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Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Weapons, Power, Communications, and Space Transportation CONTENTS Page Introduction Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Weapons, Power, Communications, and Space Transportation CONTENTS Page Introduction . ......................105 5-6b. Boost and Post-Boost Kill Weapons . ..................,......105 Effectiveness (500 single-RV Kinetic-Energy Weapons (KEW) ....106 ICBMs atone site) . ...........117 Directed-Energy Weapons . .........123 5-7. Boost and Post-Boost Kill Power and Power Conditioning . ......142 Effectiveness (200 “medium- Space Power Requirements . ........142 bum-booster” ICBMs at one site). .............118 Space Power Generation Technology .143 5-8. Schematic of an Electromagnetic Power Conditioning . .. ..........145 Launcher (EML) or “Railgun” ..119 Communication Technology . .........146 5-9. Lightweight Homing Projectile. .l2l 60-GHz Communication Links .. ....147 5-10. Illustration of the Relationships Laser Communication Links . .......148 Between Laser Parameters and Space Transportation . ..............148 Power Density Projected on a Space Transportation Target . .............125 Requirements. ................149 5-11. FEL Waveforms . .............125 Space Transportation Alternatives ...149 5-12. Schematic of a Neutral Particle Space Transportation Cost Beam Weapon.. .............129 Reduction . ................153 5-13a. Annual Space Launch Capacity .152 Conclusions . ....................153 5-13b. Space Transportation . .........152 Weapon Technology Conclusions ....153 Space Power Conclusions. .........155 Tables Space Communications Conclusion. ..l55 Table No. Page Space Transportation Conclusions ...156 5-1. Key Issues for Electromagnetic Launchers (EML) . .............120 Figures 5-2. Characteristics of a Ground-Based FEL Weapons System . .........124 Figure No. Page 5-3. Characteristics of an HF Laser 5-1. Orientation of SDI to RV .. ....111 5-2a. Space-Based Interceptor Mass v. Weapons System. .............127 Velocity . ....................114 5-4. Characteristics of Directed Energy 5-2b. Number of Satellites v. SBI Weapons Against a Fully Velocity . ....................114 Responsive Soviet Threat . ......130 5-2c. Number of Space-Based 5-5. Possible Beam Steering and Interceptors v. Velocity.. .. ....114 Retargeting Requirements for 5-2d. Constellation Mass v. SBI Boost-Phase Engagement . ......134 Velocity . ....................114 5-6. Key Issues for Free Electron 5-3a. Number of Projectiles v. SBI Lasers (FEL) . .................136 Velocity . ....................115 5-7. Key Issues for the HF Chemical 5-3b. SBI Constellation Mass v. SBI Velocity . ..............4.....115 Laser . ...............138 5-4. Total SBI Constellation Mass in 5-8. Neutral Particle Beam Issues ....139 Orbit v. Booster Bum Time ....116 5-9. Estimated Power Requirements 5-5. Boost and Post-Boost Kill for Space Assets . ..............142 Effectiveness (l,400 ICBMs v. 5-10. Current U.S. Space Launch “Realistic’’ SBIs) . ............116 Inventory . ..............150 5-6a, Boost and Post-Boost Kill Effectiveness (500 single-RV ICBMs at three sites)... ......117 Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Weapons, Power, Communications, and Space Transportation INTRODUCTION This chapter reviews weapon technologies weapons, power systems, and communication relevant to ballistic missile defense (BMD). It systems of most interest for the Strategic De- emphasizes the chemically propelled hit-to-kill fense Initiative (SD I). Finally, it considers the weapons most likely to form the basis of any new space transportation system essential for future U.S BMD deployment in this century. a space-based defense. The chapter also covers the directed-energy WEAPONS A weapon system must transfer a lethal dose DEW, if they reach the necessary power levels, of energy from weapon to a target. All exist- would revolutionize ballistic missile defense. ing weapons use some combination of kinetic DEWS offer the ultimate in delivery speed. energy (the energy of motion of a bullet, for But they are not likely to have sufficient de- example), chemical energy, or nuclear energy ployed power in this century to destroy ballis- to disable the target. The SDI research pro- tic missiles, and they certainly could not kill gram is exploring two major new types of the more durable reentry vehicles (RVs). In weapon systems: directed-energy weapons and hopes of designing a system deployable before ultra-high accuracy and high velocity hit-to- the year 2000, the SDI research program has kill weapons. Not only have these weapons emphasized increased speed and accuracy for never been built before, but no weapon of any the more conventional kinetic-energy weapons type has been based in space. Operating many (KEW), such as chemically propelled rockets. hundreds or thousands of autonomous weap- With speeds in the 4 to 7 km/s range, and with ons platforms in space would itself be a major terminal or homing guidance to collide directly technical challenge. with the target, these KEW could kill a sig- Directed-energy weapons (DEW) would kill nificant number of today’s ballistic missiles. their prey without a projectile. Energy would With sufficient accuracy, they would not re- travel through space via a laser beam or a quire chemical or nuclear explosives. stream of atomic or sub-atomic particles. Speed Although DEWS will not be available for is the main virtue. A laser could attack an ob- highly effective ballistic missile defense dur- ject 1,000 km away in 3 thousandths of a sec- ing this century, they could play a significant ond, while a high-speed rifle-bullet, for exam- role in an early 1990s decision on whether to ple, would have to be fired 16 minutes before deploy any ballistic missile defense system. impact with such a distant target. Clearly, That is, the deployment decision could hinge on our ability to persuade the Soviets (and our- Note: Complete defi”m”tions of acronyms and im”tial.z”sms selves) that defenses would remain viable for are h“sted in Appen&”x B of this report. the foreseeable future. Kinetic-energy weapons 105 106 work initially against the 1990s Soviet missile (RVs) in space. No currently deployable projec- threat. But Soviet responsive countermeasures tile system has the accuracy or speed to con- might soon render those weapons ineffective. sistently intercept an RV traveling at 7 km/s Thus, a long-term commitment to a ballistic at ranges of hundreds or thousands of kilome- missile defense system would imply strong con- ters. The SAFEGUARD anti-ballistic missile fidence that new developments, such as evolv- (ABM) system built near Grand Forks, North ing DEW or evolving discrimination capabil- Dakota in the early 1970s, and the existing So- ity, could overcome and keep ahead of any viet Galosh ABM system around Moscow both reasonable Soviet response. would compensate for the poor accuracy of their radar guidance systems by exploding nu- Strategic Defense Initiative Organization clear warheads. The radiation from that explo- (SDIO) officials argue that perceived future ca- sion would increase the lethal radius so that pabilities of DEW might deter the Soviet the interceptors, despite their poor accuracy, Union from embarking on a costly defense could disable incoming warheads. countermeasures building program; instead, the prospect of offensive capabilities might per- The goal of the SDI, however, is primarily suade them to join with the United States in to investigate technology for a non-nuclear de- reducing offensive ballistic missiles and mov- fense. This would dictate the development of ing from an offense-dominated to a defense- “smart” projectiles that could “see” their tar- dominated regime. To foster this dramatic shift gets or receive external guidance signals, in strategic thinking, the evolving defensive changing course during flight to collide with system would have to appear less costly and the targets. more effective than offensive countermeasures. The following sections discuss proposed Today, the immaturity of DEW technology KEW systems, KEW technologies, the current makes any current judgments of its cost- status of technology, and key issues. effectiveness extremely uncertain. It appears that many years of research and development KEW Systems would be necessary before anyone could state Four different KEW systems were analyzed with reasonable confidence whether effective by SDI system architects, including space- DEW systems could be deployed at lower cost based interceptors (SBIs, formerly called than responsive countermeasures. Given the space-based kinetic kill vehicles or SBKKVs), current state of the art in DEW systems, a well- and three ground-based systems. All four sys- informed decision in the mid-1990s to build and tems would rely on chemically propelled deploy highly effective DEW weapons appears 1 rockets. unlikely. Space-Based Interceptors (SBIs).–Each sys- Kinetic-Energy Weapons (KEW) tem architect proposed-and the SDIO “phase one’ proposal includes—deploying some type Today’s chemically propelled rockets and of space-based projectile. These projectiles sensors could not intercept intercontinental would ride on pre-positioned platforms in low- ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or reentry vehicles Earth orbits, low enough to reach existing .-—— — ICBM boosters before their engines would ‘The Study Group of the American Physical Society concluded burn out, but high enough to improve the likeli- in their analysis of DEW that “even in the best of circumstances, hood of surviving and to avoid atmospheric a decade or more of intensive research would be required to pro- vide
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