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Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016
Richard D Hooker Jr
To cite this article: Richard D Hooker Jr (2015) Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016, The RUSI Journal, 160:3, 26-36, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731
Published online: 30 Jun 2015.
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OPERaTiOn BalTic FORTREss, 2016 naTO DEFEnDs THE BalTic sTaTEs
RicHaRD D HOOkER, JR
The Russian intervention in Ukraine can be seen not as an isolated incident, but as part of a larger strategy aimed at re-establishing Russian control and influence over its near abroad – a sphere of influence severely diminished with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Building on its success in Georgia, the Russian Federation moved aggressively in 2014 to seize Crimea and destabilise eastern Ukraine. In each case, Russia leveraged ethnic Russian populations to encourage separatist movements, introducing Russian paramilitaries, intelligence operatives, special forces and eventually conventional forces. In this hypothetical scenario, written as a ‘historical perspective’, Richard D Hooker, Jr examines a possible next move against the Baltic States, where similar conditions apply. Should Russia move against the Baltics, NATO will face its most challenging test in a generation.
n28January2016, the North Thestakesfor NATO could not have economic ties to the traditionalWestern Atlantic Treaty Organization beenhigher. Russian actions could be powers.USinitiatives to station ballistic- Ofaced the mostmomentous missile defencesinPoland between seen not justasattempts to reclaimlost decision in its history,decisively territories, but also as an ambitious effort 2001 and 2008 had rankledRussian answeringmanycritics who openly to fractureand bring down the Alliance leaders, althoughtheyhad been scaled questioned NATO’s resolve. In this historic itself,along-cherished dream. Defection back by the following administration. session, the twenty-eightmembersof by anymember statewould constitute Though posing no militarythreat, these the Alliance votedfirmlyinfavour of a arepudiation of the WashingtonTreaty developmentswereinterpreted in strong militaryresponsetoRussia’smove and its founding preceptthat‘an attack Moscow as parts of aconscious strategy into Estonia. Long feared, the Russian on one is an attack on all’.2 Repeatedly, to undermine the economic and political operation closely resembled its previous both the secretarygeneral andSACEUR viability of the RussianFederation. land grabsinCrimea and eastern Ukraine had warned that anyRussian subversion This charge wasatleastpartly true; no in 2014.1 In the aftermath of those using the techniques of hybrid warseen Western democracy could approveof incursions the Russian economystumbled in Crimea andeastern Ukraine would be the growing corruption, human-rights badly,hit hardbyfalling oil prices and consideredanArticleVtriggerjustifying violations andauthoritarianism taking Western sanctions and the collapse of the aNATOmilitaryresponse.3 Nowthe test hold inside Russia. rouble. In the midstofeconomic crisis had come. Patiently but deliberately,the and increasingly isolatedinternationally, Whydid Russia intervene? Historians Russianpresidentinhis yearsinpower but buoyedbyrising domesticsupport willdebate thatquestion foryears, and hadeffectively consolidatedhis control basedonappeals to Russian nationalism, until inside sources aremade available of the state, channelling deep-seated the Russian president‘doubled down’ on the onlyanswers mustbeconjectural. But themes aboutRussian nationalism, sending Russian intelligence operatives the broad outlines seem clear enough. imperialism and acentrally organised and special forces into Estonia. As with According to the Russian narrative,NATO autocraticsystemofgovernance. The earlierincursions elsewhere, Russia’s had reneged on assurancesthatitwould re-nationalisation of the energy sector interventionwas not declared. Instead, not expand to the eastfollowing the in the early 2000sand high global Moscow expressedits support for collapse of the SovietUnion.4 The entry energyprices yielded economicbenefits ‘oppressedRussian minorities in eastern of former Warsaw Pact states into NATO that overshadowed hisprogressive Estonia and in defense of their right to and the European Union had transformed dismantling of Russia’snascent self-determination.’ them into democratic polities with closer democracy and construction of an
RUSI JOURNALJUNE/JULY2015 VOL. 160 NO.3pp. 26–36 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1054731
RUSI 160_3 TEXT.indd 26 19/06/2015 06:39:38 Estonian troopsparade in Narva,Estonia, February2015. Courtesy of AP Photo/Liis Treimann.
oligarchicand corruptpolitical system.5 decade, as Russia modernised its military, which, combined with aprecipitous It alsocreated energy dependence upgradedits command-and-control drop in oilprices, putstrong pressure in Eastern andCentral Europe that structures andcodified its foreign and on Russian elites. The NATO summit in magnified Russianinfluence, inflating defence policies.9 Using allinstruments Wales in September 2014 also specifically the country’srole in international of national power, with special emphasis referred to ‘thechallenges posedby politics and security beyond its actual on informationoperations and the Russiaand their strategic implications’, military, economic anddemographic cybersphere, Russia had embarked reaffirming theprimacy andimportance strength.6 Though Russia’s military on an ambitious programmetoregain of collective defence.11 An obvious capacityhad declined since the fall of influenceand controloverthe ‘near Russianoption, to end theintervention the SovietUnion,Russian use of force– abroad’ in Eastern Europe and Central in Ukraine and work to re-establish in Chechnya and Dagestan, in Georgia, Asia. In 2010 theRussian government productiveties with theWest, would and mostspectacularly in Crimea and officially designated NATO as the have yielded immediateeconomic and eastern Ukraine –had bolsteredthe country’stop security threat. At the political benefits. But in the psychology regime’spopularityathome while same time, defence spending by NATO which seemed to hold Moscow in its grip, drawing only weak responses from the member states continued to plummet, withdrawal would mean something like West.7 Meanwhile, continued penetration while the lastUStank stationed in failureordefeat, whichthe regime was and influence operations in Bulgaria Europe departed in 2013.Perhaps not prepared to countenance.Russia had and Hungaryinparticular indicated distracted by its long commitmentin succeeded beyond expectation with its continued Russianinterestinrolling back Afghanistanand increasing turmoil in the hybrid approach to conflict:leveraging democraticgains in Eastern Europe. Middle East,NATOwas slowtoappreciate ethnic Russianpopulations around its The Russianmilitaryintervention the growing threat. Ukraine changed periphery, using propaganda, cyber, in Ukraine in 2014 fedRussian nostalgia all that. economic pressureand infiltration across about its former imperial past,but its Re-drawing borders by forceinthe sovereign borders effectively,always mostshatteringeffect wasthe direct Europeanspace was, by 2014, shocking backed up by the threatofpowerful challengetothe internationalorder and deeply offensivetoEuropeanleaders conventionaland even nuclear forces. it represented.8 Clear warning signs born in the mid-twentieth century.10 They Even thedowning of acivilianairliner hademergedthroughout the previous responded with economic sanctions by Russian proxies in July 2014 and the
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fall of Mariupol to Russian forces in on the ground wassofar unproven. Planning in parallel, AlliedCommand October 2015 had not elicited anyserious Overshadowing everything else wasfear. Operations and the NATO Military militaryresponse by the Americans or Russia,the strongestnuclear poweron Committee examined the options. Europeans.12 the planet, had apowerfulmilitaryand ForyearsNATOhad fielded a‘NATO Forthe small or weak states which aprovenwillingness to use it. Response Force’,rotated among nations hadonce belonged to the empire, this Forall of these reasons, aunanimous butnever felt to be up to the task of form of bullying waseffective.13 Using the decision to confront Russiamilitarily over rapid deploymentand employmentin Ukraine playbook in the Baltic States was theBaltics wasuncertain at best. Inside times of crisis.16 Russian aggression in agamble.14 Yetitseemed at leastaslikely the Alliance, the debate wascontentious Crimea had also spurred NATO to begin as not thatNATOwould lack the unity and and highly charged. In the midstofthe work on a‘spearhead’ reaction force confidence to meetthe challenge. To the crisis the US, the backbone of NATO, of brigade size, but Russian movesinto Russian leadership this possibility seemed playedastrong leading role –reassuring Estonia took place before this concept worth running risks.Inthe worstcase, here,cajoling there–and in some had gotoffthe ground.17 As with most Russiacould denyactual involvement cases bluntly deploying its economic conflicts, this one burst upon NATO as a and be no worseoff, as senior advisers and political strength in the interests ‘come as youare’crisis. Whatwas needed seemtohaveargued. It maywell be true of Alliancesolidarity.The UK proved a wasacredible force, drawnfromacross thatthe ultimate decision wasnot sober strong and persuasiveally,asdid France the Alliance, thatcould move quickly, and calculated, but an emotional reaction after some intensiveconsultation. Italy, sustain itself and if necessary conduct to deep-seated feelings that Russiahad Spain and Portugal–farther from the kinetic operations to bolsterlocal host- been marginalised and disrespected point of confrontation and with pressing nation forces, stabilise the situation and by Western leaders. In anycase, it challenges in the Mediterranean–were securethe border. precipitated themostdangerous crisis in more hesitant, while the newermembers Within seventy-twohoursof NATO’s history.The unthinkable had burst in Eastern Europe (the Poles excepted) confirmationthatRussian elements upon the Alliance. Warwith Russia was were terrified. Thepivot on whichall had crossedthe border,the Council nowinprospect. turned wasGermany. After awrenching directedthatamilitaryforce be internaldebate,and in the knowledge formed anddeployed under ArticleV
NATO Responds thatfailing to support aunited Alliance of the WashingtonTreaty. This wasan The first and mostimportantsteps were response would not preventthe formation extraordinaryachievement, giventhe political. Smaller statesinEastern Europe of aUS-led militarycoalition, the needfor consultation in all twenty- in particular sawhigh riskinbanking on chancellor made acourageous and in the eight capitals as well as NATO’s own the firm support of the US and other end decisivedecision in favour of action. headquarters bureaucracy.18 Operating leadingpowerslikeFrance,the UK and The vote of the North Atlantic under crisis-management procedures, Germany. ManyNATOmembersin Council captured the attentionofthe the Council issuedthe following political Eastern andCentral Europe were largely entireworld. Nothing so dramatic had guidance through the MilitaryCommittee or even wholly dependentonRussian happenedinEuropeanpolitics since the to SACEUR: ‘Your mission is to deploy energysupplies. Germany, Europe’s reunification of Germany. At issue was militaryforcesassoon as possible to the economic powerhouse, wasdeeply something deeperthan the future of the Baltic republics, to support hostnation ambiguous aboutusing forcetoresolve Baltic States or even thefutureofNATO. forces in restoring order and securing political disputes. Poland took afirmer The real question in the mindsofAllies their territorial integrity.Lethal forceis approach. Southern European economies and adversaries alikewas whether the authorized if necessarytodefend NATO remained fragileand reluctanttorisk West would take astand at all. Previous forces or host nation noncombatants.’19 economic collapse over aconfrontation militarydeployments in Iraq, Afghanistan With no time to spend on with Russia. Strong political pressures and Libya had not beenexistential in developing newconcepts, SACEUR and existedinevery NATO capital to avoid nature. Direct confrontation with Russia his plannersquickly found asuitable directconfrontation with the Russian might well be.Eveninsiders could not answer: the communityofrapid-reaction Federation at almostany cost.The with confidencepredict the result. On formations found throughout NATO.In high representativeofthe European 28 January, with heads of stateand manywaystheseweretailor-made for Union forforeignaffairsand security governmentsitting in the Council, the problem at hand. Though European policy publicly opposedaNATOmilitary NATO’s member nationsanswered militarycapabilities had declined since response, expressing uncertainty over the challenge. All knewthatevenone the fall of the SovietUnion, manynations Russia’s actual involvementand calling instance of dissent could mean the end, retainedemergency interventionforces fornegotiations to address ‘points of not only forEstonia and the Baltic States, (usually parachuteunits). Mostwere conflict’. Russian hybrid warapproaches but forNATOitself.15 The ultimate vote,a maintained at high states of readiness, were sophisticated, offering many difficult but unanimous decision to send filled with high-quality professional opportunities forwavering or frightened assistance to the Baltics, surprised many soldiers, were well equipped, and had states to discountmilitaryaction on the who did not expectsuch resolution. The considerable combatexperience from basisthatactual Russian involvement stagewas nowset forthe next moves. Iraq, Afghanistanorother operations.
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NATO parachutetroopsregularlytrained At the outset, the ability of the small either laterally in Latvia and Lithuania and interacted with each other,bringing Estonian defence forces to respond to using paramilitaries,orbyintroducing higher levels of interoperabilitytothe Russian incursions wasminimal, and regular forces to the mix in Estonia as it table.20 An added advantage wasthe forseveral weeksRussian special forces had done in Georgia, Crimea and eastern ability to organise and move quickly by (inuniform but without identifying unit Ukraine? Clearlysuch forces could be airand, if needed, to insert forces rapidly or national markings) and plain-clothes seen, massing in the LeningradMilitary into contestedareas, as the French so paramilitaries were able to organise District closetothe Estonian border,and ably demonstrated in Maliin2013.21 and move into ethnically Russian in the Russianexclave of Kaliningrad.30 If Supported by US andEuropean enclavesinthe eastern part of the these forces were used, the crisis might airlift, both militaryand commercial,the country.27 On 1Februaryaseparatist rise to full war, even raising the spectreof force–dubbed the ‘NATOStabilization provisionalgovernmentwas formed nuclear weapons. Force’ (NSF) –formed up ‘onthe fly’. with greatfanfare in Narva, acity Even as rapid-reaction forces Tendaysafterthe ‘execute’ order,only heavily populatedbyethnicRussians in movedinto Estonia by air,rail and sea, fourteendaysafterRussian forces had the northeast area astride the Russian NATO planners wrestled with next steps. enteredEstonian territory, apotent border,declaring itsindependence Alarger, stronger forcemightforestall brigade-sized forcehad assembled and desiretojoin with Russia.28 At the interventionbyRussian conventional on the eastern outskirts of Tallinn, same time, the internationalmedia forces –orprovoke it. Other Russian includingUS, Frenchand British para reported large,violent demonstrations movesinto neighbouring countries had battalions.22 Aweek laterthe forcehad by ethnic Russians living in Tallinn, also to be considered. Potential Russian growntodivisionsize, withthe addition apparently orchestratedbythe Russian navaloperations in the Gulf of Finland of Italian, Turkish, Belgian, Spanish, government, demandingreintegration and air defence over Estonia and the Portugueseand Polish parachute- with the Russian Federation. Justinside Baltic regiondemanded appropriate infantry battalion battlegroups, each Russianterritory,anominousbuild-up measures. No onewantedamajor withtheir ownartillerybatteryand anti- of armoured and mechanised forces, military confrontation with Russia. Yet tank, engineer, air-defence,signaland combataircraft,artilleryand logistics prudence dictated ameasured response logistics units.23 US and UK all-weather dumpswereestablished, clearly meant thataddressedall dimensions of the
attack helicopterbattalions were also to deteraNATOresponse. Estonian unfolding crisis. provided. These were accompanied by officials movedquickly to mobilise the By mid-February, the NSF wasfirmly brigade-levelheadquartersfromthe Kaitseliit,the reserve army(as did Latvia established on the ground as adivision- US, UK and France,and adivision-level and Lithuania), but thatwould take time sized jointtask force, headquartered in ‘assault command post’fromthe US and could not in anycase cope with the Rakvere(25 km to the eastofTallinn), airborne division.24 Combataircraft from threat.29 Meanwhile,NATOmoved to fill with one US-led brigade in Johvi across NATO providedfighterand airlift the void. controlling the road and rail nexuswest supportfrombases outside Estonia.25 A Politically,the crisis resembled of Narva;one French-led brigade in Polva, NATO Special Operations Forces element agiantchessgame. The Alliance had to forestall anyRussian incursion south wasalso formed with contingents from weathered the first and mostdangerous of LakePeipus;and the UK-led brigade manyofthe high-end special-forces units challenge: the political decisionto centrally positioned in Jogevaand able to existing in the Alliance. respond with forcetothe Russian respond in either direction. NATO fighter The particular mix of forces sentto incursion. The introduction of strong aircraft stepped up air patrols over the Estonia wasintended to convey aclear forces from acrossNATOinto Estonia Baltic Sea andBaltic republic airspace, signal to Russian decision-makers. On the meantthatre-establishing stability and while astrong NATO navaltask force one hand, the forcerepresentedsome host-nation controlinthe ‘breakaway’ movedinto the Baltic Sea, positioned of the bestcombattroopsavailable, region wasnow likely –ifNATOheld firm. outside the Gulf of Finland to monitor reinforcing NATO messaging thatthe But it also constituted anothercritical the Russian BalticFleet.31 Alliancemeantbusiness and would fight decision pointfor Russia. Since the end to defend amember state. On theother, of the Cold War, NATO had refrained The Crisis Deepens the NSF wasequipped with only light from permanently stationing NATO Within afew days of NATO’s arrival, vehiclesand possessednoreal offensive troopsinformer Warsaw Pact countries, Estonian forces partnered with NATO capability,reassuring Russianplanners and had sidetracked NATO membership SOF units began to confront rebel forces thatcross-border operations were not forGeorgiaand Ukraine,indeference in thevillages and communities outside likely.26 No tank units or heavy bombers to Russian sensitivities. In the present Narva,preceded by high volumesof were relocated to forwardair basesand crisis such measures were setaside. As social-media and radio messaging. Local nuclear alert levels were not heightened. the NSF builtupitbecame clear that militia groupsled by Russian advisers Russian propaganda trumpetedthe Russian paramilitaries andspecial forces offered sporadic but spirited resistance ‘massive’ NATO build-up as an invasion supporting ethnic Russian‘militias’ would using mines, mortarfire,sniper attacks force. Russiandecision-makers knew not be enoughtooverthrowthe Baltic and crude improvisedexplosive devices better. governments. Would Moscow escalate, but there were no set-piecebattles.
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Ominously,however,some Russian thatwecontinue to flowour rapid conventionalforces and avert apossible conventionalforcesmoved forwardto reaction forces to provide astrong catastrophe. Ivangorod, astride the Russian–Estonian and capable conventionaldeterrent, border,raising the stakes to afevered whileatthe sametime reassuring the Following NACapproval, this largerforce pitch. RussianminoritiesinLatvia Russiansthatwehavenooffensive began to deployforty-eight hourslater. andLithuania begantomobilise and intentions. Irecommend we deploya Alreadyalertedbyprevious events, demonstrate, though intelligenceinitially corpsheadquartersunder JointForces forces earmarked forthe next phase failed to identify anyovert Russian Command (JFC) Brunssum, with three of operations movedtorailheads and militaryactivity insidethose countries.At divisions composed of light, rapid departureairfieldsand began to deploy. the UN, the US secretaryofstate and the reaction troops. These would be drawn The advance echelon of the ARRCarrived NATO secretarygeneral addressed the from across the Alliance. Pleasenote in Rigaand established its operations General Assembly andpresentedproof the forceisdefensiveonly and will not centreon17February.32 The next day, thatRussian militaryand intelligence include main battle tanksorrocket forwardcommand posts of the German personnel were presentinand actively artillery, although it is well provided Schnelle Kräfte(‘rapid forces’) division destabilising Estonia and Lithuania. No withanti-tank capability should that flewinto Latvia, with advance elements SecurityCouncil resolutionwas possible be required. If the NACapproves, we of the German 26th Airborne Brigade, due to aRussian veto,but public opinion arereadytodeploy the ARRC[the Polish 6th Airborne Brigade ‘Sosabowski’ around the world,exceptinside Russia, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, based in andDutch 11th Airmobile Brigade under tilted decisively againstMoscow. the UK] as the three-staroperational command.33 ANordic brigade composed On 14 February the NACmet again headquarters, immediately. of Norwegian, Danish, Swedish and to considernextsteps.Herethe Finnish infantry battalions accompanied secretarygeneral argued persuasively SACEUR continued: the corpsreserve positionedinRiga thatNATOmusttakepositivesteps to (Finland and Sweden were of course forestall anyescalation by the Russian Ladiesand gentlemen, the problemis not NATO members, buthad longbeen Federation. ‘Ukraine is one thing,’ he said. largerthan justEstonia. The Russian close, formal partners).34 Simultaneously, ‘Military action to redraw frontierson militaryhas longdesiredthe return of 1st (UK)Division headquartersdeployed
the soilofapartnernation wasaserious the Baltic States, or at leasttheir neutral to Vilnius to command Multinational provocation. But the use of forceagainst status, to regain whattheysee as Division South.35 Its task organisation amember stateisunacceptable. Our strategic depth. Their historical concerns included3Commando Brigade (Royal early action means thatparamilitaries forthe defense of St Petersburgpre-date Marines) with aCanadian battalion andintelligenceagentswill not be the Russian Revolution and countfor battlegroup attached,the Italian ‘Folgore’ enoughtodrawEstonia back into the much in their strategic calculations. We AirborneBrigade, andthe Spanish 6th Russian orbit. Moscow nowhas two have already discussed the opportunity Parachute ‘Almogavares’ Brigade, with a choices: to bring in conventionalforces, theysee to fracturethe Alliance. In Portugueseparabattalionattached.36 or to back down. We mustbestrong addition, youare all awarethatthe Interoperability among the various enough to deterthe first,but also calm Kaliningrad oblastisanisolatedexclave NSF unitswas aconcern, as manyused enoughtoenable the second.’ separated from therestofRussia by differentcommunications systems and 300 km. It is heavilymilitarized, with notall leaders were fluentinEnglish. SACEUR followedwith details: morethan 10,000 troops, alarge This problem wasaddressedbythe militaryair base and the headquarters simple expedient of embedding US We arecalling the NATO Stabilization of the Russian Baltic fleet. Lithuania and Special Forces (‘Green Berets’) within Forcemission Operation ‘Baltic Fortress’. Latvia lie squarely betweenKaliningrad each national contingent. Each of the We assess thatthe Russianmilitarycan and mother Russia. The presentcrisis non-US NATO brigade headquarters and enterEstonia at anytime, using the presents an opportunity,fromthe battalion battlegroupswas supported by conventionalforcesithas massed along Russianperspective, to solvethis atwelve-man Operational Detachment the border; however, such amove awkwardproblem with force. Therefore, Alpha(ODA) from the US 10th Special would almostimmediately encounter from the militarypointofview, Ibelieve Forces Group, with sophisticated secure NATO troops, bringing on amilitary we musttakeinto consideration not communications equipment.37 Each confrontation neitherside maybeable only the current situation in Estonia ODAincluded trained andcertified to control. The NATO division nowon but the overallsecurityofthe Baltic NATO Joint Tactical Air Controllers the ground should be able to defend States moregenerally.For this reason I (JTACs) capable of calling in air strikes. Tallinn temporarilyinconjunction with recommend we position division-sized 10th Group’s1st Battalion, basedin Estonian forces, butmay not be able to lightforcesinLatvia and Lithuaniaas Stuttgart, Germany, pushedforward its stop heavy Russian forces at the border. well as Estonia, supported by adequate twenty-one ODAs early in the conflict Therefore, deterring further Russian navaland air forces. If we canget these to support host-nation forces in the action while avoiding provocations is forces into positionquickly,Ibelievewe Baltic States. Its 2nd and3rd Battalions key. In my judgmentitisimperative canforestall the introduction of Russian deployedfromthe continentalUStofall
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in on the other NATO contingents. The the support battalion organic to each pronouncements aboutthe importance ARRC’s communications with its higher NATO brigade,arriving in the‘second’ of NATO’s ArticleVcommitments, the headquarters, as well as its subordinate echelon after thecombattroops. In Russian inner circle had been sure divisions and separatesupporting mostcases, European-based personnel he would shrink from aclash which brigadeswas providedbyits organic and lightequipment and supplies were might well leadtowar.Now,any use signals brigade and by the supporting US flown in by national assets such as C-130 of Russian conventionalforceswould signal brigade.38 In this way, continuous Hercules and C-160Transall aircraft or mean aclash withNATOcombattroops and securecommunications links, both by commercial freightcarriers. National thatwereclearly ready to fight. Already voice and data,wereestablished from flights continued throughout the crisis to bruisedbymanymonths of fighting in the outset. provide continuous logistics support. All Ukraine and besetbypoor morale, those Thesedeployments were historic flights were protectedbyNATOfighter forces constituted abluff thathad now both in terms of scaleand speed. By the aircraft as theyapproached the theatreof miscarried.41 Thatmiscalculation caused end of February,barely amonth into the operations. Helicopterunits were largely dismayinthe Kremlin –and ahurried crisis, NATO had fieldedonthe ground able to self-deploy, with maintenance reassessmentofthe entireoperation. in the crisis area acorps-sized formation assets following later. Much of the The first Russian response wasto of elite troops. The initial echelon movementofsupport troops, supplies escalatethe informationwar.State- movedbyair,with supportechelons and equipmentwas carried outby sponsoredmediarailed aboutNATO’s arrivingbyroad, rail and sea. Here,the means of commercial truck, rail, shipand ‘invasion’ of the Baltic States, denying dense, modern Europeantransportation aircraft.The task wasimmense, and there anyRussian involvement. Russian- network proved aboon. Sustainment were mishapsand some confusion. In inspired social media trumpetedthe supplies and afull complementof general, however, the logistical challenge sameline. At the UN, the Russian vehicleswould take moretime, butin wasmet and overcome handsomely. ambassador implored the General short order –far fasterthan manyexperts In thisurgentcontingency, the Assembly to ‘takeaction against NATO deemedpossible –the combatechelon existence of light, rapid-reaction forces aggression’ which threatened ‘all wasinplaceand ready to fight.39 acrossthe major NATO powers proved out war’.Russian generals rumbled US Army Europe’s (USAREUR) 21st critical to the outcome. Their ability ominously about using nuclear weapons,
TheaterSustainmentCommand provided to move rapidly and put in place a as theyhad previously over Crimea.42 the theatrelogistics framework without viable deterrentforce,both capable Meanwhile, Russianfleetmovements which Operation Baltic Fortress would and interoperable,stunned Russian andair patrols were stepped up, not not have gotoffthe ground. While the planners. Of greatsignificance wasthe justinthe Baltic regionbut in many logistics infrastructureofUSAREUR had fact thatthis wasnoAmerican ground places, thoughactual violations of beendrawn down along with the combat forcewith afew coalition partners, airspaceorterritorialwaterswerevery forces, it retained arobustcommand-and- but rather apowerfulformation drawn few. Disturbingly,separatistmovements controlcapability.Host-nation support, from across the Alliance. ShouldRussian nowbroke out in Latvia and Lithuania, especially with food and potable water conventionalforcesinvade, the Alliance which included armedclasheswith local supplies, wasimpressive. TheUSDefense would counterwith afirm, united front. police and defence forces, undoubtedly Logistics AgencyEurope maintaineda At home stations, major NATO countries abetted by Russian intelligence officers. large presenceand strong distribution also began to ready heavier armoured Aseparatist‘republic’ wasdeclared in capabilities, and in partnership with the and mechanised forces forpossible use, Daugavpils, Latvia’ssecond-largestcity NATO Supportand ProcurementAgency but these remained in theirgarrisons.40 and one withastrong majority Russian (NSPA) washighly effectiveatexecuting In Moscow,NATO’sbold response population. Communications intercepts collectivesupport missions. Still, Baltic provoked consternation. Heretofore, andhuman-intelligence reporting soon Fortress would not have beenpossible the West had reacted mildly to Russia’s established the presenceofRussian logistically without very responsive military adventures. The Alliance had special forces there, as in Estonia. In operational contract support, provided seemeddivided, still troubledbylow Kaliningrad, Russian combatforces on alarge scale by both US and European investmentinmilitaryforces, internal movedfromgarrison to jumping off commercial organisations. Their ability squabbles aboutburden-sharing, positions on the Lithuanian border.43 to move in quickly and establish the US ‘rebalance’toAsia, the NATO Russia had other options short of effectivesupply-chain management, commitmenttoAfghanistanand outright warand the Russianpresident bulk field delivery and other essential the Eurozone crisis. MostAmerican elected to take decisiveaction once services wasextraordinary. Other combatforceshad withdrawn from the fullscope of the NATO deployment enablers, such as USAREUR’s engineer, Europeand NATO–EU relations were became clear.On2March, Gazprom, medical,air-defence,militarypolice and indifferentatbest. TheUS, by farthe the Russian state-owned energy giant, intelligence brigades, contributed the dominantmember of NATO,seemed suspended alloil and natural-gas necessarycombatsupport and service preoccupied with defence cuts and deliveries to the Baltic republics and to supportfunctions thatwereabsolutely downsizing its ground forces. While the Germanyand Poland.44 In mid-winter necessary. Of prime importance was US presidenthad been firm in his public this causedserioushardships as well
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as parliamentary discordincapitals, offensivecapabilities and these were in depth shouldRussian conventional with opposition parties calling forahalt used to respond to Russian attacksinthe forces actuallyinvade, and providing to NATO deployments and talkswith cyber-domain,pressing Russian military emergency or ‘quick reaction’ forces Moscow. The immediate humanitarian command and controlalong the whole when needed. NATO air and naval crisis wasmet by calling on national networkfromthe Kremlin to special forces operated at high alert but were energy reserves, by accelerating delivery forces andparamilitary units forward careful to avoid provocations even as of fracked US and North Sea oil and on the ground. No cyber-reprisals were they closelymonitored Russian military by tapping other alternate sources.45 carried outagainstRussian civilian movements at sea and in the air.When Fortunately,global energy supplies targets. host-nation or NATO forces came under were ample. Still, adjusting to the These were not the only options firetheyresponded proportionally.NATO sudden interruptionmeanthardship available. On 8March acatastrophic use of indirectfire wasrareand civilian and suffering forthe targeted populations explosion took place at afreightyardin casualties were low. and without question put pressureon Vilnius whenaRussian rail carloaded The crisis took aserious turn forthe NATO political leaders. Here,the US, with ammunition destined forKaliningrad worseon11March when Estonian civil the EU and the IMF acted with dispatch detonated, killing thirty-eightcivilians servants enteredNarva in an attemptto to shoreupfaltering economies, while and injuring morethan ahundred. negotiate with separatist leaders.The neighbouring countries responded Russianmediasourcesimmediately unarmedparty wasimmediately taken generously by tapping national reserves condemned the Latvian government hostage and paraded before the media. of refined oil and gastohelp theBaltic andNATObut fewwerefooled; the train The next dayseparatistparamilitaries, States andother targetstoget through waspart of regularly scheduled,daily rail undoubtedly led by Russian officers, the winter. services to the Russian exclave and the began to push west alongthe E20 Of equal or greaterimport was explosion had undoubtedly beencarried motorwaytowardthe capital in large the series of cyber-attacksthattook out by Russian operatives. All three Baltic columns of both militaryand civilian place beginning on 5March againstthe governments reacted by issuing a‘stop vehicles. SeveralEstonian soldiers Baltic States andNATOnetworks. These and search at the border’directivefor all were killed andwounded in sporadic were expectedbased on Russian cyber- rail and road trafficoriginatingfromthe fighting. After afew sharp encounters
attacksinEstonia in 2007,Georgia in RussianFederation. Moscow stridently the defending Estonian units fell back 2008 and Ukraine in 2014,integrating responded with shrill complaints about towardsJohvi. On the nightof12March cyber-operations with other offensive NATO’s decision to ‘cut off and besiege’ the advancingcolumns struck defensive actions. Russian actorsinundatedthe Kaliningrad, even though alltraffic was minefields and found themselves under Baltic States with wavesofdistributed allowedtoproceed once cleared. firefromNATOattack helicoptersand denial of service (DDoS) attacksthat These developmentswerealarming field artillery, suffering serious losses temporarily overwhelmed crucial sectors and theyspreadfear andapprehension before withdrawing to Narva.EliteNATO includinggovernment, banking and in capitals, but NATO leaders took some SOF units conducted aseries of raids communications.46 Russia also used its comfort in whatwas not happening. amidstthe confusion, capturing advanced offensive cyber-capabilities to attack both Russian nuclear alert levels were not Russian equipment issued only to Russian NATO networksand networksinthe allied raised. Reserveswerenot called up. special forces and, most spectacularly, countries thatmostvocally supported Ground and air units were not being takingRussian militaryprisonersin the Baltics, with particular emphasis transferred from theinterior to the Baltic. uniform.48 on the transportation infrastructurein Diplomats were not recalled.Both in Estonian forces, by nowincluding Poland and GermanyasNATOforces Moscow and in Brussels, though acrisis reserve formations with their NATO transited through. Heavyjamming of atmosphereprevailed,itwas clear that special-forces advisers, then counter- military communications nets across the senior decision-makerssoughttocontrol attacked, pushing into Narva and the city frequency spectrum accompanied these events. Events threatened to spiral out centretooccupythe baroque town hall cyber-attacks.47 of controlatany moment, but amidst and the medievalcastle. Separatist flags Broadly speaking,affected countries the apparentchaos these signs provided were takendown, the Estonian hostages were able to cope –albeit only just– hope. were releasedunharmedand Estonian withouteconomic collapse or loss of life, Throughout the month of February civil controlwas re-established. Here the but Russiancyber-activity imposed high and on into March, in bitter winter fighting wasnot as intense as expected, costsand serious hardship on targeted weather,NATOcommanders on the though tensions were at breaking pointas populations.Asamatter of policy,NATO ground conducted operations carefully only the Narva river separated NATO and confines itself to cyber-defence,and and with greatrestraint.Asmuch as Russian forces positioned in Ivangorod. herethe Alliancewas able to guarantee possible,host-nation forces led the NATO militaryand political leaders command-and-control capabilitiesfor its wayinall interactionswith the civilian waited withapprehension forRussian ownnetworksand to deploying NATO population, assistedbyNATOSOF.NSF artilleryoraircraft to intervene butthis forces, with some degradation. Anumber conventionalforcesgenerally confined did not materialise. Asimilaroperation of member states possessed advanced themselves to establishing defences in Daugavpils wasalso successful. In
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Kaliningrad, Russian units remained being dismantled.While showing no supporting action to defend the Baltic poised threateningly on the border but offensiveintent, NATO wasclearly States. Afailure to achieve unanimity did not invade.49 determined to stand fast.Now wasthe in the NACmighteasilyhavebeen Theseeventsprovokedafirestorm time to climb down, and look forpoints of fataltothe Alliance. NATO’s response of invectivefromRussian media, picked congruence and mutualinterest. Russia’s wasbold but also measured, signalling up and repeatedinternationally. NATO position internationally wasunfavourable apurely defensiveand proportional leaders,however,remained composed. and degradingrapidly,and even success deployment. Both risk and contribution On 17 March the defence ministers of in theBaltic States would bring even were shared fairly.Despitecontroversy the US, UK,France,Poland and Germany greatereconomic distress. Escalation and criticism from manysides, NATO’s appeared in apress conferencewith the wasfar toodangerous, as no one could militarycapacity wasfound to be equal secretarygeneral.Hewas nothingifnot predictwith confidencethe result. to the challengewhen marriedwith firm eloquent in his remarks: political guidance. Diplomacycontinued Crisis Averted throughout and wasinthe end decisive Letusall recall whatisatstake here, for At this critical juncturediplomacy in promoting solutions thatcould be it is nothing lessthan the peace of the intervened in theform of concrete acceptable, if not optimal, to all sides. wholeworld. All good people knowthat proposals, bruited in the UN initially, Considerations of national pride were this conflict wasnot of our making,and thatwould allowRussia to climb down ultimately subordinatedtothose of we wish nothing morethan its speedy gracefully.Statesmen on all sides national interest.Mostimportantly,a and peaceful resolution. But we wish to agreed, privately if notpublicly,thatan pathwaytopeace waskeptfirmlyinview be clear.NATOstands firm and united in overt Russiandefeat, whether military and neverclosedoff. All of these things this crisis. We willnot permit an Alliance or political, would not in the long run took vision, steadfastness and no small member –nomatter howsmall or serveanyone’sinterests. Theremust measureofhope. Thesequalitieswere distant–tobeinvaded and conquered be compromise –each side mustrelent found in abundanceinthe secretary by foreign powers.Wewill resist. And andmakepainful concessions. The general, the supreme allied commander we will prevail. Again and again in recent NATO offer,made discreetly through and in the heads of state and government weeksour resolvehas been tested, by intermediaries, wassimple and direct. whose resoluteand unified actions
armed attacks, by cyber attacksand by All Russian militaryand subversive preservedapeace that at times seemed cuttingoffenergy suppliesinmid-winter. activitiesonthe soil of NATO member to be vanishing. Equally important were The international community cansee states must cease. NATO would make the courageand skill of the menand withoutdoubtthe role of the Russian apublic declaration announcing that women engaged in the conflict,military Federation in provoking this crisis. You Ukraine should not join NATO,but and civilian, who never faltered. have seen our response. We stand ready would be free to choose its political and It is tooearly to knowifthese to negotiate in good faith to resolveany economicfuturefor itself.50 Resolution dramatic events heraldamorepeaceful difficulties. But we willnot negotiate,we of the Crimea issue would be deferred future,orthe beginnings of anew Cold willnever negotiate,atgunpoint. To the until afuturedateunder UN auspices. War. Much willdepend on the actions and Russian leaders we say: we were friends Economic sanctions would be lifted forbearance of menand women of good once.Wecan be friends again. Meetus and NATO forces would return to willonall sides.Asfor NATO,the Alliance at the table. But do not doubtus. That their home garrisons, with apromise has emergedfromthe crisis strengthened will lead only to tragedy forall. nottobepermanentlystationed on and renewed. If the Europeansecurity the territoryofany stateformerly architecture is to be re-established on In the Kremlin,the Russianleadership amember of theWarsawPact. A asolid foundation, NATO mustand will hesitated, pulled in opposite directions by reinvigorated Organization forSecurity continue to playits historic role as the hard-line and moreconciliatory advisers. andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) indispensable securityprovider.For many The hardlinersargued forcefully that would monitor the disengagementof yearstocome,Operation Baltic Fortress Russiancredibility and prestigewere all parties and the stationing of their willremainatestamenttothat. at risk, that the NATO deployment was forces. TheNATO-Russia Councilwould at bottom mostly bluff,and thatthe be reactivated to take alead role in Richard D Hooker, Jr is Director, Institute prospects foreventual successremained addressing the concerns of ethnic Russian for National Strategic Studies at the good; the Europeans in particular would minorities in the Balticrepublics.51 National Defense University in be forced to respond to their vocal These measures openedthe window Washington, DC. A former Dean of the publics and back down. Others argued which ultimately led to aresolution NATO Defense College, he previously thatthe gamblehad failed. NATO had not of the crisis, the mostdangerous in served with the National Security only reacted quickly and withresolve. It NATO’s history.Both sides could now Council staff in the Clinton and George hadengaged decisively and kinetically to claim ameasureofvictory. But success W Bush administrations. As a military stop the driveonTallinn. The separatist had been farfromassured. ManyNATO officer he commanded a parachute movements in Estonia and Latvia were leaders had run greatpolitical risksin brigade in Baghdad in 2005–06.
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Notes
1 During 2015 the Russian intervention lightning move thatcould take NATO by Herbst, ‘Putin and the “Mariupol Test”’, in eastern Ukraine stabilised, with surprise. Voice of America,‘Brzezinski: International New York Times,15March separatistssupported firmly by Russia US, AlliesShould Deploy DeterrentForce 2015. in controlofthe Donetsk regionand the to Baltics’,21January2015. governmentinKievunable to reclaim 13 See RobertEvans, ‘Russia Signals lost territory. 8 The sequence of events that led to Concern forRussians in Estonia’, Reuters, Russian interventioninUkraine suggest 19 March 2014. 2 Estonian President Toomas Hendrik said: that the campaign wasnot necessarily ‘The big differenceisthatUkraine is pre-planned; mass demonstrations in 14 Often called ‘hybrid warfare’ in the West, notinNATOand we are…this is about November 2013 protesting the rejection it is also called in Russia the ‘Gerasimov Article 5–ifiteverfails, then NATO no by Ukrainian PresidentYanukovychof Doctrine of AmbiguousWarfare’,after longer works. Then no onetrusts it’. closer economic ties with the EU led to Chiefofthe RussianGeneral Staff Quoted in Lally Weymouth, ‘Estonia’s his downfall and the subsequent Russian General Valeriy Gerasimov. See Igor President:Russia is Threatening “The reaction. Sutyagin, ‘RussianForcesinUkraine’, EntirePost-World WarIIOrder”’, RUSIBriefingPaper,March 2015, p. 1. Washington Post,29September 2014. 9 Keydocumentsinclude ‘The Russian Federation National Security Strategy 15 Because the North Atlantic Council 3 See remarksbyGeneral Phillip Breedlove Until 2020’, 12 May2009,
Affairs (September/October2014). 2013,
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22 These were the US 1st Battalion 503rd ParachuteRegimentand 5th Battalion The
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none largerthan 105mm, butno from the internationalairportinVilnius. during the Crimea crisis. See Zachary artillerybrigades were sentinorder to Keck, ‘RussiaThreatens NuclearStrikes reinforcethe defensivecharacter of the 37 10th Special Forces Groupsupports Over Crimea’, Diplomat,11July 2014. deployment. The totalnumber of tubed the US EuropeanCommand (EUCOM) artillerybattalions wasten, comprised of and is thus oriented operationally and 43 Theseincludedthe 336th NavalInfantry thirty firingbatteriesofsix guns eachor linguistically towardsthe European Brigade, the 79th Guards Motor Rifle 180 tubes. MostNATOinfantrybattalions theatre.ODAsare commanded by Brigade, the 7th IndependentMotor Rifle were also equipped with 120-mm heavy captains and include operations, Brigade, and the 244th ArtilleryBrigade. mortarsaswell. Each combatbattalion intelligence, engineer, lightand heavy also deployed with an air-defence platoon weapons, medical and communications 44 Former Pact countries (Bulgaria, Hungary equipped with SHORAD(short-rangeair specialists. These proved particularly and Romaniaaswell as theCzech defence)systems. valuable in mobilising and preparing Republic, Slovakia andSlovenia) were Balticreserve formations foractive unaffected, as were the Balkan countries, 33 The division wasdesignated service at short notice. atransparentattempttodrivewedges ‘MultinationalDivision Center’. The between Alliancemembers. Poles (6th,16th and 18th parachute 38 The US also provided language-trained infantry battalions) were positionedin foreign area officerstoeach non-English 45 Withinaweek of theRussian cut-off,the Gulbene, the Dutch (11th Garderegiment speaking brigade to assistwith US president authorised promptrelease GrenadiersenJagersand 12th Regiment interoperability issues, usually majors of energy supplies from theUSStrategic vanHeutsz air assault infantry battalions, or lieutenantcolonels. Petroleum Reserve under the Energy withaBelgian paracommandobattalion Policy and Conservation Act. Partner battlegroup attached) in Rezekne, and 39 The logistical effort required to move nations in the InternationalEnergy theGerman para brigade (31.and 263. the NSF into the Baltic States was Agencyfollowedsuit. Though astrong Falschirmjaegerparachuteinfantry extraordinarily challenging,but it should signal,these measures would take time battalions and 231. Gebirgsjaeger be borne in mind thatexceptfor the to take effect. mountain infantry battalion) in Jekabpils. US and UK,nocontributing nation was AcompositeGerman-Dutch-Belgian required to move morethan one light 46 Forexample, on 8January2015 the helicopterbrigadeprovided aviation brigade task force. websites forthe German chancellor and support, basedatthe international the lowerhouse of the Bundestagwere airport. 40 These included the US 2nd Cavalry shut down by hackerscalling forGermany Regimentbased in Germany, the UK 20th to severall ties withUkraine andlift 34 Commanded by Danish Brigadier ArmouredInfantryBrigade, the French economic sanctions againstRussia. These GeneralJens Henrik, aveteran of 2nd ArmouredBrigade(2eBrigade Blindée attackswerealmostcertainlydirected by both Iraq andAfghanistan, the Nordic or 2e BB), the German 10. Panzerdivision, the Russian government. brigade wascomprised of the Danish III and the Polish 9th ArmouredCavalry Gardehusarregimentetreconnaissance Brigade and 15th Mechanised Brigade, 47 One NATO general interviewedfor this battalion, the NorwegianTelemark both stationed close to the border study describedRussian electronic infantry battalion, the Finnish Uusimaa with Kaliningrad. Also alerted wasaUS warfarecapabilities displayedinUkraine lightinfantrybattalion, and the Swedish armoured brigade from the 3rd Infantry as ‘eye watering’. Livregementets Husarer infantry Division (Mechanized) temporarilyona battalion. training rotation in Poland. 48 The mostimportantwereLieutenant ColonelGennadyOlafsky of theMain 35 1st (UK)Divisionisthe designatedrapid- 41 Sutyagin, ‘Russian Forces in Ukraine’, p. 9. IntelligenceDirectorate of the General reaction divisional-level headquartersfor Staff of the ArmedForces(‘Glavnoye the British Army. 42 Russian Chief of the General Staff Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye’ or GRU) General Nikolai Makarov warned a and SpetsnazLieutenant Igor Zalovga. 36 3Commando Brigade (42 and 45 Russian legislative body in 2011that RoyalMarine Commandos, and the 1st ‘I cannot rule out that, in certain 49 Throughout thecrisis the Lithuanian Battalion The RoyalCanadian Regiment– circumstances, local and regional armed governmentwas careful to allowdaily RCR–attached) waslocated in Rietavas; conflictscould grow into alarge- rail service to Kaliningrad to preventany Folgore(183rd,186th and 187th parachute scale war, possibly even with nuclear casus belli. infantry battalions) in Kaunas; and weapons.’Toenhance the credibility Almogavares (2nd parachuteinfantry of its threattouse nuclear weapons, 50 See HenryKissinger,‘To Settle the battalion ‘deLauria’ and 3rd parachute Russia’sarmed forces have conducted Ukraine Crisis, Startatthe End’, infantry battalion ‘deZarate’,plus the regular militarydrills since 2000 in which Washington Post,5March 2014. Portuguese15th parachuteinfantry alimited nuclear strikeissimulated. battalion) in Siauliai. AUKcombat Thesedrills have become increasingly 51 Co-operation betweenNATOand Russia aviation element (twosquadrons of common since the Ukrainecrisis began. wassuspendedon1May 2014 over the Apache attack helicopters,one squadron In some cases, Vladimir Putin has Crimea andthe NATO-Russia Council, of Gazelle scout/light attack helicopters ordered snap drills simulating nuclear established in 2002, had beenlargely and one squadronofLynxutility strikes. These threats were reiterated by moribund sincethen. helicopters)supported 1st (UK)Division Russian Foreign MinisterSergeiLavrov
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