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Exo-Atmospheric Intercepts: Bringing New Challenges to Standard Missile
G. A. SULLINS Exo-atmospheric Intercepts: Bringing New Challenges to Standard Missile Gary A. Sullins The Navy Theater Wide System is being designed to provide defense for U.S. forces and our Allies against medium- to long-range tactical ballistic missiles. As part of this system, a new variant of Standard Missile, SM-3, will be introduced to the Fleet. SM-3 will perform a hit-to-kill intercept of the ballistic missile while it is in exo-atmospheric flight (i.e., while outside the Earth’s atmosphere). Exo-atmospheric flight and hit-to-kill intercepts have brought new challenges to the SM Program. These challenges have intro- duced new technologies, which in turn have created the need for new tests to be added to an already robust SM ground test program. This article discusses these new challenges and describes tests geared to verify SM-3 design, with emphasis given to those tests performed at APL. INTRODUCTION The threat of ballistic missile attacks to U.S. forces and the ability of the combat system to engage them and our Allies continues to grow. Currently over 40 by guiding the missile to an intercept. Modifications are nations have the capability to launch ballistic missile being made to the AWS to change the logic consistent attacks. Most of these missiles are not capable of reaching with tracking and engaging ballistic missiles rather than U.S. soil; nevertheless, they do pose a significant threat its traditional Anti-Air Warfare role. to our forces stationed overseas. Many of these nations In addition to modifications to the AWS, the NTW also have the ability to build chemical, biological, or System is developing a new SM variant, SM-3. -
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Weapons, Power, Communications, and Space Transportation CONTENTS Page Introduction
Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Weapons, Power, Communications, and Space Transportation CONTENTS Page Introduction . ......................105 5-6b. Boost and Post-Boost Kill Weapons . ..................,......105 Effectiveness (500 single-RV Kinetic-Energy Weapons (KEW) ....106 ICBMs atone site) . ...........117 Directed-Energy Weapons . .........123 5-7. Boost and Post-Boost Kill Power and Power Conditioning . ......142 Effectiveness (200 “medium- Space Power Requirements . ........142 bum-booster” ICBMs at one site). .............118 Space Power Generation Technology .143 5-8. Schematic of an Electromagnetic Power Conditioning . .. ..........145 Launcher (EML) or “Railgun” ..119 Communication Technology . .........146 5-9. Lightweight Homing Projectile. .l2l 60-GHz Communication Links .. ....147 5-10. Illustration of the Relationships Laser Communication Links . .......148 Between Laser Parameters and Space Transportation . ..............148 Power Density Projected on a Space Transportation Target . .............125 Requirements. ................149 5-11. FEL Waveforms . .............125 Space Transportation Alternatives ...149 5-12. Schematic of a Neutral Particle Space Transportation Cost Beam Weapon.. .............129 Reduction . ................153 5-13a. Annual Space Launch Capacity .152 Conclusions . ....................153 5-13b. Space Transportation . .........152 Weapon Technology Conclusions ....153 Space Power Conclusions. .........155 Tables Space Communications Conclusion. ..l55 Table No. Page Space Transportation -
LAYERED HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE a Strategy for Defending the United States
LAYERED HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE A Strategy for Defending the United States “Our fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life... A layered missile defense system will defend our homeland against missile attacks. ~ National Security Strategy, 2017 DEFENDING THE HOMELAND Defending the U.S. homeland is DoD’s number one objective. Rogue states seek to threaten the U.S. homeland with long-range ballistic missiles to coerce us, restrict our freedom of action, and undermine our resolve to defend allies and partners. A secure U.S. homeland allows us to defend our security interests, commit to the defense of others, resist coercion, and negotiate from a position of strength. THREATS TO THE HOMELAND Rogue state adversaries like North Korea and Iran seek dangerous capabilities, including long-range ballistic missiles that can threaten the U.S. homeland, support regional aggression, and deter potential U.S. responses. North Korea, despite repeated diplomatic engagements, is developing and testing nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could reach the U.S. homeland. Iran has demonstrated a space-launch capability that could lead to the development of an ICBM. These threats are likely to advance in capability and capacity by mid-decade and beyond, which is why President Trump stated, “We are committed to establishing a missile defense program that can shield every city in the United States. And we will never negotiate away our right to do this.” U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY U.S. missile defense policy recognizes the reality and enduring nature of these threats – plus the need to hedge against the uncertain nature of future threats. -
Outer Space in Russia's Security Strategy
Outer Space in Russia’s Security Strategy Nicole J. Jackson Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 64/2018 | August 2018 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 64/2018 2 The Simons Papers in Security and Development are edited and published at the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University. The papers serve to disseminate research work in progress by the School’s faculty and associated and visiting scholars. Our aim is to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the series should not limit subsequent publication in any other venue. All papers can be downloaded free of charge from our website, www.sfu.ca/internationalstudies. The series is supported by the Simons Foundation. Series editor: Jeffrey T. Checkel Managing editor: Martha Snodgrass Jackson, Nicole J., Outer Space in Russia’s Security Strategy, Simons Papers in Security and Development, No. 64/2018, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, August 2018. ISSN 1922-5725 Copyright remains with the author. Reproduction for other purposes than personal research, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), the title, the working paper number and year, and the publisher. Copyright for this issue: Nicole J. Jackson, nicole_jackson(at)sfu.ca. School for International Studies Simon Fraser University Suite 7200 - 515 West Hastings Street Vancouver, BC Canada V6B 5K3 Outer Space in Russia’s Security Strategy 3 Outer Space in Russia’s Security Strategy Simons Papers in Security and Development No. -
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 30, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33745 SUMMARY RL33745 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) September 30, 2021 Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Specialist in Naval Affairs Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there will be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.” The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts; what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. -
Design and Optimization of an Electromagnetic Railgun
Michigan Technological University Digital Commons @ Michigan Tech Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's Reports 2018 DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION OF AN ELECTROMAGNETIC RAILGUN Nihar S. Brahmbhatt Michigan Technological University, [email protected] Copyright 2018 Nihar S. Brahmbhatt Recommended Citation Brahmbhatt, Nihar S., "DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION OF AN ELECTROMAGNETIC RAILGUN", Open Access Master's Report, Michigan Technological University, 2018. https://doi.org/10.37099/mtu.dc.etdr/651 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etdr Part of the Controls and Control Theory Commons DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION OF AN ELECTROMAGNETIC RAIL GUN By Nihar S. Brahmbhatt A REPORT Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE In Electrical Engineering MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 2018 © 2018 Nihar S. Brahmbhatt This report has been approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE in Electrical Engineering. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Report Advisor: Dr. Wayne W. Weaver Committee Member: Dr. John Pakkala Committee Member: Dr. Sumit Paudyal Department Chair: Dr. Daniel R. Fuhrmann Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 7 Acknowledgments........................................................................................................... 8 List of Figures ................................................................................................................ -
House Bill No. 944
FIRST REGULAR SESSION HOUSE COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 944 101ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1836H.02C DANA RADEMAN MILLER, Chief Clerk AN ACT To repeal section 571.030, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof one new section relating to unlawful use of weapons, with penalty provisions. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Missouri, as follows: Section A. Section 571.030, RSMo, is repealed and one new section enacted in lieu 2 thereof, to be known as section 571.030, to read as follows: 571.030. 1. A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons, except as 2 otherwise provided by sections 571.101 to 571.121, if he or she knowingly: 3 (1) Carries concealed upon or about his or her person a knife, a firearm, a blackjack or 4 any other weapon readily capable of lethal use into any area where firearms are restricted under 5 section 571.107; [or] 6 (2) Sets a spring gun; [or] 7 (3) Discharges or shoots a firearm into a dwelling house, a railroad train, boat, aircraft, 8 or motor vehicle as defined in section 302.010, or any building or structure used for the 9 assembling of people; [or] 10 (4) Exhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of 11 lethal use in an angry or threatening manner; [or] 12 (5) Has a firearm or projectile weapon readily capable of lethal use on his or her person, 13 while he or she is intoxicated, and handles or otherwise uses such firearm or projectile weapon 14 in either a negligent or unlawful manner or discharges such firearm or projectile weapon unless 15 acting in self-defense; [or] 16 (6) Discharges a firearm within one hundred yards of any occupied schoolhouse, 17 courthouse, or church building; [or] EXPLANATION — Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted from the law. -
Space Weapons Earth Wars
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces. SpaceSpace WeaponsWeapons EarthEarth WarsWars Bob Preston | Dana J. Johnson | Sean J.A. Edwards Michael Miller | Calvin Shipbaugh Project AIR FORCE R Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. -
Space Almanac 2007
2007 Space Almanac The US military space operation in facts and figures. Compiled by Tamar A. Mehuron, Associate Editor, and the staff of Air Force Magazine 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2007 Space 0.05g 60,000 miles Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 22,300 miles Hard vacuum 1,000 miles Medium Earth Orbit begins 300 miles 0.95g 100 miles Low Earth Orbit begins 60 miles Astronaut wings awarded 50 miles Limit for ramjet engines 28 miles Limit for turbojet engines 20 miles Stratosphere begins 10 miles Illustration not to scale Artist’s conception by Erik Simonsen AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2007 75 US Military Missions in Space Space Support Space Force Enhancement Space Control Space Force Application Launch of satellites and other Provide satellite communica- Ensure freedom of action in space Provide capabilities for the ap- high-value payloads into space tions, navigation, weather infor- for the US and its allies and, plication of combat operations and operation of those satellites mation, missile warning, com- when directed, deny an adversary in, through, and from space to through a worldwide network of mand and control, and intel- freedom of action in space. influence the course and outcome ground stations. ligence to the warfighter. of conflict. US Space Funding Millions of constant Fiscal 2007 dollars 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 Fiscal Year 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 Fiscal Year NASA DOD Other Total Fiscal Year NASA DOD Other Total 1959 1,841 3,457 240 5,538 1983 13,051 18,601 675 32,327 1960 3,205 3,892 -
Keeping Europe Safe
Missile Defence Update Keeping Europe Safe November 2017 Issue INSIDE SMART InvestmentS: EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENCE MAKES IMPORTANT PROGRESS MISSILE DEFENCE SUCCESS IN ACTION PAGE 3 Next-GenERATION Missile Defence PAGE 5 by MISSILE DEFENCE UPDATE Every day, missile defence systems safeguard hundreds of millions of people across Europe, identifying and responding to the unprecedented security challenges coming from multiple sides. These advanced, proven, interoperable systems ensure Europe has capabilities that will keep it safe. Sustaining this level of protection requires smart, strategic investments by the member states of NATO and the European Union. Many of these countries are users of Raytheon’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense system and other defensive systems, which offer the best technology and the best value to taxpayers. This issue of the Missile Defence Update highlights the recent advancements, investments and strategies that allow European countries to rise to the challenge of stopping these threats. CONTENTS 2 SMART INVESTMENTS IN MISSILE DEFENCE 3 SUCCESS IN ACTION 4 HOW DOES LAYERED MISSILE DEFENCE WORK? NEXT-GENERATION 5 MISSILE DEFENCE NEXT-GENERATION 6 MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 7 PATRIOT MAKES THE GRADE 8 PATRIOT MAKES ITS WAY IN EUROPE POLAND’S COMMITMENT TO PATRIOT 9 READY NOW FOR GERMANY THE NETHERLANDS: PATRIOT INVESTMENT 10 LITHUANIA PURCHASES THE NASAMS SYSTEM AEGIS ASHORE TRANSFORMS EUROPEAN 11 MISSILE DEFENCE SKYCEPTOR INTEGRATION IN POLAND’S MISSILE 12 DEFENCE SYSTEM 13 RAYTHEON IN EUROPE 1 Missile Defence Update • November 2017 Issue MISSILE DEFENCE UPDATE SMART INVESTMENTS IN MISSILE DEFENCE PROTECTING EUROPE Continued investment in the Patriot also has many economic advantages THROUGH COLLABORATION that contribute to the growth of AND INTEROPERABILITY Europe’s defence industry. -
Complex Projectile Technology and Homo Sapiens Dispersal Into Western Eurasia
Complex Projectile Technology and Homo sapiens Dispersal into Western Eurasia JOHN J. SHEA Department of Anthropology and Turkana Basin Institute, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4364, USA; [email protected] MATTHEW L. SISK Interdepartmental Doctoral Program in Anthropological Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4364, USA; [email protected] ABSTRACT This paper proposes that complex projectile weaponry was a key strategic innovation driving Late Pleistocene human dispersal into western Eurasia after 50 Ka. It argues that complex projectile weapons of the kind used by ethnographic hunter-gatherers, such as the bow and arrow, and spearthrower and dart, enabled Homo sapiens to overcome obstacles that constrained previous human dispersal from Africa to temperate western Eurasia. In the East Mediterranean Levant, the only permanent land bridge between Africa and Eurasia, stone and bone projectile armatures like those used in the complex weapon systems of recent humans appear abruptly ca 45–35 Ka in early Upper Paleolithic contexts associated with Homo sapiens fossils. Such artifacts are absent from Middle Paleolithic contexts associated with Homo sapiens and Neandertals. Hypotheses concerning the indigenous vs. exogenous origins of complex projectile weaponry in the Levant are reviewed. Current evidence favors the hypothesis that complex projectile technology developed as an aid to ecological niche broadening strategies among African popu- lations between 50–100 Ka. It most likely spread to western Eurasia along with dispersing Homo sapiens popula- tions. Neandertals did not routinely deploy projectile weapons as subsistence aids. This puzzling gap in their otherwise impressive record for survival in some of the harshest environments ever occupied by primates may reflect energetic constraints and time-budgeting factors associated with complex technology. -
The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Militarization of Space: Scientific Responsibility and Citizen Resistance
Penn State International Law Review Volume 9 Article 2 Number 2 Dickinson Journal of International Law 1991 The trS ategic Defense Initiative and the Militarization of Space: Scientific Responsibility and Citizen Resistance Matthew Lippman Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr Part of the International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Lippman, Matthew (1991) "The trS ategic Defense Initiative and the Militarization of Space: Scientific Responsibility and Citizen Resistance," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 9: No. 2, Article 2. Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol9/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Militarization of Space: Scientific Responsibility and Citizen Resistance Matthew Lippman* I. Introduction The moderating of international tensions between the superpow- ers, the slowing of the nuclear arms race and the promise of a peace dividend have all contributed to a lessened popular concern over is- sues of national defense.1 The diversion of attention from war and peace has resulted in little scholarly attention being paid to the omi- nous potential growth in third-generation high-technology weapons. 2 These automated weapons systems are being designed primarily to operate in outer space where, despite claims to the contrary, they will be used to enhance the United States'ability to launch a first strike nuclear attack.3 The technological and strategic foundation of this revolution in weaponry is the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).