Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016
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The RUSI Journal ISSN: 0307-1847 (Print) 1744-0378 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20 Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016 Richard D Hooker Jr To cite this article: Richard D Hooker Jr (2015) Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016, The RUSI Journal, 160:3, 26-36, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731 Published online: 30 Jun 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 752 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi20 Download by: [National Defense University] Date: 26 January 2017, At: 08:26 This work wasauthored as part of the Contributor’s official THE Rusi JOuRnal duties as an Employee of the UnitedStatesGovernment andisthereforeawork of the United States Government. In accordance with 17 USC 105, no copyrightprotection is available forsuch worksunder US Law. OPERaTiOn BalTic FORTREss, 2016 naTO DEFEnDs THE BalTic sTaTEs RicHaRD D HOOkER, JR The Russian intervention in Ukraine can be seen not as an isolated incident, but as part of a larger strategy aimed at re-establishing Russian control and influence over its near abroad – a sphere of influence severely diminished with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Building on its success in Georgia, the Russian Federation moved aggressively in 2014 to seize Crimea and destabilise eastern Ukraine. In each case, Russia leveraged ethnic Russian populations to encourage separatist movements, introducing Russian paramilitaries, intelligence operatives, special forces and eventually conventional forces. In this hypothetical scenario, written as a ‘historical perspective’, Richard D Hooker, Jr examines a possible next move against the Baltic States, where similar conditions apply. Should Russia move against the Baltics, NATO will face its most challenging test in a generation. n28January2016, the North Thestakesfor NATO could not have economic ties to the traditionalWestern Atlantic Treaty Organization beenhigher. Russian actions could be powers.USinitiatives to station ballistic- Ofaced the mostmomentous missile defencesinPoland between seen not justasattempts to reclaimlost decision in its history,decisively territories, but also as an ambitious effort 2001 and 2008 had rankledRussian answeringmanycritics who openly to fractureand bring down the Alliance leaders, althoughtheyhad been scaled questioned NATO’s resolve. In this historic itself,along-cherished dream. Defection back by the following administration. session, the twenty-eightmembersof by anymember statewould constitute Though posing no militarythreat, these the Alliance votedfirmlyinfavour of a arepudiation of the WashingtonTreaty developmentswereinterpreted in strong militaryresponsetoRussia’smove and its founding preceptthat‘an attack Moscow as parts of aconscious strategy into Estonia. Long feared, the Russian on one is an attack on all’.2 Repeatedly, to undermine the economic and political operation closely resembled its previous both the secretarygeneral andSACEUR viability of the RussianFederation. land grabsinCrimea and eastern Ukraine had warned that anyRussian subversion This charge wasatleastpartly true; no in 2014.1 In the aftermath of those using the techniques of hybrid warseen Western democracy could approveof incursions the Russian economystumbled in Crimea andeastern Ukraine would be the growing corruption, human-rights badly,hit hardbyfalling oil prices and consideredanArticleVtriggerjustifying violations andauthoritarianism taking Western sanctions and the collapse of the aNATOmilitaryresponse.3 Nowthe test hold inside Russia. rouble. In the midstofeconomic crisis had come. Patiently but deliberately,the and increasingly isolatedinternationally, Whydid Russia intervene? Historians Russianpresidentinhis yearsinpower but buoyedbyrising domesticsupport willdebate thatquestion foryears, and hadeffectively consolidatedhis control basedonappeals to Russian nationalism, until inside sources aremade available of the state, channelling deep-seated the Russian president‘doubled down’ on the onlyanswers mustbeconjectural. But themes aboutRussian nationalism, sending Russian intelligence operatives the broad outlines seem clear enough. imperialism and acentrally organised and special forces into Estonia. As with According to the Russian narrative,NATO autocraticsystemofgovernance. The earlierincursions elsewhere, Russia’s had reneged on assurancesthatitwould re-nationalisation of the energy sector interventionwas not declared. Instead, not expand to the eastfollowing the in the early 2000sand high global Moscow expressedits support for collapse of the SovietUnion.4 The entry energyprices yielded economicbenefits ‘oppressedRussian minorities in eastern of former Warsaw Pact states into NATO that overshadowed hisprogressive Estonia and in defense of their right to and the European Union had transformed dismantling of Russia’snascent self-determination.’ them into democratic polities with closer democracy and construction of an RUSI JOURNALJUNE/JULY2015 VOL. 160 NO.3pp. 26–36 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731 RUSI 160_3 TEXT.indd 26 19/06/2015 06:39:38 Estonian troopsparade in Narva,Estonia, February2015. Courtesy of AP Photo/Liis Treimann. oligarchicand corruptpolitical system.5 decade, as Russia modernised its military, which, combined with aprecipitous It alsocreated energy dependence upgradedits command-and-control drop in oilprices, putstrong pressure in Eastern andCentral Europe that structures andcodified its foreign and on Russian elites. The NATO summit in magnified Russianinfluence, inflating defence policies.9 Using allinstruments Wales in September 2014 also specifically the country’srole in international of national power, with special emphasis referred to ‘thechallenges posedby politics and security beyond its actual on informationoperations and the Russiaand their strategic implications’, military, economic anddemographic cybersphere, Russia had embarked reaffirming theprimacy andimportance strength.6 Though Russia’s military on an ambitious programmetoregain of collective defence.11 An obvious capacityhad declined since the fall of influenceand controloverthe ‘near Russianoption, to end theintervention the SovietUnion,Russian use of force– abroad’ in Eastern Europe and Central in Ukraine and work to re-establish in Chechnya and Dagestan, in Georgia, Asia. In 2010 theRussian government productiveties with theWest, would and mostspectacularly in Crimea and officially designated NATO as the have yielded immediateeconomic and eastern Ukraine –had bolsteredthe country’stop security threat. At the political benefits. But in the psychology regime’spopularityathome while same time, defence spending by NATO which seemed to hold Moscow in its grip, drawing only weak responses from the member states continued to plummet, withdrawal would mean something like West.7 Meanwhile, continued penetration while the lastUStank stationed in failureordefeat, whichthe regime was and influence operations in Bulgaria Europe departed in 2013.Perhaps not prepared to countenance.Russia had and Hungaryinparticular indicated distracted by its long commitmentin succeeded beyond expectation with its continued Russianinterestinrolling back Afghanistanand increasing turmoil in the hybrid approach to conflict:leveraging democraticgains in Eastern Europe. Middle East,NATOwas slowtoappreciate ethnic Russianpopulations around its The Russianmilitaryintervention the growing threat. Ukraine changed periphery, using propaganda, cyber, in Ukraine in 2014 fedRussian nostalgia all that. economic pressureand infiltration across about its former imperial past,but its Re-drawing borders by forceinthe sovereign borders effectively,always mostshatteringeffect wasthe direct Europeanspace was, by 2014, shocking backed up by the threatofpowerful challengetothe internationalorder and deeply offensivetoEuropeanleaders conventionaland even nuclear forces. it represented.8 Clear warning signs born in the mid-twentieth century.10 They Even thedowning of acivilianairliner hademergedthroughout the previous responded with economic sanctions by Russian proxies in July 2014 and the 27 RUSI 160_3 TEXT.indd 27 19/06/2015 06:39:40 OPERaTiOn BalTic FORTREss, 2016 fall of Mariupol to Russian forces in on the ground wassofar unproven. Planning in parallel, AlliedCommand October 2015 had not elicited anyserious Overshadowing everything else wasfear. Operations and the NATO Military militaryresponse by the Americans or Russia,the strongestnuclear poweron Committee examined the options. Europeans.12 the planet, had apowerfulmilitaryand ForyearsNATOhad fielded a‘NATO Forthe small or weak states which aprovenwillingness to use it. Response Force’,rotated among nations hadonce belonged to the empire, this Forall of these reasons, aunanimous butnever felt to be up to the task of form of bullying waseffective.13 Using the decision to confront Russiamilitarily over rapid deploymentand employmentin Ukraine playbook in the Baltic States was theBaltics wasuncertain at best. Inside times of crisis.16 Russian aggression in agamble.14 Yetitseemed at leastaslikely the Alliance, the debate wascontentious Crimea had also spurred NATO to begin as not thatNATOwould lack the unity and and highly charged. In the midstofthe work on a‘spearhead’ reaction force confidence to meetthe challenge. To the crisis the US, the backbone of NATO, of brigade size, but Russian movesinto