The Bundeswehr in 2014: Between Kabul and Crimea the Year 2014 Marks a Turning Point for Germany’S Bundeswehr

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 154, May 2014, Editor: Christian Nünlist

The Bundeswehr in 2014: Between Kabul and Crimea The year 2014 marks a turning point for Germany’s Bundeswehr. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the longest and most intense mission in the Bundeswehr’s history will come to an end. Furthermore, as the conflict over Ukraine heats up, a threatening shadow once more looms over Europe. What does this mean for Bundeswehr reform?

Von Martin Zapfe

According to a military aphorism, every army plans for the last war. At the same time, any future mission is unlikely to ac- commodate the Bundeswehr by conform- ing exactly to its schematic plans. The Bun- deswehr of the future must therefore primarily be flexible. In principle, the current state of Bundeswehr reform (Neuaus- richtung der Bundeswehr) meets this re- quirement and constitutes sound military planning.

However, the Ukraine crisis reveals an inherent tension that has characterized the reform effort from the start: By attempting to cover the entire spectrum of possible operations, the Bundeswehr runs the risk of not being optimally positioned to face any of the likely scenarios. Instead, it is liable to choose an underfunded “third way” that re- A CH-53 helicopter of the Bundeswehr with Chancellor Angela Merkel on board arrives in Mazar-e Sharif, duces operational readiness for many mis- Afghanistan, escorted by two helicopter gunships «Tiger», 10 May 2013. Kay Nietfeld / Reuters sions.

As a confounding factor, the parameters of multinational integration within the alli- facilitated by a high degree of interopera- around ground forces. Therefore, this anal- ances will change fundamentally: The re- bility. In this way, multinational coopera- ysis will concentrate on the German Army turn of “symmetric” threats, reinforced by tion in Nato and the EU will resemble that (Heer). the Ukraine crisis, will expose inherent of the 1990s more than that after 2000. problems with the integrated cooperation An Active Army models that have been attempted since While the Bundeswehr reform affects all For historical reasons, the Bundeswehr has 2000. In the near future, operations within services, air and naval forces are governed always been deeper integrated into its alli- the framework of Nato and the EU will by different parameters than armies, espe- ances than any other European army. likely be conducted on a principle that cially when it comes to multinational inte- Founded as a purely defensive army within might be described as “ad-hoc plus”: the gration and operations. At the same time, Nato that lacked national operational com- spontaneous configuration of task forces, most of the likely missions will evolve mand structures, operations are only con-

ceivable within a multinational framework. Most Important Bundeswehr Operations Apart from very few exceptions – in particular, the evacuation of citizens overseas – the Bundeswehr only carries out armed operations in the context of Nato, the EU, the OSCE, and the UN. Among these organizations, Nato with its integrated military structures is no doubt the most significant, followed by the EU with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Since the end of the imminent territorial threat to the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies, the Bundeswehr has gradually oriented itself towards out-of-area operations. In the 1990s, the Balkans took center-stage, culminating in the air campaign over Kosovo in which Bundeswehr aircraft played a significant role. After 2001, the fo- cus shifted to the operations in Afghani- stan. The ISAF mission constitutes the longest deployment in the history of the Bundeswehr. What is more, the Hindu cluded a differentiation within the army in able at the national level, as noted in the Kush saw the most intense ground combat terms of operational readiness and capa- principle of “breadth before depth”. operations conducted by German soldiers bilities, in order to be able to engage in – initially, special operations forces, then both (likely) expeditionary operations and The reform proposal for this realignment thousands of regular troops – since the end (unlikely) defensive wars against aggres- was only made feasible by the suspension of the Second World War. In short: In Af- sors. This pattern was consciously broken of conscription in 2011. Only now could ghanistan, the Bundeswehr learned to fight. when then-defense minister Thomas de the foundation be laid for armed forces Maizière introduced the latest reform that were deployable in their entirety. The Beyond Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr’s package in 2011. notion of a unified structure for all opera- operations involve all its services. Most tions is the guiding principle of organiza- missions, particularly those within the The political framework of the reform is tional planning in the army in particular. framework of the EU, deliberately adopt an staked out by the “Defense Policy Guide- indirect approach, consisting of security lines” of 2011, issued in the context of the The current reform is to be completed by financial crisis. In this docu- 2017 – provided the new Minister of De- In Afghanistan, the ment, de Maizière ordered a lit- fense Ursula von der Leyen allows the pro- tle noticed about-face: No cess to continue without alteration. The all- Bundeswehr learned longer would the Bundeswehr’s volunteer Bundeswehr will then comprise to fight. first task be “international con- up to 185,000 soldiers. Based on this struc- flict prevention and crisis man- ture, the Bundeswehr is to contribute to agement”, as it had been de- stabilization operations as a framework na- force assistance and capacity building – i.e., fined since 2003 – essentially referring to tion and also to prepare for conventional enabling local actors to take on security deployments such as in Kosovo or Afghan- challenges on the borders of the alliance. tasks themselves. For instance, in Mali and istan – but “territorial defense as alliance Somalia, Bundeswehr soldiers train parts defense”. The key military document of the In the Heer, this principle translates into a of the national armed forces. Taking into reform, the “Conception of the Bun- structure of three divisions: two practically consideration the relatively low troop levels deswehr” published in 2013, states that in- identical armored divisions of three bri- involved in these missions as well as the ternational conflict prevention is seen as gades each and the Division Schnelle Kräfte rather low risk for the deployed soldiers, the most likely task while alliance defense (DSK; “Rapid Forces Division”), which in- such missions can be expected to increase is the most demanding task. The planning corporates the army’s airmobile and special in the future – however, large-scale opera- challenge for Germany’s armed forces, operations forces. The Heer must have the tions such as in Afghanistan are unlikely now, is to live up to both tasks within nar- capability to continuously sustain the for the time being. row financial constraints. equivalent of one brigade (of up to 6,000 soldiers) in stabilization operations or to The Bundeswehr’s Neuausrichtung Thus was the basic principle of the reform deploy a division with two reinforced bri- As with most European armies after the defined: The Bundeswehr is not to become gades for high-intensity operations. Cold War, the Bundeswehr has experi- a stabilization force, but should be able to enced numerous reforms, often imposed in carry out operations of any intensity – No army would ever claim to have suffi- rapid succession. Each of these steps has against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well cient funding. Yet, while the Bundeswehr diminished its size in order to better adapt as against military forces on the alliance’s has suffered comparatively little during the to new threats and to generate a peace div- borders. To this end, all necessary capabili- budget crisis, compared to the forces of idend. Moreover, most of these reforms in- ties should be at least rudimentarily avail- other European countries, the German de-

fense spending is probably too low to operations and against an opposing force Troop Strength / Defense Spending match the lofty aspirations of the realign- with lower military capabilities. While not ment. Shrinking armed forces only become all of the capability gaps identified in Af- more effective if their equipment and ghanistan have been closed yet, new short- training improve at the same time. How- comings are arising now that potential alli- ever, an excessive share of the Bundeswehr’s ance defense enters the picture. defense investments continues to be spent on long-term, occasionally decades-old Secondly, the Heer rightfully strives to bet- procurement projects. And while efficient ter prepare for the increasingly likely task management is supposed to compensate of training foreign security forces. In Af- for insufficient numbers of critical major ghanistan, the army has met difficulties weapons systems, this only goes so far. finding enough personnel that is both available and suitable for this activity. As a The unified structure of the army only remedy, peace time brigade staffs are now makes sense if it is based on effective train- being expanded to deploy the additional ing and full equipment throughout the bri- personnel as instructors on the ground. gades. If that is not the case, the armed While the purpose of this measure is laud- forces will neither realize the promised able, it is also an example of a compromise benefits of the unified structure nor gain solution whose implementation is liable to advantages from (so far rejected) speciali- deliver less than optimal results. The Af- zation. The Bundeswehr would end up ghan model is working sufficiently well, yet army’s combat troops and key enablers, sol- with the worst of both worlds. it does not come close to exhausting the diers throughout the ranks have consider- possibilities of security force assistance. able operational or combat experience. Ir- Difficult “Third Way” Other Western armed forces assign these respective of structural and doctrinal The future force structure of the army will tasks primarily to special operations forces. decisions, constant promotion of these be strongly influenced by the lessons of Af- As of now, the Bundeswehr choses another soldiers is essential. If combat experience in ghanistan. However, the Heer will not be an path. In doing so, the effectiveness in these Afghanistan can be translated into contin- “Afghanistan army”, and this is where the operations is sacrificed to the principle of a uous high-quality training and a high level quandary arises: The army is neither opti- unified and comprehensive structure with- of combat-readiness in all scenarios, weak- mally geared towards stabilization opera- out, at the same time, significantly improv- nesses in the structure may be gradually tions, nor is it certain that it is sufficiently ing the capability for alliance defense. balanced out. While initial indications are prepared for alliance defense. This dilemma encouraging, success in the long run is far is illustrated by the following three exam- Third, there are underlying tensions be- from certain. A return of conventional ples. tween the brigade structure and potential threats should not lead to disregard for the task forces. The army’s structure is sup- Afghan veterans among the troops. First of all, the army is running the risk of posed to ensure that soldiers having spent being too “light” for Crimea and too four months in the field shall spend 20 Hitherto, planning challenges have fur- “heavy” for Kabul. Its two nominally ar- months at home. The reasoning is a plausi- thermore been mitigated through multina- mored divisions together will only field 225 ble one and is based on the assumption of tional integration (cf. text box). However, main battle tanks. The remainder of the long-term missions. However, every mis- in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, this may structure is dominated by mechanized in- sion will necessarily break up the task force proof more difficult. fantry (Panzergrenadier) units with infan- system. At the same time, the added value try fighting vehicles as well as the various of the new army structure, if it is to cover Changing Multinational Cooperation types of infantry. This signals a disposition the entire spectrum of operations, is to be The crisis in Ukraine will fundamentally towards stabilization missions, which tend found precisely in the brigades’ enhanced change the political framework conditions to be infantry-heavy and of longer dura- operational autonomy and sustainability in of multinational integration, thereby mak- tion. Against the background of the crisis conventional operations. In order to pre- ing politically convenient solutions more in Ukraine this posture is increasingly re- serve these properties effectively, the task difficult. First of all, multinational opera- garded critically by political observers as force system must necessarily be weakened. tions will once more be planned ad hoc in well as a number of Bundeswehr generals, Prioritization is inevitable. the framework of internal “coalitions of the while others emphasize that the configura- willing” led by Nato or the EU. Secondly, tion towards stabilization operations still Overall, the Bundeswehr is implementing models of integration such as Smart De- does not go far enough. many critical and generalizable insights fence within Nato or Pooling & Sharing from ISAF. However, the new structure is (P&S) in the EU will likely become less Contrary to habitually voiced concerns, the not ideally suited for comparable missions, relevant at the operational level. problem is not the quality of equipment. either. Instead, it attempts to find a “third Overall, the Bundeswehr is exceptionally way” that causes a dilemma in planning. Multilateralism “Ad-hoc-plus” well equipped when it comes to expedi- This dilemma can, to a degree, be amelio- Before 1990, military integration of ground tionary operations. However, frequently, rated by a strategic personnel policy. forces within Nato adhered to a simple the quantities are too low for adequate principle: The alliance’s command and con- training, while a large part of the equip- Organizations learn and develop primarily trol structures were integrated and includ- ment is geared towards operations that rely by promoting the right personnel. Here, ed soldiers from most member states; be- on a protected presence in the theater of Afghanistan has left its mark. Among the low the operational level of the corps,

however, the forces were composed on a Military Integration Concepts in EU and NATO strictly national basis. While there were exceptions, the military requirements of con- Multinational military cooperation within the EU and Nato is guided by three concepts: “Pooling & ventional warfare, together with national Sharing”, “Smart Defence”, and the “Framework Nation Concept”. reservations, made integration at lower lev- • Pooling & Sharing within the EU and Smart Defence within Nato are concepts for economical and efficient defense planning. States may either pool their own capabilities or give them up els essentially unpractical. altogether and rely on other allies (sharing). Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing are bottom-up initiatives proposed by several allies as a way of saving money: Efficiency is In order to save money while retaining consciously prioritized over effectiveness. combat-ready, modern military formations, • By contrast, the Framework Nation Concept is a top-down concept consciously geared towards Nato and the EU chose different ways. closing jointly identified capability gaps. As part of the Nato Defence Planning Process, select What they had in common, however, was states are to cooperate in closing the gaps, and in doing so, rely on a framework nation. States are to retain their national autonomy and not necessarily give up capabilities. the intention to achieve integration possi- Further reading: Daniel Möckli, Smart Pooling: State of Play in European Defence and Armaments bly down to battalion level by introducing Cooperation, CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 126 (2012). multinational, rapidly deployable task forces and fixed planning cycles. Here, the concepts of the Nato Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) are still relevant today. However, neither of these formations has been deployed yet to 2010 introduced “Smart Defence” to pro- more like 1990 than 2010. In the short date, and, due to both political and military mote enhanced cooperation among its mili- term, this might even enhance the effec- considerations, any future deployment tary forces. The EU adopted a similar ap- tiveness of European defense – at the ex- seems questionable. proach with its concept of Pooling & pense of efficiency. This will mainly benefit Sharing (see text box). Critically, both con- Nato with its tremendous institutional ex- Instead, these ambitious cooperation mod- cepts were mainly geared towards efficiency, perience. While “Smart Defence” will face els will likely be replaced in the near-term not effectiveness. They are particularly valu- difficulties, the concept of the “Framework by an “ad-hoc plus” model: Task forces will able for joint training, but even now their Nation” introduced by Germany – aiming probably be formed at short notice in a value added to operations is limited. primarily at closing the alliance’s capability brief consultation process between the par- gaps within a coordinated process – could ticipating states and then subordinated to Two factors – one of them political, one remain valuable even under the new politi- the alliance structures. The EUBG and military – will further diminish the useful- cal auspices. In this regard, the Bundeswehr NRF will effectively be replaced by less ness of both concepts. Politically, in view of with its broad portfolio of military enablers ambitious cooperation models. The attach- the crisis in Ukraine, the defense budgets is indeed a suitable military partner for ment of a Dutch airmobile brigade to the of alliance members are less likely to shrink other nations to “plug in”. However, the Bundeswehr’s airborne “Rapid Forces Di- further. In certain areas, they may even see willingness among the allies to give up vision” could serve as a guiding paradigm. moderate increases. This reduces the eco- their own military capabilities, which has Through constant common training, the nomic incentive for cooperation, which is been unimpressive so far, is likely to dimin- combat-readiness and interoperability of already of limited effect. If individual states ish further. both the German and Dutch forces will be should now increase their expenditures, enhanced without one nation necessarily such investments will be primarily fun- For the time being, the illusion of military having to give up capabilities. While this neled towards national capabilities. The integration in Europe that is at the same procedure of force generation is unwieldy huge political trust among states that is es- time more effective and more efficient must and deficient, encumbered by political and sential for the functioning of integration be discarded. In view of the Crimean crisis, bureaucratic pitfalls, and constitutes a step models is currently simply lacking. Militar- piecemeal integration will not lead to a suf- backwards from the ambitious plans of the ily, “Smart Defence” models are existential- ficiently powerful European army – and in past 20 years, it functions sufficiently well. ly geared towards lower-intensity missions. its pursuit of a “third way”, the Bundeswehr While the advantages of the NRF and Conventional operations of high intensity cannot take a simple European shortcut. EUBG can be retained, the pretense of allow even less latitude for friction – thus their deployment can be dispensed with. the partial return of conventional scenarios in the wake of the Ukraine crisis imposes Dr. Martin Zapfe is Senior Researcher at the Less Smart Defence clear limitations on a modular composition Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich and In the face of the pressing double challenge of multinational combat units. leads the team «Global Security». He is the author of maintaining expeditionary forces and of Sicherheitskultur und Strategiefähigkeit (2011) handling budgetary constraints after the fi- In the years ahead, multinational integra- and various analyses on missions and the nancial crisis, Nato’s Lisbon Summit of tion within Nato and the EU will look developement of the Bundeswehr.

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