The Bundeswehr in 2014: Between Kabul and Crimea the Year 2014 Marks a Turning Point for Germany’S Bundeswehr

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 154, May 2014, Editor: Christian Nünlist The Bundeswehr in 2014: Between Kabul and Crimea The year 2014 marks a turning point for Germany’s Bundeswehr. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the longest and most intense mission in the Bundeswehr’s history will come to an end. Furthermore, as the conflict over Ukraine heats up, a threatening shadow once more looms over Europe. What does this mean for Bundeswehr reform? Von Martin Zapfe According to a military aphorism, every army plans for the last war. At the same time, any future mission is unlikely to ac- commodate the Bundeswehr by conform- ing exactly to its schematic plans. The Bun- deswehr of the future must therefore primarily be flexible. In principle, the current state of Bundeswehr reform (Neuaus- richtung der Bundeswehr) meets this re- quirement and constitutes sound military planning. However, the Ukraine crisis reveals an inherent tension that has characterized the reform effort from the start: By attempting to cover the entire spectrum of possible operations, the Bundeswehr runs the risk of not being optimally positioned to face any of the likely scenarios. Instead, it is liable to choose an underfunded “third way” that re- A CH-53 helicopter of the Bundeswehr with Chancellor Angela Merkel on board arrives in Mazar-e Sharif, duces operational readiness for many mis- Afghanistan, escorted by two helicopter gunships «Tiger», 10 May 2013. Kay Nietfeld / Reuters sions. As a confounding factor, the parameters of multinational integration within the alli- facilitated by a high degree of interopera- around ground forces. Therefore, this anal- ances will change fundamentally: The re- bility. In this way, multinational coopera- ysis will concentrate on the German Army turn of “symmetric” threats, reinforced by tion in Nato and the EU will resemble that (Heer). the Ukraine crisis, will expose inherent of the 1990s more than that after 2000. problems with the integrated cooperation An Active Army models that have been attempted since While the Bundeswehr reform affects all For historical reasons, the Bundeswehr has 2000. In the near future, operations within services, air and naval forces are governed always been deeper integrated into its alli- the framework of Nato and the EU will by different parameters than armies, espe- ances than any other European army. likely be conducted on a principle that cially when it comes to multinational inte- Founded as a purely defensive army within might be described as “ad-hoc plus”: the gration and operations. At the same time, Nato that lacked national operational com- spontaneous configuration of task forces, most of the likely missions will evolve mand structures, operations are only con- © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 154, May 2014 ceivable within a multinational framework. Most Important Bundeswehr Operations Apart from very few exceptions – in particular, the evacuation of citizens overseas – the Bundeswehr only carries out armed operations in the context of Nato, the EU, the OSCE, and the UN. Among these or- ganizations, Nato with its integrated military structures is no doubt the most significant, followed by the EU with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since the end of the imminent territorial threat to the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies, the Bundeswehr has gradually oriented itself towards out-of-area operations. In the 1990s, the Balkans took center-stage, culminating in the air campaign over Kosovo in which Bundeswehr aircraft played a significant role. After 2001, the fo- cus shifted to the operations in Afghani- stan. The ISAF mission constitutes the longest deployment in the history of the Bundeswehr. What is more, the Hindu cluded a differentiation within the army in able at the national level, as noted in the Kush saw the most intense ground combat terms of operational readiness and capa- principle of “breadth before depth”. operations conducted by German soldiers bilities, in order to be able to engage in – initially, special operations forces, then both (likely) expeditionary operations and The reform proposal for this realignment thousands of regular troops – since the end (unlikely) defensive wars against aggres- was only made feasible by the suspension of the Second World War. In short: In Af- sors. This pattern was consciously broken of conscription in 2011. Only now could ghanistan, the Bundeswehr learned to fight. when then-defense minister Thomas de the foundation be laid for armed forces Maizière introduced the latest reform that were deployable in their entirety. The Beyond Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr’s package in 2011. notion of a unified structure for all opera- operations involve all its services. Most tions is the guiding principle of organiza- missions, particularly those within the The political framework of the reform is tional planning in the army in particular. framework of the EU, deliberately adopt an staked out by the “Defense Policy Guide- indirect approach, consisting of security lines” of 2011, issued in the context of the The current reform is to be completed by financial crisis. In this docu- 2017 – provided the new Minister of De- In Afghanistan, the ment, de Maizière ordered a lit- fense Ursula von der Leyen allows the pro- tle noticed about-face: No cess to continue without alteration. The all- Bundeswehr learned longer would the Bundeswehr’s volunteer Bundeswehr will then comprise to fight. first task be “international con- up to 185,000 soldiers. Based on this struc- flict prevention and crisis man- ture, the Bundeswehr is to contribute to agement”, as it had been de- stabilization operations as a framework na- force assistance and capacity building – i.e., fined since 2003 – essentially referring to tion and also to prepare for conventional enabling local actors to take on security deployments such as in Kosovo or Afghan- challenges on the borders of the alliance. tasks themselves. For instance, in Mali and istan – but “territorial defense as alliance Somalia, Bundeswehr soldiers train parts defense”. The key military document of the In the Heer, this principle translates into a of the national armed forces. Taking into reform, the “Conception of the Bun- structure of three divisions: two practically consideration the relatively low troop levels deswehr” published in 2013, states that in- identical armored divisions of three bri- involved in these missions as well as the ternational conflict prevention is seen as gades each and the Division Schnelle Kräfte rather low risk for the deployed soldiers, the most likely task while alliance defense (DSK; “Rapid Forces Division”), which in- such missions can be expected to increase is the most demanding task. The planning corporates the army’s airmobile and special in the future – however, large-scale opera- challenge for Germany’s armed forces, operations forces. The Heer must have the tions such as in Afghanistan are unlikely now, is to live up to both tasks within nar- capability to continuously sustain the for the time being. row financial constraints. equivalent of one brigade (of up to 6,000 soldiers) in stabilization operations or to The Bundeswehr’s Neuausrichtung Thus was the basic principle of the reform deploy a division with two reinforced bri- As with most European armies after the defined: The Bundeswehr is not to become gades for high-intensity operations. Cold War, the Bundeswehr has experi- a stabilization force, but should be able to enced numerous reforms, often imposed in carry out operations of any intensity – No army would ever claim to have suffi- rapid succession. Each of these steps has against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well cient funding. Yet, while the Bundeswehr diminished its size in order to better adapt as against military forces on the alliance’s has suffered comparatively little during the to new threats and to generate a peace div- borders. To this end, all necessary capabili- budget crisis, compared to the forces of idend. Moreover, most of these reforms in- ties should be at least rudimentarily avail- other European countries, the German de- © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 154, May 2014 fense spending is probably too low to operations and against an opposing force Troop Strength / Defense Spending match the lofty aspirations of the realign- with lower military capabilities. While not ment. Shrinking armed forces only become all of the capability gaps identified in Af- more effective if their equipment and ghanistan have been closed yet, new short- training improve at the same time. How- comings are arising now that potential alli- ever, an excessive share of the Bundeswehr’s ance defense enters the picture. defense investments continues to be spent on long-term, occasionally decades-old Secondly, the Heer rightfully strives to bet- procurement projects. And while efficient ter prepare for the increasingly likely task management is supposed to compensate of training foreign security forces. In Af- for insufficient numbers of critical major ghanistan, the army has met difficulties weapons systems, this only goes so far. finding enough personnel that is both available and suitable for this activity. As a The unified structure of the army only remedy, peace time brigade staffs are now makes sense if it is based on effective train- being expanded to deploy the additional ing and full equipment throughout the bri- personnel as instructors on the ground. gades. If that is not the case, the armed While the purpose of this measure is laud- forces will neither realize the promised able, it is also an example of a compromise benefits of the unified structure nor gain solution whose implementation is liable to advantages from (so far rejected) speciali- deliver less than optimal results.

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