STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Center for Security Studies

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017.

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 4 Threatened from Within? NATO, Trump and Institutional Adaptation Martin Zapfe

NATO faces an existential challenge by a revanchist Russia. Despite impressive assurance and adaptation measures, its overall defense position remains weak. It will face serious challenges in balancing strategic divergence, both within Europe and in its transatlantic relations. While regionalization and increased European efforts might offer some respite, the stage is set for potentially serious rifts at a critical point in time.

US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg during a NATO defense ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, 15 February 2017.

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The Atlantic alliance is both more rele- alliance. However, it is unlikely that vant, and more threatened by internal NATO can insulate itself from global disturbances, than ever before since US conflicts under a President Don- the end of the Cold War. At least since ald Trump who appears to follow a Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea strictly transactionist understanding and subsequent invasion of eastern of foreign policy. The US could very Ukraine, European states and their well impose conditions on its secu- militaries have had to accept that they rity guarantees, and other alliance have to use the current time of peace members may find that increasing to think potential war. At the same their defense budgets, while necessary time, the Russian challenge goes far and imminent, might not be enough. beyond conventional military threats, Although there are ways for “institu- opting instead for “cross-domain coer- tional NATO” to mitigate the strate- cion”1 from sub-conventional to nu- gic divergences within the alliance, clear means and methods. The target they each come with distinct risks at- is cohesion within NATO – weaken- tached and will not be a substitute for ing the transatlantic link and suprana- US leadership and capabilities. tional European institutions – a policy of constant divide and rule. It is at The Russian Threat and NATO’s this critical point that the presidency Response of Donald Trump appears to threaten A Threat to Cohesion NATO from within. European states are facing many and complex security challenges. Migra- This chapter argues that NATO’s ad- tion pressures, terrorism, and frag- aptation towards countering the Rus- ile states at their periphery demand sian challenge since 2014 is impressive. attention. However, the challenge Nevertheless, although achieved at high posed by Russia under President political cost, it still risks falling short. Vladimir Putin is of a different qual- Further tangible steps are necessary to ity, as it targets the very basis of the deter Moscow, and yet internal strate- order that, after the end of the Second gic divergences within NATO threaten World War, enabled the longest peri- to hamper or block such measures. It od of peace in written European his- is here that the external and internal tory – and a democratic, prosperous threats to NATO converge. peace as well. Both with its aggression against Ukraine and with the largely The US is NATO’s indispensable ally, sub-conventional, “hybrid” nature the political and military core of the of this aggression, Russia has crossed

74 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? lines that only a few years ago were long denied by Russian authorities, considered inviolable. The Russian appears to augur the “new normal” in challenge is existential in that it com- Russian-European relations. Russia’s bines external and internal threats: understanding of interstate relations Russia poses the only credible territo- as a continuum of conflict, where the rial threat to a NATO member while choice of means is not dictated by actively aiming to subverting not only questions of legality, but of practica- the inter- and supranational European bility, is diametrically opposed to the alliances, but the democratic order of conduct of diplomacy and the under- European states per se. standing of interstate relations from the European point of view. Russia’s First, the annexation of Crimea concept of “new-generation warfare” marked the first armed land grab consciously and explicitly denies the in Europe since the end of the Sec- distinction between war and peace ond World War. Six decades of gen- as separate spheres. This overburdens eral peace were partly made possible the West’s ability to formulate policy through the official renunciation of responses.2 In addition, Russia has territorial ambitions and irreden- demonstrated that its understanding tism. Borders, while changeable in of information warfare (IW) as an in- principle, were to be inviolable, as tegral part of cyber-operations aims laid down in the Helsinki Final Act at a soft spot in the West’s defense of 1975 and confirmed in the Paris – its normative and legal distinction Charter of 1990. Even through the between the military and civilian bloody wars of Yugoslav succession, spheres, and its commitment to the this principle was generally upheld. principle of a free press. The influ- Kosovo, for all the debate about it ence operations conducted daily in constituting a precedent for Crimea, Western societies, most prominently was not invaded by any Western state the hack-and-release operation to in- for the sake of territorial gains. The fluence the outcome of the US presi- Russian attack against Ukraine to pre- dential election in 2016, aim at weak- vent the nation’s movement towards ening the democratic societies of the Europe was and remains a watershed West and their trust in the democratic predicted by very few within and out- process of governance.3 side of NATO. Adaptation Falls Short Second, the “hybrid”, ostensibly cov- NATO stepped up to the challenge ert nature of the invasion, which was in ways that not too many observers

75 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 had expected. In the mere three years facing an unprecedented – if still since the Wales Summit of 2014, merely symbolic – NATO presence at NATO has implemented the “Readi- its borders and reinforced US troops ness Action Plan” and taken impor- in Europe. tant and far-reaching steps to reassure allies and adapt to the new challenges Compared to where the alliance stood for a credible defense of the exposed when Russia invaded Ukraine – with allies in the east – first and foremost, limited plans, no significant pres- the Baltic states. It has established the ence, and a diminished institutional so-called “Very High Readiness Joint memory of how actually to conduct Task Force” (VJTF) as its spearhead, territorial defense – the progress is it has enhanced the NATO Response impressive. Judging by whether these Force (“eNRF”), it has established measures, by themselves, could cred- eight small headquarters in the east- ibly deter a Russian aggression in the ern member states to facilitate quick most feared scenarios, however, the deployments, and it has adapted its answer appears to be negative. Un- Force and Command Structure. The til it is backed up by credible capa- next, logical step at the alliance’s July bilities, rehearsed contingency plans, 2016 summit in Warsaw was the de- and demonstrated political will, a cision to deploy four multinational symbolic presence in the form of a battalion-sized battlegroups as the trip-wire force remains exactly that “Enhanced Forward Presence” (EFP). – symbolic.

On top of these multilateral measures, For NATO, the order of the day must the US, under the administration of be twofold: politically, to preserve the former US president Barack Obama, cohesion of the alliance and to un- significantly increased its military derline the importance of Article 5, commitment to Europe. In addition and militarily, further to strengthen to the two combat brigades continu- NATO’s posture in the east. This en- ously stationed in Germany and Italy, hanced posture would allow the al- armored brigades will rotate in nine- liance to better resist Russian “new month cycles into eastern Europe to generation war” in peacetime and to train with local forces, and equipment make credible preparations for open for another armored brigade will be hostilities in case of war. The agenda stored in Belgium, the Netherlands, should be set. However, serious stra- and Germany. Three years after the tegic divergences threaten to prevent invasion of Crimea, Russia will be this from happening.

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NATO’s Conventional Deterrence Posture Key multilateral and US forces, key NATO command and control structure

NATO members NATO members with Force Integration Units (FIU) Iceland HQ NATO and Shape Mons Joint Force Command (JFC) Multinational Corps Northeast (MCNE) NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) Multinational Division South-East (MND S-E) Romanian Multinational Framework Brigade NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) *** enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) * NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Baltic Air Policing * US Combat Brigades Stored material under the European Activity Set (EAS) Area of operations, rotating USNorway armored brigade

Tallinn UK

Estonia Russia a CA e S

c Riga i Denmark t Latvia l a B Lithuania

GE United Kingdom Vilnius

US Stettin Netherlands Bydgoszcz Poland Brussels Brunssum Mons Belgium Germany Luxembourg * Czech Republic

Slovakia France Bratislava

Hungary

Szekesfehervar * Slovenia Romania Croatia Bucharest

Craiova Spain Se a Black Italy Bulgaria

Sofia

Naples Albania

n Greece Turkey Allied Reaction Forces a * e n a VJTF 2016: ES r r *** * e eNRF VJTF 2017: UK i t * e d VJTF 2018: IT M Sources: NATO; US Army; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Ministry of Defence

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Threats to Cohesion simultaneously experiencing hitherto “If the alliance is to remain the foun- unknown doubts about the US secu- dation of Western security there must rity commitment. be no basic disagreement on the nature of our global objectives and on A Shaky Intra-European Consensus the collective responsibility of the Many allies are preoccupied with oth- West to protect its interests.”4 er serious security threats, and it is in Cyrus Vance, 1983 addition to the existential and there- fore common challenge from Russia In the face of these determined Rus- that these other security issues are to sian efforts to undermine it, NATO be seen. Jihadist terrorism, carried out faces a period of not unprecedented, by commandos sent by, or perpetra- yet serious strategic divergence. Of tors inspired by, the so-called “Islamic course, the Cold War did see its share State” (IS) is high on the agenda, es- of strategic divergences and momen- pecially in France in Belgium. At the tous political upheavals seriously af- same time, Italy is struggling with a fecting NATO, such as the Algerian massive movement of refugees and War and the Suez Crisis during the migrants over the Mediterranean, 1950s and Greece and Turkey facing which is largely ignored by its north- off over Cyprus in the 1960s. ern neighbors. Paris, Brussels, and Rome look southwards, not east- What is new in 2017, though, is the wards. France has refused to lead one potentially dangerous combination of of the EFP’s battalions, citing strained an challenge from a revanchist Rus- resources, which proves that this stra- sia on the one hand, and deep inse- tegic divergence has already had im- curity about internal strategic diver- mediate implications for operational gences within NATO on the other. A and politico-military matters. strong and essentially unified alliance would not have to fear the destabi- The “conventional turn” of 2014 has lizing acts of an overall weaker com- not sufficiently strengthenedNATO ’s petitor with growing, but still limited cohesion. Understood as the general military capabilities. However, an al- tendency within the alliance to move liance that struggles with diverse, yet away from troop-intensive stabiliza- subtly linked challenges does have tion operations and back to a general reason for concern. The alliance notion of collective defense, this turn is facing a serious intra-European had already begun with the draw- rift about defense priorities, while down of ISAF and was significantly

78 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? reinforced by the Russian aggression and indiscriminate crackdown against against Ukraine. Contrary to the ex- real and imagined participants of the pectations of many, including this au- failed coup attempt of July 2016 is thor, this did not sufficiently enhance observed with muted suspicion and allied solidarity, nor did it form a solid worry, Turkey’s aims and priorities in basis for the years ahead. The unprec- the Syrian carnage and in the broader edented and unexpected migration Middle East are also partly at odds crisis of 2015 – 6 strained intra-Euro- with those of its allies. On the upside, pean relations to the breaking point, the prospect of direct Turkish-Rus- and the challenge to the south became sian clashes, which had flared up after more prominent as the Syrian war Turkish jets downed a Russian air- escalated further, now with Russian craft in northern Syria in November troops actively supporting Bashir al- 2015, has faded. That fear has now Assad. On top of that, bloody terrorist been replaced by a certain weariness attacks in France and Belgium set the regarding Turkey’s internal develop- agenda and demanded political atten- ments and a rather spectacular rap- tion and bureaucratic resources. prochement with Russia, resulting in a de-facto alliance, at least in the short On top of that, hugely complex and term, in parts of Syria. For decades, potentially bitter negotiations over NATO has included non-democratic the terms of the UK’s departure from states among its members, yet today, the EU (“Brexit”) are to be expected. it will have to ask itself whether it can With the UK being Europe’s most im- permanently endure the tensions aris- portant and resolute military power, it ing from an increasingly authoritar- appears increasingly unlikely that the ian, undemocratic, and Islamist state critical security relationships between in its ranks. For now, the only thing London and its European partners that prevents serious discussions of a will remain unaffected by the Brexit “Turxit” from NATO may be the fear talks. NATO will have to struggle with of what might happen if Turkey were increased uncertainty and acrimoni- not to be an ally, but an antagonist. ous relations between the UK and its partners at the time when it can least NATO and the US afford them. During the Congo Crisis of 1960, NATO’s secretary general, the Belgian Finally, relations between most NATO Paul-Henri Spaak, mused: “Can we, members and Turkey are on a danger- thanks to NATO, maintain a com- ous course. While the heavy-handed mon policy on European questions

79 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 and […] oppose each other on all oth- burden-sharing, this has fed suspicion ers?” That question appears to be more and undermined the alliance. After relevant than ever, with the US under all, Trump’s pressure on allies to in- President Trump appearing liable to crease their defense spending is part entangle the alliance in global conflicts of a decades-old tradition, and comes not of its choosing. only six years after the landmark 2011 speech by then-secretary of de- During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, fense Robert Gates, who issued an US reluctance to intervene stemmed identical threat, raising the specter of not from an urge to abandon Europe, a strategic reassessment by Washing- but from the conviction that, with the ton.5 Moreover, President Trump can Soviet threat gone, Europe should be legitimately point to the commonly able to manage its strategic glacis by agreed 2-per cent target for defense itself. When the US under President spending. Thus, his pressure on allies George W. Bush, in his neo-conserv- to increase defense budgets follows ative first term, split the alliance by the normal playbook and would, in invading Iraq, the basic commitment different times, not constitute a threat to European security was never seri- to NATO. ously questioned. “Old Europe”, and even more “New Europe”, counted on However, the extent to which Trump the US in the event of a still-unlikely has already undermined the US secu- Russian resurgence. That has already rity guarantees, and his surreal and changed. positively grotesque efforts to cast Pu- tin in a positive light, are fueling the With or Against Russia? most basic European fears of a “Yal- At the beginning of 2017, the insecu- ta II”, a grand bargain between Mos- rity within NATO capitals over the fu- cow and Washington over the heads ture relationship between Moscow and of the Europeans. Essentially, Europe Washington is perplexing. During the fears that the US will abandon its US presidential election campaign of long-term allies. Senior administra- 2016, incredulity over the Republican tion officials have so far failed to reas- candidate’s nearly ritualistic admira- sure the allies that their president is tion of Russia, and especially of its au- not serious about what he says. Thus, thoritarian president, mounted by the by increasing their defense spending week; and it has not faded since the – in case of Germany, quite dramati- inauguration. Far more than Trump’s cally – the Europeans are not only threats and demands regarding a fairer alleviating pressure, but also hedging

80 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? their bets against the time when the will not easily accept NATO members US is no longer the continent’s secu- standing aside in US conflicts beyond rity guarantor. the campaign against terrorism – when confronting IS, Iran, or China. Global Allies, Always? In addition to this intra-European dis- At the very least, the alliance faces sent, the alliance faces unprecedented intense discussions about its role in doubts about Washington’s essential the fight against IS, and the broader security guarantees as a NATO mem- Middle East as a whole. President ber. These are compounded by the Trump has made clear that IS con- prospect of potential global turmoil, stitutes his key foreign policy prior- with the US under Trump refusing to ity. Former and current advisors, like allow its allies to stand by and decline former national security advisor Lieu- involvement. In a time of growing tenant General Michael Flynn and doubts about NATO’s security, global White House chief strategist Stephen conflicts far beyond Europe could well Bannon, viewed “radical Islamic ter- contribute to a transatlantic divide. rorism”, if left unchecked, as a potentially existential threat to the US; they The two global theaters most likely to apparently wield strong influence over be at the center of forceful US foreign the president. While Trump has been policy efforts – the Middle East and famously silent on the specifics of his Asia – are liable to see severe disagree- plans, he has hinted that he wants his ments between the US on the one NATO allies to take on a stronger role hand, and most of its NATO allies on in the “fight against terror”. Since the other. While President Trump’s most NATO members are already en- senior officials, namely Secretary of gaged in the US-led coalition against State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of IS, albeit outside of NATO, this could Defense James Mattis, have tried to re- mean either that they would increase assure European allies, Donald Trump their engagement within this coali- made the headlines. During the cam- tion, or that NATO could take over paign, he seemed to qualify US solidar- part of the campaign in what would ity by tying it to the European states’ be a largely symbolical step without defense spending. Furthermore, after too much tangible value being added his inauguration, he added to that by to the campaign. famously calling NATO “obsolete”. Without clarifying what, precisely, he Such wins may not be nearly as easy meant by this, it is clear that the US to achieve when it comes to the other

81 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 potential main effort of the Trump no mere faux-pas, but that he might administration in the Middle East. assume a more confrontational policy Trump and his key advisors have been vis-à-vis Beijing, temporarily chal- outspoken in their criticism of Iran’s lenging the One-China Policy and role in the region and its attacks on attacking the current imbalance in US service members and interests. bilateral trade as unfair. In addition, Washington’s European allies have some of his personnel picks indicate been instrumental in negotiating the a tougher stance on Beijing.6 While Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action one has to be careful – and President (JCPOA) of 2015. They are unani- Trump has already been forced to mous in supporting the agreement, backtrack from his challenge to the and have strong economic interests in One China policy – it appears that expanding trade relations with Tehran. the US under Trump will continue to Should President Trump choose to ab- confront China on many levels, not- rogate the agreement in the absence of withstanding logical inconsistencies unambiguous Iranian violations, he such as the cancellation of the TPP, could not count on European support. which decidedly disfavors Beijing. And should he listen to those voices around him (and in the region) who At the same time, fears emerged con- still demand US attacks on nuclear cerning an early confrontation with and military installations – potential- North Korea. In the face of specula- ly in a combined operation together tions over a test of an intercontinen- with Israel – it appears highly unlikely tal missile that might be capable of that he could count on the active and reaching the US mainland, the pres- unanimous support of NATO and its ident-elect promised via Twitter that member states. North Korea “developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of The same applies to potential conflicts the US [...] won’t happen”, leading in the Far East. Asian security chal- to speculation over what he would lenges took center stage even before do, once in office, to prevent the re- the inauguration after president-elect gime of Kim Jong-un from follow- Trump upset the People’s Republic of ing through on its promises. While China by accepting a phone call from the response to the test of a missile Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, with shorter range has been rather who congratulated him on his victo- restrained, North Korea might well ry. In the days that followed, Donald pose the first real test of President Trump made clear that this had been Trump’s foreign policy.

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Few European states have a global stra- purely transactional in nature, might tegic perspective. Only France and the well condition the US security guar- UK, formerly the continent’s preemi- antee for Europe on direct Europe- nent colonial powers, include global an assistance in the Middle East or interventions in their strategic portfo- Asia – and there is no guarantee that lio. While any of the aforementioned NATO would be willing to live up to conflicts would immediately affect his expectations, or indeed capable of European interests, it is far from cer- doing so. tain that the mere possibility of such outcomes could prompt European Mitigating Strategic Divergence NATO members to contribute mili- In the face of these strains on cohe- tarily to any US-Chinese or US-North sion within the alliance, how can Korean conflict. While the Chinese NATO leverage its institutional flex- encroachment in the South China ibility to mitigate the fallout? The Sea, and the challenge this poses to the obvious answer is increased defense global rules-based order, could incite spending, as the US has repeatedly European resistance, no one should demanded. This message appears to count on Berlin, Rome, or Madrid finally have been understood, and Eu- to be willing to confront China over ropean states have pledged to increase their profound economic interests. their defense expenditures, sometimes This would be even more unlikely if, dramatically. That alone, however, from the Europeans’ perspective, the will not suffice. The institution itself US under Trump were to blame for must adapt, as it has always done over any escalation. six decades. Three possible courses of action, which are not mutually ex- Trump, who puts “America First” and clusive, continue to re-appear in the has already stated that NATO has be- debate, but none comes without costs come obsolete by focusing on Rus- and risks attached – and none may be sia as the main threat, is unlikely to easy to implement. accept the simple legal fact that the NATO treaty is limited to “the territory Regionalization as Risk and Chance of any of the Parties in Europe or North The obvious functional answer to such America (and) the Islands under the divergent interests, at least regarding jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the the European allies and their respec- North Atlantic area north of the Tropic tive priorities, would be a regionali- of Cancer.”7 TheUS president, appar- zation of the alliance – meaning the ently viewing international politics as acceptance that certain potentially

83 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 overlapping groups of allies prioritize from the sheer necessity of fighting certain regions or challenges. Such a together to generate the numbers, regionalization is at odds with NATO’s this also had a very strong symbolic historical approach and, while having aspect. Most of the main allies had undisputable benefits, would entail ground troops on the frontline. For the risk of further diminishing unity all practical purposes, it was near im- in case of conflict. possible to opt out of any escalation – an important reassurance for all al- For NATO, this means accepting stra- lies in general, and for the German tegic divergence and nascent regionali- government in particular. Buffeting zation as a given and actively moderat- the increasingly diverse strategic foci ing it to contain the risks and cultivate of NATO members through increased the chances that such a trend entails. regionalization risks weakening the Both the advantages and the disadvan- very cohesive forces that hold NATO tages are potentially significant. Walk- together in times of crises. ing the tightrope between accepting specialization and regionalization to However, if NATO should manage to buffer strategic divergences, while still coordinate and steer that regionaliza- ensuring political and military unity tion, there would be tangible advan- and interoperability across the board, tages. There is a considerable potential appears to be one main challenge in for a distinct east-south specialization the years to come. – a split that, in reality, is already relevant. On the upside, such a strategy NATO has always known a certain de- could sharpen the operational and re- gree of regionalization. Italian troops gional focus of the alliance, increase were focused south of the Alps, while military efficiency and efficacy for Norway guarded the north. Greece relevant contingencies, and allow for looked towards the Mediterranean, better force planning and harmoniza- and Turkey had an eye on the Black tion of capabilities. Sea. However, the bulk of the alliance’s forces was to be fighting at Europe’s The NATO Command Structure central front between the Alps and – still the military centerpiece and the North Sea. Here, British, Dutch, most important asset of the alliance Canadian, Belgian, Danish, US, and – has experienced quasi-constant re- German (and, although of varying form since the end of the Cold War. independence, French) forces were Currently, it is based on functional- positioned to fight side by side. Apart ity, not geography, meaning that no

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The Framework Nations’ Concept Introduced by Germany in 2013, adopded by NATO in 2014

bility Dev y: Capa elopme man orces” nt a er ow-on f generat nd G “foll ion Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Luxemburg Poland Croatia Romania Hungary

Slovakia

t o

a t

z Denmark i a l r i e Albania b J n Latvia a o t e U i s g n Austria* K r t e : Lithuania o c E f C r x o Italy t o p f n Netherlands n e t e l d r a i i Slovenia m t b n Norway p o io u i t o t n i l a o e a n Spain v n r e i y s lt F t D o o y u r t c th li m e e i d ( b n J a a EF ap s ) C n y: io al at It er op

* Non-NATO Member

Sources: Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Nations’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?”, in: NATO Defense College Research Paper, no. 132 (2016); Hans Binnendijk, “NATO’s Future: A Tale of Three Summits”, Center for Transatlantic Relations (2016).

headquarters are permanently as- example, while the Joint Force Com- signed to a specific region. It would mand Brunssum could be designated seem imperative, then, for the alliance as “JFC East”, its sister command in to designate a distinct and unambigu- Naples could be modeled as a “JFC ous chain of command for one single South” with permanently subordi- region and to focus all its bureau- nated or assigned forces, tailored to cratic bandwidth on war-planning, specific missions and contingencies. contingencies, and preparations in Recent announcements by NATO the assigned area of operations. For point in that direction.8

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This could imply a regionalization of a group of nations focusing on stabili- the alliance in terms of force genera- zation operations.10 tion as well. With regard to Russia, for example, such a group could form However, any regionalization would a core of nations prepared to go fur- come at potentially prohibitive politi- ther in their military integration and cal and military cost. NATO has al- to pledge certain capabilities with a ways been more than just a military regional focus and much deeper in- organization searching for the most tegration than currently achievable. efficient battle plan. It is also an -or Such a regionalized defense cluster ganization of mutual security that for would need to include the US; the 60 years has protected its member “Big Three”, whose capabilities come states against external enemies and as close to full-spectrum forces as is promoted peaceful conflict resolution realistically possible, namely France, between them, as laid down in Article the UK, and Germany; and the east- 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, ern member states primarily affected political unity, or the acceptance of a by this threat. In addition, a certain single basic contractual and political degree of regionalization could facili- framework, is not just mere symbol- tate the integration of non-members ism, but the foundation for peaceful Finland and Sweden into NATO’s relations between alliance members. contingency planning, if their respec- Regionalization, if unchecked and tive governments should choose that unmoderated, could undermine this course.9 unity and degrade the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to a mere symbolic In the south, where various maritime shell. and coast guard capabilities are in demand, together with stabilization In military terms, overly specialized capabilities, states like Italy, Spain, armed forces that are focused on a Portugal, and Greece would prioritize single scenario risk “preparing for the those missions. last war”, meaning that they cultivate capabilities that are relevant in the This split is already visible in force worst-case scenario, but of little use planning: Within NATO’s “Frame- in other (and, for NATO as a whole, work Nations’ Concept” (FNC), Ger- more relevant) scenarios. For exam- many is leading efforts to generate ple, should the southern states com- viable so-called “follow-on forces” for pletely reorient their armed forces to- the eNRF, while Italy is coordinating wards intervention and stabilization

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Multinational Integration in the Dutch and German Land Forces

*** *** Royal Netherlands German Army Army Command Command

** ** ** 1 AD RFD 10 AD

* * * * * * * * * * * 13 MB 43 MB AB 9 AB 21 MB 41 11 AirB AirB 1 SOF MIB 23 AB 12 MB 37

Dutch German Simplified with focus on ground combat brigades and harmonized designations. AD: Armored Division RFD: Rapid Forces Division MB: Mechanized Brigade / Mechanized Infantry Brigade AB: Armored Brigade MIB: Mountain Infantry Brigade AirB: Airmobile/Airbone Brigade SOF: Special Operations Forces (Kommando Spezialkräfte, KSK) Sources: Deutsches Heer; defensie.nl missions in the south – focusing on increases the danger that a vanguard of infantry-heavy, light and sustained willing nations could embroil NATO low-intensity land operations to the in a war it does not want. The organi- detriment of heavy, armored, high- zational integration of armed forces technology intervention forces with as pursued by some allies might also a priority on high-end air and naval reinforce this dilemma. While right- forces – the day might come when fully hailed as an important symbolic they are not only unwilling, but also move, and with real military poten- essentially unable to support the Baltic tial, integrating the Dutch and Ger- allies against a Russian incursion. man land forces will only make sense if it is accompanied by a harmoniza- That logic also applies conversely. As tion of political decisionmaking be- NATO might find itself fighting wars tween The Hague and Berlin, which with the burden being carried by only would create new power centers that a small number of specialized states, so could mobilize or block NATO.

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The principle of collective decision- within and outside of NATO. In fact, making thus constitutes an effective even for the most basic task of territo- barrier against NATO being dragged rial defense, NATO might have to fall into such a scenario, but a regionalized back on “coalitions of the willing” if it and specialized defense posture invol- does not adequately prepare for what untarily entails informal decisionmak- is still essentially its raison d’être. ing groups of the most affected nations, potentially putting NATO solidarity Again, the concept of a group of na- to the test in a situation where it is far tions resolving to act together and from guaranteed. Furthermore, any to move further, faster, and more ef- such development would immediately ficiently than the alliance as a whole touch off the decades-old question of is not a totally new one. Throughout the alliance’s nuclear deterrence, con- its existence, NATO’s member states trol of relevant assets, and collective have allied or cooperated for specific decisionmaking in nuclear scenarios. wars and operations, independently of It could thus become impossible, on their NATO commitments. Whether purely technical grounds, to uphold it was the French and British during the hugely important principle of “all the Suez Crisis or, naturally, the US for one, one for all”. in all its global entanglements since 1949, no article of the North Atlan- Below and Beyond the Alliance? tic Treaty prohibits its members from ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and going it alone. However, the current Unilateralism trend towards a variety of ad-hoc coa- A regionalization of NATO entails litions meets a different NATO than risks, and yet it would affect neither during the 1950s; and ad-hoc coali- the institutions nor the logic of NATO. tions under US leadership risk rel- Every foreseeable form of regionaliza- egating NATO to a backseat at a time tion would still involve the symbolic when it needs to be front and center. presence of at least token forces from most member states. It is precisely this Current relevant ad-hoc coalitions can logic that underwrites NATO’s EFP be categorized in three groups. First, in the Baltics and Poland. Neverthe- allies can form ad-hoc coalitions and less, institutions can lose some of their cooperate flexibly as well as in varying integrative force, as illustrated by the coalitions, outside of NATO, and for growing trend towards what former any conceivable scenario. Most prom- US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld inently, the “Counter-Daesh” coali- referred to as “coalitions of the willing” tion fighting the so-called “Islamic

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State” is coordinated by US command coordination-intensive air campaign institutions and brings together a very against Libyan forces. heterogeneous coalition of NATO and non-NATO states. While there For all its short-term successes, “Uni- are good reasons to circumvent the fied Protector” was an interventionist alliance in this fight, this form of ad- operation in NATO’s periphery with- hoc coalition poses the least threat to out a clear and present danger to alli- NATO cohesion. ance – and nevertheless, it may be far- fetched to imagine a coalition of the Second, NATO members can act (pri- willing within NATO operating the marily) within the framework of the machinery of NATO against Russian alliance, using its institutions and forces without the unanimous sup- command structure, while others not port of the NAC. However, if region- only abstain, but oppose the opera- alization is thought through to the tion. The 2011 Libya Campaign is an extreme, it is not unimaginable that a obvious case in point. During “Uni- high-pressure situation could lead to fied Protector”,NATO was far from a wrangling NAC tacitly agreeing that unified. In the United Nations Secu- selected members move the NATO rity Council, Germany abstained from machinery to action while others ab- UNSC Resolution 1973 authorizing stain from the vote without blocking the operation, yet did not block agree- mobilization. The dangers for allied ment in the NAC, allowing NATO cohesion that such a scenario would to command parts of the operation entail needs no further elaboration. through its command structure. How- ever, the German abstention caused Third, NATO members could act not only political, but also tangible outside of NATO’s institutions, yet military problems. While the federal within its basic politico-military logic government distanced itself from the and relevant scenarios. One potential operation, more than 100 German of- scenario that is seldom discussed, but ficers supported it through their work is highly relevant, envisages allies such within NATO’s Command Structure. as the UK and the US intervening in At the same time, Germany prohibit- a Baltic invasion scenario in the face ed the use of German airmen assigned of a divided NAC blocked by hesitant to NATO’s integrated Airborne Early allies. In that case, the nations could Warning and Control (AWACS) wing not use NATO’s Command Struc- at Geilenkirchen, Germany, signifi- ture, but would likely use some of the cantly straining allied resources in a same forces, and only slightly adapted

89 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 operational plans, to act as NATO’s relations with Russia and its NATO “unsanctioned vanguard”. allies, a growing number of voices responded with the familiar call for A theme frequently discussed among a stronger European pillar within central and eastern European NATO NATO – partly to accommodate US members is that NATO’s primary pressure for better “burden-sharing”, designated instruments for deterring and partly to prepare better for a for- Russia – the VJTF and the eNRF be- mal or informal US withdrawal from ing the most prominent among them NATO.11 While such an approach is – are liable to fall short due to politi- undoubtedly important, and never cal and military reasons. Exposed al- more so than today, one has to be lies then point towards nations with clear-eyed as to its limitations: Even strong military capabilities that might in the best-case scenario, Europe is set be willing to go above and beyond to lose with a US withdrawal, at least what has been authorized by a reluc- for years to come. tant NAC and intervene on their own. This envisions US, British, or Danish First, the very political and institution- troops coming to the assistance of the al logic of NATO depends on the US. Baltic and Polish states far quicker and It is, of course, no coincidence that more decisively than the designated Europe has been united and at peace NATO units. for the first time in centuries during the same time in which the US shed Setting aside the implications for NA- its tradition of shunning permanent TO’s credibility of such a non-NATO alliances and engaged with Europe. vanguard countering Russia in a region that dramatically favors the Rus- The political bedrock ofNATO is the sian side, this hope for an anti-Russian US determination to stay engaged, coalition of the willing stands and falls and to help defend its European al- with US resolve. While the UK is Eu- lies. The US is the indispensable bal- rope’s prime military power, and even ancer that brings together the still- some smaller allies have respectable heterogeneous countries of Europe military capabilities, the US is, and re- under one roof – especially the “new” mains, NATO’s indispensable nation. member states of Central Europe, all of whom look to Washington, not Strengthening the European pillar? Berlin, London, or Paris for political After the election of Donald Trump leadership and protection (not only gave rise to fears about Washington’s against Moscow).

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Second, NATO’s prime military as- notice over strategic distances. More- set, its integrated and tested com- over, if we look beyond these ground mand structure, has always been built forces to air and naval capabilities, the around US capabilities and forces. gap between US forces and those of Just as NATO’s supreme commander the other allies is even larger. The fact in Europe (SACEUR) is simultane- that NATO had to rely on US sup- ously the commander of all US forces port, coordination, and supplies for in Europe (COM EUCOM) within a relatively minor air campaign over the US unified command plan, US Libya in 2011 should caution against general officers form the backbone of ambitious expectations in any real NATO’s Command Structure. The US war scenario against Russia. While cannot simply withdraw from NATO’s individual NATO members may add military integration, as France did in relevant capabilities in the area of spe- 1966, without doing the utmost dam- cial operations and cyber-capabilities, age to the alliance’s capability for mili- the US remains on a level of its own tary operations. in these spheres as well.

Third, in addition to the command- Fourth – and re-entering the debate and-control arrangements that are after years of neglect – NATO’s nuclear critical to any military operation, and deterrence still is vitally dependent on even more so for multinational cam- US nuclear weapons and political will. paigns, the US provides the bulk of Through its strategic and tactical nu- critical, mission-relevant, and mission- clear weapons, and through the nucle- ready capabilities and forces. With ar sharing arrangements with selected regard to ground forces, even with European nations, the US provides the generous counting, the major Euro- nuclear umbrella for the continent. pean allies would be hard-pressed to Should that umbrella weaken or even provide one combat-capable brigade disappear, it is far from a given that the at short notice. The US alone is set to two remaining nuclear powers, France have three combat brigades present in and the UK, could step into the void. Europe at all times, plus materiel for a Judging by the political climate that fourth, as well as the relevant ground made Brexit possible, London is liable enablers, including significant artillery to value independence over anything capabilities and national command- else, its public support for NATO not- and-control elements. Added to these withstanding. Paris has always been are high-readiness forces in the US consistent in its insistence on nuclear that can be deployed at relatively short sovereignty. Nevertheless, even if one

91 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 or both of these nations were to agree the alliance. Within only a few years, to extend their nuclear deterrence, this the alliance has found itself facing a would hardly be an equivalent substi- weak but determined strategic com- tute for US forces. The UK only op- petitor, structural insecurity in its erates submarine-based strategic nu- neighborhood, and existential doubts clear weapons and is technologically over the reliability of the indispen- dependent on the US. In addition to sable ally, the US. Increased defense submarines, France relies on tactical spending, while critical, will not suf- aircraft as delivery platforms. These fice. Institutional adaptation might forces are several “steps” below the ca- bring some respite and leverage NA- pabilities that are traditionally – and TO’s strengths, but comes with its increasingly – deemed necessary on the own risks and costs attached. ladder of escalation. Without the US, there is no credible nuclear deterrence Ultimately, the strength and cohe- in NATO.12 sion of NATO as an alliance of sov- ereign nation-states depend on the The bottom line is that the US is and political determination to overcome remains NATO’s indispensable nation. political challenges. Without Wash- While fairer burden-sharing and in- ington acknowledging that, through creased European commitments will all disagreements, NATO is not just a have some effects, there is no cheap means, but an end in itself, the pros- and immediate shortcut for the Euro- pects are bleak. However, for all of peans to strengthen the “European pil- Russia’s determination and the cred- lar” to the point of “strategic autono- ible threat that it poses, NATO is pri- my” or even to substitute a retrenching marily threatened from within – and US. In any scenario, especially regard- can thus be saved from within. ing a revanchist Russia and its Eastern defense, there is no credible deterrence and no realistic defense of Europe, 1 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Co- within or outside of NATO, without ercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy”, the US – for at least a decade to come. in: Proliferation Papers no. 54 (2015).

2 Mark Galeotti, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya A Thoroughly Political Challenge Voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military challenge right (Prague: Mayak Intelligence, 2016), NATO is in peril; not because the 77 – 82. challenges are insurmountable, but 3 Thomas Rid, “How Russia Pulled Off the because it is threatened from the out- Biggest Election Hack in U.S. History”, in: side and within, severely hampering Esquire, 20.10.2016.

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4 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 393 – 394.

5 Robert Gates, Speech on the Future of NATO, 10.06.2011.

6 William Choong, “Trump and the Asia-Pacific: Managing Contradictions”, in: Survival 59, no. 1 (2017), 181 – 187, here 183.

7 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

8 “So will die Nato islamistischen Terror bekämpfen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.02.2017.

9 Martin Zapfe / Michael Haas, “Access for Allies? NATO, Russia, and the Baltics”, in: The RUSI Journal 161, no. 3, (2016), 34 – 41.

10 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Na- tions’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?” in: NATO Defense College Research Paper no. 132 (2016).

11 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Why NATO needs a European pillar”, in: Politico.eu, 11.02.2017.

12 Oliver Thränert, “No shortcut to a European Deterrent”, in: CSS Policy Perspectives 5, no. 2 (2017).