Munich Security Report 2017 Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?
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Munich Security Report 2017 Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order? Munich Security Report 2017 Table of Contents Foreword 5 Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order? 6 Actors 12 United States: Trump’s Cards 14 EU: Brussels’ Clout 16 Turkey: Scoring a Coup 22 Places 24 Central and Eastern Europe: Fears of Influence 26 Middle East: Meddling Through 30 East Asia: Pacific No More? 34 The Arctic: Tempers Rising? 38 Issues 40 (Dis)Information: Fake It, Leak It, Spread It 42 (Forced) Migration: Here to Stay 46 Jihadism: Cornered Rads 50 Health Security: Small Bugs, Big Bombs 54 Defense Innovation: Changing Gear 56 Food for Thought 58 Books 60 Reports 62 Acknowledgments 64 Endnotes 68 Events 84 3 Munich Security Report 2017 Foreword Dear Reader, The annual Munich Security Report, first published in 2015, is our conversation starter for the Munich Security Conference and aims to serve as a useful compilation for decision-makers, security professionals, and the interested public. Ahead of the Munich Security Conference 2017, we are pleased to present the report’s third edition. The international security environment is arguably more volatile today than at any point since World War II. Some of the most fundamental pillars of the West and of the liberal international order are weakening. Adversaries of open societies are on the offensive. Liberal democracies have proven to be vulnerable to disinformation campaigns in post-truth international politics. Citizens of democracies believe less and less that their systems are able to deliver positive outcomes for them and increasingly favor national solutions and closed borders over globalism and openness. Illiberal regimes, on the other hand, seem to be on solid footing and act with assertiveness, while the willingness and ability of Western democracies to shape international affairs and to defend the rules-based liberal order are declining. The United States might move from being a provider of public goods and international security to pursuing a more unilateralist, maybe even nationalistic foreign policy. We may, then, be on the brink of a post-Western age, one in which non-Western actors are shaping international affairs, often in parallel or even to the detriment of precisely those multilateral frameworks that have formed the bedrock of the liberal international order since 1945. Are we entering a post-order world? How this question will be answered in the years to come will depend on all of us. With this report, we try to make sense of today’s security environment by presenting information on important current trends, actors, places, and issues. As in previous editions, the list of topics is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive. This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the numerous renowned institutions, friends, and partners who made their research and data available to the Munich Security Conference. I wish you an interesting and thought-provoking read! Sincerely yours, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger Chairman of the Munich Security Conference 5 Munich Security Report 2017 Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order? The world is facing an illiberal moment. Across the West and beyond, illiberal forces are gaining ground. From within, Western societies are troubled by the emergence of populist movements that oppose critical elements of the liberal-democratic status quo. From outside, Western societies are challenged by illiberal regimes trying to cast doubt on liberal democracy and weaken the international order. And Western states themselves seem both unwilling and unable to effectively tackle the biggest security crises – with Syria as the prime example. The Populist and Anti-Globalist Challenge in the West: The Politics of Fear in a Post-Truth World “We are living in the The past twelve months have been a resounding rejection of the status quo. In days where what we several elections and referenda, political outsiders succeeded, while the establish- call liberal non- ment was dealt major blows. Populist parties are now part of the government democracy, in which in about a dozen Western democracies. And even in countries where populists we lived for the past only received a small share of the vote, they often exert a defining influence by 20 years, ends, and shifting the debate or pressuring mainstream parties to adopt different policy agendas.1 we can return to real Economic factors may explain part of the populist rise: incomes for a majority of democracy.”10 citizens in industrialized economies have stagnated or fallen between 2007 and VIKTOR ORBÁN, 2014.2 However, in the US, for instance, analyses show that it was “not economic 10 NOVEMBER 2016 hardship but anxiety about the future that predicted whether people voted for Trump.”3 There is also a cultural backlash against so-called “globalism” from which the populist surge draws. The main dividing line in politics runs less and less between left and right but between a liberal cosmopolitan pole and a populist (or even xenophobic authoritarian) one.4 Populist parties reject the cultural moder- nization in Western societies and revolt against what they perceive as threats to the nation, ranging from immigration and cosmopolitan elites to international institutions. They dismiss pluralism and liberalism, essential elements of liberal democracies.5 “The whole of the West Populists are experts in the politics of agitation, forming an “axis of fear” across is turning its back on a the West that exploits insecurities and grievances of the electorate, often by twisting failed system of the facts or even by spreading outright lies that speak to the preconceptions of politics.”11 their supporters. And they may not even be punished by voters for not offering NIGEL FARAGE, solutions.6 In his farewell speech, German President Joachim Gauck warned of 9 NOVEMBER 2016 the dangers for Western democracies: “We should remember that if we only accept as fact what we already believe anyway and if half-truths, interpretations, conspiracy theories and rumors count every bit as much as the truth, then the path is clear for demagogues and autocrats.”7 With good reason, the editors of the Oxford Dictionaries proclaimed “post truth” the word of the year 2016.8 Beyond all the dangers for democracy, this also has a very clear security dimension: If politicians, for instance, lie about crowd sizes, say demonstrably wrong things about previously held positions and suggest that falsehoods are merely “alternative facts,” can citizens and allies trust them on national security issues?9 Likewise, 6 Munich Security Report 2017 THEThe DECLINEDecline of OF Number of countries with declining/increasing aggregate scores (combined Freedom FREEDOMFreedom AroundAROUND the House scores for political rights and civil liberties), 2004-16 THEWorld WORLD Declined Improved Difference 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 2016 Source: Freedom House12 WHATWhat CitizensCITIZENS of Share of citizens answering “very good” or “fairly good”, percent THINK:Select WOULDCountries 1995-97 2010-14 HAVINGThink: Would A STRONG having a LEADERstrong leader WHO who 0 20 40 60 80 does not have to DOES NOT HAVE India bother with parliament TO BOTHER WITH Ukraine and elections be a PARLIAMENT AND Romania ELECTIONSgood way to BE “run A this country” Russia GOOD WAY TO “RUN Taiwan THIS COUNTRY?” Philippines Mexico South Africa Georgia Colombia Armenia Turkey South Korea Belarus Nigeria Pakistan Argentina Spain Chile Peru United States Uruguay Estonia Japan Slovenia Sweden Australia Azerbaijan New Zealand Germany Source: World Values Survey; Foa and Mounk13 7 Munich Security Report 2017 a “post-truth” culture makes foreign disinformation campaigns more likely and erodes the very foundation of enlightened debate on which liberal democracies depend. The Illiberal International and Cracks in the Liberal International Order “We cannot avoid facing The rise of the populists has rapidly become a systemic challenge that threatens up to this challenge. to undermine the liberal international order the world’s liberal democracies have The fact is that liberal built and upheld since the end of World War II. The populists watch and learn from democracy and the each other and increasingly cooperate across borders. Some analysts have already political and normative referred to the “Illiberal International,” the “Populist International,” or the “International project of the West are of nationalists.”14 Together, the populists at home and the illiberal regimes abroad under fire.”21 form a formidable challenge to the main elements of the liberal international order: JOACHIM GAUCK, the spread of liberal democracy, economic interdependence based on free trade, 18 JANUARY 2017 and a strong web of international institutions – which researchers see as major factors contributing to a peaceful international order.15 “For many decades, First, liberal democracy has become increasingly contested. According to Freedom we’ve enriched foreign House, 2015 was “the 10th consecutive year of decline in global freedom,” i.e., industry at the expense for a decade, there were more countries with net declines than those with net of American industry; gains each year.16 Maybe unsurprisingly, in stark contrast to his predecessors, subsidized the armies President Donald Trump’s inaugural address did not mention words such as of other countries while democracy, liberty, or human rights. This does not bode well for liberal values around allowing for the very sad the world. “The global rise of populists poses a dangerous threat to human rights,” depletion of our military; Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch warns. “Too many Western political leaders we've defended other seem to have lost confidence in human rights values, offering only tepid support.”17 nation’s borders while refusing to defend our Second, the open international economic order may be unraveling. WTO nego- own; and spent trillions tiations have stalled for years, and it seems protectionism may return. Last year, of dollars overseas while the CETA negotiations between Canada and the European Union came close to America's infrastructure failing, and TTIP has almost become a political anathema.