The Sukarno File, 1965-1967: Chronology of a Defeat (Social Sciences in Asia)
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The Sukarno File, 1965–1967 Social Sciences in Asia Edited by Vineeta Sinha Syed Farid Alatas Chan Kwok Bun VOLUME 9 The Sukarno File, 1965–1967 Chronology of a Defeat by Antonie C.A. Dake LEIDEN • BOSTON 2006 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data A CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Stroumsa, Gedaliahu A.G. Hidden wisdom : esoteric traditions and the roots of Christian mysticism / by Guy G. Stroumsa. — Rev. and extended pbk. ed. p. cm. — (Numen book series. Studies in the history of religions, ISSN 0169-8834; v. 70) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-13635-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Occultism—Religious aspects—Christianity—History of doctrines—Early church, ca. 30-600. 2. Discipline of the secret. 3. Mysticism—History—Early church, ca. 30-600. I. Title. II. Studies in the history of religions; 70. BR 195.O33S77 2005 261.5’13—dc22 2005045741 ISSN 1567-2794 ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15382 0 ISBN-10: 90 04 15382 9 © Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands CONTENTS Note by the author .................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................ xi Part One January 1, 1965–September 30, 1965 Chapter One Conflict with the Army Chiefs .............. 3 Chapter Two Sukarno Summons the Communist Leaders, Aidit and Njoto, to Return Home ........................................................ 11 Chapter Three August 4 .................................................. 19 Chapter Four Untung Goes to Work Summoning the PKI to Help ............................................ 27 Chapter Five Conspiring by Networking ...................... 35 Chapter Six Upbeat to a Coup .................................. 47 Part Two October 1, 1965 Chapter Seven The Edge of Night ................................ 63 Chapter Eight Morning .................................................. 77 Chapter Nine Turning Point Midday ............................ 91 Chapter Ten Afternoon ................................................ 103 Chapter Eleven ‘Are we safe on the way to Bogor? Yes, Pak, we are!’ .................................. 113 Part Three October 2, 1965–March 12, 1965 Chapter Twelve Trapped .................................................... 147 Chapter Thirteen The End .................................................. 165 vi contents Summary .................................................................................... 175 Appendix I The Fifth Force ............................................ 185 Appendix II The Council of Generals .............................. 199 Appendix III Sukarno’s State of Health ............................ 223 Appendix IV The Coup’s Military Side ............................ 235 Appendix V Suharto and the 30 September Movement ...................................................... 251 Appendix VI The 30 September Movement for Washington: “An Undeserved Accident” .... 263 Appendix VII Documents ...................................................... 287 Appendix VIII The Widjanarko Report ................................ 341 Selected Bibliography ................................................................ 483 Biodata ........................................................................................ 489 Index .......................................................................................... 499 NOTE BY THE AUTHOR In General With Suharto’s resignation in 1998, it seemed that there were no more obstacles in Indonesia in the way of free discussion of the fun- damental events of 1 October 1965. Suharto had always wanted to draw a veil over the origin of his position of power, which could be traced back to these events. He wanted to regard the Indonesian communists as the only actors responsible for the ‘30 September Movement’. As little attention as possible was to be paid to the role played by other factions and persons, including his predecessor. It is true that he used Sukarno as a suspect or as a shining example from time to time, as it suited him, but this had little to do with the chronicling of history. So when Suharto could no longer exercise direct power, it was time to take a fresh look at 1965 and at the origin of the 30 September Movement, the still surprising affair which led to a lot of bloodshed and heralded the demise of the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. The research on which this book is based was started in the year of Suharto’s resignation with the intention of furthering if possible the discussion on 1965 and all that. This has resulted first of all in an Indonesian edition of the Sukarno File, published in Jakarta in November 2005. The national media paid considerable attention to the tenor and details of the book. The reactions on the whole were favourable, including the one from ex- President Suharto who told the author in an interview that he thought the Sukarno File was “a positive contribution to the history of the Indonesian Republic”. Equally important was that in the publicity surrounding the book one could gather an implicit desire to finally bring the discussion on the 1 October 1965 affair more into the open and to a more mature level. It might be too early to talk of a general call for revision of the still current official interpretation. But it would not be amiss—even if it were only to stimulate general historic insight, particularly among a younger generation of Indonesians—if the Sukarno File were to be the spur for the opening of hitherto still hermetically sealed gov- ernment archives. viii note by the author On sources Here it might be appropriate to dwell for a moment on the ques- tion of sources used for the Sukarno File, especially where it con- cerns typical standard opinions regarding who or what has been behind the 30 September Movement and the kidnapping of the anti- communist leadership of the army at the time. First the role of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, where the ques- tion is no longer whether the PKI has been implicated, but on what level of the party organization, with what aim, and alone or in a wider conspiracy. In general the Sukarno File has drawn on this point from known and lesser known open sources, one of which has been the author’s earlier treatise of 1973 on the history of the PKI, “In the Spirit of the Red Banteng”, and on a number of interviews with survivors like Rewang, in 1965 the youngest member of the leading organ of the PKI, the Polituro, and still alive in 2001 after 30 years imprisonment. But generally stated: in the following story the PKI has given pride of place to the role of the then President of the Republic, Sukarno. There is then the question whether the 1 October 1965 affair not has been an internal army affair. The author had already years ago come to the conclusion that this thesis, circulated by remnants of PKI leadership immediately after the 30 September Movement had failed dismally, could not in any seriousness be entertained. For that reason a “Preliminary Analysis”, written and circulated anonymously in the fall of 1965 and supporting in a circumspect way this PKI- message, has not been in the eyes of the author an honest and worth- while paper to be made use of. For his view on the place and role of the CIA during the period lead- ing up to the 1st of October the author has used, as can be seen in the special appendix on that subject, only open sources. Specialist publications written with the advantage of hindsight could be con- sulted as well as a number of primary documents like radio tran- scripts and reports issued at the time by the US Embassy, by the State Department and by the CIA itself, accesible thanks to the American Freedom of Information Act. The position of then Major General Suharto vis-a-vis the events of the 1st of October 1965 have been commented upon widely over the last 40 years and still is a matter of recurring disputes. The author found that this subject of course warranted special attention and for note by the author ix that reason treats it in one of the special appendices. For the sources used he refers to that appendix. Further, for stitching together in detail the story of the 1 October affair, the interrogation of Sukarno aide, Bambang Widjanarko, should be mentioned of course as an important source, to be found ver- batim in one of the appendices. Also use is made of a general report put together on behalf of the Suharto regime in 1967 by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh, and of the well-known CIA-report of 1968. All three sources the author regards as serious, although of course at the same time they can be seen as partisan or at least biased because of its specific background or link with the prevailing regime. Careful weighing was called for. Three things can be stated here. One