Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017. © 2017, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 4 Threatened from Within? NATO, Trump and Institutional Adaptation Martin Zapfe NATO faces an existential challenge by a revanchist Russia. Despite im- pressive assurance and adaptation measures, its overall defense position remains weak. It will face serious challenges in balancing strategic diver- gence, both within Europe and in its transatlantic relations. While regional- ization and increased European efforts might offer some respite, the stage is set for potentially serious rifts at a critical point in time. US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg during a NATO defense ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, 15 February 2017. 73 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 The Atlantic alliance is both more rele- alliance. However, it is unlikely that vant, and more threatened by internal NATO can insulate itself from global disturbances, than ever before since US conflicts under a President Don- the end of the Cold War. At least since ald Trump who appears to follow a Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea strictly transactionist understanding and subsequent invasion of eastern of foreign policy. The US could very Ukraine, European states and their well impose conditions on its secu- militaries have had to accept that they rity guarantees, and other alliance have to use the current time of peace members may find that increasing to think potential war. At the same their defense budgets, while necessary time, the Russian challenge goes far and imminent, might not be enough. beyond conventional military threats, Although there are ways for “institu- opting instead for “cross-domain coer- tional NATO” to mitigate the strate- cion”1 from sub-conventional to nu- gic divergences within the alliance, clear means and methods. The target they each come with distinct risks at- is cohesion within NATO – weaken- tached and will not be a substitute for ing the transatlantic link and suprana- US leadership and capabilities. tional European institutions – a policy of constant divide and rule. It is at The Russian Threat and NATO’s this critical point that the presidency Response of Donald Trump appears to threaten A Threat to Cohesion NATO from within. European states are facing many and complex security challenges. Migra- This chapter argues that NATO’s ad- tion pressures, terrorism, and frag- aptation towards countering the Rus- ile states at their periphery demand sian challenge since 2014 is impressive. attention. However, the challenge Nevertheless, although achieved at high posed by Russia under President political cost, it still risks falling short. Vladimir Putin is of a different qual- Further tangible steps are necessary to ity, as it targets the very basis of the deter Moscow, and yet internal strate- order that, after the end of the Second gic divergences within NATO threaten World War, enabled the longest peri- to hamper or block such measures. It od of peace in written European his- is here that the external and internal tory – and a democratic, prosperous threats to NATO converge. peace as well. Both with its aggression against Ukraine and with the largely The US is NATO’s indispensable ally, sub-conventional, “hybrid” nature the political and military core of the of this aggression, Russia has crossed 74 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? lines that only a few years ago were long denied by Russian authorities, considered inviolable. The Russian appears to augur the “new normal” in challenge is existential in that it com- Russian-European relations. Russia’s bines external and internal threats: understanding of interstate relations Russia poses the only credible territo- as a continuum of conflict, where the rial threat to a NATO member while choice of means is not dictated by actively aiming to subverting not only questions of legality, but of practica- the inter- and supranational European bility, is diametrically opposed to the alliances, but the democratic order of conduct of diplomacy and the under- European states per se. standing of interstate relations from the European point of view. Russia’s First, the annexation of Crimea concept of “new-generation warfare” marked the first armed land grab consciously and explicitly denies the in Europe since the end of the Sec- distinction between war and peace ond World War. Six decades of gen- as separate spheres. This overburdens eral peace were partly made possible the West’s ability to formulate policy through the official renunciation of responses.2 In addition, Russia has territorial ambitions and irreden- demonstrated that its understanding tism. Borders, while changeable in of information warfare (IW) as an in- principle, were to be inviolable, as tegral part of cyber-operations aims laid down in the Helsinki Final Act at a soft spot in the West’s defense of 1975 and confirmed in the Paris – its normative and legal distinction Charter of 1990. Even through the between the military and civilian bloody wars of Yugoslav succession, spheres, and its commitment to the this principle was generally upheld. principle of a free press. The influ- Kosovo, for all the debate about it ence operations conducted daily in constituting a precedent for Crimea, Western societies, most prominently was not invaded by any Western state the hack-and-release operation to in- for the sake of territorial gains. The fluence the outcome of the US presi- Russian attack against Ukraine to pre- dential election in 2016, aim at weak- vent the nation’s movement towards ening the democratic societies of the Europe was and remains a watershed West and their trust in the democratic predicted by very few within and out- process of governance.3 side of NATO. Adaptation Falls Short Second, the “hybrid”, ostensibly cov- NATO stepped up to the challenge ert nature of the invasion, which was in ways that not too many observers 75 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 had expected. In the mere three years facing an unprecedented – if still since the Wales Summit of 2014, merely symbolic – NATO presence at NATO has implemented the “Readi- its borders and reinforced US troops ness Action Plan” and taken impor- in Europe. tant and far-reaching steps to reassure allies and adapt to the new challenges Compared to where the alliance stood for a credible defense of the exposed when Russia invaded Ukraine – with allies in the east – first and foremost, limited plans, no significant pres- the Baltic states. It has established the ence, and a diminished institutional so-called “Very High Readiness Joint memory of how actually to conduct Task Force” (VJTF) as its spearhead, territorial defense – the progress is it has enhanced the NATO Response impressive. Judging by whether these Force (“eNRF”), it has established measures, by themselves, could cred- eight small headquarters in the east- ibly deter a Russian aggression in the ern member states to facilitate quick most feared scenarios, however, the deployments, and it has adapted its answer appears to be negative. Un- Force and Command Structure. The til it is backed up by credible capa- next, logical step at the alliance’s July bilities, rehearsed contingency plans, 2016 summit in Warsaw was the de- and demonstrated political will, a cision to deploy four multinational symbolic presence in the form of a battalion-sized battlegroups as the trip-wire force remains exactly that “Enhanced Forward Presence” (EFP). – symbolic. On top of these multilateral measures, For NATO, the order of the day must the US, under the administration of be twofold: politically, to preserve the former US president Barack Obama, cohesion of the alliance and to un- significantly increased its military derline the importance of Article 5, commitment to Europe. In addition and militarily, further to strengthen to the two combat brigades continu- NATO’s posture in the east. This en- ously stationed in Germany and Italy, hanced posture would allow the al- armored brigades will rotate in nine- liance to better resist Russian “new month cycles into eastern Europe to generation war” in peacetime and to train with local forces, and equipment make credible preparations for open for another armored brigade will be hostilities in case of war. The agenda stored in Belgium, the Netherlands, should be set. However, serious stra- and Germany. Three years after the tegic divergences threaten to prevent invasion of Crimea, Russia will be this from happening. 76 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? NATO’s Conventional Deterrence Posture Key multilateral and US forces, key NATO command and control structure NATO members NATO members with Force Integration Units (FIU) Iceland HQ NATO and Shape Mons Joint Force Command (JFC) Multinational Corps Northeast (MCNE) NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) Multinational Division South-East (MND S-E) Romanian Multinational Framework Brigade NATO enhanced Forward Presence