetheless required to realize the latent ASAT potential of these systems. Another significant military power It is therefore fair to say that the US that is known to possess at least a la- does not routinely field space weapons tent direct-ascent ASAT program is as part of its global defense strategy. India. The Indian armed forces are currently working towards a layered The Russian Federation is also report- missile defense system and have so far edly engaging in a variety of space war- conducted at least seven tests, which fare activities, driven in large part by may have provided sufficient know- US insistence on a continental missile how to conduct an ASAT mission

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with relative ease. India is not current- similar to that of the US. France and ly known to be developing or fielding a Israel are both nuclear powers with dedicated capability, but is sure to keep considerable military stakes in space, a close watch on China’s activities in although it would appear that neither this area, given its own growing stakes is critically dependent on space-based in outer space, its unresolved territo- C2 or early warning for the integrity rial disputes with that country, and a of its deterrent. However, even in the potential for serious geostrategic com- absence of such dependence, these petition in the Indian Ocean. states may come to decide that an ASAT capability of some kind is de- Other nations that currently possess sirable for symmetrical deterrence of the technical prerequisites for direct- threats to their spacecraft. In addition ascent or co-orbital attack systems and to these established space powers, the could field such systems within years proliferation of satellite, launch sys- of a political decision to do so include tem, and precision-guidance technol- Japan, Israel, and France. In fact, Ja- ogies means that a growing number pan’s deep involvement in the Aegis of states will possess latent space war- BMD program means that it is already fare capabilities in the future. They in possession of a latent capability will most likely include Pakistan,

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Iran, Turkey, South Korea, and North joint operations and operational com- Korea, and possibly additional actors mand and control. Chinese planners like Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine. view US space assets as important enablers of US military superiority, ASAT and counter-ASAT in and being both vital and vulnerable, great-power military planning they are seen as highly attractive and, While a number of actors possess mo- indeed, natural targets for any serious bilized or latent ASAT potentials, only anti-access strategy. the US, China, and the Russian Fed- eration are known to be integrating As a result, the PLA is preparing to these potentials, or military options target US satellites at the outset of a of dealing with enemy potentials, into conflict to partially equalize what is their war planning. While Russian still a seriously skewed balance of mil- doctrinal statements have generally itary power in the Asia-Pacific region. focused on the threat posed by oppo- One must assume that PLA planners nents’ space warfare capabilities to its are aware of the escalatory implica- own strategic warning and C2 assets tions of any such move, but it appears as well as on the possibility of deploy- that this has not led them to rule out ing ASAT weaponry against the space- such a course of action, which could based elements of a US ballistic mis- provide substantial advantages once sile defense system, many more details war initiation is perceived as inevita- are known about the emerging Sino- ble. It is, however, likely that the PLA American interactions in this area. would seek to keep the use of kinetic weaponry to an unavoidable mini- From a Chinese perspective, space mum, to forestall unnecessary escala- warfare is perceived as a critical ele- tion as well as excessive international ment of a ‘counter-intervention’ or opprobrium, and perhaps to retain peripheral defense strategy designed to this most extreme option as part of a deny US military forces access to Chi- strategy of intra-war deterrence. This na’s immediate maritime environment is particularly likely as non-kinetic in event of a conflict over Taiwan or alternatives including electronic at- other vital Chinese interests. Given tacks, cyber-attacks, and reversible the PLA’s sustained investment in this laser or microwave attacks may be strategy, the creation of such an ex- available in many cases. One can also clusion zone is now no longer an idle expect that Chinese reluctance to threat, even though serious deficits are escalate immediately to a kinetic ex- thought to persist in areas including change would increase further as the

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PLA itself becomes more dependent or advanced payloads, this state of af- on space-based services as well. fairs may well persist into the 2030s. To offset the current vulnerability of It is much less clear, however, that arti- the nation’s military posture, planners ficial ‘firebreaks’ instituted and tacitly may opt to counter or even preempt or explicitly communicated at the out- Chinese initiatives with early attacks set of a conflict would hold asUS and of their own that would have to be Chinese forces engage in high-inten- directed against some of the most sity, conventional exchanges, suffering threatening capabilities and installa- grievous losses and progressive disruptions, which would generally be situ- tion of essential services and capabili- ated on the Chinese mainland. ties. It is also unclear whether space systems employed in support of con- One of the more worrisome aspects of ventional forces can be distinguished the US doctrinal debate is the sugges- from systems that are entangled in the tion, which has gained some traction strategic nuclear deterrent with suffi- in recent years, of using conventional cient clarity to avoid, at a minimum, prompt strike weaponry to disable the the impression of a coordinated and PLA’s most threatening ASAT systems sustained attack on the opponent’s before they can be brought to bear nuclear forces. In some cases, includ- against vulnerable US satellites. While ing infrared sensors deployed for early such attack options are not currently warning, which would likely also be available, the reliance on missile-based employed to locate conventional mis- prompt strike during the early hours sile batteries, this would be next to of a conflict would further compress impossible. Overall, even a Chinese decision-making timelines and create strategy of highly selective space war- ‘use-or-lose’ dilemmas on both sides fare could trigger escalation to the nu- of the equation. The implications of clear level. such developments for crisis management and conventional first-strike Such a dynamic could be compound- stability could be grave, and cross- ed by current US military planning, domain linkages including to cyber- which also exhibits some highly of- space and the nuclear sphere are sure fensive traits and which must contend to complicate political and military with the inherent vulnerability of vital decision-making even further. assets. Given the tense fiscal environment and the timelines for fielding On the other hand, the development new and more survivable platforms of viable alternatives to space-based

77 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 services and of doctrinal constructs for the prevention of space conflict may operations in space-denied environ- depend on the recognition of mutual ments could serve to reduce the incen- vulnerability in space, and the inter- tives for early attacks on space or coun- nalization of a sense of shared inter- ter-space systems on both sides of the est in avoiding worst-case outcomes. confrontation. Hence, the current vul- While there are obvious similarities to nerability of space-based services might the nuclear sphere, the situation with provide sufficient impetus for change regard to the space environment is to avoid some of the more destabilizing complicated by several factors. implications of the renewed interest in the means and methods of space war- First, the consequences of a kinetic fare, and may eventually lead to closer exchange in space are not very well consultation between the great powers. understood, and the proposition that catastrophic damage to orbital infra- Robust deterrence or fragile state structures would be the most likely of non-aggression? outcome of such an exchange is not Ultimately, however, the avoidance of universally accepted. Consequently, the more destructive forms of space the exact degree of vulnerability and warfare would seem to require not just the likely ramifications of a military the successful management of succes- clash remain a matter of debate. sive crises as they emerge, but ultimate- While few analysts would deny that ly the institution of stable deterrence re- unrestrained space warfare would lationships between the main parties to entail serious collateral damage, the this burgeoning competition. This will ‘crystal ball effect’ that is associated depend in part on the effective com- with nuclear weapons is not nearly as munication of deterrent threats, based clear-cut with regard to space warfare. both on denial (the ability to negate This raises the possibility that some the opponent’s initiatives, for example decision-makers may calculate that by creating sufficient redundancies and the political aftershocks and econom- being able to operate effectively even in ic costs of waging war in space will be the absence of space support) as well as commensurate with the advantages punishment (the ability to impose un- gained by crossing this threshold. The acceptable cost by inflicting symmetri- total absence or very low number of cal or asymmetrical damage). human casualties constitutes another fundamental difference between nu- Even more than on these well-known clear and space warfare, and may serve elements of a credible deterrent strategy, to underline such considerations.

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Secondly, the availability of non-ki- factors cited above change the funda- netic options and the possibility, at mental fact that the human presence least in some scenarios and with some in space is comparatively fragile and proposed technologies, of achieving will continue to be vulnerable to dis- kinetic effects while keeping environ- ruption as a result of military conflict. mental damage to a minimum would All of them, however, might make it lower the initial threshold for attacks more difficult to avoid such conflict against space systems even further. in the long run. Overall, then, despite While a space conflict, once joined, some striking similarities, deterrence may still spiral out of control, result- relationships based on mutual vulner- ing in massive damage to civil and well ability are bound to be significantly as military infrastructures, initial mili- less robust in space than is the case in tary steps may not suggest that such an the nuclear field. outcome is likely. This would also tend to undermine any shared perceptions Managing vulnerability in the new of vulnerability. era of rivalry Fortunately, a number of options Finally, future technological develop- are nonetheless available for hedging ments may increase the actors’ ability against the ramifications of conflict, to reconstitute the space environment and many of these would also serve by removing some (though certainly to render space warfare a less attrac- not all) debris, increasing the robust- tive course of action. A first line of ness of space systems, or rendering effort would involve the supplemen- them more easily replaceable. Such tation or partial replacement of space- developments would also tend to based systems with terrestrially based, make kinetic attacks a more palat- airborne, or near-space systems for able option. In addition, some types communication, positioning, and of debris removal capabilities may other critical applications. While this also have an inherent dual-use ASAT would not solve the basic problem of potential. The introduction of space- vulnerability in space, it would create based strike weapons for use against redundancies, reduce the effectiveness terrestrial targets, which also remains of space denial programs, and serve to a possibility, would add a further layer partially deflect the military competi- of complications. tion from the space arena. States could also seek to reduce the reliance of While the case for mutual vulnerability their civilian and military activities on in space can be overstated, none of the space-based assets wherever possible,

79 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2015 which would diminish – though cer- additional actors from entering into tainly not eliminate – the impact of competition. Finally, increased space any future disruptions. situational awareness would increase the risk of cheating on any existing A second line of effort would rely on or future agreements, especially if it more technical approaches designed were to be provided by a multilateral to mitigate particularly destabilizing agency. aspects of militarized competition through targeted confidence- and se- Despite the considerable potential of curity-building measures, and perhaps such targeted mitigation measures, eventually more robust arms control the possibility that space may yet be- agreements. A moratorium or ban on come the scene of military conflict counter-space weapon testing would will undoubtedly remain, and the be extremely useful during the earlier essential fact of civil as well as mili- stages of a competition, but may be tary vulnerability is likely to persist difficult to achieve in practice. As is of- well into the future. Given that a sta- ten the case in arms control processes, ble sense of mutual vulnerability is a slow, deliberate, and incremental ap- unlikely to emerge in the short run, proach may offer the greatest chances and may not hold in the long run, the of success. While they would severely re-emergence of serious space rivalries hamper vertical as well as horizontal is a cause for concern, both for es- proliferation, these measures would tablished space powers and for small leave in place existing capabilities and states that depend on space-based ser- would entail significant verification vices provided by others. For better challenges. Non-proliferation mea- or worse, the coming decade may be sures, including more stringent export decisive in shaping the future of our controls on dual-use goods and tech- tenuous presence along this vulnera- nologies, may (or may not) prevent ble frontier.