The Anti- Satellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System

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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011 The Anti- Satellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System

— BY LAURA GREGO

In early 2008, President Bush tasked U.S. based missile defense system. After a few days done so since 1982.2 This unofficial morato- Strategic Command with Operation Burnt of waiting out rough seas, on February 20, the rium had been recently broken by China in Frost: “mitigating” the threat posed by a non- U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class cruiser Lake Erie 2007, when it destroyed its own aging responsive intelligence satellite that was soon launched an SM-3 missile which intercepted weather satellite at 800 km altitude. The Bush to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. USA-193 the USA-193 satellite. administration had withdrawn from the Anti- had been launched into orbit just over a year While framed as a public safety measure, Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and expressed earlier, and its fate was sealed after the Na- some observers expressed skepticism that this interest in a range of new military uses for tional Reconnaissance Office was unable to risk was the real or entire motivation for the space, including space-based weapons and establish control over the satellite after launch. exercise. The interception, at an altitude of anti-satellite weapons. Just a week before Op- While the imminent re-entry of a satellite was 240 kilometers (km), vividly demonstrated eration Burnt Frost was carried out, China not in itself at all remarkable—70 tons of the ASAT capability of the U.S. Aegis sea- and Russia had circulated to the Conference space debris and scores of large objects drop based missile defense system. The intercept on Disarmament a draft treaty that would out of orbit each year without any casualty required only modification of the system ban putting weapons in space and using force and without any operations mounted in re- software,1 and could have been done from any against satellites.3 The United States re- sponse—administration officials expressed of the 5 cruisers or 16 destroyers equipped sponded with little interest, saying that there concern that leftover hydrazine fuel aboard with the Aegis system at the time (two de- was no need for arms control in space.4 the satellite might survive re-entry and hurt stroyers were slated to be backups to the USS Operation Burnt Frost, in turn, is impor- someone on the ground. Lake Erie). tant context for the announcement eighteen On February 14, 2008, General James The context is important. This was the months later of the Obama administration’s Cartwright announced the United States first time the United States had deliberately new plans for European missile defense, the would destroy the satellite using the Aegis sea- destroyed a satellite since 1985; Russia hadn’t Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).

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This new PAA plan replaced the maneuver (“divert capability”). Both Block I and the recently shuttered Airborne Laser, George W. Bush administrations’ plan that interceptors have a reported burnout velocity of also have intrinsic anti-satellite capability.9 aimed to protect European allies from 3.0-3.5 km/s. The Block IIA will have longer The GMD interceptors could reach nearly missile threats in the Middle East using range and a seeker with better discrimination any satellite in low earth orbit (LEO). powerful ground-based interceptors in and more divert capability. The Block IIA inter- The SM-3 is designed to intercept Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. ceptors are expected to burnout at a velocity 45- warheads in the midcourse phase of flight, PAA would rely on and substantially ex- 50percent faster than the Block I missiles, so in when they are above the atmosphere. The pand and improve the Aegis missile de- the range of 4.5 to 5.5 km/s.5 The Block IIB kill vehicle carries its own fuel for maneu- vering as well as an infrared sensor. The fense system used in Operation Burnt interceptor is still in the conceptual stage, but is sensor is intended to guide the interceptor Frost and demonstrated to have anti- meant to engage intercontinental-range ballistic toward an object and allow it to home in satellite capability. missiles and to have yet higher propulsion. It on and destroy the target by direct impact, may be land-based only. or “kinetic kill.” The Phased Adaptive The plan is to make all versions of the SM-3 Because midcourse missile defense Approach to European missile able to be launched from the launch systems are intended to destroy ballistic tubes on the Aegis ships. Missile Defense missile warheads, which travel at speeds Also important is the development of more and altitudes comparable to those of satel- sensors and the capability of the Aegis ships and The PAA system’s much smaller SM-3 lites, such defense systems also have ASAT sites to perform “launch on remote,” the ability interceptors are to be based primarily at sea capabilities. In fact, while the technologies to launch on the cue from a sensor not on the on Aegis ships converted to the purpose as being developed for long-range missile ship. This will allow the interceptors to launch defenses might not prove very effective well as some land-based “Aegis ashore” from a greater range. This capability was first against ballistic missiles—for example, sites. It is meant to be flexible and address introduced to the Aegis system after Operation because of countermeasure problems in- emerging ballistic missile threats from the Burnt Frost and will now become standard. herent in midcourse missile defense—they Middle East over the coming decade. It could be far more effective against satel- will be improved incrementally, in four Missile Defenses as ASAT Weapons lites. phases. The current generation of the SM- In many ways, attacking satellites is an 3 missiles, Block 1, will eventually be aug- easier task than defending against ballistic mented with longer-range, more sophisti- While Operation Burnt Frost was the first time the United States used a missile defense system missiles. Satellites travel in repeated, pre- cated missiles. More ships would be outfit- to destroy an orbiting satellite, the United States dictable orbits that ground facilities can ted with new missiles and new and im- has for years had some intrinsic ASAT capability accurately determine by tracking them. An proved sensors added. Land-based sites in its existing missile defense programs. Both the attacker would have time to plan an attack would be added starting in 2015. Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area against a satellite, could choose the time of Currently, only the Block IA variant Defense (THAAD) missile defense systems the attack in advance, and would be able to of the SM-3 missile is deployed. The Block were considered during the preparation of Op- take as many shots as necessary to destroy IB interceptors, currently under testing eration Burnt Frost,7 although THAAD, like it whereas advance notice of a ballistic and development, are based on the same 3- the SM-3 Block 1 systems, would be useful only missile attack is unlikely. In addition, an stage booster missile as the Block IA mis- against the lowest altitude satellites. interceptor attacking a satellite would not sile, but the Block IB kill vehicle will have The U.S. Ground Based Midcourse (GMD) have to contend with the same counter- sensors that can image the target at two missile defense system with a total of 30 de- measure10 problems that a midcourse mis- ployed interceptors in Alaska and California8 wavelengths and increased capability to sile defense system would face.

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Countermeasures can severely limit the below the inclination angle) twice a day. Since the vast majority of LEO satellites (see Fig- ability of a midcourse missile defense to de- an attacker could choose the timing and ge- ure 2).11 Interceptors with burnout speeds at fend against ballistic missiles: warheads and ometry, the attack can be mounted when the the high range of estimates for the SM-3 IIA lightweight decoys move on the same trajec- satellite is overhead and the missile defense (5.5 km/s) would be able to reach any satel- tories in the vacuum of space, and the inter- interceptor may therefore use its velocity to lite in LEO, as would GMD interceptors. ceptor’s onboard sensor or ground-based reach the highest altitude possible rather than radars would be unable to distinguish these to reach out laterally. A rough estimation of PAA as a Strategic ASAT decoys from the warhead. An attacker can the maximum altitude an interceptor can Weapons System release numerous decoys along with the war- reach may be calculated by setting the kinetic head in order to confuse the missile defenses energy of the interceptor at burnout (when While the United States has long had ASAT or exhaust them by forcing them to intercept the missile ceases powered flight) to the po- capability in its missile defense systems, the all the decoys along with the warheads. tential energy at the given altitude. PAA system as conceived is ASAT capability Operation Burnt Frost showed that The current Aegis interceptors SM-3 IA/ on a much different scale. The enormous SM-3 interceptors can successfully intercept IB can reach only the relatively few satellites in potential size of the capability is new. While satellites if they can be reached. LEO satel- orbits with perigees at or below 600 km alti- the projected inventory of Block II SM-3 lites are generally in highly inclined or nearly tude. However, even using a conservative es- interceptors is modest—there are 29 Block polar orbits, and their orbits will take them timate of the burnout speed (4.5 km/s), SM-3 IIA interceptors and an undefined number over any given region on earth (with latitude Block IIA interceptors would be able to reach

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of SM-3 IIB interceptors planned for 2020, nificant portion of either China’s or Russia’s While some may describe the capability as Aegis warships are capable of carrying large low earth orbiting satellites, particularly if “latent,” it has been clearly demonstrated in numbers of interceptors—cruisers have 122 the numbers of Block II interceptors is in- Operation Burnt Frost. At the same time, launch tubes and destroyers have 90 or 96 creased or it is considered in concert with international law treating the interference or each.12 This would support a large scaling- GMD. destruction of satellites is only very weakly up. Block II interceptors are designed to fit Another important point is that the elaborated. in all launch tubes. PAA system is highly mobile. The 43 Some restraints on using the PAA sys- The number of ASAT-capable SM-3 planned Aegis ships could be positioned tem as an ASAT weapon do exist. Opera- missiles can be scaled up and their configu- optimally to stage a “sweep” attack on a set tion Burnt Frost required a modification of ration changed more rapidly and less expen- of satellites nearly at once, rather than a the missile defense software in order to per- sively than the GBI sequential form the ASAT intercept and this report- missiles. While set of at- edly will not become a standard option. GBI interceptors t a c k s a s However, no formal U.S. policy exists that cost about $70 s a t e l l i t e s renounces deploying this option, either, and million each, the The PAA system is moved into other countries will assume that this change estimated pro- r a n g e o f could readily be made to give any Aegis curement cost for highly mobile. The fixed inter- interceptor the ability to intercept satellites. each SM-3 Block ceptor sites. Additionally, the United States is IIA missile is $20- 43 planned Aegis This posi- clearly aware of the debris consequences of 24 million. While t i o n i n g using kinetic energy interceptors to destroy locating a new GBI ships could be po- flexibility satellites. For example, the destruction of a missile site in a also means single 10-ton satellite could by itself double different location sitioned optimally t h a t t h e the total amount of large debris currently in would take greater SM-3 mis- low earth orbit.14 This is a major reason than five years for siles would why the United States prefers non- construction, the to stage a “sweep” not have to destructive ASAT options. It is therefore sea-based SM-3 e x p e n d unlikely to use the PAA as an ASAT missiles can be attack on a set of m u c h o f weapon simply to signal intent or in any readily moved to their thrust situation outside of a major conflict. th e th e ater in satellites nearly at going cross- But the existence of this capability also which they are range and makes significantly less likely the possibility needed.13 once. could retain that other countries will also refrain from This poten- the ability building such systems. The hit-to-kill inter- tially large ASAT capability can be com- to reach the highest LEO satellites. (The cept technology used by China for its January pared to the satellite inventory of the two more powerful GMD interceptors also 2007 satellite destruction was apparently heaviest space users after the United States, could use some of their fuel to reach out developed as a system that could be used which owns just shy of half of actively oper- laterally over thousands of kilometers, al- either for ballistic missile defense or ASAT ating LEO satellites. Satellites stationed in lowing them to hit satellites in orbits that attacks. It is likely that China’s first ballistic LEO perform important civil and military do not pass directly over the GMD missile missile defense test on January 11, 2010, used functions; this is where most earth- fields in Alaska and California.) this same technology.15 India is also develop- observing, reconnaissance and signals intel- ing a hit-to-kill ballistic missile defense sys- ligence, and weather satellites orbit. Table 3 The Way Forward tem which could also serve an ASAT role. shows the number of actively operating Long-standing restraint regarding such sys- Chinese and Russian satellites in low-earth While the primary purpose of the PAA tems has been weakened. orbits. China has a total of 49 and Russia system is not ASAT, as conceived it will be The Aegis-based missile defense system 43. (The United States owns 230 LEO sat- the largest destructive ASAT capability ever is also likely to be owned by other countries ellites.) The PAA system as it gets to Phase 3 fielded and can hold a significant portion of besides the United States. The Aegis system’s and 4 (see Table 1) could hold at risk a sig- any other space actor’s space assets at risk. interceptor technology is being codeveloped

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Intercept prior to the potential deploy- ment of multiple warheads or penetra- tion aids –the principal reason often cited for EI – requires Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deploy- ment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.

While the study cites other capability- enhancing or cost-reducing scenarios that the longer-range interceptors could provide, the authors cede that successful operation of midcourse missile defense requires address- ing the as-yet-unsolved countermeasures problem.19 And the Block II missiles do not do so. While the SM-3 Block II missiles will not solve the countermeasures problem by providing an early intercept capability, they could still have a theoretical capability to intercept Russian and Chinese long-range missiles; this can complicate Russian and Chinese reductions in nuclear weapons.20 Limiting the allowed burnout speed of the SM-3 missiles would therefore not sacrifice any new capability, and would also avoid the and operated by Japan, and Japan is modify- and are focused instead on creating norms problems that deploying an unlikely-to-being all six of its Aegis destroyers with the of behavior. (Even the Russian-Chinese used but still provocative ASAT system updated Aegis BMD system. In June 2011, draft treaty on space weapons does not re- would. Japan agreed in principle to the export of strict ground-based missile defenses.) The space environment needs more the codeveloped SM-3 Block IIA missile to Few limits or guidelines exist on tech- protection, satellites face growing risks, and other countries,16 clearing the way for the nologies suited to ASAT use and devising space activities continue to be a potential expected sale of the Aegis BMD system to effective limits on them becomes increas- source of mistrust and tension. Making additional users, including several European ingly difficult as more weapons are devel- significant progress requires making countries as well as South Korea and oped and tested and more countries develop forward-looking choices. Australia.17 Given the intrinsic ASAT capa- policy rationales and military doctrine for bility of this system, the United States using them. Serious efforts to strengthen should review carefully its plans to sell this them should be put forth by all spacefaring Dr. Laura Grego is the Senior Scien- capability to other countries. nations; such discussions have not taken tist in the Global Security Program At the same time, the United States is place for many years. of the Union of Concerned Scientists. grappling with what to do to address its In addition to strengthening the legal outstanding space security issues. The Na- and normative framework, space security She focuses on the technology and tional Security Space Strategy outlines a requires thoughtful limits on the most dan- policy implications of space weapons strategy for protecting U.S. interests in gerous technology. One way to address the and is primarily concerned with safe- space, including supporting the develop- inherent ASAT capability of the PAA is to guarding the secure and equitable use ment of norms of responsible behavior for restrict the burnout velocity of the deployed of space. She is the co-author of Se- space-faring nations, and increasing the SM-3 missiles and to discontinue the Block curing the Skies and The Physics of ability of the U.S. military to continue to II program. Space Security. Before joining UCS, operate despite interference with its satel- A primary rationale for the high-speed lites by an adversary.18 The United States is Block II interceptors is to enable “early in- Grego was a postdoctoral researcher engaging in diplomatic initiatives such as tercept”—the capability to intercept the at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center the effort to create an International Code of attacking missiles after their launcher burns for Astrophysics. She earned a doctor- Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the out (post-“boost phase”) but before they are ate degree in experimental physics at United Nations Group of Governmental able to release countermeasures. However, the California Institute of Technol- Experts forum on confidence-building and the Defense Science Board, in an unclassi- ogy and a bachelor of science degree transparency measures to improve space fied summary of its report on early intercept security and sustainability. However, none states that: in physics and astronomy at the Uni- of these efforts yet imagine restrictions on versity of Michigan. “hardware” like missile defense interceptors,

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REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 It is unlikely these software changes were significant and likely just provided infrared signatures of a satellite for the seeker and eliminated any instructions to ignore satellites. General Cartwright said in a press briefing that the physical modifications were instrumentation; this is presumably to provide information about the test. “Destruction of Spy Satellite.” February 21, 2008. C-SPAN, c-spanvideo.org.

2 In 1982, the Soviet Union conducted its last test of its Co-Orbital antisatellite weapon. In 1985, the United States destroyed an aging weather satellite using a direct-ascent kinetic kill interceptor launched from an F-15 airplane. Grego, L. “A History of Anti-satellite Programs” January 2012. Union of Concerned Scien- tists.

3 Russia and China introduced their draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” on February 12, 2008. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/wgroup/PAROS-PPWT-factsheet.pdf The treaty forbids “hostile action against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.”

4 Christina Rocca, U.S. ambassador to the CD, told the delegates in Geneva on February 13, 2007, that “we continue to believe that there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for arms control to solve.” Statement delivered to the United Nations’ Conference of Disarmament on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Geneva, February 13. Online at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/Feb13USA.pdf.

5 O’Rourke, Ronald. “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.” December 22, 2011. Congressional Research Service. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf , accessed Feb. 1, 2012.

6 Ibid.

7 At an April 23, 2008, hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, General Henry Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, testified as follows: “It took us a couple weeks to analyze, and it turned out that both the ground-based midcourse THAAD and the Aegis all had capability, if they were modified, to go do this mission [to shoot down the failed USA 193]. The Aegis was the easiest to modify and also represented the most flexibility and the minimum impact to our program overall.”

8 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Fact Sheet. Missile Defense Agency. Accessed February 1, 2012. http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/gmdfacts.pfd

9 Wright, D. and Grego, L. “Anti-Satellite Capabilities of Planned U.S. Missile Defense Systems.” Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No. 68, December 2002-January 2003.

10 For an extensive discussion of countermeasures to midcourse missile defenses, see A. Sessler et al., Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effec- tiveness of the Planned U.S. National Missile Defense System, April 2000, Union of Concerned Scientists.

11 The satellite information comes from the UCS Satellite Database, January 2012 edition. Available at http://ucsusa.org/satellites.

12 The number of launch tubes depends on how many cells were used to host loading cranes.

13 O’Rourke, Ronald. “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.” December 22, 2011. Congressional Research Service. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf , accessed Feb. 1, 2012.

14 See Wright, D. “Space Debris.” Physics Today. Vol. 60, No. 10, October 2007, pp. 35-30.

15 See Jacobs, A., and J. Ansfield. 2010. “With defense test, China shows displeasure of U.S.” New York Times, January 12. See also the blog post and the references therein at China’s missile defense interceptor program: An independent Chinese analysis. Online at http://thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/2010/01/chinas-missile-defense-interceptor.html, accessed on September 19, 2010. 16 Japan requires three conditions for the export—that third-party recipients of the technology have appropriate domestic systems for export control and information integrity, that they are members of international frameworks on these matters, and that the transfer benefits Japan’s security, though it is not clear by what proc- ess these conditions are determined to be met.

17 O’Rourke, Ronald. “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.” December 22, 2011. Congressional Research Service. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf , accessed Feb. 1, 2012.

18 Text of the National Security Space Strategy and related documents are available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/

19 The Defense Science Board study states that “Although not analyzed in detail during the course of the study, it is clear that the successful operations [of cost-effective ballistic missile defense] is predicated on an ability to discriminate (in the exo atmosphere) the missile warhead(s) from other pieces of the offensive missile complex, such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware, and intentional countermeasures. The importance of achieving reliable midcourse discrimination cannot be overemphasized.”

20 Butt, Y. and Postol T. Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense. Federation of American Scientists Special Report No. 1, September 2011.

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