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2019-12-16 Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona

Cahill, Adam

Cahill, A. (2019). Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111354 doctoral thesis

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Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona

Adam Cahill

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2019

Abstract

This dissertation is an examination of American-Israeli relations through the lens of

American nonproliferation policy, pertaining to the Israeli nuclear program known as Dimona.

President John F. Kennedy held a favourable view of Israel; he admired the Jewish state as it fit neatly within his worldview of a nation worth supporting in the Cold War. Kennedy’s dominant priority of nonproliferation, stopping the Israelis from developing a nuclear program, overruled this positive view of Israel. For the first two years of his Presidency, 1961 and 1962, Kennedy tolerated Israeli behaviour and maintained a positive view of Israel. By 1963, he adopted one of the firmest stands of any President against Israel, notably the most severe approach to Dimona.

Due to troubling intelligence, he no longer trusted the Israelis regarding their nuclear intentions and confronted them accordingly. This study investigates this clash of presidential priorities. It delves deeper than existing scholarship into why Kennedy chose his specific course of action in

1963 and how this confrontation affected bilateral relations. It argues that though Kennedy and the United States “won” the diplomatic standoff on Dimona, the Israelis outsmarted their counterparts and ultimately achieved their aims. Despite Kennedy’s sustained concern and the deployment of nearly all means at his disposal, he and the Americans “lost” the war on Israeli nuclear proliferation. The dissertation concludes that though Dimona constituted a serious diplomatic rift, decisive actions by Kennedy and equally astute measures by Levi Eshkol and skilled Israeli diplomats guaranteed that the American-Israeli special relationship continued.

Despite Kennedy’s best efforts, coordinated deception and organized Israeli diplomacy ensured the Americans never truly deciphered the extent of Israeli nuclear progress. This case study of

Israeli nuclear proliferation best exemplifies how Kennedy and the United States responded to potential proliferation threats at a key juncture in the Cold War.

iii

Acknowledgments

This dissertation has taken me throughout North America and the Middle East. I lived in

Israel for two years prior to writing my thesis. The research was undertaken in the United States and Canada. I have benefitted from the influence of many individuals who contributed directly to this work. My supervisors, Dr. John Ferris and Dr. Stephen Randall, went above and beyond in consistently and meticulously reading drafts, making insightful suggestions and improving the work. Dr. Michael Keren's input was also fundamental to this process. Dr. Paul Chastko was a vital part of my committee. To my committee, I am deeply grateful. Given the nature of archival research, I am indebted to many different institutions for supporting this project. The University of Calgary provided funding, specifically, the George A. Self Graduate Scholarship and the

Queen Elizabeth II Doctoral/Graduate Scholarship. I held the Kahanoff Family Israel Studies

Fellowship for four years -- my many thanks to the Kahanoff family. In 2015-2016, I received the Rabin Scholarship for the Advancement of Peace and Tolerance from the Canadian Friends of the Hebrew University. I want to offer my thanks to all the staff at the Harry S. Truman

Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library/Marjorie Blum Kovler Foundation provided me with the

Marjorie Kovler Research Fellowship which was invaluable to my research and multiple trips to

Boston. I am equally indebted to the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin and the Moody Foundation of Galveston, Texas, for the Moody Research Grant. I owe a large deal of gratitude to the many talented and patient archivists at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the National Archives II in Maryland, and at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa. I have greatly benefitted from Israeli scholars who write for an English audience and who welcome

outsiders to discuss matters of central importance to their country. While in Israel, several scholars shared their time and insight on aspects of Dimona, national security and other issues which contributed to my thesis. Ori Rabinowitz gave a great deal of her time in enlightening me on Dimona and the debate in Israel. I am deeply grateful for all her help. Adam Raz, Zaki

Shalom, David Tal, and Uri Bar-Joseph also shared their time and expertise. These conversations significantly aided my research; my many thanks to these fine scholars. To my mentor, who was a significant influence enabling me to undertake my doctoral studies, a heartfelt thanks to the late

Lewis "Skip" Fischer. To say that I have a supportive family is a gross understatement. Thanks to my sister, Alana, who was kind enough to listen to my many discussions on the project. She also provided refuge while I was in Ottawa. My parents, Brian and Mildred Cahill, were my biggest supporters. Their help and unwavering patience allowed me to complete this project. My girlfriend, Devonne, has had to endure too many discussions about my thesis for the entirety of this project. She also tolerated me living half a world away for sustained periods. I am forever indebted for her kindness, unfaltering optimism, patience, and sense of humour during this process. While many individuals aided the completion of this project, any shortcomings are mine alone.

Table of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………… ii

Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………………... iv

Table of Contents...... vi

Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………………. 1

Chapter Two: Kennedy’s View of Israel……………………………………………………….. 28

Chapter Three: The Hawk Sale and Positive Relations (1961-1962)………………………….. 66

Chapter Four: Dimona’s Origins……………………………………………………………... 113

Atoms for Peace………………………………………………………………………………….123

Collision Course: The United States, Israel, and Dimona…………………………………138

Chapter Five: The American Discovery of, and Reaction to, Dimona…………………………….155

Chapter Six: Respect and Suspicion, 1961-1962……………………………………………………..200

Kennedy’s Introduction to Dimona……………………………………………………………203

The Threat of an Israeli Nuclear Weapon……………………………………………………209

Inspection and the road to the Waldorf-Astoria…………………………………………….220

The Waldorf-Astoria Meeting and the creation of the Dimona Rules…………………….232

Increased scrutiny of Dimona………………………………………………………………….240

1962: The push for inspections; Internal studies; and Dimona on the backburner?...... 253

Kennedy after the Missile Crisis……………………………………………………………….262

Chapter Seven: Mistrust and Confrontation, 1963…………………………………………………..273

The unified front against Dimona: Kennedy finalizes his Approach……………………..286

The Superpower Re-emerges…………………………………………………………………..302

The Integrated Path to Preventing an Israeli Bomb………………………………………..305

Dimona and American Policy………………………………………………………………….311

Kennedy, Dimona, and the Special Relationship……………………………………………319

Kennedy’s Dimona Ultimatum…………………………………………………………………334

Chapter Eight: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...349

The President and Dimona: Kennedy’s Israel Legacy……………………………………..355

Dimona’s lasting impact on American Nonproliferation…………………………………..359

Dimona versus the Special Relationship……………………………………………………..362

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………368

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Chapter One: Introduction

Within the historiography of American-Israeli relations, John F. Kennedy's Presidency is remembered for three issues: the sale of Hawk missiles which altered the arms relationship between these states; his statement that the United States had a "special relationship" with Israel equal only to that with Britain;1 and his actions to prevent an Israeli nuclear program which was based near the town of Dimona. Kennedy began a military relationship, coined the term which describes that bilateral bond today, and spent years addressing the troublesome Dimona project which he inherited from his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The threat of Israeli nuclear weapons challenged Kennedy’s Israel policy. This dissertation focuses on that preoccupation with nonproliferation and American efforts to prevent an Israeli bomb.

In late 1960, the United States uncovered what they believed to be an Israeli nuclear facility near Dimona in the Negev Desert. American intelligence personnel labeled the potential

Israeli nuclear program, “Dimona”, due to its proximity to this town.2 The Dimona threat became the greatest challenge to Kennedy’s relations with Israel.

For twenty years, Kennedy’s Presidency has been seen as transformational for American-

Israeli relations. Many scholars have examined his actions concerning Dimona, notably, his diplomatic assault of 19633 against Israeli Prime Ministers David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol to meet American demands for inspections of the site, accompanied by a pledge not to build nuclear weapons. However, scholars have grossly underestimated Kennedy’s distrust and anger towards

Israel over this disturbance, which became the central issue in the bilateral relationship during

1 Herbert M. Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2005), 91. 2 Members of the CIA's Photo Interpretation Center, Dino A Brugioni and Arthur C. Lundahl, have taken credit for this designation. Dino A. Brugioni, Eye in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA, and Cold War Aerial Espionage (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 273. 3 Zaki Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona and Washington (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 33. Shalom labels this a "crushing offensive". 1

1963. The special relationship was his second priority behind his paramount goal, nonproliferation. In 1963, he threatened a rupture in American-Israeli relations over Dimona with not one, but two Israeli Prime Ministers. Israel’s uncovered nuclear activity could have unravelled fifteen years of progress. Kennedy took the firmest stance any President ever has taken against Israel on nuclear matters at a critical juncture of American nonproliferation policy during the Cold War.4

This dissertation is an examination of American-Israeli relations through the lens of

American nonproliferation policy. This is a study of Kennedy’s Israeli policy, not of Kennedy and the Middle East, Kennedy and the Arab-Israeli conflict, or American grand strategy in the region. It considers these elements only to contextualize the threat of a nuclear Israel, or the reasoning for American suspicion of Israel. This thesis does not analyze Kennedy's wider nuclear proliferation policy, though it does briefly address India and China to demonstrate how Kennedy perceived global proliferation and Egypt, as the Egyptian nonconventional threat was treated alongside Israeli nuclear weapons. This work does not address: Kennedy's nuclear strategies; the

Soviet-American nuclear relationship; and joint Soviet-American nonproliferation strategies.

This investigation addresses the attempts by Kennedy and the United States to monitor Israel's nuclear progress and try to prevent an Israeli bomb.

While the clash of interests between the Americans and Israelis over Dimona has been previously analyzed by scholars, this dissertation delves into why this issue reached such levels of animosity and anger for the Kennedy Administration. It investigates in a manner no scholar has done before why Kennedy took his specific course of action on Dimona, and why he did so

4 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 99. Avner Cohen and William Burr, eds. “Concerned about Nuclear Weapons Potential, John F. Kennedy pushed for Inspection of Israel Nuclear Facilities,” The National Security Archive. National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 547 Apr 21st, 2016. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-04-21/concerned-about-nuclear-weapons-potential- john-f-kennedy 2

in 1963. While a nuclear program was a paramount goal for Israel’s survival, it posed a direct problem for larger American goals: power projection, nonproliferation, and stability in the dangerous Middle East. Dimona was the essential issue which demonstrates the differing interests of these close allies under President Kennedy. Kennedy, who held Israel in high esteem, subordinated his ideological and positive view of Israel to the need to stop their nuclear program.

Kennedy had to make a choice: he could allow his positive view of Israel to dominate and permit their nuclear program to come to fruition, or he could act to prevent their ultimate security goal.

In 1963, he decisively chose the latter, and undertook comprehensive measures to stop the Israeli nuclear program. However, the Israelis were well-prepared and Kennedy became the victim of determined, ruthless, deceptive, and well-orchestrated Israeli diplomacy which successfully hid the true progress of their program. Israel had long invested in this program and would not let the

Americans prevent the realization of their nuclear goal. Diplomatically, Kennedy was successful regarding Dimona. Privately, the Israelis achieved their goal soon after his death.

This dissertation addresses Kennedy’s Israel-priorities by contrasting his favourable view of Israel with his overarching goal to stop nuclear proliferation. This clash of priorities is missing from the literature about Dimona. Kennedy’s worldview and overarching goal to stop nuclear proliferation (preventing other countries from developing nuclear weapons) converged with

Dimona. Kennedy diplomatically succeeded in forcing the Israelis to capitulate to his demands, due to intense and sustained pressure from his Administration. He also applied unprecedented threats to American-Israeli relations. He ultimately lost the war to stop an Israeli nuclear bomb.

This failure was not due to lack of Presidential power or personal effort, rather it was his, and by extension the American, inability to gauge the extent of Israeli commitment to achieving their goal. For years, Kennedy afforded the Israelis the benefit of the doubt on Dimona. However, by

early 1963, it was apparent he had to take action. Even through an examination of American sources in this study of American foreign relations, it is apparent that the Israelis outmaneuvered the Kennedy Administration in achieving their main goals during his Presidency. The Hawk missile sale on a smaller scale and the conflict over Dimona demonstrates successful American diplomacy. Ultimately, these same American “victories” reveal the Israeli ability to consistently and conclusively outmaneuver their super-power, patron bilateral partner. This study showcases the limits of American-Israeli relations. It also demonstrates why the relationship continues, even during its most fraught times. A complete investigation of why Kennedy confronted Dimona reveals an unprecedented challenge to the relationship, one which was successfully navigated albeit by the narrowest of margins.

John F. Kennedy's Israeli policy was complex and nuanced. In foreign policy, Kennedy was pragmatic. He analyzed information, balanced options, and made his own decisions in general and consistently on Israel, especially regarding Dimona. 5 After consulting intelligence and many advisors, Kennedy made the final decisions on foreign policy. He was ideologically a kindred spirit with the Jewish state. He believed in the idea of Israel: a stable, successful and rising economy; non-communist; a liberal democracy -- a rarity in a volatile region.6 Kennedy welcomed ideological partners in fighting the Cold War.7 Yet Kennedy grew to distrust Israel, especially concerning its covert nuclear progress. As intelligence exposed Israeli nuclear and

5 Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle-East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7-8, 247. Bass argues the President was not a "sentimental man". This has been accepted by scholars in the field since. Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Stumbling Into Alliance: John F. Kennedy and Israel,” Israel Affairs 15, no. 3 (2009): 226-227. Antonio Perra argues that Kennedy made his decisions based on "Cold War pragmatism, not on idealism". Antonio Perra, Kennedy and the Middle East: The Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 6. 6 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 4. 7 Zachary K. Goldman, “Ties That Bind: John F. Kennedy and the Foundations of the American-Israeli Alliance,” Cold War History 9, no. 1 (Feb. 2009): 26-27. Goldman argues Kennedy shared a "personal affinity" for Israel: 32, 50-51. 4

nonconventional arms development, his pragmatism overruled sentiment, and he chose to act.

Concern over nuclear weapons compounded with lack of trust in Israel drove an adamant stance over Dimona in 1963, despite his sympathies with Israel.

The American government continually monitored Dimona and Israel’s nuclear activities from Kennedy’s inauguration on January 20th, 1961. The outgoing Secretary of State Christian

Herter and President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that Israel would provide a challenge to nonproliferation.8 Kennedy inherited a nuclear crisis with Israel, marked by the notion that they had lied in the past, and therefore, should be suspect.

This dissertation also addresses how far Dimona affected wider aspects of American-

Israeli relations. It argues that Dimona was of paramount significance for American attitudes toward Israel during the Kennedy Administration, especially in 1963 when conclusive "proof" in the form of extremely worrying intelligence led Kennedy to act. Between March and July of

1963, Dimona was the only issue that mattered in the bilateral bond. Only after Levi Eshkol accepted Kennedy’s ultimatum did progress ensue on other matters between the United States and Israel.

This thesis challenges the orthodox view that Dimona did not create a major disruption within the bilateral relationship, rather a momentary blip in the ebb and flow of American-Israeli relations.9 The orthodoxy stems from an Israeli diplomat to the United States during Kennedy's

Presidency and later historian of American-Israeli relations: Mordechai Gazit. He states:

“The Dimona issue, which continued to remain controversial between the two countries, had no effect on the bilateral security dimension. After all, the Americans themselves insisted that

8 “History of United States’ interest in Israel’s Atomic Energy activities,” Folder: Israel: Security 1961-1963, President’s Office Files (POF), Box 119a John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts. Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 32-33. 9 Mordechai Gazit, Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 231 5

Dimona had to be viewed as an issue of global importance and thus to be treated separately from the bilateral issues, including the military ones.”10

Gazit’s argument must be re-evaluated. His interpretation, and by default the traditional account of Dimona during Kennedy’s Presidency, has been severely understated and underestimated. Gazit chose to prioritize 1963 for the perceived transitory importance of

Dimona11 -- the exact year this dissertation employs to highlight Dimona’s devastating impact on the American-Israeli relationship. Relations progressed only after Eshkol relented and agreed to the majority of Kennedy's conditions. Problematically, Gazit did not clarify what the “bilateral security dimension” entailed. In this dissertation, the bilateral security dimension comprises arms deals, the long-sought security guarantee Israel wanted from the United States, and any joint military calculations.

This thesis argues that John Kennedy believed in Israel ideologically. However,

American intelligence on covert Israeli nuclear activities caused him to mistrust Israel and clash with its government at every opportunity on nuclear proliferation. His efforts to stop an Israeli bomb became the defining and central issue in Kennedy's Israeli legacy. This collision of ideology and national security explains Kennedy’s focus on nuclear proliferation. John Kennedy was concerned with nuclear proliferation prior to his Presidency. Dimona was always on the

President’s radar, until it consumed positive relations in 1963. Dimona defined Kennedy’s

Presidential legacy on Israel, though the Hawk sale and special relationship were important achievements. The Hawks and Dimona were not connected in the American documents, though they may have been connected for the Israelis. An examination of the American response to

Dimona illuminates the importance which the United States has long assigned to nuclear

10 Gazit, 235. 11 Ibid, 232-235. 6

proliferation. This case study involving an amicable ally demonstrates the unequivocal depths of

American efforts to halt nuclear proliferation.

Whereas Kennedy and Dimona usually are treated as separate from American-Israeli relations, this dissertation integrates American-Israeli relations and American nonproliferation policy. It argues that scholars have misunderstood the centrality of Dimona by treating it as a severe disturbance which quickly faded into the trials of the special relationship.

Historiographically, Kennedy has been praised for his response and actions on Dimona, and is ranked above other Presidents (Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon) who have dealt with

Dimona.12 Even critics of the President’s legacy praise his strong crisis-management abilities which included Dimona. 13 Still several criticisms have emerged about Kennedy. This dissertation challenges the notion that Kennedy and by extension the United States “took the easy way out” in employing their superpower status in negotiations with Israel.14 One scholar argues that Kennedy did not succeed in stopping Dimona, as the Israelis progressed, albeit covertly, towards a bomb during his Presidency -- thereby marking a failure of his Israeli policy.15 Overwhelmingly, however, scholars praise his response to Dimona, the Hawk sale, commitments to Israeli security, and the special relationship designation in 1962.16 Many scholars have argued that the supposed “Israeli/Jewish” lobby influenced his thinking. However, extensive documentary analysis shows this was never the case on the important issues, namely

Dimona and the Hawks. Specifically, the influence, or lack thereof, of the American-Israel

12 Druks, 145. Bass, 13. Cohen, 207. 13 Stephen G. Rabe, John F. Kennedy: World Leader (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), 8-9. 14 Shalom, 31, 38. 15 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 522. 16 Bass, 248. 7

Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is highlighted.17 One scholar argued that domestic support for Israel, election calculations, Israeli lobbying, along with "Zionists in his administration", caused Kennedy’s policy to become increasingly pro-Israel.18 Archival investigation disproves this case. Kennedy knew of AIPAC head I. L. Kenen when he was Senator.19 However, on the most important issues such as the Hawks and Dimona, the domestic contingent and lobbying had no effect.20 Kennedy’s involvement with Dimona has benefitted in recent years from the newest addition to the field: intelligence history. Additional works have recounted Kennedy’s desire for all available intelligence reports and information on the Dimona facility during his Presidency.

Two “schools” of Kennedy historiography are pertinent to this dissertation: The first is the orthodox interpretation which involved studies prior to the 1990s before many documents were declassified; and secondly, the “revisionist school” which relied heavily on American archival material. Early surveys of American-Israeli relations largely neglected Kennedy and instead praised Lyndon Johnson and the blooming relationship after the 1967 war.21

Subsequently, with additional document declassification during the early 1990s, Kennedy has emerged as a central figure, perhaps even the creator of the modern relationship. From 2000 in what can be tentatively labeled the revisionist or current school of American-Israeli Kennedy historiography, Kennedy's Israeli and Middle Eastern policy has been appraised in terms of

17 Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Tivnan outlines the history of lobbying groups, such as The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, which Kennedy encountered during his time as Senator. 40-41,50. 18 Roby C. Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), xxii, 4, 6, 182. 19 There are many exchanges between Kenen and Kennedy in his Senatorial, Pre-Presidential paper. Even in I. L. Kenen's memoir, Israel's Defense Lines: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981), Kenen admitted he lobbied for the Brazzaville Israeli peace plan, instead of the Johnson Plan, 158. On this topic, American Political Scientists and IR scholars John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt try to counter Bass and Spiegel for downplaying the lobby The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 19. The authors admit that Kennedy made his own decisions regarding Dimona and wanted to stop or restrain the Israelis at any cost, 35. 20 Bass,7. Goldman has also sided with Bass's account, 26. 21 Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1978), 369, 374. Goldman has also highlighted the lack of emphasis on Kennedy and Israel: 24. 8

success or failure. For the most part, such studies showcase Kennedy's Israeli policy as positive and successful. Often, he is called the father of the special relationship.

Conversely, the revisionist school assesses his wider foreign relations more critically.22

During the 2000s and through the 2010s, in what is termed the “post-revision school” in the wider Kennedy historiography,23 Kennedy is depicted as a strong, competent President in dealing with Israel and also nonproliferation. Kennedy is praised for his handling of: a potential Chinese nuclear threat; his consideration and then abandonment of the idea of giving nuclear weapons to

India; and Dimona and the Israeli nuclear challenge. The lone dissenting recent works come from nonproliferation historian, Francis J. Gavin. Gavin criticizes Kennedy for incoherent, hypocritical and selective, instead of universal, nonproliferation. Kennedy gave the United

Kingdom Polaris missiles and debated giving the French nuclear warheads in 1963 in order for them to sign his Limited Test Ban Treaty. He was also willing to arm India (debated in 1961) with nuclear weapons in order to "beat" communist China in Asia -- not evidence of a sound universal nonproliferation policy.24 Finally, addressing Israel's nuclear program, he posits that

Kennedy "displayed ambivalence and confusion".25 This dissertation refutes this interpretation on Israeli proliferation contending that Kennedy did much to restrict or confront their proliferation.

22 Campbell Craig, "Kennedy's International Legacy Fifty Years On," International Affairs 89, no. 6 (2013): 1369. Rakove, xxii. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), x. 23 In the field of foreign relations, this largely “restored” Kennedy’s positive legacy, reverting back to an orthodox school (1964-1980s). The reasoning centers on the Cuban Missile Crisis tapes and other crisis scenarios when Kennedy, supported by recordings, acted appropriately. It should be noted within American-Israeli historiography there is really only the orthodox (pre-1990s) and revisionist schools. No actual post-revisionist Kennedy school exists concerning Israel. In both the wider revisionist and post-revisionist schools on Kennedy’s foreign policy, Kennedy has been consistently portrayed as positive. 24 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 38-39. He argues that it was the fear of having to help or engage in nuclear sharing with Germany that ended his policy of European nuclear sharing or the MLF Multilateral Force. 25 Gavin, 76, 99. Gavin believes that Kennedy's nuclear posture of Flexible Response was a myth and did not halt nuclear proliferation, 31, 76. 9

Given the sensitive nature of many dealings (the Hawk sale, the Johnson refugee plan, and of course, Dimona), crucial documents were withheld until thirty years after Kennedy's death. Thus, the first real professional histories addressing Kennedy and Israel based on thorough archival evidence did not emerge until the early1990s. Until then, journalists, political scientists, international relations scholars, and historians produced multiple works on American-Israeli relations. These initial studies treated Kennedy as a secondary figure within the special relationship.

The best work within the orthodox school was written by the American political scientist

Steven Spiegel. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from

Truman to Reagan (1985) utilized his own interviews with Kennedy administration figures as well as limited declassified Oral Histories to gauge Kennedy's decision-making structure and policy toward Israel. He examined Kennedy's advisors like Robert Komer, Myer Feldman,

McGeorge Bundy (National Security Council), and Phillips Talbot (State Department). While

Spiegel would not label Kennedy an idealist, he espoused the nuance in Kennedy's thinking, equating many American Jews' support of Israel to Kennedy's own ideological affinity for

Ireland -- Kennedy admitted this designation between the two.26 Spiegel bolstered Kennedy's role within the bilateral relationship, albeit his focus was Kennedy and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Vitally, he understood that Kennedy practiced a measured approach to decision-making regarding Israel.

By the early 1990s, the first histories, which relied heavily on primary documents from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and National Archives, were written. Historian

Douglas Little (1993) argued that Kennedy and Eisenhower "laid the groundwork" for the special

26 Spiegel, 95. While Spiegel made some errors, believing the Hawks were tied to Dimona inspections, 113, this is understandable given his time of writing. 10

relationship. Little was one of the first to analyze the Johnson Refugee Plan, the Hawk sales, and their larger importance with a specific discussion of the issue of Dimona. He incorporated the

Dimona and intelligence literature through the use of declassified CIA reports, as well as

National Security files,27 and initiated the view that Kennedy's role was much more significant than had previously been interpreted in creating the special relationship. Conversely, historian

David Schoenbaum, writing at the same time, showed that the Hawks were not sold in conjunction with inspections at the Dimona reactor, but rather for “self-restraint” so that Israel would not attack the United Arab Republic (Egypt).28

By the late 1990s through the early 2000s, Israeli political scientist Abraham Ben-Zvi wrote prolifically on Kennedy. He utilized American archival documents to decipher Kennedy’s bargaining strategies with Israel and the Hawk sale. Ben-Zvi argues that after an "incubation period or years” of “embryonic" development under Dwight Eisenhower, Kennedy ushered in a new era of American-Israeli relations with the Hawk sale in the summer/fall of 1962.29 Little and

Ben-Zvi in Israel greatly changed the notion of Kennedy's role in the relationship. Furthermore,

Ben-Zvi 30 argued that Kennedy allowed for the creation of an arms purchase, patron-client new dynamic within American-Israeli relations. He called the Hawk sale, the "crossing of the

Rubicon", which allowed for further arms deals after 1967.31 Ben-Zvi is infatuated with the concept of linkage and traces the potential tie and later separation of the Johnson Refugee Plan and the Hawk missile sale over the summer of 1962. Furthermore, he argues that the Hawk sale was not tied to Dimona but that Komer, Bundy, Talbot, and Kennedy learned from the Israelis

27 Douglas Little, “The Making of the Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (1993): 563, 568. 28 David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 126, 133, 137. 29 Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 3. 30 Abraham Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002). 31 Ibid, viii. He cites this as the turning point of relations, 3. 11

refusing "expected reciprocity", that "required reciprocity" would be needed.32 He argues that

Kennedy sold the missiles because: he knew the Israelis needed this defense to counter a growing Arab threat; this would not constitute a threat to the United States with an arms race; and lastly, it aligned with an achievement Kennedy could utilize in the domestic sphere with

Congressional elections in 1962 and his re-election campaign set for 1964.33

In two sweeping volumes on the history of the relationship in 2001, The Uncertain

Friendship: The U.S. and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy, 34 The Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process,35 and a specialised monograph John F. Kennedy and Israel (2005), historian Herbert Druks identifies Kennedy as the decisive leader and transitional figure from “friendship” to “alliance”. Kennedy sought peace and stability in the

Middle East while also pursuing an end to the Palestinian refugee issue and curtailing an Israeli nuclear program.36 He traces Kennedy's time as a young man, Congressman, Senator, and

President to illustrate the length and breadth of his interest and interaction with Israel.37 Druks showcases both the American and Israeli side, though he relies on American archival sources and interviews with American and Israeli government members.38 He concludes that the President continually and repeatedly assured the Israelis that the United States would come to their defense should the need arise, sold them the Hawk, and marked the birth of a new dynamic of American-

32 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 74. He specifically states that concerning Dimona, Kennedy learned from the Hawks and no expected reciprocity would be allowed. Instead, the concept was tied to the security relationship 93. This involved a security guarantee Israel had long sought. 33 Ibid,122. 34 Hebert Druks, The Uncertain Friendship: The U.S. and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001). 35 Herbert Druks, The Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001). 36 Ibid, 1-2. 37 Druks, The Uncertain Friendship, 218-222. 38 Druks, The Uncertain Alliance, 23-24. 12

Israeli relations.39 His history is accurate and balanced. This dissertation most closely resembles

Druks, who made Dimona a seminal component of his work. The difference in this dissertation from his interpretation is that even if Israel had these legitimate grievances, from an American point of view Kennedy had to take his Dimona actions regardless of Israel's external threats.

Druks concludes that perhaps Ben-Gurion and the Israelis were naive to suspect that Kennedy would allow their nuclear aspirations to be attained under his watch. Similarly, he argues

Kennedy may have been ignorant of the level of Israeli security concerns. He concluded that devoid of a security guarantee from the Americans, the Israelis had to pursue nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately for Israel, this clashed with Kennedy and his staunch nonproliferation agenda.40

While this thesis traces a somewhat similar path and draws upon several of the same documents as Druks' 2005 intricate study, there is staunch disagreement -- the Americans were not naive about Israeli desires, rather they did not care. They sided with Israel ideologically; however,

Kennedy and the United States, as the superpower, decided that Israel could not pursue even the possibility of nuclear weapons and needed to be stopped. Druks does not focus intensely on the progression and deteriorating intelligence picture for the Americans. He misses the continuity and rise in Kennedy's anger -- having been deceived by the Israelis.

The best work on how Israel fit within Kennedy's model of prioritizing economic successes, liberal democracies, Western-oriented, and practicing a Western mindset in the Cold

War is Zachary Goldman’s article, "The Ties that Bind: John F. Kennedy and the Foundations of the American-Israeli Alliance" (2009). Goldman espoused that Kennedy comprehended that the

Israelis prioritized the same concepts as he did, and were partners in the Cold War fight.41 Israel fit within Kennedy's worldview, so supporting Israel was easier and facilitated the Hawk sale.

39 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, ix. 40 Ibid,145-146. 41 Goldman: 27. 13

Israel was a "liberal democratic modernization" success -- all tenets of Kennedy's Cold War fight.42 Goldman understands that on the important issues, specifically Dimona and the Hawks,

Kennedy's pragmatism dominated and his assessment of intelligence negated his worldview.43

Ideologically, he respected and believed in the Jewish state, but Kennedy knew by mid-1961 onwards that the Israelis were lying about Dimona, and his belief gradually gave way to distrust, resentment, and anger.

The most recent study on Kennedy's Middle Eastern policy (2017) comes from Italian scholar Antonio Perra. Perra's work is more critical of Kennedy and is primarily focused on

Kennedy's relations with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. He argues that American-Israeli relations developed unintentionally, as Kennedy was trying to "contain" the Israelis against attacking

Nasser -- Kennedy's long-sought after prize. Even with this criticism, he admits that Kennedy is undoubtedly the father of the American-Israeli special relationship.44 Perra characterizes Israel harshly -- he believes that the President understood Israel as a "destabilizing force" in the Middle

East, unable to help in the Cold War fight.45 Perra, an expert in American-Arab policy, does

Israel a disservice, treating the state as a side-event to Egypt. Unfortunately, Perra believes that

Egypt drove all of Kennedy's decisions and any Israeli actions were secondary – evidently, not the case. Dimona alone made Israel, not Egypt, Kennedy's primary concern albeit Egyptian anxiety and reaction constituted a degree of his Dimona concern. While Perra is critical of Israel on Kennedy's Middle Eastern view, he adds to the conception on Dimona. He understood something long neglected in the historiography: the increasing frustration, annoyance, and even

42 Goldman: 31-33. 43 Ibid, 50-51. 44 Perra, 3-5. He argues that Kennedy "laid the foundation for the special relationship" -- this was Little's approach in 1993. Perra believes that the "special alliance" came under Johnson and Nixon. 109. Even critics acknowledge Kennedy's role. 45 Ibid,10. 14

mounting anger of Kennedy and his administration about Israeli actions.46 He goes so far as to say that Dimona "nearly ended Kennedy's tolerance".47 Perra is really the only scholar outside of nuclear specialists on Israel to realize just how close Dimona came to reversing the accomplishments in American-Israeli relations.

Overall, the studies on Kennedy and Israel are primarily positive regarding his legacy.

Each work after 1993 either labels Kennedy the father of the special relationship or the enabler of more positive American-Israeli relations. Even though Israel continued their nuclear development under and after Kennedy, within the nuclear historiography on Dimona, Kennedy’s actions are widely praised.

Concerning the historiography on the United States, Dimona, and Israeli nuclear weapons, a total history is still impossible. During an alleged meeting between Israeli Prime

Minister Golda Meir and American President Richard Nixon in 1969, the Americans and Israelis completed an agreement whereby the Americans48 and by extension Western archives (Great

Britain, Canada, and Australia) keep classified any "proof" of Israeli nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, Israel still has a military censor forcing Israeli scholars to never acknowledge nuclear possession by Israel -- instead they must cite "according to foreign sources" to report specifics of Israeli nuclear weapons.

There are only two distinct schools of history on Dimona: works written before Israeli philosopher/historian Avner Cohen's major work, Israel and the Bomb (1998), and those which came afterwards. Cohen's master work took ten years to research and write as he interviewed participants all over the world. Cohen's book, first published in English in 1998, was highly

46 Perra,138. 47 Ibid,180. 48 Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), preface, x-xi. 15

controversial in Israel having not conformed to the censor -- when his Hebrew version was published in 2000 he had difficulty upon re-entry to Israel.49 Cohen produced the only real history of the Israeli side (written in English) and he accomplished his goal of "a political history of the formative years". He traces the accidental birth of Israeli nuclear policy or, as he argues, they "stumbled into" a policy of nuclear ambiguity.50 Cohen's work really jump-started the field, even though he admits that this history is incomplete and speculative.51 His comprehensive study researched and addressed the American response to Dimona under Eisenhower, Kennedy,

Johnson, and Nixon -- his concern, which has been maintained over the years, involved Dimona's impact on Israel. His book is about the inner-workings of Israel and what the move towards a bomb meant for Israel. He traces the interaction between Israeli politicians with the American reaction and is invaluable in shedding the first real light on how Israel deceived, and secretly hid the project from the United States. While his work, like the majority of Israeli scholars addresses the American response, the primary focus is Israel.

Long before the American archival records on Dimona were released (many documents still remain classified), studies were written in the late-1970s speculating about Dimona and addressing Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, or amimut (Cohen's Hebrew term for opaque).52

Other speculative strategic security studies addressed Dimona throughout the 1980s.53

49 American political scientist Alan Dowty detailed Cohen's plight and praised the master work in the field. Alan Dowty, "The Enigma of Opacity: Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program as a Field of Study," Israel Studies Forum 20, issue 2, (2005): 13-15. Dowty's article functions as a review article. He also mentions, which this study understands, that those who research and write about this subject become part of Israel's nuclear ambiguity, 4. 50 Cohen, 1-4. 51 Ibid, 6. 52 Alan Dowty, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Israeli Case," International Studies Quarterly 22, no. 1. (1978). Within this article, Dowty, among the first to write on the issue, admitted that since 1964, the Dimona reactor could produce plutonium: 81. Importantly, he highlights the American belief in a nuclear domino theory: 94. 53 Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Feldman, an Israeli nuclear strategist and mainstay in the field, outlined his policy for nuclear strategy. He, not having access to the archival material, believed Dimona inspections were tied to the Hawk scale -- which was untrue. 211. Importantly, long before it was "acceptable" to write about this issue, Israelis and Americans bravely published. 16

The first American journalist to uncover many of the documents addressing Dimona was

Stephen Green, admittedly, a non-Israel, non-Middle-Eastern specialist. In 1984, Green uncovered CIA estimates of Israeli nuclear capabilities from the National Office of Estimates in

March of 1963. This document, later in its full declassification, is the most revealing for historians.54 Green's stumbling upon these discoveries in the National Archives proved invaluable to future works, including this thesis.

Former Dimona technician and lighting rod in Israel, Mordechai Vanunu, "proved" the existence of Israeli nuclear capabilities (a long-suspected plutonium separation facility) in an interview with British paper, The Sunday Times, in 1986.55 Though many surmised this was the case, Vanunu allowed for an open, at least outside Israel, discussion of Dimona's nuclear capabilities.

By the start of the 1990s, a new phase of writing about Dimona emerged internationally after Vanunu’s revelations. In 1991, Seymour (Sy) Hersh, arguably the greatest living American investigative journalist, presented his account of the history of the nuclear program and the

American response, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.

While certain sources are evidenced, it is clear he was either leaked or saw early declassifications of American archival sources. This is frustrating for the historian, as he utilized unnamed sources and secret interviews. Still, he greatly contributed to the field. Occasionally, his study forms the nexus between speculation and scholarship, but it affords crucial insights to Dimona.

Understandably, Hersh's work contains many inaccuracies, given his time of writing before the

54 Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), 164. He cites Chief of the Office of National Estimates, Sherman Kent’s “Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability”. 55 The Sunday Times, "Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal," 1-3. Oct 5, 1986. MG31 K 39 Box/Vol. 117 Folder "117-13 Nuclear Power-Israel 1986-1991". National Archives of Canada (NAC). For the definitive story on Vanunu and the" release" or "treason" of his account, see Israeli journalist, Yoel Cohen’s, The Whistleblower of Dimona: Israel, Vanunu, and the Bomb (New York: Holmes & Meir, 2003). 17

full declassification (or present state) of archival American sources. What is astonishing is how the majority of his work is still accurate after thirty years. At the time, Hersh worked for The

New York Times and drew extensively upon the paper’s archives, providing inside information on how stories were leaked, specifically, how then Atomic Energy Commissioner and later CIA head, John McCone, told reporter John Finney about the discovery of Dimona and his fury in retelling the details. Hersh's work is an attempt to recount how "Israel became a nuclear power in secret."56 While impossible to replicate or source-check in an academic sense, this publication provided crucial insights and advanced the field.

Israeli political scientist Zaki Shalom's Israel’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes

Diplomacy between Dimona and Washington published in 2005 is one of the other foundational investigations on the history of the Israeli nuclear program -- more specifically, the interplay between the Israeli and American governments including Kennedy's Administration. Next to

Cohen's work, Shalom's is preeminent. Combining British, Canadian, Israeli, and American archives, this short and meticulous political study of the diplomatic row is invaluable to the field.

Operating a decade after the opening of archives Shalom wrote that at that juncture (mid-2000s) an abundance of archival evidence existed in the field, especially in the West, and a new era within the historical analysis emerged.57 Unsurprisingly, despite Shalom's strong work and focus on the American and Israeli side (similar to Cohen's), he is disproportionately interested in the implications for the Israelis of the American reaction. Again, he highlights Israel and how this affected Israeli politics and the domestic sphere. His work is a diplomatic history of the

56 Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), preface, 71-72. 57 Shalom, preface ix, viii. Shalom generously informed me in a conversation in Tel Aviv, Israel in June, 2016, that Australia had untouched archival sources on this issue. Unfortunately, this falls outside the scope and feasibility of this thesis. Still, I am greatly indebted to Shalom. I also saw many of the same sources (and new documents) which he had read through during my own American and Canadian archival research. 18

interaction between the Americans and Israelis. His strength is that he gives the reader insight into Israeli political decisions. Shalom’s writing coincided with a fruitful period in the mid-2000s when Israelis greatly contributed to the historiography on Dimona.58

The newest and final emergent element of study or field which addressed the American reaction to Dimona is intelligence history. This also began with Avner Cohen's 1998 work. To

Cohen's credit, by the mid-1990s as he reviewed the American archival sources, he uncovered an important principle in American thinking: despite what the scientific community discovered through inspections, the American intelligence community never trusted Israeli intentions with respect to Dimona.59 Cohen recognized the dichotomy of suspicion on Israel between American intelligence and what inspectors "found" in Dimona, writing in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, it was not an important component within the historiography until almost a decade later.

While Cohen marked the original entry on intelligence, American historian Jeffrey T.

Richelson wrote the seminal intelligence history concerning the American approach to Dimona in 2007. Meticulously, Richelson dissects the history of American surveillance, intelligence gathering, and American attempts to penetrate the truth about Dimona. Richelson's study is to the field of American intelligence history what Cohen's was to the historiography of Israeli nuclear history, a high watermark for scholarship. Richelson's book greatly influenced this thesis. He spent years utilizing CIA, State Department intelligence, AEC speculation, Defense and State documents, even tracking satellite movements to uncover the full extent of American activities

58 Israeli investigative journalist Michal Karpin’s, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel went Nuclear and what that means for the World. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006) is one such work. This book, a companion to his earlier documentary, shares many helpful insights. He also uses anonymous sources, though Shimon Peres is quoted on record. For instance, Karpin shares Peres' conclusion that Kennedy's efforts were all in vain as by the summer of 1963, the Dimona reactor was already critical, 195. 59 Avner Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy: The Critical Decade (1958-1968)," The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 2 (1998): 5. 19

against supposed allies (like Israel and France) concerning Israeli nuclear efforts.60 He scrutinized every available CIA report or Estimate and American inspection report on the Israeli nuclear program. He focused less on Kennedy and more on the CIA, however, his research enriched the field. His work is masterful and provides an analysis of the American government and their relationship with the intelligence community.

Since Richelson's work, this sub-field has increased and has drawn the attention of intelligence experts. This intelligence history, strategic studies, and specific focus on the debatable American intelligence failure is influenced by current problematic situations, such as

North Korea and Iran -- specifically, what can be deduced from the missed signs of a friendly

Israeli state. More recently, studies have addressed the specific failure or failures to detect the

Israeli nuclear program along with the initial discovery of the facility under Eisenhower, and

Kennedy's efforts to rectify the situation with mixed results. Authors praise John Kennedy, a rarity among presidents, who consistently sought more intelligence and information on the Israeli program.61 The most recent works further incorporate nuclear history with a special focus on

American intelligence, specifically, why the Israeli case was difficult to address and what can be learned from this challenge. While Kennedy and the intelligence community understood something was not right and that they were being lied to, they never had the "full picture", or actual situation.62

60 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 258. He routinely contacted the operators and archivists of the Corona satellite to ascertain pictures on Israel's facilities in the early-1960s. 61 Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount, "Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs," Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 3 (2014): 375-376. These new studies include a theoretical model of intelligence operations and failures, and a direct history of the Israeli case. 62 Austin G. Long and Joshua R. Shifrinson, "How long until Midnight? Intelligence-Policy Relations and the United States Response to the Israeli Nuclear Program, 1959-1985," Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 1 (2019): 72. The authors explain that, under Kennedy, in 1960-1963, this constituted a part of the "second phase" of American intelligence actions -- when they were keenly attuned to Israeli actions, and much intelligence was produced: 57. 20

While he perhaps unintentionally started this intelligence focus on Dimona in 1998, throughout his plethora of works Cohen had not dwelled on this important intelligence dimension, even in his myriad works with American historian William Burr over the last six years.63 This all changed with their 2016 report. In presenting previously uncovered documents, they showcased the importance of CIA, AEC, and wider American doubt of Dimona's true capability and purpose. While the authors argue that Kennedy's main goal heading into 1963 was to bring Dimona under some sort of international inspections regime and control, they highlight that American intelligence agencies maintained a healthy distrust and skepticism of Israel's nuclear intentions. Despite repeated assurances from the Israelis, the Americans continued to monitor and scrutinize Israeli covert actions through a variety of means.64 It appears that Cohen and Burr are working on a new book, or a comprehensive revision, perhaps of Cohen's earlier assessments.

These intelligence histories address Dimona through a theoretical intelligence lens. While this thesis does not apply any specific theoretical lens of bureaucratic models of intelligence collection or systems analysis, the CIA, and American intelligence monitoring of Dimona is featured prominently. It appears intelligence reports and internal studies that documented Israeli progress greatly contributed to Kennedy's response to Israel.

The last topic for historiographic study involves the analysis of American nonproliferation efforts under President Kennedy. Though relatively sparse, the field has intensified in the last decade. Scholars have highlighted Kennedy’s deep concern for nuclear proliferation since the 1960s, after his 1963 assassination. Kennedy’s closest “court” historian,

63 These "works" all appear as Digital Electronic Briefing Books for the National Security Archive's website. Topics include: the American discovery of Dimona under President Eisenhower; uranium and nuclear material tracking routes by American and Western intelligence; and other elements of the intelligence breakdown. 64 Cohen and Burr, eds., “Concerned about Nuclear Weapons Potential,” Apr 21, 2016. 21

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., identified that Kennedy since his time as a Senator, had a long-held interest and concern with nuclear proliferation.65

Intricate studies on Kennedy’s wider nonproliferation policy have been produced only within the last decade. Israeli and American scholars though divided in opinion have previously addressed nuclear weapons, proliferation, and what this meant to his Presidency. In the early

1990s, as more documentation was released, and Israeli scholars began to confront nuclear threats from Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and a rising challenge from the Islamic Republic of Iran, they addressed Kennedy’s nonproliferation actions. These studies addressed Israel as well as wider proliferation problems. In 1992, Israeli political scientist Shlomo Aronson, a scholar who has written extensively on nuclear policy and Dimona, teamed with Oded Brosh to address

Kennedy.66 Aronson posited the need to combine nuclear strategy (deterrence, balance of terror, game theory) within the "political-historical context" to comprehend how a state would operate as a nuclear actor.67 The authors analyze Kennedy not only in the context of Israeli nonproliferation, but also in terms of global nonproliferation. They note that Kennedy was the first president who appears to have actively included deterrence theory into his foreign policy strategies.68 While they speculated on Kennedy, they also understood that he clearly stood against proliferation. This support for Kennedy was countered by a biographer who argued that the President was willing to compromise on major tenets of his foreign policy to bring about

65 Schlesinger Jr., 453, 455. Shane J Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 145. He, along with Schlesinger, credits Kennedy friend, Clinton Anderson, and British diplomat David Ormsby-Gore with instilling in Kennedy the need for an end to nuclear testing. 146. 66 Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory and Reality, 1960-1991 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 14. 67 Ibid, 1. 68 Ibid, 35. The authors cite the missile gap in his 1960-campaign as proof. He hired a young Henry Kissinger, a nuclear strategist, as an arms policy advisor. The authors argue that McGeorge Bundy was heavily influenced by Thomas Schelling's deterrence theory. 29. 22

seminal political achievements, including nuclear proliferation.69 This initial scholarship was subject to limited archival declassification, and as the field progressed so too did Kennedy’s nonproliferation reputation.

Through the mid-to-late 1990s, Israeli scholars, concerned with the possibility of multiple states developing weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, produced strategic studies which also incorporated the first (albeit limited) histories of Kennedy’s nonproliferation policy.

Unsurprisingly, Israel was the priority, yet American nonproliferation policy was further investigated. Scholars have substantiated Kennedy’s concern with nuclear proliferation. He was the first President to make nuclear proliferation essential to his overarching foreign policy.70

Despite Kennedy’s firm stance against nonproliferation, other scholars noted that American nonproliferation policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s was disorganized and uneven globally. 71

By 2009, fuller histories of Kennedy’s nonproliferation efforts were possible. Studies produced during this decade highlight Kennedy’s firm stance against both Israeli and global proliferation. Though Gavin is a prominent dissenting voice, the majority of scholars during this period support Kennedy’s strong proliferation legacy.

While debate persists on its coherence, his global anti-proliferation policy has received accolades from several scholars. In 2009 and 2010, Kennedy was praised for his ardent global efforts against nonproliferation in two separate works. Scientists Thomas C. Reed and Danny B.

Stillman strongly supported Kennedy's overall nuclear legacy. They disclosed the extent to which he opposed a Chinese bomb. In 1962, he gave his approval and the Americans trained a

69 Reeves, 19. 70 Yair Evron, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 142, 148. Evron asserts this was a foreign policy goal of Kennedy's. This study argues it was the ultimate goal of his Israeli/Middle Eastern policy in 1963. 71 Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 175- 176. 23

Taiwanese contingent to attack Chinese nuclear facilities, though the plan was abandoned.

Kennedy went to extreme lengths to oppose nuclear proliferation. The authors continually credit

Kennedy for his decisions in trying to prevent an Israeli bomb. They conclude their analysis of his wider nonproliferation actions by writing: "John Kennedy was the defining antiproliferation president, but those concerns were among the casualties of Dallas."72 Furthermore, Professor of

Government and innovator in the field of American nonproliferation history, Matthew Kroenig, admits that after a brief discussion in early 1961 on whether to arm or aid India with nuclear weapons, Kennedy strongly opposed global proliferation. In particular, his foremost concern was a nuclear China. With this mindset, he stood firmly against Israel and any other potential new proliferator. Kroenig demonstrates through the use of CIA documents that China, India, Pakistan, and Israel were all connected in Kennedy's mind -- he needed to stop any sort of ripple effect of proliferation.73 This indicates that while Kennedy did not appear to have an overarching nuclear vision, he feared a potential nuclear proliferation domino theory in specific regions -- if India became nuclear, so too would Pakistan; if Israel acquired weapons, Egypt would follow.

Kroenig's survey prominently addressed power projection and influence over clients or countries, specifically, it was important to prevent Israeli attainment of a bomb in order to project dominance on an American client in a hostile region.74

Historian Shane Maddock, in agreement with Kroenig, cites Kennedy's declaration that a nuclear communist China would be "the most significant and worst event of the 1960s" for the world.75 Kennedy worked with the Soviet Union to enact treaties and international pressure so

72 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), 83, 106 73 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 19, 24, 31. 74 Ibid, 67. 75 Maddock, 155. Kennedy specifically referred to a nuclear test from China. 24

that Israel and Egypt would abstain from development, or at least it would be very difficult for them to go nuclear.76 Maddock's conclusion echoes those of Stillman and Reed: Kennedy was a good nonproliferation president, better than his successor, Lyndon Johnson. The author believed that Johnson inherited a "strong commitment to nonproliferation from JFK, but squandered it."77

The above works survey the various historiographic periods on: Kennedy and Israel;

Kennedy and Dimona; and Kennedy’s nonproliferation. The abundance of English language sources by both non-Israelis and Israelis contribute to a more complete evaluation of Kennedy's

Israeli policy. This study also aims to continue this discussion. This revisionist wave of Dimona historiography is a welcome addition to the consistently high-level Hebrew language works by interested Israeli scholars.78 New American voices and scholars also emerge to challenge and re- interpret the traditional narrative of Dimona.79

This dissertation aligns with the new emergent element within the field. This work concurs with Kennedy's positive historical legacy on nonproliferation, but challenges traditional views about Kennedy’s policy regarding Israel. The prevalent interpretation of Dimona argues that Kennedy supported a new arms and special relationship with Israel, permitting a closer bond and shared ideological support for Israel. Dimona, while a very serious issue, was “solved”. This thesis counters that Dimona was the central overriding concern and challenge in 1963 which defined his Presidency regarding Israel. This dissertation explains why he acted as harshly as he

76 Maddock, 192. 77 Ibid, 284. 78 In a telephone conversation in Israel in June of 2016, the rising Israeli expert on Dimona historiography, Adam Raz, informed me that in 2015 he wrote a new history outlining the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon within Israel. This work has not yet been translated to English. It addresses the Israeli inner-workings of policy. Shlomo Aronson also informed me that he has written many works over the years -- still only available in Hebrew on the Israeli side of Dimona. As this is a study of the American reaction, these studies would not address my focus, although their existence enriches the field. 79 Roger J. Mattson, Stealing the Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel, (United States: Self-Published, 2016). Matson, a former nuclear reactor designer, engineer, and AEC member, marks the entry of more science- based scholars into the field. He represents these new voices, having contributed the most recent book on Dimona. This dissertation joins this latest crop of scholars with a less sympathetic view of Israeli nuclear actions. 25

did. By early 1963, he understood there was a discrepancy between what the Israelis told him and what the American government covertly uncovered. This distrust consumed the core of his

Israel policy. It threatened to end American-Israeli relations and dominated all other considerations in the bond. The severity of this struggle has been greatly underestimated. Once he understood that the Israelis were moving towards a nuclear bomb, he took all immediate measures to prevent this goal. The Dimona issue was ever-present in Kennedy's Presidency and affected all aspects of American-Israeli relations. When the two states pursued competing objectives, Kennedy forced his will on the Israelis. Once the Israelis appeased the Americans, the mistrust largely subsided and American respect for Israel characterized decision-making.

The following chapter traces how Kennedy’s views of Israel developed over his time as a

Congressman and Senator. Chapter Three addresses the “positive” interactions in the relationship with Israel during 1961 and 1962. The sale of the HAWK (Hawk) missile demonstrated how relations operated. Chapter Four and Five analyze public record, how and why the Israelis initiated Dimona in the late1950s, and President Dwight Eisenhower's reaction to the program.

The inability to detect Dimona surprised the Americans and shaped Kennedy’s suspicion of

Israeli intentions. Israeli deception to initially conceal and then protect their program is explored.

Chapters Six and Seven deal with Kennedy, Dimona, and Israel. Chapter Six addresses: 1961-

1962 notably, the road to and proceedings of, the famed Waldorf-Astoria meeting; the effort to bring Dimona under international inspections; and the cracks the Americans uncovered in the

Israeli official story. As intelligence worsened, Kennedy and his close aides' views of Israeli intentions changed. Lastly, Chapter Seven delves deep into 1963 and illuminates Israeli actions such as Operation Damocles, an emergent Egypt missile threat, and the reasons why Kennedy confronted the Israelis on Dimona. The chapter re-examines Kennedy's approach to David Ben-

Gurion and Levi Eshkol. As Kennedy understood, the Israelis were not being truthful and their covert conduct harmed American interests in the region. Thus, Kennedy confronted the Israelis in an unprecedented manner regarding Dimona.

The dissertation concludes with an examination of Dimona’s impact on the American-

Israeli relationship. Israeli politicians and diplomats outmaneuvered the Americans at every turn to hide Dimona’s true purpose. Mordechai Gazit’s assertion that Dimona had no effect on the bilateral security considerations is false. Only through yielding to Kennedy's demands did the

Israelis avert a diplomatic catastrophe. Otherwise, Kennedy genuinely would have reconsidered aspects of the relationship. Yet even though Kennedy "won" the diplomatic battle over Dimona, he "lost" the war. The Israelis, through an intricate system of deception and covert development, produced a nuclear capacity under the watchful eye of the Americans. The following pages untangle the rise, fall, and resurgence of American-Israeli relations over Dimona.

Chapter Two: Kennedy’s View of Israel

President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963 makes it difficult to decode the reasoning for his Israeli policy. He could not leave memoirs which illuminated his view of the Israelis on topics like support for Israeli initiatives, the Hawk sale, or Dimona. Nonetheless, Kennedy’s perspective on Israel can be deciphered from his actions, speeches, and the experiences of those around him. Israel fit within Kennedy’s worldview, his ideology, and his Cold War mentality.

This belief in Israel boosted the President’s trust in Israel. Kennedy's image of Israel evolved over time from his travels to Israel throughout his years in Congress and the Senate. When he began his Presidency, he held Israel in high regard. Unfortunately for Israel, actions conflicted with another high priority: nuclear nonproliferation. This chapter: traces Kennedy's belief system and how he perceived Israel, Jews, and the Middle East; investigates his long-held concern for nuclear proliferation; and analyzes decision making within his administration on these issues.

Kennedy preferred liberal, democratically-progressive states with strong economies, like

Israel. Israel’s economic agenda fit the President’s (and indirectly his chief economic adviser,

Walt Rostow’s) successful economic model for winning the Cold War. Lastly, Israel was a

Western capitalist and industrial state.80 Over the years, pragmatic and more pressing concerns overtook Kennedy’s ideology (rhetorical or real) in his Israeli policy. Ideology explains certain elements of Kennedy’s Israeli decisions, but not paramount issues like Dimona. He believed in

Israel, but distrust emerged as he witnessed Israeli actions, most brazenly, nuclear activity.

Israel was worth supporting in Kennedy's view, as the Israelis espoused Western ideals, were staunchly anti-Communist at the United Nations, and practiced successful economic development. Israel was a near-perfect model to advance American Cold War initiatives.81 Even

80 Goldman: 26, 31-32. 81 Ibid: 34. 28

in times of trepidation and apprehension of Israel, Kennedy never doubted Israel's alliance or stance in the Cold War. Kennedy applied the term, “special relationship”, to American-Israeli relations. He informed Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in Palm Beach, Florida, in

December, 1962, that the two countries’ relationship was tantamount to that of the United States and the United Kingdom.82 The Kennedy worldview explanation needs to be codified within the existing discrepancy of what exactly constitutes the “special relationship”. Only through an examination of Kennedy's initial conception of Israel which he brought into office can one truly understand the depths of his anger concerning later Israeli actions. At the start of his term,

American-Israeli relations were positive. Distrust gradually emerged over his Presidency.

Many Israeli scholars dismiss the worldview explanation or any type of ideological justification, and argue it constitutes a sentiment-based approach that does not properly explain the reasoning of presidential administrations. The main proponents of this analysis are Yaacov

Bar-Siman-Tov and Abraham Ben-Zvi. Ben-Zvi contends the special relationship is one paradigm of decision-making contrasted with the realist, or strategic. Within this line of argumentation, the special relationship "encompasses domestic, public opinion, and shared heritages, specifically, based on sentiment."83 This model conflicts with his geopolitical realist view which he employed to explain arms sales such as the Hawk in 1962. He argues nearly all of

Kennedy’s decisions were based on the geopolitical context.84 Bar-Siman-Tov counters that the relationship contains both “soft” and “hard” factors and only after the hard factors -- such as, a community of strategic interests, arms deals, and cooperation -- came to fruition did the

82 Little: 569 83 Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, 4-6. 84 Ibid, 6 29

relationship become “special”.85 The special relationship is not a paradigm that is mutually exclusive in decision making. The underlying impetus for Kennedy’s decisions on Israel involved Israeli alignment with his worldview. Kennedy's worldview combined ideology and realist calculations: Kennedy supported Israel due to his belief in Israel’s values and system; he also understood Israel was a valuable partner in the Cold War fight.

Within Kennedy’s global perspective, Israel, a model of economic progress, represented a country worth supporting in the East/West Cold War dynamic. Israel was decidedly pro-Western by 1960. Not only did Israel align with the sentiment and soft factors in the United States, it would never constitute a concern in Kennedy’s global dilemma -- preventing the expansion of communism. Communism was Kennedy's paramount concern. Despite the Wilsonian idealism evident in his beliefs, pragmatism reigned in issues of national security.86 Kennedy’s worldview was not representative of a soft idealism, rather his preferred way of winning the Cold War and countering communism.

Dissecting John Kennedy's worldview is essential to understanding his approach towards

Israel. Intellectually, during his campaign and into his Presidency, Kennedy was heavily influenced (reflected in his Presidential policies) by Walt Rostow, a MIT economist, later his

Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and afterwards, the head of Policy

Planning within the Department of State. Rostow, whom Kennedy read87, became his dominant economic intellectual and initial policy-planner within the administration.

By the late 1950s, the Americans knew that Israel was firmly Western in their ideology.

There was never a chance that Israel would pivot to the Soviets for arms under Kennedy.

85 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948: A ‘Special Relationship?’,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 2 (1998): 232. Bar-Siman-Tov argues that Israel stresses the hard factors. 86 Perra, 6. 87 Rostow’s articles and opinion pieces are prevalent in Kennedy’s pre-Presidential papers during his days as a Senator – specifically, in 1958. 30

Importantly, no other Middle Eastern/Levant nation could say the same. Critically, Israel never fell into the same global problems, as did Egypt -- the Americans understood Israel’s orientation.

Throughout Kennedy’s Presidency, despite harsh debates, stern warnings, and disagreements, especially on Dimona, Kennedy understood that Israel was not going to compromise his global plan: battling communism in the Cold War.

Kennedy’s favourable view of Israel developed over the decade prior to his Presidency. It is evidenced in speeches he gave and articles he wrote as Senator. Kennedy, an intellectual and deeply curious individual concerning foreign policy and the Middle East, did not hold a static view of the region, especially Israel. Certainly, the domestic political context in the United States and his search for Jewish votes most likely contributed to solidifying his Israeli view. Overall, however, Kennedy was intrigued with Israel -- at least rhetorically in his speeches.

Unlike many other presidents, Kennedy had differentiated himself before he took office.

He was exceptionally well-traveled as a Congressman and Senator. In 1939, while conducting fact-finding information on British policy on the advice of his constantly scheming father, Joseph

Kennedy (at that time, Ambassador to the United Kingdom), the young Kennedy traveled throughout the Middle East -- notably, Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem.88 Kennedy’s father had been very unpopular with American Jews, given his open support of the policy of appeasement by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Kennedy wrote to his father that the latter's 1938 speech was good for “anyone not bitterly anti-fascist”.89

In an undated letter to his father from 1939 during his trip to Palestine (pre-Israeli statehood), Kennedy shared some interesting comments which would never be uttered once he entered life as a politician. The young Kennedy gave his impressions of Palestine and wrote to

88 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963, (New York: Back Bay Books, 2003), 57. 89 Ibid, 56. 31

his father that “though if you know the Jews, you know the ‘whole story’.” He suggested that to comprehend the region, it is essential to understand how both the Arabs and Jews were promised the same land under the Balfour Declaration and the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, respectively. Kennedy insightfully explained that while he understood the principle of the 1939

White Paper from the British Government, limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine would not work in practice as the prior partition plan in 1936 was rejected.90 Though he argued that the

British were doing a commendable job, he believed the only solution was to “break the country into two autonomous districts with self-government.... not to interfere with each other and ensure that the British interest is safeguarded.”91 Kennedy then delivered a prophetic assertion he should have remembered in political life when dealing with the prospect of peace during his Presidency:

“I have never seen two groups more unwilling to try and work out a solution that has some hope of success than these two groups”92 -- referring to the Palestinian Jews/Yishuv and the

Palestinian Arabs. Lastly, Kennedy shared his thoughts with his father concerning the Yishuv, or the Jewish community in Palestine. He revealed his sympathy for the Arabs, stating that some of the Jewish leaders were arrogant with an “uncompromising attitude". However, he did note that one faction of the Jewish population was willing to make a compromise, yet others were very liberal with an “almost communistic form of government”.93 He ended his letter with the judgment that British policy was failing despite their best attempts.

This is the only public unedited view on Israel from Kennedy's youth. His views evolved through the years, and undoubtedly changed when he entered politics in 1947 with a

90 "Letter written to his Father following Trip to Palestine, 1939," 1. Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files. Special Events through the Years. Ditigal Identifier: JFKPOF-135-001. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 91 Kennedy, Joseph P. Sr. Letters from JFK, 1939-1942, and undated. 3. Papers of John F. Kennedy. Personal Papers. Correspondence, 1933-1950: Family. Digital Identifier: JFKPP-004-031. JKPL. Boston, MA. 92 JFK Letter to Joseph Kennedy, 1939 undated. Papers of JFK, Personal Papers. Correspondence, 1933-1950: Family. Digital Identifier: JFKPP-004-031. JKPL. Boston, MA. 93 Ibid. 32

congressional seat in Massachusetts. John Kennedy, an astute politician, courted the Jewish vote, and subsequently, was aware of his demographic base during his senatorial tenure. Significantly, this is also the last time Kennedy mentioned Israel and communism.

None of this implies that Kennedy was controlled by any supposed domestic Jewish vote.

His understanding of the Middle East and Israel is evident from this letter. Indeed, a lifelong curiosity with the Middle East began. Nonetheless, when John Kennedy began his political career, the label, 'anti-Semite', given to his father in 1947, complicated matters somewhat.

Herbert Druks is representative of the majority of scholars who defended John Kennedy, saying unlike his father, he was certainly no anti-Semite. From the outset of Kennedy's political career, he befriended Hirsh Freed, a Boston attorney, political insider, campaign financier, and link for Kennedy to the Jewish community. Freed successfully convened a meeting between

Kennedy and the local Jewish leaders in Boston in 1947.94 This astute domestic alliance set a precedent for Kennedy's approach on the political trail -- tasking one of his intermediaries to liaise with the Jewish community. Later, in 1960, during his Presidential campaign, Myer

Feldman and Abraham Feinberg filled this role -- they both convened meetings with Jewish financial and political backers. The Catholic Kennedy, a member of a religious minority himself, understood the importance of ethnic blocs in voting, and as he began his political career focused on foreign issues with ethnic support, namely, American Jews and Poles, central in Kennedy’s political base.95

94 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 19-21. 95 Dallek, 139. 33

Hirsh Freed revealed Kennedy’s transformation, his political career, and aspirations.

Freed, who met Kennedy in 1945 and corresponded with him over many years96, believed

Kennedy was an intellectual. Freed speculated that perhaps he was the “only Jew Kennedy had ever known”, and while this was untrue, it sheds light on Freed’s initial assessment of

Kennedy.97 Hirsh Freed made an interesting comment on Kennedy's evolving view of Israel. He suggested Kennedy knew the Palestine question as a young man “in an academic way”, crystallizing his point regarding Kennedy’s intellect and accentuating the importance of the

American domestic issue in the conflict.98 With Freed’s assistance, Congressman Kennedy met with various Jewish leaders and campaign financiers. He described Kennedy as a voracious reader who learned everything he could on each subject, including Israel.

Others in his inner circle explained that Kennedy was clearly pro-Jewish and understood their issues; he disagreed with many of his father’s comments and was his own man. Kennedy, however, would not totally commit to the cause of Zionism stipulating that he would need to read more.99 This theme persisted throughout his Presidency. Kennedy did not bow to domestic pressure when he was personally opposed to an issue.

John Kennedy brought his beliefs and positions on Israel into his political career. In 1951,

Kennedy returned to Israel. This time, however, there was no outward criticism towards Israel

96 The Hirsh Freed Personal Papers at the JFK library in Boston show correspondence dating from 1946 when Kennedy was running for Congress to 1960 before his inauguration. Papers of Hirsh Freed, Box 1 1946 to 1960. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 97 “Hirsh Freed Oral History Interview JFK #1 6/5/1964,” 1, 3. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 98 Ibid, 17. 99 “Lewis H. Weinstein Oral History Interview # 1 June 3, 1982,” JKPL, Boston, MA. Weinstein was a lawyer, member of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities from 1961-1968, and a Kennedy Fundraiser. Importantly, Weinstein was the Chairman of the Conference of the Presidents of American Jewish Organizations making him a member of what some label the “Israel/Jewish lobby”. Weinstein stated there were four-to-five “pro-Israel organizations” within the conference, 45. Weinstein had a glowing report of Kennedy, believing he was his own man different from his father on Jewish issues. 5. Importantly, Weinstein as a member of the lobby does acknowledge that Jewish lobbying efforts helped halt weapons to Arab countries, 15. Lastly, he reminisced that while he wished Kennedy did more for Israel, he was good for Jews and Israel, 52. 34

and the Jews versus Arabs. Rather, a more mature and reserved figure emerged. The domestic element of Jewish donations to his campaign and the influence of individuals like Hirsh Freed definitely contributed to his new view of Israel. He also demonstrated a greater understanding and maturity. On this trip, Kennedy traveled widely throughout Asia and the Middle East. Again, he stopped in Israel.100 On this foray, he met the founder of modern Israel and its sitting Prime

Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Kennedy was impressed with what he witnessed in Israel, namely, the immense progress made since his visit as a young private citizen in 1939.101 Sadly, the fervor and impression that Israel left on the Congressman was not shared by Israel’s leader.

Subsequently, in 1965, David Ben-Gurion revealed that he did not have any memory of

Kennedy’s first meeting with him. He knew it had been before Kennedy’s Presidential nomination, but incorrectly dated the encounter sometime between 1952 and 1953.102 John

Kennedy returned from this Israeli visit more attuned to Israel’s progress and its role internationally. As Kennedy’s worldview became more crystallized through the 1950s, his positive view of Israel would only increase -- speeches he delivered during his tenure in the

American Senate (1953-1960) would corroborate this view. Admittedly, Kennedy was politicking in the latter half of the 1950s. His view of Israel appropriately fit within his worldview and though comments made in his various speeches concerning the Jewish state can be perceived as pandering, they were germane to his worldview. Kennedy’s worldview built upon his vehement Catholic opposition to communism. This fervent disdain for communism also

100 Dallek, 165. 101 Rabe, 160. 102 “David Ben-Gurion, Oral History Interview #1,” 1. July 16, 1965, Tel Aviv. JKPL, Boston, MA. Ben-Gurion’s recollection should be tempered somewhat. As Israeli, new historian, Avi Shlaim writes, by 1963 Ben-Gurion’s “mental faculties were declining” and despite having his own party in 1965, at 78-years-old in 1965, Ben-Gurion can be somewhat excused for his problems of recollection. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 212, 217. Later in the Ben-Gurion interview, he does mention how astonished he was by Kennedy’s youthful image, stating that he “could not believe such a young looking boy would be nominated”. Ben-Gurion Oral History #1, 1. JKPL, Boston, MA. 35

bolstered his view of Israel as part of the free world within the Cold War. Moreover, Kennedy, a principled man, understood Israel’s transformation.

By 1956, Kennedy’s stance on Israel was shifting more and more favourably towards the

Jewish state with its consistent economic progress. It also was affected by consultation with or his realization of the slowly emerging “Israeli or Jewish” lobby. His record indicates strong advocacy for ending anti-Semitism in resolutions as a congressman and a senator -- issues that were highlighted in his 1960-campaign through his liaison with the Jewish community, Myer

Feldman.103 Poring through Kennedy’s Senatorial correspondence, it is apparent the “lobby” was also on display. The lobby (in this study, defined as groups vying for support of various Israeli issues) was officially started (in 1943) by Rabbi Hillel Silver to get Americans to address the growing problem of Jewish refugees. The primary focus of the group involved refugee issues and the creation of a home in Palestine for the Jews.104 By the mid-1950s, the lobby or pro-Israel groups were corresponding with the future president. In February of 1956, Kennedy answered

Rabbi Morris S. Lazaron concerning the senator’s assurances to Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe

Sharett, that a new agreement on Middle East arms control was needed -- one that would be more

“meaningful and a more substantial pact” than the 1950 Tripartite Agreement.105 One of the most direct influences of the lobby involved the interaction between Kennedy and I. L. (Si) Kenen, the

103 In two different versions, “Kennedy’s Record in the Middle East” and “Position of Senator Kennedy on Various Issues Involving Israel and the Middle East”, Feldman lists Kennedy’s efforts in bringing an end to the persecution of Jews in Soviet Russia in 1953; and a 1955-bill helping liberalize immigration laws. Myer Feldman Personal Papers, Folder “Jewish Problems 2 of 4” Papers, Series 2 Campaign 1960, Kennedy Speech Excerpts, Box 8. JKPL, Boston, MA. Also, see “Kennedy’s Record in the Middle East” for his protest of a 1956-arms-embargo against Israel with a letter he wrote to Dulles. Same file, Folder “Jewish Problems 1 of 4”. JKPL, Boston, MA.. 104 Elizabeth Stephens, US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship' (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 16. 105“Feb. 6th, 1956 Kennedy letter to Rabbi Morris S. Lazaron” The Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files. Legislation 1953-1960, 1956-1957 Miscellaneous-Middle East. Box No. 674 Folder “Middle East 1/7/56-3/15/56”. JKPL, Boston, MA. The Tripartite Agreement was signed between the US, UK, and France in 1950 to try to restrict arms flow to the Middle East creating an embargo against selling to countries within the region. Hypocritically, nearly everyone was secretly breaking the agreement. 36

president (and sole member) of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs, the first officially registered lobby group supporting Israel. This organization would change its name in

1959 to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and eventually become a powerhouse after the Six Day War.106 Despite several scholars framing the Israel lobby as some sort of shadow group that governs American Middle Eastern policy, this was very much not the case at this stage. The budget of the lobbying group was small as were the number of employees.

Nonetheless, its impact can be evidenced by Kenen’s writing to various senators about the organization’s views pertaining to Middle Eastern issues.107 One example of Kenen’s policy of getting “behind the issues” is a letter he wrote from the American Zionist Committee for Public

Affairs to Senator Kennedy on April 25th, 1956, calling for American arms sales to Israel in order to keep peace and parity with the Arabs.108 It is fair to say that Kennedy was certainly aware of domestic elements and organizations such as Kenen’s that monitored the government’s decisions. Conversely, no real proof exists to show that the lobby greatly affected Kennedy during his major Presidential decisions on Israel. Nonetheless, these letters demonstrate that

Kennedy was aware of the domestic element.

106 Kenen, 107-108. This is my assessment of the power of the lobby in this period. 107 Tivan uncovered that in the mid-1950s, the budget for the AIPAC predecessor was only $150,000, 39. Throughout the whole period, the budget was only in the low millions. The other noticeable proof of the lobby was the publication of Kenen’s Near East Report in 1957. This was produced bi-weekly and was sent to senators and others within the government outlining and often challenging the view of the American Government versus that of Kenen. Kenen, 108. 108 “Letter Apr. 25th, 1956 Kenen to Kennedy American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs” Folder “Middle East 5/4/56-9/24/56” Box No. 674 PPK, Pre-Presidential, Senate Files.1956-1960, 1956-1957 Miscellaneous- Middle East. JKPL, Boston, MA. Within this file are numerous letters between Kennedy and Kenen. Usually Kennedy’s response involved the senator “thanking” Kenen for the information. One such example is a document entitled, “The Administration’s Policy in the Near East”, attached with an "Analysis of Dulles’ Testimony", dated March 18th, 1956. Kenen blamed the United States for the situation with Egypt. He outlined that Israel has been seeking a security guarantee since 1954 when the Baghdad Pact was initiated, and furthermore, Kenen believed that Dulles and the government were ready to give such an agreement to Israel in 1955. Lastly, to conclude the organization’s disagreement with the administration, Kenen wrote that Nasser was an imperialist who is “trying to be Chou Enlai of Africa and the Near East”. These were the type of exchanges between Kennedy and the lobby. 37

Throughout 1956, Kennedy began to give pro-Israel speeches. This most likely straddled the divide between Kennedy’s courting Jewish and Christian domestic support and his pre- existing and quickly evolving worldview of Israel’s place in the Cold War. During April at

Yankee Stadium, Kennedy left no ambiguity as to where he stood on Israel stating that:

“It is time that all the nations of the world in the Middle East and elsewhere, realized that Israel is here to stay, she will not surrender -- she will not retreat -- and we will not let her fall.”109

Senator Kennedy followed this speech strongly supporting Israel at the Annual Banquet of the

Histadrut Zionist Organization in Baltimore on November 27th, 1956. Once again, he reaffirmed

Israel’s place in the Middle East that the small Jewish state was there to stay.110

During the October/November Sinai and Suez War of 1956, the Israelis had quickly taken the Sinai desert from the Egyptians. The Israelis kept their forces in the Egyptian territory well into 1957, angering President Dwight Eisenhower and creating a gulf between Israel and the

United States. From this rift came certain progress in the special relationship, particularly, an opportunity for Kennedy. Firstly, one could argue that the idea of the modern “lobby” emanated directly from the War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested to the American Jewish community that instead of dealing with constant disparate voices from the community, a more coherent and sole voice of organized lobbying from the American Jewish community would be beneficial. Significantly, this suggestion from the highest political echelon of Washington catalyzed the operation of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations which had met for the first time in 1954.111 Though the organization emerged prior to the War, it

109 “Position of Sen. Kennedy on various issues involving Israel and the Middle East.” Folder “Jewish problems 2 of 4”. Myer Feldman Personal Papers, Box. 8. Campaign 1960, Immigration, Kennedy Speech Excerpts. JKPL, Boston, Mass. 110 John F. Kennedy (Senator), The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), 110-112. In this address, Kennedy, no doubt on the campaign trail, addressed the importance of keeping communism out of the region and the vitality of oil. 111 Tivnan, 40-41. 38

was the Suez/Sinai battle which solidified this need for a coherent voice. Secondly, the War led

Senator John Kennedy, who was more reluctant than Democratic Majority Leader, Lyndon

Johnson, to overtly call for help and support Israel.112

In his role as Senator, Kennedy continued to correspond with concerned Jewish voices regarding Eisenhower's policy on Suez -- he had demanded that the Israelis recede or their aid from the United States would be cut off. Notably present during these exchanges was the future

President's continuing dialogue with I. L. Kenen.113 Kenen, who agreed with the issues he raised, framed the conflict through a lens that fit into Kennedy’s worldview -- economic progress to aid and end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kenen understood that this was music to Kennedy’s ears, who believed that economic prosperity would foster peace in regional wars. Kenen raised the

Johnston Plan of 1953 as a great project for the development of the Jordan Valley.114 He understood how Kennedy viewed Israel, and how to enact good relations. Future Israeli leaders would follow suit.

Finally, on February 11th, 1957, when Eisenhower and Dulles vigorously pressed David

Ben-Gurion to pull Israeli troops out of the Sinai, or American aid essential to Israel would be

112 Tivnan, 50. 113 There are letters from Kennedy to Kenen, dated Jan 25th, 1957, thanking Kenen for his Jan 17th, 1957 letter where he outlined his thoughts. The letter dissected the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was launched that year and called for any Middle East Nation fearing communism to call for American aid and intervention. Kenen did not feel this would help the Middle East’s situation. Interestingly, Kenen, almost mimicking Kennedy, directly stated that the real problem in the region was “not communism,” but “war, subversion, poverty, not Soviet aggression.” Letter Kenen to Kennedy Jan 17th, 1957: His Analysis on Near East,” 2-4. PPK, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files. Legislation 1953-1960 1956-1957 Middle East (cont) New Haven Railroad, Box No. 675 “Folder Middle East 1/25/57-1/31/57” also “Letter Kennedy to Kenen Jan 25th, 1957,” same folder. JKPL, Boston, MA. 114 “Letter Kenen to Kennedy”, 5-6. JKPL, Boston, MA. Kenen cautioned against arms coming into the region that were causing heightened relations. The wider Jewish community was concerned as evidenced by a number of letters to and from Kennedy, namely, “Letter Kennedy to Herbert A. Abeles, President Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds Inc,” Folder, “Middle East 1/25/57-1/31/57”, Box 675. PPK, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files. JKPL, Boston, MA. The Johnston Plan (named after former envoy Eric Johnston) called for a cooperative development of the Jordan Valley Waters between Jordan and Israel. Based on the Tennessee Valley Authority, the plan (the Jordan River Project) was hatched in the early-to-mid-1950s (1953-1955). Later under Kennedy, the Jordan Waters issue would become a fraught contention between Syria, Jordan, and Israel. 39

threatened, Senator Kennedy wrote directly to Secretary of State Dulles. In this letter, he declared:

“I am deeply concerned over the possibility that this Government would recommend UN sanctions against Israel for her refusal to abide by the resolution calling for complete withdrawal of her troops.”115

Thirteen days later on February 24th in a speech at the Brotherhood Year Observance of the

National Conference of Christians and Jews in Cleveland, Ohio, Kennedy addressed the Middle

East. Specifically, he presented the objectives he wanted addressed and would later confront in his Presidency. Kennedy highlighted both the tenets of economic success, his own personal worldview, and the issues he perceived as constituting the root causes of problems in the region -

- all of which Kenen had raised. Kennedy cited the refugee problem of Palestinians (those who left or were evicted in the 1948 War), the issue of the Jordan River’s resources, and the unstable political and economic status of the countries of the region. He also tied these imperatives to the

Israeli military status, and noted that even with the Israeli withdrawal from Egypt’s territory, the situation would not change.116 The speech was very telling as it combined Kennedy’s worldview, his interpretation of Israel as Western, Democratic, and an economic success. Yet, he certainly was pandering somewhat to his future domestic base, and by then had started to build his name on foreign policy. Kennedy began to advocate for a strong push by the Americans for Middle

Eastern peace, a concept where he would heavily criticize Eisenhower during his Presidential campaign. He also raised an end goal that Ben-Gurion had been pursuing since 1953, the trade- off of an Israeli (and Egyptian, if they were so inclined) security treaty or guarantee with the

115 “Letter Kennedy to John Foster Dulles, Feb 11, 1957,” Folder “Middle East 2/5/57-2/25/57,” PPK, Pre- Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Box No. 675. JKPL, Boston, MA. 116 Kennedy, 113-114. 40

United States for territorial concessions or compromise.117 Kennedy further outlined the need to build a “Middle East Regional Resources Fund under the UN and World Bank” to jointly advance the economic success of the region -- this would contribute to peace in his economically-driven belief. As early as 1957, Kennedy’s Middle Eastern and Israeli policy was evident, organized, and public.118 In this speech, Kennedy shared that he had been to Israel in

1939 and again in 1951. He declared his astonishment with the economic transformation he witnessed during his two visits. He advanced the often-cited narrative that the region was previously barren and then transformed by the Israelis, indulging the joint foundational myth of pioneering between Americans and Israelis -- the Frontier Thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, that both nations were settlers against the native inhabitants, and “improved or settled” the region.119 Again, this was certainly politicking and campaigning to those present, and aligned with Kennedy’s worldview. John Kennedy admitted that:

“Israel is the bright light now shining in the Middle East. We, and ultimately Israel’s neighbors, have much to learn from this center of democratic illumination, of unprecedented economic development of human pioneering and intelligence and perseverance.”120

In March of 1957, Kennedy again confronted Eisenhower’s Middle East policies, voicing his criticism against the Eisenhower Doctrine in a Senate speech.121 This along with Kennedy’s

117 Kennedy, 115-116. 118 Kennedy, 116-117. 119 Ibid, 118. The foundational “myth” of the two does not have to be false, rather that both populations believe in it. Stephens, 4, 9. Stephens writes that the frontier thesis is ingrained with religion in America, much like Israel, 60. Historian Michelle Mart also makes numerous references to Israel’s kibbutzism and pioneering ethos -- mirroring Americans. She goes so far as to argue that Americans perceive Israelis as "surrogate Americans", Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), ix, xx. Mart cites a bevy of American publications which highlight the "pioneering Israelis conquering the desert."54-55. Lastly, Michael Oren outlines the religious element to the Puritans in early America and their attachment to the Jews of Palestine. Oren, 90. He, akin to Stephens, cites one of the foundational American myths -- manifest destiny as directly tied to biblical Restorationism in Israel, 141-144. 120 Kennedy, 118. 121 “Kennedy in Senate against Eisenhower Doctrine, March 2nd, 1957,” PPK, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Box No. 675. JKPL, Boston, MA. 41

actions concerning Israel were for the first time clearly articulated in his famed Foreign Affairs article, A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy (October, 1957). This signaled the beginning of

Kennedy’s emergence on the campaign trail as the presidential candidate who was gravely concerned with the direction of American foreign policy. Kennedy's comments on the Middle

East included further criticisms of his predecessor. He highlighted the lack of coherent American policy in the region since World War II. Regarding Israel, he wrote: “we were right to support the establishment of the State of Israel, whose democratic stamina and military effectiveness have withstood the hard tests of outside challenge and aggression.”122 This piece is the clearest evidence for Israel’s status within Kennedy’s burgeoning worldview. His understanding of the nation fit within his Cold War approach. This bridged his ideological affinity for Israel with realist calculations of Israel’s effectiveness.

By 1958, Kennedy was in full campaign mode and worried about the Jewish vote, specifically, how to appeal to Jewish voters. Kennedy understood which posture towards Israel would help his political career. In a private meeting with Philip Klutznick, president of B’nai

B’rith and a wealthy real estate developer from Chicago, the two discussed what American Jews viewed as strong American policy vis-à-vis Israel. Succinctly, Klutznick informed the senator that the American response to Suez/Sinai was widely derided, while Harry S. Truman’s strong support -- the United States were the first to de facto recognize Israel in 1948 -- was applauded.

This lesson made an impression on Kennedy’s future speeches addressing Israel,123 points

Kennedy clearly articulated between 1958 and his Presidential win in 1960. Building on

Kennedy’s appeals to Israel, he delivered a speech of support for Israel at the B’nai Zion

122 John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36, No. 1 (Oct, 1957): 48, 50. 123 Tivnan, 53. 42

Banquet entitled, "Israel: A Miracle of Progress". This speech outlined Kennedy’s worldview and aligned with the domestic support he sought.

Kennedy repeatedly traced the ties and similarities between Israel and the United States.

He advanced and supported the idea of Israelis as settlers akin to early American pioneers who conquered the “sterile plains of the US”, comparing Palestine to the United States when it was settled.124 Kennedy reassured the crowd it was a myth that the birth of Israel was the reason for the region’s problems, admonishing “even by the coldest calculations, the removal of Israel would not alter the basic crisis in the area.”125 He suggested the only concept the Arabs agreed on was their opposition to Israel, used as a flashpoint to scapegoat the Zionists. Kennedy made an apt explanation as to how Israel fit within his worldview:

“Israel today stands as an example for all the Middle East in spotlighting how economic modernization may be spurred and accelerated against high odds, great physical barriers, and constantly growing populations as well as against all communist blandishments.”126

This could have emanated from Walt Rostow’s mouth illustrating his preference for fostering fledging non-European economies, specifically, his focus on Israel as a developing country that was quickly modernizing. To emphasize this point, Kennedy continued:

“Israel, on the other hand, embodying all the characteristics of a Western democracy and having long passed the threshold of economic development, shares with the West a tradition of civil liberties, of cultural freedom, of parliamentary democracy, of social mobility. It has been almost untouched by Soviet penetration.”127

These statements by Kennedy were certainly appealing to his Jewish audience along with the many domestic supporters of Israel. Israel clearly aligned, if not directly, conforming to a near

124 “Israel: A Miracle of Progress Golden Jubilee Banquet of B’nai Zion. Feb 9, 1958. An Address. Honorable John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts.” Folder Speeches (JFK) Israel B’nai Zion Banquet 2/9/58 Correspondence 3/14/58- 6/24/58. 3. Theodore C. Sorensen Personal Papers, Correspondence and Memoranda Speeches (JFK) Schedules, 1955-1960, Subject Files 1953-1960, Box No. 16. JKPL, Boston, MA. 125 Ibid, 4. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid, 4-5. 43

textbook example of a successful state within Kennedy’s worldview. Kennedy argued that providing arms shipments into the region had been, and would be, deeply unhelpful to the tensions between nations. This was foreshadowing for his eventual arms limitation initiative.

This speech perfectly encapsulates Kennedy’s global lens, Israel’s place within it, and his eventual Israeli policy. His concern on arms control would be dominant throughout 1963 -- tying directly to Israel’s Dimona project.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Israel’s statehood, Kennedy among others praised Israel in the Senate. In a speech on April 25th, he said the “recreation of Israel was easily one of the most dramatic stories in history.” This again coincided with the traditional American triumphant celebration of Israel’s narrative of overcoming insurmountable odds. He also added that he hoped close collaboration would continue with Israel, given the “mutual devotion to the principles of freedom” between both countries.128

John Kennedy clearly articulated how he viewed his predecessor's Middle Eastern policy.

He wrote that the region was presently, “a monument to Western misunderstanding.”129 During a

1959 interview, he suggested that Israel as the Jewish homeland was consistent with American national interests. He believed that the President’s priorities in the Middle East should be the preservation of peace and stability.130 Kennedy believed the incoming Democratic President could right the ship and “reverse the present deterioration.”131

Kennedy set his sights on the White House in 1960. He encouraged prominent New York

Jewish Democratic fundraiser, Abraham Feinberg and his special counsel, Myer Feldman, to

128 “Congressional Report: Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, Second Session” Apr 25th, 1958. The Papers of President Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Box No. 695. 1958 Miscellaneous Legislation. “Folder Legislation Files 1958-Israel”. Within the file is a letter from I. L Kenen thanking Kennedy for his remarks, dated May 2nd. 129 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 106. 130 Ibid, 217. Again, Kennedy did not believe there was a conflict between Arab and Israeli goals. 218. 131 Ibid, 218-219, 227.

schedule a meeting at Feinberg’s Hotel Pierre apartment in New York. Feldman divulged that the intended purpose was an exchange of views; however, it was also an attempt to get the 5.5 million Americans Jews to vote for him in the coming election. Abraham Ribicoff, who attended the meeting, argued Kennedy perceived Jews as “a kind of liberal force.”132 In August of 1960, when Kennedy was in full presidential campaign mode (having declared in January of that year),

Kennedy met with: Abraham Ribicoff, the former Governor of New York Averell Harriman,

Label A. Kutz, Jacob Avery, Louis Boyer, I. L. Kenen, Mark Boyar, Philip Klutznick, Max

Bressler, Morris Shenker, Abraham Feinberg, Dr. Dewey Stone, Ira Guilden and Julian B.

Wenezky, along with Myer Feldman.133 These people represented large private financiers,

Jewish leaders, and what many would consider members of the “lobby”. Kennedy had corresponded with nearly every name on the list at some point, heavily with Shenker, Kenen, and

Klutznick. Feldman, in correspondence with Shenker, expressed Kennedy’s views on civil liberties, namely, his actions for Jewish Americans.134 Despite this apparent bias or large domestic contingent seemingly affecting domestic policy on the Arab-Israel conflict, Feldman defended Kennedy, stating this was “not coloring views, (rather) a frank and candid” exchange occurring with the incoming President who desired strong relations with all Middle East nations.135 Scholars have uncovered that during this meeting, not a fundraiser, those present offered to finance Kennedy’s Presidential run in exchange for guiding his Middle Eastern and foreign policy plan during the first-four-years of his Presidency. Kennedy was furious with this

132 “Myer Feldman Oral History Interview JFK #12,” 556-558. Aug 26, 1967. Washington, DC. JKPL, Boston, MA. 133 “Letter I.L. Kenen, AIPAC to Myer Feldman Aug 10, 1960” in Folder Jewish Problems 2 of 4, Myer Feldman Personal Papers, Series 2 Campaign 1960 Immigration Kennedy Speech excerpts, Box No. 8. JKPL, Boston. MA. 134 “Letter Myer Feldman to Morris Shenker Aug 20th, 1960,” Jewish Problems 2 of 4, Box No. 8. JKPL, Boston, MA. 135Feldman Oral History #12, 561. JKPL, Boston, MA. 45

offer, again demonstrating that domestic pressure policy would not supersede his key principles.136

Kennedy's final pre-Presidential speech on Israel was significant for understanding his

Presidential policy. It was delivered to the Zionists of America at their convention in New York

City on August 26th, 1960. Kennedy was eloquent and again played to his audience. He frequently cited Jewish history asking for the audience's forgiveness for his youth -- he alluded that David was young when he vanquished Goliath. In testimony that could have come from an

Israeli government pamphlet on the return of the people of Israel, Kennedy, building upon his comments from 1957 and 1959, shared that he saw grandeur emerge in 1951 in Israel, a stark contrast from the Ottoman legacy of neglect and ruin that he witnessed on his first visit in

1939.137 Kennedy denounced a report in the Arab paper, Al-Gomhouria, countering he believed

Israel was there to stay. Importantly, Kennedy equated Israel with Ireland, citing Irish independence as wider than just an Irish cause -- no small gesture, given Kennedy’s love of

Ireland. Kennedy continued that “friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter. It is a national commitment.”138

Kennedy cited past policy “blunders”, for instance, the Eisenhower Administration's poorly conceived policy during Suez. This created a rift which pushed Israel to adopt their adverse position. Israel was a champion of democracy and sometimes it must have appeared as if

“they (Israelis) were being punished for their virtues”, once more, implying Suez. The Senator then advocated that some sort of arms guarantee or arms limitation would be crucial for peace in

136 Paul Charles Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004), 50. Bass, 57. 137 “Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Zionists of America Convention” Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, NY August 26th, 1960. presidency.uscb.edu/us/index.php?pid=742/7. This is reminiscent of the Labor Zionist narrative of making the desert bloom, or turning the desert green. 138 Ibid. 46

the region -- a tenet that comprised the majority of Kennedy’s efforts concerning Israel in 1963.

He also pledged that the “full authority and prestige of the White House would be used for peace for Israel and the Arab States.” Kennedy followed through on this promise during his Presidency, directly involving himself in a number of Israeli issues, most importantly, in confronting

Dimona. Kennedy then followed with what can be considered the most important aspect of this speech, certainly sharing his belief in Rostow’s economic modernization model, explaining that

“the Middle East needs water, not war, tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs.”139 This is the exact embodiment of what Kennedy valued in the Cold War struggle, specifically, how the West and economic progress could create better societies. Pertinently for the American cause, this would prevent communist progress. Kennedy ended his address solidifying his priorities in the Middle

East, which he had addressed or continuously raised since he was a Senator, and more intensely since 1957: the use of the Jordan River; the resolution of the refugee problem; alleviating an arms race; and finding a permanent peaceful solution.140 Finally, Kennedy had fully developed his approach to the Middle East and Israel. This aligned with his worldview, yet he was cognizant of the vitally important domestic support.

Senator Kennedy's pre-Presidential years are vital in comprehending his view of Israel and his actions with the Israelis. They needed to be traced for several reasons: firstly, whether it was merely rhetoric or his ideological affinity for Israel; even prior to his Presidency, Kennedy was heavily interested in the region. Scholars and administration officials contend that while

President, he was personally more interested than the American Government in the Middle

139 “Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Zionists of America.” This is a famous passage that crystallizes Kennedy's modernization/economic approach to his Middle Eastern foreign policy. 140 Ibid. 47

East.141 Secondly, Kennedy’s priorities and course of action towards Israel were developed over a period of about three years and solidified by the time he came to office. He held a nuanced view of Israel which simultaneously appealed to voters and aligned with his Cold War, capitalist- democratic preference. With his Presidency, he brought into office a very positive view of Israel.

The intention is not to stipulate that domestic politics solely explains why Kennedy advocated a more supportive stance towards Israel in the late-1950s. Correspondingly, his view on the region was informed albeit he was fully cognizant that ensuring certain ethnic groups would greatly aid his Presidential bid. Kennedy, as both Lewis Weinstein and Hirsch Freed admonished, was his own individual -- not committing to any cause (Zionism) that he did not completely understand or condone. This pre-existing and developed worldview formed the basis upon which Kennedy practiced when he entered the White House. Henceforth, many of his decisions were pragmatic, cold, calculated, measured, and consistent with his belief in Israel.

When he had to make final decisions regarding Israel, he rationalized that Israel was in the

Western sphere, therefore, an ally.

Lastly, a great deal of scholarship has framed the lobby during Kennedy’s Presidency as the dominant influential factor in his closer affiliation with Israel. One would counter that scholars of American-Arab relations and those trying to emphasize the lobby’s “control” of

141 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 45. Druks states that Kennedy’s personal interest in the region (Israel, specifically) did not align with the major foreign policy problems of the United States Government. Indeed, Myer Feldman stated that the “Middle East was never at the top of Kennedy’s agenda.” “Myer Feldman Oral History Interview JFK #10,” Dec 11th, 1966. Washington, DC. 473. JKPL, Boston, MA. This is directly countered by Philips Talbot of the NEA, who stated that “the complex of Arab-Israel issues also absorbed a good deal of the President’s time and energy.” “Philips Talbot Oral History Interview # 1,” 23. Dec. 5, 1964. Assistant Secretary NEA and South Asian Affairs, State Department, 1961-1965. JKPL, Boston, MA. The amount of time Kennedy allocated to the Middle East is still contested; however, it seems to be sustained that he was deeply and intellectually interested in the region. To support his admiration for Kennedy’s Middle Eastern involvement, Komer added that Kennedy knew more on the region than other member of the “top echelon of his administration”, including Bundy or the Secretary of State. “Robert W. Komer Oral History Interview # 1,” 5. June 18th, 1964. JKPL, Boston, MA. 48

policy have exaggerated this component.142 Parenthetically, many of the administration figures note the dominance or omnipresence of the domestic factor. Kennedy's American Ambassador to

Israel, Walworth Barbour, explained that with the "influence the Jews have in the American political scene, (it) is unrealistic to think that any attack on Israel would go unanswered by the

United States."143 While there was evidently a domestic element to his Israel policy which stemmed from both Jews and Christians, overall Kennedy made critical decisions, his actions against Dimona for instance, devoid of outside pressure or influence.

One of the counters to Kennedy having been swayed by the domestic factor involved his domestic Jewish expert, Myer Feldman, who admitted that Kennedy made his own decisions on the Middle East and was not influenced or driven by those in the Senate. Again, this hurts the domestic lobby thesis as the main determinant for American-Israeli policy.144After a thorough archival analysis, Bass is correct in illustrating that the lobby or domestic pressures had little effect during Kennedy’s Presidency.145 Yet, this ignores the period Kennedy served as a Senator when clearly he was aware of the lobby and cognizant of its presence. This point is paramount:

Kennedy understood this element existed from his time as a Senator. He was familiar with

Kenen, notably, his acute comprehension that there were domestic elements who wanted a certain Israel policy. Kennedy even welcomed members of the so-called lobby, such as Lewis

Weinstein and Philip Klutznick, into his administration. Klutznick was American Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson’s assistant.146 Kennedy's consultation of either Feinberg or

Freed, dating back to the late 1940s, solidifies his realization of this presence. Feldman’s

142 Barrett also greatly emphasizes the lobby and "domestic pressure" as the main determinant in Kennedy's Israeli policy. xxii, 6. 143 "Walworth Barbour Oral History Interview -JFK #1," 18. 5/22/1981 Ambassador to Israel. JKPL, Boston, MA. 144 "Myer Feldman Oral History Interview JFK #12," 585. Aug 26, 1967. JKPL, Boston, MA. Feldman admitted it was his role to deal with any "Near East problems in the Senate". 145 Bass, 6-7. 146 Spiegel, 100. 49

appointment as liaison with the Jewish community-- the first President to formally create this role -- also indicates Kennedy understood the importance of the domestic context. While

President, Kennedy largely kept the lobby and domestic considerations out, but not entirely, as this contingent continued to exist throughout his dealings with Israel. Usually, the higher the interest a president possessed for a region, the less access interest groups were afforded.147 Given

Kennedy’s personal interest in the Middle East, this is detrimental to those who advocate the domestic factor theory -- specifically, that the lobby drove or limited American actions concerning Israel. During his time as a Senator, Kennedy aligned more closely with Israel due to its place within his worldview, not because of overwhelming domestic pressure or lobbying efforts. Some administration officials believed this was not the case. Philips Talbot, who openly addressed the impact of the domestic lobby, believed that with the Hawk Sale during the summer of 1962 the lobby had an impact through domestic pressure. In a common refrain within the

Department of State, he joined with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in remembering that he himself never felt the "day-to-day" pressure.148

This is the main impetus for outlining much of the American domestic battleground: when it came to President Kennedy's non-essential matters as opposed to his national security priorities, he was willing to cooperate with lobby or interest groups. Conversely, on essential principles (most prominently, Dimona) during his term, he and his administration would make the decisions devoid of outside influences.

147 Spiegel, 10. 148 "Talbot, Oral History #2," 17, 20. JKPL, Boston, MA. Dean Rusk shared that he was very surprised by the lack of continuous or any prolonged direct pressure on him during both Kennedy's and Johnson's Presidencies from the "Jewish community" "Dean Rusk Oral History Interview #8," 352. July 7th, 1970. JKPL, Boston, MA. Though he does not explicitly mention in which instance it occurred, he recounted that during one meeting there was evidence of this direct pressure. 50

Not only did Kennedy repeatedly declare his admiration for Israel -- his long held working relationship with Jewish Americans continued to progress. This was evident when selecting his eventual administration. Kennedy did not discriminate based on religion when selecting his administration, notably his Cabinet and White House. This was particularly pertinent to Jews within his administration -- Walt Rostow, Robert Komer, and Carl Kaysen were members of his National Security Staff; Myer Feldman, a prominent pro-Israel liaison, served as well. Theodore Sorensen (himself identifying as a Unitarian with a Jewish mother), a

Kennedy speechwriter and adviser, wrote that the only qualification Kennedy had for those

Jewish appointees in his administration was “whether they can handle it.”149

Two members of Kennedy's National Security Council were vital in his decision-making process, especially on Israeli nuclear progress. The first was a gifted former intelligence analyst,

Robert Komer, officially the roving and also Middle Eastern expert on Kennedy's NSC. Komer was intricately familiar with Kennedy's decision making style and worldview. He revealed that

Kennedy was not fond of bureaucracies and even invited dissent and congenial disagreement among those in his Middle Eastern circle. Komer shared a funny anecdote from his regular meetings concerning the Middle East. Kennedy relished pitting Feldman, representing the domestic Jewish perspective, against Komer, representing the State Department, "Arabist" or pro-Arab, realist approach. Komer explained that when both men were present and wished to share the views of the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kennedy would state “let’s hear what the Jew thinks”, inviting Feldman’s stance, then evoking Komer to share “what the Arab thinks.”

149 Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the Late President, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 253. 51

Komer admitted that he loathed this designation.150 Kennedy's exercise, while farcical (Komer and Feldman were both Jewish), invited debate and brainstormed different approaches. Robert

Komer divulged his admiration and respect for Feldman throughout the interview; however, he admitted that both he and Kennedy were aware that Feldman was a channel for the Israeli embassy. Komer admirably noted that he was not angered at Feldman for his “sentimental” view of Israel. Nevertheless, he understood that his boss, National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy agreed that Feldman could not be trusted as it was assumed he would leak information to the

Israelis behind the administration’s back. Despite Komer's praise for Feldman, he corrected an interviewer on their roles in informing Kennedy. Notably, Komer described himself as an

“arbiter between Kennedy and Feldman”, who tried to pursue a non-preferential path towards

Israel or the Arabs -- yet he termed Feldman a lawyer for the Israelis, specifically, “the lawyer they wanted.”151 Though Feldman debated the impact of his own importance in the Kennedy

Administration and his involvement in formulating policy concerning Israel, Komer identifies that Feldman’s role was merely that of a domestic figure. Komer’s importance rose in the

Kennedy Administration and by 1963, he had a higher security clearance than Feldman; therefore, Feldman was kept out of the close policy making circle.152 Komer was very aware of the competing dimension to his and Feldman’s relationship. Their positions were not symmetrical.

The other central figure in Kennedy's decision-making structure involving Israel and national security was his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy. It was Bundy who initially hired Komer. Bundy was also trained in signals intelligence (SIGINT) during the Second

150 “Robert Komer Oral History # 5,” 38. JKPL, Boston, MA. It is noteworthy that both these men in Kennedy’s inner sanctum within this dynamic were Jewish. It is interesting to see that though Kennedy is widely regarded as pursuing an even-handed approach, there was no Arab ethnic representation concerning Middle Eastern policy. 151 Komer Oral History #5, 38, 73. JKPL, Boston, MA. 152 Ibid, 81. 52

World War. Significantly, he and his older brother, William, a member of the Department of

Defense, were both former intelligence practitioners. William was a staff director at the CIA's

Office of National Estimates in 1954. It was he who suggested Komer to his brother McGeorge as a possible candidate on Kennedy's NSC.153 Bundy, Komer, and the prevalence of intelligence- trained individuals working on Israel added a further challenge to Israeli nuclear ambitions: these were not average civilian politicians, rather minds trained to look for deception and inconsistencies. Komer consistently noted that Kennedy was fanatic about reading all cables relating to the Middle East each morning -- he, Kennedy, and Bundy would voraciously read through all the intelligence traffic. This alignment of Kennedy, Bundy, and Komer created an attentive NSC apparatus -- well-trained individual NSC members serving a highly-interested and attentive President. Kennedy also favoured deciphering intelligence himself, or at least having direct access to information, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.154

Bundy also brought another useful passion and pertinent expertise to the problem of

Dimona -- his familiarity and experience with nuclear nonproliferation. McGeorge Bundy, who later in life became an avid advocate for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, was personally tutored by Robert Oppenheimer, and ghost wrote the memoirs of Henry Stimson -- perhaps, two of the most connected individuals to the American nuclear Manhattan Project.155

Bundy, Komer, and Carl Kaysen constituted the members of what some have anointed, the

“Bundy State Department”.156 Bundy, a Republican, former Dean of Harvard, and one of the action intellectuals, was an appropriate fit with the New Frontiersmen; however, he rarely had a

153 Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy Brothers in Arms; A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 15-16, 187. Bird writes that McGeorge Bundy had a deep appreciation for intelligence, 16. 154 Bird, 188. Bird seconded Komer and others in their oral histories that perhaps Bundy's greatest strength was his unparalleled speed reading. "Phillips Talbot Oral History #2," 44. Aug. 13, 1970. Assistant Secretary of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau – State Department, 1961-1965. JKPL, Boston, MA. 155 Bird, 17. Bundy thanks these men for his education in the preface to his own book on nuclear weapons in 1988. 156 Bass, 63. Bass does not seem to have a great admiration for this label for the group. 53

grand overarching, coherent strategy concerning foreign policy.157 Komer and Bundy both shared Kennedy’s desire to bypass the State Department and make their own foreign policy.158

Kennedy's tight-knit decision-making counsel, including his brother, Bobby,159 was solidified.

Robert Komer brought a unique background, predictive intelligence, which aided

Kennedy's scrutiny of Israeli efforts to hide their nuclear program. He had previously worked at the Office of National Estimates within the CIA. Komer had a first rate intelligence education, learning directly under Sherman Kent, the chief of the Board for National Estimates.

Fortuitously, it was Kent, who personally assigned Komer to direct the Middle East and South

Asia staff. In the 1950s, this initiated Komer’s long familiarity with the Middle East.160 Komer greatly respected Kent’s analysis. This would be vital in 1963 as Israeli nuclear proliferation progressed; Kent wrote a decisive predictive intelligence report sharing his estimates of the consequences of an Israeli bomb.

Komer’s biographer identified him as a pragmatist, neither a moral intellectual nor a

“soft-liberal”. This mindset along with his keen intellect allowed Komer to become the most influential member of Bundy’s staff in determining Middle Eastern policy.161As the historiography has grown and more documents become available, Komer's importance and balanced decision-making have been increasingly investigated.

157 Frank Leith Jones, Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 4. Jones also believes that Kennedy did not have an “overall grand diplomatic strategy”. 158 Robert B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 37-38. 159 Bobby Kennedy is a virtual ghost in files pertaining to Israel. He never appears on any National Security, or Presidential cables -- unsurprisingly, as the Attorney General would not be directly involved in national security matters. Nonetheless, Kennedy was closest with his brother. 160 Jones, 20, 22-23. Komer, who eventually represented the CIA on the NSC under Eisenhower, would visit Egypt, Lebanon, India, and Iran in 1956, 25-26. 161 Jones, 37, 52. Jones states that unlike Rostow, who was tied to theory and morally accountable to spreading the American economic model, or the action intellectuals and internationalists, Komer was a strong crisis manager, a pragmatic individual who focused on facts. 34. 54

Rounding out the inner circle of Kennedy’s decision-making group and the National

Security Council was his special counsel, former Washington and Philadelphia lawyer, Myer

Feldman. Feldman had been an advisor on Jewish affairs for Kennedy since the latter was a

Senator in 1958. When Kennedy offered him the job, Feldman replied that he was concerned he was too close to the Israeli side, too emotionally invested in Jewish issues, and this in turn, would affect his judgment. Kennedy happily retorted that was exactly what he was expecting, as he needed Feldman to keep him up-to-date on the sentiment of the American Jewish community.162 Feldman would become one of Kennedy’s seminal intermediaries between Israel and the Americans. Whenever the President needed something completed in a sensitive manner, like the Hawk announcement, he called upon Feldman. Regarding intimate American national security issues, Feldman was never in the inner-most sanctum of Kennedy’s most trusted advisers. Komer, Bundy, and Feldman formed the inner circle on the domestic-foreign policy apparatus for Israel and the Middle East. They were juxtaposed with the State Department, notably, the supposed remaining “Arabists”.

The designation of Arabist was loosely applied to members of the State Department's

Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), along with many CIA officials, and various American ambassadors. Briefly, this study designates an Arabist as an individual who is closely familiar if not enamored with Arab culture, a fluent Arabic speaker, and one who has spent significant time within an Arab country. The problem is that the blanket term came to apply to many who consistently sided with the Arabs over the Israelis -- this was never the intended purpose of the label. Though the term was loaded, it was traditionally used in the historiography to denote (many times unfairly) those who were seen as anti-Israel, specifically,

162 “Myer Feldman Oral History Interview #10,” 475. Dec 10th, 1966. JKPL, Boston, MA. 55

the State Department. This Department contrasted with the domestic support of Israel or against the supposed “Israeli lobby”.163

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot was often described or labeled as an Arabist; however, his expertise and doctorate involved South

Asia (India).164 He did not even speak Arabic. This designation was unfair, and his role in dealing with Israel demonstrated his attention to specific issues like nuclear proliferation.

Though Talbot was not an expert on the Middle East, he did contribute to formulating a great deal of policy in the region.165 Talbot believed that Arabists were usually individuals who were

“largely entangled in the domestic side of American foreign policy towards the Middle East.166

This quote elucidates the need to comprehend the prevalence or lack of Arabist power -- it directly conflicts with the lobby/Zionist domestic hypothesis. These theories or decision-making models are overemphasized. Talbot argues many in State believed that this even-handed or more

Arab-centric State view was needed, as the domestic "pressures" on presidential administrations were adamantly pro-Israel and Zionist. This he contends would be gravely adverse to the long- term interests and strategy of the Americans in the Middle East.167

163 Robert Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993), 5-7. Kaplan states that the term may even have an assumed hint of anti-Semitism traditionally -- being the direct descendant of the orientalists. 164 “Chester Bowles Oral History Interview #2,” 83. July 1st, 1970, Essex, Connecticut. JKPL, Boston, MA. Bowles, former Undersecretary of State, astutely makes this point, and has a good comprehension of each of Kennedy’s administration members' abilities. 165 For instance, David Ben-Gurion credits Talbot along with Myer Feldman and Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Avraham Harman, for planning and coordinating the famous May-Waldorf-Astoria meeting between himself and John Kennedy. Oral History Interview Ben-Gurion #1, 1. JKPL, Boston, MA. 166 "Philips Talbot Oral History Interview JFK #2," 3. Aug 13th, 1970. Assistant Secretary of the Near Eastern and South Asian Bureau Department of State (1961-1965). JKPL, Boston, MA. 167 Ibid, 14. Talbot, one would conclude, does not believe this sentiment. Talbot does argue that Congress and the Senate on Capitol Hill were more pro-Israel and this certainly would highlight (in State's view) the long-term dangers to American Middle East policy. 16. Lastly, he shares that throughout Kennedy's Presidency, the Department felt the administration was too "soft on Israel", and more concessions and demands should be extracted from their bilateral counterpart. 16-17. 56

Phillips Talbot, in a common refrain defended the State Department, eschewing their belief that the Department was merely balancing what they believed were “strong pro-Israel domestic pressures that in the long term could hurt American interests in the Middle East.”168

This is a sentiment shared by nearly all State Department figures and Kennedy Administration officials. In interviews, they rarely directly address the “Israeli lobby” but move around

“domestic pressure” and “influence”, and contend that was problematic for the nation, though they all deny it was severe. Nonetheless, Talbot presents a very human side of the Department, espousing that he understood given what has happened in Jewish history why the Israelis would be wary of the Department’s stance. Talbot mentions Jewish Americans as his intended focus for the term domestic pressure, but counters that he did not feel pressure daily. This was echoed by the highest echelons of State, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.169 Rusk went so far as to say that he did not “get the sense that Kennedy was ever directly pressured by the Jewish American community.”170

Walworth Barbour, the highly esteemed American Ambassador to Israel for the duration of both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson’s Presidencies, addressed the issue of Arabism.

168 Talbot Oral History Interview JFK #2, 14. JKPL, Boston, MA. He stated that he felt most in the State Department were not pro-Arab and actually given their familiarity with the Arabs saw the downside of dealing with them. He vehemently defended an avoidance of polarizing the Middle East in the 1960s with a pro-Israel or pro-Arab policy. Lastly, he walks around the issue of the lobby, stating that he had a concern that “US domestic influence would push American foreign policy and jeopardize very significant national interests.” 16. 169 Ibid, 20. Dean Rusk also stated that he did not remember any “direct pressure on Israeli policy” either. Rusk Oral History Interview #8, 352. JKPL, Boston, MA.. It is important to note the “pressure” both talk about at that time would be directed on Capitol Hill and Congress, not State. I also believe it is significant that all State individuals were very much aware of a “lobby” or groups pressuring the administration on Israeli policy. This would suggest that perhaps the lobby’s role in this period has been somewhat undervalued. I do not believe, however, there was one cohesive lobby, as suggested by Mearsheimer and Walt during this period. Interestingly, Rusk stated there was no “oil lobby” from one particular nation either -- Komer would echo these statements. Rusk, 353. 170 Ibid, 353. Rusk also supports the historical analysis that even if there was pressure, Kennedy would not have bent to their demands, given he was not concerned with “special interests”. Interestingly, Rusk was unaware of Kennedy’s 1960 meeting with Jewish financiers. 57

Barbour noted certain Arabists knew what they were talking about, while others did not. He argued that by Kennedy’s Presidency, most of the Arabists were expunged from this group.171

On the other side of the domestic spectrum concerning Middle Eastern foreign policy was the much more pro-Israeli view of some of Kennedy’s administration. Myer Feldman did not agree that State and the Arabists were neutral -- in fact, he believed the Department carried an anti-Israel bias. Feldman disclosed that Talbot was not part of the problem rather it was “really the people below him all had anti-Israel bias”.172 It is very difficult to treat Feldman as an unbiased member of the administration; however, he advances a position worth noting.

Subsequently, he professed that Kennedy understood the United States could not ascertain many significant gains from supporting a small country with no oil against tens of millions of Arabs with very limited power, diplomatically, and through the United Nations. Feldman countered that morality was the crux for supporting Israel (in this instance) and that it appeared this view was lacking from the State Department.173 Feldman did not highlight the intricacies of Kennedy's worldview and was not as familiar as Komer with Kennedy’s image of Israel.

Despite all the accusations that the Department of State was adamantly anti-Israel, there is direct evidence to counter these beliefs. In retrospect, what is most interesting is the apparent respect or agreement that many of the Ambassadors to various Middle Eastern countries held for

American-Israeli policy.174 A former Ambassador to Turkey promoted the strength of Israeli diplomats, admitting that there was domestic pressure from the Jewish American community, yet he maintains this was not needed. Given the strength of Israel's diplomatic corps (including,

171 “Walworth Barbour, Oral History Interview JFK #1,” 16. 5/22/198, JKPL, Boston, MA. Barbour states that the State Department under Kennedy and Johnson was objective and professional. 172 “Myer Feldman Oral History Interview #11,” 538. July 29th, 1967, Washington DC. JKPL, Boston, MA. 173 Feldman Oral History #10, 538-539. JKPL, Boston, MA. 174 Raymond Hare, John Jernegan, and even Arabist John Badeau espouse support for much of Kennedy's policies toward Israel, though they counter that the Arabs were against these measures. 58

Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman and his subordinate Mordechai Gazit), lobbying would not be needed -- Israelis could achieve their aims alone.175 This is a common theme throughout this dissertation: Israeli diplomats and leaders, especially under duress, consistently outmaneuvered their American counterparts. This was true on day-to-day interactions, and detrimentally in significant exchanges concerning Dimona.

While these two orientations existed -- the seemingly pro-Arab State Department stood in contrast to the pro-Israel Feldman -- Kennedy, who believed in Israel, made the final decisions.

Furthermore, this ideological difference of opinion between segments of the government is not evident on vital decisions between 1961 and 1963. With regard to Dimona, all camps were aligned -- the Central Intelligence Agency, State, NSC, and Kennedy all united in preventing an

Israeli bomb.

By the time of Kennedy's Presidency, evangelical, Jewish, and general supporters of

Zionism grew as the influence and organization of the lobby rose. Conversely, the Arabist,

Protestant/WASP influence waned. One scholar maintained that even if all the experts in the

State Department and CIA were hypothetically Arabists, a demographic shift in opinion (pro-

Zionism), or more significantly a passion from any specific president, would have brought about a defeat to the Arab domestic cause.176

Despite these competing ideologies and personal biases, for the most part, Kennedy's

Government witnessed professional agreement on Israel. The President, McGeorge Bundy, and

175 "Raymond Hare Oral History," 36. Sept 19, 1969 Washington, DC Ambassador to Turkey 1961-1965. JKPL, Boston, MA. Hare concurs with Talbot and Rusk that the pressure is greatest on the Hill, as opposed to directly on the White House. 176 Hugh Wilford, America's Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 291. In another work, Wilford cites the rise of AIPAC, Israeli-skilled diplomacy -- notably, hasbara, literally translated from Hebrew as "explaining" -- as a factor. The term has gone on to designate Israeli lobbying and public relations work concerning their image. Hugh Wilford, "America's Great Game: The CIA in the Middle East, 1947-67," in Challenging US Foreign Policy: America and the World in the Long Twentieth Century, eds. Bevan Sewell and Scott Lucas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 109. 59

Robert Komer had the final say in the formulation of national security policy. While Komer,

Bundy, and Kennedy understood the global importance of Israel in the Cold War, they held no illusions about certain views of the Israelis. Polemically, Komer, who tried to deal even- handedly with Israelis and Arabs, asserted the Israelis were harder to get along with, or at first associate with, and admits he was “a great admirer of the Israelis, but I was calling them as I saw them.”177

Though the United States and Israel shared an affinity, cultural bond, and similar Cold

War orientation with Soviet and Soviet-backed Arab clients as their respective enemies, each country held different national interests and aspirations. Israel valued defense over all else: the

United States, especially Kennedy, vehemently opposed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

While the State Department and CIA178 were more traditionally suspicious of Israel (if one believes in Arabism writ large), by the time Kennedy came to office, he had an open mind towards Israel. He wanted better relations than under Eisenhower, evidenced by his repeated criticism of Eisenhower's conduct during the Suez War. Israel fit neatly within his worldview of an economic, Western-leaning, stable, democratic state -- a reliable partner or ally in a dangerous region. There was one major problem for the Israelis: Kennedy prioritized few agenda items above communist penetration and Cold War fighting against the Soviets. One of those priorities involved stemming nuclear proliferation. Kennedy also carried this agenda into his term. His positive view of Israel clashed with his realization of Israeli deception or their continued lies, and dominated the relationship for large parts of 1963. Israeli behaviour left the President no choice but to take firm actions against the proliferating State. Dimona represented the collision of

177 Komer Oral History Interview #5, 78. JKPL, Boston, MA. Barbour echoes this statement, arguing Ben-Gurion was not very likeable albeit Barbour and Golda Meir were good friends. 178 The CIA also had been traditionally staffed with many Arabists. This was especially true of their Near East Division which addressed the Middle East. Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists, 206. By 1961 when Kennedy assumed office, this was beginning to subside. 60

Kennedy's worldview with his paramount concern of stopping an Israeli bomb -- pragmatism and ideology clashed.

John Kennedy took an interest in nuclear weapons and nonproliferation during his tenure as a Senator. In the late1950s, when he was trying to carve out his own foreign policy priorities, he was educated on the danger of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately for Israel, their nuclear desires and Kennedy's nonproliferation stance were henceforth on a collision course. While a Senator, even before he conclusively decided to run for President, in his speeches and writing, Kennedy alluded to nuclear proliferation and the need for nuclear control.

In February of 1957, in a speech in Ohio, Kennedy advanced the idea of a "Middle

Eastern Nuclear Center" for peaceful research. This idea operated along the same ideological principle as President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program and would ensure peaceful nuclear research in the region without a move towards weapons programs by the region's inhabitants.179

This was forward-thinking as the United States at that stage did not suspect any covert nuclear activity within the area. Kennedy latched on to the concept of nuclear control and nonproliferation as he launched his bid for President. In his Foreign Affairs article in October

1957, he addressed the danger to America and the world with global proliferation. He cited

China, Germany, and India as potential threats. Furthermore, he cautioned "several smaller nations may soon possess nuclear tools of destruction."180 The smaller states he referenced likely did not include Israel, rather Sweden and Switzerland. It is clear from 1957 onwards that

Kennedy was aware and well-read on the nuclear proliferation literature, the dangers of such developments and arguably, internal government studies of nuclear proliferation.

179 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 117. 180 Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy”: 45. 61

John Kennedy's fear of nuclear war was paramount: as a Senator he was concerned about an irrational actor or a fanatic causing a nuclear war.181 Kennedy continued in the late-1950s to address nuclear proliferation as his public concern became one of his pivotal campaign items. It is clear Kennedy learned a great deal about the subject in the late1950s into 1960, prior to his election. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. credits a Kennedy friend, Senator Clinton Anderson, with convincing Kennedy in 1956 that it was beneficial to push for a cessation of testing as this would benefit the American conventional weapons position.182 While this was a practical, realist calculation for Cold War fighting, Kennedy also ideologically opposed further proliferation. By

1959, Kennedy was convinced by a British diplomat to oppose proliferation and nuclear testing.

It was at this juncture that he embraced a test ban agreement of some variety.183 Hypocritically,

Kennedy would resume testing during his Presidency – yet, he understood the concepts of deterrence and the need to address nuclear proliferation. It is evident that Kennedy was familiar with the subject of nuclear proliferation, given his application of the term "Nth Country". In a

November 2nd, 1959 speech at the University of California at Los Angeles, Kennedy addressed the issue of nuclear testing. He explained the Nth Country problem, arguing that no one could be completely certain of the exact number of possible nations which may attain nuclear weapons.

He named France, Sweden, and China (a foremost personal concern of his) as potential proliferators. Kennedy realized by 1959 that this would pose a great problem for American power.184 The Nth Country label was not widely utilized within the American Government at that time. Instead, the CIA and intelligence community, even the State Department primarily employed the "Fourth Country Problem" -- referring to France teetering on the nuclear precipice.

181 Maddock, 8. Based on the perception and largely racist view of the time, Kennedy was likely intonating, China. 182 Schlesinger Jr., 453. 183 Maddock, 146. 184 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 20-21. 62

Kennedy voraciously read articles by scientists, consultants or those outside of the government.

His familiarity with the topic demonstrated an advanced interest in nuclear proliferation, affirming that this problem posed immediate and long-term consequences of a global nature.

The future Democratic President's clearest articulation of his preoccupation with and comprehension of nuclear proliferation was delivered to a crowd in Portland, Oregon, in the summer of 1959. Kennedy outlined his thoughts on the issue of nuclear proliferation.185 He espoused "the basic knowledge required is possessed by practically every country -- the only question is how many will commit themselves politically and economically to joining the nuclear club."186 His language indicates that he received some sort of briefing or information-sharing with the intelligence community. Considering he was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee since 1957, this was plausible. It is uncertain whether Kennedy saw the CIA's

National Intelligence Estimates (NIES) on nuclear proliferation through the end of the 1950s, given the highly classified nature of the issue. Even as a privileged Senator, it is doubtful that he read the exact text of the Estimates, instead, he likely knew of certain conclusions. Kennedy's continued assertions in this speech suggest that he did not see the specific Estimates. He outlined the dangers to the world should proliferation continue. He listed those close to a weapon or

States that had discussed nuclear weapons openly: Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland and his incessant fear, Communist China. Kennedy's next admission is the most insightful for this study.

He identified by name every country capable or likely to proliferate: Belgium, Japan, India, West

Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, South Africa, Spain, Hungary, Argentina, and Austria.

As Senator, he concluded that all these nations possessed the ability to create a weapon if

185 His thoughts aligned with the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates of that time, addressing nuclear proliferation. 186 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 23. 63

feasible, given their expertise and resources.187 Interestingly, he does not mention Israel. He was completely blindsided by their progress and responded accordingly to stop an Israeli bomb.

By the time Kennedy entered office, he harboured the most severe conviction towards nuclear proliferation up to that point, and debatably of any president since then.188 This was unfortunate timing on Israel's part as their actions coincided with Kennedy's Presidency, pitting his positive view of Israel and its place within his worldview against a staunch, pragmatic and more pressing concern to stop nuclear proliferation in one of the most volatile regions of the

Cold War.

John F. Kennedy's ideology and worldview of Israel informed the understanding for many of his actions and direction towards the Jewish State. No doubt, the domestic sphere had an impact on peripheral issues during his Presidency. Conversely, the domestic sphere was not a factor in his seminal decisions regarding Israel, notably the Dimona reactor. It is essential to analyze Kennedy's worldview and the competing parties within the American Government under his leadership. Kennedy's view of Israel was overwhelmingly positive as he entered office. To a lesser degree, this aligned with the votes he needed. More importantly, this corresponded with his genuine beliefs. John Kennedy developed this positive view of Israel from his first encounter in Israel in 1939 during his time in Congress (1947-1953) and in the Senate (1953-1960). His nuanced appreciation of Israel's security threats, economic success story, agricultural achievement, and shared culture with Americans added to his more realist approach to Israel's utility in the Cold War fight against communism and stability in the Middle East. Unfortunately, his ultimate concern with nuclear weapons placed his Presidency and Israel's desires on a collision course. These underlying beliefs and issues are essential to comprehending what

187 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 23-24. 188 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 99. 64

Kennedy inherited and how he dealt with Israel. As evidenced by the diverse domestic figures and highly-trained intelligence practitioners in his administration, Kennedy was well-prepared to understand Israel.

To fully comprehend how distrust was fostered and Kennedy's experience with Israel during the years of his Presidency, certain issues within the relationship call for further examination. First, the non-Dimona, "positive" Israeli relations must be examined in order to contrast the disruptive effects of the nuclear program. Pertinently, the Israeli pursuit and sale of the Hawk missile best exemplifies this positive interaction. This will be addressed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: The Hawk Sale and Positive Relations (1961-62)

During John F. Kennedy's Presidency, his view of Israel remained largely positive.

Besides the Dimona issue that monopolized much of 1963, Kennedy sold Israel the Hawk missiles in 1962 and admitted that a special relationship existed between both countries in

December of that year. Seemingly, the relationship progressed fruitfully until the winter of 1963.

It appears that positive American-Israeli relations endured concurrently with tensions over

Dimona. This chapter examines the "good times" that occurred before Dimona poisoned the relationship, and presents an in-depth analysis of an important interaction which illustrated

Kennedy's Israeli policy: the Hawk missile sale of September, 1962. The process of how this sale transpired and the ongoing discussion involving arms sales within the administration were central to American-Israeli relations. Unlike Dimona, this never threatened essential American goals and interests. Accordingly, Kennedy accepted a great deal of compromise in dealing with the Israelis whereas this was not the case concerning Israeli nuclear weapons. While positive relations were maintained through the end of 1962, and Kennedy agreed to sell the Hawk, the sale also indicated controversial behaviour. The Israelis never had to compromise or accept any other American initiatives for receiving the missiles. By the end of 1962, Kennedy’s NSC deduced this formed a problematic pattern in relations. The seeds were planted within the administration for their later suspicion of Israeli intentions regarding Dimona.

President Kennedy’s distrust and anger towards Israel mounted gradually. This emanated from Israeli actions to conceal, and in the American view, purposely deceive them while moving ahead with their nuclear program. Conversely, the State Department held a high degree of suspicion towards Israel, even prior to the Dimona project. When it came to less pressing issues,

Kennedy maintained a positive outlook within the relationship. His administration, the CIA, and

State Department doubted Israeli intentions pertaining to Israeli end goals regarding the actual need for the Hawk and their intended use. Because the Hawk sale and minor issues, such as the pursuit of a security guarantee, never directly threatened American national security interests (at least until 1963), Kennedy tolerated Israeli behaviour. He understood the Israelis had legitimate concerns regarding the Hawks. This chapter contrasts how Kennedy and his administration handled the Israelis on what constituted a minor issue with the subsequent assertive, all- encompassing assault on Dimona. The difference is significant: the Hawk sale issue did not interfere with any direct American national security issues whereas Dimona posed a potentially devastating problem. Kennedy began to see signs that Israel may have been less than trustworthy, evidenced on non-essential matters. Conclusively, the Hawk sale did not have anything to do with Dimona -- at least true within American considerations. Leading up to 1963, relations continued to progress unabated. Even as non-essential decisions were debated, Dimona became the real American focus. Throughout 1962, Dimona did not prevent developments in the relationship.

The Hawk sale serves as a critical case study to decipher Kennedy’s interactions with

Israel. This transaction produced several pertinent findings: the American government was conflicted on Israel and whether their intentions and needs warranted the sale -- this did not threaten the regional balance, or American interests; lastly, Kennedy acted as the final decision- maker; approved the sale for several reasons, and throughout this process he maintained a positive view of Israel. While the Hawk sale occasionally tested and divided the administration, ultimately, Kennedy still favoured Israel due to his worldview. Concerning Dimona, the government was never divided and Kennedy’s favourable perception of Israel became irrelevant.

The Israeli pursuit of the Hawk missile did not begin with the inauguration of President

Kennedy, as the Israelis sought the projectile in the last year of President Dwight Eisenhower's term. Initially, Secretary of State Christian Herter was hopeful and believed the Hawks could be sold to Israel; however, the State Department would eventually prohibit the sale.189 The Israeli pitch emphasizing their vulnerabilities and the need for the HAWK (Hawk for the rest of this dissertation)190 missile system was consistently rejected. Israel's population clustered around Tel

Aviv -- to nullify this threat, ground-to-air Hawk missiles would be necessary. Prime Minister

Ben-Gurion also hinted that American involvement would be needed to help finance the missiles.191 Later in 1960, after intricately analyzing the case for a sale, the State Department delivered what would become their constant rebuttal to Israel's pursuit of the Hawks. They advised Herter and Eisenhower against selling the missiles.

Over the summer of 1960, the sale was deemed contrary to American interests in the

Middle East (regional balance) and Cold War tensions. Fittingly, the State Department expressed

American uncertainty with Israeli motives: "I cannot help but feel that Ben-Gurion's request, while openly based on a persuasive military rationale, has nevertheless concealed in it a desire to change our policy on supplying weapons and to worsen our relations with the UAR to Israel's benefit."192 Instead, a policy of "hope" was sold to Israel that an eventual sale may come to

189 Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, 85-86. 190 HAWK was an acronym for Homing All the Way Killer. Due to the Hawk’s integration into larger discussions within the vernacular, Hawk will be utilized. 191 "Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 10th, 1960, 3:45 pm" "Israel's Security, Under Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, G. Lewis Jones, Armin H Meyer, NE; Ben-Gurion, Ambassador Avraham Harman, Yaacov Herzog and Aryeh Manor Israeli Ministers," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, eds. Suzanne E. Coffman and Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), Doc 132, 289-290. 192 Department of State " Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary," July 15th, 1960, 1-2 in 784A. 56/2/3-2560, RG59 General Records Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960- 1963, Box 2059. National Archives II (NA), College Park, Maryland/Washington, DC. 68

fruition.193 In August, the United States formally rejected the sale. Herter left a glimmer of optimism as the Eisenhower Administration exited. He informed Ben-Gurion that the Americans could reconsider the sale should the situation within the Middle East change.

With the arrival of John F. Kennedy, Israel resurrected their attempts to obtain the

Hawks. This represented a critical Israeli objective and constituted a primary issue within the bilateral relationship until the decision to sell the Hawk in August, ending with the eventual sale in September, 1962. Two factors need to be deciphered to properly discern why the Americans were reluctant to sell the Hawk. The first involved an existing Israeli relationship; the second included a larger Israeli strategic goal.

The first component was the Franco-Israeli military relationship, largely facilitated in the mid-1950s by the Director General of the Defense Ministry and close confidant of Prime

Minister David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres. American intelligence was privy to the somewhat secret agreement. Unfortunately, the Americans were unaware of the covert origins of the

Dimona project. Dwight Eisenhower gave his blessing to covert French arms sales to Israel in

1955 for two reasons: firstly, the Americans would not have to sell Israel weapons; secondly, the

Europeans kept the region balanced after the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal of 1955.194 In mid-1961, Kennedy read about the intricacies of this relationship. The Americans traced this

"warm and close relationship" back to the mid-1950s, further solidified after the Suez Crisis.

During the period overlapping the Hawk sale, it was France, not the United States, who was

Israel's main arms supplier.195 American intelligence surmised that the alliance emerged back in

193 Department of State " Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary," July 15th, 1960, 1-2 in 784A. 56/2/3-2560, RG59 General Records Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960- 1963, Box 2059. NA. 194 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 10. 195 "Background for Ben-Gurion; Document 2 (part 5) Background on Israeli Issues" undated, prepared for Kennedy's meeting with Ben-Gurion, so likely mid-late May, 1961 -- as the two met on May 30th in Israel: Security: 69

1953 due to an ideological affinity between the Socialist French government and the similarly left-wing Mapai. In the mid-1950s evidenced by Suez, Israel and France jointly battled Egypt.

By 1958, French war hero and President Charles De Gaulle craved closer relations with the

Arabs. The French were fighting an Algerian resistance movement. In countering this concern, he and his Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, reassessed their relationship with

Israel. Despite this reassessment, the French government continued the close collaboration with the Israelis. In 1959, De Gaulle admitted that France would honour the fulfillment of any existing contracts; however, no new deals with Israel would be consummated. In 1960, the

French President informed World Zionist Organization Head, Nahum Goldmann, a close Israeli interlocutor, France would no longer be Israel's primary or major arms supplier.196 This did not seem to apply to the Dimona contract, as this agreement was shrouded in secrecy and the United

States was still deciphering the true nature of France's role in the Israeli nuclear program. The

United States maintained close intelligence on French transactions with Israel, specifically, the sale of thirty Super Mystere fighter jets in the spring of 1960. In March of 1961, Israel placed an order for sixty, "ultramodern" Mirage III jets.197 This transaction would not be helpful for Israel as the Americans assessed that a balance of arms was currently maintained. By estimating that

Israel kept its qualitative advantage, there would be no reason for the Americans to sell the

Hawk. The Israelis directly attacked this assessment in their continued, dogged sales pitch.

The other determinant which made the Kennedy Administration wary of a Hawk sale involved perhaps the fundamental Israeli strategic goal. The Kennedy Administration was well

David Ben-Gurion, 1961: January-May Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-007; President's Office Files, Israel, Box 119a, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Boston, Massachusetts. 196 "Background for Ben-Gurion" Doc 2, p. 2. 197 Background for Ben-Gurion; Document 2 (part 5) Background on Israeli Issues" undated, prepared for Kennedy's meeting with Ben-Gurion, so likely, mid-late May, 1961 -- as the two met on May 30th. 3. Israel: Security: David Ben-Gurion, 1961: January-May Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-007; President's Office Files, Israel, Box 119a, JKPL, Boston, MA. 70

aware of this Israeli objective. Beginning in the mid-1950s, heightened after the Suez War in

1957 and maintained through Kennedy's death in 1963, the Israelis, particularly Ben-Gurion and

Mapai, sought a formal security guarantee from the United States. The Israelis coveted an agreement equal to NATO members.198 One of Ben-Gurion's main reasons for a larger security agreement was his understanding of the nearing termination of the Franco-Israeli military partnership. His request for an international defense treaty was rejected by NATO. He continued to vehemently pursue some sort of alliance or official American guarantee for Israel's security as

John Kennedy took office -- this continued throughout Kennedy's term.199 The Israelis first posed the question of an alliance to the Americans in 1954. Then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles argued that it would not be consistent to issue a formal guarantee to Israel's security when there was no such document for Arab states. Poignantly, Dulles, in August of 1955, argued in order for the United States to formally guarantee Israel's territorial integrity, there would first have to be an accepted permanent frontier between Israel and her Arab neighbours -- this was not present.

Israel did not have permanent boundaries, rather armistice lines and temporary truces in flux -- hence, the birth of American rejection for this Israeli pursuit.200 The Israeli desire and their quest for a security guarantee or some form of agreement with the United States would be ever-present throughout Kennedy's Presidency. The Americans worried that the Hawk sale would serve as a bridge to symbolize this partnership.

The Hawk sale is also examined as a precedent for American-Israeli arms transactions. It is easily the most studied, debated, and addressed singular issue (outside of Dimona) during

198 Menachem Klein, “The ‘Tranquil Decade’ Re-examined: Arab-Israeli Relations During the Years 1957-1967,” in Israel: The First Hundred Years: Vol. II From War to Peace?, ed. Efraim Karsh (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 68. 199 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 191. Shlaim writes that it was Eisenhower and Dulles's pressure that induced the NATO Council to decline an Israeli security treaty ("association") in 1957. 200 "Israel's Quest for Security" Limited Distribution, Memorandum, June 5th, 1963, Doc 20b. Israel Security Guarantee, 1963. National Security Files, Files of Robert Komer, Box 427 PPJK, JKPL, Boston, MA. 71

Kennedy's Presidency within American-Israeli relations. Both the Israeli pursuit of these missiles and the eventual Hawk sale, as far as Israeli historiography is concerned, represented more of a transition in relations than the simple justification and conditions for the transaction -- a one-time sale of ground-to-air defensive missiles used to counter aircrafts. While the Israelis actually pursued this specific armament, the Hawk also represented a decision for the Americans to become a major arms supplier, a situation Israel desperately sought. Single-handedly and against the continued reservations of the State Department, this decision to sell changed the American policy on refusing to act as a major arms supplier in the region. Despite being advertised as a purely defensive weapon, it was the first sale of advanced weapons from the Americans to

Israel.201 Abraham Ben-Zvi, who has written most extensively on the Hawks, concludes the

Hawk represented a specific Israeli weapons need and was a symbol.202

Lastly, in order to analyze the process of the Hawk sale and the eventual transaction, the larger context should be examined. During Kennedy's Presidency, the "Arab Cold War" was raging. Syria and Egypt united as one country (between February, 1958 and September, 1961) known collectively as the United Arab Republic (Egypt kept this designation through the 1960s).

This Arab conflict pitted "revolutionaries" against "reactionaries"203 – Gamal Abdel Nasser head of one camp, the revolutionaries, against the reactionaries, specifically, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, under King Hussein. This all contributed to the grave Israeli concern of Arab unity.

At the beginning of Kennedy's term, shortly after his inauguration, Dean Rusk brought the President up to speed on Israel's pursuit of the Hawk missile. He outlined the Department of

201 David Tal, "Symbol Not Substance? Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles, 1960-1962," The International History Review Vol. 22, No. 2 (June, 2000), 304. 202 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales, 3. The author believes this sale represented the turning point in American-Israeli arms sales. 203 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals 1958-1970, 3rd edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), Preface, vi. Kerr, who coined the term, would caution Nasser fought equally with the revolutionary and the reactionary regimes. 72

State's consistent mantra to avoid becoming a major arms supplier of any nation in the Middle

(Near) East. Furthermore, this missile was costly; detrimentally, the sale would justify a Soviet counter-sale to the UAR. Expensive weaponry was forthcoming from France. Israel could approach other Europeans for arms (most likely, the West Germans or British). Rusk cautioned against the sale as it could catalyze a "burdensome and dangerous missile era in the Near

East."204 It is noteworthy that from the outset of Kennedy's Presidency, Rusk and State were aware of Israel's continued campaign for the Hawk and a larger security guarantee -- on both counts, Rusk was angling to get the new President to taper Israeli expectations.

Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Avraham Harman, reiterated Israeli security concerns, highlighting a rising arms race in the Middle East. In a meeting with Rusk on February

13th, 1961, American representatives wanted to address Dimona as their anxiety was growing.

The Israelis, however, expressed their preoccupation with arms parity. State had determined that despite Harman's concern about this challenge, the Middle Eastern states were exclusively producing small arms; therefore, the warring parties would need to turn to the United States and the Soviet Union for more "advanced weapons".205 In a call with Rusk, Harman emphasized that the Soviet MiG-19 used by the Egyptians, and the pending arrival of newer "greatly superior" fighters to the Israeli French Super Mystere, endangered the Israelis. The Secretary of State countered that Israeli jets were on par albeit he conceded that perhaps the MiG-19 had certain advantages. With this admission, Israel's continued pursuit of the Hawk was reiterated. Harman mentioned that Herter and his successor, Rusk, had rejected a Hawk sale noting the change in

204 "Memo for President Kennedy from Secretary of State Dean Rusk (Doc 2)" Israel, General, 1/61, Papers of President Kennedy National Security Files, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 205 "Telegram AmEmbassy Tel Aviv to NEA MR. Jones (G. Lewis): Reporting Ambassador Harman's call to Secretary February 13th." Doc 6a Israel, General, 2/61, PPJK, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 73

arms balance should be re-investigated. The Department of State interpreted Israel as engaged in a "never-ending pursuit of better arms". Yet, they stood firm that due to the sophistication of the

Hawk system, the weapon should not be sold to Israel.206 Harman then sought some sort of financial aid, or perhaps further funding from the United States which could help with the Hawks

-- this was not received positively by Rusk. Clearly, the State Department were dubious about dealing with the Israelis, given their intentions.

In a meeting between Kennedy favourite, McGeorge Bundy,207 Harman, and Mordechai

Gazit (the next highest ranking Israeli minister at the Embassy), Israeli armaments and security were raised. Since the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the Israelis claimed that an arms race was under way. Harman explained how back in 1957, the UAR received MiG-19 air-to-air missile delivery capability -- this was only balanced with France's Super-Mystere. At that point, the

Israelis were awaiting the Mirage's arrival, though this would not occur for some eighteen months. On this occasion (in 1961), Harman announced that Israel had evidence that both the

UAR and Israeli enemy Iraq had a newer MiG. Harman also shared that UAR pilots were getting stronger Soviet training. In refrains that would become familiar to American governments, the

Israelis emphasized the narrow ten-mile "waist" of Israel, with 50-by-350 mile dimensions. The

Ambassador argued that while the UAR had twenty-six airfields, the Israelis only had three.

Harman stressed that Israeli jets could be downed in a moment, and for this reason cited the pursuit of the Hawk initiated the previous year. In the Israeli view given the defensive nature of the Hawk (they were anti-aircraft missiles), they could not be utilized for offensive purposes but solely for guarding Israeli airfields. Harman knew that the previous American rejection was

206 "Memo for McGeorge Bundy through Ralph A. Dungan from Walter J. Stoessel Jr.; Subject: Ambassador Harman's Call February 16th." February 21st, 1961, Doc 7. Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 207 Bird, 189. Bird writes that Kennedy held a deep admiration for his fellow Bostonian. 74

contingent upon any change in the situation in the region. He inquired whether Israel could already send technicians to be trained in the United States in 1962, anticipating the training and delivery of the Hawk would take some years. Bundy repeated the American stance on not wanting to introduce weapons of an offensive nature into the region. Israel was informed to check with "traditional sources", referring to the French and British. Harman brought Bundy and the Americans up to speed on Israel's plight. Given the Israeli estimate that the situation changed and his belief that the arms balance favoured the Arabs, it was time for a sale of the Hawk.208

This approach emphasized the strategy that the Israelis repeatedly pursued with the Hawk since 1960. Israeli diplomats employed a number of methods which: accentuated that the situation in the Middle East had changed; downplayed their own armaments (including planes and missiles), and always hinted at intelligence that the Soviets would be providing additional weaponry of the increasingly advanced variety to their clients, notably the UAR. One of the reasons the United States was so reluctant to become a major arms supplier dates back through the Presidencies of Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman. Israel first requested arms from the United

States in 1950. In response to and in a climate of a potential arms race, the United States, France and Great Britain signed the Tripartite Declaration on May 25th, 1950. 209 In essence, the document was a partial arms embargo. Under the rationale of the Declaration, weapons could be afforded only on the grounds "that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate selfdefense (spelling in original) and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area

208 "Israel's Security and Other Problems, Meme of Conversation, Feb 16th, 1961. Participants: McGeorge Bundy, Avraham Harman, Mordechai Gazit (Minister) and William L. Hamilton (NE). Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 209 Tal, “Symbol Not Substance?”: 305. 75

as a whole."210 The document called for penalties for states which violated this treaty. The

United States could contend that in reality the French were not honouring this document nor were the British, given the collusion during Suez. The French theoretically could counter that the

Soviets, as non-participants in this agreement, were arming the Arabs, thus balancing the Israelis.

The Declaration's intended purpose was for a regional peace, but there were many violations.

Nonetheless, the Americans were officially doing their best to comply with the agreement.

The State Department internally updated their position on the potential Hawk sale to

Israel. Firstly, not only would the Hawk be the most expensive system ever sold to Israel, it would reverse the long-held American policy of not becoming a major arms provider to the region. Should this change, this would be damaging as "this would set (a) precedent (which) would be hard to return to traditional policy." In terms of Middle Eastern policy, the Department denoted that this would have grave effects.211 Secondly, if Kennedy agreed to sell "spectacular missile weaponry" in the region, then it was only logical for the Arabs (again, usually referring to Nasser) to turn to the Soviet Union for similar arms -- this would destroy the fragile balance of the Middle East and heat up a volatile area in the Cold War. Interestingly, State assessed that the

Arabs may have held a slight advantage. Even after this evaluation, State advised against the sale as the "Hawk sale could start a spiral only advantageous to the Soviets."212 This admission is significant as it espouses the Department of State’s thoughts that this was not only an Arab-

Israeli conflict, the wider super-power conflict was intertwined. Thirdly, though they understood the Israeli point of view, the Department believed that the "splendid air force of Israel could in the foreseeable future defeat their UAR counterparts". Additionally, Israel soundly defeated the

210 The Tripartite Declaration, May 25th, 1950 https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/3EF2BAA011AD818385256C4C0076E724 211 "Consideration Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles" undated (February, 1961). Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 212 Ibid. 76

Egyptians in Suez/Sinai; therefore, the Israelis could deal again with the UAR in any form of land combat. Regarding arms discrepancy, both the United States and Israel's ally, France, had pledged that they would come to Israel's aid should the Arabs invade. Fourthly, the sale and installation would be costly. The Americans knew Israel would need some sort of funding or additional help should the sale occur. Fifthly, there was the issue of impartiality and trying to maintain neutrality in the Arab-Israeli dynamic. Also included in the Department's criteria of

"partiality" was the problem that currently only NATO allies had the Hawk. The missile system was still classified as secret for external NATO purposes.213 State believed that the Department of Defense would have to approve this sale and that was highly unlikely.

Again, the Americans under Kennedy questioned Israeli intentions and tried to predict what the Israelis intended to do with the Hawks. Israel was working on a project to divert water from the Jordan River/Waters system which would come into effect in 1964. Kennedy strongly supported the Israeli use of the Jordan River waters throughout his Presidency. As long as Israel undertook the diversion in a safe and fair manner, Kennedy believed this should be allowed.214

For the purposes of the Hawk, the first concept of linkage is evidenced -- the Hawk was certainly not isolated in the minds of the Kennedy Administration. The Americans worried that perhaps the Hawk could be used to "protect" or guard Israeli water diversion, taking more water than allotted by the water diversion (Johnston/Unified) plan.215 From the outset, the Americans

213"Consideration Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles", Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 214 "Kennedy Letter to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, July 13th, 1962" Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006, POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. "Memorandum for President Kennedy, Feldman to Kennedy, May 26th, 1961. Subject for Discussion with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion" Israel: Security 1961-1963. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. January 30th 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006, JFKPOF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 215 The Jordan Waters Initiative was based on the Johnston Plan from the early-to-mid 1950s. Eric Johnston, Eisenhower’s Ambassador had gone to Israel to come up with joint-solution to Arab-Israeli water woes in 1953- 1955. The Plan called for 60% of the water to go to the Arabs (Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan) while Israel would receive 40%. Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel: US-Israeli Relations 1953-1960 (Gainesville, FL: University of 77

tried to gauge Israel’s real motives. This suspicion indicates that elements of distrust were developing. With this new weapon, the Israelis could bully the Arabs.216American disbelief or questioning of Israel's intentions accelerated, yet Kennedy had not lost faith. This was not a significant enough issue to tarnish his positive conception of Israel.

There was also the concern of an adverse Arab reaction. The State Department highlighted an Israeli doctrinal tenet of deterrence, which was vital in Kennedy's later concern about any potential Israeli nuclear program: the need for the Arabs to know or believe the Israelis possessed a specific capability. While the American concern involved the Hawk, the practice would be repeated for Dimona. It was all-important to the Israelis that the Egyptians understood they possessed a certain weapon. The Israelis informed the British that secrets would fail to deter the Egyptians. Therefore, if the Israelis were to acquire the Hawk, it would be crucial that Nasser learned of this transaction. The "presence" of the Hawk would be crucial for deterrence.217 This was indicative of Israeli strategic thinking and foreshadowing, as the Americans would encounter this problem again in 1963 when Israel refused to inform Nasser exactly what was going on in Dimona. The Israelis prioritized keeping their enemies off balance. The lessons for

Kennedy that later emerged on Dimona were slightly apparent within their pursuit of the Hawk.

On a positive note, even the usually-critical State Department emphasized Israel's thriving economic progress through 1961. Though emboldened to showcase why Israel did not need the Hawk, the truth that Israel had made "tremendous economic progress" greatly pleased

Florida Press, 1993), 117-124. For the rest of Kennedy’s Presidency, he supported an initiative based on Johnston’s formula, known as the Unified or Johnston Plan. Israel was legally allowed to divert water from the Jordan River while Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon could utilize the Yarmuk water basin. Kennedy consistently supported Israel’s legal right to their share of the water. Importantly, even in these “positive” programs, there was an element of American suspicion towards the Israelis. Kennedy supported the program as it was the embodiment of his preference for economic modernization and projects to divert away from conflict with the Arabs. 216 “Consideration Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles", 3 Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. This is somewhat sound judgement; however, given the claims of State Department Arabism, this passage is cited as evidence of anti-Israeli sentiment. 217 Ibid. 78

Kennedy who venerated economic progress in the Third World (in this instance, non-

European).218 The following sentence could have been included in one of Kennedy's campaign speeches on Israel: "(We) believe Israel's real hope for survival lies in positive constructive growth rather than in introducing (a) spectacular weapon which will stir up troubles in the Near

East and thus produce conditions unfavourable to Israel's continued progress."219 This was likely tailored for Kennedy, an astute attempt to appease the President while rejecting the sale. Lastly,

State predicted Israeli reactions. The Department advised against the sale for all the reasons given; however, they advised no flat rejection, which would disappoint the Israelis. Preferably,

Israel should be somewhat appeased in order to prevent the Israelis from pre-emptive action to acquire more land through war (as in Suez), or engage the UAR while their military advantage still held. The Department was mindful that by "stirring up unrest in the Middle East", the

Israelis could create a situation where the Hawks would be seriously needed, given the new reality they would have created.220

Predictably, the Department of State advised against the sale of Hawks, citing American national interest. A more nuanced reason for rejection was advanced, though no "hope for immediate future" should be given – once more, an "under review" status would be adopted. As a compromise, aid for Israel for water, smaller arms deals, and tens of millions in credit terms for

Israel's defense should be given. Finally, close relations with senior Israeli figures needed to be

218 Kennedy identified Israel as part of the Third World. Despite this designation, he greatly admired their Western democracy and significant economic progress. This Third World status also bolstered Kennedy’s belief in Israel. In a problematic region with countries emerging from colonial grasp, the Israelis could balance Soviet penetration. Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Stumbling into an Alliance”, 229-230. 219 "Consideration Bearing on Israel's Acquisition of the Hawk Missiles," 3. Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 220 Ibid, 4. 79

maintained, notably, with Ben-Gurion. Echoing Kennedy, State concluded they should "not rely on sabre or missile rattling and arms races, but pursuit of peace through economic means."221

The State Department practiced a coherent strategy for dealing with specific Israeli requests. Overall, the situation in the Middle East was tenable; no apparent arms imbalance was evident. Kennedy tried to maintain strong American-Israeli relations and preserve regional stability. He had to pick his battles as a more serious issue was developing with the discovery and lack of clarity on Israel's alleged nuclear facility. State was continually suspicious of Israel.

They needed to be closely monitored, should they take pre-emptive action. A sense of Israel's place in the Middle East crystallized for Kennedy: Israel could be a potential disruptor.

By April of 1961, there were enough burgeoning issues in the American-Israeli relationship to warrant a meeting between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion. The Israelis requested an

April meeting between both leaders;222 however, the Americans knew Kennedy was preoccupied and needed time to prepare, given the administration's mounting concern with Dimona. The only meeting between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion (while he was President) occurred on May 30th,

1961, at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York City.223

Kennedy prepared for a variety of issues which could potentially emerge: firstly, the

United States was grateful that Israel was currently practicing "quiet diplomacy", and no "frontal and public attack" manifested. The State Department was directly worried about the supposed influence of the Israeli Lobby, or organized Jewish lobbying on the government. Phillips Talbot

221 "Consideration Bearing on Israel's Acquisition of the Hawk Missiles," 5. Israel, General, 2/61, NSF, Box 118, Country Files: Ireland/Israel, JKPL, Boston, MA. 222 "Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 13th, 1961, 3:31-3:58 pm. Subject: Prime Minister Ben- Gurion's Request for an Appointment with the President, Participants: Dean Rusk, Avraham Harman, Mordechai Gazit, G. Lewis Jones (NEA, Assistant Secretary), William L. Hamilton (NEA/NE). Doc 32, p. 81 in FRUS, Vol. XVII. 223 Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, ed. Nina J. Noring. gen. ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington United States Government Printing Office, 1994), Doc 35, 86. 80

emphasized that no security guarantee or declaration of territorial integrity could be possible, given the Soviet Union would further exploit the region -- this would make the Arabs uneasy.

Furthermore, no major arms sales (Hawks) were advised as it would destabilize the balance. The main worry was that it was not America's role to become Israel's principal arms supplier, as the

Israelis could turn to the Europeans.224 Conversely, addressing an Israeli suggestion for regional arms disarmament, Talbot accepted the reason for Israeli anxiety; however, he believed this was not realistic in the Middle East.225

Prior to the meeting, at least one branch of government, the Department of Defense, specifically, McGeorge Bundy's older brother, William, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, seemed to endorse the Hawk sale. In early May, William

Bundy agreed with the Israeli conclusion that the Hawk was a purely "defensive" weapon.

Unlike State, he did not seem as concerned with the political ramifications of the sale, going so far as to review the classification of the Hawk, and felt optimistic that the Israelis could "master their use in very short order" given their existing "technical competence". Bundy did not appear distraught about the estimated 50-million-dollar-cost previously presented, nor the assumption that the Hawk would represent a major arms shift in the Middle East. 226

As Kennedy prepared for his meeting, he gauged what to expect from his Israeli counterpart. The first American prediction of Israeli behaviour involved their pursuit of some sort of defense mechanism, both figuratively and literally: a security guarantee and likely the

Hawk missile. Along with the preponderant issue of the Dimona nuclear reactor, there was the

224 "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk," Washington, May 1st, 1961. FRUS, Vol. XVII, Doc 39, 93-94. 225 Ibid, 94-95 226 "Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 8th, 1961. Subject: 'Hawks for Israel'; Participants: William Bundy, Admiral Grantham, Ambassador-designate Walworth Barbour, Colonel Stanley Harding, William L. Hamilton (NEA/NE). Ibid, Doc 43, 102-103. 81

subject of Arab refugees and how to deliver repatriation, or resettlement, and the potential initiation of a Jordan Valley Authority for water diversion. Israel would likely warn that given her air defenses, the country was vulnerable to a surprise attack.227 Kennedy was briefed extensively on the importance of the meeting and noted what the Americans hoped to achieve.

Rusk's briefing notes advised that the United States should strive to influence the Israeli leader, notably:

" (Ben-Gurion) can be impressed with the realization that the answer to Israel's future lies not in some sort of Fortress Israel concept but in Israel initiatives and cooperation in moves designed ultimately to make Israel an accepted member in the Middle East family of nations. If we are to hope to break the ever more dangerous Arab-Israel impasse, and if we are to regain some degree of Arab confidence in us, there must be a significant unilateral concession by Israel.228

Rusk impressed upon Kennedy the direction that State wished the President would pursue. Unfortunately for State, usually Kennedy and his National Security Council members, notably Robert Komer, made their own decisions. Rusk, in trying to avoid the actual formal declaration of a security guarantee, briefed the President that the close bond between both countries should be a sufficient and reasonable assurance to Israel.229

Before the meeting, Kennedy familiarized himself with the Department of State's grand realist strategy with Israel and Israel's indisputable economic progress. This directly appealed to his values and campaign endorsements of Israel. Israel's gross domestic product was remarkable, even outperforming strong European economies like Holland. However, this was somewhat

227 "Memo for the President from Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: Your Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion," May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. JFKPOF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 82

qualified (in State's consistent, cold, and measured fashion). Since 1948, the United States had given over eight hundred million dollars in aid to Israel, with another one hundred plus million annually from private American groups and citizens.230 Rusk advised the President to notify Ben-

Gurion that if attacked or seriously threatened, the United States would stand behind Israel in and outside of the United Nations. Once again, Rusk and Talbot reinforced issues which President

Kennedy certainly appreciated about Israel; specifically, the Jewish state had the highest industrial growth rate in the world in 1960.231

Kennedy must have been reassured when during the meeting State correctly anticipated all Israeli positions. Ben-Gurion professed that Israel's population was clustered, vulnerable to air attack, threatened by Soviet MiG-19s, and Israel had fewer airfields. The Americans comprehended Ben-Gurion's disappointment from 1960 when he believed a sale for the Hawk was forthcoming. The Israeli even suggested that at least the Americans could start training

Israeli technicians on the Hawks in anticipation of the sale.232 On the larger and intertwined issue of a security guarantee, Kennedy had been prepared that Israel would raise several possibilities for peace in the region: some sort of formal guarantee with Israel from the United States, or a treaty; a joint Soviet-American declaration of territorial integrity and preservation of Middle

Eastern borders; lastly, an American unilateral declaration to support territorial integrity and sovereignty in the region -- all rationales the Americans wished to avoid.233

230 Memo for the President from Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: Your Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben- Gurion" May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF- 119a-008. JFKPOF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 231 "US-Israeli Relations: Discussion" attachment to "Memo for the President from Sec". May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. JFKPOF, Box 119a. 232 "Israel's Security Problems" doc 9 attachment to "Memo for President Kennedy from Rusk" May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. JFKPOF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 233 Ibid.

All was not without hope, as Kennedy was advised to tell the Israelis that any small state had the support of the Americans, particularly, Israel.234 On the topic of a regional disarmament initiative or plan, Kennedy was counseled to express American sympathy and understanding with Israel, yet given the current climate of the Middle East, any kind of arms limitation seemed unlikely. The Americans would monitor the situation should an opportunity arise.

Building upon previous acknowledgements, the Americans believed Ben-Gurion was under the impression that "the United States virtually promised the Hawk."235 It was possible the

Hawks could indeed be sold in the foreseeable future; nevertheless, given the current situation, conditions were not permissible for a sale. The offered compromise involved the available sale for eighteen million dollars of early warning equipment.236

Lastly, concerning regional disarmament, Kennedy was advised to quell the topic of new weaponry as Israel and the UAR could only produce small arms -- any type of "advanced" weapons would have to be sought from outside the region.237 This approach would drastically change in 1963, when Dimona and advanced weapons became realistic possibilities.

The Americans not only analyzed Israel but also their principal rival, Nasser and the

UAR. "Nasser's agitation was primarily responsible for Arab-Israeli problems". This frank analysis on the UAR side further implored that Nasser was "mortgaging his country ... with

234 "Israel's Security Problems" doc 9 attachment to "Memo for President Kennedy from Rusk" May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. JFKPOF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 235Ibid 236 Ibid. 237Ibid. 84

weapons to eliminate Israel."238 This candid acknowledgment indicated the supposed balance of terror developing in an unstable region.

Before the meeting, Kennedy was also apprised of Ben-Gurion and the government's perception of the elder statesman of Israel. Ben-Gurion was depicted as a devoted socialist and

Zionist, a solitary decision-maker, the epicenter of Israeli power. Rusk had prior warnings about the Prime Minister's long-winded sermons. His predilection for somewhat dictatorial tendencies was highlighted. The Americans felt the old man at Israel's helm was "apparently sustained by the almost mystical certainty that he can personally ascertain the mood of his people and the requirements of history."239

The May 30th meeting began with pleasantries; however, the ensuing detailed discussion turned to Dimona as Kennedy articulated the American concern for what may or may not be happening there. Kennedy warned Ben-Gurion it was important that the Arabs, Americans, and wider world not even suspect Israeli insidious intentions, even if nothing was evident. Moving on from this pressing concern, Ben-Gurion raised, in the Israeli view, his country's precarious security environment. He harped on the growing arms race and the Soviets stocking UAR armouries. The Israeli Prime Minister in an alarmist tone when discussing Nasser iterated that the UAR was gaining a quantitative and perhaps qualitative edge in tanks. He compared Nasser to Hitler. "If they should (the UAR) defeat us they would do to the Jews what Hitler did."240 Ben-

Gurion also shared his grim view that the Arabs valued human life with much less sanctity,

238 "Document 11 The UAR's Role in Middle East Problems" "attachment to "Memo for President Kennedy from Rusk," May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF- 119a-008. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA 239 "Document 14 Biography of Ben-Gurion" attachment to "Memo for President Kennedy from Rusk" May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May, 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 240 "Memorandum of Conversation (drafted by Philips Talbot) May 30th, 1961. Conversation between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion. President's Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NYC." Participants: Kennedy, Ben-Gurion, Harman, Philips Talbot (Assistant Secretary of State for NEA) and Meyer Feldman (Deputy Special Assistant to the President). 3. Israel. General 7/61-12/61. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 85

making the region's problems more difficult. Predictably, Ben-Gurion moved onto the Hawk and defensive weapons for Israel. He traced the Israeli case and argued that Israel should receive missiles because they were purely defensive, noting the Eisenhower Administration acknowledged a change on the ground could signal an intention for a sale. Kennedy promptly answered that no written trail existed on the American side to indicate a sale was forthcoming.

Even if the Hawk was defensive, this was still a missile -- a weapon that would escalate a Middle

East arms race. The President worried that if Israel received the Hawks, the Arabs could turn to the Soviets for comparable ground-to-air capabilities. Kennedy assured Ben-Gurion that should

Israel be in "critical danger", the Americans would respond. He then opined that his administration would "need to have a better understanding... (we) hesitate to introduce missile weapons to the region."241 Ben-Gurion cleverly countered that the Israeli case for Hawks was not based on prior assessments, rather the current situation in Israel. Again, he was rebuffed by the

President. The Prime Minister broached the Hawks once more after a discussion on fighter jet parity as a purely defensive weapon which could only be employed to prevent damage from

Egyptian fighter-planes. Kennedy maintained that the Americans did not want to see the Israelis

"at a disadvantage". The final word concerning the Hawk went to Kennedy as he informed his

Israeli counterpart that only few countries possessed the Hawk. The potential consequences of a ground-to-ground-missile race were deeply concerning. Ultimately, Kennedy informed Ben-

Gurion: "You don't feel this is a satisfactory answer to your request, but you can be assured that we will continue to watch this situation."242

241 "Memorandum of Conversation (drafted by Philips Talbot) May 30th, 1961. Conversation between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion. President's Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NYC." Participants: Kennedy, Ben-Gurion, Harman, Philips Talbot (Assistant Secretary of State for NEA) and Meyer Feldman (Deputy Special Assistant to the President). 3. Israel. General 7/61-12/61. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 242 Ibid, 4. 86

Ben-Gurion talked glowingly of Kennedy's international development initiatives like the

Peace Corps. Ben-Gurion, ever astute commented, "(W)hat makes an impression is better standards of living and health and education."243 This was the embrace of kindred souls discussing economics and modernization theory. Undoubtedly, Ben-Gurion was well-informed on Kennedy's passion for economic progress. Kennedy concluded the meeting alluding to the

Hawks by leaving the door open to a possible change in American policy moving forward. He promised Ben-Gurion his administration would keep close scrutiny on the region and that if

Israel got into trouble with her neighbours (hopefully, not due to Israeli actions), the Americans would come to their aid.244 Like Herter and the State Department, Kennedy provided a glimmer of optimism for the Israelis.

For the rest of 1961, Kennedy and the Americans were preoccupied with other areas, such as, Berlin, The Bay of Pigs disaster and its fallout in Cuba, as well as issues emerging in

Laos. Still, Israel and their pursuit of the Hawk were ever-present. In September of 1961, the

Department of State debated the true capacities of an arms race in the Middle East. The

Department along with Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, held talks to assess the situation. They discussed the question of joint-planning, or joint-estimating, with the Israelis.

Philips Talbot articulated that despite Israel's continued worry, by 1963, they could be subject to a UAR attack, though the Americans believed this was more a political ploy for weapons or a security guarantee. Despite the usually unquestionable Israeli intelligence, American intelligence estimates differed. Talbot explained that every day the Department monitored Israel's defense situation and refused to believe, the Arabs had gained any advantage. Talbot's comment, "we are

243 Ibid, 5 244 "Memorandum of Conversation (drafted by Philips Talbot) May 30th, 1961. Conversation between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion. President's Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NYC." Participants: Kennedy, Ben-Gurion, Harman, Philips Talbot (Assistant Secretary of State for NEA) and Meyer Feldman (Deputy Special Assistant to the President), 7.Israel. General 7/61-12/61. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA 87

reminded everyday", can be interpreted as both a condemnation of the constant lobbying from the Israeli Embassy and most likely wider domestic pressure. It is apparent in yet another instance that State officials did not believe the Israelis were presenting an accurate picture -- this evidenced the growing disparity of trust between the governments of both countries. Rusk and

Talbot concluded that the Israelis could "repel a massive Arab attack". Additionally, Israel's

Western allies (France, Britain, and the US) would come to Israel's defense, therefore, no formal treaty would be needed.245 Arguably, the most explicit view of the Department of State concerning Israel's pursuit of the Hawk was advanced in this instance:

"Israeli intention to try and place us in a position of being obliged to provide the HAWK missile.... that is their fixed objective. (They) should not be allowed to underestimate the ability of the United States government to resist their (Israeli) pressure, now and later. We do not believe that we can afford to increase the ante in the area by purveying such weapons, even if defensive, to any country."246

State consciously argued that the actual situation was not as portrayed by Israel in their meetings with the United States, rather a political or lobbying attempt framed in a way to receive the

Hawks. The Americans (based on their intelligence) continued to believe that the Israelis could defeat the UAR, even though no large-scale "holy war was coming". The Arabs knew the West would react with force if Israel was attacked. Since 1954, the Israelis had estimated some sort of massive war from a united Arab front was forthcoming. State presented their view of the Middle

East moving forward: no Suez-like war was evident; Israel may constitute an American security hindrance if it was isolated leading to Israeli pre-emptive action-- most likely an attack of some

245 "Department of State Telegram (Arab Embassies: Paris, Rome and London). Exchange of Information: Barbour and NEA," September 13, 1961. Also included is: "Assistant Secretary Philips Talbot's Reply, September 26th, 1961 (from Rusk)", 2 Israel. General 7/61-12/61. NSF Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA 246 Ibid. 88

sort against the UAR. It was vital that the United States not let Israel sense isolation. Talbot and

Rusk deemed the best course of action: "(we) need to observe closely and continuously Israel's military intentions."247

By late1961, a significant contingent in the American government was distrustful of

Israel, or at least believed Israeli actions needed to be continuously monitored -- the only measure to avoid war. The Israelis may have surmised a coming UAR clash in 1963. The

Americans, however, did not share this assessment. The perception of State encompassed two situations: the reality on the ground, and the version they believed Israel presented for a number of varying goals, which included: differing interpretations on refugees, arms balance numbers that did not align with the United States' assessments, the need for a security guarantee, and ultimately, their urgent need for Hawk missiles. This suspected discrepancy would not always be shared by the White House and Kennedy -- State was generally consistent in suspecting Israel's true motives. The Department of State believed the American internal assessments of the situation and rarely agreed the Israelis were telling the whole truth. This was the underlying impetus for why they were so suspicious of Dimona. Rationally in their view, the Israelis continually portrayed the security situation, particularly the UAR, as an ever-increasing threat.

Lastly, this was not all propaganda -- Israeli scholars defend the genuine Israeli concern with another round of Arab war.248 Competing Israeli and American security positions collided on the

247 "Assistant Secretary Philips Talbot's Reply, September 26, 1961 (from Rusk)," 2. Israel. General 7/61-12/61. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 248 Zaki Shalom, Ben-Gurion, The State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949-1956 (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2002). Shalom argued that since the early-1950s, Ben-Gurion's security conception did not believe that total victory over the Arabs was possible; however, he believed another round of fighting would transpire. 3-5. His paramount fear was a clash with a unified Arab front. 115. In another work, Shalom reasserts the devastating realization for Ben-Gurion and Israel that they could never truly defeat the Arabs. Zaki Shalom "Israel's Nuclear Option Revisited," Journal of Israeli History Vol. 24, no. 2 (2005): 269. Shai Feldman argued that an apocalyptic, Holocaust view reigned in Israel and that this directly contributed to Israel' nuclear program. Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, xv. Shlomo Aronson also highlights David Ben-Gurion's existential fears throughout the 1950s and 1960s that he knew there was roughly a 40-to-1 Arab-to-Israeli ratio -- this evoked a 89

issue of the Hawk. This also served as a prelude to the eruption on Dimona. The Hawk sale was considered among a plethora of considerations involving Israeli intentions and potential actions, and continued to percolate in American minds into 1962.

In May of 1962, Shimon Peres visited the United States. The facilitator of the Franco-

Israeli military relationship tried to work some of his magic on the Americans. Peres met with

Talbot and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee.249 During the meeting, Peres raised the previous Hawk missile rejection and urged the United States to re- evaluate their decision. This familiar Israeli refrain appears to have been given new life through

Peres. He not only requested the Hawk but more conventional arms -- American help in financing Israeli weapons' needs and closer "identification" (collaboration) with the Israeli military. McGhee had the unenviable task of telling Peres that based on American calculations, the Israelis still held arms superiority. Therefore, the Hawk should not be introduced, as a more sophisticated weapons race would be ignited. This represented the third separate instance (1960,

May 1961) when the United States could change their mind based on an assessment of the shifting arms balance. Pertinently, during their conversation, McGhee asked Peres about nuclear weapons. Peres argued against the presence of such weapons in the region; however, the young

Israeli stipulated that Israel would respond to developments in kind should any need arise.250

On May 23rd, Peres met with the Bundy brothers. During Peres's meeting with the group, he appeared to have had a positive effect concerning Israel's bid to improve defenses.251 This

Holocaust mentality for the Israeli Prime Minister. Shlomo Aronson, "Israel's Security and the Holocaust: Lessons Learned, but Existential Fears Continue," Israel Studies, Vol. 14, no. 1(2009), 84-85. 249 "Department of State Memo for Bundy White House from William H. Brubeck. Subject: Your Appointment with Israel Deputy Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, May 14th, 1962," Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA 250 "Memo for Talbot. Subject: Conversation with Peres, May 21, 1962) "Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, May 26th, 1962. Bundy attached May 28th, 1962, "Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF Box 118 JKPL, Boston, MA. 251 Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 59-60. 90

visit was cited as the commencement of an Israeli pressure offensive by diplomats to finally receive the Hawks.252 Peres also advocated for some sort of NATO or formal treaty with the

United States. The Department of Defense countered by reasserting the Tripartite Declaration.

Shimon Peres then brought up Israel's sense of isolation and asked the United States to "take a more major role alongside France" as a prominent arms supplier -- he intimated that the Hawk was the goal. Peres presented a changing bilateral relationship with France and shared that

French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, would appreciate another Western power overtaking France's role as Israel's arms supplier.253 This nuanced approach framing a transitioning France was an interesting Israeli tactic, especially from the man who largely, single-handedly fostered this alignment.254 Peres described the British as continually more reluctant to deal with the Israelis as they, along with France, were moving closer to the Arabs.

More problematically, Israel believed the arms imbalance was supposedly worsening. Peres really emphasized the Israeli deficit in arms; he believed the Hawks were essential to actively defend against Syria and Egypt. William Bundy aptly evaluated Peres's request for further sales as a sign to "demonstrate (an) indication of our concern for supporting Israel and maintain a military balance."255 Peres openly linked substance and significance with a specific military need. The Hawk would signal an American willingness to transition into a different role as

Israel's principal arms supplier. Peres ended the meeting affirming that Israel would receive

Mirage fighters from France. He coyly noted that this request did not represent Israel making a formal appeal for the Hawk (as he realized this would be rejected), the inference was clear.

252 Tal: 313. 253 "Memo Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to Phillips Talbot May 23rd, 1962. Conversation with Peres," doc 11 and 11a (second page) Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA 254 In 1957, Peres received the French Legion of Honor due to "services to the cause of Franco-Israeli relations". Doc 8a "Shimon Peres Bio" attached to "Memo Kaysen to Bundy, May 18th, 1962,” Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 255 "Memo Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to Phillips Talbot May 23rd, 1962. Conversation with Peres," 2. doc 11 and 11a (second page) Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 91

Fortunately for the Israelis, Defense now ascertained that Israel had merit for the Hawk sale.

Israel was "short on all weather fighters" and the capacity of Israel's enemies, pertinently Iraq and Egypt, was not readily apparent. The Department did not conclusively know if surface-to- surface missiles were ordered from the Soviets and that it was plausible that Iraq could receive them before the end of 1962.256

This debate on an arms sale revealed the widening rift within the government between the

Departments of State and Defense. Additionally, the NSC guided by President Kennedy had become more insular or less trustworthy of others in the decision-making arena by 1962.

Kennedy had become increasingly skeptical of the intelligence community, especially the Joint

Chiefs of Staff after the April, 1961-Bay of Pigs fiasco. He took further measures to consolidate his and the NSC's abilities to analyze intelligence. Correspondingly, he disbanded the National

Security Council Planning Board and Operation Coordinating Board.257 In undertaking these measures, Kennedy centralized decision-making. Only his most trusted Middle Eastern advisors,

Mac Bundy, Komer, and occasionally, Feldman's input, would be considered. Under Kennedy, it was not the State Department but the NSC which acted as the main decision-making body on foreign policy regarding Israel.258 This is not to say that State was relegated altogether outside the administration; nevertheless, as Kennedy grew more devoted to the region, he further relied on Robert Komer for advice. Komer professed that Kennedy did not have any special admiration for large bureaucracies, including the State. He enjoyed a tight-knit decision-making apparatus.259 Under this new system, the cleavage between State and Defense defined Kennedy's

256 Memo Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to Phillips Talbot May 23rd, 1962. Conversation with Peres," 3. Doc 11 and 11a (second page) Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118, JKPL, Boston, MA. 257 Perra, 29. 258 Ben-Zvi "Stumbling Into Alliance": 228. 259 This is a combination of two of Komer's Oral History Interviews. In one, he shares that Kennedy "had no great admiration for existing bureaucracies such as State, Defense and the Pentagon." "Robert Komer, Oral History #4 92

approach in deliberating the sale. This internal jousting informed the dynamic during the summer of 1962. Defense advocated for the sale while Talbot and Rusk for State were very much opposed. Ultimately, Kennedy and his NSC worked to arrive at the best course of action.260

The full Israeli campaign for Hawks was evident over the summer of 1962. On June 6th, a planted Israeli story appeared in The Washington Post claiming American aid to Egypt

(predominantly food aid, notably PL-480) was used by Nasser to buy arms from the Soviet

Union.261

Ambassador Walworth Barbour met with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir on June

7th. Their conversation revealed a great deal about how the Israelis perceived the Hawk and deterrence. Meir informed the Ambassador that "possession of this weapon may offer Israel little or no technical advantage but would (be) of great psychological value to (the) Israeli people in bolstering their sense of security."262 Minister Meir argued for closer affiliation between both countries, even though France was an arms supplier -- an explicit example of Israeli diplomatic lobbying. The Hawk itself was not considered a pivotal piece of military equipment; the psychological deterrent effect was what Israel desired. This psychological dimension, or representation, lends more credence to the argument that a military alliance of some sort was more important than the Hawk itself -- in retrospect, a puzzling diplomatic admission by the

Israelis. Meir emphasized the heart of Israeli security thinking. The mental aspect was vital for deterrence. This proved to be a crucial component in future Dimona considerations.

JFK" August 31st, 1964. 18. JKPL, Boston, MA. In another interview, Komer argues that Kennedy bypassed the traditional State Department policy channels and cemented much policy within the White House. Komer argued: "He really was the Secretary of State we didn't deal with the Seventh Floor (of State, NEA?) on Middle East policy very much. We really dealt directly with the White House." "Robert Komer Oral History Interview #1 JFK," 2. June 18th, 1964. JKPL, Boston, MA. 260 Bass,164. 261 Ben-Zvi "Stumbling Into Alliance": 234. Ben-Zvi reported that the FBI found that the Israeli Embassy was to blame. 262 "Department of State Telegram. Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, June 9th, 1962," Doc 9. Israel, Genreal 6/1/62- 6/15/62, National Security Files, Countries Israel, PPJK, Box 118a, JKPL, Boston, MA. 93

To alleviate some of this pressure, Kennedy sent Ben-Gurion a letter on June 13th, 1962.

He assured the Jewish State's security, explaining that Israel maintained a prominent position in the American mindset. Though the letter does not explicitly mention the Hawks and focused on other developments, notably the water diversion project from the Yarmuk and Jordan River, along with Israeli and Syrian border incidents263, it is revealing.264 Kennedy, in his own words, reassured the Israelis and invited Ben-Gurion's assessment of the region. On June 24th, the

Israeli Prime Minister replied. After thanking the President for having received Peres, Ben-

Gurion astutely wrote about concepts that directly aligned with Kennedy's priorities. He discussed a desire for peace with his Arab neighbours instead of border fighting, and that he did not hate the Arabs. In an alarmist manner, Ben-Gurion again tied Nasser to a Nazi-like threat. He argued that the lack of democracies (besides Israel) catalyzed problems in the Middle East. Ben-

Gurion, extremely well-read and informed, was aware of Kennedy's aptitude for strong economic progress and democratic values. Ben-Gurion personally believed in these values; he was not merely appealing to Kennedy albeit he knew how to deal with the American President. The

Israeli Prime Minister highlighted Israel's modernization process as he traced the early Jews who arrived in Israel from the ghettos of Europe to "tillers of the soil and into productive people in other fields of endeavour, the transformation of the Negev."265 The Prime Minister, expressing his preference for stronger American-Israeli relations, illustrated the common bond between both countries, specifically, Kennedy's admiration for Israel's progress. He actively cited Kennedy's

263 The issue of Syrian-Israeli fighting in the Demilitarized Zones along with the Jordanians in Jerusalem and the West Bank was occasional during Kennedy's Presidency. This will not be investigated in this work, as it existed squarely in the realm of Arab-Israeli fighting, and was in no way connected to the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, it was present and heightened in 1962 and 1963. An example of what Kennedy is describing is reported in "Department of State Telegram AmEmbasssies, June 14th, 1962" Doc 12. Israel, Genreal 6/1/62-6/15/62. NSF, Box 118a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 264 "Letter President Kennedy to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, June 13th, 1962" Israel, Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 265 "Letter Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy, June 24, 1962" 3. "Israel, Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. JFKPOF Israel Box, 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 94

worldview and Israel's centrality within this conception. The astute Israeli leader understood that in both realist and ideological terms Israel fit neatly within the American modernization success group -- a democratic, progressive, economically successful country. This worldview or positive perception of Israel informed Kennedy's considerations of the Hawks. Scholars have also appropriately proven Kennedy's understanding of the regional balance of arms for the sale.266

These calculations and the worldview and positive image of Israel coalesced to lead to the sale.

Once Kennedy concluded that the Hawk sale would not ignite an arms race in the Middle East, could help him domestically, and aligned with his admiration for Israel while not alienating

Nasser, he decided he could sell the Hawks.

By July, the State Department acknowledged that the Hawk sale was somewhat imminent

-- a positive decision was coming regardless of how they felt. They even suggested strengthening security guarantees to Israel if the Hawk was delayed. This marked a divergence from their traditional policy. Talbot agreed that the Hawk would help Israel's air vulnerability; however, he raised State’s objections on political grounds. The usual problematic consequences were outlined: the sale would anger Nasser; whether the United States intended to or not, an arms race would ensue; Israel may attack the UAR; certainly, the UAR needed to be assured. Lastly, the

United States was in the midst of initiating some sort of arms limitation mission. Talbot believed

Nasser's reaction to this process should be analyzed beforehand. As a last resort, should the

Arabs receive missiles from the Soviet Union, after consultation with the British, the Hawk should then be sold.267

266 Bass, 2. Bass argues that Israel had valid air vulnerabilities, and Kennedy was addressing a specific concern. 267 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk" Washington, July 9th, 1962. Subject: United States Policy toward Israel. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, ed. Nina J Noring gen. ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1995), Doc 2, 2, 4-5. 95

William Bundy and the Department of Defense convincingly articulated that the Hawk would not change the balance of arms between Israel and the Arabs. Defense also agreed the

Israelis were correct that the country was vulnerable to a surprise air attack. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff affirmed that the Soviets had armed Egypt with TU-16 bombers, further endangering

Israel's security situation. Conclusively, Defense was firmly for the sale.268 State was desperately trying to delay a sale, or at least attach the Hawk to some sort of large Israeli concession, such as the water diversion project, arms limitation, or notions of a security guarantee. With Defense and

State staunchly divided, the White House made their own ruling on the sale.

By July, 1962, the Hawks were needed as the UAR increased their capabilities. The sale would provide a deterrent against a UAR attack. The weapons system could be operable in less than nineteen months. Importantly to the administration, especially Komer, the system should stop any Israeli pre-emptive attack on the UAR. The Hawk sale would also help garner domestic praise for the administration in espousing "US provision of Hawk system to Israel would meet with favour among supporters of Israel."269Along with the domestic component, this new analysis with Komer's insight confirmed that Israel was more likely to attack the UAR than vice versa. The real reason the UAR would attack Israel was the significant threat constituted by the

Dimona reactor. State approved the sale due to reliable American intelligence that the UAR were receiving missiles from the Soviet Union. If Nasser did not agree to an arms limitation agreement, then the missiles should be sold.270 The Egyptians were progressing with their own missiles, a mitigating factor in the sale. Since the early 1960s, the UAR employed former West

German Nazi-affiliated rocket scientists and technicians to develop missiles; in mid-July, they

268 "Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant)" Washington, July 16th, 1962. FRUS, Vol. XVIII, Doc 3, 8-9. 269 "Considerations Bearing on the Sale of the Hawk," Israel 1961-1963 Folder 2 of 2. Papers of President Kennedy National Security Files, Robert Komer, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 270 Ibid. 96

tested their first rocket.271 This development in a bordering country deeply worried the Israelis, and had been one of their preoccupations (addressed in Chapter 7).

Secretary of State Rusk sided with Komer, Defense, and Kennedy for the sale.272

Kennedy finally agreed and submitted in August of 1962. While Kennedy also distrusted the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, he nonetheless paid attention to their military recommendations. Certainly,

Komer, a former CIA figure, respected his former co-worker, William Bundy's sound analysis.

In August, 1962, the realist calculations aligned with Kennedy's view of Israel to allow the sale of the missiles to Israel.273

On August 7th, after persistently holding out against the Hawk sale, Rusk gave Kennedy his formal blessing to sell the Hawk to Israel. Rusk changed his conclusion and came to believe this vulnerability could be addressed.274 Phillips Talbot still tried to get the Israelis to make some sort of concession before the Hawk sale was finalized. He attempted to explicitly link the then failing Johnson Plan with the final Hawk sale.275

This Plan should be referenced here. While the Hawk sale was debated, Dr. Joseph

Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, launched what would become the

Johnson Plan. The Plan was an initiative from May of 1961 (in August, Johnson began visiting the Arabs) to the end of 1962 to resettle or repatriate Arab refugees from the 1948 War. Over time, the Israelis grew more and more disillusioned with the Plan, and eventually rejected the

271 Perra, 92 272 Goldman: 42. 273 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, viii. Ben-Zvi argues extensively that the "geo-strategic" calculations largely powered this sale. He adds that William Bundy and Komer "won" over State in Kennedy's decision-making model, 46. 274 "Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy" Subject: Review of United States Policy toward Israel. Washington, August 7th, 1962. See Enclosure. Doc 14, pp. 29-32. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. This is really a repetition of "Bearing on Considerations" that Komer addressed. Nonetheless, Rusk was on board. 275 "Memorandum Talbot to Myer Feldman Aug 9th, 1962" Eyes Only Subject: Considerations Relating to Use of Presidential Emissary to Secure Israel's Cooperation in Implementation of the Johnson Proposal. Israel, General 8/9/62-8/15/62. NSF, Box 118a . JKPL, Boston, MA. Regarding direct negotiations, this was a proposal that the Americans consistently rejected as they felt they should mediate, and Israel may be embarrassed since many Arab states did not recognize them. 97

initiative in September of 1962. While this dissertation does not address this Plan, it was negotiated in the same period, yet never tied successfully to the Hawks. Nonetheless, by being somewhat receptive to the idea of taking back refugees, the Israelis rejected a Kennedy initiative.276 Cumulatively, this also contributed to American distrust of Israel by the end of

1962.

Talbot, an even more stern negotiator than Komer, wrote that Ben-Gurion was a "hard bargainer and can only be dealt with, with hard bargaining."277 His efforts would be in vain -- he was acting as the State archetype (Arabist or NEA stereotype) and constituted the last standout.

Feldman was about to be sent by the President to Israel to inform Ben-Gurion of the Hawk sale albeit supposedly to try and link the Johnson Plan to the Hawks as a "special emissary" -- this would not come to fruition. Perceptively, Feldman did not care for the linkage, and debate has continued historiographically on the sincerity of Feldman's efforts. Tal argued that the Israelis, notably Ben-Gurion, simply did not understand the link with the Johnson plan during Feldman's conversation in August. The Israeli historian further added that before the public announcement of the Hawk sale in September, the Johnson Plan was not even mentioned in a meeting between an NEA officer and Ambassador Harman.278 Ben-Zvi has used the Hawk to exhaustively trace the concept of linkage. In many of his works, he talks of "positive sanctions" or "expected reciprocity" prior to the sale. There were no detrimental consequences for Ben-Gurion if he received the Hawks and rejected the Johnson Plan -- merely an implied and hopeful (naive)

276 "Letter Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy, August 20th, 1962," Doc 2a Israel, General 9/6/62-9/21/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. In fairness to the Israelis, Kennedy understood that refugees provided a challenge to their security conception. Furthermore, though Nasser approved the Plan, it was Syria which first “killed” this program. Nonetheless, Israel also privately rejected Johnson’s proposal. Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 87. Druks, John F. Kennedy, 43. 277 Memorandum Talbot to Myer Feldman Aug 9th, 1962" Eyes Only Subject: Considerations Relating to Use of Presidential Emissary to Secure Israel's Cooperation in Implementation of the Johnson Proposal. 2. Israel, General 8/9/62-8/15/62. NSF, Box 118a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 278 Tal: 316. 98

belief that Ben-Gurion and Israel would respond positively in kind.279 Bass identifies certain individuals, such as Talbot and Komer, who attempted to tie the Johnson Plan to the Hawk, though Israel rejected this ploy.280

On August 15th, Kennedy sent Ben-Gurion a letter informing him that Feldman was coming to Israel "without publicity", supposedly to discuss the Johnson Plan and the Hawk sale.

In this instance, Kennedy seems to make the linkage explicit; he wrote Feldman would explain the purpose of his visit.281 Feldman's mission was to notify Ben-Gurion of Kennedy's decision to sell the Hawk. Ben-Gurion informed Kennedy of his "profound appreciation" for selling the

Hawk to Israel. Though he expressed gratitude on Israel's long pursuit, the rest of the letter outlines why the Israelis would officially reject the Johnson Plan in a month. Ben-Gurion argued with the tens of thousands of Jewish refugees they could not accommodate Arab refugees. More importantly, the Arab states were exploiting the refugees and did not care for their wellbeing, nor would peace come about through any refugee initiative -- certainly not this specific endeavour.282

A detailed analysis of the Hawk sale was undertaken for several reasons: firstly, nearly all historical discussion of Kennedy's achievements or the American-Israeli relationship (outside of Dimona) involves two factors -- his December-1962-declaration of a "special relationship" and the precedent for an arms relationship or a patron-client relationship initiated by the Hawk sale. Furthermore, the process effectively demonstrates disagreement in various offices of government -- State versus Defense and the National Security Council with Komer acting

279 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 74. Ben-Zvi stated that Kennedy probably should have practiced "required reciprocity" instead. In an earlier work, Ben Zvi did not even believe Feldman explicitly used linkage between the Hawk and Johnson Plan. Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Influence and Arms: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, 1962-66," Israel Affairs 10, no.1-2 (2004), 40. Ben-Zvi first argued that the Hawk and Johnson were not tied in Decade of Transition, 108, 113. 280 Bass, 147. 281 "Letter Kennedy to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. August 15th, 1962" Israel, General 8/9/62-8/15/62. NSF, Box 118a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 282 "Letter Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy, August 20th, 1962," 1-4. Israel, Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a, JKPL, Boston, MA. 99

flexibly and attentive to changing needs of Israel (the deciding arbiter). This point is crucial as

Kennedy made the final decision for the sale -- he was not passionately involved in this issue, a stark contrast with Dimona. Kennedy was actively involved in the Dimona affair with certitude.

Unlike the Hawk sale, all levels of government comprised one camp: preventing Israel from getting a nuclear weapon. The only differing response centered on the severity which Israel should be punished, or addressed. Another reason for this exhaustive analysis was that though the Hawks were never directly tied to Dimona in the archival evidence, the quest for a security guarantee which the Israelis long sought transitioned from Hawk considerations and intertwined with the American handling of Israeli nuclear aspirations in the latter half of 1963. The Hawk was a defensive missile system; however, the American concern over the introduction of a missile race also correlated with how they handled Dimona. Lastly, to reiterate what has been consistently highlighted throughout this chapter: the Americans never fully trusted Israeli intentions, albeit on an issue of relatively minor significance, this was not enough to threaten the relationship.

While the general historiographical conclusions are sound that Kennedy sold the Hawk predominantly for realist reasons: he decided this would not set off an arms race; Israel was vulnerable; the United States had to preserve the balance and help Israel -- there was also minor domestic benefit. With the sale, Kennedy could also gain points domestically in the vital

Congressional Elections (House elections) of November, 1962. His decision to quietly tell

Jewish American leaders on September 13th demonstrated his inclination and attentiveness to the domestic sphere. As Komer admonished, Kennedy was sharply attuned to electoral considerations.283 Talbot wrote to Rusk on September 12th: Kennedy "(W)wishes for the word to spread to rabbis throughout the United States in order that their sermons be crowded synagogues

283 Komer Oral History #1, 9. JKPL, Boston, MA. 100

on the High Holy Day, September 29th."284 It is apparent domestic politics were not the dominant reason for the Hawk sale. Regardless, Kennedy, an astute politician, would not let this beneficial act towards Israel go unrewarded within the American domestic political context.285

The documentation does not reveal that there was ever any explicit connection between the sale of the Hawks and the inspections in Dimona. Despite earlier conclusions, the two did exist on different parallel tracks, at least openly. Robert Komer complicates this conclusion, as he candidly expressed his belief and worked under the assumption that conventional weapons were directly linked to Dimona. "One way to drive (the) Israelis nuclear, have implications for other countries, is to let them believe they did not have a conventional deterrent. One way to keep them from going nuclear: keep their adequate conventional deterrent option coming and open."286 Komer clearly believed there was a link between the Hawks and Dimona, though this is unsubstantiated with no archival evidence. This is problematic for the historian regarding the

Israeli nuclear program, as much was hidden, assumed, verbally committed and consciously kept off the record. Komer argued that conventional balance, preferably from non-American sources, was vital to prevent the Israelis from going nuclear -- the deep American fear.287 What is also quite puzzling was the lack of clarity in McGeorge Bundy’s memory. Bundy, who was intricately involved or at least kept abreast of the situation, wrongly believed that Dimona was

284 "Letter Talbot to Secretary of State Rusk, September 12th, 1962," Subject: Problems of Timing in the Near East. Doc 69. Israel 1961-1963 Folder 1 of 2. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. This recently declassified document shows State sarcasm (borderline anti-Semitism) on Kennedy's approach. Talbot was not anti-Semitic and may have been sarcastic, however, the Arabist accusations will loom. In this handwritten note, Talbot jokes (one would imagine) "Apparently Jews take their political (words unclear) there from in an election year." This letter was also written with the goal of trying to appeal to Nasser or give the UAR some sort of package considering Israel had gotten the Hawks, rejected the Johnson Plan, and Congress was aligning against the UAR. 285 Warren Bass concluded that Kennedy's decisions regarding Israel, pertinently the Hawk, were not driven by sentiment. 9. It is hard to dispute Bass's argument; however, given comments about Kennedy as domestically attuned, both elements hold true. 286" Robert Komer, Oral History Interview #5, JFK," 76. December 22nd, 1969, JKPL, Boston, MA. 287 Ibid, 76. 101

tied to the Hawk sale in exchange for American visits to inspect the reactor.288 The most plausible explanation is that Bundy's work was written in 1988 prior to the release of archival evidence. By this logic, Bundy merely forgot about the inner-workings or trade-offs within the

American-Israeli relationship. Still, Bundy was present in many of these policy decisions, and given his interest and involvement on the nuclear issue, it is somewhat disheartening that he made this mistake. Undoubtedly, Bundy who kept much correspondence for his work on nuclear proliferation would have kept or had access to the essential documentation/cable.289

There is a great deal of agreement within the literature explaining why the Hawks were sold. Bass and Ben-Zvi are in accordance that the Hawks were sold for realist, calculated decisions based on an assessment of the Middle Eastern arms balance. Bass argued successfully throughout his work that Kennedy was not a prisoner to the domestic whims of the American-

Israeli dynamic, and the domestic sphere did not dominate his approach to Israel. He cites Israel's continued efforts for a relationship and realist calculations as the explanation for the sale.290 Ben-

Zvi, in his detailed analysis of decision-making utilizing the Hawk sale, writes that

"traditionalists" such as Talbot and to a lesser extent Rusk, were overruled by those governed by domestic considerations -- namely, Feldman, the dominant group and "pragmatists" comprised of

Bundy and Komer, who eventually changed their view given their analysis of the fluid situation that convinced Kennedy to sell the Hawk.291

288 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 310. 289 Most likely, Bundy was simply forgetting an event over twenty years in his past. He admitted he never recalled any discussion addressing Dimona with either Lyndon Johnson when he was President or Walt Rostow, Bundy's successor as National Security Advisor -- this also seems odd, yet is accepted. Bundy, 310. 290 Bass, 97, 148-150. He agrees that the Hawk set a precedent for arms deals in the relationship. 291 Ben-Zvi "Influence and Arms": 1-2, 33-36. Ben-Zvi, a political scientist, believes that a failed attempted bargaining approach was selected over some sort of "inducement" or "coercive diplomacy" Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 91. 102

Others focus on the domestic aspect. Barrett argued that Kennedy's whole Israeli policy was governed by domestic considerations and as his term progressed he became much more influenced by domestic politics.292 To bolster the case that the domestic side, specifically any sort of "lobby" was conversely absent in the Hawk pursuit, Tal recounts that the Israelis did not actively engage domestic lobbying efforts to pursue the Hawk. He applied this justification to argue that the Hawk was not a pressing or essential Israeli need; however, it also clearly indicates that the Hawk was primarily sold for strategic or grand strategy reasons.293 Even participants note the domestic element regarding the sale. Talbot recalled there was domestic pressure concerning both the Hawk sale and the Johnson Plan, and though he did not elaborate, he articulated throughout Kennedy's Administration, he did not feel daily pressure.294 Tal also raises an important point in connection to the Dimona issue. He notes that once the Dimona facility was discovered by the Americans at the end of 1960, the Israelis temporarily put their pursuit of the Hawk on hold.295 This upon further reflection is significant. Tal argues that Israel did this to demonstrate that the Hawk was non-essential and took a back seat to other issues in the Israeli mind – perhaps, an understatement. The pause of the Hawk pursuit was not due to inconvenience, rather the Americans were deeply angered and shocked by the discovery that the

Israelis would have not even been afforded an opportunity to present any issue for at least two months between December-1960 and February-1961. The lack of involvement by the lobby seems to be supported. Edward Tivnan, in his work on the Israeli lobby, cites no mention of

AIPAC or other groups' efforts to obtain the Hawk. Similarly, I. L. Kenen, head of AIPAC under

292 Barrett, 6. Barrett focused on George Ball's oral history when he said that the Hawk sale was a "gesture towards Israel" 205. This is used as supporting evidence. It is debatable how involved Ball was in the decision to sell the Hawk in its final stages. 293 Tal: 310. 294 "Phillips Talbot Oral History Interview JFK #2," 17, 20. August 13th, 1970. New York City. JKPL, Boston, MA. 295 Tal: 309 103

Kennedy, also acknowledged that he did not lobby for the Hawk. Nonetheless, he appreciated

Kennedy's somewhat pandering decision to first inform a group of "informed Jewish leaders" on

September 27th, 1962, directly before the Hawk sale reached the wider American public.296

Spiegel was one of the first American scholars to argue that the Hawk was not dictated by the domestic factor, rather in maintaining an arms balance with Soviet clients: Iraq and Egypt.297 He agrees that afterwards with Kennedy's presentation of the sale and leaking the decision to appropriate parties, this emboldened the domestic component.298 While domestic interests did not determine the reasoning for the sale, Kennedy was concerned with the appearance of the sale to the American Jewish community and supporters of Israel afterwards. Conversely, this concern with the domestic reaction would be completely absent in his handling of Dimona. Public reaction or participation would be irrelevant to Kennedy's confrontation on Dimona.

Kennedy made realist calculations, and the Hawk sale fit with his view that Israel was worth supporting; nonetheless, he quickly reaped the domestic rewards. Even Mearsheimer and

Walt were unable to find any documentary evidence to support a domestic determinant for the

Hawk sale. Yet in their notes they agree with Komer's statement that Kennedy, a "shrewd politician", knew there would also be a large reward for the Hawk Sale.299

David Schoenbaum raised an interesting perspective for why the Hawk was sold: it was to deter Israel from attacking her neighbours in a pre-emptive attack.300 While listed as one reason, particularly by State in their final analysis, this represents only a partial reading of the

296 Kenen, 166. 297 Spiegel, 100, 108. 298 Ibid,108 He notes that Kennedy went against the Pentagon and helped Israel finance the Hawks -- a deal on par with close ally Australia. 109. 299 Mearsheimer and Walt, 25, see endnote 10 (page 362). This is most likely based on Robert Komer's Oral History #1, 8 Philips Talbot also shared that Kennedy was a "consummate politician who understood domestic politics". Talbot iterated that Kennedy understood the Democrats were seen as the friends of Israel. Talbot Oral History Interview #1, 23. JKPL, Boston, MA. 300 Schoenbaum, 137. 104

situation. Schoenbaum, in 1993, with the advantage of further archival declassification, advocated that the Hawk was for "Israeli self-restraint with their neighbours." He correctly divorced the Hawk from Dimona.301 This rectified a long held inaccurate belief in the field, a pre-archival release that the Hawks were sold for either an Israeli pledge not to go nuclear, or for a trade-off of American inspections.

Mordechai Gazit, who was involved in these negotiations (partly) and review years later, believed that the Hawk sale was completed to signal to the Soviet Union that the United States wanted to keep peace in the region. He recognized that this transaction was for balance in the arms race of the Middle East. He cites Philip Klutznick's conclusion that Kennedy really contributed to Israel by selling the Hawk, but was not given sufficient credit.302 While this may have been the case when Gazit wrote between the 1980s to the early 2000s, since that time, it has become one of the dominant themes pertaining to Kennedy

Ben-Zvi noted that Robert Komer, ever the pragmatic individual, changed his tactics after the Hawk sale. No longer would expected reciprocity or good faith expectations suffice, Komer ensured onwards that the United States would be more commanding in their relations with

Israel.303 This was evident through his rising concern on Israeli nuclear activities and informed his scrutiny on Dimona.

There are several indicators that Kennedy did not treat the Hawk sale with the same vigour as the Dimona issue. Firstly, he and Komer are somewhat absent from the pertinent

National Security Files. This should be annotated by Komer's admission that Kennedy read every

301 Schoenbuam, 137. 302 Gazit,198. 303 Abraham Ben-Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 4. 105

report or the vast majority cover-to-cover on the Middle East.304 Secondly, Myer Feldman was intricately involved. While Feldman was Kennedy's key domestic link to Israel (Kennedy joked that Feldman was an "Israeli emissary)305, Komer was the ranking security figure with high-level intelligence clearance -- this may suggest a secondary importance for Kennedy.

Avner Cohen conclusively deciphered that at the archival level, there was no direct tie between the Hawk sale and Dimona, either in terms of American inspections or an Israeli promise not to develop nuclear weapons.306 Nonetheless, Cohen hints that both -- the conventional aspect of arms sales and the response to Dimona -- were linked in the American mind. Cohen interviewed by far the most American officials involved and was likely given this impression from Kennedy officials. Years later, Bass navigated the minefield in trying to address the issue of linkage implied by the documents. He built upon Cohen's interviews with Komer, and adds Feldman believed the policies were linked. Robert Komer professed: "There was never really two tracks, security and atom; there was always really one track."307

While this study examines the American perspective employing American archival sources, it appears the Hawk and Dimona (or the conventional and nuclear) were linked in the minds of the Israelis. Ben-Zvi maintains that since 1960 when Peres, Ben-Gurion, and the

Israelis sought the Hawk, the request was made with Dimona in mind. The Hawks would be utilized to guard the facility from air attack.308 If this is true, then the linkage was clear in Ben-

304 "Robert Komer, Oral History Interview #1 JFK," 5. June 18th, 1964. JKPL, Boston, MA. Komer detailed Kennedy's foreign policy infatuation, astonishing that "he read everything. He gobbled up all the intelligence reports, the State Department daily summary, the press and secondary sources." 305 Phillips Talbot, Oral History #1, 24. JKPL, Boston, MA. While this was a joke, Talbot certainly believed, as did Rusk and occasionally Komer, that Feldman was not to be trusted. Talbot shared that even Kennedy understood that Feldman was being used by Harman (and most likely, Gazit) occasionally as "a conduit to the president" by the Israelis. 306 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 111. 307 Bass, 204, also in Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 174. 308 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy, 21. Ben-Zvi says this was the "desire" for the Hawks, though he does not give a supporting note. 106

Gurion's mind from the outset -- the Hawk was certainly a symbolic gesture, vital in establishing an arms relationship with the Americans. Yet there was also a clear, defined, and practical purpose attached to the sale. Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh were the first scholars to espouse that guarding Dimona was the real reason the Hawks were needed.309 Despite not seeing the

Israeli Dimona sources first-hand,310 this makes logical and tactical sense. The Hawk, a purely defensive weapons system was intended to intercept fighter jets -- exactly the Israeli concern from the UAR. Certain American scholars have questioned whether this was indeed the case.311

While the Israeli sources are still shrouded in secrecy, in the Americans archives, the Hawk and

Dimona were never connected.

The repercussions of the Hawk sale and Israeli rejection of the Johnson Plan were still felt by the end of 1962. As Kennedy prepared to meet Meir in December, in Florida, State called for increased reciprocity from Israel. State was frustrated that Israel: had received the Hawks; were receiving ongoing American help on the Jordan River diversion (which Kennedy greatly believed in); and had to concede little. The frustration towards Israel was now apparent with

State personnel, specifically, Talbot. State was particularly angered by what they believed what an Israeli-led domestic campaign to kill the Johnson Plan. The Israelis "stirred up the American

Jewish community against the refugee initiative despite a promise not to do so."312

One of the definitive expressions of how American-Israeli relations needed to be addressed at this stage came from Komer. Kennedy still held his positive view of Israel by late

1962. He would shortly see cracks in the relationship, which in a few days he would anoint as

309 Aronson and Brosh, 72. 310 Besides my focus on the American perspective, seeing this document would prove near impossible. Bass and others, as well as Israeli scholars, note the closed nature and perpetual archival limbo of Israeli sources pertaining to Dimona. 311 Bass, 204-205. Bass also believes this makes tactical sense instead of needing Hawks to defend urban areas. 312 "Memorandum for Bundy, President's Meetings with Israel Foreign Min Briefing Materials,"1-6. Israel, General 11/14/62-12/21/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 107

“special”. In early December, 1962, when the Johnson Plan was about to be buried, Komer still clung to some hope that the Plan could be linked with some kind of Israeli concession. On

December 5th, 1962, Komer outlined how the Israelis were diplomatically outmaneuvering the

Americans. He debated the conclusions of a State paper from Talbot which called for more reciprocity. While he did not agree with all State's findings, he perceived a need to put more pressure on the Israelis, and forwarded a biting critique of Ben-Gurion's Israel. He argued that even if Israel was given a security guarantee, it was unlikely that Ben-Gurion or Meir were willing to take any short-term political risks. Komer asserted that Mapai's coalition partners may turn on them; however, this was truly damning -- showcasing Komer's analysis of the Israeli willingness to compromise. He also outlined the large-scale pressure campaign that was mounted on the State Department. Komer poignantly cautioned that if the Americans kept bending to

Israel's will, more than the Hawk would be needed for balance. Most importantly, Komer informed Kennedy that Israel: had American support for the Jordan water project; had received the Hawk; were receiving high levels of American aid; and at that point with the Johnson rejection, the United States would get "nothing in return, the score was four to nothing for

Israel".313 While this admission was not exceptional, it articulated Komer's comprehension that the American-Israeli relationship was a series of give-and-take negotiations, which the Israelis were decisively winning. While Israel was worth supporting, Komer listed all the benefits that

Kennedy and the Americans provided -- some sort of concession or reciprocity would be needed.

Robert Komer was more inclined to help Israel albeit he realized this pendulum had swung too far. During Kennedy's Presidency, Komer concluded that certain bureaus in State (like

NEA) were pro-Arab, but countered that the Israeli lobby was effective in increasing the level of

313 "Komer Memorandum for President Kennedy December 5th, 1962," 3. Israel, General, 12/22/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 108

annual aid for Israel.314 Komer defends Kennedy against catering to the domestic factor. He reported that Kennedy was never one for a "special plea", or interest group politics; the President would take an alternative course, if need be. Komer admitted Feldman was utilized effectively in dealing with the Israelis.315 On the Hawk sale, the Israeli lobby (notably, AIPAC) did not have any influence -- this held true to an even larger degree for Dimona.316 Kennedy wanted a bargained negotiation with Israel of quid pro quo.317 The Hawk sale best represented this ongoing bartering. Unfortunately for Israel, though they were winning this negotiation, Dimona would not be a bargain -- rather a power dictating the rules to a small state. Unlike the Hawk,

Dimona did not constitute an issue of peripheral importance to American interests and had gripped Kennedy’s attention and involvement.

Kennedy's policy and relations with Israel outside of the Dimona issue were complex, multi-layered, and generally well-conceived. The Hawk sale best represents these positive interactions before Dimona. The sale made sense in reassuring Israel of American commitment, garnering domestic support for Kennedy, and advancing relations. Kennedy's real failure came from an inability to amass further Israeli concessions albeit what these concessions entailed is difficult to readily discern.

The Hawk sale was a prime example of the Americans mulling over Israeli security needs and directly addressing them. Kennedy gave his special relationship admission because he believed in the similarities between both nations. Israel was liberal, democratic, Western, free, and a successful economic country in a troubled region worth helping. He called for greater reciprocity; however, Israel gained the upper hand in negotiations. Kennedy allowed for

314 Komer Oral History #5, 73, 76. JKPL, Boston, MA. 315 Ibid, 39. Komer stated that neither side (Arab nor Israeli) could complain about Kennedy. 316 Bass, 6-10. 317 Spiegel, 110, 117. 109

domestic lobbying to affect levels of aid, elements of the Johnson Plan, and peripheral elements of the relationship. Kennedy really believed in such issues as: Dimona, the security guarantee, and to a much lesser extent, the Hawk. Accordingly, he would either listen and ignore the domestic community, or bar them altogether.

After careful examination of the documents concerning the non-Dimona issues, specifically the Hawk, certain elements are apparent: the Israelis gained the upper hand in negotiations on peripheral issues. This was due to the quality of Israeli diplomats in the Hawk sale and wider relations.318 Shimon Peres played a vital part in expediting the Hawk sale. It is clear that consistent efforts by Israeli diplomats, and politicians, rather than any sort of lobby, had a much more significant effect on the Hawk sale. Even scholars, who are predominantly critical of the power of the lobby or the politicking of Israeli diplomats, concede Israel was successful in this regard.319 Clearly the lobby, notably AIPAC, was not nearly as powerful or participatory under Kennedy as it was under Lyndon Johnson. Still, Kennedy was well aware of its presence, given his congressional and senatorial experiences, along with Feldman's advice.

Considering Israel received 48.1 million in 1961, 83.9 million in 1962, and 76.8 million in total aid from the United States (this excludes the millions in Export-Import Bank loans)320along with millions in loans and military aid, Kennedy's belief in Israel and support in the domestic sphere aligned.

A final crucial finding emerges from an examination of these issues, one which has been overlooked by scholars. The notable issues: the Hawk, the Johnson Plan, and Johnston/Jordan

318 Tal: 317. 319 Mearsheimer and Walt, 25. The authors often deemed anti-Israel or anti-Semitic, which is unfounded, stated that "skillful Israeli diplomacy and the influence of several pro-Israel advisers" along with Kennedy's personal interests contributed to Kennedy's Israel policy. 320 Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1984), 148. 110

waters diversion had all been expertly analyzed. Specifically, any linkage to Dimona has been meticulously researched. Yet, one finding is clear: the Americans had elements of doubt concerning Israeli intentions or estimates, not only on the Dimona issue, but on several facets of

American-Israeli relations.

The Israelis exaggerated the need for the Hawk, evidenced by continued State

Department appeals and by Komer and Bundy. This constituted the first example of unclear

Israeli motives for Kennedy. The second example of a wavering faith in Israeli adherence was the American belief that Israel could accept a tolerable number of refugees. Having initially informed Kennedy he may cooperate, Ben-Gurion fell under further American suspicion. He was blamed for revoking this good faith negotiation. The third case for fostering distrust involved the

Jordan waters. Even though the Israelis were committed to the Johnston Plan, American officials consistently worried that Israel would take more than what was needed, using the Hawk to do so.

Treated as one American perception of Israel rather than separate issues, multiple parallel paths do not appear. Instead, a mixed combination of healthy skepticism towards Israel emerges. This was compounded with the underlying American assessment of Israel's true intentions on a nuclear program to create a deeply suspicious United States. If Israel could not be trusted on an issue as simple as the Hawk, how could the Americans believe Israeli assurances concerning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, or the true nature of Dimona -- pivotal matters of national security?

Robert Komer's revealing admissions over the years shed doubt that even prior to 1963, these issues were divorced from Dimona. He emphatically believed all issues were conceived with Dimona in mind. He argued that his and Kennedy's top and constant priorities were keeping

Israel from attaining nuclear weapons, no matter the cost.

111

Dimona, the ultimate American concern of Israeli proliferation, must be assessed to determine if Komer was correct. Dimona was clearly the top priority for Kennedy, more so after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 as his crusade against nuclear proliferation intensified. As for Israeli bargaining on Dimona, Kennedy would do everything in his power to prevent the score from becoming 5-0 for Israel. Unlike the relatively innocuous Hawk sale, when it came to the Dimona issue, the American-Israeli diplomatic protocols and niceties were largely relegated to the side. Within this new dynamic, the United States approached this interaction not as an equal negotiation, rather as a super power with a client. To properly contextualize and comprehend what Dimona entailed, an intricate analysis of how Dimona was initiated and the

American "discovery" is needed. The origins and American reaction to an alleged nuclear program, prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, will be addressed in the next Chapter.

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Chapter Four: Dimona’s Origins

The United States’ suspicion of Israel's nuclear program was linked to the secrecy around the origins of Dimona. In 1960, the final year of Dwight Eisenhower's Presidency, the Americans uncovered the shocking Dimona facility. Kennedy inherited this crisis with Israel, and when he entered office was advised to monitor Israel's program. This chapter examines what the Israelis concealed and how the Americans were misled. The chapter is subdivided into three sections, addressing: firstly, Israel's desire and need for a nuclear program, and how with the help of

France it was secretly initiated; secondly, the Atoms for Peace program of President Dwight D.

Eisenhower, and how the Israelis exploited this inconsistent nonproliferation policy, and; lastly, how after failed efforts by the United States to decipher what Israel was doing, the two countries were placed on an impending collision course. Israel’s program was approved and bolstered by secret invaluable support from France at an opportune time to construct both a nuclear reactor and proliferation facilities, debatably, under a less than stringent American President. The

American nonproliferation policy of the 1950s was very much in its infancy, at best ambiguous and predominantly disjointed. Atoms for Peace afforded the perfect cover for Israeli nuclear weapons research while simultaneously covert, extensive, and relatively unprecedented aid from

France bolstered Israel's secret weapons’ path. In essence, the Israelis deliberately disguised their intentions, confused the Americans, pursued multiple reactors to guard Dimona's secrecy, and succeeded in hiding their program in the late 1950s. These efforts are recounted to demonstrate the anger of the American "discovery" in late 1960.

One conclusion (examined in this chapter and the next) becomes abundantly clear: strong

Israeli diplomacy juxtaposed with a distracted President and disjointed American efforts allowed the Israelis to gain a much-needed head start and upper-hand in developing their nuclear facility.

113

The Israelis also outmaneuvered the Americans and successfully hid their program for years.

Officially, Israel employs the status of intentional ambiguity concerning their possession of nuclear weapons. This means they neither confirm, nor deny possession of weapons. The challenge then emerges -- how does one write the history of something that does not actually publicly exist?

Over the years, many Israeli scholars, notably Avner Cohen, Zaki Shalom, and journalist

Michael Karpin have researched and produced insightful scholarly works on the topic.

Furthermore, multiple biographies and memoires of Shimon Peres, the man credited with overseeing the production of the program, have been released. Still, for historians, murky areas remain, much documentary evidence is absent, informed speculation and logical deduction is needed. These works by Israelis have made the task significantly easier.

The "open secret" and proof of an Israeli nuclear capability was exposed in 1986 by a disgruntled Israeli technician, Mordechai Vanunu, who worked at the Dimona reactor.321 On

October 5th, 1986, The Sunday Times in England ran an expose with photos taken by Vanunu.

The paper also included a graphic which explained how the Dimona reactor facility was intentionally designed to fool American inspectors and parties who wanted to monitor Israeli progress. Importantly, hidden from American inspections in the 1960s was Machon, or Institute

2, which housed a chemical treatment facility that acted as a plutonium separation plant.322

Above ground, when American scientists came to inspect ("visit") under President John Kennedy

(1961, 1962), everything appeared peaceful; however, fake walls hid elevators that ran through

321 Avner Cohen has labeled Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, “the worst kept secret”, and applied the term “open secret”. Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret, xiv. 322 A chemical or reprocessing plant is essential in treating spent fuel rods and vital for plutonium production. Uranium is fed into the reactor or used as a fuel source, and in weapons programs; highly-enriched weapons grade plutonium is the output. A chemical processing/treatment plant, the more efficient plutonium separation facility, signals intention for nuclear weapons. 114

six levels of the actual Dimona facility.323 This discovery is significant for this dissertation: during Kennedy's scramble to decipher the true layout and capacity of Dimona, the United States merely suspected but could not prove that the French had built a chemical separation plant for

Israel. Vanunu's testimony provided the missing link or "proof" of a working nuclear weapons facility. His admission the facility lay deep underground demonstrates: firstly, how committed

Israel was to keeping this secret from the Americans; and secondly, the extent of French collaboration. Problematically, there is no proof when specific components of the facility were completed -- scholars and scientists assumed the French completed all facilities, even the plant, between 1957 and 1964.324 The understanding, also advanced in this study, is that during this period the Israelis deceived the Americans. Retrospectively, American suspicion of Israel during the Kennedy years was warranted on the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of the information they received from Israel.

Of all current nuclear states -- the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia,

Pakistan, North Korea, and India -- Israel's logic for possessing nuclear weapons may be clearest to any uninformed observer. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel was a small country surrounded by enemies with overwhelmingly larger populations. Additionally, the unique and tragic fate of

Jews during the Holocaust added another motivation. While caution is advised in equating the universal Jewish experience with the unique Israeli circumstance, in the case of the Holocaust, this rings true. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion learned the excruciating lesson from the

Holocaust of the need for external allies and the future impetus for Israelis to be able to defend themselves. This realization was bolstered by Ben-Gurion's consistent conception dating from

323 The Sunday Times, "Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal," Oct 5th, 1986, 1-3. MG31 K 39 Box/Vol. 117 Folder "117-13 Nuclear Power-Israel 1986-1991”. National Archives of Canada (NAC). 324 Ibid, 2. It is assumed that the plant was completed in 1964, as Saint-Gobaint Nucleare, the French company which built the facility worked between 1963-1965, and then left Dimona. 115

the War of Independence continuing through his rule in 1963 that the Arabs would not accept a final Israeli victory, instead, "another round" of fighting would transpire.325 Ben-Gurion's decision for Israel to develop its own nuclear capability potentially extended as far back as

October of 1945, when he was shaken by his visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.326

Ben-Gurion also greatly emphasized science. He had a longstanding fascination with addressing

Israel’s agricultural and water needs, both could be addressed with nuclear energy.327

Though relatively resource-poor, the southern Negev of Israel had some natural phosphates. In the early 1950s, gifted Israeli nuclear physicist, Israel Dostrovsky, created a new method for extracting the fissionable uranium U-235 from phosphates.328 So Israel had talented nuclear experts domestically. Retrospectively, Ben-Gurion's 1948-interest in atomic power and natural uranium was identified as a missed sign regarding the American failure to detect

Dimona.329 Organic chemist Ernst David Bergmann, one of the heads of Israel’s nuclear programs and head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) created in secret in 1952, either shared or was reported to have expressed his delight with Israel's interest in the field and potential to be somewhat self-sufficient in future nuclear power.330

325 Aronson, "Israel's Security and the Holocaust”: 66, 85. Aronson writes that Ben-Gurion realized a nonconventional weapon for deterrence was needed due to a 40:1 Arab to Israeli ratio (1950): 84. 326 Michael Karpin, "Deep in the Basement: Israel's Harmonious Nuclear Ambiguity," World Policy Journal, 26, no.3 (Fall 2009): 32. 327 Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir, ed. David Landau (New York: Random House, 1995), 115 Peres, who uses "nuclear power" in this explanation, is somewhat ambiguous concerning the program. 328 Karpin, Bomb in the Basement, 38. The French bought the patent but it was deemed too arduous a process for practical proliferation – still, Israeli scientists were contributing to the field. 329 Foreign Service Dispatch Aug 16, 1960, Amembassy Tel Aviv, Subject: Israel's Uranium Potential, Folder 8884A.19/2-2060 RG59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. From 8884A.18/1-1860 to 884A.1907-461. National Archives of the United States of America, College Park, Maryland/Washington DC. National Archives II, (NA). By 1960, when the Embassy, State Department, and intelligence community were trying to ascertain when Israel began a nuclear program, the 1948 discovery of phosphate deposits in the Negev was reported. 330 "Israel's Uranium Potential" Aug 16, 1960 Amembassy TA, Foreign Service Dispatch, Potential Folder 8884A.19/2-2060 RG59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. The American Embassy in Israel shared that Bergmann informed them in August, 1960, about producing heavy-water and natural uranium in Israel. 116

Director General of the Defense Ministry, later Deputy Defense Minister, Shimon Peres, was the decision-maker who ran the overall project and acted as the driving force.331 By 1955,

Peres reported that the decision was taken by Ben-Gurion to pursue a nuclear weapons program.332 Ben-Gurion personally selected Peres to run the Dimona project. 333 Up to that point and continuing on somewhat, Israeli scholars consistently maintain that Israel had no grand design. Supposedly, unlike the American Manhattan Project, Israel moved along piece-by-piece with their program.334 Very few individuals within Israel knew about the program. This makes it problematic to truly decipher why certain Israelis took the actions they did. Were they merely uninformed, or part of an elaborate plan for disinformation? From 1957 and certainly after the

Suez War, it appears relatively clear that the Israelis had an unequivocal design: receive nuclear weapons assistance from France and keep the Americans in the dark.

Peres admitted it was his idea, not Ben-Gurion's, to seek nuclear aid and weapons from the French in the mid-1950s. He recounted that the Czechoslovakian arms deal to Egypt

(September, 1955) was a major contributor to Israel seeking a major Western ally. The problem involved the United States, and given President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles' goal of guarding impartiality in the Middle East, they could be discounted. Despite this reasoning, Peres and the Israelis had negotiated arms deals with the French since 1954.335 Peres believed in

France, given their resentment of the Anglo Alliance between Britain and the United States and a shared hatred of the Nazis. Shimon Peres also believed that France was the best location to train

331 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 17. 332 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy, 6. 333 Guy Ziv, "The Triumph of Agency Over Structure: Shimon Peres and the Israeli Nuclear Program," International Negotiation 20, issue. 2 (2015): 224. 334 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 52. 335 Peres, 102-104. 117

Israeli physicists and nuclear scientists.336 Since 1949, the Israelis dispersed their strongest students around the globe to train in premiere nuclear science institutes -- a move which suggests a great deal of foresight for a country with no grand nuclear plan.337 There were many reasons why the French helped the Israelis develop Dimona, including: Holocaust guilt and shame; 338

French nuclear scientists of Jewish origin; a shared history of working together (since the 1940s);

339 realist incentives for French progress on their own bomb with Israeli nuclear expertise; 340 both France and Israel had a common enemy with their struggles in Egypt and Algeria, respectively; 341 lastly, the wrongful, or at least prejudiced, belief by the French military that the

Israelis could act as the gateway to all Jewish scientists, notably Robert J. Oppenheimer and

Hydrogen/Thermonuclear Bomb inventor, Edward Teller. 342

Peres grew close to individuals within successive French governments and further ensured their nuclear aid.343 He effectively needled the French government to agree to provide

Israel with a nuclear reactor and in September of 1956, a month before the secret plot between

Israel, France, and Great Britain for the Sevres protocol, Peres had achieved the first step in his mission.344 The French had an added impetus for helping Israel, as they felt they were being

336 Shimon Peres, No Room for Small Dreams: Courage, Imagination, and the Making of Modern Israel (New York: Custom House, 2017), 64, 67, 84. 337 Reed and Stillman, 72 Most of the students were sent to Western Europe, some to the United States and from 1953 onwards, the majority in France, including Peres himself. 338 Zaki Shalom, "Israel's Nuclear Option Revisited," Journal of Israeli History 24, no. 2 (2005): 270. 339 Gadi Heiman, "Diverging Goals: The French and Israeli Pursuit of the Bomb, 1958-1962," Israel Studies 15, no. 2 (2010): 108. 340 Heiman:107. Reed and Stillman, 69. 341 Shalom "Israel's Nuclear Option Revisited": 270. 342 Binyamin Pinkus "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue: French/Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949-1957," Israel Studies 7, no.1 (Apr. 2002), 111. French Jew and deputy director of the IAEA from 1969-1973, Andre Finklestein, understood how ridiculous this was and said it was French gentile generals who believed this, not French Jews. "The Avner Cohen Collection," The Wilson Center. Interview with Andre Finkelstein and notes. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/andr%C3%A9-finkelstein. The transcript: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113997. 343 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams, 70-72. 344 Matti Golan, The Road to Peace: A Biography of Shimon Peres, trans. Akiva Ron (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 44. 118

excluded from the Anglo nuclear club and held an anti-American, anti-British bias.345 The larger proliferation situation was beginning to take shape. The Americans, unwittingly and unintentionally, had driven the French and Israelis together in creating a supposed “nuclear club” of themselves and the United Kingdom.

Peres wrote that the Franco-Israeli agreement on Dimona came during the Sevres negotiations in late October, 1956.346 While no public document exists for the early agreement, over the summer and into September, 1956, the French promised Israel not only the reactor, but all facilities including a reprocessing plant (the chemical treatment plant) essential to plutonium production and fissionable weapons.347

The French began to worry about their covert collaboration with Israel. The French

Foreign Minister told Peres they held specific concerns: he fretted that this kind of nuclear aid was unprecedented; pertinently, he raised the scenario that should the Americans discover this project, they would cease supporting France in the field of nuclear energy -- this would remain in

French minds; lastly, this French "assistance" to Israel could push the Soviets into arming the

Arab states. The French did not want to be held accountable for any of these outcomes. Even

Peres knew this would be a challenge, though he assured the French these problems were all four years away.348 The use of ample time to reassure the French set an Israeli precedent, as they would mount the same defense to the Americans in December, 1960 and January, 1961. In

September of 1957, Peres delivered the first of what would become one of many lies to a foreign

345 Adelson and Brosh, 43. The French believed the Americans either welcomed or were indifferent to British nuclear tests in 1952. There was also an element of lagging French pride due to decolonization. They wanted to keep pace in the nuclear race. 346 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams, 85. Cohen argues that during the Sevres Protocol of Oct 22nd-24th, Peres met with Mollet and Bourges Maunoury alone to finalize the deal, Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 54. Golan indicates it was Sept 21st, 1956. 44. Shalom cites the Sevres agreement, then another in December of 1956, Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes, 7. 347 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 52. 348 Golan, 51-52. 119

country regarding Israel's nuclear ambition: no weapon would be produced; this was solely a peaceful program. This also foreshadowed continued false Israeli promises to the Americans that they only had peaceful nuclear intentions. On October 3rd, 1957, the formal Franco-Israeli document was signed. It was not an inter-governmental accord between countries, rather between the respective countries' Atomic Energy Commissions.349As fear of American detection was made explicit by the French, this dissertation argues from this point onwards Israel's main mission was to keep the project secret from the United States and to ensure its continued development.

To demonstrate how wary both the French and Israelis were of detection, Israel did not deal directly with Saint-Gobain Nucleaire, the company which built the Marcoule French reactor and Dimona, rather they set up a shell company, Societe Industrielle D'Etudes. Furthermore, both

French and Israeli leaders hid much of their actions, even from their own governments.350 By promising the Dimona reactor and reprocessing facility, the French set a precedent -- a more meaningful kind of nuclear transfer, specifically, with no safeguards or noted inspections.351 The

Israelis and French believed they had an existing relationship to defend their deal should it be uncovered. They would cite this precedent throughout late-1960. This was the Canadian financing, building, and supply of a natural heavy water reactor to India. The French could claim that if discovered by the Americans, they had received a clear declaration of peaceful intent from

Israel. The Franco-Israeli agreement afforded the Israelis a twenty-four megawatt reactor, the use

349 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 58. 350 Ibid, 59. Karpin noted that though Israel and France stated that the reactor and program would be used for "civilian purposes", each side realized this was categorically untrue. He cites the shell company as Societe Alsacienne, 91-92, The Bomb in the Basement. This company did complete actual work later on, so this may be incidental. Either way, the Israelis were very cognizant of the need for secrecy. 351 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989), 100. 120

of French technicians, a technical agreement, and uranium supply.352 The agreement is said to have included most of what Vanunu would later report: underground facilities with a preparation workshop for spent fuel (vital for plutonium weapons production); hot laboratories to analyze the irradiated spent fuel rods; materials for the reactor; a waste facility, and of course, the plant which treated/extracted the plutonium -- the step which really separates peaceful resources from the production of weapons grade plutonium.353

This covert project was by no means unanimously supported. Foreign Minister Golda

Meir was against the program. She consistently worried it would hurt the Israeli relationship with the United States and argued for notifying the Americans. This point is significant, as Meir would conduct several meetings with Kennedy in the 1960s on the topic. Finance Minister Levi

Eshkol (Ben-Gurion's successor after the latter resigned in May 1963) worried that the project was unaffordable; therefore, several Israeli officials (of the few who knew) were against the project or its repercussions.

Peres wrote that half of the cost of the project was covered by a group of private citizens.

Lastly, to demonstrate both Peres' relentless pursuit to execute the deal and the French level of commitment to the project, a departing French Prime Minister (on November, 1957) backdated the agreement to forge the legality of the document.354

Shimon Peres selected Manes Pratt from the IDF to oversee the construction of the reactor by the town of Dimona in the Negev Desert in 1957.355 Peres revealed the reasoning for the nuclear "power" (as he always termed Dimona) plant to be constructed in the desert -- Israel's population lay clustered around the coast of the Mediterranean, and this was to avoid any

352 Melman and Raviv, 101. 353 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 58. 354 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams, 85, 94. This was done so that the French CEA would continue honouring the Dimona agreement. 355 Ibid, 88. 121

potential nuclear leaks or spills.356 While this is a great story, it was a different kind of leak that worried Peres: the reasoning for positioning the project in the middle of nowhere was to stem discussion by Israelis, primarily to avoid American detection.

By 1958, construction of the Dimona reactor was in full swing and control of the project fell under Peres.357 Pratt was directly responsible for the Dimona reactor construction, while

Ernst Bergmann was in charge of the IAEC albeit this group was largely excluded from the intricacies of Dimona. On June 5th, 1958, for budgetary reasons and to maintain absolute secrecy on the project, control of Dimona moved outside of the Ministry of Defense. On this occasion, the coherent plan of deception and utmost secrecy bloomed358 -- an autonomous select few involved with Dimona ran the project under Peres. Specifically, Ben-Gurion needed to buy time, at least five years of development, before the Americans detected what was being covertly built.

He set up what one author terms a "heavy smoke screen" with the underground facility and the above ground reactor covertly developed in the Negev desert.359

Israel's covert proliferation involved a supremely secretive group to procure nuclear materials and mask the Dimona project. This agency overseen or initiated by Shimon Peres was so secretive that when initially invoked, not even Ben-Gurion or Mossad Head, Isser Harel, knew about it. The agency entitled Lakam, a Hebrew acronym, was really an intelligence and counterintelligence unit, founded as a Science Liaison Bureau.360 Benjamin Blumberg, one of the ultimate secret insiders, was the security officer within the IDF who ran the agency under

356 Peres, Battling for Peace, 119. 357 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, xi,16. 358 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 113-114. Karpin states that the Israelis still had no master plan, just incremental moves 115. This appears to be incorrect -- if just looking as an outsider (as the Americans were), it was clear that the project was further buried for secrecy. 359 Ibid, 100. 360 Karpin believes the purpose of Lakam (Lekem as he transliterates) was to guard Dimona and gather "technical intelligence/scientific information" from around the globe. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 110. This was true; however, one of the main purposes was disruption and deception. Melman and Raviv, 102-103. 122

Shimon Peres.361 Lakam agents were disguised as science attaches and worked in foreign embassies. At points, these (actual) scientists were directly involved (in the 1960s) in trying to steal nuclear material themselves albeit it went poorly without Mossad help.362 This last piece in the covert effort by Israel is crucial to the American failure to detect Dimona and Israeli success.

Israel effectively administered disinformation or noise generation through an overflow of stimulation for American intelligence. The seldom-analyzed notion of Lakam is central in explaining how American intelligence missed detecting Dimona. The Israelis were so skilful in their deception and disinformation that the CIA did not even know of Lakam's existence until

1976 when the unit was dissolved.363 This counter-intelligence illuminates the extent to which the Israelis were willing to go to hide their project. They had their own scientists working through embassies (notably in America) to solidify this elaborate ruse to keep the Americans in the dark on actual Israeli progress.

Atoms for Peace

Since the 1946 presentation of Bernard Baruch's "Baruch Plan" for nuclear inspection, control and guarding of the American nuclear monopoly, it was American policy to stand against proliferation.364 McGeorge Bundy, a nonproliferation insider, attested that since his inauguration,

President Dwight D. Eisenhower made nonproliferation a concern.365 It appears that in the 1950s, the American government’s policy was incoherent, selective, and inconsistent.366

361 Ofer Aderet, "Israel's 'Man of Shadows,' Who Tricked U.S. Nuclear Inspectors, Dies at 95," Haaretz, Aug 30th, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-benjamin-blumberg-israel-s-nuclear-man-of-shadows-tricked- u-s-inspectors-in-dimona-dies-1.6431062. 362 Melman and Raviv, 104-106. 363 Ibid, 114. Certain scholars attest the birth of Lakam dates to 1957; however, I counter there is evidence that actions were taken before this, disrupting American intelligence collection. 364 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy": 1. 365 Bundy, 287. Bundy, a Kennedy partisan, stated that Ike was against the proliferation of weapons, "before, during and after this Presidency". 366 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 79. 123

President Eisenhower's nuclear legacy is complicated. Scholars have labeled his nonproliferation policy, "enigmatic"367 -- a kind descriptor, more appropriately, “inconsistent”.

Eisenhower was not solely to blame. His administration (notably, Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles) treated Western European proliferation one way and the rest of the non-aligned, non-

Soviet bloc differently. Western Europe was the American priority and area in the Cold War, while the Soviets were the main adversary. Eisenhower was less reluctant to NATO and ally proliferation, notably the United Kingdom and France. Problematically, proliferation on the periphery would become the issue in the 1960s (of which, Israel belonged), and may have been unintentionally accelerated through Eisenhower's initiative: Atoms for Peace.

President Eisenhower ascended to the Presidency as an individual familiar with the nuclear bomb, having been a general in the Second World War. He realized the destructive capabilities and the importance of the new weapon.368 The Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb in

1953 stirred the United States. From the outset of his Presidency, Eisenhower understood the dangers he faced.369

Eisenhower's response to nuclear proliferation was delivered in a speech to the United

Nations on December 8th, 1953. The Atoms for Peace plan had evolved from a report, originally commissioned in April of 1952. In his speech, he discussed the need for peaceful nuclear sharing, nuclear power instead of weapons, and conjoined the terrible premise of nuclear danger with world peace.370 Eisenhower acknowledged that the "nuclear secret" was out and would spread around the globe in the coming years. He called for making "joint contributions from their stockpiles (UK, SU, and US) of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International

367 Aronson and Brosh, 26. 368 Bundy, 236. 369 Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 94. 370 Bundy, 287. 124

Atomic Energy Agency".371 He requested the United States "devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."372 It appeared as though the Americans were trying to stem the tide of proliferation in the 1950s as part of a mission for altruistic reasons. The real purpose of Atoms for Peace held more insidious purposes. The actual purpose of the program was to ensure

Western stability, specifically in NATO. The goal was to get West Germany to remain engaged and try to taper French ambitions, although this seemed somewhat difficult. A letter to Atomic

Energy Commission Chairman, Lewis Strauss, indicated that it was more of a propaganda exercise as the called-for uranium and fissionable material would burden the Soviet Union, while the United States could afford to part with this amount.373

Even insider, McGeorge Bundy, admitted years later that while the program started a concrete agenda of American nonproliferation, it no doubt promoted nuclear weapons interest globally, even in states that may not have been interested.374 Another problem and the main issue for this study involved the intended target of the initiative and the birth of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Europe.375 France, West Germany, and even neutrals in Europe like Sweden and Switzerland were America's main proliferation concerns. Nonetheless, given by the late 1950s and 1960s, the real problem proliferators were two non-NATO, non-bloc countries in Israel and India. Regarding these two states, Atoms for Peace inflicted more damage than restraint in allowing both countries to attain knowledge and materials.

371 Press Release "Atoms for Peace" Speech, December 8th, 1953 DE's Papers as President, Speech Series, Box 5, United Nations Speech 12/8/53. Accessed at: https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf 372 Bundy, 287-288. 373 Wenger, 95. 374 Bundy, 288, 293. 375 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holt, Atoms for Peace and War 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), xvii. 125

This was the American-dominated international proliferation norm in which Israel pursued nuclear weapons. From the President's speech through late-1957 and early-1958 with the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM, the European Atomic

Energy Community376, the United States was attempting to come to terms with proliferation safeguards, inspections, and norms. Israel proliferated on the cusp (this is debatable) of a period of relative nuclear lawlessness or legal ambiguity with no firm measures in place. The Israelis initiated and likely ascertained a nuclear capability pre-NPT, pre-Limited Test Ban Treaty; hence, there is theoretically a defense. What is evident is that Israel welcomed the opportunity within Atoms for Peace and latched onto this new program.

The Israelis outwitted the Americans under Atoms for Peace. This operation that tried to sell nuclear power and know-how on a small scale to try and buy off nations from pursuing weapons clearly did not work in the case of Israel. Seymour Hersh categorized the mindset of the program correctly, saying: "small progress would satisfy small nations."377

In the early 1950s, Ben-Gurion was enthralled with atomic physics and energy -- with

Eisenhower's new system, the little country could be given a reactor. Although from the outset, the secret weapons program was a response to Ben-Gurion and Bergmann's fear of another

Holocaust and annihilation, not an elaborate thought-out program.378 Atoms for Peace greatly piqued the interest of a resourceful and curious Israel with nuclear aspirations.

Under the Atoms for Peace program, a new Atomic Energy Act emerged in 1954, one that enabled sharing of open nuclear information for peaceful purposes. This was a venture spurred on by private business and the American administration, and made "nuclear diffusion" in

376 John Krige, "The Peaceful Atom as a Political Weapon: Euratom and American Foreign Policy in the Late 1950s," Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38, no. 1 (2008): 6. 377 Hersh, 84. 378 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 12. 126

the 1950s possible.379 The Act afforded bilateral participation between the United States, and after 1957, between the IAEA and the participating country. One of the key components outlined in this initiative as well as the Act called for international inspections for participating countries.380

Israel was one of the first countries to express intense interest in the program. In

November of 1954, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, delivered a speech to the United Nations advocating for peaceful atomic use and seconded the American suggestion of a scientific conference addressing nuclear energy sometime in 1955.381 The Israelis were concerned with procuring any help they could from the Americans in the field of nuclear expertise. They would receive specific components they needed from the French, hence, the

Atoms for Peace aid was not vital for research. Israel quickly followed Turkey as the second official signatory to a bilateral agreement on July 12th, 1955.382 The agreement formally placed safeguards on the reactor that would be installed mandating the small amount of U-235 (less than

6 kilograms). Additionally, any material produced could not be utilized for any other military purposes; none of this material could be transferred outside the country.383

Herein lies the problem for both the historian and American intelligence personnel during these events; the following Israeli actions in the mid-to-late 1950s can be interpreted multiple

379 Karpin, The Bomb in The Basement, 52. Mattson, 18. 380 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/ATOMIC54.PDF. 97, 128. The document mandates inspections for all participating countries. 381 “Department of State Memorandum of Conversation November 10th, 1954. Participants Mr. Yaacov Shimoni, Israel Embassy, NE Mr. Bergus Subject: Israel's Desire to Participate in UN Atomic Energy Activities,” in 21.50 Country File: Israel. d. General 1953-1961 Part 1 of 2, RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Special Asst. To Sec. of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space General Records to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 382 “History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities,” ( attached to Rusk to Kennedy Jan 30) Israel's Security, 1961-1963 Box 119a President's Office Files, Digital Identifier- JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 383 "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Israel" 21.50 Country File: Israel A. Agreements 1953-1960 and 62 Part 1 of 2. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 127

ways: as random acts of incoherent direction; a calculated plan to deceive the United States and to divert attention from Dimona, or; legitimate and logical measures relating to an Atoms for

Peace reactor while concealing their weapons progress. The evidence, from the American point of view, appears to indicate the latter. This was a very unclear picture throughout the 1950s for

American intelligence. Even if some of these Israeli admissions and actions were not part of a larger plan, their existence adds to the complexity and deception on Dimona.

The first example of a somewhat odd Israeli comment emerged in February of 1955, and may have been disregarded. In a conversation on February 9th, 1955, between Israeli Minister

Reuven Shiloah and members of the NEA, the issue of nuclear power for water desalination was broached. This was a program that Ben-Gurion and the Israeli leadership showed interest. The following comment appears prophetic. Shiloah expressed the Israeli desire for a research reactor.

The Americans offered small research reactors that could not produce any noticeable, certainly no problematic levels of plutonium. What emerged in 1955 was the transfer of unclassified information from the United States to participating countries on a bilateral agreement basis

(known as bilaterals). Initially, no more than six kilograms of enriched U-235 uranium could be transferred. Though the enrichment would only reach 20%, 80% enriched uranium is needed to produce weapons. Furthermore, the bilateral agreement which Israel signed later that year called for safeguards -- the uranium should be permitted solely for peaceful purposes. A final safeguard allowed the Americans to inspect any reactors developed under this program, specifically, expended fuel in the reactor. Under this rationale, only peaceful nuclear power could legally be created. Following the logic of this initiative, a statement from Reuven Shiloah is quite odd:

Shiloah admitted that the Hebrew University in Jerusalem was interested in a research reactor.

He recounted how Lebanon and Turkey were already interested in receiving such a reactor under

128

the Atoms for Peace banner. Shiloah then said: "This would tend to prevent any rumours that

Israel was attempting to produce an atomic bomb."384 Shiloah may have not known about the

Israeli grand design of Peres and Ben-Gurion; nevertheless, this was a very revealing expression, given there was no possibility of bomb production from a research reactor. Shiloah was no nuclear expert; however, this seems an odd statement, especially in 1955. This declaration best encapsulates the complexity of trying to decipher what Israel was actually doing. More troubling, however, was the presence at the meeting of a Mr. Salkind, an Israeli science counsellor who understood nuclear expertise, which strongly suggests nefarious purposes. It is important to reassert that Lakam employed their agents as scientific counsellors.

In an earlier meeting (1955) with Israeli Ambassador Eban on preparing for Israel's research reactor that would be finalized later that year, he shared that at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot (on the coast by Tel Aviv) the French had helped establish an isotope research reactor as Israel was progressing on Dostrovsky's techniques for extracting uranium from phosphates.

This was significant as a later American assessment of intelligence blunders detailed that when they heard reports on a French aided nuclear center, American intelligence assumed it was this facility -- the legitimate reactor. Perhaps, Eban was only sharing information to be helpful albeit he also purported in this interview that Israel had created an Atomic Energy Commission in

1953, not 1952, when it was actually initiated in secret.385 If Eban erred on both these comments,

384 Depart of State Memcon (Memorandum of Conversation) Feb 9th, 1955. Subject: Peaceful Uses of the Atom; Significance of Changes in the Soviet Union. Participants: Minister Shiloah, Mr. Salkind, Embassy of Israel; Mr. Bechhoefer. 21.50 Country File: Israel s. Atomic Development Program 1955. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 385 Letter Ambassador Patterson to Mr. Bechhoefer Jan 12th, 1955. Subject: Peaceful Uses of the Atom- meeting with Ambassador Eban of Israel 21.50 Country File: Israel s. Atomic Development Program 1955. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 129

then it would be understandable, though highly dubious an individual with intellect like Eban would make these mistakes. The confusion-inducing Israeli approach began to bloom.

In August, 1955 the much anticipated inaugural conference on the Peaceful Uses of

Atomic Energy occurred in Geneva. The main scientific leaders of the Israeli nuclear project were present. Ernst Bergmann approached Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Lewis

Strauss, about a "real reactor". Unlike the July agreement that would eventually build a small five thousand kilowatt reactor incapable of producing any substantial quantities of plutonium and subjected to stringent American safeguards at Nahal Soreq (Rebi Nubin) near Tel Aviv,

Bergmann felt more would be needed. Bergmann requested a pressurized water reactor and wanted to work on significant quantities of plutonium. This request was strongly rejected by

Strauss.386 Bergmann wanted to enhance the Nahal Soreq facility or the quantity of material permitted to Israel. He began a series of requests in Geneva that continued into 1956 seeking ten tons of heavy water for a 10 megawatt reactor. He discussed the separation of plutonium with

Strauss and it was evident this would violate the American-Israeli bilateral agreement.387

As the Israelis made their request to Strauss during the summer, they met with the

American Ambassador, and the Americans inquired about Israeli atomic progress. Ernst

Bergmann professed that Israel wanted to move at a faster pace in research, "as quick as possible" due to an absence of oil and their need for power. Bergmann informed the Americans that the Israelis were producing uranium from phosphates and small quantities of heavy water.

When the Ambassador queried Bergmann on whether Israel had considered the response from

386 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 53-54. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 45. Cohen shares that this request was the idea of De Shalit, namely, to ask for plutonium; however, he felt it was bold to ask the Americans directly. This contributed to the animosity between De Shalit and Bergmann, and probably, directly contributed to the IAEC resignations of 1958. Karpin writes that De Shalit warned Bergmann that any expert of Strauss's stature would know what was implied. 55. 387 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 54. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 52. 130

the Arabs to Israelis producing plutonium, he replied it was too small to be of concern and that no military implications were entailed in this research.388

The Israelis sought a second reactor from the United States, even though they had the proposed 5 mw (5,000 kw) reactor at Nahal Soreq. Bergmann brazenly informed the Americans that Israel "enjoyed a fairly advanced technological position in the atomic field and wished to skip over the experimental phase of operating a swimming pool type reactor."389 The Israelis would drop their request as the heavy water would be subject to American safeguards. This was not immediately flagged by American intelligence: indicative of problematic nuclear behaviour, unidentified by the United States.

In April of 1956, Bergmann, Dostrovsky, along with I. Pelah and Victor Salkind, labeled again as a "scientific counselor" from the Embassy of Israel, met with members of the

Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and discussed Bergmann's request in more detail -- Bergmann along with this group of Israelis were on a tour of United States

"atomic energy installations".390 During this meeting, Bergmann and his colleagues again made the case for a heavy water, 10 megawatt research reactor fuelled by natural uranium which could be produced by Israel. This represented the first overt sign missed by American intelligence -- a

Post-Mortem in 1961 cited this episode as a missed sign, and indicated a blatant admission that

388 Memorandum of Conversation. August 18th, 1955. Participants/Present: Prof Dr. Ernst David Bergmann, Prof Dr. Israel Dostrovsky, Dr. Amos De Shalit; Ambassador Patterson, Bernard G. Bechhoefer (meeting August 16th, 1955) 21.50 Country File: Israel b. Atomic Development Program 1955, Box 500. NA. 389 Memo for the Acting Secretary from S/AE Mr. Farley Department of State, Spec. Assistant to the Sec. Aug 16th, 1956. Subject: Request for Authorization to Enter Into Negotiation with Israel for Atomic Power Reactor Agreement for Cooperation. 21.50 Country File: Israel a. Agreements 1953-1960 and 62 Part 1 of 2. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 390 Memorandum of Conversation April 11th, 1956. Subject: Israel's Atomic Energy Program Participants: Bergmann, Mr. I. Pelah, Mr. I. Dostrovsky, Mr. Victor Salkind, Scientific Counselor, Embassy of Israel; AEC: Messrs. Avrill, Bengelsdorf, Thomas Janes and Kaufmann; State: Mr. Halvor O. Ekern S/AE. 21.50 Country File: Israel a. Agreements 1953-1960 and 62 Part 1 of 2. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 131

Bergmann was openly discussing plutonium research with the Americans and should not have been dismissed.391 This is even more alarming given that since the late 1940s, Bergmann had advocated openly for rocket defense. He was told to relent on his public comments by individuals believed to have fund-raised the Dimona project.392

On July 17th, 1956, Bergmann wrote to Strauss, asking to buy ten tons of heavy water from the AEC for Israel to be used in a 10-megawatt uranium heavy water experimental reactor.393 In January of 1957, scientific counselor and certain Lakam-agent Ephraim Lahav394 asked AEC and State officials why American safeguards would have to be applied on the heavy water sale and this "research", and questioned why they were inquiring about this reactor. The

Americans responded that given the current bilateral Atoms for Peace agreement, any heavy water sold needed safeguards. Furthermore, specific research reactors like this proposed reactor had "excessive plutonium production capabilities which necessitated the controls of the power type reactor". Lahav was assured these measures were not directed solely at Israel, rather a

391 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability," January 31st, 1961. 6. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor 1961 Part 1 of 2 RG59 Gen Records of the Dept of State Office to the Sec Special Ass to Sec of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space Gen Records to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. American intelligence retrospectively admitted "Although at the time, heavy water was associated with a peaceful-uses reactor program. In retrospect, it might have provided insight into the fact that Israel desired to embark on a major reactor construction program independent of peaceful uses safeguards." 392 Hersh, 26. He identifies the source to be American Democratic mega-donor Abraham Feinberg. 393 Memcon Dec 4th, 1956. Subject: Meeting with Mr. Lahav Concerning Implementation of Israeli Atomic Energy Program. Participants: Dr. Ephraim Lahav Scientific Counselor, Embassy of Israel; AEC-DIA Mr. S. Trewithick, Mr. RN Slawson, Mr A.H. Furnia Copies to G. G. Smith, N. Rogers. 21.50 Country File: Israel a. Agreements 1953- 1960 and 62 Part 1 of 2. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 394 While outside the scope of this study, the "proof" involved Lahav's continuous appearances throughout the 1960s at the NUMEC Apollo facility in Pennsylvania. Scholars have situated him at the facility along the timeline when tons of sensitive nuclear materials went missing. Ephraim Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (2001): 417. Kahana cites Lahav as a "frequent visitor" to the NUMEC company in Pennsylvania since the late 1950s. 132

universal program.395Lahav's concern could have further raised suspicion for the Americans present.

These requests occurred simultaneously with France agreeing to provide the actual weapons program at Dimona in September and October of 1956. The Israelis would drop their request for American heavy water in 1957, as they did not want American safeguards. Yet again,

American intelligence was not alarmed, if they were, it was not disseminated. The Israelis never again asked the AEC for any heavy water, and the administration never followed up on any further talk of the supposed 10-megawatt reactor.396

As many of these requests to the Americans were debated in July of 1956, Bergmann sent

Peres (the two masterminds of the deception) a letter suggesting that the Rehovot Atoms for

Peace peaceful research reactor should be built in step with the military and non-peaceful facility in the Negev: Dimona. This represented the official birth of the dual-path covert and overt programs -- simultaneous peaceful and hidden weapons programs.397 Bergmann felt it was necessary to get at least a small "research reactor" from the United States, Canada, or France.

The ultimate goal was a "larger more capable reactor".398 The initial agreement for a reactor

France promised to Israel in September 1956 was for a 10-megawatt reactor, not the 24- megawatt reactor (or even more powerful capability).399

Ernst Bergmann tested the limits of the United States and escaped undetected (until about

1960) by American intelligence with his overt demands and talk of plutonium research. The

395 Memcon Jan 25th, 1957. Subject: Implementation of Atomic Energy Program with Israel Participants: Dr. Ephraim Lahav, Scientific Counselor, Embassy of Israel, R.N. Slauson, AEC DIA, C.N. Janes. 21.50 Country File: Israel a. Agreements 1953-1960 and 62 Part 1 of 2. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Office of the Secretary Spec. Ass. to Sec. For Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 500. NA. 396 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 61. 397 Ibid, 51. 398 Richelson, 238. 399 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 81. 133

Americans were certainly distracted with bigger issues in the Middle East, such as Suez and

Nasser in the mid-1950s400; nonetheless, scientists such as Philip Farley within the State

Department had the capability to detect clear warning signs. While Bergmann tested the

Americans, Peres secretly solidified the weapons program. From 1956 onwards, it is indisputable the Israelis were deceiving the Americans: this maze of reactors and requested material marked the first official step.

Pertinently, in Israel's defense, in August-September, 1955, India agreed to a Canadian offer for help in the nuclear field. Under the Colombo Plan of the Commonwealth, richer member states could help poorer ones, and the Canadians never missing a chance to showcase their nuclear power reactors largely financed and built a heavy water natural uranium reactor with a 40 megawatt capacity, known as CIRUS (Canadian-Indian-United States). The agreement was formally signed on April 28th, 1956, and would set the precedent for the Israelis and French, when in December 1960, their collaboration, or some extent of it, was discovered.401 The reason both the French and Israelis chose to cite the India-Canada precedent involved the public portrayal of the agreement. Due to the fact that it was a bilateral agreement, which later involved the United States which sold India heavy water, it appeared as though the reactor, uranium, and heavy water were sold with no safeguards, international inspections, or conditions.402 The

Americans had agreed to provide tens of tons of heavy water to India under Atoms for Peace, yet had rejected the Israeli request for ten tons in 1956 and 1957-- ad hoc American policy emerged.

The easiest explanation is that states were treated differently – the United States battled the

400 Hersh, 21. Hersh makes this case as to why the Americans did not discover Dimona throughout the 1950s. 401 "Chronology: US Nuclear Non-Proliferation," 1945-1991. The Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) "Nuclear Nonproliferation Collection". https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/dnsa/docview/1679124686/8CFA766D5C5E453CPQ/8?accountid=9838 402 Hersh, 37. 134

Soviets for India's approval, and the Asian state was much more valuable to the Americans than

Israel. It was France which best illustrates this inconsistency.

In June of 1958, Eisenhower again amended the Atomic Energy Act to help programs that were close or progressing. This was a poorly veiled reference to Britain's developing thermonuclear program and though this was clearly intended for British-American sharing403, De

Gaulle hoped (to no avail) the Americans would help his country as well. Instead, France was treated with measured indifference as the United States neither helped nor deterred the French.

Gadi Heiman has suggested that this was the reason De Gaulle ordered all Israeli nuclear aid suspended in June of 1958 (though it would not end until two years later).404

By 1959, Saint-Gobain Nucleaire, the company which built the French Marcoule reactor in the early 1950s, was secretly constructing the underground reprocessing plant in Dimona. The construction on the above ground facilities had begun in 1957-1958 under Manes Pratt's supervision. In 1958, the construction of the Nahal Soreq facility was completed, and the peaceful Atoms for Peace swimming pool reactor would be operational by 1960.405

Further diluting the complex global diffusion of nuclear materials, a seemingly non- essential heavy water sale occurred between Norway, France, and the United Kingdom on

February 16th, 1956. It was agreed that Norway, the leading and only real major producer of heavy water outside of the United States, place safeguards on these sales cautioning the UK and

France they were prohibited from exporting this material outside of their countries.406 This apparently unrelated transaction would come to play a key role in the later official discovery of

Dimona by Western intelligence, as the British would be consulted on heavy water they had

403 "Chronology," DNSA. 404 Heiman: 110-111. 405 Richelson, 240-241. 406 "Chronology" DNSA. 135

bought from Norway which was re-sold to Israel. In the 1950s, Norway, with its abundance of heavy water production, was really the only option for covert proliferation aid outside the United

States. France and Israel both utilized the Scandinavian country to cool their reactors.407

Norway had sold France heavy water before the 1956 sale, powering the Marcoule reactor and Saclay in the 1950s -- both countries also had exchanged nuclear expertise.408 As in the case of France, the Israelis could not turn to the United States for heavy water without apparent detection, so that left the other leading producer, the Norwegians. Norsk Hydro in

Norway was a leading heavy water producer. Through labour channels (Israeli-Norwegian parties) and Bergmann (who knew some of the Norwegians), the Israelis put forth the request to

Norway in1956. In 1957-1958, the negotiations intensified. The Norwegians believed Israel was operating a 40-megawatt (the same as India's CIRUS) natural uranium reactor which would be used for "technical training" and to produce plutonium. In February of 1959, Norway agreed to sell Israel heavy water. An unintended consequence occurred for Israel and their covert deal was exposed. Some of the heavy water that Norway would sell had been the heavy water promised to

Britain in 1956. Britain had an excess and did not need the material; however, Norway had to inform them of the re-export of the material going to Israel based on the previous safeguards.

The British left the safeguards to a bilateral Norway-Israel deal with the Norwegians in charge.409 The Norwegians, to a lesser extent than the French, chose the path of plausible deniability concerning Israel. They established safeguards on the agreement making Israel commit to peaceful purposes and even included an inspection clause (from Norway themselves).

407 Phillip C. Bleek, "When Did (and Didn't) States Proliferate? Chronicling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Project on Managing the Atom, June, 2017, 3. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/When%20Did%20%28and%20Didn%27t%29%20S tates%20Proliferate%3F_1.pdf, 34. 408 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 33. 409 Ibid, 61-62. 136

The Norwegians agreed to sell Israel twenty tons of heavy water, despite Noratom, the

Norwegian atomic body, holding doubts about the Egyptian and American response to such an action.410 With this sale, Israel could produce a great deal of weapons grade plutonium easily.

In 1959, the British became somewhat of a guilty party to the Israeli covert program. In defense of the British government, the Foreign Office was against the sale, yet the Atomic

Energy Authority (Britain's nuclear entity) approved the deal.411 The British Atomic Energy

Authority believed it would be both "over-zealous" to put safeguards on the heavy water.

Pertinently, they did not feel the need to inform the Americans. The AEA described the resale of a total of twenty-five tons of heavy water, initially sold to Britain by Norway in 1956, in a pre- safeguard era.412 The decision not to inform the Americans suggests that the British understood the possible American anger which could be directed against them. The British also were the first

Western government that learned of the Franco-Israeli collaboration on some degree of nuclear project. Their suspicions were solidified early in 1959. Shimon Peres, in a seemingly flippant speech at the Weizmann Institute, spoke of the "secret weapon". Despite heavy press censorship afterwards, word of the speech leaked to the British in early 1959. The British Ambassador later confirmed from an Israeli source that Shimon Peres was interested in a nuclear weapon. With this knowledge, the British could have blown Israeli cover had they openly reported this to the

410 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 144-145. 411 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 145. 412 Minutes, Mr. D.E. H. Peirson Atomic Energy Authority to the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department Sept 22nd, 1958 received Sept 1958. Norwegian Heavy Water- Safeguards .The date of the document predates the final sale by Norway in February 1959, when the sale was finalized. This is handwritten and though it is hard to read, it appears to say this was suggested in saving the Norwegians from embarrassment or further questioning. In a Letter that Mr. Peirson wrote to a Mr. R. A. Thompson (AEA) (Sept 22, 1958), he argued that though heavy water fell under material that should be safeguarded, when Britain initially bought the heavy water in 1956, there were no safeguards, and that Norway take charge of this dynamic. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/israelbomb.pdf. The accompanying British Broadcasting Corporation story: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm highlights decades later, Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Security of Defense was shocked that the Americans were not told. 137

Americans in 1959.413 By 1958, Ben-Gurion had clearly adopted Peres’s and Bergmann's grand strategy of pursuing a dual path nuclear program -- the Nahal Soreq open peaceful program with the covert weapons project at Dimona.414

Collision Course: The United States, Israel, and Dimona

In order to properly understand how American intelligence missed Dimona, it is necessary to examine the murky and still secretive nature of what the Americans knew about

Dimona, and when. The official "discovery" of Dimona would come over the summer and through the waning months of 1960; however, from 1957 onwards, many clues emerged.

Ironically, for the abundance of criticism on American intelligence for their failure to detect Dimona, in 1957, State Department intelligence clearly articulated the reasoning for an

Israeli nuclear weapon. Ironically, segments of the American intelligence community understood

Israeli intentions, notably, their end goal. They had underestimated Israeli capabilities, notably, what the French would provide. As the United States Intelligence Board and the Central

Intelligence Agency were preparing their first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on nuclear proliferation in June of 1957, State intelligence included in their submission for the estimate (as

NIEs incorporate the whole intelligence community to try and create the most accurate picture on pertinent issues) a perfectly outlined case for Israel to become a nuclear state. 1957 was an appropriate time for the United States to finally address nuclear proliferation as the IAEA was coming to fruition. Additionally, many potential European countries emerged as proliferation threats. The impending French bomb appears to have been the impetus for these NIEs albeit

Sweden was also very close to producing a nuclear weapon.415 While this document suggested

413 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 150. 414 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 65. 415 "OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries- Likelihood and Consequences," May 31st, 1957 Enclosed with Letter from Helmut Sonnefeldt Division of Research for USSR and 138

only France and China were likely proliferators in the coming years, Israel received insightful study. The OIR (within State Intelligence) was very familiar with France's program, as the

French were not really keeping their activities secret. State Department intelligence realized that

France was producing weapons grade plutonium, yet was still debating whether or not to produce and test a weapon.416 In this contribution, Israel was included with India in the second to last section -- only Latin America received a lower priority. Herein lay one of the resounding conclusions of the American failure to detect Dimona: Israel was not a priority for American intelligence in the late-1950s, only the discovery of late-1960 changed this course. Israel, although not a formal ally was clearly in the Western orbit and perceived as a stable country in a region where Eisenhower prioritized stability and even-handedness, therefore, the East-West struggle took precedence. The ultimate concern of the State Department regarding Israel acquiring nuclear weapons was estimated to be the "shattering" impact on the Arab world and their capitals. Certainly, this would destroy the stability of the Middle East.417 There was an agreement between Israel and France on nuclear matters dating back several years; however, intelligence believed it was relegated to research and non-military purposes. Though the formalized Dimona agreement would not be signed for months, Israel and France had already entered a military agreement in the field of nuclear weapons -- there was no way the Americans would have known this. The most important conclusion established in this document was that although there was no sufficient evidence France provided "materials to Israel for weapons grade

Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, June 4th, 1957, Secret, Document 1. National Security Archive https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=2830701-Document-1. In the NSA's side notes, France, West Germany, Sweden, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Japan, China, India, Israel, and Brazil are discussed throughout this contribution. 416 “OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries- Likelihood and Consequences," May 31st, 1957. Section A, "Countries Likely to Produce Nuclear Weapons over Next Decade," 1. 417Ibid, Part D "Near and Middle East and South Asia," 6. This estimate is tinged with the inherent racism of the State Department at that time arguing that if Israel received a weapon, the Arabs may "reject the modern world due to a sense of weakness ....they could accept the superstitious irrational leadership of the Moslem Brotherhood or a similar organization." 7. 139

production," they argued: "It is not impossible that France might give such assistance to

418 Israel." The OIR predicted that an atomic weapon would make Israel feel more secure.

Insightfully, they understood Israel clearly had a reason for weapons, being surrounded by the

Arabs. They worried about Israel's potential to leverage or exploit the Arabs with nuclear blackmail. Their most prescient observation was: "If Israel had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons, it would do so. Israel came into existence by fighting and has perpetuated itself by fighting."419

On June 18th, NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries

Likelihood and Consequences was produced and delivered. Israel was not mentioned until well into the document, lumped in with countries like Australia and Communist China: China was viewed as likely to proliferate in the coming ten years. Conversely, Israel would need "major foreign assistance to produce even the first weapon within the next ten years."420 A further sentence about Israel's pursuit of nuclear weapons, “should they be able to, they would produce weapons”, echoes the verbatim text of the OIR's contribution.421 A precedent was established in this NIE in the American mindset: Israel was not close to a weapon, so it was not that important and assessed as a lower proliferation status.

The National Intelligence Estimates on nuclear proliferation would become an annual production after 1957, though the vast majority of annual NIEs on nuclear weapons are still classified, making it challenging for the historian to track the continuity and linear appraisal of

418 Ibid, 10. 419 OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries- Likelihood and Consequences" May 31st, 1957. Part D "Near and Middle East and South Asia," 10. 420 "National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences," June 18th, 1957. 4. Central Intelligence Agency https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf. The National Security Archive, also available at CIA Electronic Reading Room. 421 Ibid, 7. 140

Israel through the eyes of American intelligence.422 The 1958 Estimate is declassified and is one of the last un-redacted documents concerning Israel. In the July, 1958 Estimate, Israel was assigned a lesser priority, given the status "P" for potential long term nuclear power indicating that their capacity was "small".423 In this instance, Israel was again assessed to "almost certainly attempt to achieve modest nuclear capabilities if it could obtain fissionable material." There is one major difference with this latest Estimate: American intelligence believed "such material could come from a power reactor program initiated with the assistance of a foreign country."424 It is apparent that at this stage the Americans had some inkling this was a possibility and that assistance came from France. The exact manner in which this information was derived is still unknown, though various intelligence gathering measures were stepped up by 1958 and uncovered certain findings.

According to a 1961intelligence summary, this lead was not further explored. While these failures are evident, what occurred in 1958 is truly puzzling. One factor to keep in mind throughout this process was the effective diversion and deception tactic of Peres -- notably, that

Nahal Soreq, the Rehovot peaceful Atoms for Peace reactor, was under construction in 1958, concurrently with the secret Dimona facility. These actions added to the confusion the American intelligence community would later try and sort through regarding Dimona.425 Many American diplomats, intelligence agents, and government officials assumed it was the Nahal Soreq reactor being discussed, not a new Dimona reactor -- the intentional design of Peres and Bergmann.

422 Historian William Burr outlines the frustration in trying to access these estimates; he and his National Security Archive colleagues have fought and continue to lobby for their declassification. William Burr "National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957-1967," June 1st, 2005. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 155. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm. 423 "National Intelligence Estimate 100-2-58: Development of Nuclear Capabilities By Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences," July 1st, 1958. 7.https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001108555.pdf Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. 424 Ibid, 16. 425 Richelson, 247. 141

Since 1956, Eisenhower, an ardent analyst and supporter of intelligence, authorized U-2 spy planes to fly over several regions for a variety of reasons. During one of these flights over

Israel, intelligence discovered French cargo planes and fighters arriving in Israeli airfields (and likely, activity in the Negev desert). He then authorized more intense scrutiny, presumably at the end of 1957.426 By March 1958, the Department of State and Embassy in Israel heard rumours of work on a secretive project and wanted further analysis, although the Israelis denied knowledge of any project under construction south of Beersheba, the main town in the Negev desert. Dino

Brugioni, one of the top analysts in the Photo Intelligence Center/Photo Interpretation Center

(after August 1958) within the CIA, disclosed that the photo intelligence division was advised to look at a certain section of the desert south east of the town of Beersheba. The rationale provided was that they were looking for Israeli air-bombing field practice and antipersonnel weapons.427

What they found through aerial photographs was what clearly appeared to Brugioni and his colleagues to be a massive, newly-constructed facility with noticeable construction equipment,

"heavy transmission lines indicative of a nuclear installation" and an area which may have indicated a military link.428 Several individuals in the Agency, who were in the department when they analyzed secret Nazi missile sites in World War Two, positively identified this Israeli site as a nuclear installation. The giveaway included large sections of dirt stacked and concrete poured to hide something underground.429 The problem moving forward for the United States entailed positive confirmation. From 1958 to 1960, the Dimona facility would be photographed from both land and air. Yet, American intelligence could not conclusively discern this was a nuclear facility under construction.

426 Richelson, 248. 427 Brugioni, 268. 428 Ibid. 429 Richelson, 249. 142

Within this precarious situation, Brugioni's interpretation beginning in1958 was critical.

His boss, Arthur C. Lundahl, briefed Eisenhower in 1958 on the photographs. Brugioni shared his view repeatedly with scholars and in his own work in 2010. He does not indicate the date that

Lundahl briefed Eisenhower, and importantly, Brugioni was not in the room himself when this interaction occurred, but has remained consistent over the years on the specific details of what transpired. The first Eisenhower briefing likely occurred in the spring of 1958. Regarding the sharing of information on Israel, Brugioni admits it was very sensitive, even though he knew

"high level Israelis were lying" -- in late 1958, he and the CIA heard rumours. He prepared a briefing board showcasing the Beersheba (Dimona) photographs, and under the guidance of

Lundahl, suggested it was a nuclear installation.430 First Brugioni briefed Allen Dulles with the picture board; Dulles informed Brugioni he should see the intelligence reports on Israel, indicating Dulles was not surprised. Brugioni details an interesting chain of events that followed: the CIA rejected his access to these reports even though he obtained security clearance. He would later admit that he personally believed the CIA had been informed Dimona's development by Jewish American scientists familiar either with the intricacies or rumours of nuclear activities in Israel. He named Edward Teller as one such individual. He posited that his denial of access was to protect these individuals from embarrassment.431 This is yet another example of an evidence problem for the historian and American intelligence at the time: circumstantial or rumoured evidence cannot be positively proved. No one has conclusively proven that

Oppenheimer helped the Israeli nuclear program, although he visited Israel and talked to Ben-

430 Hersh, 47-53. Brugioni believed that if you found something on Israel, it was better to move it along the chain, saying, "you'd better be careful especially if you've got a career." 53. Obviously, this gets into problematic territory; however, it was clear that the Israelis held sway with the CIA. 47-53. 431 Brugioni, 272. 143

Gurion.432 What followed next is truly puzzling, and the course of American reaction suggests much information may be hidden.

Lundahl briefed Eisenhower on the board and pictures -- Cohen believes this was early

1958; based on Brugioni's latest work, it appears more likely to have been sometime later in

1958, likely spring. According to Lundahl, Eisenhower, presented with the findings and given the recommendation that this was probably a nuclear site, displayed no reaction whatsoever.

President Eisenhower did not order a follow-up meeting or briefing but requested further intelligence and photos on the site.433Brugioni found it very odd that the "usually effusive

Eisenhower" had no discernible reaction. He confirmed that several officials of the Agency's

Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) also saw this board.434 Eisenhower, in a briefing in 1960, again delivered by Lundahl when Allen Dulles was present, would pass over and neglect the photo board altogether. 435 Brugioni and Lundahl later came to believe that Eisenhower most likely already knew of this project -- presumably told by the financiers of the project: private

American citizens who were wealthy Jews. 436 Lastly, from 1958 into 1960, Brugioni and

Lundahl became convinced that Israel was working towards a bomb. Given Dulles' prior comments to Brugioni, it appears that the CIA was highly suspicious as well. Dino Brugioni wrote that the Interpretation Center was given the impression to prepare the briefing boards, yet

"keep our mouths shut about any collateral information we learned about the installation."437 By the end of 1959, it was evident to these analysts that the Israelis were aware the Americans knew

432 Hersh, 25. 433 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 83. 434 Brugioni, 272 435 Ibid, 273. The author said Eisenhower pushed it aside. 436 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 83 See footnotes to this page. Brugioni later asserted that he believed Eisenhower knew of the project perhaps from the start, and wanted the Israelis to have the bomb to deter the Arabs -- likely as a warning to the Soviets in the region. Brugioni, 273. This is dubious at best, though it is telling that those directly involved held this belief. 437 Brugioni, 273. 144

of or suspected their secret program and that they would act accordingly. Hersh asserted that the photo intelligence tandem believed Eisenhower was purposely avoiding the issue and findings.438

There are two plausible explanations for Eisenhower's stoic silence and apparent lack of reaction to these presentations. Still there is no conclusive evidence to explain why the President did not act at this point. These interpretations are speculative and open-ended. Eisenhower knew or was confident about the Israeli program and dismissed any further discussion on the issue.

This was unlikely, given his actions after the official discovery of Dimona in 1960. The second explanation posits that Eisenhower was shocked at what he saw. He realized this was a nuclear weapons program, but for unknown reasons, mainly that Israel did not constitute a major

American problem, merely brushed the issue aside. He could wait until such time as this constituted an American problem further down the line. One finding is clear, as Brugioni reported, whatever the reasoning, his behaviour appeared inconsistent with his preference for intelligence.

To decipher the intricate complexity of Dimona within American-Israeli relations, another element warrants scrutiny: the financiers, a small group of American Jews, who directly tied the two nations and project together. The individual secret members or the total number of those who financed the Dimona project have never been conclusively confirmed. It is apparent through Ben-Gurion's continued efforts to suppress Dimona within Israel that Israel did not openly use American governmental aid or direct contributions from the Eisenhower

Administration (from aid or loans) to finance Dimona. Ben-Gurion was hyper-vigilant in ensuring that no plutonium (negligible) from Soreq or any nuclear materials with American

438 Hersh, 55-58. Lundahl noted that Eisenhower never took any notes during the presentation which was odd for the thorough former general. 53. Though Hersh admitted much of the Ben-Gurion Eisenhower dealings were kept between them with most Americans not privy to discussions, 55. 145

governmental help were used in Dimona.439 This demonstrates the care Ben-Gurion took with the project, and indicates the financing for this expensive project had to come from other sources.

This program had to be financed so it would be hidden from Israeli accountants (though Eshkol knew) and impossible for the Americans to trace. Shimon Peres revealed the cost of Dimona, according to Israeli estimates (in 1960) was around 80 million dollars -- 40 million of this sum was covered by private donors outside of Israel.440 This begs the question, where did the Israelis derive the other 40 million? One possibility was reparations from the government of West

Germany. Ben-Gurion and Peres had negotiated reparation payments to Israel from the Federal

Republic of Germany. The Israelis garnered arms, trade, and annual payments of 126 million.

This amount, valued in the 1950s, constituted a fortune, even though most came in the form of

German products.441 Throughout the 1950s, the Israelis acquired what today would be billions through these payments. These funds would have paid for this apparent discrepancy if diverted to

Dimona construction. Years later, when questioned by the Americans, the French even admitted that they believed the money for Dimona, "came from you", meaning the United States.442 Even the French, the external overseers of the project, were unaware of the Israeli financial source.

The actual total cost of Dimona's creation is unknown. Exactly where the Israelis acquired the rest of the money also remains unknown. The United States estimated in December 1960 that the

439 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 55, 128. 440 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams, 87. 441 Central Intelligence Agency, "Special Report: West German Policy toward Israel and Egypt, " June 19th, 1964, 2. These reparations continued from 1952-1964. CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A004500040004-7.pdf 442 Avner Cohen and William Burr (eds.), "The U.S. Discovery of Israel's Secret Nuclear Project," April 15th, 2015. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/. The specific document was telegrammed from Paris in 1960. Department of State Telegram Paris to Secretary of State December 16th, 1960. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/docs/doc%2011.pdf. 146

Israelis were grossly under-selling the cost of Dimona, placing the figure at a more realistic 100-

200 million.443

Seymour Hersh was the first to report on the "Committee of Thirty", indicating the thirty wealthy Jews from around the world who financed Dimona. While this primarily occurred in

1960, it appears to have been initiated in 1958.444 This group, whose full names and participation have never been released, was vital to the project. It quickly becomes apparent why the full list of names has never been given: firstly, Israel is still supremely secretive regarding every aspect of Dimona; secondly, the list of those known to have participated is a collection of the extremely wealthy. It is clear that those contributing knew what the project involved, as it was labeled, a

"special weapons" program.445 It was Franklin Roosevelt's former Secretary of Treasury, Henry

Morgenthau Jr., who convened a meeting of the group. The United Jewish Appeal appears to have been directly involved. Among the known members who contributed to Dimona are: members of both the British and French Rothschild families, specifically, Baron Edmund de

Rothschild, and Canadian gold mine tycoon, Samuel Zacks, as well as Isaac Wolfson, and

Samuel Bronfman, a prominent wealthy Canadian Jew, who helped Peres procure prior arms.446In typical Israeli journalistic tradition, even when the participation of many individuals was known, it was kept secret until their death. This is true for Dimona financier and the creator of Perrier water, French Jewish millionaire, Gustave Leven.447 Interestingly, the list of those who

443 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 128. Karpin explains that Dimona fell under "Budget B" in the Defense Ministry, suggesting the project was a fully autonomous wing of government. 444 Hersh, 66. Both Cohen and Karpin date 1958 as the start of the fundraising drive with Ben-Gurion and Peres participating. Cohen states 1958 as the initial fundraising meeting, Cohen Israel and the Bomb, 69, while Karpin gives the exact date of October 21st, 1958 for the fundraising discussion. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 135. 445 Hersh, 66. 446 Ibid. Karpin 136-137. This is one of the strengths of Karpin's journalistic inquiry -- he sheds invaluable light on how Dimona was financed. 447 Shuki Sadeh, "How Foreign Donors Reshaped Israel: A Who's Who," Haaretz, March 17th, 2013. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-how-foreign-donors-reshaped-israel-1.5234429; Mattson, 33 147

financed and aided the Israeli nuclear weapons program in the 1960s reads like a secret spy novel. The Rothschilds, Leven, and the billionaire Hollywood producer, Arnon Milchan, played a vital role in funding, procuring, or facilitating the Dimona project.448 Other contributors remained anonymous; however, the United States followed Israeli press coverage of a "quiet millionaire" and his family, who survived the Holocaust and were of Polish origin. Vague but certain references to a "specific project not yet undertaken by Israel" indicated Dimona financing.449 In 1958, Abraham Feinberg initiated and facilitated the meeting of American

Jewish financiers with Ben-Gurion and Peres450 -- this further complicates the American political dynamic and the Dimona project. Abe Feinberg would be labeled in today's parlance, a

Democratic Party mega-donor. Since the 1940s, he had been actively involved in philanthropy and helping Jewish refugees in Palestine. Feinberg played two crucial roles in the project: he and

Peres raised the money (about 250 million today, equivalent to 40 million in 1960), and he ensured that the secrecy on the American donors remain, which it has to this day -- no Israeli official has even publicly acknowledged Feinberg's role.451 His central role and evident understanding of what was to be financed raises interesting problems for this study: Feinberg went on to be a major financier of the Kennedy Presidency. He occasionally acted as a direct intermediary between Israel and the United States under Kennedy. It is problematic that one of

448 On Arnon Milchan, the current Hollywood producer, former Israeli arms dealer and Lakam collaborator, see Ofer Aderet, "Israel's 'Man of Shadows' Who Tricked U.S. Nuclear Inspectors, Dies at 95," Haaretz, August 30, 2018. Julian Borger, "The Truth about Israel's Secret Nuclear Arsenal," The Guardian, January 15th, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/truth-israels-secret-nuclear-arsenal. 449 Translation of Newspaper Articles on Atomic Energy Development in Israel, March 2nd, 1961. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2 RG59 General Records of the Dept of State Office of the Secretary Special Ass. to Sec. of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space General Records to Atomic Energy Matters 1948- 1962, Box 501. NA. The man and his family in question visited Israel in 1958 -- the time of this financing drive, and continued this contribution through 1961. There are references that this individual perhaps funded the new road to the Dimona facility. The start of the article cites "Jewish Family from Western Hemisphere contributed Money to Negev reactor". 450 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 69. 451 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 137. 148

Kennedy's major financial backers and liaisons with Israel was directly involved in financing the project. Perhaps, Kennedy never knew of this, or if he did, he never publicly recognized it -- the latter is eminently more probable.452 Feinberg's participation highlights the extent of American-

Israeli collaboration in the covert sphere -- this excluded official government funding.

From 1958 onwards, many signals were missed by the Americans. In February 1958, the

Jerusalem Post reported that French former Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Francois Benard, declared that France and Israel were indeed party to a nuclear agreement, whereby Israel received uranium (all its uranium needs) in return for the important discoveries Israeli scientists made in the field of nuclear research. Ernst Bergmann vehemently denied this existed, citing only an agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As the Israelis received nuclear material needs from the United States under Atoms for Peace, he conveyed there would be no need for French material. He also strongly denounced a Sunday Observer piece on April 6th, claiming France was close to a nuclear weapon, and when achieved France and Israel would exert pressure on the Arabs. Noteworthy was Bergmann's April admission that Israel had already conclusively decided to build a nuclear power reactor, though this would take at a minimum two- and-a-half years to construct. Furthermore, it would require at a minimum five additional years to be an economically feasible project.453 Here is an Israeli slip-up that could have alerted

American intelligence on the actual provisions of the secret agreement; however, American intelligence was still trying to decipher if there was a formalized agreement with military implications. In a summation of the American Intelligence Community's (IC) intelligence failings (in 1961), a post-mortem identified this incident as one of the indicators which could

452 In depth, archival research could not uncover documents proving any knowledge Kennedy had about Feinberg's role. 453 Foreign Service Dispatch Amembassy Tel Aviv to The Department of State April 16th, 1958. Subject: Israeli Exchanges with Other Countries Relating to Atomic Energy. The National Security Archive https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/docs/doc%201B.pdf 149

have alerted atomic intelligence to Israeli intentions earlier.454 Bergmann's quick denial likely ended any speculation on the matter. American intelligence believed that Bergmann was referring to the Atoms for Peace reactor, not another reactor being covertly built. Due to this collection error, Bergmann's plan of intentional confusion removed American suspicion.455

In 1959, the Americans increased their efforts to detect Israeli advancements in the nuclear field. In May, the British having heard of Peres's speech and through their follow-up on

Israeli weapons interest with the Head of the Weizmann Institute informed the Americans about the leaked information. Aluf Dan Tolkowsky, a high ranking official within the Israeli Defense

Ministry, had resigned on April 26th. What was pertinent for the United States was the reason -- according to the British, he resigned over his dissenting opinion and vehement opposition to

Shimon Peres, the man advocating for a nuclear weapon within the Defense Ministry.

Tolkowsky was vocally opposed to this idea; he felt this would compel the Soviets to give the

Egyptians nuclear weapons. The Americans also learned of Peres' heavily censored speech from the Weizmann Institute in February (some sources cite January) when he and the IDF outlined a specific need for nuclear weapons. The Americans were unable to confirm if this was indeed the reason that Tolkowsky resigned.456 Yet again, based on a failure to authenticate Tolkowsky's reasoning, no further intelligence was ordered and no firm measures were pursued.457

Though the British chose not to inform their American counterparts of the heavy water sale, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed an American AEC official about the secret Israeli

454 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60,” January 31st, 1961. 1-2, Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor 1961 Part 1 of 2 RG59 Gen Records of the Dept of State Office to the Sec Special Ass to Sec of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space Gen Records to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 455 Ibid,10. 456 Naval Message From ALUSNA Tel Aviv to CNO May 25, 1959 Limited Distribution 21.50 Country File: Israel d. General 1953-1961, Part 2 of 2 RG59 Gen Records Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 457 Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", January 31st, 1961, 11. Box 501. NA. 150

heavy water deal on June 5th, 1959. The Norwegians revealed that their agreement "included safeguards and inspection" which conformed to IAEA and American procedures. Unfortunately, the Americans were not provided the quantity or reasoning for which the Israelis wanted the heavy water. The State Department through correspondence with the American Embassy in

Norway learned of the deal in July; however, for unknown reasons, agencies within the intelligence community did not see this information until December 13th, 1960. The intelligence community later admonished that had the Americans known of Israel's second reactor (the actual destination of the heavy water), they could have discovered the Israeli program a year earlier.458

By the end of 1959, the Americans heard more Israeli lies concerning the program. The constant problem of timing and the processing of information would again plague governmental departments. In October, on a seemingly harmless trip over the Negev, Jack Hagerty of the State

Department spotted a large construction project below. He asked his Israeli handler what was being built. Preminger (his liaison) quickly replied, "why, that's a military installation; ask your military attaché to inquire to the IDF."459 Murat M. Williams, then Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, wrote that Preminger informed him of this conversation in

December, 1960, when a crisis over Dimona was developing. Hagerty had apparently forgotten about the exchange. In early 1961, Williams indicated this had been the most truthful answer any

458 Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", January 31st, 1961, 2, 11. Box 501. NA. Avner Cohen and William Burr, eds. "The U.S. Discovery of Israel's Secret Nuclear Project," April 15th, 2015. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510 The National Security Archive https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/. The authors, who have become the most reliable experts on this matter, go into great detail and have uncovered (gotten NARA to declassify) many new documents. Included is the June 9th explanation that an AEC official received from Olaf Solli in the Foreign Ministry (Norway), who explained that the Norwegians put safeguards on the heavy water, and if the Israelis refused inspection, the agreement could be terminated. Doc 2A Memcon Norwegian Foreign Ministry June 5th, 1959. Though the amount or purpose was never exposed, the Norwegians valued secrecy as they had commercial relations with Egypt. 459 Memo from Murat M. Williams to NE William E. Hamilton (handwritten "Some Israeli Evaluations") Subject: A Catalogue of Replies Regarding the Reactor January 16th, 1961. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 151

American had received to that point on the nature of Dimona.460 This inability to accurately record and assess information in a timely manner damaged the intelligence collection, generation, and dissemination of helpful reports.

At the end of 1959, the American intelligence community monitored an impending

French nuclear test. Their goal was to see if any Israelis would attend the French test slated for early 1960.461 By 1958, the father of France's nuclear commission, Charles De Gaulle, returned to serve as President of the Fifth Republic. He now controlled the nuclear decisions, and was eager to break away from the Israelis. Immediately, as De Gaulle learned of the Franco-Israeli nuclear agreement, he ordered all collaboration between France and Israel to end. In May, 1958,

Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville told Israel that relations had been severed.462 Due to a variety of factors -- bureaucratic non-communication, incompetence, and committed members of the French nuclear community to Israel's program -- the cooperation continued unimpeded until June of 1960. De Gaulle desired American nuclear material and collaboration from Eisenhower. He understood that the Americans would not appreciate this covert Israeli collaboration and apparent contravening of the proliferation regime they were trying to develop.463 This French refusal to follow De Gaulle's orders was crucial in starting the chemical plant in 1959. When De Gaulle realized in June of 1960 his orders had not been followed, he was furious and ordered an immediate end to any Israeli nuclear participation. On May 12th, Couve

460 Memo from Murat M. Williams to NE William E. Hamilton (hand written "Some Israeli Evaluations") Subject: A Catalogue of Replies Regarding the Reactor January 16th, 1961. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962 Box 501. NARA Murat Williams shared his version of accounts confirming that he was informed of the textile plant/industry. Williams, evidencing his humour, shared his appreciation of the Washington Post's comedic assessment of "the smashing tailors of Be'er Sheva" (original spelling). Interview with Ambassador Murat Williams, Dec 5th, 1990. Library of Congress, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2010/2010wil03/2010wil03.pdf. 43 461 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," Jan 31st, 1961, 7. Box 501. NA 462 Ziv: 233. 463 Heiman: 105, 111. Hersh also argues that De Gaulle was worried about Egypt getting the bomb, feeling France would have been partially responsible, 69. 152

de Murville gave the Israeli Embassy an ultimatum: the Israelis would need to publicize Dimona to the world; publicly declare the intention of the reactor was solely for peaceful purposes; and submit the facility to inspections from an international monitoring body (likely the IAEA).

Unless these conditions were met, all French participation and essential nuclear materials would be suspended.464 What followed was perhaps the strongest achievement of Shimon Peres's diplomacy with France in ensuring the completion of the nuclear project. Through June and the summer of 1960, as speculation grew on the Dimona program, Peres and Ben-Gurion met with

French officials. Peres used his improvisational skills to list the consequences should the French suspend this aid.465 Both Ben-Gurion and Peres lied to the French, promising they would never produce a bomb and urged France to reconsider this devastating decision.466

Peres bluffed Couve de Murville that the French termination of this agreement was unlawful -- should the Arabs find out, French companies would be subject to boycott. Peres’s tactic was successful and the agreement passed between Saint-Gobain-Nucleaire and the IAEC, instead of "official" French government participation.467 Peres also waited until November to answer Maurice Couve de Murville's pointed ultimatum. Shimon Peres admitted that Israel would publicly declare the peaceful intent of the program and on November 1st. The Israelis promised they would present the reactor as part of a larger scientific program involving research and a university in the Negev. Still, no international inspections would be allowed, as other countries, namely Egypt, were not subject to this violation of their sovereignty. Peres bought much needed time for the Israelis to build their nuclear facilities with his three-month delay in a

464 Heiman: 114. 465 Ziv: 236. 466 Heiman: 116. 467 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams, 97. 153

response. By December of 1960, as Israel was working on their official statement to announce

Dimona, the United States discovered the program and a diplomatic frenzy ensued.468

On February 13th, 1960, under the leadership of Charles De Gaulle, France officially joined the nuclear club with a bomb test at Reggane in Algeria. A debate has continually raged within the historiography whether or not Israeli observers (scientists) were present at this test.469

Unfortunately, for American intelligence, yet again they could not attain irrefutable proof that

Israelis were present. This not only represented a failed intelligence gathering mission, more damaging, the information was not shared with other agencies until January 12th, 1961.470 1960 began with an unproductive start for American intelligence. Seemingly, since 1956-1957, the

Israeli deception had worked, and Dimona progressed, undetected. The Israelis had brilliantly outmaneuvered American intelligence during this critical stage.

Until 1960, the Israelis successfully developed Dimona without American detection.

Later in the year, increased intelligence collection led to Dimona's discovery. This created a diplomatic crisis, alarmed American intelligence, and formed a problematic situation for the incumbent President Kennedy. The American discovery and subsequent fallout from Dimona's secret development will be examined in the next chapter.

468 Heiman: 117. 469 Hersh argues that the CIA knew for a fact that Israelis were present. 63. Reid and Stillman also agree. 79. According to the documents of the intelligence community, this could not be confirmed. Lastly, using sources on the Israeli side this time, journalist Michael Karpin strongly contends that Israelis were in fact present at the Reggane test site. Karpin, evidently familiar with the CIA Post-Mortem, argued that though the CIA could not verify their presence, two Israelis were present (at least two). The Bomb in the Basement, 154. 470 "Post-Mortem of SNIE 100-8-60" January 31st, 1961, 11. Box 501, NA. 154

Chapter Five: The American Discovery of, and Reaction to, Dimona

By the summer and fall of 1960, the Americans knew the Israelis had exploited Atoms for Peace and avoided American intelligence detection efforts. The United States realized they had an Israeli nuclear problem. While they did not know the Israelis were building a nuclear weapons program, they were highly suspicious. In November and December with help from many sources, the Americans confirmed the existence of the Dimona nuclear reactor. This chapter examines the Americans’ failure to detect earlier the development of Dimona, the continued Israeli efforts to downplay any problem upon discovery, and the resulting diplomatic crisis. At Kennedy's inauguration, he took over a crisis-managing response to Dimona, largely established by the outgoing Secretary of State, Christian Herter. From December 1960 to early

January, 1961, American officials seethed with anger over the Dimona deception. While publicly the administrations largely dismissed the threat of Israeli nuclear weapons, privately, the State

Department, AEC (within State), CIA, and Embassy in Israel administered consistent and unrelenting diplomatic pressure to uncover Israel's nuclear intentions. Overall, the Israelis outmaneuvered the United States. This chapter chronicles the united and extensive power of

American monitoring capabilities on Dimona, once it was uncovered. The Israelis narrowly weathered this American response, and as Kennedy took over, they tried to assure the new leader of their false peaceful intent. It was too late for Eisenhower to do anything conclusive to overturn their program; however, his administration ensured that Kennedy would not make the outgoing

President's mistakes by monitoring Israel from the outset. Official timelines indicate that the

Americans started to intensify their speculation on a potential covert French-Israeli nuclear

155

program on June 14th, 1960. American personnel heard rumours the French were aiding the

Israelis in the Negev desert on a nuclear program.471

The last mention from the United States Intelligence Board of any pertinent information before the summer of 1960 was received in early-1960, but "deemed insufficient by OSI/CIA analysts for a sound judgment, and was discounted."472 Clues emerged in 1960 with sporadic exchanges between Israelis and Americans albeit the larger issue was not understood. A member of the Israeli Ministry of Finance (Treasury), Addy Cohen, replied to American Air Attaches during a helicopter ride in May of 1960 when asked, what was being built below, "why, that's a textile plant."473 The Americans had to deal with a number of replies during the year when they inquired about the facility: "a textile mill” and "an arid zone research laboratory" were some of the Israeli responses.474 In September of 1960, the Assistant Air Attaché and an American service officer asked the Israeli Foreign Liaison Officer what exactly was going on in the Negev.

This time the Israelis announced that a metallurgical research installation was under development. This was a smart reply, as the Americans discovered such a facility did exist nearby.475 Kitan Textiles was operating in the town of Dimona, so the textile argument was a viable excuse.476Addy Cohen provided the textile justification to American Ambassador Ogden

Reid in September, 1960. Cohen learned of the project as a senior Treasury official in meetings with Minister of the Treasury, Levi Eshkol. Addy Cohen said: "that was our response at the

471 “History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities,” POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 472 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," 8. January 31st, 1961. Gen Records of the Dept of State Office to the Sec Special Ass to Sec of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space, Box 501. NA. 473 "Subject: A Catalogue of replies regarding the Reactor," Jan 16th, 1961 Williams to Hamilton. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2 RG59 1948-1962 Atomic Energy, Box 501. NA. 474 Information Report CIA Country Israel Subject: Atomic Reactor Site Near Beersheba Date of Info Oct 1960, Israel, Tel Aviv, Date of Distribution February 17th, 1961. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2, RG59 1948-1962 Atomic Energy, Box 501. NA. 475 "Subject: A Catalogue of Replies Regarding the Reactor, " Jan 16th, 1961, Gen Records of the Dept of State Office to the Sec Special Ass to Sec of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space, Box 501. NA. 476 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 157. 156

time", though he knew Israel had been "misbehaving".477 Cohen admitted candidly on December

23rd to members of various American agencies the Dimona project was intended for eventual weapons development as a deterrent against Israel's Arab enemies.478 This quick thinking pragmatism indicates the role played by individuals in lower levels, such as Cohen, in maintaining Israeli deception and secrecy.

American Naval Attache Captain Kitteridge heard rumours in August about a nuclear facility in the Negev southwest of Beersheba and wanted to investigate. He asked the Israelis for permission to see the facility where the reactor was being built; he knew exactly where this was; however, he was told no reactor facility existed.479 After Kitteridge's assessment, American intelligence personnel tried to photograph the Dimona facility from the ground with highly successful results. Since about 1959, the Israelis were aware of potential monitoring, and planted trees beside the massive fence encircling the site to block the facility from roadside visibility.480

This Israeli reaction was necessary. Perhaps as early as 1959 and continuing throughout the

1960s, American intelligence-gathering missions from various parties (Naval and air attaches, embassy members, and the CIA) conducted "picnics". American personnel in Israel would take their families or significant others for a picnic in the Negev with a covert purpose to take photos along with the use of detection technology to understand the true nature of the Dimona facility,

477 Avner Cohen and William Burr, eds., "The U.S. Discovery of Israel's Secret Nuclear Project," April 15, 2015. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/. In December of 1960, Addy Cohen would report of the Israelis misbehaving. 478 Telegram: Embassy Tel Aviv to the State Department Dec 23rd, 1960. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/docs/doc%2015.pdf. Also, see Cohen and Avner "The US Discovery of Israel's Nuclear Project." 479 "Subject: A Catalogue of Replies Regarding the Reactor," Jan 16th, 1961. Box 501. NA. 480 Richelson, 250. The author argues this was significantly ramped up in the fall of 1960. Brugioni, 273. Brugioni also stated this was an intentional Israel effort, as Israeli personnel were aware they were being monitored by the Americans. 157

and later discern the capabilities of the project.481 The Central Intelligence Agency would later recount that in mid-1960 (likely, June), a "high French official stated the reactor was a result of a very secret agreement negotiated shortly after Suez." The French raised the Canada-India agreement to justify the collaboration. The Agency surmised this was "practically a Marcoule plant" with the French supplying the Israelis the raw material needed.482

In August, an American technician working on the Atoms for Peace facility learned of

French construction on a reported 60 megawatt reactor at Beersheba, and concluded the French

Government knew of this work.483 The first clear articulation of the Embassy and State

Department's efforts to try and make sense of the progression of the Israeli program came in mid-August, 1960. The Embassy interviewed Bergmann and noted his statements dating back throughout the 1950s to try and trace a logical case on the progress of Israel's nuclear efforts.

Since the late 1940s, Bergmann had admitted his desire for producing heavy water and uranium in Israel. Furthermore, embassy officials surmised that Israel was utilizing more than their reported amounts of enriched uranium. The Israelis denied working with the French or any other power for a nuclear program, yet it was believed Israel was pursuing this research for "security reasons". The Americans called for a follow-up effort to discern any information on French

481 Ronen Bergman, "NSA Spying on Israel: This is How you Treat your Enemies," Yedioth Ahronoth, Jan 3rd, 2016, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4747949,00.html. One of the preeminent Israeli intelligence experts, Bergman, stated that in the mid-1960s, the American National Security Agency were running signals intelligence trying to uncover the Dimona truth. Prior to the mid-1960s, members affiliated with the US embassy undertook these missions. Richelson also describes the "picnics", uncovering that CIA officials brought special automatic cameras in 1960, 250. 482 "Analysis of the Discrepancies in Information on the Israeli Reactor Complex near Beersheba Draft Feb 20th 1961 CIA/NED/Cooney for Possible Dissemination to Intelligence Community Secret/NOFORN," Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2, RG59 Nuclear Energy, 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 483 Foreign Service Dispatch from Amembassy Tel Aviv August 2nd, 1960. Central Decimal File 1960-1963. Box 2803. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060. NA. 158

collaboration with Israel. Henceforth, the Americans would pursue all avenues to decipher what was happening in the Negev.484

In August, 1960, multiple strong indicators of Israel's program were ignored, disregarded, or not properly disseminated to the pertinent agencies. The Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee met on August 25th to discuss the August 2nd admission of the American technician regarding

French aid in Beersheba. The Committee requested any additional information be brought forward. Unfortunately, no evidence was produced on France's role and no new information was reported. The CIA and OSI (Office of Scientific Intelligence) continued to collect information and produce reports into October. More damaging was the lack of analysis of a report recounted by a secretary within the Embassy. On August 19th, 1960, she informed her supervisor at the

Department of State that she and her Israeli boyfriend had taken a trip to the Negev months before. He told her -- this was substantiated by French nationals she met -- that they (France) were working on the construction of a reactor. Her boyfriend informed her that this was a secret project. Due to the timing of the information, after the August 2nd admission of the technician, the CIA did not formally report the encounter. It was informally discussed at a JAEIC meeting on January 12th, 1961 -- valuable time had already been lost which could have contributed to the

American response.485 Crucial pieces of evidence were collected, yet not shared or disseminated with the appropriate agencies, clear indications of a bureaucratic, institutional failure by the

American agencies. The only bright spot for American intelligence is that by September, the

Americans were likely aware of the project. It is relatively clear that American intelligence knew the French were deeply involved with the Israelis, or at least, that the Israelis had an advanced

484 Foreign Service Dispatch August 16th, 1960. Amembassy Tel Aviv Subject: Israel's Uranium Potential" Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060. Bergmann was interviewed in August by the Embassy; however, he denied any program was undertaken with French aid. The American suspicion at this point was high on Israel. NA. 485 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," 11-12. Box 501. NA. 159

program. The proof for this assertion is reflected in CIA documents. The annual NIE on 1959 remains classified, hence, it is impossible to discern the extent of American evidence on Israel.

The 1960 Estimate is accessible and indicates a new approach of the United States redacting intelligence on the Israeli program.486 It was apparent since the 1958-estimates that Israel was listed as a potential proliferator. In the 1960-document, all evidence of Israel is redacted both in terms of individual country references and complete sections on Israeli proliferation are completely blocked.487 On further analysis, it is highly plausible a specific source is being protected, or smoking gun like omission is hidden from the record. This is best evidenced by the

Department of State's January 30th, 1961-summary of Israel's Atomic Activities -- Addy Cohen's textile excuse is included, however, on September 19th, the section is completely redacted.488 By

September of 1960, given the NIE and the redactions, the Americans clearly discovered some sort of proof of Dimona's purpose. After September, 1960, the Americans intensified their efforts to uncover the truth of Dimona. This was enacted through their Embassy, and increased intelligence collection.489 The British would also pose a problem for the Israelis.

By the summer of 1960, the British had only allowed twenty tons of the heavy water from their and Norway's deal with Israel to pass to Israel. They determined Israel's desires were likely not peaceful, and withheld the last five tons.490 The British collaborated with American intelligence in October and November, supplying the Americans with photographs taken from the ground on November 8th. They believed it was more than likely a nuclear reactor was under construction. The JAEIC rushed to get the proper photo-interpretation from the CIA after a

486Burr, "National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem the First Ten Years, 1957-1967," NSA. 487 "National Intelligence Estimate 100-4-60: Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries," Sept 20th, 1960. 3, 7, 9, 12. National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-5.pdf. 488 "History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities," POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 489 Ibid. 490 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 145. 160

meeting on November 21st, and they wanted conclusions. The Assistant American Air Attache in Israel was advised to take more photos of the installation (as he had since July). On November

16th, he obtained long range pictures sent to the CIA on December 5th, and made available to the

JAEIC albeit wider dissemination did not occur until the end of December (December 27th).491

The French joined the Israelis in outwardly lying to American diplomats on November

22nd. A member of the French CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) informed members of the

American Embassy in Paris that they "flatly rejected" having anything to do with a nuclear power reactor by Beersheba. The individual defended this justification explaining that any

French company working on such a reactor would need prior permission from the government or

CEA, and no request had been granted. The French scientist indicated that the Franco-Israeli agreement did not apply to nuclear power reactors and that the agreement was not a bilateral agreement but rather an IAEC-CEA agreement; it was classified and private.492 Unfortunately, this French CEA member basically outlined the extensive involvement needed for French collaboration. This would later be a damning admission as the Americans came to realize the extent of French governmental involvement.

The final piece of evidence leading to the discovery of Dimona by the United States came through a visit by American engineer and esteemed nuclear expert, Dr. Henry Gomberg, Head of the University of Michigan's Phoenix Project.493 He had been initially invited by the Israeli

Institute of Technology, known as the Technion, in Haifa. He was slated to go to Israel for ten

491 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," 12-13. Box 501. NA. The Army Attache also had taken pictures in August; however, he did not know or come to realize what the facility was. 492 Department of State Incoming Telegram From Amembassy Paris to Sec of State Washington, Nov 22nd, 1960 Pass to A. A. Wells Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501 NA. 493 "History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities," POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 161

days of contract work in early August.494 Gomberg contacted the American Embassy in Israel during October and November on his way back through Paris. The Americans revealed that he may be of some help.495 On the following day, November 26th, Gomberg felt he had "urgent and secret" information on what was happening in Israel. Gomberg reported that a close personal friend (later identified as Ernst Bergmann) stated that within a span of three weeks, Ben-Gurion would announce major developments in the Negev, including a nuclear power plant near

Beersheba. France was helping Israel in order to try and maintain their status as a power.

Gomberg further shared that France, devoid of any IAEA or Euratom inspection, was either providing, or would eventually provide, the natural uranium for a large nuclear power plant.

Lastly, the American scientist confirmed that the French helped the Israelis with the design and construction of the reactor.496

Gomberg confirmed American suspicions with intricate details and insightful analysis -- this was the final piece for American intelligence monitoring Dimona. Upon Gomberg's return to the United States on December 1st, he was debriefed by representatives of the administration. He adamantly believed, given what he witnessed from consultations and from the excess amount of needed personnel, Israel was building a French-Marcoule type reactor. He concluded this project had been undergoing construction for the past two years and that it would require another year until completion. During his final meeting in Israel, he asked Bergmann about the project. It was

494 Letter John H. Street to Edward R. Pierce O/NESA, William A. Chapin State/NE R. G. Bradley AEC/DIA R. N. Slawson AEC/DIA, T. J. Wilson O/IND July 15, 1960 Subject: Proposed Visit to Israel by Dr. Henry J. Gomberg Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel d. General 1953-1961, Part 2 of 2 RG59 RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. It is unclear if this was a delayed trip into October and November when Gomberg informed the Americans of Dimona, or it he went on multiple trips, either way he was in Israel in late October and November. Other documents suggest Gomberg made many trips to Israel in 1960. 495 Dept of State Airgram Nov 25th, 1960 Paris to Secretary of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803, Folder 884A. 19/2-2060. NA. 496 Department of State, Paris to Secretary of State Nov 26th, 1960. "Urgent and Secret" Information on the Israeli Nuclear Program is Obtained. Digital National Security Archive, "Nuclear Nonproliferation". https://search- proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/dnsa/docview/1679126971/106DEFEDD5D645E7PQ/12?accountid=9838. 162

then that Bergmann informed him in the coming weeks, Ben-Gurion would make an announcement concerning the development in the Negev.497

In late1960, the professor shared an abundance of information with the Americans.

Gomberg, as part of his research duties, was taken to the labs of the IAEC (non-Dimona) at the

Weizmann Institute. While there, he observed they graduated thirty students a year from nuclear engineering -- far too many for their Atoms for Peace needs. When he visited the laboratory, the

Israelis informed him that he was the first foreigner to visit. He was subsequently advised to remove his camera. This alarmed him, as he had been previously briefed that pictures would not be a problem. Lab personnel informed him "that for my (Gomberg's) purposes, it would be necessary to pretend that nothing existed beyond the unclassified activities."498 Gomberg told the

CIA that those who shared information with him did not want to divulge their names, as the information they reported was classified. Many peculiar and telling elements aroused his suspicion. The Israelis were working with curie quantities of polonium and gram quantities of plutonium, which appeared excessive. He believed that the facility had begun construction three years ago. His estimation of the size of the reactor indicated that the training reactor was much larger than required for research and would be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

Gomberg surmised the Israelis had the capabilities to produce a 200-megawatt thermal reactor, noting anything they did not yet understand (scientifically), the French would teach or the

Israelis would solve. He had heard that the legends in the plant (Dimona) were in both French

497 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," 15. Box 501. NA. Reid and the Embassy in Tel Aviv confirmed they were aware of these comments, and had talked to Gomberg through the Paris Embassy on the 30th of November. Marcoule was the French nuclear reactor designed by Saint-Gobain Nucleaire that went critical in 1956. 498 Information Report: CIA Feb 9th, 1961 Country Israel. Subject: Nuclear Engineering Training/large Nuclear and Electric Power near Beersheba/French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitude Towards the Announcement of its large-scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for US Participation in Nuclear Power Water Conversion. Date of Info: November 1960, Source: US Citizen who is a nuclear engineer. Traveled extensively promoted nuclear education. Went to Israel first in Nov 1960. 1-2. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 163

and Hebrew, indicating the collaboration. Gomberg alarmingly posited that the reactor could be completed by the summer of 1961, well ahead of other estimates. He did not know where the

Israelis received the funding and doubted the Israelis would produce another reactor. He felt confident the Israelis understood what they were doing. The American visitor was quite blunt reporting that in regards to the Arabs and the USSR, the Israelis realized they were on their own.

Gomberg expressed his understanding of how the Israelis perceived the Americans and their actions, or meddling in this program. This may be the best articulation of how the Israelis viewed the Americans at the time, and is worth sharing in full:

" they regard the United States as a sort of rich but stupid uncle who will provide all kinds of moral support but actually do nothing whatever in a practical sense to provide the Israelis with any military security or at the very most provide too little. The Israelis have the view that this large nuclear development is something which they must do and take full responsibility for on their own, both for their own protection and for their economic development."499

Gomberg was not only familiar with the nuclear technology and scientific actions taken by Israel, he understood their impetus and security reasoning for undertaking such an action. His last piece of advice suggested that should the Americans want to halt or work with the Israelis, they could suggest technical assistance in the area of utilizing nuclear power for the "conversion of sea water." He indicated that the Israelis were a pragmatic people, who were aware of their limitations; however, they were "determined to do as much as they can while they can."500

Gomberg's debriefing on December 1st was the confirmation that American intelligence long sought. On December 3rd, Ogden Reid met with Bergmann who provided the same information he gave Gomberg: by the following week, Ben-Gurion would announce a 10-20

499 Information Report: CIA Feb 9, 1961 Country Israel. Subject: Nuclear Engineering Training/large Nuclear and Electric Power near Beersheba, 3. Box 501, NA. 500 Ibid. 164

MW heavy-water-moderated research reactor was in development and would go critical in about a year-and-a-half. The pending announcement involved a university located near Beersheba and that the reactor was of an "exclusive Israeli design with some French equipment." Bergmann's stated purpose for the facility was research on desert plants, and when opened, John McCone, the

AEC Chairman, would be welcomed. This was the first official confirmation by an Israeli official that a nuclear facility was under construction in the Negev.501 In next few days, the machinery of Washington went into overdrive. The JAEIC met on December 2nd and 7th; the

Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy convened on the 3rd, and requested an update; Eisenhower ordered a Special National Intelligence Estimate concerning the Israeli nuclear program. Secretary of State, Christian Herter, met with his State colleagues who deemed

Israel's responses on the Dimona issue had not been consistent. On December 8th, Philip Farley,

Special Assistant for Atomic Energy in the State Department, briefed the Joint Congressional

Committee on Nuclear Energy – clearly, the Americans were fast-tracking the Dimona issue.502

On December 8th, there was a flurry of substantive coordination on the Dimona issue as the National Security Council convened to discuss these emergency developments. Allen Dulles,

CIA Director, briefed the President and members of the NSC on the Israeli issue (this may be when Lundahl and Brugioni reported Eisenhower pushed the picture board out of the way in

1960). Dulles confirmed that Israel was building a nuclear facility in the Negev with the help of

France, who were training and supplying equipment to the Israelis. He suggested that the facility

"probably" incorporated a reactor with the capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The

Director built on Reid's information, the findings of Gomberg, and intelligence that Israel would

501 "Post-Mortem on SNIE-100-8-60," 15. Box 501. NA, and "History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities,"1-2. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Department of State Airgram Dec 3, 1960 Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 502 "Post-Mortem," 17; "History of United States Interest," 2. 165

announce a university, a small research reactor only intended for peaceful purposes.

Unfortunately, the intelligence community estimated there was no way the Israeli facility would be utilized for solely peaceful purposes.503 The CIA Director informed the group that the

Arabs and Soviets would interpret the program as a weapons-producing initiative. Herter reported he would meet with Israeli Ambassador, Avraham Harman, in the coming days. Of specific concern to the administration was the estimated cost of Dimona, between 40 and 80 million dollars at a time when the United States was providing Israel aid. Vice President Richard

Nixon inquired about procedures concerning other reactors, Dulles and Herter acknowledged that inspections were the norm for the United States and Herter debated whether Israel would accept such measures or any safeguards. Dulles showed the army's photographic intelligence confirming the nature of the facility to all members present. It was surmised that perhaps the money for Dimona came through American Jews or charitable organizations by way of deductible donations under American tax law. This admission could have serious implications for the administration. Dulles also announced that President-Elect John Kennedy had been briefed on the situation. This is the first official notice that Kennedy was given of Dimona.

Nixon worried this could be a precedent, given the "fourth country problem", now the "Nth country problem", and that intelligence should be stepped up on any potential proliferators.

Lastly, Dulles shared that the United States had known for "some time" about the facility, yet only recently (Gomberg's testimony) identified it as a nuclear facility.504 This meeting

503 Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8th, 1960 Doc 177, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, eds Suzanne E. Coffman and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: United States Government Printing Press Office, 1992), 391. 504 Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8th, 1960 Doc 177, 391-392. FRUS, Vol, XIII. Nixon and Dulles outlined the importance of intelligence on even friendly countries proliferating, as they also posed a threat to the United States. 166

demonstrated a rare occasion when Eisenhower became directly involved -- Herter, Dulles, and especially Reid through the embassy led the charge on the American response.

On December 8th, American intelligence agencies produced a Special National

Intelligence Estimate.505 SNIE 100-8-1960 incorporated much of the discussion at the NSC meeting: Israel had been covertly building a nuclear reactor with extensive French help in the

Negev. A number of possible scenarios were advanced: research and nuclear power generation; however, the likely "major" purpose was plutonium production for weapons.506 Given the secrecy around the project, the CIA believed that weapons-grade plutonium was a major impetus for the facility. They had "extensive evidence" of France's role in training Israelis, supplying materials and equipment. The sale of twenty tons of heavy water from Norway was reported. The

Estimate predicted the first weapons-grade plutonium by 1963-1964, or even 1962. While French motivations could not be proved, it appeared that France wanted a stable and long term partner in the Middle East. It was much easier to assess the Israeli motivation with an omnipresent Arab foe on all borders. The CIA rehashed their stance that Israel with nuclear weapons may achieve a sense of greater security leading to more assertive behaviour. Accurately, the SNIE predicted that any forthcoming Israeli public statement would emphasize the peaceful nature of the project.

Problematically, if the Arabs did not already know, they would shortly and anticipate a weapons drive. The CIA continued to assert that under no circumstances would the USSR give or help the

United Arab Republic with nuclear weapons. Lastly, Israel's proliferation was tied into the larger

American fear of global proliferation. The intelligence community feared that a free-world small

505 This differs from the traditional NIE which is planned months in advance with a high degree of collaboration and usually addresses a pertinent threat or developing situation. Conversely, a SNIE deals with an issue that requires immediate action, usually a crisis-like scenario, and is assembled relatively quickly. 506 "Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-8-1960: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability," Dec 8th, 1960. National Security Archive. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/docs%/208.pdf. Accessed through Cohen and Burr. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/. 167

country would lead others to proliferate, or at least "remove some of the inhibitions of development", namely, Sweden and Switzerland.507 This Estimate incorporated Bergmann's

December 3rd-statement of a 10-20 MW reactor as their only admitted evidence. This SNIE was the first devoted to the Israeli nuclear program. This was a precedent and outlined two concerns for the Americans moving forward: the possibility of instability or war in the Middle East followed by the implications for global proliferation. By December 8th, the American

Government was fully committed to uncovering the truth of Dimona.

The following day, Herter summoned Ambassador Harman to confront him and hear the

Israeli explanation of what was happening in the Negev. Herter showed Harman the photographs

(supposedly taken from the road) and suggested this seemed to far outweigh any Israeli public comments on the scope of the reactor. Herter was concerned about the scale of the complex which included power lines, and he argued this source seemed to power something ten times the size of what Israel had previously mentioned. Furthermore, Herter wanted to know where the money for the project came from -- he estimated the cost about 80 million. The Secretary revealed that American intelligence and science personnel were aware of the French involvement, which suggested a large-scale reactor. He warned Harman that "(K)nowledge of potential nuclear weapons capacity would have (a) very disturbing impact on (the) Middle East and affect US interests as well as those Israeli themselves."508 Harman studied the questions and discussion and responded that he would have to check back with the Israeli government to deliver a response. Herter followed up on this meeting by informing the British and French of this discussion.509

507 "SNIE 100-8-1960," 2-3. NSA. According to the estimate, the Soviet Union would also be against this proliferation. 508 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, Dec 9th, 1960. Doc 178. 393. FRUS, Vol. XIII. 509 Ibid, 394. 168

In mid-December, private speculation mounted as Harman returned to Israel to receive

Ben-Gurion's direction on how best to address the Dimona questions. The Americans acquired supplementary information from personnel, who had heard or seen about Dimona. An American physicist, Dr. Hillard Roderick, disclosed that he had visited a massive structure -- what he thought was the Desert Research Institute -- in the Negev in August of 1960. He recounted seeing firsthand components of the Dimona project. He was a former AEC official, and apparently, was aware by December of what was going on in the Negev.510Time magazine without revealing the country, wrote on December 13th, that a small non-bloc power was developing nuclear weapons, initiating the public debate on Dimona.511 On December 16th, the

London Daily Express published an article written by investigative journalist and plugged-in intelligence contributor, Chapman Pincher. Pincher outlined both British and American intelligence believed Israel was secretly making a bomb. Pincher, who had close contacts with

British intelligence and the Mossad, leaked this information to create a joint British, American diplomatic campaign on Dimona. 512 As Pincher publicly revealed Dimona, privately the British informed the Americans they had information leading them to conclude that France had sold

Israel blueprints for a Marcoule G3 type reactor back in 1957. The British also believed that perhaps two reactors were being built at Dimona, one powered by heavy water and another G3 type. While this was not the case, speculation abounded.513

The Americans joined the fray in revealing the Dimona facility. AEC Chairman John

McCone was set to make an appearance on television's Meet the Press. Harman and the Israeli

510 Department of State Airgram Dec 16th, 1960 Paris to Secretary of State Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 511 "History of United States Interest," 2. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. On December 8th, Herter informed the United Kingdom’s Ambassador that the Americans were set to talk to Harman about this facility. 512 Ibid. Hersh, 76. 513 Extract for JAEIC Info London Dec 16th, 1960. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 169

Embassy tried in vain to entice McCone not to publicly mention the project.514 Conversely,

McCone was advised by the Department of State as he prepared for this appearance to emphasize that the Israelis denied the reported information published in the London paper. The Chairman was instructed to firmly emphasize that the United States opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the globe, and that under American law (Atoms for Peace) no American assistance could be given to help other countries with nuclear weapons programs. Atoms for

Peace assistance was given to many countries strictly bound to the premise of peaceful intent.515

Against the wishes of Harman and expressing his personal frustration as well as that of the

President's administration, McCone mentioned the Israeli program on the television show on the

18th. When journalist Arthur Krock (New York Times) posed a question on whether the Israelis were building covert weapons program, McCone answered the United States only had informal information and that not all nuclear reactors create weapons; nevertheless, each reactor breeds plutonium potentially utilized for weapons production. McCone declared that the Americans had previously asked and were in the process of receiving a response from the Israeli government.

During the segment, McCone noted that Israel would be an ideal country for safeguards inspections by the IAEA -- no doubt, to demonstrate the peaceful nature of the program. Lastly,

McCone revealed that the Israelis did not divulge Dimona to the Americans; rather the American government received this information, "unofficially and informally”.516 The Americans made

Dimona public and official with this confirmation -- the secret was out. Despite McCone's cool and calm demeanor, he was furious over the lie. Arthur Krock told fellow New York Times

514 "History of United States Interest," 2. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 515 Memorandum of Conversation Dec 17th, 1960. Subject: Suggested Guidance for Chairman McCone's use in "Meet the Press" interview Dec 18th, if asked about reported Israeli Atomic Weapons Development. Participants: Dep Under Sec Raymond A. Hare, Myron B. Katzer AEC, Raymond F. Courtney, John McCone. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 516 Excerpt from Transcript of Meet The Press, Sunday, Dec 18th, 1960. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 170

reporter, John Finney, to contact McCone. McCone later leaked details of American knowledge to the paper in an effort to mount a public pressure campaign for answers from Israel.517 The

Israeli media reported that Bergmann called the London Daily Express news, "flattering but untrue". The Jerusalem Post quoted his admission that the Israeli industry could not support such an endeavour. Other Israeli newspapers mentioned that the IAEC said: no bomb program existed, whatsoever.518

By the 19th, Israel had issued statements through the media promising peaceful intentions, justifying their activities for research purposes. The Americans wanted to get their message out in the press in order to definitively separate the Atoms for Peace cooperation and this project. Herter advised State Department officers and ambassadors to emphasize that official

American policy stood against all nuclear proliferation, and that the United States, through the

US Atomic Energy Act, would act to impede any countries trying to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities.519 John Finney's NYT column was also printed on the 19th. With the title of "U.S.

Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential" and subheadings, such as "Report on Israel is

Troubling U.S." and "U.S. Officials Suspicious", the message to Israel was clear -- the

Americans were unhappy. The article disclosed that the Joint Congressional Committee on

Atomic Energy had convened and was briefed in a closed session on French collaboration with

Israel. The story raised Harman's denials. The Israeli Ambassador cited President-Elect

Kennedy's debate comments with Richard Nixon on October 21st, which mentioned Egypt and

Communist China, not Israel, as potential proliferators. Harman was attempting to justify the

517 Hersh,71. The author reports that McCone was "sputtering mad". Hersh, a NYT reporter himself, learned of these exchanges through mutual acquaintances. Again, Hersh is invaluable. 518 Department of State Telegram Dec 18th, 1960 Tel Aviv to Secretary of State. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. This news would be reported to the American people by The Washington Post on December 19th. 519 Department of State for the Press Dec 19th, 1960. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 171

danger Israel faced and illustrate that Israel was now harshly singled out. The article was insightful, revealing that American officials were suspicious, but uncertain of Israel's intentions.

Finney also identified French reasons for helping, such as prestige and the potential benefit of receiving Israeli plutonium. Finney continually cited "annoyance" by administration officials.

What was most upsetting was that the United States had been "left in the dark by two of its international friends, France and Israel."520 The following day, Finney penned a front page, full spread on the Dimona facility. In this piece, he outlined the intricacies of the American frustration -- the textile excuse, the deception. The Americans convened a meeting at the White

House on December 19th, which included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer), the President's special assistant for Science and Technology (Kistiakowsky), the Secretary of

Defense (Gates), Treasury (Anderson), Eisenhower, and Herter. This marked a significant and rare occurrence when Israel was the sole item discussed. France and Israel also issued a joint statement admitting they were engaged on a secret project; however, no weapons initiative was in development. Finney reiterated that the Americans advocated for international safeguards or inspections, and that they were still suspicious of Israel. He shared an important insight -- the

French and Israelis declared the reactor ran on natural uranium with heavy water to moderate as the coolant. This was the same type of reactor used in South Carolina at the Savannah River facility, which was "particularly suited for producing the fissionable plutonium used in nuclear

520 John Finney, "U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential," The New York Times, Dec 19th, 1960. 1-2. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. The article voiced the position of the administration declaring this had nothing to do with Atoms for Peace. Collaboration was raised between the two, citing American research at the Weizmann Institute. Amos De Shalit was named as an individual who had worked at Princeton and MIT. A story also appeared in The Washington Post on the 19th, which the Department of State would later call "extensive and fairly accurate" "History of the United States Interest," 2. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 172

bombs." Finney ended the piece citing the IAEA norm of inspections and casting doubt on

Israel's story, likely again leaked by the AEC.521

The aforementioned meeting was the result of an intense American effort that involved the President and his national security team to try to decipher what Israel was doing and to push for immediate measures. This represented the height of a diplomatic crisis between Israel and the

United States. At the meeting, Herter and Allen Dulles outlined that it was evident from intelligence the facility was not intended for peaceful purposes, based on capacity alone. The

Secretary of State noted that it was probably financed by private and public aid to Israel (likely from the United States). The President in a rare contribution on the issue shared that the cost which had been grossly underestimated at 80 million was likely100 to 200 million dollars.522

Dulles reiterated that the Americans had exposed Dimona before November 1960, now French confirmation was received. Eisenhower assured the group that he believed the project was solely for peaceful use, but a precedent was set for all proliferators. Israel would have to be dealt with to demonstrate uniformity in future cases. Lastly, Herter took charge as he believed that Israel could still be "head off", if the United States acted quickly.523 This meeting revealed many of the secret feelings of the various American departments. Dulles shared the CIA view: the Israelis were consciously attempting to confuse the appropriate parties and wider public between the small, peaceful Nahal Soreq reactor which received American aid, and the Dimona reactor. He and McCone expressed the AEC viewpoint that there was no way the plant was for peaceful

521 John Finney, "US was Misled on Israel A-Plant," The New York Times, Dec 20th, 1960. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. The Washington Post also ran an article, entitled "The Secret Reactor," The Washington Post, Dec 20th, 1960. The New York Herald Tribune also ran a piece examining the growing nuclear club. Suspiciously, Ogden Reed's family owned this paper, and it is not difficult to locate the Tribune's source. 522 Though it is probable Eisenhower received this figure from the State Department and Treasury, this admission also raises suspicion that likely Eisenhower knew more than reported. He may have been told by Feinberg, who was one of the few individuals who knew the true price tag of the project. Again, Eisenhower's actions invite dissenting speculation. 523 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 89-90. 173

purposes. The AEC Chairman speculated that the Israelis likely had built a plutonium extraction plant, which up to that point, was undiscovered. Even at this critical juncture, with this intense scrutiny and near certainty, there was much unease about how the Americans framed their official approach.524 This speaks to not just the presumed Israel lobby, rather to many factors: the overwhelming positive view of Israel by the American population; criticism of an ally in the

Cold War; and treatment of one of the only stable, non-communist states in the Middle East vital to Eisenhower's realist anti-communist policy. Once again, the issue of whether the money came from tax deductible donations was raised (perhaps, from American citizens). Eisenhower's response was "very moderate" in that he did not seem to care about the consequences of reining in Israel. It is significant that the President inquired if he should make a statement, yet ultimately, deferred to Herter and State leading the American response.525 This decision shaped the

American response moving forward. For the rest of December and January until Kennedy took office, and even early on in his administration, the State Department along with the CIA led the charge against Israel. Herter was totally committed to ending Israel's program. He may have been the only member of the meeting to try and get Israel to terminate the program, while others pushed to get reassurances from Israel and trace the money to the project -- this would form operational policy.526

On December 19th, the French sent a message to the Americans assuring them that this

"peaceful collaboration" with Israel was not unprecedented, as Canada had previously aided

524 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 158-159. 525 Ibid, 160. 526 Ibid. In this meeting and the December 8th NSC convergence, Dulles and the CIA were on to Bergmann and Israel's policy of utilizing Soreq to blur the truth on Dimona. 159. 174

India in a similar fashion. Nuclear exchange had become a more regular occurrence.527 The

French promised their participation was exclusively for peaceful purposes, and clarified the

Dimona reactor was a heavy water natural uranium reactor.528

On the 20th, Harman met with Herter with the official Israeli reply to Herter's previous questions. As opposed to reports in the media, Harman replied that they were building the reactor for scientific knowledge, such as industrial, agricultural, and medical innovation. Some material was imported from France, though France's role and secrecy was maintained due to a fear of an

Arab boycott. The project was constructed under Israeli scientists -- Harman seemed to minimize the French role. Unsurprisingly, the Israeli Ambassador asserted it was for peaceful purposes.

Herter admitted he was glad the intention was peaceful; nonetheless, he wanted to know where the spent or produced plutonium (vital to weapons making) would go. Harman, seemingly changing the topic, announced the reactor only cost 5 million annually to operate, and that despite reports in the media of a 100 to 300 mw reactor, this was only a 24 mw capacity. He added that upon completion, students or visitors from "friendly countries" would be permitted to visit. Harman explained the Atoms for Peace reactor was intended for small research -- nothing more. He said that Ben-Gurion would be making a statement the following day to the Knesset

(Israeli parliament) to discuss the reactor. Harman and Minister Mordechai Gazit voiced their disgust this was in the press. Herter retorted that these leaks were not coming from him (this is likely true, as McCone was the guilty party). Secretary Herter pressed again on the issues of safeguards and where the plutonium would go. Harman never strayed from the French statement

527 Public Statements Concerning the Israeli Nuclear Program (Compiled by S/AE Department of State) Jan 17th, 1961. This was cited in a French Foreign Office Communique Folder 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 528 Department of State Airgram Dec 19th, 1960. Paris to Secretary of State. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA.

175

that this was a peaceful facility and would be completed in three years, and bore no relationship to any weapons program. Herter clearly expressed that he wanted the impending Israeli public statement to distinguish between the American-backed Atoms for Peace reactor and this French reactor. The Americans wanted to know if this facility would also produce power.529 This exchange highlights one of the American concerns: the State Department was worried about what Israel was actually achieving in secret. Of immediate concern was the public perception that the Americans were tied to this project. They rallied to quickly distance themselves from accusations of helping Israel. This was primarily intended to show the Soviets, Arabs, and allies where the Americans stood on the issue.

The following day, before Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset, Herter again advised Reid and his ambassadors in France and Great Britain to firmly state the American opposition to nuclear proliferation, and therefore, was "interested in having full and frank account (of) Israeli atomic activities". Again this represented the value the Americans assigned to both the public view of this concern and their private instruction.530

Even with all the suspicion and flow of continuous information, by late December 1960, much was still unknown -- this explains Herter's attempts to receive concrete assurances on the plutonium and safeguards. The British Foreign Office and State Department as well as British and American intelligence agencies were coordinating heavily. On December 20th, the British handed the Americans many questions they wanted answered on Israel. As of December, there

529 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Dec 20th, 1960 Subject: Israeli Atomic Program. Participants: Harman, Gazit, Herter, Jones NEA, Farley, S/AE Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 530 Department of State Telegram Herter to Amembassy Tel Aviv, Paris and London Dec 21st, 1960. Folder 884A. 19/2-2060 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 176

was no conclusive proof the Israelis did in fact operate a nuclear weapons program. They shared the American view, asserting it would be "most regrettable" to find proof.531

On December 21st, the Israeli Prime Minister publicly disclosed the Dimona facility in the Israeli Knesset. Ben-Gurion shared that a peaceful 24,000 kilowatt (24 mw) capacity reactor was being completed for the purposes of industry, agriculture, health, and science, as opposed to the Nahal Soreq reactor which was 1 mw (this would eventually be 5). Most importantly, Ben-

Gurion admitted that it would require three or four years to finish and any talk of attempts to produce a bomb were "deliberate or undeliberate untruths (in original)".532 Some anxiety was lifted with the public notification and the Israeli admission that a nuclear reactor was under development. The problem of Israeli credibility quickly emerged on December 3rd when Ernst

Bergmann informed the Americans that the reactor would take a year-and-a-half to complete.

Ben-Gurion directly countered this by estimating three-to-four years, as had Harman in his conversations with Herter.533 Perhaps, the Israelis had encountered technical problems in two weeks, adding years. More likely, a new story was spun to buy time and keep the United States temporarily at bay.

One of the defenses for the excessive secrecy on the Dimona project cited by Israel was the global media coverage on the project and the need to be discrete, particularly given Israel's myriad Arab enemies. Israeli media expressed anger that the Americans had photographed the

Dimona facility, which they argued indicated spying on a friendly sovereign nation. Likely

531 “Questions from the UK,” Dec 20, 1960 Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 532 Ben-Gurion Explains Project "Special to the New York Times," Jerusalem (Israeli Sector), Dec 21st, 1960. Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. Ben-Gurion specifically outlined his plan to develop the Negev and that the reactor would help with essential arid zone research in the coming decade. Letter CD Wiggin British Embassy, Washington to Phil (PJ) Farley, Dept of State Jan 23rd, 1961. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 533 Discrepancies in Information on the Israeli Reactor Complex Draft Feb 20th, 1961 CIA/NED Reactor 1961, Part 1 of 2, RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. Though this record is from the following year, it arranges chronologically the discrepancies that the Americans quickly addressed. 177

leaked by administration figures, neither the research purposes of the facility nor its status as a nuclear reactor were widely advertised in the Israeli press. Only an intense debate about a

"metallurgical research" facility was discussed, and involved the press censorship in Israel (with

Peres at the helm). The Israeli press also discussed the fear of the United States forcing their will through mandatory inspections, likely reflective of Israeli governmental fears.534 Israeli leadership was clearly angered about the United States trying to intimidate them through the press.

The UAR was also deeply concerned about this apparent Israeli nuclear program. In a meeting between the State Department and UAR officials, the Americans argued the Egyptians

"manifested an almost hysterical attitude concerning Israel's atomic capabilities." Given the danger from Israel, the UAR concerns are understandable, but the Egyptians believed a more insidious objective was at play. They believed the project was yet another attempt to drive a wedge in American-Arab relations by pushing the Arabs to the Soviet Union. Egyptian officials argued this was Israel's "hidden objective."535 Plausibly, this was not the objective of the Israelis, yet deterring the Arabs was a real calculation.

Gamal Abdel Nasser stepped up Egyptian public rhetoric with a speech on December

23rd. The UAR President used an opportunity at Port Said to denounce the Israeli program.

Nasser declared war on Israel, if they were indeed pursuing a nuclear program. He also cautioned

534 Department of State Telegram Dec 22nd, 1960 Tel Aviv to Secretary of State. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. The incorporation of governmental views in the press is my conclusion. Based on censorship laws at the time, it is highly doubtful these suggestions would have been published without governmental approval. 535 Memorandum of Conversation December 22nd, 1960. Subject: Israel's Atomic Energy Activities Participants: Mr. Salah El Abd, Counselor, Embassy of the United Arab Republic; Dr. A. Aziz Allouni, Counselor, Embassy UAR; NE MR. Armin H. Meyer. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 178

that the UAR would develop a nuclear weapon of its own and declare war on France if they were facilitating Israel's ambitions536 -- one of the CIA’s anticipated problems was materializing.

Given the understandable Arab outrage with Dimona's publication in the media, the

Americans decided to push matters behind the scenes, devoid of publicity. The Americans at least publicly, on December 22nd, confirmed they welcomed the assurances of Israel's peaceful intentions. More importantly, they argued that Israel was not being singled out or dealt with in isolation and all actions were part of the American response to global proliferation. Herter advised embassies across the globe to distinguish between Atoms for Peace and the American response to proliferation of weapons programs. State surveyed the nuclear proliferation landscape addressing Canadian aid to India albeit the Americans supplied the heavy water; they also monitored the UAR, who received a research reactor like Nahal Soreq at Inschass (Inschas) with Soviet aid. Even with many nations engaging in proliferation activities, American displeasure with Israel was evidenced. The United States publicly supported Israel's peaceful declarations, yet privately, they were disheartened that they learned of the Dimona facility from

"non-Israeli sources". The Department's messaging quickly formed the American mantra on both

Israel and nuclear proliferation moving forward: the United States opposed all nuclear proliferation. In an effort to limit any public concern or criticism, the United States outwardly echoed Ben-Gurion's Knesset announcement that the Israeli-French program was very similar to

Canada and India -- exchanges for peaceful purposes. In a conscious effort to not single out

Israel, Communist China was explicitly mentioned in correspondence to American embassies, as a potential proliferating country that would not be deterred. Herter and State disclosed American thinking regarding the future nature of nuclear energy. If Israel could go down this path and

536 “Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb; Nasser Threatens to Attack Israel if She Has A-Bomb,” The New York Times, Dec, 24th, 1960. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=FA0D17FC3E551A7A93C6AB1789D95F448685F9. 1-2. 179

master atomic technology, the argument appeared legitimate that akin to the case of electricity, nuclear proliferation was inevitable. The Americans briefed their embassies across the world of the American obligation to fight proliferation.537 An American approach towards global proliferation quickly emerged in December -- no weapon proliferation would be allowed under the United States' rules. Herter tied the specific Israeli case to a larger American determination to halt proliferation. No doubt, this was too late.

As Eisenhower had deferred to the State Department, Herter led the charge throughout

December, 1960. Herter advised Ambassador Ogden Reid to question Ben-Gurion in order to clarify the particulars of the project. On December 24th, the American Ambassador met with the

Israeli Prime Minister at his residence. After a cordial start, the meeting turned gravely serious regarding Dimona. Reid raised State's prior discussions with Harman and argued the Americans wanted immediate answers. He noted Eisenhower's deep concern for nuclear proliferation:

Atoms for Peace was cited as one such method he employed. Reid openly discussed Communist

China as a proliferation problem with Ben-Gurion. The American Ambassador wanted to know about plutonium and pressed for safeguards. Ben-Gurion was irritated as he countered the United

States were pressuring the Israelis on safeguards, yet unlike the UAR, Israel had voted in

September for safeguard measures at an IAEA conference. Ben-Gurion expressed deep frustration with all the coverage in the press, asking "why in the United States is everything being told (to) everybody?" Ben-Gurion then made two interesting comments: firstly, he was

"sorry" he could not have told Eisenhower about the program during his last visit (March) – a more incendiary comment when one considers the level of deception. The second comment involved a discussion with Homi J. Bhabha, who argued that even states like Israel and India

537 Department of State Telegram, Dec 22nd, 1960 Herter Circular. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 180

could have atomic power in the next decade or fifteen years.538 Ben-Gurion discussed using such nuclear power for water for the Negev, predicting increasingly cheap costs of nuclear materials and heavy water. That the eventual father of the Indian bomb and the leader behind the Israeli bomb were convening should raise flags for any observer. These two non-European atomic pursuers discussed potential nuclear weapons programs, and directly challenged American power.

Ben-Gurion explained that this was a research facility exclusively and that France was supplying the materials so they too should be consulted. He cited Nasser's December 23rd- speech, yet argued Nasser was not ready to attack Israel, given the conventional status of Egypt's army. This highlights an interesting point: Ben-Gurion was relatively confident no immediate war would come with Egypt. His existential fear of Israel's annihilation never dissipated, even when no immediate Israeli-Egyptian conflict was forecast. Lastly, he supported Harman's stance that even if the United States had concerns, the project was three-to-four years until completion, so there would be sufficient time for a global safeguards regime to be established. Israel, he promised, would not be an outlier to this system.539 Just as Peres had earlier done with the

French, Ben-Gurion assured the Americans that time was on their side to alleviate any remaining problems. By late December, Israel formulated a timeline which they sold to the United States.

Despite confusing early discrepancies from Bergmann indicating one-and-a-half years, from late

December onwards, the Israelis agreed on a three-to-four-year timeline. It is obvious the varying timelines were employed to buy Israel even more time, Nevertheless, by late December, Ben-

Gurion and Peres conceded that a unified story was needed.

538 Department of State Dec 24th, 1960. Tel Aviv to Secretary of State. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 539 Ibid, Part 2. 181

On the 28th, the Americans received specific information from a source in the Israeli

Ministry of Finance that the reactor was not financed on an inter-governmental basis, rather on supplier credits. Unsurprisingly, the Americans were unable to ascertain the names of individuals who had contributed money, the source also estimated the project began in 1959.540

A further intensification of American diplomatic and intelligence efforts materialized near the end of December to uncover all relevant information on Dimona. Simultaneously, on the

28th, as the Americans were digging to uncover the financing, they pressed the acting Norwegian

Foreign Minister (Kristiansen) to collaborate and enforce Norwegian safeguards on Israel.

Kristiansen had been alarmed to uncover the 1959 agreement and readily exchanged information with his American counterparts. The American Government wanted to see all the parameters of the heavy water sale and inquired whether the Norwegians had inspected or could inspect the

Dimona complex.541

The Americans continued their international pressure, this time on the French Embassy.

They were rewarded with specifics of the Dimona agreement. Mr. Pelen of the French Embassy read a prepared statement on the 28th -- the tried-and-tested French defense described their role in the same vein as the Canadian-India collaboration. Pelen, who no doubt conferred with the

Israelis, emphasized that no Marcoule-type reactor existed at Dimona. He shared the Israeli

Prime Minister's dismay and confusion that the issue warranted such extensive press coverage.542

By the end of 1960, the Americans had received a great deal of information from their sources and the Norwegians. The source, who the United States contacted in the Ministry of

540 Foreign Service Dispatch Dec 28th, 1960 American Embassy Tel Aviv. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 541 Department of State Telegram, Dec 28th, 1960 Herter to Amembassy Oslo. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 542 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Dec 28th, 1960. Subject: French Assistance to Israeli Reactor Project, Participants: Mr. Farley; Mr. Pelen French Embassy. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960- 1963, Box 2803. NA. 182

Finance, obtained information that the facility cost roughly thirty-four million dollars to build. A reactor, cold laboratory, hot laboratory, waste disposal plant, facility for rods (spent fuel rods essential for the nuclear cycle), offices, library services, and a medical unit were included. The project was believed to be currently in its second year of development. The appraisal indicated the waste disposal plant and rod treatment facility needed five years for completion. Lastly, and importantly for the United States, the annual operating cost of Dimona was five million dollars.

Yet, no foreign government dealt directly with financing the project, nor signed any agreement.

Once again, the names of the suppliers who had financed any component of the reactor were unknown.543 This is as much specific information the United States would uncover, at least according to archival sources, about the financiers of Dimona. The protection of those who contributed financially is most remarkable regarding the secrecy of Dimona.

Kristiansen of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry admitted that the agreement between the

Israeli and Norwegian nuclear commissions had become an embarrassment for his government.

He told the Americans on December 30th the Norwegians had inserted the right to inspect the facility in their safeguards, yet had not undertaken any such measure. He argued it would be hard to exercise an inspection, given the "extremely delicate" situation. The United States responded by pressuring the Norwegians to inspect or learn all they could on the Israeli reactor through their own safeguards. The American Embassy in Norway concluded that unless the Americans gave intricate reasons or severe pressure, then no follow-up action would be taken by the

Scandinavian nation towards Israel.544

543 Department of State Telegram Dec 29th, 1960 Tel Aviv to Secretary of State. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 544 Department of State Telegram Oslo to Secretary of State December 30th, 1960. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. This recently declassified cable sheds light on the extent that Norway understood it had erred in supplying heavy water to the Israelis. 183

As 1960 ended, the Americans rapidly deciphered the Israeli deception and extent of

Dimona's progress; they were displeased to say the least. American diplomats and intelligence services scrambled to outline this anti-proliferation pressure and wide-encompassing information net. Reid contacted Herter to push for IAEA inspections on Dimona, although he doubted the

Israelis would accept any kind of international surveillance. Ogden Reid suggested he make an approach to Foreign Minister Meir (who wanted to tell the Americans, though they were unaware) either formally or informally to try and lobby Israel to "invite" a visit or inspection.

Should this be unpalatable to the Israelis, perhaps during the next Nahal Soreq (sometimes to

Americans, Nahal Rubin) inspection mandated under the Atoms for Peace bilateral, he suggested the Americans could also visit Dimona. Reid, a diplomat attuned to the Israeli domestic situation, suggested France would need to be pressured into this as well. The Ambassador deciphered that of the thirty-four-million-dollar financing nearly eighteen million was foreign exchange.545 The

CIA still held serious concerns about Dimona: Allen Dulles admitted to members of the national security community that he "emphatically voiced his view that the Israeli Government had by no manner of means yet come clean with us."546 As the Israelis continued to clarify their program, the year ended with justified lingering suspicion within the United States.

By the start of 1961, the American strategy on Dimona, which would be continued under

President Kennedy, began to materialize. The United States wanted: to know exactly where

Israeli plutonium was going; the Israelis to unequivocally and consistently declare their peaceful intentions; safeguards (by way of inspections) established. Most troubling to the Israelis, the

United States wanted the conclusions of inspections/visits shared with allies and the Arabs.

545 Department of State Telegram, Dec 29th, 1960 Tel Aviv to Secretary of State. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 546 Letter to NEA Mr. Jones from Mr. Merchant, Dec 28th, 1960. Folder 21.50 Country File. Israel. F. Reactor, 1960. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962. Box 501. NA. 184

On January 3rd, Ambassador Reid met with Meir in what proved to be a tense atmosphere between both countries. Reid posed five questions to the Israeli Foreign Minister and expected a response as quickly as possible. He conveyed the severity and danger his government believed inherent in Israel's program. Meir admonished she did not see the need for an immediate response. Reid persisted for an answer. The following day, Reid met with Ben-Gurion to discuss the five questions -- Ben-Gurion invoked several vague responses and denials.547

The Americans established their power status in the relationship -- they would ask the questions and the Israelis would answer. The five questions posed to Meir and addressed by Ben-

Gurion involved the gravest of American concerns: Where would the plutonium produced go?

Are there safeguards on the plutonium? Would the government of Israel permit IAEA inspections? The Americans wanted to know conclusively, whether a third reactor was underway anywhere in Israel at present, or was any development planned in any future endeavour? Lastly, could Israel "state categorically" that it currently did not have, nor would in the future have, any desire for a weapons program?548 Ben-Gurion answered these questions, but once again would not discuss the financing of the project, showing his reserve and angering the Americans. Firstly, the plutonium would return to the supplier (he retorted this was the precedent, and when pressed, affirmed he meant France); secondly, yes, Israel would welcome visits from "friendly countries"; thirdly, and importantly, while Israel welcomed inspections, it was a sovereign State and would not allow an IAEA inspection, citing Arab countries as potential inspectors, and in the Cold War context, a "no Russians" rule was enforced regarding inspection; fourthly, there was no third reactor in development or under consideration; lastly, Ben-Gurion, according to the American

547 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State January 3rd, 1961. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803; Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State January 5th, 1961. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 548 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 94. 185

sources, gave a "categorical assurance that no nuclear weapons were planned."549 A pattern emerged that Kennedy intensified: the Americans asked the questions, and the Israelis skillfully answered, or bypassed them altogether. Even in his last answer, Ben-Gurion responded that no nuclear weapons were "planned"; he did not say that this would last forever nor did he rule out their consideration, rather they were not currently planned. Undoubtedly, this was a great example of skilful, political maneuvering, or ambiguity. Israeli politicians had yet again, under pressure, outwitted their American counterparts.

According to the American documents, this was how this encounter unfolded: Avner

Cohen notes the discrepancy in the Israeli and American sources of this meeting. He reports that

Ben-Gurion answered these questions in his private residence in Sde Boker, perhaps on the 5th.

While Reid presented this exchange not as an ultimatum, rather as a cordial, friendly encounter.

Conversely, the Israelis were angered by the American procedures, best demonstrated by Ben-

Gurion, who scolded Reid, "you must talk to us as equals or not to us at all."550 This exchange outlined the fundamental difference of views: to the Americans, this was not a negotiation between equals, rather a super-power on one side versus at-best a medium power state in a sea of bordering enemies. Within this dyad, Israel desired to protect sovereignty and dignity, as they bought time and attempted to dissuade the Americans from uncovering the truth.551

The United Kingdom presented their own list of ten questions concerning Dimona, and received a more interesting response. The Foreign Office posed their questions on the 10th to Dr.

549“History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities," 4. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 550 Cohen, The Bomb in The Basement, 94-95. Cohen also indicates the answers varied somewhat according to Israeli sources regarding the IAEA, writing Israel would not tolerate "international meddling", and perhaps eventually, a scientist from a friendly state would be permitted. He astutely acknowledged that both sides wanted to appear assertive. 551 Cohen has argued through his works that this was not an equal relationship, rather America asked and Israel answered. Nevertheless, it was clear, Israel were getting the upper-hand. Shalom wrote that the Americans outlined going forward, this would not be a negotiation between two equal parties. Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes, 17. 186

Chaim Yahil of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and received some eye-opening responses.

Coordination between American and British intelligence agencies took place, though the

Americans would only learn of the Israeli answers after Kennedy took office on the 23rd.552 The

British questions covered similar concerns as the Americans, but went into more detail, such as inquiring about the financing, which Ben-Gurion and the Israelis refused to discuss. When asked if the Israelis had any intention to develop nuclear weapons, Yahil professed the same response afforded to the Americans: no, Israel did not have any intentions to produce weapons. Like Ben-

Gurion, he cited the Knesset speech as an Israeli assurance. Unlike the reply to the United States, he added that Ben-Gurion believed this could change as Israel was surrounded by enemies, and therefore, this stance could be amended.553 Significantly, the Israeli response was overtly subject to change. The Israelis waited until the Kennedy-Ben-Gurion meeting in May of 1961 before admitting to Americans this was a possibility. Even then, they never really gave the impression to the United States they were considering weapons.

Despite Israel's best efforts to defuse the situation, Herter informed embassies in Tel

Aviv, Paris, and London that it did not appear from Ben-Gurion's answers that Israel was

"wholly candid" with the United States.554 At this point, Herter joined the CIA who maintained suspicion on these Israeli responses. Before Herter sent this cable on January 6th, he addressed a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. William Fulbright, a notorious Israel critic, oversaw the Committee. Herter shared what he knew about the program, having analyzed one third of the Ben-Gurion-Reid exchange hours earlier: Israel was constructing a nuclear

552 Letter CD Wiggin British Embassy Washington to Phil (PJ) Farley, Department of State Jan 23rd, 1961. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG59 Nuclear Energy 1948-1962, Box 501; Letter CD Wiggin to Farley State Department, Jan 13th, 1961. NA. The British gave the Israelis the questions on the 7th. 553 Ibid. 554 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Amembassy Tel Aviv, Paris and London. 884A. 19/2-2060. RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 187

reactor; this would be disastrous for the Middle East. He added that the construction had been privately monitored for some time, and espoused his doubt to the official Israeli defense that this was just an experimental research reactor, arguing that the capabilities exceeded the research intent. The Committee, believing Israel was bolstered by French aid, discussed the "falsified reports". The most damning comment on Israel's activities, surprisingly, did not come from

Fulbright; instead, it was delivered by Iowa's Republican Senator, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, who was knowledgeable on nuclear proliferation and its consequences, having served on the Joint

Congressional Committee for Atomic Energy since its inception in 1946. As the ranking Senator, he requested to make a personal statement for the record on the Israeli deception. His disdain for

Israel's explanation of their actions was evident:

"I think the Israelis have just lied to us like horse thieves on this thing. They have completely distorted, misrepresented and falsified the facts in the past. I think it is very serious, for things that we have done for them to have them perform in this manner in connection with this very definite production reactor facility which they have been secretly building and which they have consistently, and with a completely straight face, denied to us they were building."555

Distrust of Israel about Dimona was prevalent in the CIA and within the Department of

State, the AEC, and after this meeting the anger of Congress and the Senate was entrenched. By early January, 1961, nearly all parties who knew about the deception were angered, or had various reasons for suspecting Israeli actions. Hickenlooper's comment was representative of the

555 Briefing on the World Situation,” United States Committee on Foreign Relations, Jan. 6th, 1961. In Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series Vol. XIII, Part.1: Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session1961 7-8. http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/quick/displayMultiItemImages.do?Multi=yes&queryType=q uick&QueryName=cat&&ResultsID=13D55753FC5&QueryName=cat&ItemNumber=17&ItemID=CNP00739 . Digital National Security Archive. "Nuclear Nonproliferation" Impressively, Hersh, likely pre-declassification, first reported Hickenlooper's infamous comment about the horse thieves. 80. Herter had briefed the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy at a closed session on December 9th, so State was the intermediary (when Dulles was not open) to present information to relevant parties. 188

American anger and sense of betrayal (a critic would say, insubordination). Despite the obvious anger, it was decided the best course of action was to proceed privately with the Israelis outside the purview of press coverage and consistent diplomatic pressure.

The Israelis heavily restricted any press coverage that could be revealing within Israel, though the Americans later uncovered some reports which had leaked. The United States believed Ben-Gurion placed strict censorship on all Israeli media regarding Dimona. Hence, any future action would be strictly inter-governmental.556

The State Department and intelligence community continued to brief the relevant parties in early January concerning the Israeli situation. On the 9th, members of the State Department

(Jones and Farley) met with members of the Near East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee to discuss the Dimona reactor. They highlighted the need for secrecy in pushing the Israelis for both visits and in divulging information. The Chairman, Senator Albert

Gore of Tennessee concurred that no notes were taken nor any publicity granted.557 Though Gore agreed the matter best be broached in private, he vigorously tested the official Israeli stance by asking Jones multiple questions on the supposed textile and metallurgical excuses. William

Fulbright posited, why would the Israelis be so secretive, if indeed they had nothing to hide? The larger proliferation problem facing the United States was also addressed -- the Senators argued if states the size of Israel could produce plutonium, the United States would encounter additional proliferation problems. Bourke Hickenlooper further rationalized his fury towards Israel. A source familiar with the project, not Henry Gomberg, informed the Senator of a nuclear program back in the summer (1960). This again raises the issue of who exactly was in Israel -- it appears

556 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Jan 8, 1961. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 557 Department of State Telegram Herter to Tel Aviv, Paris and London (Eyes Only) Jan 9th, 1961. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 189

the Americans had some sort of veiled insight into the situation. Hickenlooper and Senator

Sparkman doubted the United States could force a sovereign, democratic state to abandon or moderate their activity -- even achieving visits would be difficult. Gore raised the obvious concern: the possible Arab reaction. State reported there was evidence the Egyptians asked the

Soviets to help construct a 30 to 40-mw facility to compete with Dimona -- believed to have been rejected. Hickenlooper added that even if the weapons project was three-to-four years away, he did not believe any Israeli estimates or explanations. Drawing on his vast years of experience, he submitted that peaceful nuclear energy research was inevitable and the key challenge was to keep Israel from producing a weapons project, while not barring them from peaceful research.558 Senator Hickenlooper exuded a great detail of restraint and nuance in his understanding of the Israeli position. He was aware they had lied and were still lying to the

Americans, yet he knew the hypocrisy of banning further nations from nuclear knowledge.

Though it appears the American government was united against an Israeli bomb, the extent of one individual’s knowledge remains uncertain. James Jesus Angleton, the Head of the

Israel desk (account) who held a monopoly over Israel activities within CIA559, may have known about Dimona before other intelligence and State officials. Angleton’s other job as the Head of

Counter-Intelligence involved his unhinged hunt for communist penetration. Due to this obsession he believed that as long as Israel supplied intelligence, nuclear proliferation may have been tolerable. He was not as concerned about their nuclear activities, and felt Israel's nuclear proliferation was essential for continued intelligence on communism.560 In the 1950s and under

558 Memorandum of Conversation Jan 9th, 1961. Participants: Lewis Jones, Philip Farley. Sens: Gore, Hickenlooper, Fulbright, Carlson and Sparkman. Doc 2. 2-3. FRUS, Vol. XVII. 559 Wilford, America's Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, 206. Angleton ran this account, as really the only member with a full picture on Israel between 1951/1952-1975. 560 Mattson, 34. Michael Holzman, James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Counterintelligence (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 168, 179. 190

Kennedy in the early 1960s, he made frequent trips to Israel where he became closer with Isser

Harel, the Head of Mossad, and Meir (Memi) de Shalit,561 the brother of Israeli nuclear program physicist, Amos de Shalit. Angleton was close with Dimona nuclear personnel, so this open- ended interpretation is impossible to decipher.562 The reason scholars speculate on Angleton’s role in Dimona involved his habit of making reports and not sharing them with the Agency.563

No conclusive proof or any documents sustain that Angleton knew about Dimona. The speculation on Angleton remains a missing piece about the full extent of CIA knowledge about

Dimona. Problematically, akin to trying to decipher Eisenhower’s non-reaction in 1958, one can merely speculate on the extent and timing of Angleton’s Dimona knowledge.

The last significant meeting between the Israeli Embassy staff, the Secretary of State, and pertinent State members, took place on the 11th of January, prior to Kennedy assuming the

Presidency. Avraham Harman returned from Israel and delivered official information directly to

Herter. Harman submitted the Israeli annoyance, as previously cited by Ben-Gurion in the

Knesset that Israel "categorically (categoric, original text) (has) no plans for developing nuclear weapons". He voiced his displeasure that the Israeli plan needed repetition to Herter and Reid that plutonium generation was at least three years away -- specifically, that this response was not sufficiently accepted. Harman echoed Ben-Gurion's pledge that any uranium producer, France for instance, would garner the plutonium produced -- this applied to other suppliers, or "anyone

561 Jefferson Morley, The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2017), 72-73, 174. Angleton knew De Shalit since 1951 and the two were good friends. Kahana, 410. 562 Morley, 175. He was also close with Asher Ben-Natan, who oversaw the transfer of nuclear materials from France to Israel, beginning in 1956. 563 Interestingly, Hersh, the journalist who essentially got Angleton fired, sheds doubt saying it was possible that Angleton did not know the extent of the Israeli deception; however, it was unlikely. 144. 191

else."564 After this meeting, the British discovered Israel was not being truthful and notified the

Americans that the Israelis had left open the option for eventual weapons.

Harman reiterated Ben-Gurion's previous responses to Ogden Reid when they met (the

4th): no IAEA international safeguards could be accepted because there was no universally accepted norm; when such a norm was set, the Israelis would abide; Israel were at least 10-to-15 years from nuclear power, although it was not ruled out; lastly, Harman echoed Ben-Gurion's dismay at the press coverage of the issue. At this stage in the proceedings, Harman expressed his intended purpose for the meeting, the three issues which bothered Israel: Firstly, Ben-Gurion felt the American response created much undue excitement with press coverage and that Israel was singled out and treated unfairly. With the conscious efforts undertaken by Herter and State to explicitly declare that the government stood against all proliferation, the Israelis were working towards pre-empting American nuclear accusations. Secondly, after agreement that the

Americans were trying to help, Harman raised a troubling issue: the Israelis believed the

Americans were spying on them; the Dimona photos were proof. Herter countered that the photographs delivered to Harman were taken from the road where the facility was plainly visible

(though U-2s were also photographing). Ben-Gurion was distraught his comments on the nature, capability, and timeline of the project were not being taken seriously. Israel was a friend of the

United States and Ben-Gurion had given "unequivocal assurances" which should have been sufficient, yet repeated inquiries from multiple branches of the American government persisted.565

564 Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Israel Atomic Energy Program Jan 11th, 1961. Participants: Harman, Gazit, Herter, G. Lewis Jones NEA, Philip F. Farley S/AE copies to NEA, Paris, London and Tel Aviv. 1-2. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 565 Ibid. 192

Secretary Herter informed the Israelis of the intense interest of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and their continued appraisal on this issue. Herter and Harman both agreed the press would be apprised on the peaceful nature of Dimona. Still, Jones, and Farley had specific questions concerning the reactor. Farley inquired about the long series of power lines at the complex to which Harman replied that the reactor included a "substation for distribution to two other projects in addition to the reactor complex itself -- phosphate mines and a potash plant in the area."566 This seemingly innocuous question was critical, and Farley, with an extensive background in science, was testing the Israelis. The power lines were likely used for a substation: the secretive construction of a chemical reprocessing plant. Although unable to substantiate,

Farley would have been suspicious of these efforts. Harman on advice from Pratt or Dimona personnel knew a potash plant and phosphate mine were operating in the area, and this excuse would quell American suspicion. It was an ingenious answer; unfortunately, for Israel, the intelligence community was unconvinced. The meeting adjourned with a final question from the

Secretary of State regarding the financing of the project. He was advised to see information provided to relevant American agencies in Tel Aviv. Harman opined that many "Israeli friends" believed Israel should eventually have nuclear power; the reactor was a step in that direction.567

The Israelis were consistent in their refusal to even hint on the details of the funding.

After this meeting, the parameters of the diplomatic exchanges were largely defined: the

Americans still held doubts and demanded answers. Conversely, the Israelis believed everything was sufficiently explained and attempted to move forward. In the early days of 1961, the Israelis appeared to be selling a coherent timeline of three-to-four years, accompanied by a consistent

566Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Israel Atomic Energy Program Jan 11th, 1961. Participants: Harman, Gazit, Herter, G. Lewis Jones NEA, Philip F. Farley S/AE copies to NEA, Paris, London and Tel Aviv. 3-4. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 567 Ibid, 4. 193

story: the facility with aid from France was for research, one component within the larger industrialization of the Negev and Beersheba.

Immediately after this exchange, Herter informed Reid and the American Embassy in

Israel on what had transpired. Herter and Reid laid out the final piece of the structure Kennedy inherited -- the push for inspections. Herter suggested that a visit or inspection would be the only way to verify the truth, and should be conducted as soon as possible. Furthermore, he suggested it may be in their best interests if the inspecting country was not the United States, so as to avoid the impression that they were helping Israel, or "in cahoots on the project"(the Secretary's words). Herter declared that no more press should be allotted to Dimona, rather private diplomatic channel pressure. 568

Ambassador Reid met with Ben-Gurion in order to clarify the January 11th meeting. The

Prime Minister expressed his understanding the issue was now "finished". He questioned why the Americans themselves could not visit the reactor, and was informed that the Americans did not want to appear as colluding with the Israelis. Herter messaged Reid on the 16th that the

United States would prefer a non-American scientist visit from a "neutral country", and that Ben-

Gurion should be given reassurance the Americans would verify the reactor, if need be. Herter and Reid were in complete agreement that Ben-Gurion needed to realize that, if no other party did, the Americans could inspect the reactor -- the Dimona issue was far from finished.569

In the final days of Eisenhower's administration, largely thanks to Herter (notably, the

AEC within State), coherent American nonproliferation measures emerged. Herter sent another blunt cable to all American diplomatic posts, announcing that the United States would act as the

568 Department of State Telegram Herter to Tel Aviv attached to London and Paris Jan 11th, 1961; Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Tel Aviv and Arab Amembassies Jan 11th, 1961. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 569 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Jan 15th, 1961; Department of State Telegram Herter to Tel Aviv Jan 16th, 1961. Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803, NA. 194

leader of global nonproliferation policy. Countries that wanted to pursue nuclear energy would have to accept safeguards, predominantly under the IAEA.570 Unlike Eisenhower, Herter, whom the President had deferred to on the Israeli matter, espoused a non-selective and firm nonproliferation position: if any nation wanted to go nuclear, it would have to deal with the

United States. Eisenhower's Presidency drew to a close with a rigorous push from the State

Department and intelligence community to discover all relevant information on the Israeli program. They also established the methodology that Kennedy inherited. Accordingly, the

Embassy, on advice of the Department of State, endeavoured to pressure for a visit to Israel by a

"friendly power" -- as a last resort, by the Americans themselves.571

Kennedy and Rusk were briefed by their counterparts, Herter and Eisenhower, on January

19th, the day before Kennedy assumed office. Kennedy asked about potential nuclear proliferation and Herter raised two concerns: Israel and India. The President-Elect was briefed that the Israeli reactor could possibly produce ninety kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium by the year 1963.572 Herter need not worry, as he was talking to an individual who prioritized nuclear nonproliferation. Kennedy was much more invested in stemming global proliferation than Eisenhower. He addressed this numerous times as a Senator and on the campaign trail, and adopted a more focused and consistent view of nuclear proliferation than his predecessor.

Notwithstanding, Kennedy was indebted to Herter, the State Department, and Eisenhower for establishing the protocols and practice governing the American response to Dimona: a need for inspections by an ally, or themselves; the constant seeking of assurances from the Israelis that their program was merely for peaceful purposes; the continued efforts by the intelligence

570 Department of State Circular Jan 16th, 1961 to All American Diplomatic Posts (from Secretary of State), Folder 884A.1901/1-161 RG59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 571 "History of United States Interest,"4. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 572 Reeves, 33-34. 195

community to gauge Israeli intentions and capabilities; and lastly, the push by the American government to share the information they had with their allies and the apprehensive Arabs. These procedural measures were predetermined by Kennedy's predecessors. The difference between

Eisenhower and Kennedy was the latter’s personal investment and direct participation in the

Dimona negotiations, diplomatic crisis, and internal analysis.

This lengthy prelude to Kennedy incorporated Israel's perspective, and was crucial for three reasons: firstly, to demonstrate why Israeli leaders believed they needed this program; secondly, to explain why Israeli diplomats and personnel constantly pushed for delays and provided differing excuses in order to buy time for the completion of facilities; lastly, to showcase how convincingly the Israelis duped the Americans and what can be learned. The

Israelis employed effective tactics to disorient and confuse the Americans; however, internal

American intelligence collection, analysis and missed signals also contributed to a challenging picture for American intelligence.573

It is difficult to categorize the Eisenhower Administration's actions towards nuclear proliferation, particularly, the Israeli case. Disjointed and inconsistent are fair descriptors for his overall nonproliferation policy. Eisenhower oversaw the creation of the International Atomic

Energy Agency, yet his Atoms for Peace idea as it pertained to Israel appears convoluted and directly helped hide Dimona. Regardless of Atoms for Peace, based on the evidence presented,

Israel would have gone nuclear -- given their interest in atomic energy and the Israeli security conception to defend themselves. President Eisenhower's policy did not account for peripheral or

Third World states. This certainly bolstered the Israelis in building walls against detection, although this was never his intention. It excluded France and provided one more impetus for the

573 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes, 18. The "embarrassing failure" was Shalom's term -- one would tend to agree. 196

French to help the Israelis. Eisenhower's actions are still difficult to truly comprehend. Until such time as further documents emerge, his response to an alleged Israeli nuclear program in 1958 onwards, invites speculation. His inconclusive reactions in 1958 and 1960 when shown the U-2 photographs of Dimona continue to be debated. Scholars concur Eisenhower knew about

Dimona well before the Summer-Fall of 1960, but there is no documentary evidence to conclusively promote this claim.574Certain conclusions can be drawn: firstly, Eisenhower personally appeared more concerned with how the Arabs would react, than Kennedy’s genuine anger over Israel deceiving the United States and becoming a nuclear state.575 He was focused on a grand plan in the Middle East: stability, oil, and preventing communist penetration. This program would have disrupted all of these tenets by pushing the UAR further to the Soviets and creating instability. This cannot be said of his successor, whose ultimate concern was a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, culminating with a nuclear war. Kennedy differed in his deep concern regarding nuclear proliferation as a whole -- he opposed any new members to the nuclear club. Secondly, Eisenhower's decisive response came after Kennedy was elected.

Eisenhower leapt into action after Dimona spread from the intelligence community to other departments, notably when State deciphered the problem.576 Eisenhower, pushed by Herter, briefly considered freezing the money for Dimona by trying to tax American private donations

574 Heiman articulately argued that "for various reasons (the United States) had chosen to close its eyes to the facts": 117. Cohen admonished that even when Ike saw the evidence from the intelligence channels, he did not act (as Brugioni has shared over multiple decades), Israel and the Bomb, 97. Cohen appears to at least entertain the theory that Eisenhower wanted Israel to go nuclear. 575 Matteo Galini, “Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel’s Development of Nuclear Capability,” Cold War History 10, no. 2 (May 2010): 145. 576 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 97. Cohen has for years argued that Eisenhower's policy was inconsistent regarding nuclear proliferation, and that Atoms for Peace can be blamed for this. The President's concept of nuclear sharing was as detrimental as it was helpful. Cohen" Israel and the Evolution": 4. Galini argued that Eisenhower inquired about Dimona and wanted information on the program; however, he only acted after Kennedy's election: 143. 197

and withholding aid, but eventually decided against this course.577 Overall, Eisenhower's actions and the troubling number of possible interpretations on whether he was indeed privy to news about Dimona paint a complex picture.

In conclusion, through an examination of the American primary sources and reading secondary Israeli sources, one finding is clear: the Israelis outwitted the Americans during the

1950s and in 1960 on Dimona. This is largely understandable as intelligence collection and by extension detection of the facility were reactive processes which disadvantaged the United

States. The actions of Shimon Peres and Ernst David Bergmann, as well as David Ben-Gurion and his Israeli diplomats, greatly contributed to keeping Dimona secret. Though there were

American delays and mistakes in gaining intelligence on Dimona, this was a master class by a prepared proliferator. Israeli leaders, even under pressure, deceived and out-maneuvered their

American counterparts in nearly every instance. Despite the Eisenhower Administration's efforts to encourage peaceful atomic development and their attempts to come to terms with an emerging technology, the United States, as the super-power and emergent proliferation police, rightfully did not prioritize Israel. The Israelis understood their low priority status within the United States and acted accordingly. American concern with Cold War rivalry and Western Europe trumped their focus on Israel. Israel understood this dynamic, as did France. No doubt, France, which became an object of American scrutiny and concern, also practiced strong deception in providing secret proliferation aid. Herter and the State Department built upon the testimony of Gomberg. In

December, 1960, when the intelligence community's reports were confirmed, the Americans leapt into action. The United States was by no means a bystander or complicit in this project.

577 Cohen and Burr, "The U.S Discovery of Israel's Secret Nuclear Project," 2015. As Kroenig admits, when discovered by American intelligence, the Americans had few options for dealing with Dimona.78, 156. 198

As 1960 ended and John F. Kennedy came to power, the American maintained a degree of suspicion on the secret facility. Most importantly, the Israelis still managed to hide their true capabilities, and to a large extent, motivations from the Americans. The Israelis achieved their ultimate goal -- they made significant process without American detection in the late 1950s.

Unfortunately for Israel, the domestic crisis created at the end of Eisenhower's Presidency ushered in a new, energetic President attuned to the potential Israeli drive for a weapons program. The national interests of two unofficial allies were just beginning to clash. The diplomatic crisis of December 1960-January 1961 was just the prelude for a showdown between

Israel and John F. Kennedy. Kennedy's Israeli legacy eventually would be consumed with uncovering the truth on Dimona. He would still have to deal with these highly skilled Israeli practitioners of deception.

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Chapter Six: Respect and Suspicion, 1961-1962

Israel fit within Kennedy's worldview: non-communist, allied with the United States, an economic success story in the peripheral world, Western, a free and democratic society.

Kennedy's ideological position was trumped by his concern for nuclear weapons. The Dimona issue dominated Kennedy's Israeli involvement in 1961, up until his meeting with Ben-Gurion on

May 30th. While other global issues commanded Kennedy's attention for much of 1961 and throughout 1962, he remained steadfastly aligned with the Department of State, CIA, and his

National Security Council to conduct inspections of, or visits to, the Dimona reactor. He inherited from outgoing Secretary of State, Christian Herter, a cohesive approach to address the

Dimona program. 1961 and 1962 served as the calm before the storm of 1963, when Dimona formed the vortex of all American-Israeli actions. Evidently, there were murmurs of problems between the United States and Israel, as the shock and anger of the "discovery" of Dimona dissipated. Kennedy was deeply concerned and acted from the outset to monitor and ultimately prevent an Israeli bomb. As 1962 ended, Kennedy still believed in Israel, but problematic and worrying intelligence contributed to both his personal and the wider American suspicion of

Israel. He was gradually converted by an institutional (CIA and State) mistrust of Israel.

This chapter investigates the growing problem an Israeli nuclear program presented to

American-Israeli relations and their nonproliferation goals under Kennedy. During 1961 through the end of 1962, Dimona had not yet soured American-Israeli relations; however, many problems were imminent. Kennedy discerned that Dimona threatened Egypt, and by extension war in the region. American efforts to stem wider global proliferation globally (specifically, India) were integrated into the President’s response to the Israelis. Up until 1963, American-Israeli relations progressed and positive interactions characterized the relationship. The Hawk sale, economic

200

deals, and generally warm relations indicated that overtly, all appeared well. Simmering underneath the surface were continued efforts by the Americans to uncover the truth on Dimona.

Even after a seemingly positive inspection clearing the Israelis of any nuclear wrongdoing in

May of 1961, and personal promises Ben-Gurion made to Kennedy, the President ordered a more focused effort to understand Dimona. This chapter traces the Kennedy Administration as they began to inherit the institutional (meaning CIA and State) suspicion of Dimona and by extension,

Israel. A bevy of worrying findings and a sense that Dimona’s real purpose was not yet uncovered challenged Kennedy’s view of Israel. While Kennedy had believed in Israel economically, ideologically, and as a partner in fighting the Cold War (economically, and through arms deals), it was during these first two years that he began to acquire the institutional distrust of Israel. Kennedy’s suspicion mounted on the perceived continuous Israeli secrecy around their intentions at Dimona. The Dimona issue was the main impetus for this lack of trust with Israel. Those closest to Kennedy maintained even when he appeared "absent" from official discussions, he along with Bundy and Komer continued to study pertinent intelligence firsthand.

He was never far from this issue. The production of more in-depth internal studies on nonproliferation clarified how Israel fit into the wider American concern with the spread of nuclear weapons. The Israelis needed to be stopped in order that other countries would not follow suit.578 The American nuclear domino theory hinged on preventing an Israeli bomb.

On the eve of Kennedy taking office, Herter brought him up-to-date on Dimona. Israel had constructed a reactor capable of producing ninety kilograms of "weapons-quality plutonium by 1963." He urged Kennedy to follow the Department and Eisenhower's late push for inspections, warning him not to relent on bringing the reactor under inspection -- this was needed

578 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation”: 5, 8. 201

to prevent Israel from developing nuclear weapons in the Middle East.579 These two initial briefings shaped the Kennedy Administration's model for addressing Israel: they would push for inspections, or "visits"-- the term preferred by Israel. There was an undercurrent, particularly in the CIA and Department of State, of continued distrust in the Israelis. Intelligence gathering and analysis was heightened to confirm such suspicions. Kennedy did not formulate the approach, rather extrapolated from methods and plans launched by Christian Herter and to a lesser extent,

President Eisenhower. The difference was that Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, was personally committed from the beginning. The continued distrust on Dimona was evident by the continuity in personnel at the CIA and within the Department of State. The deep concern of many government figures in uncovering the truth of Israel's program was perfectly matched with this incoming President, who had a heightened interest in nuclear proliferation, the Middle East, and the nuclear order.

From the beginning, Kennedy had made nuclear proliferation a foreign policy goal. He was the first President to do so from the outset of his term.580 He was the first President who could possibly face thermonuclear war on such a scale no victor would emerge, and the world would become unlivable.581 This permeated his thoughts on nuclear proliferation and Dimona.

Kennedy maintained a personal interest in nuclear proliferation since his tenure as

Senator, and outlined the dangers for the world should proliferation continue. On the campaign trail, he had listed those nations close to a weapon or those who had discussed nuclear weapons openly: Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and his incessant fear, Communist China. Kennedy's next admission was the most insightful: He identified by name every country capable or likely to proliferate: Belgium, Japan, India, West Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, South Africa,

579 Reeves, 30, 32-33. 580 Evron, 142. 581 Craig, 1374. 202

Spain, Hungary, Argentina, and Austria. The Senator concluded that all these nations possessed the ability to create a weapon if feasible, given their expertise and resources.582 Of all the potential countries, and his list is exhaustive, Kennedy never mentioned Israel. The NIEs (by

1957) had already identified Israel in all their estimates, which only intensified the scrutiny towards an Israeli nuclear weapons program. Kennedy, who prioritized nuclear proliferation, had been blindsided by Israel’s foray into proliferation and made this new proliferation threat a foreign policy priority.

Israel had two problems moving forward with their nuclear program: Firstly, the

American government was intensely focused on their program after having failed to detect the

Dimona facility initially -- this was addressed at the end of Eisenhower's Presidency, Secondly, under Kennedy's leadership, the National Security Council and White House welcomed a new, energetic leader with a policy to monitor Dimona and collect additional information.

Kennedy’s Introduction to Dimona

As John F. Kennedy took office, he immediately called for a summation from the State

Department and American intelligence to chronicle and present all relevant information known on Dimona up to that point.583 Kennedy read a detailed timeline of the history of what the

Americans knew about Dimona. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, informed the President in preparation for his upcoming meeting with outgoing Israeli Ambassador Ogden Reid that out of the myriad issues, the Dimona issue warranted special attention.584 Under Kennedy's direction,

Dimona quickly became the top Israeli priority. Rusk provided Kennedy with a timeline of

582 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, 23-24. 583 For Mr. Mak NEA from Raymond L. Perkins (Memo) Jan 27th, 1961. Israeli Reactor. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor Part 1 of 2, RG 59 Records of the Dept. of State Office of the Secretary Special Asst. to Sec. of State for Atomic Energy & Outer Space Gen. Records to Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. National Archives of the United States, Archives II. College Park, Maryland/Washington DC. 584 Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk Jan 30th, 1961. Subject: Your appointment with Ogden R. Red. Ireland/Israel Folder Israel, General 1/61. Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Country Files, Box 118. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 203

Dimona's discovery. This timeline included every American action, all recorded Israeli responses on the reactor, and particularly off-putting, the repeated pretensions of textile factories and excuses. Kennedy understood the American policy moving forward: Israel had repeatedly stated the reactor was solely for peaceful purposes. To ensure that this was truly the case, the United

States would press until they or an international agency inspected the reactor.585

Kennedy recognized that Israel's production or acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be disastrous to the region. One possible scenario was particularly devastating: the Soviets could provide weapons or more likely station their weapons in an Arab country. Rusk informed

Kennedy that both his Department and the intelligence community were monitoring Israel's progress and goals. An important point was raised: the Dimona issue was incorporated into the larger global proliferation problem -- not solely a problem for the Middle East. Rusk confessed that Israel was monitored "as were other countries to assure that nuclear weapons capabilities are not being proliferated."586 Accordingly, from the start of Kennedy's term, the issue of proliferation was approached as a global issue. The President ensured that the Israelis, Arabs, and other potential proliferating countries understood that Israel was not receiving any special treatment from the United States. Israel would not be able to argue as they had under Eisenhower that they were punished excessively. Rusk wanted Kennedy to buy in from the outset.

On the 31st, Kennedy met with Reid to get acquainted with all American-Israeli issues.

Reid admitted he believed Ben-Gurion's assertion at least at "face-value" that Dimona was solely for peaceful purposes. Reid confided in Kennedy that he believed an inspection from a qualified scientist should be pursued as quickly as possible, and that if secrecy of said visit could be kept,

585 “History of United States Interest in Israel's Atomic Energy Activities,” (attached to Jan 30th, 1961). Israeli Security 1961-1963, President's Office Files, Box 119a. Digital Identifier JFKPOF119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 586 Memo for the Pres., Rusk to Kennedy Jan 30th, 1961 Subject: Israel's Atomic Energy Activities. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30 1961- Oct 2, 1963. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 204

he believed the Israelis could agree to such an endeavour in the coming month.587 Reid had pressed hard for inspections under Eisenhower and Herter's aggressive diplomacy in early 1961 -

- both Harman and Ben-Gurion agreed inspections could be accepted as the matter came to subside from the public's view.

Kennedy had a busy first ten days regarding Israel. He inherited a potential crisis which was subsiding thanks to the efforts of Herter, Reid, and strong navigational diplomacy by Israeli

Ambassador Harman. Nonetheless, he knew he had to stay on top of Israel on this issue. On the last day of January, Kennedy received the finished product outlining how American intelligence missed Dimona since 1957.588 The President was fully informed on the depths of Israeli deceit, clever diplomacy, and continued excuses to delay their response to the United States which further reinforced his perception of the Dimona issue.

President Kennedy proceeded publicly according to this rubric: Israel's program was intended for peaceful purposes as a research facility, either for the Negev desert or eventual nuclear power. The facility had to be inspected and every nuclear action by Israel from the purchase and movement of materials to any suspicious activity, or posturing needed to be monitored. The administration pushed for an inspection of Dimona at the start of February; however, the Israeli domestic political scene was embroiled in a crisis. The United States encountered an Israeli government with no current sitting leader. This was due to Ben-Gurion’s momentary resignation resulting from a scandal labeled, "the Lavon Affair”. This was an extremely complex debacle that plagued Israeli politics with details lingering over decades.589

587 Conversation with Ogden Reid Dictation, Jan 31st, 1961. General, 1961-1963. POF, Box 119a. JKPL. Boston, MA. 588 "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60," Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor Part 1 of 2. RG 59 Gen. Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 589 Gili Cohen, "Israel Reveals Controversial 'Lavon Affair' Correspondence, 62 Years Later,” Haaretz, June 25th, 2016. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-reveals-controversial-lavon-affair-correspondence-62-years-later- 205

The Lavon Affair involved an unsuccessful Israeli sabotage mission within Egypt, dating back to the mid-1950s. The scandal centered on who was really to blame for ordering the mission. Pinhas (Pinchas) Lavon, then serving as Defense Minister, was blamed and later absolved of responsibility. This all greatly angered Ben-Gurion. In protest of the courts exonerating a Ben-Gurion enemy (Lavon), the Israeli Prime Minister resigned on January 31st triggering Israeli elections in the summer of 1961.590

As February began with the Americans pushing for a Dimona inspection, Ambassador

Harman informed his counterparts that this would not be possible in the short term. Given Ben-

Gurion and his entire Cabinet resigned, and that "Israel was in crisis as Ben-Gurion was set to take a four-week-vacation", he was said to be in charge of a current "caretaker government."591

The CIA and American intelligence community accurately analyzed the issue long after the

Affair subsided, and Ben-Gurion's Mapai formed a new governing coalition in August. As the

CIA analyzed Ben-Gurion’s behaviour during the Affair, they welded together personality and character with his "obsession" for Israel's security with his decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program. By February, the CIA deduced it was Ben-Gurion who ordered Cabinet in secret at an unknown date in 1956 to construct the reactor in Dimona. This was the most accurate intelligence analysis of Israel's program to date, citing this new reactor could be a "plutonium-

1.5401166. Yossi Melman, "Are We Any Closer to Solving the Riddle of the Lavon Affair," The Jerusalem Post, May 11th, 2015. https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Are-we-any-closer-to-solving-the-riddle-of-the-Lavon-Affair- 402684 590 J.L. Talmon, "The Lavon Affair," 1961: Analysis, in Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) 2nd edition. (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2008), 168-169. Talmon called this issue "the greatest scandal since the founding of the State". 169. 591 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Israeli Reactor Feb 3, 1961. Participants: Avraham Harman and G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary for NEA.; Memorandum for Brigadier Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, The White House from Walter J. Stoessel Jr. Director Executive Secretariat. Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Activities Feb. 4th, 1961. 884A-1901/2-361 RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 206

producing reactor” which would permit, if necessary, the manufacture of an atomic bomb. This decision was revealed to an extremely small circle of confidants."592

With no sitting Cabinet after Ben-Gurion's resignation, the Israelis, primarily through

Ambassador Harman, made the case that no inspection could transpire, as the country was in a state of flux. The Americans did not relent. During meetings with Israeli personnel in February, the Americans presented their interactions as a discussion between two friends. An American administration official warned that "no doubts or suspicions" should interfere with this strong friendship. The Israeli Embassy countered that an inspection would not be possible given the

Lavon Affair and Ben-Gurion’s complete preoccupation with this domestic problem. Hence, the inspection promised back in early January could not come to fruition in the near future. The

Israelis inquired why were the Americans still concerned with the Dimona issue, after Ben-

Gurion's assurances of a peaceful nature and his admission that all plutonium produced would go back to the original uranium supplying country, in this case France? Israel had maintained this position since late-December and early-January after Ben-Gurion publicly and privately gave assurances and details on the Dimona program. Members of the Kennedy Administration admitted the Israeli view was understandable, but the "idea of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was absolutely anathema to the United States, although rightly or wrongly, the suspicion of obtaining such a capability had fallen on Israel."593 As both states were "such close friends" and since it was the Israelis who made the offer for a visit, the Americans suggested it

592 Memorandum Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Resignation, 6, Feb 7th, 1961 CIA. Israel, General, 2/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 593 Memorandum of Conversation Feb 3d, 1961. Participants: Avraham Harman and G. Lewis Jones Ass. Secretary for NEA. Subject: Israeli Reactor. Israel General 1961-1963 POF Box 119a. Digital Identifier JFKPOF-119a-005 POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 207

was in both countries' interests and for "common good sense" that a quiet, non-publicized visit take place.594

In February of 1961, Dimona was vitally important to the United States. The Americans were simultaneously concerned about the impact of Dimona within the American-Israeli relationship, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the East-West conflict as well as Kennedy’s emerging effort to fight global proliferation. From the outset, the government tried to assure all potential

Israeli enemies or partners how seriously they treated Dimona. The American concern, as evidenced in their February meetings with the Israelis, involved the Arabs -- firstly, that they not even suspect the Israeli program; and secondly, this was a signal to other potential proliferators.

If other nations perceived Israel was being treated softly by the Americans or that their program was advancing, a double standard would ensue.

The Lavon Affair bought Ben-Gurion even more precious time. While the United States remained adamant that Israel agree and schedule a date for inspection at the earliest availability, with no sitting government, the scandal afforded the Israelis weeks or longer for their secret facilities, a chemical reprocessing plant, to continue its covert development.595 The Israelis did not create the Lavon Affair to divert from Dimona. Yet, they capitalized on the opportunity. The problem was that the Americans would not waver.

One of the main goals of Kennedy's Administration regarding Dimona was to assure

Israel's enemies, the UAR, that nothing untoward was being produced. In a series of meetings between State Department members and UAR/Egyptian diplomats, the Americans tied their fight against Israeli proliferation to the larger context. The United States opposed "any extension of

594 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Israeli Reactor Feb 3rd, 1961. Participants: Avraham Harman and G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary for NEA.; Memorandum for Brigadier Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, The White House from Walter J. Stoessel Jr. Director Executive Secretariat. Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Activities. 884A-1901/2- 361 RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 595 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 142. 208

nuclear weapons capability", not just in the case of Israel. The Americans tried to reassure their

Egyptian counterparts by highlighting that at the last IAEA meeting the Israelis voiced their support for international controls on nuclear reactors. This opinion contrasted with another well- known proliferation threat: India. The Americans informed UAR diplomats that they believed

Israel did not seem like a state that was trying to hide a nuclear program.596 This meeting provides further insight into American strategic thinking on the Dimona issue: Firstly, Israel was linked to the global problem of proliferation, specifically with India. Secondly, even when the intelligence community and national security staff believed something was going on in Dimona, they would tell the Egyptians that there was no need for concern. This was the American double- play of continuing to investigate their own suspicions on Dimona while reassuring worried parties.

The Threat of an Israeli Nuclear Weapon

The State Department informed the UAR that the issue of Israeli proliferation fit within a wider American concern to prevent global proliferation. This was not rhetoric used to nullify

Egyptian trepidation. Kennedy discussed an eventual agreement to limit nuclear testing and proliferation early in his Presidency. Within the State Department, the Policy Planning Council’s role was to analyze future national security threats. Headed by Kennedy’s economic adviser,

Walt Rostow, the PPC developed intricate studies and contingency plans to address emerging challenges. As early as February 1961, they confronted the "Nth Country Problem" of potentially endless proliferation. They identified security concerns for 1961 and shared their findings with

596 Memorandum of Conversation Feb 6th, 1961. Subject: Israeli Reactor, Participants: H.E. Dr. Mustafa Kamel, UAR Ambassador, NEA G. Lewis Jones, NE William D. Brewer. Folder 884A.1901/2-361 RG 59 Gen Records Dept. of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA.; Memorandum of Conversation Department of State Feb 7th, 1961. Subject: Israeli Reactor (three of three) Participants: The Secretary (Rusk), Mostafa Kamel, G. Lewis Jones and William D. Brewer. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 209

Kennedy's NSC (specifically, Robert Komer). While reaffirming the American preoccupation with European proliferation, they identified Israel as a larger problem, noting only "France,

NATO, and possibly Israel pose immediate problems."597 Unless some sort of disarmament agreement was achieved, nuclear proliferation would be difficult to curtail. Israel was labeled a global proliferation threat, and needed to be dealt with in the regional and international sphere.

Nasser's anxiety about the Israeli "nuclear energy program" also threatened to create problems for American-Egyptian relations. In the regional context, the Department advised

Kennedy to bring the Israeli program under "effective international supervision." This would help abate Nasser's distrust of the Americans and the French, and reassure the Egyptians.598

Israeli nuclear proliferation needed to be addressed immediately as a precedent or sign to other would-be proliferation threats around the globe. Hence, it was vital to convince Israel to accept international safeguards, specifically, inspections or controls.

Given the severity of Dimona's potential impact, the Americans ratcheted up their pressure on the Israelis by utilizing high level officials to convey the severity of Kennedy's deep concern with potential proliferation. Rusk asked Harman if he had received any direction or answer for an inspection date. Harman answered that Ben-Gurion's internal problems would first have to dissipate, but he was sure once Ben-Gurion returned, a visit could be arranged. The

Secretary of State then outlined the larger international proliferation and disarmament case. As

Kennedy was set to discuss the issue of nuclear testing with the Soviet Union and within the

United Nations, it was vital that Israel be honest with the United States given the stakes. The

597 Department of State, "Key National Security Problems," Feb 10, 1961. Buford Nth Country Problem, 33. Attached to Master List of Planning Problems July 31st, 1961 Doc 4a. Item #3 "The Nth Country Problem," Folder National Security Problems 1961. Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Files of Robert W. Komer, Box 438. JKPL, Boston, MA. 598 Department of State. Written by Halla. "#19 The Arab-Israel Problem," undated in Master List of Planning Problems July 31st, 1961. Folder National Security Problems 1961. NSF, Box 438. JKPL, Boston, MA. 210

Israeli Ambassador raised the now familiar Israeli defense advanced earlier to Eisenhower officials: it would take two-to-three years before any production of note could take place in

Dimona. The implication was that this was not a pressing concern for Israel, nor should it be for the Americans, as they had a great deal of time to address the issue.599 By this stage, the

Americans were familiar with Harman's nonchalant characterization of the Dimona issue. The

Israelis knew how important this issue was for the United States and this was yet another diplomatic tactic to stall and frame the reactor as a non-issue.

Dean Rusk questioned the Israelis on their future intentions and what would happen as the status quo between Israel and the Arabs changed. Harman stated that a Middle East arms race was in full force, dating back to the Czech arms deal of 1955 -- the Israelis, he admonished, needed to keep pace. The Americans concluded that fortunately only small arms could be produced and no "deadly stuff" could come from either Israel or Egypt. This could change should the Israelis produce a nuclear weapon.600 Kennedy did not need further impetus to prevent a nuclear bomb; however, with an arms race accelerating, he knew it was essential to act while weapons were still in the conventional realm.

In a further analysis of the meeting and the Dimona program's secrecy, White House staff conceded that Israel had a valid case to hide their program, given the deadly repercussions should their Arab neighbours uncover this development. Harman admitted that the fact information about the Israeli reactor was shared in the press was unfortunate. Furthermore, though congressional leaders were frustrated with the government's lack of transparency on the issue, with a considerable delay of Dimona information to Congress, this was for the best in

599 Memorandum of Conversation Feb 13th, 1961. Subject: Inspection of Israel's New Atomic Reactor, Participants: The Secretary, Avraham Harman, Mordechai Gazit, Minister Embassy of Israel, G. Lewis Jones and NE William L. Hamilton. 884A.1901/2-361. RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 600 Telegram Amembassy Tel Aviv to NEA Mr. Jones Reporting Ambassador Harman's Call to Secretary Feb 13th. Israel, General 2/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL. Boston, MA. 211

addressing Israel's program.601 In Congress, Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, a prominent member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had repeatedly inquired about Dimona.

Fulbright was often a vehement critic of Israel, yet he wanted to be kept up-to-date on all Israeli activities, arguably his right.602 The Dimona issue was only accessible to a select few -- Kennedy did not want publicity, a spectrum of opinions, or a wide-encompassing audience on this matter.

This was part of his personal strategy, but it also honoured a commitment that Herter made to

Harman back in January. Despite Fulbright’s and several senators' anger on the Dimona issue, officials in the State Department and White House showed empathy towards the Israeli position.

The Americans could understand why Israel had undertaken, and continued doing, what they did.

Despite the Israeli view, the problem was that any nuclear weapon development clashed with

American objectives and security goals -- this could not be tolerated. It was not ignorance about

Israel's security challenges that plagued the United States rather American goals superseded those of Israel. Herein lay the central conflict of Dimona: there was a legitimate security aspiration that made logical sense for Israel to pursue nuclear weapons. Conversely, their nuclear program went against American interests, power projection and aspirations in the Middle East and around the globe.603 Kennedy and the Americans could not accept an openly-known Israeli nuclear program.

McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's National Security Adviser, met with Harman and

Mordechai Gazit on the 16th of February. Avraham Harman expressed Israeli anxiety over superior weapons and training afforded to the UAR from the Soviet Union. Bundy inquired as to

601 Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy through Ralph A Dungan from Walter J. Stoessel Feb 21st, 1961. Subject: Ambassador Harman's Call Feb 16. Israel, General 2/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 602 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 68. Fulbright and Bourke B. Hickenlooper were angered by Israeli actions over Dimona, namely, the secrecy of the program. Fulbright would later call for investigations on American Zionist Organisations as potential foreign entities. Fulbright would continue to inquire about inspections and the latest information on Dimona in 1962. 603 Mearsheimer and Walt, 148. The authors argue this conflict of national interests held for the 1960s. 212

whether the Dimona reactor heightened this Israeli-labeled arms race. Harman quipped that

Israel had no intention to produce a bomb, and reverted to his timeline excuse that Israel was three-to-four years away from any bomb. Harman then went further and contended that the

Dimona reactor was insignificant given its size to create an Arab worry. He argued that even if the UAR developed a reactor of a similar size or even larger, the Israelis would not be concerned.604 This was a blatant lie as the Israelis would argue in 1963 that they were concerned about Egyptian nuclear aspirations and unconventional weapons. Harman persisted that Israel was nowhere near a bomb and that this should not be of concern to the United States.

The Kennedy Administration continued their push towards inspections and though they were repeatedly guaranteed the peaceful intent of Dimona, intelligence groups continued to dig for information. Throughout February, the various American intelligence agencies amassed an impressive portfolio on Israeli nuclear developments -- the Central Intelligence Agency was the leading player. Secondly, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the INR, who provided foreign intelligence for diplomats and the State Department, also collected information on

Dimona. Lastly, the armed intelligence services, specifically, The Office of Naval Intelligence, also practiced surveillance within Israel. Having learned from 1960, the Americans were comprehensively trying to uncover the truth on the Dimona reactor. The American Embassy in

Israel interviewed a former worker at the Dimona site, and while little information came from this encounter, they were prying at every opportunity.605 Naval Intelligence in Israel monitored developments in the Israeli Knesset on the nuclear issue. The only real dissenting view, that of the Israeli Communist Party, shone light on the minimal political debate within Israel. A

604 Memorandum of Conversation Israel's Security and Other Problems Feb 16th, 1961. Participants: McGeorge Bundy, Harman, Gazit, NE William L. Hamilton. Israel, General 2/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 605 Official Informal Secret John F. Shaw Charge D'Affaires ad interim to Armin Meyer Director Office of Near Eastern Affairs, American Embassy Tel Aviv Jan 31st, 1961. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 213

Communist Member of Knesset asked publicly about the budget for Dimona, specifically, from where the money came. Finance Minister Levi Eshkol retorted that the budget could be found in

"accepted arrangements and control procedures."606 By this stage, even domestic intelligence in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was involved in the hunt to acquire information on Dimona. They were alerted to a request from an Israeli scientist, a Mr. Hermoni, inquiring about a classified talk from a British nuclear expert in England. The FBI surmised that if Israel's intentions were peaceful, they would not be concerned with ascertaining the information presented in this closed talk for the Unites States Navy.607

This intense surveillance of Israel across the spectrum of the American intelligence community is unsurprising, despite an unofficial agreement between the Israelis and Americans not to spy on one another during Kennedy's Presidency.608 James Jesus Angleton, the Israeli

Desk chief within the CIA, delivered an insightful quote concerning the beginning of the CIA-

Mossad relationship in the early 1950s: he argued that it was built on "respect and mistrust".609

This was how the American government, specifically State and the CIA, viewed Israel concerning Dimona in the early 1960s -- they believed in Israel, though they did not trust the

Israelis. Even as continued meetings produced more Israeli pledges that nothing menacing was produced, their peaceful intent never wavered. The Americans never fully trusted the Israelis.

President Kennedy would gradually inherit this mistrust and suspicion on Dimona.

606 Info Report Office of Naval Intelligence Feb 21st, 1961. Date of Report Feb 21st, 1961. Israel: Atomic Budgeting of. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 607 Federal Bureau of Investigation Feb 20th, 1961 to Director Naval Intelligence from John Edgar Hoover, Director, Subject: A. Hermoni Internal Security Israel. Folder 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 Part 1 of 2. RG 59 Gen Records Dept of State Atomic Energy Matters 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 608 Hersh, 90. This was a gentleman's agreement dating back to the mid-1950s between the Mossad and CIA. Kahana, 415. This is one reason that Dimona was missed -- the CIA had to pretend they were not spying on Israel. Both sides were breaking this agreement -- even allies have diverging national interests. 609 Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: The Untold History of Israeli Intelligence, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), 169. 214

Teddy Kollek, the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, and close confidant of

Ben-Gurion, informed the Americans on February 26th that he perceived of no obstacle for an

American scientist to inspect the reactor in March. The State Department were already in the process of evaluating an expert to send610 and had a set date in mind. They believed that Ben-

Gurion authorized this admission and pounced on the opportunity to pressure the Israelis.

On March 3rd, the State Department concurrently continued their push for inspections with the Israelis and their efforts to assure the Arabs that no nefarious activity was underway in

Israel. Rusk advised American Ambassadors to stymie activity on Israel. The Department admitted that nuclear power and energy had reached a point akin to electricity as many nations could develop capabilities -- the question was how to ensure a peaceful intent. The issue of how plutonium would be produced and where this would go needed to be addressed. On Israel, a clear position emerged: State understood that several countries had reactors "considerably larger than

Dimona"; they raised India as an example. The Department outlined that all countries needed to be monitored, including the UAR with an emerging (modest) nuclear reactor. Lastly, Israel, once more was presented as just one of many cases which would be monitored -- as was India.611 Two points deserve further discussion concerning this State circular: firstly, a brief on why India was continually raised. Since 1959-1960, India claimed they could, should they choose to, set off a nuclear test as they possessed that capability. India's Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru consistently opposed nuclear weapon development for India. Nevertheless, due to extensive nuclear aid from Canada for "peaceful purposes" along with tens of tons of heavy-water sales from the United States since the late 1950s, India was a proliferation concern for the

610 Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk March 3rd, 1961 Subject: Israeli Reactor. Israel General 1961- 1963. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 611 Department of State Circular Mar 3rd, 1961. To Baghdad, Beirut, Paris, London, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Amman, Cairo, USUN. 884A.1901/2-361. RG 59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 215

Americans.612 Considering India was officially neutral yet received hundreds of millions from the Soviet Union and the United States, it was quite easy to understand why Herter warned

Kennedy about India and Israeli proliferation specifically. Secondly, this is the second instance noted where India was explicitly tied to Israel and the larger issue of nonproliferation. Once again, this was a signal to the Arabs that Israel was not a special case; the inclusion of European allies and the United Nations on this cable illustrated that this was not merely rhetoric -- rather, the official American position. The United States understood they had a regional Middle Eastern nuclear problem and a wider global problem -- the two were entwined: the Americans opposed global proliferation.

The danger for the region if the Israelis did proliferate was heightened when UAR diplomats and intermediaries informed the Americans that should Egypt discover the Israelis developed nuclear capabilities, the Egyptians would "go to any lengths" to attain nuclear weapons of their own -- they were even willing to side with the Soviet Union.613 This added another impetus to Kennedy’s thrust to prevent Israel from pursuing weapons.

Throughout March, the Americans continued on this dual track of lobbying for an inspection of Dimona, while privately gathering intelligence and continuing to ascertain any possible pertinent information on Dimona. Meetings with Israeli diplomats continued with the usual outcome: the Americans would press for an inspection date to be set and the Israelis delivered an excuse. Specifically, the Israelis employed the fallout of the Lavon Affair and the problems for Ben-Gurion. Due to these obstacles, the Israeli Prime Minister had no time to deal with Dimona. The Israelis argued that given his host of critics, Ben-Gurion could not be seen as

612 Digital National Security Archive, "Chronology: US Nuclear Non Proliferation”. In 1959, an Indian politician made the claim that India without any foreign help could, if they chose to, produce a nuclear weapon. 613 Department of State Telegram March 11th, 1961. Amembassy Cairo (Reinhardt) to Secretary of State. 884A.1901/2-361. RG 59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. This news came through a visiting American Muslim, who held discussions with members of Nasser's inner-circle. 216

weak on foreign affairs bending to American demands on inspections -- this would hurt him at home.614 The Americans made it clear that no matter the explanation, the inspection was going to happen. They would not drop the request to inspect. Hidden from the Israelis was the extent of

American information-gathering.

The State Department learned in December of 1960 that Norway, within its bilateral agreement with Israel -- having sold Israel the necessary heavy-water she needed -- could inspect the Dimona reactor as a listed safeguard. The Americans had asked the Norwegians repeatedly if they had done so; the Norwegians answered that they had not and given the delicate nature of the situation were not eager to inspect. In March, the Americans pressed the Norwegians to inspect

Dimona.615 If the United States could not get a favourable response on an inspection date, they were not content to wait -- another nation would need to inspect (anyone, but France). The level of distrust and suspicion was apparent within the American Government.

March ended with no formal inspection date provided by the Israelis. Kennedy personally conveyed to the Israelis he wanted a visit and an immediate date. Israeli Ambassador Harman, having used all his capital on the Lavon Affair excuse, agreed to a visit, but cautioned this would have to wait until after Passover, after April 10th. Harman voiced Ben-Gurion's irritation that the

Prime Minister, having given his word, did not enjoy being forced to comply on this request, particularly in a tense political climate where he could be criticized on Dimona.616 Israel’s

614 Memorandum Department of State Lewis Jones to Secretary of State March 7th, 1961. Subject: Visit to Dimona Reactor in Israel. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2. RG 59 1948-1962 Nuclear Energy, Box 501. NA. 615 Department of State Memorandum Ernest L Stranger, UNP to Mr. Cargo UNP March 10th, 1961. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 616 Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State (Bowles) March 30th, 1961. Dimona Reactor in Israel; Department of State Memorandum of Conversation March 28th, 1961. Dimona Reactor, Participants: Harman and Jones. Israel, General: 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL. Boston, MA. Avner Cohen first traced the Israel dual approach of the Lavon Affair and Jewish holidays in preventing a concrete date for a Dimona inspection during this period. Israel and the Bomb, 102. 217

leaders concluded that a visit could take place on May 15th, or sometime that week.617After months of continued persistence, the Americans attained a date to inspect Dimona, albeit the inspection would be labeled a "visit".

The Americans had finally received a concession from Israel on a date; they had honoured their word. The Israelis still held reservations about the visit. Zero publicity or any kind of information was advised, though the Americans did not want to have to deny leaks.

Furthermore, Mordechai Gazit rebuffed an American suggestion to inform the British of the inspection. According to Gazit, Ben-Gurion inquired "what concern is Dimona to the UK?"

Gazit did not seem upset, yet Israel wanted this to be very low key with little sharing on the imminent inspection.618 A State Department officer told Gazit that two heavy water American experts would come to inspect the facility and would make it appear as a casual visit. The

Americans wasted no time as Philip Farley, the atomic energy expert within State, had already selected potential inspectors. The two experts were: Ulysses M. Staebler, who served as Senior

Assistant Director of the Division of Reactor Development within the AEC, and Jesse William

Croach Jr., who worked at Dupont as a scientist and at the Savannah River Laboratory. The

Israelis accepted the American nominees and discussed a two four-day trip with no publicity.

The Americans readied for any possible leak and maintained no coverage of the issue.619

In April, Norway informed the United States that they had conducted an inspection in

March and found no evidence of fissionable materials. Given what the Norwegians witnessed, they deduced the Israelis were under "appropriate safeguards." They concluded "we have no

617 Telegram Info Report CIA April 10th, 1961 Israel Subject: Date Selected for an Official US Visit to the Dimona Reactor 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 618 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Apr 17th, 1961. U.S. Visits to Dimona Participants: Jones and Gazit. 884A.1901/2-361 RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 619 Department of State to Amembassy Tel Aviv Apr 28th, 1961. 884A.1901/2-361 RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 218

basis to believe that the Israelis are misusing the heavy water."620 The Norwegians did not carry out the complete inspection the Americans sought; however, they uncovered no evidence of

Israeli weapons. Heading into May, American intelligence had no solid proof that Israel was pursuing a weapon. The Norwegian inspection bolstered this case. Still, based on the continued suspicion of Israel, the Americans wanted to see for themselves.

After agreeing to this inspection, the Israelis submitted a request for a meeting between

Ben-Gurion and Kennedy. The request was submitted through an interesting channel. On the

American side, it came via Myer Feldman, who transmitted the request from Abraham Feinberg.

Feinberg, the fundraising mind behind the "Committee of Thirty", was the catalyst for the meeting. Kennedy agreed to meet sometime in late May. It is interesting, within the documents, that outside of Kennedy’s Administration, Feinberg was not widely known. He was described as an individual "from NY named Abe Feinberg"621 – a point that warrants attention.

This is one of the only documented cases of Feinberg's influence or direct action between

Israel and the Kennedy Administration. Kennedy knew Feinberg, a Democratic donor, from his

Hotel Pierre meeting with Jewish leaders in the summer of 1960. While it is clear in this instance that Feinberg was influential in establishing a Kennedy-Ben-Gurion meeting, his impact on

Kennedy's thinking about the Dimona issue is unclear. The only official role Feinberg carried, besides acting as a major financial contributor to the Democrats, was his title as an adviser to

Philip Klutznick, American Ambassador to the United Nations and Adlai Stevenson's deputy for

620 Memorandum of Conversation Apr 28th, 1961 Participants: Dr. Gunner Randers, Mr. Miller N. Hudson Subject: Safeguards for Dr. C. Reichardt, Intelligence, Charles W. Thomas S/AE Department of State. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. The Norwegians inspected "heavy drums" and took 100 gram samples to be tested. 621 Editorial Note, Doc 35. 86 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East 1961- 1962. Nina J. Noring ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie gen ed. (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994). 219

several years.622 Combing through the documents, he never appears when Dimona was discussed. In other instances, however, scholars have posited his role was vital. Seymour Hersh argued that not only did Feinberg arrange this meeting, he was critical in delaying or postponing any American inspections of Dimona.623 It is clear that Feinberg was involved on various issues voicing domestic Jewish concern on Yemen in 1962-1963. He also had regular contact with

Myer Feldman. One could say he was a lobbyist yet he did not have any official ties to Israel.624

The Dimona matter was so highly sensitive that this was a unique scenario with so few individuals involved.

Warren Bass highlights a demoralizing yet relevant point: much of the discussion involving Kennedy, his brother Bobby (his most trusted advisor), and Dimona was not written down, rather was conveyed in conversations and face-to-face encounters.625 There are ample sources available to reconstruct the American response to Dimona; however, Feinberg's influence remains uncertain.

Inspection and the road to the Waldorf-Astoria

After requesting a delayed inspection, to which the Americans refused, the Israelis submitted to an American “visit” on May 18th. The Israelis continually strove for any possible delay as this gave the French time to work. The Israelis knew they needed about a year since

Dimona was discovered, so that the French could secretly construct Israel's chemical processing

(separation plant) underground at Dimona.626 The American visitors would be the "guests" of the

Israel Atomic Energy Commission -- they would be in Israel for four days and after the regular

622 Tivnan, 56. 623 Hersh, 94-95, Hersh argues that Kennedy asked Feinberg to attend the meeting, though he declined, 102. 624 “Myer Feldman Oral History Interview #11,” 505. July 29th, 1967. Washington, DC, JKPL, Boston, MA. Feldman contended that Feinberg and other American Jews "tried to get concessions -- halt propaganda for Yemini recognition" so he was helping Kennedy in this instance. Klutznick had been president of B'nai B'rith; however, he was not formally tied to the Israeli government. 625 Bass,189. 626 Aronson and Brosh, 72-73. The authors argue this was Ben-Gurion's approach since 1960. 220

Atoms for Peace, Nahal Soreq inspection, they could visit the Dimona site. The Israelis advised the Americans it was preferable for the visiting inspectors not to be in touch with the American

Embassy in Israel so as to keep as low a profile as possible and to avoid leaks -- the Americans agreed.627At first, this appears an innocent request and a courtesy to which the Americans responded. The Israelis had been adamant that no public information come to light on the

American inspection of Dimona during their stay in Israel. Upon further review, this was presumably an Israeli effort to ensure that the intelligence reports and latest reconnaissance missions from the American Embassy not be shared with the inspectors. The less information the inspectors had on the political side for Israel, the better. The Israelis wanted this to be a purely scientific visit and as such divorce the scientists from understanding the history of the Dimona reactor and the tension it had caused.

There is no documentary evidence that the inspectors were given excessive intelligence reports on the history, or current intelligence gathering, or the latest information on the Dimona project. Avner Cohen argued twenty years ago, based on interviews with CIA personnel (namely, former Tel Aviv Bureau Chief, John Hadden), that the inspectors were not privy to the aerial surveillance from the U-2 planes, or an extensive intelligence briefing prior to the trip.628

Continuing on Cohen's informed speculation, he and William Burr argue that the inspectors may have been sent to verify with their own eyes, devoid of the reports, what intelligence long

627 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, May 4th, 1961 Visit to Israeli Reactor Participants: Mordechai Gazit, James Farley, Armin Meyer NEA. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 628 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 107. Intelligence scholars Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount corroborate Cohen's argument stating that the inspectors were not privy to any intelligence prior to leaving. They argue the inspection's findings were "unsurprisingly uninformative". Montgomery and Mount: 376. 221

suspected.629 Based on this line of logical speculation, the Israeli Embassy's request to separate the inspectors from political personnel does not appear to be as innocent.

May 1961 represented the most intense American focus on Israel's nuclear program before an eruption of activity in the Spring and Summer of 1963 between the United States and

Israel. Unequivocally, this month marked the highest degree of participation by President

Kennedy in 1961 and 1962. There are really two reasons for this high profile and priority for the

President: firstly, on May 18th, American inspectors were set to finally inspect Dimona; secondly, a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Kennedy was arranged for May 30th. Ben-Gurion would be "unofficially" (he was not officially invited by Kennedy to Washington) visiting the

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City where he would meet the President.

Rusk briefed Kennedy that the Israelis admitted they wanted to discuss the Dimona issue at length during the May 30th meeting. It was their hope to have the report of the inspection ready before Kennedy met with Ben-Gurion.630 Absolute secrecy was paramount for the upcoming visit. State even advised their Embassy personnel in London, arguably the closest

American ally, that an agreement had been agreed to, and to tell the British that perhaps a visit could be arranged in June.631 This secrecy was to prevent any leaks, yet it is illuminating that even the British were not informed of the inner-workings of Dimona procedures until after the inspection was completed. The Americans honoured the Israelis' repeated request for total silence on the issue. The Americans wanted to witness firsthand what the Israelis were doing before discussing with their allies. Mistrust reigned supreme; however, the Americans still respected Israel's wishes.

629 Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. 630 Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State, Rusk. May 5th, 1961. Israel, General: 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 631 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Tel Aviv and London May 5th, 1961. 884A. 1901/2-361. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File, 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 222

McGeorge Bundy updated the President on the inspection on the 11th, specifically that no international inspector from a neutral country would be present. Kennedy had advocated for this approach since he received the suggestion from Herter. Herter had continually pushed for a

"neutral" inspection as it would quell the accusation (by the Arabs or India) that the United

States was letting the Israelis off due to their close relationship. Bundy argued a neutral inspector accompanying the Americans would help "world opinion and credibility." He informed the

President that they did not have any success on this endeavour, as the Israelis argued this "visit" was an act of honouring Ben-Gurion's promise and demonstrated his good faith. Lastly, Bundy suggested that Kennedy could pressure Ben-Gurion at this meeting on the issue of a neutral either taking over the inspections or accompanying the Americans, going forward.632 Clearly, the

Americans were cognizant of global nonproliferation when approaching the specific Israeli case.

There was a compromise reached on two factors to ensure that the visit took place: firstly, there was no publicity at all on the inspection; secondly, Kennedy’s continued request for a neutral scientist was not granted on this particular visit. Ambassador Barbour reported Ben-

Gurion argued that Israeli sovereignty had to be maintained, and like any other international country who did not receive nuclear aid (though they did under Atoms for Peace) from the

United States, they would not have to submit to any international inspections. This visit was agreed to as a courtesy between strong allies, not as an Israeli submission to the IAEA. Even with these stipulations, it was worth performing this inspection instead of no verification at all.633

The inspection occurred on the 20th of May, not the 18th, under Ulysses Staebler and J.

W. Croach. The Americans were in Israel from the 17th to the 22nd to make the inspection look

632 Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy May 11th, 1961. A Neutral Scientist to visit the Israeli Atomic Energy Installation. Israel, General: 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 633 Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy Barbour for Kennedy from L. D. Battle and M. L. Manfall. May 16th (this is the believed date and the start of the note) 1961. Israel, General: 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 223

like a wide-encompassing visit, as promised to the Israelis, the Americans visited Nahal Soreq, the Weizmann Institute, Dimona, and the Technion (in Haifa). Manes (Emmanuel) Pratt --

Peres's handpicked former IDF field officer, and now Director of the Dimona Reactor -- led the inspection. Scholars have deduced that the LAKAM were behind supervising these visits.634

Unsurprisingly, the inspectors did not uncover any insidious or revelatory information at

Dimona. This was due to well-prepared Israeli smoke and mirrors. Mordechai Vanunu later revealed that fake walls hiding elevators to a lower-level and a dummy control room were installed for the Americans.635 Nonetheless, the inspectors tried to be as thorough as possible.

The visit commenced at 11 a.m. on the 20th. Pratt sprang these details on the American team. Though he would answer all their questions, no written material would be allowed, nor any cameras permitted during the visit.636 This impromptu change to what the inspectors had been promised could have raised flags, yet the Americans were the "guests" of the Israelis and had to make do. Before the Dimona visit on the 17th and 18th, the Americans asked to meet Ernst

Bergmann. The Israelis advised against such a meeting as he was a high-profile figure and this would invite suspicion within Israel -- another warning sign for the Americans. The scientists were informed the reason for such secrecy around the reactor involved the fear of an Arab boycott for their partners, and the general desire for the Arabs not to learn of Israeli capabilities.

Pratt, with his well-prepared notes, briefed the team on the history of Israel's nuclear program, starting in 1957 with the Soreq reactor. He then delivered what from that point on became the official Israeli "history" of Dimona for the Americans. The individuals that ran Dimona were:

634 Mattson, 108. Emphatically, LAKAM gained full control of the inspections, ensuring nothing was found in 1964 onwards. 635 The Sunday Times, "Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal," Oct 5th, 1986, 1-3. MG31 K 39 Box/Vol. 117 Folder "117-13 Nuclear Power-Israel 1986-1991". NAC. 636 U.M. Staebler and J.W. Croach Jr. Notes on Visit to Israel Draft May 23rd, 1961. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 224

Bergmann, Pratt, and Israel Dostrovsky (no mention of Peres). After studies, a seventy megawatt research reactor for lab work was not feasible by Israel. Therefore, this reactor was chosen due to the availability of natural uranium, domestically. Pratt then made some interesting admissions: firstly, nuclear power would be the eventual goal; secondly and more shocking, a pilot plant for "Pu" separation, plutonium separation, was entertained for a future power reactor with plutonium as fuel.637 Here is the clearest indication that Israel was trying to inform the

Americans, or test them on their reaction to an eventual plutonium separation facility -- essential for weapons. Several warning signs were missed: even to a non-specialist, a 70 mw facility was comparable to what the Indians had; however, this greatly exceeded the megawatts needed for

"research" and is no doubt why the Israelis shifted to claiming nuclear power as their goal. They had done so only after initially telling the Americans in December and January that power was not part of the Dimona goal. Any talk of a plutonium separation facility is more distressing as this would be near impossible to monitor. Even if the intention was for nuclear power, plutonium could be transported or moved to create a bomb -- making inspection extremely challenging.

The rest of the visit and the report by the scientists is highly technical, however, certain pertinent findings were acknowledged: Dimona's construction began in 1959 (this is likely a lie;

1958 appears to be the actual beginning); the reactor was in fact close to the French EL-3 (like the Marcoule reactor) design -- this had been suspected by the CIA and State Department since the end of 1960 as they scrambled for intelligence on the facility; lastly, the facility would be completed in 1964.638 Herein resided the problem for the Americans -- this was the closest they could get or had gotten to this stage. Despite their best intelligence-gathering efforts (problematic in 1958-1960, improved in 1961), they had to at least accept this version from the Israelis. The

637 U.M. Staebler and J.W. Croach Jr. Notes on Visit to Israel Draft May 23rd, 1961. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 638 Ibid. 225

last point the inspectors raised in their report was acutely technical, though they found no real reason for concern, they raised the Israeli desire for a fuel or plutonium processing pilot plant.

They were informed of the design and concluded that was to be used for nuclear power purposes

-- "they (Israel) want enough plutonium to experiment with as a power fuel."639

President Kennedy read the report's findings on the 26th. The final report advised the

President and his national security personnel that regular inspections would be needed to ascertain the continued truth of the program; however, one visit was sufficient for 1961. The reasoning for Israeli secrecy had been accepted by the scientists and shared with Kennedy: the facility was close to Arab borders, therefore, an attack was not out of the realm of possibilities; a potential Arab boycott; and the desire for Israel to keep their scientific capacities secret. The

American inspectors apparently did not see any potential concern with the issue of plutonium as they explained that it was evident that some plutonium would eventually be produced (this was treated as an eventuality with nuclear reactors). The inspectors shared some doubt on the Israeli timeline -- they felt the 1964-date of completion was "too conservative an estimate".640 They agreed with the CIA and State Department suspicion of the Israeli timeline albeit they did not share the irritation or lack of faith in Israel that these agencies did. The report went so far as to praise the Dimona accomplishment, and noted that even with extensive French help, Dimona was a "most creditable accomplishment both in concept and execution."641 While the report appeared to validate the Israelis with a conclusion that "there is no present evidence that the

Israelis have weapon production in mind", and that "nothing was concealed" from the inspectors,

639 U.M. Staebler and J.W. Croach Jr. Notes on Visit to Israel Draft May 23rd, 1961. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 640 Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy Subject: US Scientists' Visit to Israel's Dimona Reactor, May 26th, 1961. 21. 50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2 RG59 Dept of State 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 641 Memorandum for Bundy the White House from Lucius Battle and Melvin L. Manfall. : US Scientists' Visit to Israel's Dimona Reactor, May 26th, 1961. Israel, General, 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 226

unintentionally, they raised suspicions outlining that the area fenced off is much bigger than the reactor facility itself.642 American intelligence and State built upon these findings and despite a supposed exonerating visit, their skepticism did not dissipate. Kennedy and the Americans did not find any evidence to contradict Israeli assurances on the inspection, and had to act accordingly. They could not present an accusatory tone in Kennedy's May 30th meeting, as they had in December 1960. Importantly, Kennedy was not personally angered or embarrassed heading into this meeting, as had been Herter and Eisenhower when Dimona went public and caused a global stir at the end of 1960. By May-1961, the issue was really only an Arab concern and a private American governmental source of irritation along with an unclear picture for intelligence. An inspection had been achieved and the United States had to honour the findings of the inspectors' report -- intelligence and State were not so bound by this diplomatic procedure.

As Kennedy prepared in the final few days before his May 30th meeting, he received the most intense briefings, save for a few months in 1963, of his Presidency about Israel. While presented as a diplomatic gesture towards Ben-Gurion, it is clear from the American sources the gravitas attached to this meeting: it was essential in addressing American-Israeli issues, and the

Dimona dilemma was at the core of this discussion. Myer Feldman briefed the President on the pertinent issues to be addressed during the meeting and the advisable positions he should take.

The issues which needed discussion involved: Israeli security vis-a-vis the Arabs; the need for disarmament in the region; and Dimona, the central concern. Feldman suggested what would become the tone of Kennedy's meeting with Ben-Gurion: it was not sufficient that Israel was not producing weapons, nor did they intend to do so -- the Arabs had to believe this was the case. It was crucial that the President convey to his counterpart that the concealment of what Israel was

642 Memorandum for Bundy the White House from Lucius Battle and Melvin L. Manfall. : US Scientists' Visit to Israel's Dimona Reactor, May 26th, 1961. Israel, General, 3/61-5/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 227

developing was just a dangerous, given which countries resided at their borders.643 Kennedy would confront Ben-Gurion on this exact issue. Privately, the Americans were highly concerned about what the Israelis were doing at Dimona; publicly, and in terms of grand strategy, they were equally worried how the Arabs perceived the project.

Since his inauguration, the entirety of Kennedy's inheritance concerning Dimona was attached to Dean Rusk's briefings for the President. The history of French participation in the

Dimona program and the continued American belief that this may be a weapons-grade plutonium reactor was the first piece of information shared.644 At this stage, prior to the May meeting,

Kennedy read a mix of intelligence from closed-and-open sources, including the inspection.

Pertinent information attained by State and confirmed by the team of scientists explained that the

Israelis had potentially bought the Marcoule (France G-3 reactor) design.645 This was the clearest articulation of American understanding of French anger with regards to being "excluded from the nuclear club". State surmised that France may be continually unhelpful on Israel, due to the

American-British neglect of France as an equal member. Kennedy read other alarming sentiments, such as Israeli admissions by diplomats and Embassy staff in January that Israel could not merely wait for Egypt to first go nuclear.646

Kennedy received a bevy of reports from American intelligence. One such CIA report shared two insightful points. The first gave a clear indication of CIA thinking about Jews, Israel, and the Agency’s problematic, flawed, anti-Semitic view on determining Israel's interest in nuclear weapons. The CIA concluded "insomuch as almost every nuclear scientist who has

643 Memorandum for President Kennedy from Myer Feldman May 26th, 1961. Subject for Discussion at Meeting with PM Ben-Gurion. Israel: Security 1961-1963, January 30th, 1961-Oct 2nd, 1963. Digital identifier: JFKPOF- 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 644 Background on Israeli Issues (doc 2 of 5) (Undated between January 20th and May 25th) Israel: Security: David Ben-Gurion, 1961. Background for BG. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 645 Ibid. 646 Ibid. 228

contributed to the development of nuclear weapons in the US has been a Jew and a great number of prominent nuclear scientists have come to Israel" this was the Agency’s justification for why they felt Israel could successfully produce a weapon.647 This is deeply problematic: firstly, for the similar ideological anti-Semitism to Hitler labeling nuclear physics, "Jewish physics"648; more importantly, for the disclosure on Dimona -- how the CIA perceived Teller, Oppenheimer, and other American Jews who had visited Israel. The CIA had a difficult relationship and an analytical problem in amalgamating Judaism with Israel -- this is a blatant example. The second point which emanated from this document produced helpful intelligence on Egypt. The CIA deduced that the Egyptians wanted advanced missiles and nuclear capabilities of their own, and had distanced the UAR from the Soviet Union. The Soviets supplied them aid. With this new schism, however, Nasser turned to the West Germans (the Federal Republic of Germany) for help. The CIA concluded this was the Israeli reasoning that they could not wait for Egypt to go nuclear -- it was a veiled hint for American efforts to stop the Egyptians.649 West German scientists in Egypt would enlarge the wider context and add a dimension to the Dimona problem, creating an unconventional arms race between Israel and Egypt. This directly contributed to

American procedures in addressing both countries, notably the decision to sell Israel the Hawk650 and arms limitations in 1963.

Officially, Kennedy received the inspection report on the 26th. In all probability, he already knew about their findings. Dean Rusk advised Kennedy that the Israelis would likely

647 CIA Information Report 36B Dec 1960 Info Date of Distribution January 18th, 1961. Israel: Security: David Ben-Gurion, 1961: January-May Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-007, POF, Box 119a, JKPL, Boston, MA; Background for BG. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. Bass also highlights this racism. Support Any Friend, 195. 648 Reed and Stillman, 8. 649 CIA Information Report 36B Dec 1960 Info Date of Distribution January 18, 1961. Israel: Security: David Ben- Gurion, 1961: January-May Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-007; Background for BG. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 650 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 84. 229

raise the threat of rising Arab military capabilities, leaving them with no choice but to pursue a nuclear option for deterrence. Rusk succinctly presented why the United States stood so firmly against the Israeli nuclear efforts: this was a challenge to global nonproliferation and dangerous for the Middle East.651 It was imperative that the Americans convey this message to Ben-Gurion to demonstrate the severity of the issue for the United States.

The United States had specific problems with Israeli proliferation. Whether correct or erroneous, the United States was viewed as the one country that could prevent this program.

State noted it was only the Americans who could "exert sufficient pressure" to stop a military program. The Secretary of State also shared a consistent stance -- even though Croach and

Staebler had conducted an inspection, a regular process was required. Again, the American

Government did not trust the Israelis, irrespective of any kind of warning signs, or confirmatory evidence on Dimona. Israeli actions (preventing "foreign inspectors", referring to the Americans, or the "neutrals" they desired) raised two problems: firstly, the Israelis were potentially creating a military program and trying to hide it; or secondly, they implied a choice to go towards a weapons program, and keep their Arab enemies in the dark on their actual progress. Rusk explicitly outlined that the Israelis could not be allowed to produce or develop weapons as the

United States Government stood firmly against all proliferation. In regards to the regional implications, this was too dangerous a gamble given the Arabs could attack the Israelis over some sort of signal misinterpretation or a preventive war. Secretary Rusk commented that "the

Israelis should be in no doubt as to the importance with which the US regards this

651 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State May 25th, 1961.Your Meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. 2. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Richelson, 254. Warned about Ben-Gurion's propensity to speak at great length uninterrupted, Kennedy needed to assert the American objections during the meeting. 230

development."652 Kennedy was instructed to push an appeal for more neutrals or members from

"free world countries" to inspect Dimona. By allowing these scientists and experts to inspect, there would be more transparency. Rusk raised the problem with current Israeli actions: even if their program was peaceful, it was just as dangerous for the Israelis to remain vague or unclear as it could invoke an attack from the Arabs. The implied threat to Israel was presented to the

President; Israel was virtually dependent on foreign aid, and as such, it was probably better for

Israel to leave nuclear development to the larger countries.653 Kennedy had leverage over Israel -

- he could even threaten to cut donations from the United States. Openly, however, Rusk was merely stating this would be very difficult for Israel. Reading the subtext, Rusk's implied message was clear. Ben-Gurion could also claim that the nuclear reactor was intended for the development of Israeli resources with no weapons program ever intended. Rusk demonstrated his acute understanding of the situation by estimating that Israel would declare they could not renounce an intention to ever proliferate because the Arabs had done so first. Lastly, the Israelis might argue that even with all their promise of peaceful intentions, like any other country, they could not give foreign countries, groups, or associations (the IAEA) full and open access to their facility, as the Arabs would raise some kind of objection to what the Israelis were doing. The most alarming outcome would entail the Israelis requesting further economic, material, and arms deals/aid in order to ensure that Israel would keep this program entirely peaceful.654 There is no archival evidence during these two years that the Americans sought to modify Israeli nuclear behaviour with the supply of conventional arms.

652 Israel's Nuclear Program: Discussion attachment to Memo for Kennedy from Rusk. May 25th, 1961. Ben-Gurion. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 653 Ibid. 654 Ibid, 2. 231

There were promises Kennedy could make as well. He should instil in the Israelis the message that if attacked, the Americans would come to their aid.655 This was the implied unofficial birth of Kennedy guaranteeing Israeli security, while simultaneously convincing the

Israelis that a nuclear program was not needed, and would not be tolerated by his administration.

Most telling was the image the Americans presented of Israel: a worthy ally, an economic success story with the potential for disastrous regional wars from vague actions, insinuating the developing lack of American trust on Dimona. Rusk (and Talbot) admitted that the inspection did not produce any red flags. Still, sustained suspicion was warranted -- the Israelis had not fully changed their behaviour. Kennedy arrived at the Waldorf-Astoria with a difficult task.

The Waldorf-Astoria Meeting and the creation of the Dimona Rules

Kennedy met David Ben-Gurion in New York on May 30th for their first and only face- to-face meeting of his Presidency. His purpose was to inform the Israeli Prime Minister that the

United States stood firmly against all global proliferation and Israel would not be given any reprieve. Ultimately, as he tried to compel the Israelis to abandon a continually growing garrison mentality, instead of a "Fortress Israel concept", he wanted to encourage the Israelis to join in initiatives and peaceful programs with their neighbours to gain acceptance in the Middle East.656

On the surface, this may appear incredibly naive, yet was the long-term goal of the Americans --

Dimona constituted a vital part of Fortress Israel, in the American mind. Even though Kennedy wanted to dampen a conventional arms race in the region, nuclear proliferation was his ultimate concern. It was essential that Israel appear to the Arabs and world that they were not moving to proliferate. Importantly, it was insufficient that secretly Israel was not proliferating -- the appearance of peace was vital.

655 Ibid. 656 Memo for the President form Rusk May 25th, 1961. Israel: Security: Briefing Book, Ben-Gurion Visit, May 1961 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-008. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 232

Amidst the diverse spectrum of issues Kennedy dealt with as President during this period, it is remarkable that he took on the Ben-Gurion meeting. This is a testament to the importance Kennedy affixed to both the Dimona issue and domestic support for Israel.

Parenthetically, through mid-April into May and beyond, he dealt with the intelligence and operational debacle at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. When the plan failed catastrophically, he grew disenchanted and mistrustful of the CIA. He completely lost confidence in the Joints Chiefs of

Staff, abolished the traditional National Security Council Planning Board as well as the

Operation Coordinating Board, and cemented his own group within the NSC of close advisers: usually Robert Komer, McGeorge Bundy on the Middle East and his closest aid, his brother

Robert Kennedy.657 Kennedy also faced the ever-present threat of Soviet actions in Berlin.

Fearing a nuclear crisis with the Soviet Union, Israel was not high on his list of priorities. The

Dimona issue was most pressing to him, and at this stage he needed it addressed. To emphasize the centrality of the Dimona issue during this meeting, scholars have recently labeled the meeting, a "nuclear summit".658 This is appropriate, as Dimona was not only the first issue discussed, but received a lot of attention and set the tone for the meeting. Kennedy informed

Ben-Gurion about the concern of "some nations" (he was inferring the Arabs) that Israel was constructing a reactor that could eventually produce plutonium. Kennedy then declared in a now- famed warning and long out-dated metaphor on Dimona "(on the theory) that a woman should not only be virtuous but also have the appearance of virtue."659 Ben-Gurion countered that the context of the reactor was vital in understanding why it was built. He argued that given Israel's

657 Perra, 29. 658 Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. 659 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation May 30th, 1961. Drafted by Phillips Talbot, Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, President's Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NYC. Participants: Kennedy, Ben-Gurion, Harman, Phillips Talbot Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, Myer Feldman Deputy Special Assistant to the President. Israel, General: 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL. Boston, MA. All works that have addressed this meeting have cited this line. Bass used "The Appearance of Virtue", as a subheading. 200. Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 79. 233

crippling need for fresh water, desalination (desalinization) of the Jordan River was a goal of the facility. Additionally, Israel could use nuclear power should this become cheaper and available in the coming years. There are several reasons he emphasized desalination: firstly, there was much truth that Israel wanted to use nuclear reactors for their resource-poor problems, including water; secondly, Ben-Gurion, an astute leader and well-briefed on Kennedy, knew of the

American President's predilection to embrace modernization successes and economic projects for peace. Henry Gomberg first suggested this project as a way to build a constructive relationship with the Israelis on Dimona.660 This had been broached by Ben-Gurion and Israeli scientists in the past. Under Kennedy, it appeared that Ben-Gurion wanted to rationalize Israel's nuclear desire with this issue. Somewhat akin to the logic of Atoms for Peace, this mindset attached production of nuclear reactors for economic projects and solutions, playing right into Kennedy's worldview.

Ben-Gurion then articulated the Israeli stance and the message he wanted to convey to

Kennedy -- the Israelis acknowledged "Israel's main and for the time-being, only-purpose

(author's own emphasis) is this" (Ben-Gurion stated peaceful purposes) "we do not know what will happen in the future; in three or four years we might have need for a plant to process plutonium."661 A quick note on the interpretation and use of individual sources is warranted here.

This dissertation cites the official transcript used by the American government, disseminated to relevant National Security personnel, the State Department (the select few eyes- only) and the President. Avner Cohen first to detail these proceedings (in 1998) utilized the notes

660 Information Report CIA Feb 9th, 1961. Country Israel. Subject: Nuclear Engineering Training/Large Nuclear and Electric Plant near Beersheba/French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitude towards the Announcement of its Large-Scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for US Participation in Nuclear Power Water Conversion Date of Info 1960. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961Part 1 of 2. RG59 Dept of State. Atomic Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 661 Memcon, May 30th, 1961. Waldorf-Astoria. Israel, General 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 234

of the meeting within the National Archives of the United States with Myer Feldman as the note taker.662 The two accounts are virtually identical; however, Cohen highlighted aspects of the meeting that are debatable and not recorded in the official document in the Kennedy Library.

Cohen discerned through transcripts or interviews with Phillips Talbot that the recording of the meeting reveals Ben-Gurion talking quickly in a low audible voice about this possibility of a plutonium facility, and that plutonium separation was explicitly discussed with a probable three- to-four year timeline.663 His inference is that the Israelis were honest with the Americans and

Kennedy did not respond to a near blatant admission of a future weapons project. Similarly, he has looked at the Israeli records of the meeting when Ambassador Avraham Harman was the note-taker. He argues that though the versions do not really differ, the Israelis admitted that "we shall have a pilot plant for separation" in three-to-four years.664 Warren Bass has read both sets of records of the meeting using the official Memorandum of Conversation on the American side, utilized in this chapter, and the Israeli version. He notes minor differences in interpretation though he did not address the issue of whether the separation facility was a definite or a possibility.665 This brief dissection of sources is vital as this chapter proceeds on the Talbot

Memorandum of Conversation which did not record the Israelis guaranteeing a separation facility, merely, as a potential future possibility -- a decision that would be entertained depending on outside forces -- the Arabs.

662 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 109. 663 Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. The draft version of the meeting is available from The National Security Archive. Document 9B. Memorandum of Conversation, "President Kennedy, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel, Myer Feldman of the White House Staff, and Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, Near East and South Asian Affairs, at the Waldorf Astoria, New York, 4:45 p.m. to 6:15 p.m.," May 30th, 1961. Secret, Draft. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=2806694- Document-9B-Memorandum-of-Conversation-President. In this draft, the note-taker recorded that Ben-Gurion spoke in a low and rapid voice, though no additional mention of a plutonium-facility is shared; however, he (Feldman) admits that some words were lost. 2. 664 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 108-109. This differs largely from the American account of "we might have a need" 109. 665 Bass, 296. Footnotes, 74-77. 235

The Israeli Prime Minister continued that he did not believe the Soviets would provide the Egyptians with nuclear weapons. However, it was plausible within the next decade-plus that the Egyptians could produce capabilities on their own. Kennedy concurred with his Israeli counterpart, though again he cautioned Israel should not give the impression to the UAR or others that they were going nuclear as this may push them to develop. Ben-Gurion was candid, admitting that France had helped with the program. When asked if the Americans could share the inspection report and what was discussed during this meeting with the Arabs, the Israeli Prime

Minister replied "you are absolutely free to do what you wish with the report. If you feel you should publish it, we have no objection."666 Ben-Gurion was more unclear on plutonium, citing multiple possible producers: France, Israel, and the United Kingdom. When the issue was raised about plutonium supervision, he was vague on its final destination.667 Cohen has rightly criticized Kennedy for not being more insistent, as were Reid and Herter in their earlier dealings with Ben-Gurion and Harman, regarding the plutonium's destination.668 Kennedy asked whether

Israel would agree to a "neutral" scientist inspecting Dimona, Ben-Gurion questioned who this entailed. Ben-Gurion agreed Sweden, Switzerland, or other Scandinavians were acceptable.

Kennedy ended the discussion of the Dimona issue, admitting he was happy and that both countries could move forward on this basis.669 Importantly, this encounter set the "Dimona

Rules", establishing a precedent for how both sides would act and a baseline for promises and compromise. Israeli scholars have emphasized how well the meeting went for Ben-Gurion and the Israelis, given how pleased Ben-Gurion must have been, anticipating a harsh reaction from

666 Memcon, May 30th, 1961. Waldorf-Astoria. Israel, General 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen contends, in this instance, in Harman's notes, Kennedy was vague, stating "it would be helpful if we could get this information out." Israel and the Bomb, 109. Bass argues that the Israeli version cites Ben-Gurion encouraging the Americans "On the contrary, we are interested in your doing so." Support Any Friend, 296. Footnote, 77. 667 Memcon, May 30th, 1961.Waldorf-Astoria. Israel, General 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 668 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 109. 669 Memcon, May 30th, 1961. Waldorf-Astoria. Israel, General 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 236

Kennedy, which never ensued. They noted this established the pattern for future encounters: the

Americans aggressively on the offensive with the Israelis giving answers to the specific

American questions. The unequal balance of power between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion was on full display in this interaction.670 The Israeli point of view has been emphasized repeatedly in the historiography as a victory for Ben-Gurion, or at least a relief.

Zaki Shalom concluded that a certain amount of manoeuvrability was achieved by the

Israelis during this meeting. Ben-Gurion also wanted to keep the option open for Israel to go nuclear should the need arise.671 Similarly, Cohen dissected Kennedy’s rationale for his lack of further questioning on why the Israelis needed a peaceful small reactor in Nahal Soreq and

Dimona. He never formally told Israel they could not produce nuclear weapons capabilities. He did, however, forward the American stance on proliferation.672 The American achievements and understanding of this meeting have not been properly represented.

Kennedy did exactly what he wanted to do -- he ensured that the Israelis had no immediate plans for nuclear weapons. He outlined as clearly as possible how detrimental Israeli nuclear actions, either covert or ambiguously interpreted, would be for the region. In the midst of a personal intelligence crisis, his larger issues with the Soviet Union, nuclear disarmament and global conflicts, Kennedy addressed an immediate concern of the United States with one of their allies. He established what shall be termed the Dimona Rules, or protocols. While studies have emphasized several reasons why Kennedy did not press the Israelis harder, such as a desire to avoid a blow to the prestige of American proliferation policy which would be weakened by

670 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 110. Shalom Behind the Scenes, 17. Though Shalom notes this extended prior to this meeting as well. 671 Shalom, 27. 672 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 111. 237

Israel673 or that proliferation in the Israeli case was somewhat inevitable, there was little he could do.674 Kennedy, however, represented the United States appropriately and achieved his goals. His

Dimona Rules bore fruit for future negotiations -- the Israelis had committed to allow a neutral to visit, at the very least they concurred with this idea. Ben-Gurion gave his approval for Nasser and the Arabs to be informed on visits and the American-Israeli discussions on Dimona. When the Israelis later retracted both these conditions, Kennedy acted as the super-power in the relationship, a switch in power differential within the bilateral relationship that characterized his

Presidency. He set a tone that though the two states were friends, they were not equals. Dimona would not be a negotiation.

While this meeting ended with "mutual expressions of respect"675 and was positive, the

State Department and intelligence community were not satisfied. This marked the acceleration of their suspicion on Dimona. One report from an inspection team did not change the trajectory of intelligence collection, or American efforts to keep prodding for the truth. Kennedy moved on to other issues for the rest of the year. Throughout 1962, the Dimona issue lingered.

The Israelis had another reason to be content with how Kennedy handled the Dimona issue in the meeting: they informed the Canadians they had plans for a plutonium separation facility. On May 29th, on his way to New York, Ben-Gurion met with Canadian Prime Minister

John Diefenbaker. Zaki Shalom first reported that Ben-Gurion informed the Canadian Prime

Minister that the Israelis were in essence beginning a nuclear program by moving to create a plutonium processing facility in the near future.676 Ben-Gurion informed the Canadians to gauge

673 Shalom, 31. He argued that Kennedy wanted to avoid a direct clash between these partners as he understood how much this meant to Israel. He also surmised that Ben-Gurion's government had enough problems due to domestic concerns. 674 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 79. 675 Memcon, May 30th, 1961. Waldorf-Astoria. Israel, General 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 676 Shalom, 25. 238

their response and when no condemnation came, he believed Kennedy would not end the program. In the official American correspondence, the only issues shared were that Ben-Gurion assured Diefenbaker the Americans had carried out an inspection and that Israel was not considering pursuing nuclear weapons.677 Based upon this admission to the Canadians and meeting with Kennedy, the Israelis gauged the American reaction as hopeful and Ben-Gurion informed Peres: "the Americans do not know exactly what we are doing at Dimona."678

American intelligence would address this deficiency in the coming year.

Kennedy took the time to personally discuss Dimona amid: the Bay of Pigs fiasco; larger issues of disarmament; and a potentially escalating crisis in Berlin which erupted over the summer of 1961. No conflict erupted at this meeting and it pushed the Dimona issue down the line for a confrontation in 1963.679 The Israelis inherently believed that Kennedy's non-reaction or lack of reprimanding Ben-Gurion's admissions signaled some sort of compliance, or at least complicit understanding of Israeli future actions.680 The traditional argument advanced and accepted was that after this meeting the Dimona issue lost its priority and was removed from the bilateral relationship.681 Internally, within the American Government, the Dimona issue never dissipated -- conversely, further intelligence efforts intensified.682

Scholars believe the Waldorf-Astoria meeting acted as a mere ceremonial exchange of information and understandings. Internally, the Americans acted as if nothing had changed. The continued, relentless work by the State Department to uncover the truth on Dimona and monitor

677 Department of State Telegram US Embassy Ottawa to Secretary of State, June 7th, 1961. BG Talks with Diefenbaker. Israel, General, 6/61. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 678 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 194. 679 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 113. 680 Shalom, 28. The author argues "tacit acceptance" may have been understood by Ben-Gurion. 681 Both Israeli and American scholars had made this argument over decades. Tal: 311. Goldman: 45. Both authors cite this had no effect on sales of the Hawk in the fall of 1962. 682 Cohen and Burr, “Concerned about Nuclear Weapons,” 2016. The authors recently concluded that while it was removed from the "bilateral, diplomatic and political relationship", the CIA still kept searching for proof of weapons. 239

Israeli activity indicates the extent of the lack of faith in Israeli divulgences on Dimona. Unless at this point the CIA knew about the Israeli plutonium separation/reprocessing facility under construction by the French (which is unlikely), further intelligence collection was administered due to Israel's past actions and deception towards the United States.683 What is evident from the available records is that despite what American intelligence conclusively knew, they had predicted since the end of Eisenhower's term that if unimpeded, based on American estimates, the earliest Dimona could produce weapons would be in 1963.684 Based on this evidence, the traditional literature has assumed that Kennedy's quiet reaction in the Waldorf-Astoria meeting indicated support or compliance for the Dimona program to create plutonium in the future; however, another analysis is plausible -- Kennedy may have been recalibrating. He saw this new evidence, despite the inspection report largely clearing the Israelis, understood he could not do anything at this stage, yet realized he had time until 1963 when Dimona became a larger problem, and moved on to other issues in his Presidency. The continued intelligence collection and efforts of the State Department support this analysis. 1961 progressed with continued

American intelligence procedures to track Israeli nuclear supply routes for incoming materials and any suspicious activities. Kennedy was merely biding his time until he had better evidence upon which to act.

Increased scrutiny of Dimona

In June, the State Department cast doubt on the inspection report and Ben-Gurion's comments from the May meeting. Officials argued that there were problems in determining what

683 Cohen and Burr note that we still do not know when exactly the CIA knew that a plutonium reprocessing plant was under construction or constructed. It is unlikely they knew this early. Cohen and Burr, “Concerned about Nuclear Weapons Potential,” 2016. The only thing the Americans knew was a small pilot plant of plutonium was underway -- Ben-Gurion admitted this. Roger J. Mattson countered that the Americans did not conclusively know of an Israeli plutonium facility even into 1966. 254. 684 Mattson, 37. Herter informed Kennedy of this as he took office. 240

would happen, should the Israelis use non-French uranium. The Israelis had been vague on other uranium, though they notified the Americans that plutonium produced through French uranium would be returned to France.685 American embassies around the globe and intelligence agencies continued to track any potential non-French sources of uranium to Israel.

The Americans pursued their consistent multi-levelled approach: they would publicly push for inspections by a neutral scientist and seek to reassure the Arabs on what they found; within the government, intelligence, and the State Department attempted to decipher what was happening in Dimona. Speculation persisted around Ben-Gurion's answers. Administration officials were still digesting Ben-Gurion's comments from May 30th, and noted irregularities.

On June 9th, Phillips Talbot and Myer Feldman, both of whom had been at the Waldorf-

Astoria meeting, met with Armin H. Meyer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, to closely examine Ben-Gurion's explanations on Dimona. This meeting evoked the best insight as to why the CIA and intelligence community still felt uneasy about Dimona after all these assurances and lack of evidence during the inspection. Meyer and the other participants verified that Ben-Gurion, in a low voice, said that plutonium production would not be a problem until

1964, when plutonium could be processed. At this point, the Israeli Prime Minister argued Israel would decide what to do with the plutonium. Ben-Gurion had informed Ambassador Reid on

January 4th that the country providing the uranium would receive the plutonium, now it appeared that Ben-Gurion had amended his story.686 Upon further review when State revisited the correspondence of January 4th, Ben-Gurion intimated that this would be the case, it was merely

685 Shalom, 34. 686 Document 9D. Memorandum by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Armin H. Meyer of White House discussion on Ben-Gurion/Kennedy Meeting, n. d. [circa 9 June 1961], Secret. The National Security Archive https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=2806696-Document-9D-Memorandum-by- Deputy-Assistant 241

vague and suggested, instead of guaranteed.687 It was only at this point the Americans understood how cleverly the Israelis gave themselves room to maneuver with their nuclear production.

Kennedy may not have understood this admission, or the intricacies, when Ben-Gurion gave this response during the meeting.688 It was clear the United States monitored and interpreted every single word of the replies they received from the Israelis.

The Americans notified Nasser that the inspection had gone well and Dimona was exactly as publicly described by Israel on June 17.689 The disconnect post-May 30th continued.

Within their diplomatic correspondence with other nations, calm was restored, and the

Americans sold Dimona as peaceful. Nevertheless, internally, a far different perception emerged whereby the Israelis were treated with suspicion.

Unfortunately for American intelligence, all inspections and checks from outside Israel kept absolving them of any nuclear culpability. The tests on the material from the Norwegian partial inspection of heavy-water came back in June. The Norwegians confirmed independently that though small plutonium quantities were detected, there was no indication of weapons capabilities.690American intelligence did not receive any indication of Israeli deceit from the

Norwegians. Despite yet another positive return, the CIA continued to suspect Israel. The

Americans would have to find out for themselves if the Israelis were telling the truth.

The Department of State continued to assure other governments and personnel that all appeared well at Dimona, yet they chased a neutral inspection to separate the bilateral exclusive

687 Document 9D. Memorandum by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Armin H. Meyer of White House discussion on Ben-Gurion/Kennedy Meeting, n. d. [circa 9 June 1961], Secret. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=2806696-Document-9D-Memorandum-by- Deputy-Assistant. State concluded that the Israelis said: it was "probably" going to be returned. 688 Cohen and Burr ,"Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," April 21st, 2016. 689 Secret Memorandum A. R. Ludecke, General Manager through John A. Hall AGMIA. A.A. Wells Director Division of International Affairs (AEC) June 29th, 1961. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961 part 2 of 2. RG59 Dept of State Atomic Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 690 Department of State Telegram Oslo to Secretary of State June 21st, 1961. Israeli Reactor. 884.1901/2-361. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 242

nature of the inspections.691 During June, the Americans pushed the Israelis unsuccessfully to conform to a “visit” (meaning inspection) from a neutral country. Upon each request, the Israelis countered why this could not transpire. Specifically, the Israelis contended this was an issue of national sovereignty, though they supported the concept of all states receiving inspections. Given that there were no universally agreed to protocols for other states to adhere to regarding neutral inspections, they did not want to be exceptional.692 Additionally, the Israelis used Ben-Gurion’s upcoming August elections as a reason no inspection could occur. It appeared that the Dimona

Rules had already faltered -- Ben-Gurion had assured Kennedy at the meeting that a neutral visit could be arranged. By June, the Americans believed the Israelis reverted back to excuses and delays. After the Dimona Rules and New York compromise, the Americans were less tolerant.

On the 20th, Harman replied that Ben-Gurion would not agree to neutrals visiting at this stage -- proof he had broken his promise after the Americans fought for a compromise.693 Just as the

Israelis had garnered momentary goodwill with the United States, they just as quickly squandered it.

Over the summer of 1961, several developments also hardened the American suspicion and doubt of the Israeli version of facts on Dimona and their nuclear intentions. Since the late

1950s, the CIA, Bureau of Intelligence for the State Department, White House, and State

Department had all shared their assessments of the Israeli nuclear program and the impact of an

Israeli nuclear bomb. The Department of Defense now joined the fray. The Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to gauge how this would impact the "Free World" and what the United States could do

691 Memorandum to NEA Phillips Talbot form NEA/NE Robert Strong June 30th, 1961. Subject: Your Appointment with Mr. Sauvagnargues. 884.1901/2-361. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963. Box 2803. NA. 692 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation. June 16, 1961. Subject: The Dimona Reactor Participants: Harman, Gazit, Armin Meyer NEA/NE Mr. William R. Crawford Jr. NEA 884.1901/2-361. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 693 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation. June 20th, 1961. Harman and Meyer. Israeli Atomic Energy Activities. 884.1901/2-361. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 243

to prevent an Israeli bomb. By this stage, the JCS also included the UAR nuclear program at

Inshas (Inchass) in their considerations. This was a basic research reactor initiated with Soviet help in 1956 under a Soviet Atoms for Peace type of bilateral agreement. With only a two megawatt capacity, it was deemed an irrelevant threat. The UAR argued that since Dimona became public, the Egyptians may switch to military applications for their program. The

Egyptians were deemed unable to have the means of achieving a nuclear capability in the foreseeable future.694 Concerning Israel, the JCS predicted that they would not use a nuclear weapon in any war, given the American and Soviet responses. Israel would instead utilize the weapons to intimidate or deter their enemies as a psychological impediment. Such a capability would further destabilize the region and antagonize Israel's Arab neighbours. In the Cold War arena, this would make any test ban negotiations (which Kennedy had started to develop) very difficult as the Soviets could withdraw or hold the West accountable for Israel's actions. Likely,

Communist China also would be emboldened by Israel's proliferation and increase their own program. The Soviet fear was that the UAR and China would make compelling cases for nuclear aid with increased pressure and validated concerns, due to Israeli proliferation.695 An Israeli bomb had far-ranging consequences for the Americans.

This JCS paper encapsulated the wider American concerns of an Israeli nuclear weapon.

Such a development would destabilize the region, have an impact on the East-West struggle, and act as a model for "small countries", such as Sweden, Switzerland, and even Japan to move toward weapons production. While an Israeli bomb would not directly threaten the Americans or their alliances, it could: endanger a needed test ban; lead to regional instability and the possibility of Middle Eastern war drawing in the Americans; and hurt American objectives in the region.

694 Paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff undated "A Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Capability," Doc 95. 217. FRUS, Vol. XVII. 695 Ibid, 218-219. 244

The government needed to take "all feasible means" to convince France and Israel that an Israeli bomb would be detrimental to the interests of the Free World. One of Defense's suggestions aligned with Kennedy's preference for economic progress, inviting the Israelis to transfer their nuclear expenses and efforts into peaceful nuclear projects (the same flawed logic of

Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace).696

The JCS provided the missing piece to understanding the inner-thoughts of the Kennedy

Administration on Dimona. After this paper, Defense, State, the intelligence community, and

Kennedy's NSC voiced their concern over an Israeli weapon. The consequences would be regional, global, and have adverse impacts for Western Europe, an American priority, and add to the Soviet-American East-West struggle. None of these outcomes could be tolerated. American intelligence acted accordingly.

American anxiety was elevated with the Israeli testing of a sounding rocket, the Shavit 1, in July.697 This added another element to the conventional arms race between the Egyptians and

Israel, and signalled a move towards more advanced weapons. The test occurred thanks to advanced Israeli knowledge of rocket science, predating the American sale of Hawk surface-to- air missiles in September, 1962. While this catalyzed the American concern for Israeli nuclear intentions as the Israelis could eventually produce a vehicle to deliver a nuclear payload,

American intelligence was well acquainted with the Middle Eastern missile race. The CIA later revealed that they had been monitoring Egyptian and Israeli rocket progress for years. The

Egyptians asked the United States for nuclear help in 1961 and had been rebuked. They also approached the West Germans and feasibility studies were launched. So too, the CIA knew that

696 Paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff undated "A Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Capability," Doc 95. 220-221. FRUS, Vol. XVII. 697 Memorandum Robert Komer for the President Feb 12th, 1963. Israel 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. . Files of Robert Komer, NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 245

West German technicians, scientists, and various experts had been actively involved in Egypt since 1960, at the request of Nasser. It was the Egyptians who: first developed sounding rockets of their own in 1960; tested a rocket in early 1961 with the help of the West Germans;698 and started the missiles race according to the CIA. With the public perception of Dimona and Israel's clear nuclear advantage over Inshas, the Americans had a disastrous dynamic on their hands.

On September 21st, the American intelligence community released a new NIE on nuclear proliferation -- Israel was now central to their policy. The Estimate revealed a large body of evidence that Israel was "engaged in developing capabilities in nuclear weapons and delivery fields".699 The delivery methods referred to the Shavit II (the Americans identified the 1961 sounding rocket as Shavit I in 1963) and test of the sounding rocket on July 5th, 1961. Based on current information, intelligence predicted that the reactor operating at "maximum power" could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for two weapons by 1965-1966.700 This all depended on a plutonium separation facility much larger than their current reported pilot plant. The

Estimate's conclusion on Israel noted a nuclear missile with warheads would be extremely costly and improbable, until about 1968, or likely, 1970.701

The intelligence community recognized the disturbing pattern of Israel undertaking a rocket test while simultaneously promising that Dimona was developed for nuclear desalination.

It is clear the Americans were uncertain about the secret plutonium separation facility (still under

698 Doc 19a. CIA, National Intelligence Council, Special National Intelligence Estimate 30-2-63: "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," 19, 22. Israel Nuclear Energy Program, 1963. May 2nd, 1963, NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 699 National Intelligence Council, NIE 4-3-61 " Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK," 7. Sept 21st, 1961. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf National Security Archive, accessed through Burr, "National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957-1967." https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm. 700 Ibid. Richelson, 257. Richelson and Burr first uncovered this document as a microfiche supplement. 701 National Intelligence Council, NIE 4-3-61 "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK," 7-8. Sept 21st, 1961. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf National Security Archive, accessed through Burr "National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957-1967." https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm. 246

construction); however, they suspected Israeli intentions and the rocket acted as a warning sign.702 Israel was a high-priority for American intelligence in the field of nuclear proliferation -- the Waldorf-Astoria meeting had done nothing to stop the intelligence efforts of the Americans.

The supposed "no-spying" agreement between Israel and the United States was essentially ignored by late-1961. Kennedy was disturbed by the intelligence he read of continued

Israeli progress. The September-NIE marked a new intense scrutiny on Dimona.703 Sources in

Israel informed the Department of State that for unknown reasons, citing only "political" rationales and some sort of disagreement, French technicians had not completed any work on the

Dimona facility in the past three months. The Americans tracked the workers at Dimona through their sources to conclude there may be serious fracturing between the French and Israelis on

Dimona.704 The best estimates on the actual production of the plutonium extraction plant emanate from Israeli scholar, Gadi Heiman, familiar with both the Israeli and French sources. He argued that the facility's construction began secretly in 1959. He cites June, 1962, when Saint-

Gobain Nucleaire returned to Dimona to finish the facility after an unknown period. This activity would have required the agreement of the French government.705

Additional intelligence further shed light on the consequences of an Israeli bomb. NIE

35-61, The Outlook for Israel published on October 5th, attempted to predict where Israel was headed over the next several years. This document evidenced the intense scrutiny Israel received from the CIA. Despite the anticipated end to West German reparations (1964), the Israeli economy was booming. Kennedy's belief in Israel was rewarded. A more chilling and prophetic

702 It is somewhat plausible that the CIA knew of this facility by 1962, or 1963; however, the State Department and those within Kennedy's national security team were unaware of this information. This is clear in the American documents. 703 Montgomery and Mount: 375-376. 704 Department of State Telegram Amembassy Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Sept 26th, 1961. 884.1901/7-461 RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," April 21st, 2016. The authors first presented this evidence. 705 Heiman: 111,119. 247

analysis was evoked on the Dimona issue: "Israel may have decided to undertake a nuclear weapons program. At a minimum (Israel) decided to develop its nuclear facilities in such a way as to put it into a position to develop nuclear weapons promptly should it decide to do so."706 The next line indicates that the Americans at least suspected the French of engaging in nefarious additions to Dimona, as they believed Israel currently only had small plutonium separation capabilities. However, with French "technical aid", Israel could develop and deliver a "few crude weapons" in roughly five years.707

The CIA was concerned about potential clash-points for the Israelis with their Arab neighbours. The Israeli nuclear issue was a major concern for the Americans, as was Egypt's

Nasser. They believed Nasser felt he would lose a war with Israel. If the UAR suspected Israel was on the cusp of going nuclear, due to faulty intelligence, he could "risk a preventive surprise attack."708 The last point of interest regarding Dimona revolved around American comprehension of the Israeli security doctrine. The intelligence community noted that since Suez (1956), the

Israelis understood they could not rely on the outside support of the Americans when the Israelis initiated a war against the Arabs.709 This provided a rationale for self-reliance and a need for the ultimate security device within Israel -- the Dimona reactor.

American intelligence intensified their scrutiny through further spying efforts on Israel.

By the end of 1961, the full power and reach of American intelligence was employed through: intelligence collection in Israel; NIE’s predictions on when Dimona could produce weapon; sources informing the Americans what was transpiring on the ground; and lastly, domestic

706 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate 35-61 "The Outlook for Israel," 1-4. Oct 5th, 1961. Israel 1961-1963 folder 2 of 2. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 707 Ibid, 4. 708 Ibid, 7. 709 Ibid, 8. 248

surveillance on visiting Israeli scholars.710 Unfortunately for the Israelis and Dimona, an unpleasant development outside their control brought in another opponent against their program.

Kennedy’s continued involvement: An absent President or Patient Intelligence Consumer?

President Kennedy's departure from the dealings with Dimona is evident after his May,

1961-meeting.711 After the Waldorf-Astoria, he was consumed by other matters, such as South-

East Asia's developing problems, The Berlin Crisis and construction of the wall over the summer of 1961, and lingering dissent within Latin America. The Bay of Pigs fallout had not subsided into November of 1961. Kennedy was enraged by what he witnessed to be a poorly conceived and executed intelligence coup. An author on the Agency maintained that after the debacle,

"Kennedy first wanted to destroy the CIA."712 While Kennedy resisted this urge, he held Director

Allen Dulles personally responsible, and in September, forced the longstanding leader to retire.

This commenced a new era of the CIA. Two changes occurred after the Bay of Pigs: Kennedy wanted to see firsthand the raw intelligence on dangerous situations. He, Robert Komer, and

McGeorge Bundy, both former intelligence officers, read the intelligence previously reserved for the Agency. Furthermore, after being rebuked on his choice for a new Director, his brother,

Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he settled on a candidate: John McCone.713

John McCone had been the AEC Chairman in December of 1960, and he personally witnessed the Israeli deception and manner in which Dimona was uncovered in the global press.

710 To Dwight Ink Assistant General Manager AEC from Howard Furnas (his title Deputy in some State agency is unclear) Secret Limit Distribution Nov 15, 1961. 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1961. Part 2 of 2. RG59 Dept of State Atomic Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. Upon entering the United States for a fellowship, Israel Dostrovsky became the subject of surveillance. Burr and Cohen strongly outline the precedent this set. Dostrovsky would replace Ernst Bergmann in 1966 as the head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, so the Americans chose wisely, by putting him under what the authors labeled "discreet surveillance". Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. 711 His input is absent in the National Security Files, and there are no President's Office Files on Dimona between May 30th, 1961 and 1963. 712 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, (New York: First Anchor, 2008), 207. 713 Ibid, 207-208. 249

McCone was less forgiving about Israel's past actions on their nuclear facility. McCone informed

The New York Times about the Dimona expose. McCone took over as CIA Director -- he was not a likely candidate to favour Israel: a Republican, staunchly Catholic, conservative.714 He concluded the Israelis had lied and established a pattern of lying to the Americans on Dimona. It was McCone who argued vehemently in 1960 that Dimona would have to be inspected by either the IAEA or the United States. He initiated the structure of dealing with Dimona which Kennedy inherited.715 From November 29th, 1961, until the end of Kennedy's Presidency, Israel had a powerful enemy leading American intelligence collection. Though Kennedy's disdain of the CIA persisted, the Israelis would henceforth have to deal with Kennedy, Komer, and Bundy scrutinizing evidence themselves. Through no fault of the Israelis, their path towards a weapon got significantly tougher with fiercer opposition in 1962.

The continued desire for inspections and additional intelligence gathering illustrates the

United States believed American intelligence over official Israeli explanations.716 A revealing piece of intelligence pertaining to what the CIA actually knew or suspected about Dimona was produced in April of 1961 – a CIA bulletin built on photographs taken over a period of many months, from November to February. Intelligence analysts estimated that the "reactor containment vessel" had just been closed in February. Based on other nuclear reactors, they predicted that eighteen more months would be needed for any reactor activity to begin.

Insightfully, the CIA believed that construction had started on a facility underground which involved the production of plutonium; it could function as a separation facility to eventually

714 Hersh, 83-84. Hersh mentioned that some had privately labeled McCone, an anti-Semite. There does not appear to be corroborating evidence to support this statement. 76. Weiner, 207. 715 Hersh, 77. 716 Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. The authors argue that the Americans believed the Israelis were using a cover story. 250

create weapons.717 This is the only available CIA discussion of informed suspicion or monitoring any specific underground activity and a potential chemical separation plant already underway.

Retrospectively based on this analysis, Kennedy's Waldorf-Astoria reaction appears appropriate.

He knew he had over a year to collect intelligence on exactly what the Israelis were doing. While he has been lambasted somewhat justifiably for letting Israel off easy at this meeting, with this information another explanation manifests. Kennedy advised by the CIA concluded that the

Israelis were blatantly lying at the Waldorf-Astoria. While Ben-Gurion appeared to give Israel some room towards future plutonium separation activities, Kennedy understood this was not the case. The American President did not respond angrily as the Norwegian and American inspections produced no proof of weapons. However, Kennedy could recalibrate, build a firm case against the Israelis through continued intelligence gathering, and confront the Israelis when appropriate and necessary. This is exactly what he did. He bided his time and let a more complete intelligence picture emerge on Dimona. This is the only piece of evidence which admittedly assumed the existence of a plutonium separation facility. This “conclusion” would be debated in the coming years. The CIA was highly suspicious that Israel was working towards such capabilities.

There is some truth that out of all the American-Israeli issues during his Presidency,

Kennedy was only fully involved on the Dimona issue.718 American-Israeli relations progressed in a positive manner. The Hawks were sold, and Kennedy informed Gold Meir in December that the United States and Israel had a "special relationship" with no trace of Dimona affecting

717 Richelson, 255. The CIA Bulletin also stated that an intelligence report from March 8th, 1961, indicated that the "steelwork inside the reactor is incomplete." Therefore, the Americans knew they had time. CIA, CIA Intelligence Bulletin Apr. 27th, 1961. 4-6. Israel, Subjects: Ben-Gurion Visit, 5/20/61-6/2/61. National Security Files, Country File, Israel, Box 119a. John Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA. The CIA noted that they had been tracking uranium shipments from Argentina to Israel for some time. 4. This document is still heavily redacted -- I did not see the section that Richelson refers to on the admitted "underground plutonium factory." 255. 718 Bass, 11. Bass argues this applied to Kennedy's Middle Eastern policy -- Dimona was the only issue that commanded his attention. 251

relations. Throughout 1962, however, the Dimona issue appears to have faded into the background in the bilateral relationship -- Kennedy's involvement on Dimona is completely absent in a documentary sense. Archival research shows that more raw intelligence was brought to his closest security advisers, Bundy and Komer.

To explain Kennedy's absence, certain contextual and overarching tenets of his

Presidency in 1962 need to be addressed. Firstly, Kennedy, reeling with anger and dismay with the performance of the CIA after the Bay of Pigs, tried to change the Agency. Kennedy lost faith in the State Department in 1961 and the CIA after the debacle. To prove this dissatisfaction with the Agency, Kennedy cut the operating budget of the CIA over 1962 and 1963.719 Kennedy radically altered his decision-making structure and afforded further direct access to his closest advisors. Kennedy also made his inner-circle the decision makers, essentially his NSC, as he distrusted "existing bureaucracies" like State, Defense, and the CIA traditional structure.720

Robert Komer's influence largely grew in 1962. Komer admitted Kennedy acted as his own

Secretary of State on Israel and the Middle East – this was reinforced by his direct familiarity with pertinent intelligence.721 Hence, he was always involved with Dimona and Israel, even during periods when he appeared to have moved on to other matters.

Even State Department officials who were not part of Kennedy's inner-sanctum admit the

President had a new direct interest in intelligence.722 As Komer indicated, "he read everything -- he gobbled up all of the intelligence reports, the State Department daily summaries, the Press,

719 Schlesinger Jr., 406, 420-424, 429. Kennedy built a new group, the Special Group, with his brother to run covert operations moving forward. Weiner, 209. 720 “Robert Komer Oral History Interview #4," Oct 31st, 1964. 18. JKPL, Boston, MA. Komer shared that Bundy and Rostow were his closest aides on the region. 721 “Robert Komer Oral History Interview #1 June 18th, 1964," 1. JKPL, Boston, MA. 2. Komer indicates that the State Department was largely bypassed, as the White House set policy. 2. Komer praised Kennedy as more knowledgeable than Rusk and Bundy on the Middle East. 5. 722 Talbot Oral History Interview JFK #2, 44. JKPL, Boston, MA. Talbot noted that Kennedy did not want to learn of CIA decisions through "policy channels"; rather he wanted to see their reasoning firsthand. 252

and secondary sources."723 Lastly, Komer confirmed that Kennedy received all the cables going to State (this had to be an exaggeration), and all raw intelligence also went into the White

House.724 Regardless of Kennedy’s constant involvement, the Americans remained committed to their goal of neutrals inspecting the reactor. They also pushed for their own or an international visit to Dimona, alongside relentless intelligence monitoring on nuclear proliferation.

1962: The push for Inspections; Internal studies; and Dimona on the backburner?

On January 5th, 1962, the first signs of Kennedy's increased role for his NSC evidenced.

Bundy received a full CIA briefing report on the history of the Dimona program since its inception, or as much as American intelligence had collected. By 1962, the Americans believed the Dimona reactor was twenty-four to twenty-six megawatts fueled by natural uranium and heavy water, and based on the Marcoule (France) or CIR (India) design. Furthermore, based on their finding that the Marcoule reactor (EL-3) required twenty-six months to construct and another nine months for "criticality", the CIA surmised the reactor could be operational (critical) by as early as late-1962. Ernst Bergmann had admitted 1962 would be the start of Dimona's critical capability. The CIA, however, believed 1963 was more realistic with full power by mid-

1963 or even early-1964.725

The Americans also tracked the flow of Israeli nuclear materials. The American Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, monitored the sale of ten metric tons of U308 yellowcake to Israel for supposed "peaceful purposes".726 Americans deduced the uranium oxide, or yellowcake, was headed for Dimona. They had a new avenue to suspect the Israelis, as another supplier of nuclear

723 Komer Oral History Interview #1, 1. JKPL, Boston, MA. 5. 724 Komer Oral History #4, 20. Oct 31st, 1964. JKPL, Boston, MA. 725 CIA Memorandum for Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jan 5th, 1962. Subject Israeli Nuclear Energy Program. Israel, General 1/62-3/62. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. 726 Department of State Telegram Rusk to Amembassy Tel Aviv Feb 23rd, 1962. 884A.1901/-461. RG59 Dept of Sate Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 253

material outside of France entered the fray. Argentina continued to be observed along with South

Africa between 1961 and the end of 1963 to determine the source of Israel's uranium.727 Israel had many secret dealings. Kennedy had multiple avenues for increased suspicion and a growing distrust in the Israelis.

Throughout the year, the United States tried to ascertain exactly what it was that the

Israelis were hiding. They sought to get the IAEA more involved on Dimona. The Americans relented noting both parties in the Dimona bilateral agreement would have to agree. They understood the French would not submit to any international inspections, especially from a nuclear club member or IAEA. Kennedy’s push for a neutral inspection also floundered. By

April, Sweden was not interested in inspecting Dimona. They were debating their own nuclear program -- the Americans realized the hypocrisy of a Swedish inspection team. They preferred either a Scandinavian country or the Swiss.728

On May 21st, 1962, Bundy met with Peres to discuss a variety of issues, including

Dimona and the possibility of a nuclear Middle East. Peres said he preferred no one in the region have nuclear weapons, however, "if there were signs that others might move in this direction,

Israel would of course have to consider her own position."729 Peres's candid response to the top national security official in Kennedy's government did not inspire confidence in the Israelis. This compounded with the intelligence collection on Argentina, South Africa, and suspicion on Israeli intentions, created skepticism on Israel's nuclear commitment to peaceful development.

727 The Oral History interviewer, a Mr. Stern, after reviewing the internal documents of the Kennedy government informed Ambassador Walworth Barbour, the United States made "tremendous efforts to locate where uranium came from, France, South Africa and Argentina" between 1961 and 1963. Walworth Barbour, "Oral History Interview JFK #1,” 4. May 22nd, 1981. JKPL, Boston, MA. 728 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Apr 9th, 1962. Israel's Atomic Energy Program Participants Mr. Dennis J. Speares, Nicholas E. Thacher NE, Crawford NE. 884A.1901/-461. RG59 Dept of Sate Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 729 Memorandum for Phillips Talbot May 28th, 1962. Subject Conversation with Peres. From McGeorge Bundy (May 21st, 1962). Written by Komer. Israel, General 4/62-5/62. NSF, Box 118. JKPL, Boston, MA. Druks has also highlighted this exchange. John F. Kennedy and Israel, 82. 254

Over the summer of 1962, the Americans ramped up their focus on Israel. Firstly, the

State Department enacted an intense campaign to reach an agreement on an international team to visit Dimona. The inspection report had indicated another visit would be needed annually -- and the Americans reminded the Israelis it had been over a year since the last inspection. They advised Israeli diplomats this would help calm and reassure the Arabs to "prolong a relaxed attitude regarding development."730

In June, the Americans debated their realistic options for opening Dimona to international inspections. They concluded it was very doubtful the IAEA could gain admittance to Dimona, as the French would not allow an international inspection. The Americans knew they had a unique challenge despite the May-inspection -- “clearing” any proof of nuclear weapons’ desire. Israel's refusal to allow IAEA safeguards, persistent rumours about Israeli nuclear weapons, compounded with vague Israeli promises on their future direction, indicated that eventually

Israel could establish a plutonium chemical processing plant (separation facility). With UAR progress on nuclear technology (marginal) and missiles, the United States needed to avoid an unconventional nuclear arms race in the region. It was essential to determine whether Israel was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.731

American intelligence-gathering reaped many benefits over the summer. Open-sourced information revealed a crack in the somewhat impenetrable debate on the Israeli nuclear program. In a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, Rusk met with his French counterpart, Maurice

Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister since the inception of Dimona's construction. He was never an ideological believer in the Dimona program but was compelled to participate. Couve de

730 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Amembassy Tel Aviv June 22nd, 1962. Written by George Ball. Israel, General 6/16/62-6/30/62 National Security Files, Countries Israel, Box 118a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 731 “Draft Reply to UK Study," undated. State Department. Israel's Nuclear Reactor 21.50 Country File: Israel f. Reactor, 1962. RG59 Atomic Energy 1948-1962, Box 501. NA. 255

Murville informed Rusk that all the uranium transported to Israel would have to be returned to

France in plutonium form. The French Minister then hinted that the Israelis may get uranium elsewhere. While the Israelis had a formalized agreement with France for strictly peaceful uses of their uranium (supposedly), the same could not be said for another country's uranium. Rusk deduced that more surveillance of uranium moving to Israel was needed.732

The Department of Defense released a new and comprehensive study on global proliferation in late July. The paper formalized their thinking on Israel and the specific concern with Dimona. It aimed to inform Kennedy's ongoing negotiation to get some sort of agreement on nuclear testing with the Soviets, which eventually came in the form of his Limited Test Ban

Treaty in 1963.733 This first draft shaped Kennedy's thinking on the threat and widespread nature of proliferation. The study predicted that France would create weapons delivery systems -- the next proliferation candidate was "almost certainly China" and Israel. Israel was considered

"likely" to create a bomb over the next decade.734 The study was indicative of American strategic thinking since 1956-1957 on nuclear proliferation: the Americans believed in a sort of nuclear domino theory. China could force Australia to go nuclear -- the same for the Middle East and

Asia. Regional developments and the acquisition by an enemy could pressure certain states to move towards a weapon. Though a test ban would not stop diffusion, it could slow and restrict the process.735 Nuclear diffusion was deemed "clearly not in the interest of the U.S." The next

732 Department of State Telegram Geneva to Secretary of State written by Rusk. 784A. 561/4-1260. RG59 General Records of the Department of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, From 784A.56/1-862 To: 784A.5612/10-162, Box 2059. NA. 733 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”: 6. Cohen cites the Irish proposal within the UN GA as the move which formalized an attempt towards a global nonproliferation agreement in December, 1961: 7. 734 Department of Defense, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with or without a test ban Agreement," July 26th, 1962. 2. Accessed through William Burr, ed., “The Test Ban Challenge: Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Quest for A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Aug 11th, 2010. Document 3A. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb323/index.htm. 735 Ibid, 3. 256

line could have been written to address Israel alone: "(A)nd although their (nuclear weapons) use by a weak power would be irrational, such action cannot be ruled out."736 It was essential to stop

Israel from going nuclear in order to halt a global proliferation avalanche.

Another seemingly unrelated event took place over the summer. On July 22nd, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution, the UAR tested four rockets and

"paraded twenty or more of two sizes through the streets of Cairo."737 This deeply concerned the

Israelis -- the Egyptians were slightly ahead in both conventional and unconventional missiles.

The unconventional missiles could eventually attach warheads for biological or nuclear weapons.

The Egyptians tested two types of missiles that day.738 While the Americans did not assess the missiles to be a vital danger for Israel, they knew the Israelis would be “psychologically” alarmed.739 This new rocket accentuated an Israeli vulnerability, as one of the sounding rockets could reach "any part" of Israel.740 The Americans were less fraught than the Israelis as they knew that only about ten-to-fifteen West German scientists were involved with the development of these missiles and their help was essential. There were also targeting issues that would take years (from a later estimate in 1963); therefore, any concern of biological, radiological, chemical

736 Department of Defense, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with or without a test ban Agreement," July 26th, 1962. 5-6. Accessed through William Burr, ed., “The Test Ban Challenge: Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Quest for A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Aug 11th, 2010. Document 3A. The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb323/index.htm. 737 CIA, SNIE 30-2-63 "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," May 2nd, 1963. 13. Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 738 Bass, 164. These missiles included The Victor (Al Zafir) and the Conqueror (Al Qahir). The CIA dated the Egyptian test on July 21st, 1962. The Victor was based on the French Veronique. The Nonconventional, Conqueror was more of a concern. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. Scientific Intelligence Report "The United Arab Republic Ballistic Missile and Space Programs," 2-4, 6. August 2nd, 1965. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T05439A000500320027-6.pdf. 739 Memorandum for Deputy Director/Intelligence Attention Mr. Chester Cooper, January 10th, 1963. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63 National Security Files, Country Files Israel, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 740 Memorandum Economic Division from Africa and Middle Eastern Division Apr 19th, 1963. Nuclear Power Development in Israel and the United Arab Republic. RG25 Vol/Box 7882 File 14003-J8--40 Department of External Affairs Atomic Energy Other Countries General Israel. Co-operation with Canada from Jan 7th, 1959 to 9- 7-63. NAC. 257

or nuclear warheads attached would have to wait.741 The United States and Israel incorporated the Egyptian nonconventional missiles that could eventually carry warheads with an emerging albeit non-feasible, Egyptian nuclear desire to keep pace with Dimona. The United States wanted to avoid a nuclear arms race in the region, and this missile launch added to Israeli anxiety and

American efforts to manage the region. After the summer of 1962, the Kennedy Administration deduced that their timeline became more immediate to curtail this arms race.

The State Department continued to monitor any possible discussion within Israel. Finally, debate about the nuclear program appeared relevant. Ben-Gurion made a rare address in the

Knesset on the Israeli reactor. He again mounted his defense of Dimona, as he argued the project was akin to the CIR reactor in India with Canadian aid. On June 6th, he asserted this would take another three-to-four years to complete (this seems to lengthen the timeline) and would be peaceful. During a debate in August, Ben-Gurion declared that both Nahal Soreq and Dimona were only intended for peaceful scientific purposes. On this day, however, he was offended by another politician, a Communist member who accused Israel of producing weapons at Dimona.

Ben-Gurion retorted that any such accusation was considered slanderous.742 The Americans had finally gained insight into the internal debate within Israel.

Kennedy was preoccupied over the summer and fall of 1962 with other American-Israeli issues. He sent Feldman to Israel in August to announce the Hawk sale.743 When he announced the sale publicly in September, it appeared that Dimona had faded as a concern for the President.

Still, internal studies indicate that the Americans were acutely focused on Israeli proliferation.

741 CIA, SNIE 30-2-63 "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," May 2nd, 1963.13-14. Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 742 Airgram Aug 17th, 1962. Amembassy Tel Aviv to Department of State, Aman, Beirut, Damascus and Cairo all attached. 884A.1901/-461. RG59 Dept of Sate Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. Barbour also reported that the Israeli media ran stories about the training of technicians -- this would have required Ben-Gurion’s approval to pass through the censor. 743 “Letter Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy, August 20th, 1962," 1-4. Israel, Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box Israel 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 258

Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, had groups brainstorm and collect information on the "Nth country problem" pertinent to Kennedy's aspiration towards some incarnation of a nuclear test ban agreement. An inter-departmental paper addressed problematic proliferators, specifically, what new nuclear states would mean for the United States. This study outlined that "underdeveloped countries" with weapons would affect the wealthier nations. India and China are admitted as subjects; however, one name, most certainly, Israel, is redacted.744

Again, Europe, specifically Western Europe, was the priority for the United States and much discussion involved Germany. As for non-Europe and smaller states that could influence those in

Europe, this is the best example of the American conception of a nuclear domino theory. The

United States worried about the effects of smaller nations pursuing and achieving a weapons- capability. "Moral arguments against national involvement in any nuclear weapons development program would lose their force in many countries."745 Should one "middle-sized state" achieve this capability, then it would be difficult for leaders to quell domestic opposition to weapons in their own states. In this paper, one of the clearest articulations of the American concern on

Dimona and its global implications is presented:

"Israel's achievement of a nuclear capability would, for example, not only have a profound effect on Egypt for demonstrable strategic reasons, but it would also have a profound psychological effect in such states as West Germany and Italy. In short, it is apparent that there may be an increase in the number of entrants in the nuclear weapons race."746

744 "The Nth Country Problem- -- An Interim Report," no date or author attached to Sept 10th, 1962. This reference falls under "Other Possible Nuclear Powers," 3. Central Intelligence Agencies General 5/62-12/62. NSF, Departments & Agencies, Box 271. JKPL, Boston, MA. 745 Ibid. 746 Ibid, 3. 259

Israeli proliferation would represent the nexus of both worlds and the paramount fear of the United States: non-Europeans influencing core areas of the Cold War, notably, Western

Europe to proliferate. Along with the impact on India in Asia, the Americans were acutely worried about nuclear developments in West Germany. They explicitly tied the Israelis to global proliferation. This paper evidences that: firstly, they were concerned about Egypt and the potential for a Middle-Eastern clash; and secondly, this was a larger global issue which would threaten proliferation and the stability of Western Europe, and in so doing, American power projection, particularly the maintenance of European order. At this juncture, the challenge of

Israeli proliferation presented a grave global concern for the United States.

The Americans were not as concerned with UAR limited nuclear research, as with the

Israelis. They did note that the Israeli program would likely cause the UAR to increase their

"very limited nuclear research activity." The paper also cited the American surveillance and

Israeli concern over West German scientists helping the Egyptians with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Alarmingly, should the West German aid continue, the Egyptians could produce these rockets themselves in a few years. Problematically for the UAR, the Egyptians at this stage relied totally on this foreign assistance, had a rudimentary nuclear program, a flawed missile program, yet if this aid continued, by the end of the decade the UAR could "possibly fashion one or two crude weapons."747 Egyptian rockets continued to be monitored by the United

States throughout 1962 and into 1963.

As the internal studies of Israel's nuclear activity were delivered, the State Department continued their persistent pleas for a second Dimona visit. On the 14th of September, the Israelis were non-committal to a visit. Nonetheless, the Americans informed the Jewish state this issue

747 "The Nth Country Problem -- An Interim Report," 4. NSF, Box 271. JKPL, Boston, MA. 260

would not be dropped.748 In late September, the Department of State concluded that Ben-

Gurion's June 6th -parliamentary declaration (Dimona was like the Canada and India reactor) was intentionally used to avoid a further inspection. State and the White House wanted the inspection on September 25th or 28th when Nahal Soreq was set to be inspected. Having already witnessed the long pattern of delays in 1961, the Americans wanted a visit and would not relent its importance.749

On September 26th, the Israelis allowed a forty-minute partial inspection of Dimona. It was treated as an impromptu decision. The State Department and Atomic Energy Commission determined the visit inadequate. This inspection raised even more questions for the Americans and proved that more regular visits would be needed.750 While the State Department had many issues internally with the visit, particularly that it was unexpected, they informed the British and

Canadians that on the "political level" the United States accepted the reactor was peaceful. There were no signs of weapons production and the timeline appeared to be honest; however, due to

Israel’s progress, the reactor may go critical faster than the two years which had been promised by the Israelis. Despite accepting the political explanation, the Department provided British intelligence with their own intelligence conclusions -- these reports remain classified.751 State informed their other close ally, the Canadians, "we cannot speak to Israel's future actions, but

748 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation Sept 14, 1962. Subject: Proposed Visit of US Scientists to the Dimona Reactor Participants: Harman and Talbot. 884A.1901/7-461. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 749 Department of State Memorandum for Mac Bundy (Undated) Sept, 1962. Second Visit by US Scientists to the Dimona Reactor Submitted at the Request of Robert Komer. Israel, General 9/62-9/21/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 750 Department of State Memorandum for Bundy undated. (Dec, 1962). President's Meeting with Israel Foreign Min. Briefing Materials. 3. Israel's Nuclear Program. Israel, General 11/14/62-12/21/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 751 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Oct 23rd, 1962. Reactor. Participants Dennis Speares British Embassy, Mr. Robert Strong NE. 884A.1901/7-461. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963, Box 2803. NA. 261

what we have seen under construction."752 The Americans also shared with their Arab embassies that upon inspection by two American scientists, everything appeared peaceful akin to 1961, and it was as advertised: to "be of nature and scope publicly disclosed by the Israel Government."753

The CIA admitted internally that the "immediate objectives of the visit may have been satisfied (but) certain basic intelligence requirements were not."754American intelligence agencies had more questions after the second visit, and the restricted ad hoc nature of the visit created uncertainty as to Israel's intentions. The conclusions gleaned from the visits and what

Israel was supposedly conducting in private did not align. From September-1962 onwards,

Kennedy believed the Israelis were hiding elements of what was truly going on at Dimona. This visit heightened his suspicions.755

Kennedy after the Missile Crisis

The defining moment of the Kennedy Presidency involving nuclear weapons occurred in

October of 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was the closest the world had been to nuclear war as the Soviets and Americans went to the brink of confrontation. Rusk referred to the episode as "the gravest crisis the world has known."756 Kennedy's experience during this close call had significant impact on the issue of Israeli nuclear proliferation.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a disaster for potential nuclear proliferators, and Israel would not be spared. Not only had the crisis shaken the Soviet Union, it ingrained in the

752 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Oct 23rd, 1962. Second US Visit to Dimona Reactor. Participants: Edward r. Rettie Counselor, Embassy of Canada, William Crawford, Officer in Charge of Lebanon- Israel Affairs. 884A.1901/7-461. RG59 Dept of State Central Decimal File 1960-1963. Box 2803. NA. Cohen and Burr, "Concerned with Nuclear Weapons Potential," Apr 21st, 2016. 753 Circular Airgram from the Department of State to Certain Posts. Washington, Oct. 31st, 1962. Subject: Israel's Dimona Reactor. Doc 87. 196-198. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. They were very concerned with informing Nasser that everything was fine at Dimona. By November, all the Arab parties were informed on the Dimona visit. 754 Cohen and Burr, Apr 21st, 2016. 755 Goldman: 45. 756 Glenn T. Seaborg with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 175. 262

President already pursuing a nuclear test ban, the urgency of preventing proliferation. For

Kennedy, though the experience left a personal toll on him, it further instilled his belief that proliferation was a global evil which needed to be stopped.757

The Missile Crisis' impact was quickly apparent within the American-Israeli dynamic.

David Ben-Gurion sent a letter to Kennedy on October 29th as the crisis abated. He praised

Kennedy's actions, and Israel as part of the free world thanked the President for his responsible actions.758 Unfortunately for the Israelis, the impact of the confrontation and the lessons

Kennedy learned emboldened a more assertive and concerned American President.

Israeli and American scholars have built on the existing literature to identify the Missile

Crisis as the foundational experience for Kennedy's absolute focus and his strident efforts against proliferation. Kennedy's efforts regarding Dimona and Israeli proliferation greatly intensified after Cuba.759 Others highlight that not only did the Crisis catalyze Kennedy's nonproliferation initiatives, it also had a wider effect on American-Israeli relations as the President became less patient, and desired more Israeli efforts in the form of concessions and a more reciprocal relationship.760 Lastly, one scholar cited the Cuban Missile Crisis as the turning point in

American-Israeli relations and the Dimona issue. Due to Israeli domestic issues, the American pressure on Dimona, and political infighting within Israel, Ben-Gurion's stature after the Crisis heading into 1963 was diminished. While only remotely of Kennedy's doing, the Cuban Missile

Crisis, specifically, Kennedy's handling of the situation, greatly enhanced his reputation and

757 Cohen, "The Critical Decade”: 7. Aronson and Brosh argue Kennedy was against proliferation before the crisis; however, he was avowedly so after October 1962, 36. 758 Letter David Ben-Gurion to President John F. Kennedy. Oct 29th, 1962. Jerusalem. Israel General 1961-1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-005. January 20th, 1961-June 3rd, 1963. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 759 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 115. 760 Druks, John F. Kennedy, 89. 263

power as a world leader. The power balance between both leaders had further shifted.761 All these findings are valid; however, they simply enhance what Kennedy believed since his inauguration. He had made Israeli nonproliferation a priority since day one. After the Missile

Crisis, any ambiguity or delays would not be tolerated. This October confrontation was a measuring stick which tested his patience and nearly erupted in a thermonuclear war.

Understanding the catastrophic impact of proliferation, and returning from the precipice of war,

Kennedy set his sights on Israel. As for Dimona and Israel, this proved bad luck for the Israeli nuclear desire. The President, staunchly opposed to Israeli nuclear proliferation, had experienced a confrontation which solidified his quest to contain and uncover the truth of Dimona.

The American surveillance of Dimona continued through the end of 1962. Added technological capabilities bolstered their efforts. The newly-installed Corona Satellite undertook two missions photographing the installation twice in July and December of 1962.762 It is unclear what the Americans learned from these photographs; nonetheless, at this stage they monitored the Israel complex from the ground, air, and space.

Two significant developments ended the year. The first appeared to be a minor initiative, a study by the Policy Planning Council. The scope paper, entitled The Palestine Problem: The

Next Phase, was shared within the administration in first draft form in early December. Komer would later sell Kennedy on the benefits of this paper. The stated goal of this study was to address the seemingly impossible task of peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, the real focus was an arms control and limitation initiative. Action would soon be needed as "the types and amounts of weapons acquired grew in destructive power." The Council understood that the

Kennedy Administration would likely have to deal with an unconventional (this term dominated

761 Shalom, 35. 762 Richelson, 258. 264

the discussion) arms race between the UAR with rockets, and Israel with Dimona, along with an

Israeli emerging rocket program.763 At this stage, the problem was worsening; however, it was not yet a crisis or a vital American security issue. What is evident even at the early stages was the degree to which: firstly, State recognized that the UAR missiles and Dimona went hand-in- hand and were approached as the same problem; secondly; the degree of secrecy afforded to even the discussion of an arms limitation initiative.

The project was designated "CANE" with top-secret clearance required to even access this discussion. The study cautioned that due to "fears and uncertainties" by both sides, a pre- emptive or preventive war could be undertaken by the Israelis or Egyptians. The Americans were acutely concerned with each party’s distrust of the other's intentions. Given the historical animosity between both Israel and Egypt, the United States did not want the Soviets to exploit this issue, as it could result in "strategic loss in United States objectives in the area."764 The study continued to analyze both the UAR and Israel in detail, and was the first initiative to pair the rockets and Dimona together as an American strategic problem. With continued developments in both areas, there would be "potential changes (in) the nature of the Middle Eastern arms race qualitatively as well as quantitatively."765 This scenario was a nightmare for Kennedy: a Middle

Eastern war fought with advanced weapons. The paper outlined ways in which the United States could avoid this eventuality.

The clearest articulation of the Dimona threat, at least in the minds of the State

Department, was outlined in this paper. They realized the hypocrisy of American arms deals with

Israel -- certain weapons were more dangerous than others. The next line solidified the

763 William R. Polk, The Palestine Problem: The Next Phase S/P Draft Paper, Dec. 3rd, 1962. 1- 2. Folder Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 2 of 3. Files of Robert Komer, National Security Files, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 764 Ibid. 765 Ibid. 2. 265

distinction in the American view of conventional versus advanced weapons: "Thus, while Israel should be given the HAWK to protect airfields and so reduce the likelihood of attack, it should be discouraged from the production of nuclear fission materials which might frighten the UAR into a pre-emptive attack."766 While it is unclear at this stage whether Kennedy shared this view,

State could live with Israeli conventional capabilities and understood legitimate Israeli security grievances -- the Dimona issue was not negotiable. Upon further analysis, the concern of the

United States was obvious. By threatening Middle Eastern stability, Dimona challenged

American power, and as a result conflicted with American national security policy. After the problem was outlined, the Council suggested a program. A high level government official, supervised directly by the President, would visit both the UAR and Israel and negotiate with

Nasser and Ben-Gurion to try and achieve an arms initiative. This should occur "sometime during the first half of 1963", and given the nature of the project, absolute secrecy was essential so as not to scare off Nasser or Ben-Gurion. Furthermore, unlike previous initiatives, a total arms agreement would not work. After a "feeling out phase", the second phase would involve efforts and an agreement to limit "particularly dangerous or provocative arms and augmentation of defensive capabilities." 767 The Middle Eastern implications of Dimona were apparent: this was no longer just an Israeli issue in the region; the Egyptian element was directly factored into the

American security conception of the Middle East. As evidenced through numerous meetings and correspondence, Dimona was already intertwined with India and an American effort to stop global proliferation. The Dimona issue existed simultaneously as: a bilateral American-Israeli challenge; an American Middle Eastern obstacle; and a global proliferation problem.

766 Polk, The Palestine Problem: The Next Phase S/P Draft Paper, Dec. 3rd, 1962.7. Folder Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 2 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 767 Ibid, 8-10. 266

The second development of December 1962 was far more direct and significant. Unlike this relatively secret paper which was months away from dominating Kennedy's thoughts, he agreed to meet Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in Palm Beach, Florida, at the end of the year. Kennedy, who had been distracted by the Missile Crisis and the perils of the larger Cold

War, returned to directly intervene in the American-Israeli relationship. Komer and Talbot briefed the President for his meeting. State had become increasingly frustrated with Israel in terms of the larger relationship. Under the heading, "US grounds for dissatisfaction", Dimona was specifically identified as a contributing factor. The problem for the State Department with

Dimona was their larger grievance and message that the Israelis were not practicing reciprocity with the Americans.768 Both Kennedy's NSC (Komer and Bundy), along with State, urged him to personally raise American visits and concerns about the reactor -- given his stance, he did not have to be prompted.

Kennedy reviewed a damning portrayal of Dimona's history since he took office. Only after considerable pressure did Ben-Gurion concede to a visit in May of 1961.The second visit was limited, unsatisfactory, failed to dispel American suspicion, and left the AEC and State with more unanswered questions. The only remedy would be for the Israelis to permit more frequent inspections for the Americans or outside parties.769 Meir needed to understand the United States expected a "more open door in making it possible for US and perhaps other responsible visitors to observe Israel's program. This matter is too important for humanity for the United States not to take direct, continuing interest in it."770 Kennedy understood the gravity of the situation when he met Meir.

768 Memorandum for Bundy President's Meeting with Israel Foreign Minister: Briefing Materials, (undated, likely mid-December, 1962). Folder Israel, General 11/14/62-12/21/62. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 769 Ibid. 770 Ibid. "Talking Points," Document 14g. 267

Kennedy and Meir finally met on December 27th and discussed a plethora of issues. For the most part, the meeting was cordial. This encounter was a testament to the complexity of the

Dimona issue and the progression of American-Israeli relations. Kennedy and Meir raised several issues before coming to Dimona. The conversation turned to the Israeli concern with the

UAR's advanced weapons. Her mission was to attempt to instil within the President the Israeli security conception. In Meir's view, the problem was the continued activities of the Egyptians.

She cited West German scientists as building ground-to-ground (surface-to-surface) missiles since 1960. The Israelis assessed that the UAR were preparing rockets with warheads for radiological warfare. Problematically, Egypt received, and was receiving, additional arms from the Soviet Union.771 The President informed Meir that like Israel, the United States had security problems, and unlike the Israeli regional situation, these challenges emanated from around the globe. He then uttered his "special relationship" proclamation to reassure his Israeli visitor. The

Israelis had finally received direct security assurances from the President himself. Near the end of the meeting, Kennedy brought up Dimona, hoping that the Israelis would give thought to the

American concern with their nuclear complex. Meir replied: "there would not be any difficulty between us on the Dimona nuclear reactor." Kennedy politely shared it was not his policy to pry into the affairs of other nations; however, given the staunch opposition held by the United States to nuclear proliferation, this was essential.772 He further informed the Foreign Minister that the

771 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Dec 27th, 1962. Participants: President Kennedy, Foreign Minister Meir, Ambassador Harman, Myer Feldman, Phillips Talbot and Robert Komer. 1-3. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. Also available FRUS, Vol. XVIII, Doc 121. 276-278. 772 Department of State Circular Jan 4, 1963. President's Meeting with Meir uncleared Memorandum of Conversation.1-3. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. FRUS, Vol. XVIII, Doc 121. 278-283. 268

United States was heavily invested in Israel, a concern he "personally" shared.773 Ironically, Meir personally agreed with the President as she had been most adamant since she learned of Dimona at the end of the 1950s that the Israelis should have informed the Americans on their intentions from the outset of development.774 Unfortunately, Kennedy had no way to discern he had the most ideologically aligned Israeli Minister in his presence.

1962 concluded with Kennedy's dual approach to Israel. He guaranteed the United States would not let Israel become endangered by the Egyptians, admitting the Americans and Israelis were as close as United Kingdom and United States. Yet, he and his administration secretly distrusted Israeli comments on Dimona. This meeting best represents the complexity of

Kennedy’s relationship with, and image of, Israel: respect and mistrust.

Scholars contend Kennedy's goal between 1961 and 1962 was to bring Dimona under international inspections. Kennedy was firmly committed to the United States stopping nuclear proliferation, yet he wanted the IAEA to take control of the Dimona inspections long-term.775 He wanted Sweden or a neutral to inspect Dimona, but due to Swedish reluctance and continued

Israeli delays, a "neutral inspection" did not materialize. Indeed, Kennedy failed in his first two years to coerce Israel into allowing neutral inspectors to the site. Israel's continued objections and delays in permitting the outside world to inspect hurt the Israeli cause. The Americans became highly suspicious of Dimona, a suspicion the Israelis could have lessened by expediting a neutral visit.776 Kennedy failed in procuring international inspections for Dimona. He did, however, get two American visits to the reactor. Though incomplete and problematic, these visits

773 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Dec 27th, 1962. Participants: President Kennedy, Foreign Minister Meir, Ambassador Harman, Myer Feldman, Phillips Talbot and Robert Komer. 8. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA 774 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 282. Meir stood against visits -- they were seen as embarrassing with Israel relenting to American pressure. She had preferred to use the reactor in the later 1960s to leverage arms or benefits within the relationship. 775 Cohen and Burr, Apr 21st, 2016; Cohen “Israel and the Evolution”: 1. 776 Long and Shifrinson: 72. 269

appeased part of his nonproliferation policy. By the end of 1962, he had not yet received conclusive or concrete evidence on Israel. Throughout 1962, he began to gradually inherit the existing institutional (CIA and State) distrust of Israel’s explanations for Dimona. The mounting distrust of the Israelis on Dimona was apparent and by 1963, with new elements in the dynamic: an increased Egyptian rocket threat; the exposure of a covert program by the Israelis to assassinate West German scientists; and lastly, damning evidence that the Israelis were lying to the Americans, Kennedy changed course. His timeline readily became more immediate and he acted accordingly.

A lingering uncertainty arises around the extent of American intelligence's knowledge of the construction of a plutonium separation facility -- only one CIA report from April 1961 suggests this was likely already underway. This dissertation has examined the often-assumed, or alluded to, belief that American intelligence knew more than indicated. Perhaps the best single example of this comes from a conversation reported by Seymour Hersh. Problematically, the date of this encounter was neither cited nor dated. According to Hersh, sometime in 1962, a member of the French Foreign Ministry, Charles Lucet, was asked why the French were building a reprocessing plant in Israel. Lucet aghast, responded: no, the accuser was mistaken; it was merely a reactor under construction. The severity of this issue was obvious, given the individual posing this query -- CIA Director, John McCone.777 While quoted by other scholars, no documents recount this exchange, so Hersh's reporting cannot be substantiated. Furthermore, one

CIA report during this two-year period does not guarantee official certainty. Accordingly, the conclusion reigns that the Americans did not know conclusively about the facility; they simply applied a high degree of suspicion. Until such time as declassified documents prove otherwise, the working premise (for 1961-1962) on American intelligence is: informed skepticism.

777 Hersh, 118-119. Kroenig, 77. 270

Kennedy acted on available intelligence during the Waldorf-Astoria meeting. The interest and the priority he assigned to intelligence indicated he was never truly removed from monitoring Dimona, even in 1962. By the end of 1962, it was relatively apparent that Israel was a decisive nuclear proliferation threat, which the United States needed to address in order to stop both a regional war with advanced weapons and Egyptian nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the

American concern with large countries such as India proliferating was ever-present. In

Kennedy’s view, halting Israeli proliferation was vital to preventing an Indian bomb. Lastly, in order to stop a nuclear proliferation domino effect, and the preeminent American fear of further

Western European proliferation, Israel needed to be decisively rebuked from achieving a bomb.

Through 1961-1962, American-Israeli relations continued to foster positive interactions.

The Hawk was sold. Israel received further aid. Kennedy even admitted that a "special relationship" existed between both countries. All these developments transpired despite intense scrutiny on the Dimona reactor amid an emerging consensus that the Israelis lied, and continued to do so, on Dimona -- until the Americans discovered the truth for themselves. Still, as of 1962,

Dimona had not yet poisoned the relationship. Kennedy and his administration understood that problems were apparent as 1963 approached. With a more problematic Middle East, and in his view, reckless Israeli actions, Dimona’s priority status was high on Kennedy’s radar in 1963. He built upon his meeting with Meir at the end of 1962, and followed through accordingly.

As for the thesis of this dissertation, Kennedy's economic, liberal, progressive, and favourable view of Israel as a success story worth supporting was kept intact. Dimona had not yet derailed his belief in Israel albeit storm clouds were forming, and 1962 ended with ominous signs. By the end of 1962, respect still dominated over his mistrust. Policy Planning Council papers, CIA reports, and a shared American and Israeli rising concern with Egypt's rockets

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expedited the Middle East to the forefront of Kennedy's priorities. As Kennedy analyzed additional intelligence and incriminating reports on Dimona, his speculation increased.

Eventually, this fuelled total distrust of Israeli intentions. In 1963, Kennedy's belief system was over-powered by his need to halt Israeli proliferation, and forced him to take action.

Deciphering Kennedy’s 1963-Dimona-reaction is necessary to fully comprehend his priorities vis-à-vis Israeli and foreign policy. His decisive stand against Dimona was a key tenet in Kennedy’s Israeli legacy. 1963 also evidences the best case study for how the United States confronted proliferation challenges. Kennedy’s actions against an ally who constituted a proliferation threat provide rare insight to present American security problems. In the following year, Israel tested: the limits of Kennedy’s goodwill; his positive view of their country; and pertinently, the extent of American intelligence on their program. Unfortunately for the Israelis, all these variables contributed to one coherent conclusion: Dimona needed to be stopped urgently.

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Chapter Seven: Mistrust and Confrontation, 1963

In 1963, the Kennedy Administration shifted its collective focus onto Israel and the worsening situation at Dimona. This was not singularly Israel’s fault. Egypt with the help of

West German scientists also heightened the potential for Middle Eastern war and devastation.

Kennedy, post-Cuban Missile Crisis and with other issues subsiding, was able to devote much more energy to Israel and the Dimona problem. By year's end, he had threatened not only David

Ben-Gurion, but also his successor, Levi Eshkol, that the future of the American-Israeli relationship depended upon Israel's nuclear program. In 1963, the Dimona nuclear program eventually dominated all aspects of American-Israeli relations. From April through August, all

American policy regarding Israel incorporated the prevention of an Israeli nuclear weapon. It was Dimona which threatened to derail fifteen years of positive relations between Israel and the

United States. By the winter, the President shared the Department of State and CIA's view of

Israel: the Israelis were lying about the facility's purpose. During the spring and summer,

Kennedy took the most forceful measures of his Presidency, and perhaps, the most decisive

Presidential stand against Israel since the state's inception. Kennedy's position on Dimona shifted from affording the Israelis the benefit of the doubt to great suspicion, genuine anger, and determination that Dimona must be dealt with immediately. His own conclusions, along with the analysis of his National Security Council, State Department, and the American intelligence community substantiated this position.

This chapter analyzes the consequences of the Dimona crisis on the bilateral security relationship. It examines how, over several, Kennedy grew more forceful with the Israelis. By the summer, American-Israeli relations were at a critical juncture: if the Israelis would not come clean or allow Americans into Dimona, several devastating consequences could transpire.

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Kennedy could have ended the preferable treatment of Israel. Additionally, he could have opposed further arms sales. Lastly, though unlikely, he could have drastically cut American aid, financing and money designated for Israel. While Kennedy's worldview of Israel remained intact, the nuclear threat meant action had to be taken -- Israel would no longer be in control of the

Dimona deliberations. His positive image of Israel was subordinated to his primary concern to stop nuclear proliferation. Kennedy’s reprisal against Israel brought the relationship to the brink of disintegration. Israel’s good standing as an American ally did not prevent Kennedy’s overwhelming pressure on Dimona. He demanded a system of regular American inspections at the Dimona reactor and a pledge from the Israelis that the program would be peaceful. Only after the Israelis conformed to his demands did normal relations resume.

Though 1961 and 1962 progressed with the Hawk sale and positive interactions, by 1963, especially after late March, all American-Israeli arms and security decisions included Dimona considerations. From late-March until late-August 1963 when Dimona was “solved” or at least addressed in the administration’s view, all positive relations were paused. The most notable example was Kennedy’s repeated threats to Israeli Prime Ministers that the relationship could be re-evaluated. The other dominant effect on the security relationship involved an ongoing

American debate whether to tie the ultimate Israeli goal, an American-Israeli security treaty, with a pledge not to proliferate. After several months of administration discussions on whether to link

Dimona, specifically inspections, with such a pact, the issues were separated. While the push to procure answers on Dimona was undertaken, Dimona greatly affected all aspects of the relationship, particularly, American security considerations in the region. The threat of an Israeli nuclear weapon affected seemingly unrelated American-Israeli issues. Dimona also provided the impetus for an extensive, yet ultimately unsuccessful, arms limitation mission. An analysis of

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various administration meetings and wider intelligence collection indicates Dimona was the dominant Israeli matter in American policy calculations. By early 1963, Egyptian missiles and nonconventional weapons were incorporated into the American approach to limit all advanced weapons in the region. Specifically, after mid-1963 until late-July, the administration paired

Egyptian armaments with Israeli nuclear weapons. When Israeli actions against West German nuclear scientists who collaborated with Egypt were exposed in March, the American response to the regional arms race accelerated. By the end of March 1963, Kennedy’s faith in Israeli explanations of Dimona, and by extension, Israeli excuses, had drastically declined.

The Israelis were not treated in isolation. Additionally, India and wider proliferation were taken into account when the Americans delivered their response. 1963 was the seminal year when intelligence and internal studies proved the need to tackle Israel and larger proliferation.

Since his Waldorf-Astoria meeting (May, 1961), Kennedy had read increasingly scathing intelligence on Dimona. He realized by March of 1963 that Israel’s time had run out. McGeorge

Bundy and Robert Komer were primarily responsible for sorting and consuming the intelligence community’s findings on Israel. It was Komer, an upper-level analyst and the Middle East expert on the NSC, and occasionally Bundy, who supplied Kennedy options on dealing with Israel, such as the CANE arms limitation program. The State Department, notably, Secretary of State, Dean

Rusk and Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, also influenced Kennedy’s thinking. After familiarizing himself with the intelligence agencies’ reports on Dimona, Kennedy then made the final decisions, based on his own calculations. By 1963, intelligence, State, Komer, and Kennedy had aligned to prioritize the urgent need to stop an Israeli nuclear weapon. This decision overruled Kennedy’s pre-existing worldview and warm regard for Israel. The Dimona issue nearly derailed American-Israeli relations under Kennedy. This was not a mere blip in the highs-

275

and-lows of the relationship, rather given the global stakes, an unprecedented challenge. Had

Levi Eshkol not agreed to Kennedy’s demands, the relationship would have been adjusted. Only after Eshkol accepted Kennedy’s stipulations on Dimona was the special relationship allowed to continue on its positive path.

1963 commenced with the immediate repercussions of the Meir-Kennedy Florida meeting. With his special relationship proclamation, Kennedy had finally given Israel a concrete assurance of American support for their defense. Despite this declaration, Ben-Gurion informed

Barbour that Israel would have to rely upon itself for security.778 The special relationship declaration most clearly articulated that Israel ideologically fit within Kennedy’s worldview.779

Conversely, beginning with the Meir meeting in December 1962, as one scholar notes, the

United States entered into the "most rhetorically violent confrontation" with Israel that continued through 1963.780 This ideological and worldview designation was juxtaposed alongside more pressing American security challenges, and highlights the nuanced American-Israeli relationship.

Meir presented the case that the United Arab Republic's missile program constituted a grave, even existential threat to Israel. She had informed Kennedy that Israeli intelligence deduced Nasser was in the process of developing surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore, he had approved of a 220-to-250 million dollar program for the achievement of radiological warfare.781

In 1963, two determinants intensified Kennedy's interest: firstly, given the importance of the Middle East, Israel grew as a foreign policy priority. The presence and participation of

778 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Jan 22nd, 1963. Folder Israel, General 1/21/63- 1/31/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 779 Bar-Siman-Tov: 232. 780 Goldman: 45. 781 Department of State Circular January 4th, 1963. President's Meeting with Meir uncleared memcon. Israel, General, 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 276

Kennedy's NSC (Komer, and occasionally, Bundy, who reviewed intelligence firsthand) demonstrates the centrality Kennedy attached to the region. While State remained involved,

Kennedy's distrust of bureaucracies resulted in Komer's increased engagement -- a significant shift apparent in the latter months of 1962.782 Secondly, the emergence of Egyptian rockets created a threat for Israel and signalled a potential arms race in the Middle East with nonconventional weapons and disastrous repercussions. Kennedy would be influenced by the arguments of Komer and Bundy. Accordingly, he acted to stop this new arms race.

Since the summer of 1962 and continuing into 1963, the CIA collected information on the Egyptian missile program. They discovered it was developed almost exclusively by West

German scientists and technicians. At the start of the year, American intelligence concluded this did not constitute a significant threat to Israel. On January 10th, Kennedy’s NSC deduced that the

Meir-Kennedy meeting left the Americans "Shafted again in Palm Beach." Upon hearing Meir’s evidence and concerns about the Egyptian rocket program, the President asked Komer and the

CIA to investigate Egyptian capabilities. They concluded that the threat was an Israeli exaggeration. While the CIA evaluated Egyptian radiological capabilities, Komer investigated arms limitation. He was familiar with the Policy Planning Council’s study from December 1962.

He concurred with the Council that it was possible to could get the Egyptians and Israelis to mutually agree to arms limitation, specifically a trade-off of missiles for a non-military development pledge at Dimona. Komer was skeptical of Israeli intentions: "I wonder -- is Israeli talk about UAR build-up intended as justification for their (Israeli) own nuclear effort."783 Early

782 Political scientist, Steven L. Spiegel, first identified the importance of Komer in the Middle East. Spiegel examined the same Oral Histories as has this author (along with his own interviews) and identified Komer as a main practitioner of diplomatic policy in the region. Komer acted as the intermediary between the White House and State, as Phillips Talbot acted as his adviser on the region. Spiegel, 98-102. Throughout his book, Warren Bass argues of the rise of Komer in late-1962 into1963 and the fall, against the exclusion of Myer Feldman on the Dimona issue. 783 Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy Jan 10th, 1963. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 277

in 1963, administration officials believed the Israelis highlighted Egyptian rockets as a ploy or defense to justify their insidious nuclear development at Dimona. This view would dominate the administration in the following months.

American intelligence discovered that West German scientists had established contacts with Egypt sometime in 1960. The West Germans were commissioned to develop and produce two rockets to "counter Israeli efforts" -- a reference to both Israeli rockets and the Dimona reactor.784 The Americans deciphered that Egyptian reliance on the West Germans indicated they had not yet developed a guided missile system which could be utilized for military purposes.

Most essential components for the program were constructed within Europe itself. Nonetheless, this assessment confirmed there were reasonable grounds for some Israeli concern – possibly a rocket launched sometime in 1964. Though most workers were technicians, "West Germans remain and (the) flow (was) uninterrupted" into Egypt since the early 1960s.785 The intelligence community doubted these missiles could cause any great harm to Israel due to a limited delivery capability and the aforementioned absence of a guiding system. As for the Egyptian Inshas nuclear reactor underway with Soviet aid, this was only for research and had very little, if any, potential for a nuclear weapons capability. It was highly unlikely the Egyptians could attach radiological warheads to their missiles or possess any sizeable chemical weapons (though some could have been left by the British, pre-Suez); therefore, the Israeli concern was unwarranted.

Conventional missiles were all the Egyptians could muster given their abilities.786 Despite this benign diagnosis, Komer felt he needed to confront the Israelis and agreed to meet with Gazit.

784 Memo for Deputy Dir/Intelligence Attention Mr. Chester Cooper from Karl H (this part is blurred) for Albert D. Wheelon, Ass. Dir. Scientific Intelligence. Subject: UAR Delivery and Capability for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. undated, (likely, Jan 8th) 1963. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 785 Ibid. 786 Ibid, 2. 278

On January 14th, 1963, Gazit and Komer met to discuss a variety of issues. Komer's agitation and anxiety was apparent in this meeting as he conveyed to Gazit that the Israelis avoided answering American questions and focused solely on Israeli goals, specifically, their ever-present pursuit of a security guarantee from the United States. Komer acknowledged that the United States had a "more intimate relationship with (the) Israelis than with almost any other country."787 Regarding the Egyptian missile threat, Komer admitted the United States had a “less alarmist view" than Israel. Komer then formulated a question that would become central in

American policy concerning Dimona: would Israel be interested in "a mutual arms agreement" of

“a tacit nature”, not to develop “unconventional capabilities"? The Israeli nuclear issue and

Egyptian missiles were linked together. Gazit countered he did not believe this would come to fruition; however, it was worth exploring.788 These tepid responses had previously angered and disappointed the Kennedy Administration; however, the Americans would be more emphatic on unconventional weapons. By advancing this idea early in the year, the Americans planted the seed that they wanted to address the Dimona issue in the same vein as Egyptian rockets. The push for an arms control program at the very beginning of the year is revealing for a number of reasons. Firstly, the United States had a growing urgency to stop Dimona's development; and secondly, that Komer was willing, or at least pretended to be ready, to negotiate on Dimona akin to other issues in the relationship. While Komer was initially willing to negotiate, this would quickly change, as Kennedy's concern grew with the Middle Eastern arms race. Komer often acted as the liaison for Kennedy on Dimona; however, Kennedy made the final decision that there would be no negotiation on nuclear weapons.

787Memorandum for the Record Lunch with Gazit (Komer) Jan 14th, 1963. 1-2. Israel, General 1/4/63-1/14/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 788 Ibid. 279

On January 23rd, 1963, National Intelligence Estimate NIE 30-63 predicted that the

Israelis would keep their conventional military edge over the Arabs for the immediate years and that no Arab states were close to developing a nuclear capability for years.789 This appeared to be welcome news for the Israelis, unfortunately for the United States, the conclusions were less settling. While the CIA believed that Israel was behind the UAR in terms of rocket technology, problems persisted for the Americans. Firstly, the Israelis had tested their sounding rocket in July of 1961 and still had not let any American personnel inspect their rocket program. Secondly, the

Israelis, should they be given outside aid, could produce several missiles within three-to-four years which could potentially reach up to three hundred miles. Additionally, the Israelis were searching for foreign scientists, even Americans, to help with this endeavour. Lastly, unless impeded by external forces, or pressure (namely, American), the Israelis "will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years, and could have a limited capability by 1967-

1968."790 By early January, the CIA reasoned that Dimona could potentially go operational by the end of 1963. Still, American intelligence could not uncover any plutonium reprocessing facility or "positive evidence" of an existing weapons program.791 Komer informed Kennedy that

789 National Intelligence Estimate Washington, Jan 23rd, 1962. "The Arab-Israeli Problem" NIE 30-63. Doc 139. 318. Nina J. Noring ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie gen. ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. XVIII, Near East 1962-1963. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1995). 790 Memorandum for the President from Komer Feb 12th, 1963 Israel, General, 2/21/63-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA This memo, declassified in 2013, oddly details that Komer believed the last time Dimona was inspected was November of 1962, not in September. There is no record of any other inspection in 1962, only the September visit -- this was likely a mistake on Komer's part. Still, an individual as informed as Komer might show there were further visits -- though never reported by any scholars. Furthermore, in a newer version of the memorandum declassified after a mandatory request by this author, Komer admitted (concerning the visit schedule), "banking on Meir's assurance to you, we were planning a better look in the next month or so." Memo Komer for Kennedy Feb 12th, 1963. Folder Israel, 1961-1963: White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. Druks cited an older version of this memo. Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 92. 791 Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 30-63 "The Arab-Israeli Problem," January 23rd, 1963, Secret, Excised Copy, 10.The National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=5983539- National-Security-Archive-Doc-04-Director-of. This new version has been uncovered by Avner Cohen and William Burr. Accessed through William Burr and Avner Cohen, eds., "The Battle of the Letters, 1963: John F. Kennedy, David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, and the U.S. Inspections of Dimona," May 2nd, 2019. Briefing Book No. 671. The 280

given these findings (perhaps, based on the PPC paper), it made sense to undertake an arms limitation program to address Egypt and Israel together.792

At the outset of 1963, a coherent approach to Dimona had been created: link both the trepidation the Israelis had for Egyptian missiles with the American concern on Dimona.

Kennedy wanted stability and the avoidance of war. This rapidly escalating three-way security challenge created a unique cycle of anxiety: the Israelis focused on Egyptian missiles, the

Egyptians feared Dimona, and the Americans were uneasy about both parties in the Middle

Eastern arms race.

Kennedy needed to address both Dimona and this growing issue of West German scientists developing advanced weapons for Egypt. The administration wanted to substantiate, based on Komer’s and the CIA’s suspicion, whether the Israelis were genuinely concerned about the West Germans, or if this was merely a further justification for Dimona. In short, the answer is complicated and comprised a mix of both. To truly comprehend the importance to which the

Israelis assigned the Egyptian missile threat, a closer examination is warranted.

Israeli intelligence discovered that Nasser has been working with former Nazis since

1954.793 This Israeli proof of Egyptian-West German collaboration dated back to the mid-1950s and unsettled the Israelis, who were still very much effected by the Holocaust.794 The Israelis understood that Germans with links to the Nazis were helping a central Israeli enemy to threaten

Jewish lives. Furthermore, during this period, there was an ever-present security concern posing an existential threat to the State of Israel, Nasser’s UAR. The Nazi-scientists aligned with Egypt

National Security Archive. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2019-05-02/battle-letters-1963- john-f-kennedy-david-ben-gurion-levi-eshkol-us-inspections-dimona. Document 4 792 Memorandum for the President from Komer, Feb 12th, 1963 Israel, General, 2/21/63-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 793 Roger Howard, Operation Damocles: Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists, 1951-1967 (New York: Pegasus Books, 2013), 36. The Israelis discovered this collaboration through embedded agents in Egypt preparing for what would become the Lavon Affair. The Israelis titled this, "Operation Susannah", 44. 794 Golan, 67-68. 281

embodied the amalgamation of two traditional Jewish/Israeli enemies. This was entrenched with

Ben-Gurion's staunch commitment and guiding principle to never allow another Holocaust.795

Nasser had approached the Germans in 1959 to create a "secret arsenal of unconventional weapons".796 The initiative was so appealing that as many as three hundred Germans came to

Egypt in the 1960s -- most were technicians with only a few rocket scientists.797 The Egyptians recruited these specialists to produce surface-to-surface rockets, needed in the early-1960s to offset the possible Israeli nuclear program.798 Evidently, the American Government was not alone in linking these rockets and Dimona -- Nasser also made the connection. The Dimona program triggered a larger unconventional arms race with Israel’s Arab neighbours.

The West German-Egyptian program was initiated just as the Israelis tested their own rocket for "meteorological purposes", the Shavit 2 in July. This signalled a Middle Eastern missile race had begun.799 Israeli intelligence learned of the July 1962 missile tests of the Al-

Zafir and Al-Qahir (Kahir) rocket tests and was dismayed. Like the CIA, they derived that the

Victor (al-Zafir) only had a missile range of 175 miles while the Conqueror (Al-Qahir) could reach about 350 miles. Unlike their American counterparts, they were concerned.800 The

Americans highlighted the lack of a guidance system and ranked the chances of a successful strike on Israel as highly unlikely. The Israelis, however, were distraught for a number of reasons: Israeli existential dread (a consistent security concern) escalated with increased Israeli media coverage of the tests; and Nasser's alarming admission that the Conqueror could hit

795 Aronson, "Israel's Security and the Holocaust," 67. Aronson refers to Ben-Gurion's belief in the Iron Wall and a much needed policy of deterrence to engage the Arabs in an age of nuclear weapons. 796 Black and Morris, 193. 797 Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Services (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 144. The CIA also shared this assessment. 798 Ibid, 115. The authors argue these "unconventional weapons" would be used as a balance. 799 Howard, 134-139. 800 Bar-Zohar and Mishal, 113. 282

"anywhere south of Beirut".801 It was clear to the Israelis that they were the intended targets of these rockets. Their primary concern was Meir’s admission to Kennedy in December, 1962 that the Egyptians could place radiological, biological, or chemical weapons on the warheads of these rockets. The Israelis who had been monitoring this Egyptian development decided to take action.

Following the Egyptian tests, Ben Gurion approved a Mossad program codenamed,

Operation Damocles, which targeted collaborating German scientists. The covert operation was launched over the summer of 1962.802 Not all Israeli officials were united on this approach or whether this really constituted a threat. The Israeli intelligence apparatus was even divided on the true capabilities of the Egyptians and if this warranted a direct security concern.803 This illustrates the complexity of the Egyptian-German rocket issue; Israeli camps were divided. Meir genuinely believed in the threat. Both she and the head of the Mossad (Isser Harel) pushed for unlimited efforts to halt the Egyptian rockets, while Shimon Peres and head of Israeli military intelligence AMAN, (Amit) opposed this decision.804 Ben-Gurion, caught in the middle, reluctantly permitted Operation Damocles. Meir was truthful to Kennedy when she admitted she feared Egyptian radiological weapons. The Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff addressed

Israel’s concern, revealing "we took them (Germans and Egyptians) seriously."805 The answer is mixed on the degree of Israel’s concern on the West German scientists. The government was split on the issue. Both civilians and intelligence personnel worried. Others believed this was an exaggeration.

801 Ronen Bergman, "The Secret History of Israel's War against Hitler's Scientists," Newsweek Magazine, Apr 12th, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/2018/04/20/israel-secret-war-mossad-hitler-scientists-world-war-ii-egypt-nasser- 883630.html. 802 Howard, 5. 803 Black and Morris, 194. Meir Amit, the AMAN head, believed the United States would intervene should the Egyptians produce these weapons of mass destruction. 804 Ibid, 195. Howard, 6. He also shared the American doubt of a successfully-guided Egyptian rocket. 805 Bar-Zohar and Mishal, 116. 283

Operation Damocles involved a series of mail bombs targeting West German scientists.

The Israelis sent several bombs to West German scientists; however, often the non-intended target opened the package and Israeli activities became too high profile. This forced a cessation in operations and drew the ire of Ben-Gurion. 806 After this incident, the mail bombs took a momentary pause. Operation Damocles was eventually exposed in 1963, after a botched operation in Switzerland. After two Israeli agents threatened the daughter of one of the participating German scientists, she reported them to the Swiss police. The Israelis were arrested in March.807 The March 15th arrest and deposition in court exposed the Israeli campaign against the Germans and their covert actions.808 When the press reported on the story, the Americans and wider global community learned the extent of Israel's activities. Timing is vital here: in mid-

March, President Kennedy read about the Operation Damocles Israeli debacle. Kennedy, unaware of these covert actions, had another reason to suspect a pattern of Israeli deceit. This greatly contributed to Kennedy’s immediate timeline to discern the truth on Dimona. He confronted the Israelis accordingly.

The Israelis, both within Israel and in interactions with Kennedy Administration officials, incurred a great deal of damage from the fallout. In response, the Israelis concocted a propaganda campaign to instil fear in the Israeli populace and to act as a defense for their embattled agents in Switzerland. The hysteria even involved absurd stories that the UAR were using Germans to build death rays, a plethora of nuclear weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. In March, Meir presented the Knesset with this alarmist view of Egypt.809 The ploy

806 Bergman, "The Secret History". Rafi Eitan of the Mossad was firmly against this envelope- bombing campaign, fearing an unintended target could open the parcel. Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations (New York: Random House, 2018), 69. 807 Bergman, "The Secret History". 808 Bar-Zohar and Mishal, 124. 809 Howard, 192. This was noticed by the United States. Bergman, “The Secret History”. 284

worked as a defense, the agents were not deported to Germany and received a light sentence. The propaganda campaign continued throughout the year; the consequences within Israel were severe. It cost the leader of Mossad his job by the end of March.810

The significance of the Egyptian rocket threat to Israel is difficult to gauge. Peres summarized it best during an April 1963 meeting with Kennedy. He informed the President he did not know if the Egyptian missiles constituted a real threat; however, they were cheaper

Egyptian options than planes and bombers.811 Even Ben-Gurion was directly affected. In mid-

June he resigned for what came to his final stint as Prime Minister. No reason was given albeit the Lavon Affair, a fractured Mapai party, the impact of Dimona, and this issue have been suggested. Teddy Kollek, Ben-Gurion's close confidant, and Director-General of Ben-Gurion's office, blamed Harel and the German scientist mania for Ben-Gurion's resignation. He felt the

Israeli leader did not believe the scientists constituted a grave threat, "if there were even any scientists".812

Israeli actions in Operation Damocles are important for a number of reasons. They demonstrate nuanced Israeli thinking with multiple camps and positions, and evidenced the desperation they felt at this point. Operation Damocles and the Egyptian rocket issue framed the disconnected narratives between the Israeli and American version of threats in 1963. The Israelis believed or at least insisted to the Americans that the Egyptian rocket threat was severe; the CIA and Kennedy Administration consistently disagreed. This operation was used throughout the year to demonize Nasser and justify the Israeli need for nuclear weapons. No doubt, Israeli rumours of Egyptian rockets were somewhat exaggerated.

810 Bergman, “The Secret History”. 811 Howard, 8. 812 Teddy Kollek, "The Transition from David Ben-Gurion to Levi Eshkol," Teddy Kollek June 1963: Memoir 175- 176. Documents in Israel. Kollek attributes Ben-Gurion's resignation to the Lavon Affair and this German scientist issue. 285

The United front against Dimona: Kennedy finalizes his Approach

In the early months of 1963, American and Israeli views diverged. The Israelis, at least outwardly through Golda Meir and Mordechai Gazit, urged the Americans to respond to the

Egyptian rocket threat and portrayed the issue as a fundamental, existential threat to Israel.

Robert Komer, the CIA, and the State Department deemed the missiles and West German scientists to be of no immediate threat to Israel. Clearly, Meir succeeded in getting Kennedy to assess this threat to Israel. By tasking Komer and the CIA to investigate the extent of Egyptian rocket capabilities, the President waded further into the Middle Eastern arms race. Through

February and March, Kennedy's views would solidify. Kennedy, Bundy, and Komer descended into an intelligence collection and analysis overdrive on Dimona.

On February 9th, Komer (as he led the PPC) wrote Kennedy delivering what came to be known as the Rostow Paper. Komer argued that it seemed an appropriate time to investigate whether Ben-Gurion and Nasser would agree to "a bit of tacit arms control". He articulated that

Ben-Gurion was worried about the UAR's missiles, especially the threat of radiological warheads being attached. Similarly, Nasser was concerned with both Israeli biological weapons and their progress on nuclear weapons. An arms limitation effort could address both issues. This initiative could serve a dual purpose: the risk of a regional war would be reduced, and in so doing,

"indirect subsidies to Israel" to keep pace with Soviet-supplied weapons to Egypt would be diminished -- both positive outcomes for American grand strategy. A type of "tacit agreement" between the UAR and Israel, preventing either side from developing or acquiring

"unconventional" (quoted in original) weapons, would be the modus operandi and could

286

potentially work.813 Komer also confided in Bundy this initiative seemed to be "the most promising card available to us in (the) Arab-Israeli game, and one we ought to play before (the)

Israeli reactor or UAR rockets get too far along. This is another plot of mine."814 Both challenges fuelled an American anxiety in the region along with their quest to ensure regional stability. The

CANE initiative (the security title given to the program) was Komer's preferred method of fighting Israeli nuclear proliferation. This approach represented a new and intriguing way to deal simultaneously with American, Egyptian, and Israeli concerns. Four pieces of information solidified Kennedy's distrust of Israel, enshrined an imminent concern with Dimona, and warranted his direct action in the winter of 1963. This initiative, later detailed in painstaking order in April and May, represented the Department of State’s, Komer's, and by default, the

NSC's approach to Dimona. The CANE arms initiative constituted the first piece of evidence to compel Kennedy to act. By February, Kennedy’s positive view of Israel began to be challenged by his pressing need to stop their proliferation.

The Americans deduced that Israel progressed on their own missiles and could be actively pursuing American scientists to help them in their endeavour.815 The NSC and CIA predicted Israeli behaviour in the upcoming interactions with the Americans. They knew the

Israelis would consistently emphasize the threat of Egyptian missiles in any discussion of

Dimona. Conclusively, based on their estimates, the intelligence community deemed this Israeli argument unfounded. Komer and Bundy realized that though the Americans took a "less alarmist

813 Memorandum for the President from Robert Komer, Feb 9th, 1963. Folder Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. This memo is a newer declassified version from 2016. 814 Ibid. 815 Memorandum for the President from Komer Feb 12th, 1963 Israel, General, 2/21/63-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 287

view" towards these missiles, this threat and Israeli nuclear developments along with the eventual launch of an arms control initiative, warranted investigation.816

In February during American-Israeli meetings, as predicted, the Israelis harped on UAR missiles. Administration officials informed the Israelis they were monitoring this situation and that Dimona was the real concern. They also instilled in their Israeli counterparts Kennedy’s grave concern with Dimona’s progress.817 Kennedy and his administration somewhat dismissed the Israeli concern for Egyptian missiles and focused on their primary concern, Dimona. This marked the pattern in early 1963: the Americans tried to reassure or push aside the Egyptian threat and inquire about Dimona. When the problem became more serious, or was presented as such by Israel, the administration tied both issues together.

The second piece of information which directly contributed to Kennedy's staunch actions emanated from the Department of Defense. The Department's first draft of the paper, The

Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement, delivered in July of

1962, had an immediate impact on the Kennedy Administration's nonproliferation policy. This document was updated and unveiled on the 12th of February as part of Kennedy's ongoing negotiations with the Soviets on a Test Ban Treaty during the year.818

By this stage, the nuclear threat appeared more imminent -- eight countries not currently in possession of nuclear weapons could potentially obtain nuclear weapons and a rudimentary delivery system in the coming decade.819 The cost of nuclear technology and the spread of

816 Memorandum Komer for Bundy, Feb 12th, 1963. Israel, General, 2/21/63-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 817 Memorandum for the Record, Feb 13th, 1963 Israel, General, 2/21/63-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL. Boston, MA. 818 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”: 7. 819 Department of Defense, Office of Secretary "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement," Feb 12th, 1963. 1. Digital National Security Archive, Nuclear Nonproliferation Collection. https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/dnsa/docview/1679126965/827A01EA9934895PQ/50?accountid=9838. 288

nuclear power allowed for more feasible nuclear weapons. It appeared certain that China would produce a nuclear weapon in the coming decade, and Israel "probably" would do so due to their security situation.820 It was "likely" that Israel would produce a bomb albeit less than China's

"certainly" status. This created unease for the United States. This document clearly expressed the domino theory mentality the Americans assigned to proliferation. Diffusion in the form of technological progress would also make it easier for other countries to create a bomb, leading to wider-ranging global proliferation. This could foster situations where countries could buy nuclear devices from others.821 The paper's conclusion confirmed that nuclear diffusion was contrary to American interests. Possession of nuclear weapons by further states would increase unpredictability and the potential for danger and conflicts.822

This study represented the second piece of evidence for Kennedy's decision to confront

Israel. The Department of State, Komer (NSC), and now the Department of Defense shared their insights on Israel's nuclear program. The NSC and PPC provided a workable program to deal with Dimona and the Egyptian nuclear threat (missiles). With Defense’s estimation that Israel was close to a nuclear program, immediacy was required from the President. Though this report was mixed in its assessments, it was apparent Israel constituted a potential threat to proliferate.

By the end of February, 1963, the United States opposed any national proliferation. After the

Cuban Missile Crisis, any further proliferation increased the potential for a global conflict.823

Kennedy’s assertiveness towards Israel mounted.

820 Department of Defense, Office of Secretary "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement," Feb 12th, 1963, 1, 2. 821 Ibid, 3. 822 Ibid, 5-6. 823 Francis J. Gavin has concluded through a documentary analysis that the Americans opposed "foe and friend alike". Gavin, 27, 7. He argued the overarching reason was the challenge to American power projection. This was clearly supported in this paper. 289

At the beginning of March, it was clear that Israel's nuclear desires required action. After the input of the Departments of Defense and State, the only view missing was the intelligence community's. American intelligence monitored Dimona in a number of ways through: aerial, satellite, and ground photographs; sources that have still not been revealed; discussion and collaboration with close allies; and talks with France and Norway. Despite all these practices, the

CIA understood their collection activities had limits. CIA Director, John McCone, admitted that there were still "certain gaps in existing intelligence coverage on the subject of Israeli nuclear programs and capabilities" of which the United States Intelligence Board was aware; however, they were undertaking measures to address this deficiency.824A united front began to materialize with many departments and agencies within the government sharing information on Dimona.

This intense collaboration and increased attention manifested an efficient operation by 1963.

The third piece of evidence for Kennedy's decision to confront the Israelis on Dimona, and likely the most damning for Israel, was delivered on March 6th, 1963, Consequences of

Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability. This analysis was provided by the Chairman of the

Board of National Estimates (CIA), Sherman Kent. He presented the conclusions which Kennedy had sought when he asked Komer and the CIA to investigate the truth about Dimona and UAR missile capabilities. Kent defined a "capability" as a test or an acknowledgment from Israel of possession of a weapon. His most prophetic insight was that the Israelis may develop a nuclear weapon with French aid, and never test.825 Kent's estimate predicted the psychological, physical, and policy implications for the Americans, Arabs, Israelis, and Soviets in the region.

Problematically, if the Israelis acquired or produced a weapon it would damage the overall grand

824 Letter from John McCone to Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, John O. Pastore March 1st, 1963. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 825 Office of National Estimates (Sherman Kent), CIA, March 6th, 1963. "Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability,"1. Folder, Israel, General, 2/2163-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 290

American strategy of courting the Arabs, as the Arabs would move closer to the Soviet Bloc against Israel and the West.826 Sherman Kent estimated that the Israelis would be more aggressive, confident, and hold a psychological advantage over the Arabs albeit this was not likely to precipitate a war. Nasser could denounce the Americans as enabling and aiding the

Israelis. Furthermore, the UAR and others could pressure the Israelis into international agreements, or some sort of control and safeguards.827 Most alarming, though unlikely given

Israeli defences along with the international and American reaction, Nasser could attack Dimona should he feel threatened.828 Another worst case scenario was the UAR may embark on its own nuclear program to rival Dimona -- highly doubtful with Egypt restricted fiscally, and due to a lack of expertise and resources. Given these limitations, the Egyptian President could bolster and advocate for his "nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction -- chemical or biological".829

As for the Soviet reactions, Kent and the CIA did not believe that the USSR would "be willing to provide Arab governments with nuclear weapons, if only because of the difficulty of extending to such regimes what it is unwilling to give to its own satellites." The CIA also doubted that the Soviet Union would help the Arabs develop a bomb, as this would cut dependence on the Soviets.830 Kent qualified this statement, arguing that the Soviets could place their own bombs in Arab countries. Logically, the Dimona project would embolden the Soviets to make inroads with the Arabs.831

826 "Consequences of Israeli Acquisition," 2. Folder, Israel, General, 2/2163-3/6/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 827 Ibid, 2, 4-6. 828 Ibid, 4. 829 Ibid, 5-6. 830 Office of National Estimates (Sherman Kent), CIA, March 6th, 1963. "Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability," 6. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 831 Ibid, 7-8. 291

By this stage, Kennedy had worked closely with Bundy and Komer on this intelligence collection. Furthermore, he was briefed on the Rostow Paper – the CANE arms limitation mission from Komer. Defense effectively demonstrated that given the repercussions to potential mass global proliferation, Kennedy had to stop Israel. Sherman Kent’s cogent estimates of Israeli and Arab behaviour should the Israelis create a weapon greatly bolstered Kennedy’s decision to confront Ben-Gurion. Kennedy, who had prioritized intelligence and at this point followed what the Americans perceived as a deterioration (further development at Dimona), knew the status quo was changing. Though Kennedy distrusted the CIA, specifically their decisions and rationale for covert operations, Kent was a well-respected figure. His analysis of Israeli intentions and the severe consequences should Israel produce a bomb, galvanized the President. Kennedy followed a pragmatic approach to Dimona, a position aligned with Komer and Bundy, the two dominant pragmatists in his administration.832 This chain of command and tight working intelligence group banded together to address Dimona. A united front coalesced on Dimona and immediate action was needed.

Additional developments contributed to American anxiety. An unidentified Department of State officer recounted a disturbing exchange he had while in Israel. He had a conversation with the Department's Science Attaché at the Embassy in Tel Aviv, Dr. Webber. Webber mentioned that Israel agreed to investigate the development of a 125 megawatt capacity civilian nuclear reactor with General Electric. Webber noted that this reactor would be subject to IAEA safeguards (controls and inspections). He even suggested that the Israelis would need a "second natural uranium and heavy water reactor" from an additional country like Canada, or the United

States -- if this was the case, the Americans would apply their own safeguards. Israeli attitudes

832 Rakove, 29. Rakove writes that Komer and Bundy's pragmatism was a reaction to quickly changing situations in world developments, such as the Middle East and India. Bass, 188, 7-9. 292

towards this project were worrisome. Some Israeli leaders welcomed this American aid, while others wanted more independence and "national dignity" separate from the United States. This was coloured by their Dimona experience. The administration understood this second view had gained steam. The Americans deduced that Dimona had been created as a reaction to Suez. Since the Crisis, many Israelis felt they could no longer trust the Americans to come to their defense.833

This report is troubling and raises the possibility that the Israelis were trying to signal to the Americans that they could no longer trust them for defense; therefore, a weapon was needed.

As the Israelis used the Egyptian rocket threat to justify Dimona, this was yet another rationalization. The State Department’s conclusion regarding Israeli intentions confirmed certain

American "suspicions". Firstly, the Israelis could be developing "independent but parallel paths of nuclear and missile development"; however, it was doubtful the Israelis could successfully attach nuclear warheads to missiles. By debating this possibility, the State Department demonstrated the deep lack of faith they held towards Israeli nuclear and missile ambitions. They predicted a "crash program" or an in depth commitment to develop better missiles for nuclear use would be needed to produce such an outcome in the coming decade. Secondly, in order to stymie this effort, "we can detect such a crash program through watching the activities of the Israeli scientists who really count".834 Continued suspicion was apparent, as the Americans spied on specific Israeli scientists, even in the United States, to monitor Israeli intentions and their nuclear progress. This is an explicit example of the lack of trust and increased skepticism many in the

American Government felt towards Israel. Lastly, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and State

Department personnel advised that bi-annual inspections on regularly scheduled trips would be

833 Department of State Memorandum March 15th, 1963 Israel's Atomic Energy Program. Doc prepared by Department of State Official in charge of Israel Affairs. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 834 Ibid, 2. 293

the most appropriate protocol to monitor Israel's true progress and nuclear capabilities.

Unfortunately, it was doubtful that Ben-Gurion and the Israelis would agree to such measures or more "open safeguards visits". Still one State officer deduced: "I thought the Israelis might be more sensitive than they imagined to the degree of Presidential concern on this subject."835 The

State Department realized they had Kennedy on side. The Israelis were about to experience

Kennedy's personal involvement on this issue. On March 26th, following Kennedy's orders,

Bundy delivered National Security Action Memorandum (known as NSAM) No. 231.836 NSAM

231 was titled, Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities, and read:

"The President desires, as a matter of urgency, that we undertake every feasible measure

(emphasis added by author) to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program as well as other Israeli and UAR advanced weapons programs, and to arrive at a firmer evaluation of their import. In this connection he wishes the next informal inspection of the Israeli reactor complex to be undertaken promptly and to be as thorough as possible."837

NSAM 231 continued to articulate the President's deep concern with UAR and Israeli nuclear programs, and their "destabilizing impact". Kennedy requested proposals from the Department of

State for "forestalling such programs" and wanted assurances from both Nasser and Ben-Gurion

835 Department of State Memorandum March 15th, 1963 Israel's Atomic Energy Program. Doc prepared by Department of State Official in charge of Israel Affairs. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. 2. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 836 The NSAM had become Kennedy's highest security designation to a problem and incorporated the input of many levels of the government. 837 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Action Memorandum No. 231. "Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities," March 26, 1963 To Sec of State, Seaborg and McCone. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. McGeorge Bundy National Security Action Memorandum No. 231. "Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities," Washington, March 26th, 1963. To The Secretary of State, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Glenn Seaborg) and Director of Central Intelligence (John McCone). Doc 199. 435. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. 294

on their future intentions in the field.838 This NSAM marked the seminal document for, and initiated Kennedy's stand and pending confrontation against, Israel. This document most clearly articulates the Americans could no longer accept the false Dimona explanations coming from

Israel. At the end of March 1963, the Americans entered a new phase in dealing with Dimona.

The timing of the NSAM 231 decree still puzzles historians. The traditional account accepted for over twenty years is that on the 25th of March, John McCone presented Kennedy with Kent's March 6th-analysis. The next day the President moved to address Dimona.839 Given

Kennedy's heightened interest on the Dimona issue, particularly on any recently produced intelligence on an Israeli nuclear weapon, it is highly unlikely this was the first time the

President received these conclusions. Why then did Kennedy order the NSAM when he did?

Leading intelligence historian, Jeffrey T. Richelson, raised doubt about whether this meeting,

Kent's estimate, or any one piece of evidence directly contributed to Kennedy's timing for

NSAM 231.840 A more comprehensive and plausible reason can help explain his timing. Hence, an examination of pertinent developments leading up to the March 26th-NSAM sheds light on why Kennedy took his firm stance at this specific juncture.

On March 21st, Golda Meir addressed the Knesset over the public reaction to Operation

Damocles. The trial in Switzerland cast media attention on the ongoing activities of Israeli

838 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Action Memorandum No. 231. "Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities," March 26, 1963 To Sec of State, Seaborg and McCone. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. McGeorge Bundy National Security Action Memorandum No. 231. "Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities," Washington, March 26th, 1963. To The Secretary of State, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Glenn Seaborg) and Director of Central Intelligence (John McCone). Doc 199. 435. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. This document is quoted by all scholars, who have written on Kennedy and Dimona, and is predominantly quoted in its entirety. These include: Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 118; Cohen "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy": 8; Druks, 94. Bass has cited the importance of this document, 210, and Shalom, 36. 839 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy": 7. He writes that McCone showed Kennedy the estimate; then Kennedy immediately ordered NSAM 231. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 118. This exchange is detailed in FRUS from a CIA-archive source, in Director McCone's files. Doc 199. 435. FRUS, Vol. XVIII, 1961- 1963. See the first footnote. Cohen admitted that he was unaware as to why Kent's estimate was produced in the first place. 117. The answer was this was a response to Kennedy's request after he was disturbed by Meir's admissions on Egypt in their December 27th, 1962 meeting. 840 Richelson, 258. Richelson labeled the March 6th-estimate, "speculative analysis". 295

intelligence operatives over the past few years. Walworth Barbour concluded that Meir's address

"set (the) keynote for anticipated public campaign against collaboration of German scientists with Egyptian development."841 She cited hundreds of West Germans in Egypt who synthesized the missile program, and felt that West Germany’s failure to accept blame for their actions was inadequate. The Swiss Ambassador to Israel informed Barbour that it was "pretty dirty business" between the Israelis and Egypt on Swiss and German soil.842 The American Ambassador was aware the Israelis employed a public media campaign to try and rationalize their actions. The trial was the final straw in the erosion of Kennedy's trust in Israeli excuses.

On the 25th, the same day that McCone reportedly gave the CIA estimate to Kennedy,

INR, the State Department intelligence service, shared their analysis. They equated the Israeli nuclear program with the UAR rockets. At this stage, not only was the CIA enacting intricate intelligence collection on nonconventional Middle Eastern weapons, so too was the INR. They believed that Meir and the Israelis had exaggerated the threat and number of West German scientists. State intelligence believed this constituted "not much more than a dozen".

Furthermore, besides the West German aid, the Egyptians had also received Soviet SA-2 surface- to-surface missiles and training was presently underway. While the West Germans were not making much progress, the Egyptians benefitted. Lastly, despite Israeli technological advances, they had not yet overtaken the Egyptians in surface-to-surface developments. The INR seconded

841 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State March 21st, 1963. Folder UAR Nuclear Energy Program 1963. Papers of President Kennedy. National Security Files, Robert W. Komer, Box 446. JKPL, Boston, MA. 842 Ibid, 2. 296

the CIA report from January that the Egyptians were vitally dependent on these scientists and

European parts for any progress on missiles. The Egyptians were far from self-sufficient.843

The Meir speech and this intelligence contribution attest that Kennedy's NSAM did not materialize from one meeting with McCone on the 25th. This marked the culmination of intense scrutiny and mounting concern from intelligence groups, the State Department, and lastly, the

White House. One central issue provided the final impetus for Kennedy's distrust and refusal to entertain Israeli excuses any longer, and can also explain the timing of NSAM 231: the public exposure of Operation Damocles.

The Kennedy Administration actively monitored the trial of the arrested Israeli agents in

Basel, Switzerland. The Americans had been following these proceedings since the arrests in early March.844 The trial had exposed a great deal of information which Ben-Gurion and Peres publicly denied, in an effort not to anger their West German trading partners and Kennedy.845

Kennedy read that the Israelis had launched a media campaign and slander program against the

West Germans and Egyptians to attempt to justify their actions.846 Between March 15th and 19th, the trial created intense media speculation on the Egyptian missile program, Israeli actions, and the problems of the region.847 The widespread exposure of Israel’s covert actions cemented the fourth piece of evidence. Kennedy's distrust of Israel was solidified. Unfortunately for Israel, it was the Egyptian rocket threat that catalyzed American action -- Operation Damocles was detrimental. Kennedy had to act once the Americans understood the revelations from this trial.

843 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Reserach. Research Memo RNA-14, March 25th, 1963. INR Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State Rusk. 1-2. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 844 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State June 17th, 1963. 2. Folder Israel, General 6/1/63- 6/20/63. National Security Files, Country Files Israel. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 845 Ibid. 846 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State June 17th, 1963. 2. Folder Israel, General 6/1/63- 6/20/63. National Security Files, Country Files Israel, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA 847 Black and Morris, 199. Howard 8, 297

It appears Kennedy decided to take action in March when the trial bluntly exposed

Israel's activities to the world. Up until that stage, even the issue of Egyptian missiles had not created a stir in the American public, receiving very little media attention. The State Department,

Komer, the NSC, and CIA did not believe this constituted a viable threat to the Israelis and downplayed the issue.848 With these intelligence activities exposed, Kennedy lost faith in Israeli intentions. He had been long poring through intelligence on Dimona, and the growing Egyptian rocket threat. With Operation Damocles’s exposure, the Israeli “version” of what transpired in the Middle Eastern arms race could no longer be accepted. From January through this trial in

March, Kennedy had witnessed enough to subordinate his worldview of Israel to the larger threat of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The most telling piece of evidence justifying Kennedy's aggressive approach came from a

March 22nd letter from Komer about Dimona and the UAR missiles. Komer informed Kennedy that the Israeli publicity campaign was a mix of two factors: firstly, it was enacted to defend

Operation Damocles (the Americans never used this title, rather they referred to Israeli actions) against West Germans; secondly, Komer surmised this could be another effort to justify a rationale to proceed with nuclear weapons. Komer also redistributed an article in the Jewish

Observer and Middle East Review, "An Independent Deterrent for Israel" from February 2nd.

Komer believed this marked a step towards nuclear weapons, and he pressed Kennedy on the need for another inspection which should be pursued at the earliest possible date. Regarding

Egypt’s less than threatening missile program, Kennedy received a technical report from Myer

Feldman (still classified), which gauged strontium 90 and cobalt isotopes, essential components to produce radiological warheads were not presently developed in Egypt. Komer with Kennedy now onboard again highlighted the urgency for an arms control mission. There was optimism

848 Howard, 161, 188. 298

Nasser may entertain the Rostow paper plan.849 Since Kennedy first read the PPC study in

February, his views of Dimona, the missile race, and a deteriorating Middle East had changed.

Operation Damocles served as the missing piece for Kennedy’s abandonment of faith in

Israel on the issue of Dimona. He could no longer trust Israeli intentions or explanations on a nuclear weapon program. The President realized that the Egyptians also deserved a great deal of blame and his NSAM would not have come without the missile threat; however, by April of

1963, the situation had become untenable. The traditional explanation that Kennedy took immediate action after seeing the Kent estimate on March 25th illustrated only one piece of his larger process. He had gradually begun to share more and more of State’s, the CIA’s, and

Komer's mistrust of the Israelis. The flurry of activity by the Americans demonstrates that by the time Kennedy held his meeting with McCone, he had already decided urgent action was needed.

Kennedy's NSAM involved the regional context to constrain Middle Eastern nuclear capabilities; however, he was also deeply worried about wider nuclear proliferation. By the winter and spring of 1963, Kennedy had received Defense's updated paper on the need for a Test

Ban Treaty, and read that many potential proliferators could emerge. China was close to a weapon, India constituted a possible concern, and Israel was on the verge of embarking on a weapons program -- not to mention his central concern of European proliferation with Sweden and to a lesser degree, Switzerland, which was dabbling with weapons. West Germany and the issue of nuclear weapons in NATO in a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) had also been entertained. In March, in a famed speech, Kennedy cautioned: "Personally, I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers, instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty." He then admitted, "I regard this as the greatest possible danger

849 Memorandum For the President from Komer March 22nd, 1963. Folder Israel, General 3/7/63-4/23/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. An earlier version of this document appeared in FRUS, Vol XVIII. Doc 197. 432-433. Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 94. 299

and hazard."850 The timing of the Israeli nuclear challenge clashed with his increased steps towards a Test Ban Treaty, as his other global issues momentarily subsided.

By the time Kennedy uttered this warning, the context of 1963 proliferation was evident.

He had experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, the last version of the Department of

Defense's study on nuclear diffusion was published. This bolstered a belief in a nuclear proliferation domino theory Kennedy held for years. In a debate with Richard Nixon during his campaign on October 13th, 1960, Kennedy warned that "there are indications that ten, fifteen, or twenty nations will have a nuclear capability" by 1964. Preventing nuclear war had been one of

Kennedy's goals since the outset of his Presidency.851 Unfortunately for Israel, their program coalesced with a wider trend towards proliferation -- Kennedy took a stand against both. His long-held proliferation concerns triggered his response in 1963, as potential proliferation scenarios marked the culmination of his nuclear nightmare. By the end of March, Israeli actions,

Egyptian missiles, a worsening intelligence picture and wider proliferation threats all merged to trigger Kennedy’s response.

On March 27th, Kennedy advised Ambassador Barbour to take a firm stance with Meir and Ben-Gurion on Dimona. Barbour should "leave no misunderstanding" in his meetings with

Ambassador Harman on the need for semi-annual "visits" to Dimona -- May or November would be optimal for the Americans. The Americans promised that no publicity could be maintained -- similar to the process of previous inspections.852 State's new policy was to prevent any potential

Israeli wiggle room or further delays on Dimona.853 At this stage (the end of March), Kennedy

850 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 115-116. Druks, 94. Maddock, 181. 851 Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 133. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 28. 852 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Amebembassy Mar 27th, 1963. Israel, General, 3/7/63- 4/23/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 853 Bass, 210. 300

initiated his offensive to render the program peaceful. January through March was the period of fact-finding or intelligence collection. April through August was for the development and application of measures to bring Dimona under American control through inspections.

While publicly accusing the Egyptians of accelerating the missile race, the Israelis were themselves privately guilty. Since the summer of 1962, Israel (through Peres) had secretly approached the French about the possibility of acquiring what they later termed, Jericho missiles.

The Israeli-Franco missile collaboration through the private firm, Marcel Dassault, heated up in

April, providing another duality to the Dimona project.854 The Israelis contributed to the nonconventional arms race in private. They lobbied to stop Egyptian rockets while simultaneously developing their own missiles and progressing on a nuclear weapons program.

Throughout 1963, General Electric and the United States continued to bid on a contract to develop a 125-mw reactor for civilian nuclear use. Unlike Dimona, this facility would be subject to IAEA safeguards. The Americans tried to obtain this contract for the purpose of intelligence collection on Dimona. If an American firm received the contract similar to the Canadians with

India, they could acquire a better understanding of the true nature of Dimona. The Americans argued this "would give us real control over what might otherwise be a most dangerous move toward nuclear proliferation." It was uncertain whether Israel would move forward with his project. The Americans believed they should try and discourage this idea; however, if the project was enacted, they would take all measures to ensure the United States gain the contract.855 This hypothetical intelligence gathering avenue provides insight on American suspicion of Dimona.

The Americans did not have conclusive proof the Israelis were nearing a nuclear weapon, but

854 Howard, 178. Cohen notes that the final contract for surface-to-surface missiles was signed on April 26th, 1963. Israel and the Bomb, 116. 855 Memorandum Komer to Carl Kaysen March 30th, 1963. Folder Israel 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. Komer had discussed these ideas with James Grant of the NEA. 301

suspected Israel was on a credible nuclear path. Furthermore, due to this underhanded purpose for receiving the commercial contract, the American distrust of Israel was apparent. This suspicion could only be rectified by semi-annual inspections. Bi-annual inspections were needed, as this would inhibit Israel from creating a workable nuclear cycle between annual inspections.

Problematically, the Israelis could develop and move nuclear materials such as enriched uranium after or between annual inspections, or visits. This new methodology and push for more regular inspections aimed to ensure that this would be prevented, through monitoring. Komer, the NSC, and Kennedy wanted control of any future Israeli nuclear reactor, even a civilian one, to guard against the diffusion or dispersion of nuclear materials from this new reactor to the Dimona reactor.

The Superpower Re-emerges

April ushered in a new operating procedure as Kennedy became directly involved on all

Dimona discussions and policy. Shimon Peres made a trip to the United States to officially negotiate the financing of the Hawk sale. In a meeting with State Department officials, Peres emphasized the threat of UAR missiles, which in a few years could reach Israeli population centers. Administration officials reassured him that these missiles were of poor design. He agreed but qualified that the impact was more psychological and threatening to the Israeli population. Specifically, Peres argued that Egypt would be much more difficult to counter in terms of conventional wars; this would enhance Israeli security anxiety. Peres disclosed that

Israeli intelligence had proof Nasser had used gas on soldiers in the war on Yemen.856 The

Americans assured him that the Egyptians had no guidance system for their missiles; he understood this point. At the end of the meeting, Peres was reminded of the deep concern

856 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Political Near East Apr 2nd, 1963. Near East Tour D'Horizon Partipants U. Alexis Johnson, Shimon Peres, Mordechai Gazit, Avraham Harman, G/PM Jeffrey C. Kitchen, William Crawford Jr. 1-3. Folder Israel, General 3/7/63-4/23/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 302

Kennedy had concerning the Middle Eastern arms race. A State Department official informed

Peres: "we would be even more deeply opposed were developments to move beyond that

(conventional) into a nuclear phase."857

On April 5th, one of the most discussed Dimona-centric American-Israeli conversations transpired. The traditional narrative recounts that Peres was walking with Myer Feldman, and

"bumped into" Kennedy. The President invited Peres into his office where the two discussed several issues, including the UAR missile threat and Dimona. Regarding nuclear weapons, Peres had "given unequivocal assurance that Israel would not do anything in this field unless it finds that other countries in the area are involved in it."858 Kennedy informed Peres that he was deeply concerned with any attempt by Israel to attain a nuclear capability, and Peres assured him there would be no need for concern from the Israelis, unless a retaliatory measure was needed.

Kennedy and Peres discussed the extent of West German collaboration and the capabilities of these missiles. The meeting adopted a question-and-answer format in which

Kennedy posed a question and Peres responded. Kennedy informed Peres the United States

"followed with great interest any development" of nuclear capabilities in Israel. Peres reportedly responded "I can tell you clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region; certainly, we will not be the first to do."859 That Israel would not be the first to "introduce" is itself ambiguous, and has been adopted as Israel's unofficial mantra on nuclear capabilities.

Years later, Shimon Peres shared his own recollection of this encounter. He remembered that Kennedy "quite unexpectedly" summoned him into the Oval Office. Peres was impressed by

857 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Political Near East Apr 2nd, 1963. Near East Tour D'Horizon Partipants U. Alexis Johnson, Shimon Peres, Mordechai Gazit, Avraham Harman, G/PM Jeffrey C. Kitchen, William Crawford Jr. 3. Folder Israel, General 3/7/63-4/23/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 858 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs (Talbot) and the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, April 5th, 1963. Doc 207. 450-451. FRUS, Vol XVIII. Bass has also quoted this section verbatim, 211. 859 Golan, 73. Unfortunately, the author, who explains at the start of his book he used open sources and pieces written by journalists, does not use footnotes, so it is impossible to discern where he gathered this information. 303

Kennedy, writing that Kennedy "fired some questions at me" for over thirty minutes.

Furthermore, the President knew all the material and did not need any briefing cards or points.

Kennedy understood the intricacies and repercussions of Operation Damocles, was familiar with the extent of Egyptian capabilities, and asked if Israel was building a "nuclear option". Peres remembered his exact words "(W)e will not be the first ones to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East."860 For decades, scholars in many disciplines have tried to decipher what

"introduce" meant -- the conclusion widely accepted: a nuclear test. Avner Cohen appears to be the first Israeli scholar (or any historian) to cite the Israeli archives in recounting this exchange.

According to the Israeli archives, Peres admitted: "I can tell you most clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first."861

In a posthumous work from 2017, Peres shared further insight on his meeting with

Kennedy. He remained on point recounting the specifics of the meeting, however, was more candid on Kennedy's level of concern. This is Peres’s, or any Israeli's, closest insights into the debate of the Dimona issue between American and Israeli politicians. In this account, he admits that when he arrived in Washington, he was informed that Kennedy wanted to meet. Given that no Israeli Prime Minister had ever been officially invited to the White House, Peres was squired through a side door and "back corridor" into the Oval Office -- the account of a random meeting quickly vanishes. Peres shared details left out of previous iterations: Kennedy intricately laid out

"in front of me all the intelligence the United States had gathered on the project meticulously explaining everything his government knew, having clearly studied the findings in great detail."862 These actions confirm the personal interest Kennedy invested in the intelligence on

Dimona. Peres quickly understood the severity Kennedy attached to the Dimona problem.

860 Peres, Battling for Peace, 223. 861 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 119. 862 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams,101-102. 304

Kennedy then asked: "what are your intentions as they relate to nuclear weapons"? The President wanted to know if the Israelis even debated the possibility of weapons -- the mere consideration constituted an American concern. Peres said he countered, "Mr. President, I can tell you most clearly that we shall not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region."863 It is difficult to accept as a source the memories of a then nonagenarian; however, given the restrictions, he is still the best option. Peres remained consistent in his account of the details, and provided insight into this exchange.

Peres's admissions that Kennedy placed all the evidence on the table equated to one truth: the Americans called Israel's bluff. Finally, Kennedy suggested directly to an Israeli politician that the United States did not believe the Israelis. This is why Peres's on-the-spot ad lib was vital

-- it created a new set of excuses; Israel would not be the first to introduce. Simultaneously, it left

Israel the option to develop, and reminded the President of the real dangers the Jewish state perceived from Egypt.

The Integrated Path to Preventing an Israeli Bomb

The State Department informed Kennedy’s NSC that a select few individuals were in the process of updating the CANE arms initiative. Additionally, the more stringent push for semi- annual inspections to ensure tighter scrutiny on Dimona would be accelerated. The goal of the administration pivoted towards achieving an Israeli-Egyptian agreement on nuclear weapons and limiting missiles -- this incorporated the intelligence agencies, the Policy Planning Council, and the State Department.864

During April, Ben-Gurion reignited his long desire to get the United States to acquiesce and provide a full bilateral security guarantee. The formation of an Iraqi, Syrian, and Egyptian

863 Peres, No Room for Small Dreams,102-103. 864 Memorandum for Bundy Apr 8th, 1963 Background Report for NSAM 231. Israel, General 3/7/63-4/23/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 305

Union on the 17th added to Ben-Gurion's anxiety. The administration interpreted Ben-Gurion's frantic and distraught approach, evidenced in a letter to Kennedy, as an overreaction. The Israeli

Prime Minister compared Nasser to Hitler and asserted that the declaration of the UAR which solidified the union called for the Liberation of Palestine -- tantamount to the destruction of

Israel.865 Ben-Gurion believed some of these incitements. Still, this was also part of a larger diplomatic effort to use any justification (this time compounded with a real threat) to ascertain a security guarantee from the Americans, which to that point had decidedly been rejected. This pursuit was directly linked with the Dimona issue in the American mind. Israeli scholars have criticized both Ben-Gurion and his successor, Levi Eshkol, for not explicitly tying Dimona to

Israeli security needs in their American correspondence.866 The Prime Ministers never presented

Dimona as the requisite step to guard Israel from any Arab or other threat. American personnel inherently understood this message. Furthermore, Kennedy was acutely aware that Ben-Gurion emphasized the new and consistent dangers Israel faced to justify their nuclear efforts. A scholar has appropriately labeled the April-June dispute, which should also include July, as the "battle of

Dimona" between both respective countries. The dynamic involved Ben-Gurion employing all possibilities in his power to receive some sort of American security guarantee. Conversely,

Kennedy concentrated on the issue of inspections, control, and assurances on Dimona.867

The Americans had tracked Israeli actions under Operation Damocles once they became public. This was detrimental for Israel. The State Department argued that Nasser now had a

865 “Letter Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy, April 25th, 1963," 1-3. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30 1961- Oct 2, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 866 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 122, 169. Cohen and Shalom have been critical on Ben-Gurion for not formally stating this to Kennedy. 867 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy": 8. In Israel and the Bomb this is the title of a chapter. 306

legitimate concern as it was the Israelis who held "superior progress in rocketry."868 In a press conference on April 9th, Kennedy responded to the question of whether the Israelis had asked him to intervene on the Egyptian issue. He replied that he was concerned, and downplayed the threat as most West Germans were collaborating on aircrafts not missiles. He also cautioned the

Israelis that he deplored any preferential treatment -- specifically, the United States vehemently opposed "the introduction or manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, as we have indicated that strongly to all of the countries."869 It appeared Kennedy was a fan of Peres's terminology, and quickly adopted it for public use. While he was upset with Israeli actions, he presented a measured public demeanour.

By late April, there was an opening for the CANE arms limitation approach. Kennedy understood that nonconventional weapons needed to be prevented -- May was the perfect time to introduce this program. It was imperative that at a minimum surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons needed to be stopped.870

April ended with the administration’s continued push for semi-annual inspections on

Dimona and this new CANE program. The State Department and CIA searched for any potential shipments bringing weapons or biological, chemical, and radiological components to Egypt -- no such material was ever found. The Americans discerned that no cobalt 60 or strontium 90 weapons level was present. They concluded that no radiological weapons could be produced by

Inshas. Lastly, they traced previous American sales of isotopes to the UAR from previous years

868 Memorandum Komer for McGeorge Bundy Apr 8th, 1963. Folder UAR Nuclear Program 1963. NSF, Box 446. JKPL, Boston, MA. 869 President John F. Kennedy's News Conference Apr 9th, 1963. Folder UAR Missiles 1963. NSF, Box 446. JKPL, Boston, MA. 870 Memorandum from William R. Polk Policy Planning Council to Mr. Grant (James) NEA Apr 15th, 1963 Scope of "Phase I" of U.S. Initiative 1-2. and "The Carrot and the Stick," (same date and participants). Folder Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 1 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 307

and concluded that the Israeli fear was unfounded -- the UAR did not have advanced biological weapons. Still they needed to stop Dimona and missiles as they forged ahead with CANE.871

President Kennedy had already confronted Peres about Dimona; he then pivoted to Ben-

Gurion, who in a letter claimed the Arab Union proclamation was the real concern for Israel. On

May 6th, the Prime Minister read Kennedy's synopsis of the problems of the area: "(T)he danger we foresee is not so much that of an early Arab attack as that of a successful development of advanced offensive systems which, as you say, could not be dealt with by presently available means. I have expressed before my deep personal conviction that reciprocal and competitive development of such weapons would dangerously threaten the stability of the area."872 Kennedy made the Prime Minister decisively aware that the United States would dictate the direction of relations. Circumventing the Israeli assessment of threats, Kennedy was concerned with nuclear weapons and missiles, though he reassured the Israelis. Accordingly, Ambassador Barbour was told to notify Ben-Gurion of Kennedy's "deep interest" in receiving semi-annual inspections as soon as possible, preferably in May.

Surprisingly, given Komer and Bundy's lack of faith in Myer Feldman’s intentions and secrecy on Dimona,873 Feldman met with Avraham Harman, who in a semi-agitated state recounted that Ben-Gurion agreed that a "neutral” could inspect -- a promise made in 1961, yet unfilled. The Prime Minister agreed in good faith, visits could take place. They were not intended to become a "regular" occurrence, as this would violate Israel's sovereignty, and portray

871 Radiological Warfare in the Middle East James W. Spain NE. Apr 18th, 1963 Limit Distribution. Folder Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 1 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 872 Telegram Ambembassy Tel Aviv Eyes only for Ambassador Text President to Ben-Gurion May 4th-5th. 4. folder Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2, 1963 Digital identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. This was a response to Ben-Gurion's worried letter to the President on April 25th. 873 In a handwritten note to Bundy on a memo (dated May 6th), Komer argued that we "just can't negotiate with Israelis if Mike (Myer) is interlocutor you're really got to take this over." Memorandum of Conversation Harman and Feldman lunch May 6th, 1963 Israel General 5/5/63-5/9/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 308

the image of American dominance.874 The new American descriptor, inspection as opposed to visit, appeared in Kennedy's letters and in meetings (in May), and set a different tone for Dimona proceedings.875 The problem was the nature of the relationship: the Israelis believed, as in the case of the Hawk sale and previous negotiations, they were equals -- they were not. Harman registered his displeasure that he was unaware of any comparable inspections of Arab facilities, most troubling as the Israelis uncovered contrasting evidence Egypt was producing nuclear weapons. He argued this was a sovereignty issue and that Israel needed to be reassured on

Inshas. The administration privately balked at this notion. They understood that Inshas only had had a 2mw capacity – suitable only for research.876 By this stage, the President had grown tired and short-tempered with Israeli responses and discussion on Dimona.

At a May 8th news conference, Kennedy addressed the issue of Israeli security and the threat of UAR missiles. He reiterated the arms balance had not changed, and he aimed to limit the scope of the arms race. More importantly, he wanted to support social, economic, and political progress, which aligned with his worldview. He assured the security of both Israel and the Arabs States to live in peace. He was concerned about the arms race and promised the United

States would police the maintenance of peace.877 While publicly maintaining calm, privately,

Israeli actions had exceeded his patience.

While Kennedy publicly addressed the issue of the Middle Eastern arms race, internally a much more critical document was produced: Special National Intelligence Estimate 30-2-63 The

874 Memorandum of Conversation Harman and Feldman lunch May 6th, 1963. Israel General 5/5/63-5/9/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 875 Shalom, 36. 876 Memorandum of Conversation Harman and Feldman lunch May 6th, 1963. Israel General 5/5/63-5/9/63 NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 877 Editorial Note. Doc 238. 516. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. Department of State Circular May 9th, 1963. Folder Israel, General 5/10/63-5/13/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 309

Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel.878 This latest SNIE marked the clearest presentation of American views available and last Estimate declassified during the Kennedy

Administration pertaining to the Israeli nuclear program and the extent of American intelligence on Dimona.

The SNIE confirmed there was no "positive evidence" that Israel currently had produced a nuclear weapon, writing: "what we know of its (Dimona's) nature, and the amount of uranium concentrate acquired (acquired is underlined in Komer's copy) all suggest that Israel intends at least to put itself in a position to be able to produce a limited number of weapons relatively quickly after a decision to do so."879 American intelligence believed that while they could not prove Israel had nuclear weapons, they (the Israelis) were highly inclined to produce them -- most troublingly, "unless deterred by outside pressure" such an eventuality would occur in the

"next several years," meaning a test by late 1965 or early 1966.880 The Estimate reported that the

Israelis were in the process of obtaining surface-to-surface (Jericho) missiles from the French.

By the end of the decade, nuclear warheads could be mounted. So too, in the UAR’s case, though no nuclear weapons were on their horizon, if all conditions were ideal, by the subsequent year, the UAR could deploy some of their surface-to-surface missiles.881

The most "important step for Israel" would be nuclear weapons capabilities.882 The intelligence community outlined there were many areas that "we cannot speak with confidence"; however, this SNIE was the most explicit in predicting that Israel was hurtling towards a nuclear weapons program capability. "We have no evidence to confirm the existence of plutonium

878 Komer received this finished estimate on May 2nd. CIA Memo for United States Intelligence Board May 2nd, 1963. SNIE 30-2-63: The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel. Memo from Joseph Seltzer Executive Officer National Estimates. Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 879 Special National Intelligence Estimate 30-2-63 "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," May 8th (May 2nd in file), 1963. 1-2. Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 880 Ibid, 2. 881 Ibid. 882 Ibid. 310

separation facilities. However, the plant in Dimona is large enough to include them and Israeli industry probably is capable of constructing them."883 With this disclosure, the CIA admitted never having "proof" of a plutonium separation facility during Kennedy's Presidency.

Parenthetically, they had suspected the worst from the Israelis though were unaware on subterranean Dimona. In this document, the complete lack of faith in Dimona's capabilities was more comprehensively detailed: "no positive evidence" the nuclear energy program was aimed at achieving nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, American intelligence was highly suspicious that it was. "(I)ndeed we believe the Israelis (next line still redacted) will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years."884

The SNIE concluded that Dimona and an Israeli nuclear weapon would be attained for defensive purposes, and that this would embolden Israeli conventional positions. Undoubtedly, acquiescence to the Israeli goals was unacceptable to the United States, "failure of (the) US to force Israel to give up its nuclear weapons (and) would be regarded as a result of deliberate US policy", and could contribute to East-West conflict and regional war between the Arabs and

Israel.885 Fuelled with this intelligence assessment, Kennedy had clarity on Israeli capabilities and the continued negative impact should Dimona create weapons. His public and private actions were ratcheted up accordingly. By the start of May, Kennedy had the clearest analysis of Dimona during his Presidency.

Dimona and American Policy

On May 9th, Kennedy’s NSC discussed tying Dimona to the long sought Israeli objective: a security guarantee. The Israeli rationalization for why this was needed was evident.

883 Ibid, 4. 884 SNIE 30-2-63 "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," May 8 (May 2nd in file), 1963. 6. Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 885 Ibid, 17-20. 311

There was continued instability in Jordan. Israel needed to be prevented from seizing the West

Bank (then under Jordanian control). Additionally "noise about Nazi rocketeers was all playing into this." The administration again concluded that the Israelis were utilizing this threat to legitimize Dimona. Therefore, certain administration officials felt the security guarantee could wait. Komer, for instance, believed that this could help buy time and keep the Israelis from momentarily pursuing advanced weapons. Problematically, this relied on Nasser’s approval to stop the surface-to-surface missiles.886

Further adding to the imminent need to address nonconventional weapons, Congress submitted a resolution calling for the countries in the "Near East" not to produce nuclear weapons, missiles or any "weapons of mass destruction." This built upon Kennedy's previous admissions, articulating his vehement position against the advancement of unconventional weapons in the region.887

On the 10th, Barbour was instructed to press Ben-Gurion even harder on Dimona inspections. Rusk admitted that Dimona and Israeli nuclear weapons were no longer just a bilateral consideration -- the Kennedy Administration viewed this as a "critical concern" to regional stability. Secretary Rusk deduced the Israelis would try and add Dimona "into the arena of bargaining" to obtain a security guarantee. Kennedy had already notified Meir in December nuclear proliferation constituted a global concern so he was not singling out the Israelis. Hence, it was "a matter of global responsibility for USG (United States Government) transcending what we expect to be reciprocal give-and-take in our day-to-day bilateral relations.” Ben-Gurion needed diplomatic pressure to agree to inspections. The Americans wanted him to honour his

886 Komer Memorandum to Bundy May 9th, 1963. Israel 1961-1963 Folder 1 of 2. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 887 Letter to Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas R. Morgan House of Representatives for Frederick G. Dutton Assistant Secretary. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA 312

previous (Waldorf-Astoria) pledges.888 Though State identified Israel as a "friend", Rusk's tone was clear -- the Americans had had enough and moving forward, there would be consequences to further delays and excuses.889

The interpretation that Dimona "transcended the bilateral relations" has been employed by scholars to discount the effect on the American-Israeli relationship. Zaki Shalom asserted the

United States made the problem one of global importance and by doing so can be accused of

"taking the easy way out", since the Israelis could not fight against American demands. He argued that Barbour informed Ben-Gurion that semi-annual inspections would have to be agreed to in the coming month, and that any delays or attempts to pair with a security guarantee would not be welcomed by the United States.890 Shalom admonishes the Americans for employing their super-power status; however, this warrants a different presentation. It is remarkable that the

Americans waited until this stage before demanding Israeli compliance. The Israelis and

Americans were allies and friends; still, this was not a negotiation among equals. Up to that point, the Israelis did not have to compromise on any single issue (evidenced in the Hawk sale):

Dimona would not be considered in a bilateral bargain. Dimona was of the upmost importance to

Kennedy and as such could have derailed all relations. Kennedy, Rusk, Komer, and McCone had reached their limits with Israeli excuses, false stories and delayed inspections to Dimona.

Mordechai Gazit argues Dimona transcended the bilateral relationship, a constant refrain from Kennedy to Ben-Gurion in the coming months. He believes the Dimona issue was completely removed from the bilateral security dimension. This line of thinking purports this was

888 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Amembassy Tel Aviv eyes only May 10th, 1963. Israel, General 5/10/63-5/13/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 124. Cohen quotes from this memo. 889 Letter to Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas R. Morgan House of Representatives for Frederick G. Dutton Assistant Secretary. Folder Israel, Nuclear Energy Program 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 889 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State to Aembassy Tel Aviv eyes only May 10th, 1963. 2. Israel, General 5/10/63-5/13/63. NSF, Box 119. J KPL, Boston, MA. 890 Shalom, 37-38. 313

not to be viewed as an American-Israeli issue, rather an issue between Israel and their neighbours.891 The Americans did not share this perception. The understanding that Dimona admittedly superseded or transcended the normal special relationship did not absolve the Israelis from American ire, or affect the Israeli need to comply with their demands. Israel was about to witness Kennedy's level of commitment to render Dimona under American safeguards. Ben-Zvi, whose work addressed the linkage, argued that there would be no "expected reciprocity" on

Dimona. Kennedy had learned from previous Israeli behaviour.892 Barbour had warned Ben-

Gurion about failing to adhere to Kennedy's demands. Now, there would be repercussions.

In mid-May, the administration increased its pressure on Israel. First, it was Komer's turn with Gazit on the 14th. Gazit assured Komer there could be a quiet discussion on advanced weapons program in the region. This would also have to include the idea of a security guarantee.

Gazit was then reminded of Kennedy's "deep concern with nuclear proliferation of any kind" and

Komer accused the Israelis of stalling on Dimona. While he understood why the Israelis used

Egypt to bargain on Dimona, he noted it spurred American suspicion. Komer explained the

American view and gave some “friendly” advice to his counterpart. He argued that if he were in

Ben-Gurion's shoes, he would allow for "immediate inspection on a one time basis", leading to regular or periodic visits. Komer raised one final point. With an abundance of Israeli comments

(specifically, Ben-Gurion's letters in April and May), Komer alleged the Israelis employed the threat of Nazi scientists in Egypt to justify their own nuclear aspirations. The Americans believed that if no security guarantee was given, Israel would argue they needed to pursue

891 Gazit, 233. 892 Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales, 92. Respectfully, I disagree with Gazit. Kennedy tied the security relationship and the American perception of the bilateral security relationship with Dimona. Ben-Zvi never mentioned Gazit's stance. 314

nuclear weapons. The non-verbal response proved immeasurably revealing -- "Gazit grinned".893

Gazit’s actions demonstrated even Israeli officials acknowledged they were over-emphasizing the rocket threat, or doing so to legitimize Dimona.

Gazit was frank in acknowledging the Israeli diplomatic gamesmanship which took place; however, this wore on an already ill-tempered Kennedy. What further angered the

Americans was a new Israeli position regarding their heightened evaluation of the Egyptian missile threat. More troubling, Israeli diplomats were critical of Kennedy's continued funding for

Nasser. Gazit notified administration officials that Israel would push for an American security guarantee.894

Kennedy simultaneously deployed Ambassador Barbour to confront Ben-Gurion on the

14th. The impetus for the meeting was the need for more American inspections of Dimona. As

Komer and Barbour confronted the Israeli leadership, Kennedy read Ben-Gurion's letter which repeated his preoccupation with the threat of Israeli eradication at the hands of the Arabs. More importantly, not once did he write the word Dimona, which Kennedy had addressed in his previous letter.895 In this instance, Ben-Gurion understood the American anger over delayed inspections and excuses.896 Barbour "pressed Ben-Gurion very hard" conveying Kennedy's "keen interest" in semi-annual inspections. Ben-Gurion countered Kennedy’s demand indicating such inspections would reassure Nasser. According to Israel, this represented a sovereignty issue. The

Israeli Prime Minister questioned why Inshas was not inspected -- why did Israel have to submit to this embarrassing process? While this was diplomatic posturing, Ben-Gurion must have

893 Memorandum for the Record Conversation with Gazit (Komer) May 14th, 1963. May 15th, 1963. Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. Druks, 110. Bass also understood the significance of Gazit's response. Support Any Friend, 213-214. 894 Memorandum for the Record Conversation with Gazit (Komer) May 14th, 1963. May 15th, 1963. Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 895 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 124 896 Shalom, 42. 315

understood this could not be taken seriously by American diplomats. Meir reported the Israelis were very uneasy about the Egyptian nuclear reactor. At this stage, it is noteworthy to recall

Harman and Gazit's earlier admissions (1961, see chapter 6) to their American counterparts that even if one of the Arab states developed a reactor the same size as Dimona, they would not feel threatened -- their previous comments now hurt this defense. Ben-Gurion was given a final warning that "we regard our requests for Dimona visits as an extremely serious matter."897 Ben-

Gurion sternly replied that the Israelis had different intelligence. He posited whether the

Americans knew that Nasser used gas in Yemen. This indicated to Kennedy and his administration that Ben-Gurion was desperately seeking some sort of justification for Dimona – still, it did not resonate with the American visitor. Ben-Gurion chastised the diplomat for the

American lack of concern on Egypt's nonconventional, chemical weapons. Barbour reminded the distraught leader that on May 8th, Kennedy publicly committed to come to Israel or Egypt's defense should the need arise. He had also assured Meir of American support. Ben-Gurion calmed himself and appraised the American request: He said, "Twice a year?" – adding, he needed to gauge what would transpire in Egypt; he would, however, ask his government.

Barbour interrupted to stress this was not about the Egyptians. Ben-Gurion would have to commit himself to the American request, though the United States would do their best to reassure

Israel on Egypt. When Ben-Gurion asked why Egypt was not subject to the same scrutiny,

Barbour replied they were not nearly as advanced as Dimona. Finally, Peres had promised

Kennedy that the Israelis were not developing nuclear weapons -- to truly prove if this was the case, the United States needed to see firsthand.898

897 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Rusk Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63 NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 898 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Rusk Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63 NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 316

Kennedy’s message to Ben-Gurion was clear: we do not trust you or the Israeli version of events; only by seeing Dimona with our own eyes can we uncover the truth. Certainly, this was insulting to the Israelis: the Americans had not been involved in the construction or financing

(American private citizens excluded) and now the Israelis had to bend to American whims. The

American decision for bi-annual inspections changed the Dimona Rules of Waldorf-Astoria, and the Israelis had a legitimate grievance.899 The Israelis finally experienced the underlining dynamic of the relationship: they were no longer in control regarding how Dimona would be inspected; henceforth, the Americans would set the procedures. The special relationship comprised two friendly allies and was based on reciprocal relations -- this was the clearest indication that it was in no way symmetrical. These new negotiations were less even-sided -- one superpower dictated to a small, borderline-medium-power state.

Ben-Gurion, angered now by this new set of rules, opposed Nasser's inclusion in the information loop. He did not want to apprise the Egyptians of the findings of Dimona inspections. He suggested it would be better for Israel if Nasser remained unsure about Dimona.

Alarmingly, Barbour countered this could risk nuclear war. Ben-Gurion adamantly denied this would happen and argued indirectly that Nasser's uncertainty would bolster Israeli deterrence.

The meeting terminated with a clear message from the President that he wanted (in essence, was not requesting) "no strings attached" full inspections to occur. The Kennedy Administration desired inspections even if Nasser would not be informed. Frustrated, Ben-Gurion questioned: why should Nasser be reassured? Why were multiple visits needed per year? Barbour retorted,

"Israelis had a well-deserved reputation as very fast builders".900 This was a signal from the

899 Shalom, 36. 900 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Rusk part 2 May 16th, 1963. Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Rusk Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 317

Americans of their familiarity with past indiscretions which generated suspicion. Dismayed,

Ben-Gurion ended the meeting admitting he would consult with Cabinet on these questions.901

After this encounter, the administration believed that Ben-Gurion wanted Nasser to suspect that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, or at least remain uncertain. One Israeli diplomat protested that in "certain circumstances (a) virtuous woman might not want to appear virtuous."902 Sexist analogy aside, this admission was the verbal equivalent to Gazit's grin: the

Israelis were signalling to the Americans their intentions. The Israelis wanted nuclear ambiguity for deterrence. Unfortunately for the Israelis, America’s, specifically Kennedy’s, anger rose. The

Americans confirmed these admissions proved the Israelis had altered the agreed upon Dimona

Rules. State understood the Israelis opposed an American-mandated system of subservience by way of inspections. They concluded the Israelis wanted to deter Nasser with this psychological uncertainty, and keep the option open for a nuclear weapons path in a short time frame.903

The Americans astutely understood that for the Israelis, Dimona was now placed in the larger American-Israeli negotiation, or bargaining give-and-take. The problem at this stage was that Kennedy did not possess a great deal of patience for fusing the "non-nuclear elements" with

Dimona in an Israeli attempt at bargaining. Accordingly, the Israelis were informed that no further security matters (guarantee, weapons) would be agreed upon until they conceded to

Dimona "visits".904 This is the clearest articulation that as Kennedy’s approach solidified, even by mid-May, Dimona gravely affected the overall relationship. The Americans formally declared that until Dimona inspections took place, in essence signifying American safeguards and partial

901 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Rusk part 2 May 16th, 1963. Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Rusk Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 902 Ibid. See Note. Warren Bass first analyzed this exchange and cited the same analogy. 215. 903 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Rusk part 2 May 16th, 1963. Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Rusk Israel, General 5/15/63-5/16/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA 904 Ibid. 318

control of Dimona, absolutely no progress would occur within the bilateral security dimension.

No arms sales, security guarantee, or any other issues progressed -- all decisions were paused until Dimona inspections and American demands were met. The Israelis would soon be informed that relations hinged on how they handled Dimona.

Kennedy, Dimona, and the Special Relationship

By mid-May onwards, Dimona became the most pressing Middle Eastern issue for

Kennedy. Kennedy's firmly entrenched distrust of Israel morphed into action, specifically, measures to prevent an Israeli nuclear bomb. He did this in a number of ways: firstly, he mulled over and approved the CANE arms initiative; secondly, he wrote directly to Ben-Gurion and

Levi Eshkol and threatened both with the future of American-Israeli relations; lastly, he ensured the Israelis agreed to regular inspections. Two of these initiatives were successful -- the other was rejected by Nasser, not the Israelis. All three initiatives had the same end goal: to prevent an

Israeli nuclear weapon.

The Rostow Paper/CANE initiative had evolved into a comprehensive project by State,

AEC, intelligence agencies as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).905

The Middle East arms race had become untenable. If left unaddressed, Israel could have nuclear weapons in the coming years and a nuclear weapon delivery system by the end of the decade.

The UAR missile program was also a matter of concern albeit they would be shortly overtaken by the Israelis. If nuclear weapons and nonconventional missiles came to fruition, American power would be greatly diminished, making American actions in the region very difficult.906 The goal of the initiative was to try and stem the escalating arms race in the region. This would

905 The ACDA was created in 1961. It was heavily involved in Kennedy’s 1963 Test Ban negotiations with the Soviets. 906 Department of State Memorandum Talbot to Secretary Rusk May 14th, 1963. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 3 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 319

require both Nasser and Ben-Gurion to adhere to Kennedy's "serious concern" to refrain from elevating the arms race to "nuclear levels".907

Kennedy understood the goals of this mission, "at a minimum was to prevent: 1) nuclear weapons; and 2) surface-to-surface missiles". The nuclear weapons referred to Israel, the missiles to Egypt.908 Alarmingly, the program needed immediate activation prior to the creation of advanced weapons, which would severely restrict and endanger American control. The United

States would not be able to limit hostilities between Israel and the UAR if nuclear weapons were involved. The CANE initiative also incorporated the Israeli pursuit of a security treaty. The

Americans decided that the fundamental precondition for any security guarantee was contingent upon a formal pledge from Israel to forego nuclear weapons or offensive missiles. Still, they knew this may be impossible without Nasser's agreement to forego missiles.909 This link was suggested as the Americans understood they needed some method to stop or at least delay Israeli nuclear weapons. The security guarantee could act as an incentive, and Nasser's approval would be vital. The initiative called for a high ranking Presidential emissary to consult first with Nasser, then Ben-Gurion, to test the viability of this agreement.910 The administration was somewhat hopeful they could convince the Middle Eastern leaders to participate.

Komer wrote the President that despite the findings of the CANE report, State stood firmly against a security guarantee for Israel, and at best, the United States needed a "tacit nuclear and missile standstill agreement". He shared with Kennedy his assessment of the dire

907 Second Draft Komer, Polk, Strong, Grant (NEA), Byroade, Dickman. May 10th, 1963. Terms of Reference for the Initial Approach. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 1 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen believes that the initiative was based more on Israel than Egypt -- this is debatable. Israel and the Bomb, 124-126. 908 Subject NE Arms Limitation and Control-Plan of Action (undated) attached to memo May 14th, 1963. Israeli Security Arms: Arms Control, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-009. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 125 909 Subject NE Arms Limitation and Control-Plan of Action (undated) attached to memo May 14th, 1963. "The Advanced Weapons Problem". Israeli Security Arms: Arms Control, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-009. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen 125. 910 Ibid, "The Approach would be Flexible," VI. “What We Would Eventually Hope to Accomplish". 320

situation: "I for one am convinced that Israel will go ahead with nuclear weapons unless we give her a security guarantee."911 He felt that much could be negotiated if Israel conceded to certain pre-conditions, such as Dimona inspections. The end goal would be some sort of arms restriction with a security guarantee in a trade-off for nuclear "limitation".912 Kennedy ruminated on options from his Middle Eastern security expert. The CANE initiative was launched in June. Kennedy's other approach, a direct confrontational letter campaign with Ben-Gurion, would bring about his primary goal: gain regular inspections of Dimona. The arms limitation was a long-term goal.

Other initiatives including the CANE mission were dependent upon Kennedy's first priority, stopping an Israeli bomb.

Though Kennedy was open to arms limitation and he wanted immediate action on

Dimona and nonconventional weapons, he understood the many limitations and dependencies of the initiative. No security guarantee could be given prior to Israel complying with a no-nuclear pledge. The problem was that Ben-Gurion would not agree to renounce advanced weapons unless Nasser did as well. Problematically, Nasser would not renounce missiles or nonconventional weapons if he knew that Israel possessed a security guarantee. This was all interlinked and crucially dependent on Nasser himself.913 The solution to the arms race was murky. Cognizant of the looming challenges, Kennedy decided at that moment to take action within the bilateral relationship. Dimona had to be stopped. Kennedy realized the urgency of the situation and while his administration calculated how to deal with the arms race, he confronted

David Ben-Gurion on Dimona.

911 Druks, 110-111. Memo for the President (Komer) May 16th, 1963. Israeli Security Arms: Arms Control, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-009. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 912 Memo for the President (Komer) May 16th, 1963. Israeli Security Arms: Arms Control, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-009. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 913 Memorandum for the President from Komer May 17th, 1963. Israeli Security Arms: Arms Control, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-009. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 321

President Kennedy's approach favoured Barbour's and Rusk's suggestion after the former's meeting with Ben-Gurion: until inspections were agreed to, no positive incentives, or further developments could transpire between Israel and the United States. On the 18th, the

President wrote to Ben-Gurion. He wasted no time expressing his trepidation, writing: "I am sure that you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons".914 After all, Ben-Gurion had acknowledged this when they met in New York in 1961, and Meir declared (in Florida in December, 1962) there would be no bilateral problems on this issue. Kennedy firmly established that his government was "pre-occupied" by the need to inspect Dimona, and that at the Waldorf-Astoria meeting Ben-Gurion agreed that Nasser, or whomever, could receive the findings of American inspections. Now it appeared the Israelis had changed their minds. Kennedy argued: "the dangers in proliferation of national nuclear weapons systems are so obvious that I am sure I need not repeat them here."915 He was clear that Israeli nuclear weapons would destabilize not only the region, but the world. This would drive both the

Arabs towards nuclear weapons and in the American nuclear domino theory view "certainly lead" to "larger countries", who had refrained from producing weapons, to do so.916 Kennedy reminded Ben-Gurion he publicly supported the defense of Israel. The tone of the letter was firm yet cordial until Kennedy's next passage: "This commitment and this support would be seriously jeopardized in the public opinion in this country and the West as a whole if it should be thought that this Government was unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as

914 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv Eyes Only Embtel 894 Verbatim Text May 18th, 1963. Kennedy letter to Ben-Gurion. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961 -Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 915 Ibid, 1-2. 916 Ibid, 2. 322

the question of the character of Israel's efforts in the nuclear field".917 Kennedy threatened repercussions if Israel was not transparent regarding inspections or their intentions. He ended the letter assuring the Israeli Prime Minister that American intelligence was strong on the UAR.

Israel need not worry as Nasser did not have a comparable nuclear program. He was willing to examine any contrary evidence the Israelis possessed.918 Kennedy requested an urgent reply and pressed Ben-Gurion on the immediacy and importance of the issue.

Kennedy was blunt and removed the many Israeli excuses Ben-Gurion had raised in the

May 14th-meeting with Barbour and his last letter to Kennedy from April 25th, 1963.919 He indicated there would be severe consequences should Israel ignore its vital importance. This letter is another example of the simultaneous regional and international significance of Dimona inspections. Kennedy cited the Middle East as his primary concern and the global proliferation problem which Israel, in failing to grant inspections, was also a contributor. There was no grey area for Ben-Gurion to straddle -- Kennedy articulated his personal interest on this issue and the potentially disastrous circumstances should Israel not comply. This marked a change in

Kennedy's demeanour as this no longer appeared to be a friendly exchange.920 Kennedy's letter achieved its purpose. Meir informed Barbour that close consideration was being given to inspections and she expected the President would receive an answer in the coming days.921

917 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv Eyes Only Embtel 894 Verbatim Text May 18th, 1963. Kennedy letter to Ben-Gurion. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961 -Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 918 Ibid, 2-3. 919 Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to President Kennedy. Apr 25th, 1963. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30 1961 -Oct 2 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 920 Shalom calls the tone of this letter, "harsh" or "threatening" 42. 921 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State May 23rd, 1963. Israel, General 5/17/63-5/31/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 323

With this letter, Kennedy shifted towards opposing even the option of Israel pursuing a nuclear weapon.922 This shift was undertaken to leave no doubt whatsoever in the minds of

Nasser and the Arabs of Israeli intentions. Israel would no longer be able to appear "non- virtuous". After reading years of intelligence reports, and distressing evidence over the last few months, along with the CANE program and the deceit of Operation Damocles, Kennedy employed an aggressive stance. On May 27th, Ben-Gurion replied to Kennedy. Ben-Gurion informed Barbour that the Israelis accepted the premise of "periodic visits". Furthermore, Ben-

Gurion abandoned any demand for equal inspections of Egyptian facilities. The Israeli Prime

Minister reiterated that Dimona was only for peaceful purposes.923

The Israeli leader reassured Kennedy that his Waldorf-Astoria promises had not changed.

While he understood Kennedy's responsibilities to stem global proliferation, this was not really

Israel's responsibility. Ben-Gurion believed that without "an agreement between the Great

Powers on general disarmament", nuclear weapons would eventually be acquired by China,

European states, and eventually India. He quipped that Israel was only responsible for its own activities, not other nuclear concerns (India, China) which Kennedy had referenced. Regarding the peaceful commitment of Dimona, the Prime Minister wrote: "I regard this condition as absolutely binding."924 Ben-Gurion believed Dimona was just like Nahal Soreq, except with

French collaboration. He also admitted that nuclear power interested Israel and that they "must follow developments in the Middle East". This appeared to signal that if Egypt or other states made gains with nonconventional weapons, Dimona's purpose could change. Ben-Gurion firmly rejected a "system of formal US control in Dimona like Soreq" yet he agreed to "further annual

922 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 128. 923 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State May 27th, 1963. 1-2. Israel, General 5/17/63- 5/31/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 924 Letter Ben-Gurion to Kennedy May 27th, 1963. 1. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961 -Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 324

visits", though the "start up", meaning criticality, would not be achieved until the end of 1964.

At this stage, the French companies would turn Dimona over to the Israelis -- the most suitable time for an inspection. He admitted that either an American or neutral could inspect. In closing his letter, he warned: "Israel cannot be blind to the more actual danger now confronting us." Ben-

Gurion explained this referred to "conventional" weapons from Israeli neighbours -- code for the

UAR rocket program.925

There was much in this letter for the Americans to digest. On the important points, it appeared that Ben-Gurion complied. Closer scrutiny and analysis of the details reveal his ambiguity and delay tactics. He admitted that while nuclear proliferation was a threat to the world, it was not necessarily Israel's responsibility to be a model for nonproliferation.926 More alarming was his admission that though Dimona was not intended as a weapons program, the

Israelis would need to monitor the regional situation to ensure that this was their continued purpose.927 This letter conceded an element of defeat by agreeing to inspections, and abandoning the Egyptian parallel request. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion's refusal to acknowledge semi-annual visits, his suggestion that the end of 1964 was ideal, and his constant allusions to the UAR threat punctuated his last stand against Kennedy. Even though he had to realize Israeli was no longer in control, he still tried to retain sovereignty, delay, and negotiate on final elements of Dimona.

William Burr and Avner Cohen have recently uncovered a rare insight into Kennedy's position on Dimona. On May 25th, in a conversation with the much maligned French Foreign

Minister Maurice Couve De Murville, Kennedy articulated the need for both France and the

United States to ensure that Dimona not weaponize. Couve De Murville admitted it was a

925 Letter Ben-Gurion to Kennedy May 27th, 1963. 2-3. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961 -Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF 119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 926 Druks, 116. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 131. Cohen argues Ben-Gurion did not feel that Israel would constitute a global proliferation precedent. 927 Bass, 217-218. 325

mistake that France ever provided Israel with plutonium. This was a new admission, even though it involved only a very small quantity for lab use -- plutonium constitutes the extent of Franco-

Israeli collaboration. More remarkable was Kennedy's response. After the Foreign Minister explained that France enacted all the necessary safeguards to ensure that produced plutonium would be returned to France, he warned Kennedy that Israel could find other uranium, for example, additional "uncontrolled sources of uranium alloys."928 Kennedy went a step further, and admitted: "I am pleased because if Israel had atomic weapons, we would be blamed equally, you for furnishing uranium, and we for the financial aid given to Israel." Kennedy labeled this policy "stupid" as it helped the Soviets by hurting the Americans in world opinion.929 These admissions are astonishing. Kennedy espoused genuine regret for helping Israel financially, as

Dimona had by this stage poisoned relations. To argue this policy was "stupid" and to admit such to France was jarring. He was not completely honest with his French companion, as the CIA and intelligence community were equally concerned about French participation with Israel. As more evidence mounts, the greater the degree of Kennedy's anger and distrust of Israel is revealed.

Kennedy also moved forward on option two: the CANE program. Kennedy selected John

McCloy as the Presidential Emissary for this arms limitation approach.930 McCloy, who knew

Nasser (which was key for CANE) through his work with oil companies, was the top choice of

Kennedy.931 He was then picked as the ideal candidate to deal with first Nasser and later, if

Nasser agreed, to meet with Ben-Gurion on this initiative.

928 Burr and Cohen, eds., "The Battle of the Letters," 2019, See Document 29. 929 Ibid. I also read the French original text, provided in this Briefing Book. The translation is correct. 930 McCloy was known as the “Chairman” for his myriad roles in the United States over the years. Kai Bird concludes that McCloy was the seminal establishment figure through successive presidencies. Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 931 Bass, 224. Bass identifies McCloy as the WASP establishment figure. Kennedy greatly admired McCloy. He had offered him Secretary of Treasury and Defense though McCloy declined. McCloy had also been Kennedy’s Disarmament Advisor in 1961 and was instrumental in creating the ACDA, and by extension, Kennedy’s desire for a Nuclear Test Ban. Bird, The Chairman, 498, 501, 508-516. 326

At the end of May, Kennedy employed multiple strategies for stopping Dimona. He practiced his bilateral diplomacy with Ben-Gurion and on the advice of the CANE group wrote

Gamal Abdel Nasser a letter on May 27th. Nasser was not exactly a neutral arbiter on the subject of Israel. He had informed American Ambassador John Badeau that the West German participation in Egypt was a longer term issue, not a security concern. Specifically, he argued that by exploiting this cooperation to the Americans, the Israelis were "probably up to something".932 Nonetheless, Kennedy informed the Egyptian President that he was glad that

Egypt was committed to abstaining from the production of nuclear weapons. He updated Nasser that Israel could potentially develop nuclear weapons in the next few years. This apparent change in American policy was advanced to try and compel Nasser into the CANE initiative. Kennedy also revealed the reality of the CIA's findings. This had been a suggestion by CANE personnel to convince Nasser of the importance of halting his missile program.933 Kennedy finished his letter explaining that the missile race between Israel and Egypt must be ended in order to quell any nuclear use.934

The NSC worried that the Israeli Prime Minister still left room for a nuclear weapons option when he explained that Israel needed to "follow developments in the Middle East."

Though Ben-Gurion promised Dimona was peaceful, intelligence, and the AEC needed to conclude whether one annual visit would be sufficient. If this was the case and two visits would be needed, Kennedy would be required to write another letter pressuring Ben-Gurion to adhere to

932 Department of State Telegram Cairo to Secretary of State Apr 29th, 1963. Folder United Arab Republic: Security, 1963. Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-127-004. President's Office Files, Country Files UAR (United Arab Republic), Box 127. JKPL, Boston, MA. 933 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 126. 934 Department of State Telegram Amembassy Cairo May 27th, 1963. Letter Kennedy to Nasser. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 3 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 327

such visits.935 The administration informed Kennedy to say he still trusted Israel, yet on

“technical grounds” another visit was warranted.936 Unfortunately for Ben-Gurion and the

Israelis, Kennedy had decided they had used up their good faith on Dimona during this last few months. After NSAM 231, Kennedy was essentially signalling the end of Israel’s control and equal footing in the relationship. Despite his polite response, he had abandoned his trust in Israel.

The United States realized that Ben-Gurion exploited Dimona even in its current state with no weapons capability (or, so they believed) to psychologically deter Nasser through the mere implication of a weapon.937 The Americans believed Ben-Gurion understood from

Kennedy's last letter (May 18th) nuclear proliferation (an issue that transcended the bilateral relations) had the support of all the agencies in government. It had near unanimous support and if

Dimona activity continued, the American public and Administration's views of Israel could be challenged.938

On June 1st, the intelligence community, State Department, and Kennedy Administration concurred that Ben-Gurion's conditions "fail to meet our minimum requirements."939 Six-month intervals were required due to the potential of a weapons-grade reactor. A peaceful reactor would be discharged every two years. If a weapons program existed and "maximum irradiate fuel" production was the goal leading to the separation of weapons grade plutonium, six month interval inspections would be warranted.940 Furthermore, Ben-Gurion's timeline of 1964 could not be accepted, as the inspection team would need to visit before criticality. To firmly establish

935 Memorandum Brubeck for Bundy May 29th, 1963. Israel BG May 27 Reply Regarding Dimona Visits. Israel, General 5/17/63-5/31/63. NSF, Box 119. JKPL, Boston, MA. 936 Ibid. 937 Memo for Presidential Emissary, Scenario with Ben-Gurion Tab B. 1963, POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 938 Ibid, Section E. p. 2. 939 Memorandum for Bundy (Brubeck and E.S. Little) June 1st, 1963. Subject Reply to BG on Dimona Visits. Israel, General 6/1/63-6/20/63. NSF, 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 940 Ibid. 328

what the Israelis were manufacturing and alleviate any lingering doubt, the Americans suggested: a June or July visit in 1963; a June 1964-inspection; afterwards, a regular inspection should be undertaken every six months; the inspection team be granted entry to all areas of the reactor site and complex (to look for "fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant"); lastly, that the scientists inspecting not be rushed and be provided ample time to conduct a thorough assessment of the facility. The administration concluded that Ben-Gurion could agree to these conditions as this met his "once-a-year stipulation." American scientists reluctantly accepted compromised conditions, as they believed this would be politically acceptable to the

Israelis, and they prioritized bi-annual inspections effective immediately.941

Upon reading these recommendations, Kennedy quickly administered his response: he sent both Nasser and Ben-Gurion personal messages. His message to Nasser represented his continued honouring of the CANE initiative. Kennedy's belief in this program remains unclear.

As he consistently prioritized stopping nuclear weapons, he went along with the program. On the

15th of June, Kennedy informed Nasser nothing was more important than the continuing arms race in the Middle East. This had been exacerbated "each passing year … with more advanced weapons introduced in the area." Kennedy cautioned that devoid of controls, nuclear weapons would be introduced into the region in the "not too distant future."942 Kennedy tried to lobby

Nasser to join his arms control initiative, and while he scolded the Egyptian for missiles, his reference to nuclear weapons clearly meant Israel.

Kennedy sided with his intelligence and science advisers instead of cautiously proceeding along Komer and the NSC’s CANE path. This was concrete proof that the President alone made

941 Memorandum for Bundy (Brubeck and E.S. Little) June 1st, 1963. Subject Reply to BG on Dimona Visits. 1-2. Israel, General 6/1/63-6/20/63. NSF, 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Cohen was the first to cite this memo, which he quotes nearly entirely. Israel and the Bomb, 133. Cohen cites an older version, dated June 12th. 942 Department of State Telegram Action: Amembassy Cairo June 15th, 1963. Kennedy Letter to Nasser. 1-2. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 3 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 329

the final decisions on how to address Dimona. He was willing to trudge along with Nasser on the arms limitation initiative; however, he had reached his boiling point with the Israelis. On the

15th, Kennedy wrote Ben-Gurion admitting this was a difficult issue for Israel, as it was for the

Americans. The Ben-Gurion letter marked the harshest position Kennedy delivered, up to that point, on Israel. Kennedy noted that due to the "crucial importance of this problem" tighter visits were needed on an IAEA schedule in order to remove any doubt as to "the peaceful intent of the

Dimona project". He ended his letter reiterating his May 18th warning that "this Government's commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace and the question of the character of Israel's effort in the nuclear field."943Kennedy's message was clear: firstly, no amount of explanations or promises would convince the United States that Dimona was peaceful.

Kennedy implicitly warned Ben-Gurion he did not trust him, the Israelis, or any announcement on Dimona. He had to see for himself through unprecedented access; secondly, Kennedy appeared to politely phrase his threat as a repetition of the May 18th letter, but, this was not the case. He was more vague on the 18th, arguing that perhaps this would affect the high esteem the

United States held for Israel. This letter contained a threat: if no action was taken on Dimona and the Israelis did not submit to American conditions, the whole relationship could be questioned.

At this critical moment, the future of the relationship lay in the balance on how the Israelis responded on Dimona. This message left no ambiguity or doubt as to Kennedy's views on

Dimona and his anger towards Ben-Gurion's tactics. There was only one problem with the letter -

- Ben-Gurion likely never read it.

943 Telegram Amembassy Tel Aviv Eyes Only for Ambassador June 15thg, 1963. Verbatim Text Kennedy to Ben- Gurion 1-2. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30 1961 to Oct 2nd, 1963. Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 330

On June 16th, 1963, Ben-Gurion resigned for what became his third and final time.

Barbour was as shocked as Ben-Gurion's cabinet to hear this news. His belief was that Ben-

Gurion was tired, worn down, and "simply fed up". Many factors contributed to his resignation.

Rapprochement with Germany contrasted with public opposition to this policy directly contributed to his decision. Notably, the fallout of Operation Damocles in the domestic political sphere was an embarrassment. The issue of West German scientists was still ongoing which directly affected Ben-Gurion.944Barbour was informed that Finance Minister Levi Eshkol would take over as Prime Minister with Peres (the Dimona architect) likely to stay on as Minister of

Defense.945 The Americans had to deal with a new Israeli leader and Kennedy would not relent on inspections.

Furthermore, to demonstrate the international importance that Dimona represented for

American proliferation policy, during the final negotiations on Kennedy's Limited Test Ban

Treaty in June, the issue was to be discussed with the Soviets. A June-briefing-book for negotiations on the Treaty presented American nonproliferation problems. Administration officials insisted even the attainment of "a small number of atomic weapons by China, Israel, or the UAR decrease the power, influence, and security of both the United States and Soviet

Union."946 This was to be clearly explained to the Soviets -- a nuclear Israel would hurt the capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Clearly, Dimona was seen as endangering

American power projection globally.

944 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State June 16th, 1963. Priority. Israel, General 6/1/63- 6/20/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 945 Ibid, 2. 946 6/12/63 Briefing Book US-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement for Discussion at the Moscow Meeting Folder Nuclear Energy Matters Nuclear Diffusion-Briefing Book, Vol. 1 "On US-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement," 6/63 National Security Files, Files of Carl Kaysen, Box 376. JKPL, Boston, MA. 331

By this stage, Kennedy’s universal thinking on nuclear proliferation was clear: no one would be given exemption. "If we oppose weapons (nuclear) for the French, even at the cost of major differences with De Gaulle, we certainly are going to oppose Israel having them. To do otherwise would undermine our global policy."947 Kennedy was serious in his threats to Israel concerning American-Israeli relations. He made this clear to Ben-Gurion and would soon make this case to Nasser and Eshkol.

Kennedy expressed his concerns about Dimona and missiles during a discussion on June

15th with CANE initiative members.948 The President convened this meeting to discuss the

Israeli security guarantee and whether this should be tied to the ongoing problems in Jordan,949 and to prevent a nuclear arms race. He then turned to the issue of nuclear weapons and UAR missiles. While Kennedy understood that intelligence could not possibly uncover all aspects of research and development in Egypt, it was likely that the Americans could discern whether the

UAR was progressing on developing substantial missiles or nuclear weapons. This justified the need for an arms initiative, so that both Israel and Egypt would be inspected.950 Kennedy believed CANE was needed to address two problems: the risk of nuclear war and the situation in

Jordan. While his primary concern was Dimona, he pointed out that even if Jordan fell apart, the security guarantee was still appealing to Israel. The consensus from this meeting was that if this mission was unsuccessful, Israel would still move towards nuclear weapons, believing they could

947 Memorandum for Mr. McCloy from Komer. June 19th, 1963. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 437, JKPL, Boston, MA. Bass also highlights this connection. 187. 948 This group included Kennedy, Komer, Bundy, Talbot, McCone, McCloy, James Grant (NEA), William Foster (ACDA), and Herman Elits (NEA). 949 Kennedy and his Administration toyed with the idea of an Israeli security guarantee to keep Israel from moving into the West Bank of Jordan should King Hussein fall. From April through June, King Hussein faced problems from his own citizens (predominantly Palestinian), who supported Nasser and the "radicals" in the Arab Cold War. It was vital to keep the Israelis out of the West Bank, though simultaneously, the Americans used the threat of Israeli action to deter Nasser from interfering in Jordan. 950 Memorandum for the Record June 20, 1963. President's Meeting on McCloy Exercise Saturday, June 15th, 1963. Present: The President, McCloy, Talbot, Grant, Foster, Elits, McCone, Bundy, and Komer. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 437, JKPL, Boston, MA. 332

procure a security guarantee. This link had to be broken in the Israeli mind. Kennedy decided no guarantee should be offered without Dimona inspections and a non-weapons pledge. It is debatable whether the Americans would proffer a security guarantee as this would invite the

Soviets to offer the Arabs a similar pact. The President wanted the Israelis to remain outside of the West Bank, as the State Department argued that Jordan and Dimona should be separate issues

-- though they were obviously related.951 This is yet another example of how Dimona affected the bilateral relationship. Even with serious and disparate issues, such as Jordanian sovereignty and the threat of Israeli action, the Americans identified Dimona as a priority. The members of this meeting "agreed that opposition to nuclear proliferation was one issue which United States opinion would be solidly behind the Administration. It was therefore our best bargaining lever with Israel."952 This consensus agreement demonstrated Kennedy would not be subject to domestic pressure on Dimona.

This meeting upheld Kennedy’s support for CANE to try to deal with the Israeli and

Egyptian threats simultaneously. The message emanating from Kennedy and his administration was definite: first address priority one, the nuclear issue, and then deal with a security guarantee and other Israeli challenges afterwards. Until such time as Israeli actions on Dimona were deemed acceptable, no progress would transpire within the security relationship.

In spite of all this discussion, the CANE initiative was all for naught. After months of preparation and years of development, Nasser rejected the mission in late June. The Egyptian

President argued that, while he understood the American mission, he had to reject this appeal since no Arab leader could negotiate any sort of arms agreement that involved Israel on political

951 Memorandum for the Record June 20th, 1963. President's Meeting on McCloy Exercise Saturday, June 15th, 1963. Present: The President, McCloy, Talbot, Grant, Foster, Elits, McCone, Bundy and Komer. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 White House Memoranda. NSF, Box 437, JKPL, Boston, MA. Bass also cites certain elements from this meeting -- specifically, he notes that Myer Feldman was not present. Support Any Friend, 225-226. 952 Ibid (Memo for the Record). 333

grounds.953 Nasser commented that since he did not have any intention of developing nuclear weapons, there was nothing to inspect. He admitted Egypt had no foreseeable reason to pursue nuclear weapons, nor did he foresee attacking Israel.954 While the CANE group convened and discussions took place over the summer of 1963, the program was essentially suspended. With

Nasser removed as an immediate threat, Kennedy devoted his energy to rendering Dimona peaceful.

Kennedy’s Dimona Ultimatum

Levi Eshkol officially became Prime Minister on June 23rd.955 He had an inordinately difficult role to replace a man of Ben-Gurion's stature. Eshkol's task was about to become increasingly difficult due to constricting American pressure on Dimona. On July 3rd, Barbour visited the new Israeli leader. Eshkol affirmed that his policies would not differ greatly from those of Ben-Gurion. Levi Eshkol, who had long been a private critic of Dimona's costs, was

"horrified by the level of current military costs".956

On the 4th, Kennedy sent Eshkol one of the most confrontational, Presidential letters (of those declassified) in the history of American-Israeli diplomacy. After writing two sentences to congratulate the new Israeli Prime Minister, Kennedy delved into his problems with Israeli conduct concerning Dimona. He left no room for Eshkol feigning ignorance, writing that "you are aware, I am sure" of the myriad exchanges Eshkol's predecessor conducted with Kennedy.

President Kennedy admitted this was no easy matter for either he, or Eshkol; however, he reminded the new Prime Minister that Ben-Gurion had pledged peaceful purposes and "his

953 Memorandum for the President the White House from Dean Rusk. July 23rd, 1963. Subject: McCloy Mission on Near East Arms Limitation. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 3 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 954 Ibid. 955 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 153. He survived a vote of no confidence over the furor on how to deal with the West German scientists helping Egyptian "unconventional arms". Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Rusk June 27, 1963. Israel General 6/21/63-6/30/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 956 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State July 3rd, 1963. Israel General 7/1/63-7/25/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 334

willingness to permit periodic inspections."957 This was not entirely true, Kennedy was in the process of demanding that Ben-Gurion agree to regular visits -- though Ben-Gurion had unofficially approved over the years. Kennedy demonstrated some civility by apologizing for burdening Eshkol this early in his new role. The letter shifted tone, intimating that Kennedy was in control of these proceedings, adding regularly-scheduled visits were needed. For the third time, he reiterated his foreboding threat: "As I wrote to Mr. Ben-Gurion, this Government's commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of

Israel's efforts in the nuclear field."958 Kennedy further cautioned that after checking with his own scientists and intelligence analysts, "our common purposes" would best be addressed by a visit (inspection in internal American correspondence) "early this summer" with another visit around a year later (June, 1964), and afterwards every six months. He left no room for ambiguity, explaining that American scientists needed full, unimpeded access to all of Dimona, or any related site including "fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant". Lastly, ample time was needed to ensure the visit was thorough. He ended the letter emphasizing the

"vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of Israel, to the United States, and internationally."959

This was not a letter of proposals, offers, or a negotiation, rather a list of specific demands to which Kennedy and the Americans expected Israeli adherence. The President threatened the future of American-Israeli relations -- a rarity for any decade, almost unseen in the

957 Telegram Amembassy Tel Aviv Eyes Only for Ambassador (from State) July 4th, 1963. 1-2. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30 1961 -Oct 2, 1963. Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 958 Department of State Telegram Secretary of State for Ambassador Barbour July 4th, 1963. Letter from Kennedy to Eshkol. 2. 7/1/63-7/25/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 959 Ibid, 2-3. 335

history of the relationship. Importantly, Kennedy laid his frustration bare: he cited a plutonium separation plant. He could be referring to the experimental plant Ben-Gurion proposed in 1961. It was more likely Kennedy was insinuating that if the Israelis had any hidden or non-declared facilities, or had made further progress on fuel fabrication facilities, this needed to be checked.

This letter was the pinnacle of Kennedy's frustration, distrust, and anger. Scholars posit this represented the culmination of five months of procedures and methods by Kennedy's government to prevent an Israeli bomb.960 This is a gross understatement, as evidenced throughout this dissertation, and punctuated Kennedy's simmering suspicions: initiated in 1961; recalibrated at the Waldorf-Astoria meeting; bolstered throughout 1962 with damning intelligence collection; exacerbated by the public discovery of Operation Damocles in March of

1963; and finally erupting between April and July of 1963. Kennedy acted upon the advice of the

AEC, CIA, and ACDA and followed their suggestions word-by-word on inspections. Concerning the vitriol and formation of the threat to the relationship -- this was all his own.961 The letter affirmed Kennedy's refusal to tolerate further Israeli excuses -- fashioned through two previous letters in May and June, his threat became more direct and menacing.

On July 17th, Eshkol delivered his response. He informed Ambassador Barbour he was perplexed and surprised at Kennedy's letter – specifically, the tone. Eshkol argued that he had to do what was in the best interests of Israel in terms of its security and to retain its sovereignty.

Eshkol echoed Ben-Gurion's ominous admission since May of 1961: should Middle Eastern developments change, Israel may have to develop nuclear weapons. He then raised grievances reminiscent of earlier battles. Were other nations, for instance India, going to be inspected like

Israel? Eshkol voiced his own frustration regarding the handling of affairs. After all, the United

960 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 155. 961 Even Cohen admits Kennedy crafted this letter himself. This was supported by William Crawford. Cohen argues this was unprecedented, Israel and the Bomb, 156. 336

States and Israel were allies and Kennedy should accept the word of a "sovereign government".

Barbour agreed with this assessment. Still, he informed the Israeli Prime Minister that this stage had not yet been attained.962 Barbour further outlined the President's personal conviction against nuclear proliferation throughout the globe. Problematically, with the "explosive atmosphere of the Middle East the introduction of nuclear weapons here would be especially grave." Eshkol concurred, and promised that the Israelis would give the issue close attention.963

This letter did not provide any conclusive replies to Kennedy's multiple requests. Eshkol merely asked for time to deliberate on these issues.964 Just like his predecessor, Eshkol presented the difficult situation Israel found itself in with neighbours calling for its destruction. Though dismayed by Kennedy's threats, he asked for time to investigate each and every one of Kennedy's questions.965 This was yet another attempt to receive an explicit security guarantee from the

Americans.966 Unsurprisingly, the Americans would not entertain this pledge before Dimona was solved.

On July 23rd, President Kennedy called for a suspension of any security guarantee plans for Israel. This equated to his divorce of the security guarantee and Dimona. He appeared to side with the State Department's stance that the United States had consistently guaranteed Israel's security and a formal agreement would only endanger American interests by inviting the Soviets

962 Department of State Telegram Barbour (Tel Aviv) to Secretary of State Rusk July 17th, 1963. Eshkol letter to Kennedy. Israel, General 7/1/63-7/25/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Druks, 122. Shalom, 54. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 160. 963 Department of State Telegram Barbour (Tel Aviv) to Secretary of State Rusk July 17th, 1963. Eshkol letter to Kennedy. Israel, General 7/1/63-7/25/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 964 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 160. 965 Druks, 122. 966 Shalom, 54. Cohen argues it was Eshkol, not Ben-Gurion, who introduced this "vague linkage" between the security dimension and Dimona. Israel and the Bomb, 160. We have seen that Ben-Gurion hinted at this in all his letters not involving Dimona -- his message was that Israel was under attack by its Arab enemies. The Americans understood the implication. 337

to give the same formal offer to the Arabs.967 With the issue of a security guarantee conclusively separated from the Israeli nuclear program, Kennedy could focus solely on Dimona. The latest reports found no noticeable progress at Dimona, indicating that continued intelligence collection was still being undertaken. Unbeknownst to the Americans, underground construction continued.

Kennedy wanted all countries with nuclear reactors brought under inspection -- likely alluding to

India after Eshkol's comments. He wanted a list of countries which had rejected inspections. He desired to know if the UAR could be inspected as well. In his continued onslaught on Israel, he aimed to demonstrate that Israel would be treated as everyone else. Kennedy suggested that when the test ban was signed (it appeared imminent), he needed an agreement to get every reactor inspected or to accept an American or international visit. This would also be in the Arab interest as it would remove Dimona's secrecy. The administration placed a great deal of emphasis on when Israel would sign Kennedy’s test ban. If they quickly signed the test ban treaty this would be beneficial, conversely, refusal would raise American suspicion. Kennedy also called for more information from the French on their assessments and inspections of Dimona.968 In finalizing the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Kennedy left no defense for Eshkol to deflect inspections or try and claim that Israel was treated unfairly or being singled out.

The immediacy of Kennedy’s confrontation on Dimona was vital. Rusk divulged that

"(O)ur primary problem remains that Israel may shortly manufacture weapons"; this would create an atmosphere of further potential nuclear proliferation in the already tense Middle

967 Bass's analysis makes the point that Kennedy's suspension of security guarantee talk divorced the security approach with Dimona. 230. This was as far as Kennedy would entertain a security guarantee. Memorandum of Conversation. Washington 23, 1963. Subject: McCloy's Near East Arms Limitation Probe; Security Guarantee for Israel. Doc 303. 660. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. 968 Memorandum of Conversation. Washington 23, 1963. Subject: McCloy's Near East Arms Limitation Probe; Security Guarantee for Israel. Doc 303. 658-661. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. 338

East.969 The Americans needed "clearcut (spelling in original) written assurances that" Israeli would not "divert fissionable material" in use for nuclear weapons; "develop, test or manufacture nuclear weapons; and not seek to acquire nuclear weapons from any source." Furthermore, the

Americans demanded adequate, meaning thorough and complete, inspections of the Dimona reactor complex. Proving that Dimona was peaceful was vital for Kennedy’s overall goal of

Middle Eastern stability.970

Rusk agreed with Kennedy’s decision to break the link between Dimona and positive security relations. H categorically argued that the security guarantee was a completely separate item from the regular "visits" to Dimona -- the inspections had to be presented as beneficial for the Israelis. If the Israelis did not sign the Test Ban Treaty, which was finally signed by the

United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and United States on July 25th971, it would be problematic.

Following Kennedy's request, the Americans finalized discussions about inspections of Indian reactors, firmly leaving no more precedents or excuses for the Israelis. Rusk advised Kennedy that the Israelis should be made to believe that they were "out of step with the rest of the world" in failing to allow inspections at their facility. The American Government's proliferation efforts were now explicitly connected. Any future security agreement (divorced from inspections) must officially come at the cost of Israel renouncing nuclear weapons.972

At the end of July, the Americans wanted the Israelis to understand their efforts on the

Indian nuclear program. The administration tried to present this issue in a positive light: "this concern on our part has had very gratifying results in terms of that sovereign nation's agreement

969 Memorandum for the President the White House from Dean Rusk. July 23rd, 1963. 2. Middle East (CANE) 1961-1963 Folder 3 of 3. NSF, Box 437. JKPL, Boston, MA. 970 Ibid, 4. 971 Druks, 124. 972 Memorandum Rusk to President Kennedy July 25th, 1963. Israel's Desire for a US Security Guarantee. 18a. Positions that the US Might take to Persuade Israel not to Insist on a Written Security Guarantee.1-2. Israel Security Guarantee 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 339

to accept satisfactory safeguards on a major installation". In order to kill any Israeli defense that

Israel was treated differently than India, Eshkol had to be informed of the serious concern Indian proliferation created in Washington.973 By August, the Israelis had virtually no excuses left as

Kennedy had created an air tight case for inspections -- the Israelis could no longer use their preferred precedent of India. The repeated pressure of Kennedy's letters and Barbour's diplomatic meetings strengthened American actions and rendered Israel devoid of options.

The United States ensured the Israelis had no avenue to block inspections by relentlessly probing the French on the specifics of their agreement with Israel. Kennedy was concerned with the type of safeguards the French imposed and the specific details of the agreement. The

Americans gave the impression that they would discuss any of their information on Dimona with their French counterparts.974 The French informed the Americans that Israel had tried to obtain uranium from Africa but France had stopped this sale. Despite their covert construction of the plutonium separation plant, the French did not want to openly antagonize the Americans with any additional Israeli supply routes. They assured the Americans that their bilateral agreement with Israel called for all plutonium or irradiated uranium returned to France as promised. Any outside uranium such as an African supplier was not subject to these limitations -- this suggested a weapons desire.975 Unfortunately for Eshkol, this bolstered Kennedy's overbearing pressure.

Levi Eshkol finally answered Kennedy on August 19th. His letter affirmed many assurances on Dimona. He believed the Israelis went beyond any reasonable limits to address

Kennedy's specific concerns. He gave a brief synopsis of the letter to Barbour that visits could

973 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to Ambassador Barbour (late July, no date), 1963. Israel, General 7/26/63-7/31/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 974 Department of State Telegram Washington (Department of State) for Paris Aug 10th, 1963. Israel, General 8/1/63-8/19/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 975 Department of State Telegram Paris to Secretary of State Aug 14th, 1963. Israel, General 8/1/63-8/19/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 340

take place before criticality, meaning 1963, and the United States could "observe the procedure of fuel control" referring to the spent uranium and fuel cycle. Predictably, Eshkol made some amendments. He also changed the Dimona Rules. He reversed course on Ben-Gurion's assurances that anyone, even Nasser, could be informed on the American findings during inspections. Eshkol understood Ben-Gurion's earlier pledge, yet at this instant decided to keep

Nasser guessing: Israeli nuclear deterrence at its most pronounced. His justification was that

Nasser and Egypt had a conventional superiority of weapons and a "large preponderance of manpower".976An additional impetus for Eshkol's actions likely involved an Israeli face-saving measure as they had largely capitulated to Kennedy. He had accepted many of the American demands: the uranium would be returned to France and the inspection could see all this fuel; additionally, a regular system of visits could be agreed upon in 1964. Eshkol still wanted information kept secret and felt that even with the possibility of an attack from Nasser, he preferred Nasser remain uneasy and question Dimona.977 Barbour was pleased to inform Eshkol that Kennedy "personally attached significance" to these inspections.978

The letter detailed Eshkol's difficult decision on this compromise after holding consultations with many of his cabinet and "scientific advisers". He firmly reiterated Ben-

Gurion's 1961 and May, 27th, 1963 pledges that Dimona was solely intended for peaceful purposes -- this was further enforced by the bilateral agreement with the French. Eshkol wrote of the "special intimacy of" the United States and Israel, notably, that it was essential both governments collaborated on this issue. He then took a subtle slight at Kennedy reminding the

976 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Aug 19th, 1963. Documents 19a and attachment 19c. Israel, General 8/1/63-8/19/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 977 Ibid, 2. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 163. Cohen raised these three new Israeli concessions: a visit before criticality; the schedule of regular visits in 1964; and the visiting team could conclusively discover the purpose of the reactor. Bass echoes these "three concessions". 232. 978 Department of State Telegram Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Aug 19th, 1963. 2 Attachment 19c. Israel, General 8/1/63-8/19/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 341

President that the Americans had not helped construct Dimona, yet the Israelis allowed inspections. An American inspection was permitted at the end of 1963 when the French handed the reactor over to Israel. He honoured Kennedy's demand for regular inspections. Eshkol took the unprecedented step of allowing American inspectors to "observe the procedure of uranium control", even praising Kennedy for the completion of the Test Ban Treaty which Israel promised they would sign by the end of July.979

Eshkol's letter represented an unprecedented Israeli compromise on Dimona. In essence, this rendered American control of safeguarding Dimona through inspections. Still, Eshkol's defense that the Americans did not contribute to the development of Dimona, and his alteration of the Dimona Rules that Nasser not be told about future inspections, showed the courage and pride the Israeli leader still maintained against overwhelming American pressure. Scholars have given numerous explanations as to why Eshkol submitted and wrote this letter at this juncture.

He was more pragmatic than Ben-Gurion on Dimona, more easily amenable to dealing with the

Americans.980 Eshkol had long been a proponent of honesty with the Americans on Dimona, and he acted on this belief.981 From an examination of admittedly only the American sources, this rationale is rebutted – it was overwhelming pressure that forced Eshkol to concede on Dimona.

American actions, such as: ensuring inspections in India; the conclusion of the Test Ban; collaboration with France; and finally, Kennedy's consistent pressure culminated with his threat to American-Israeli relations and intensified the need for his prompt response.

With this letter, the Dimona issue subsided in prominence during Kennedy's

Administration. There would be occasional references to Dimona, as the security guarantee talk

979 Bass, 232, Israel officially signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 9th. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 161. Letter Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to President Kennedy Aug 19th, 1963. 1-2 Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961- Oct 2nd, 1963. Digital Identifier: JFPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 980 Bass, 233. 981 Karpin, Israel and the Bomb, 237. 342

lingered. In a discussion with British diplomats on August 20th, the Americans admitted that the

French were "convinced" Israel was not presently in "any position to manufacture atomic weapons at this time."982 With this conclusion, Kennedy and his administration had essentially completed their goals: they reached an agreement on full and regular Dimona inspections before the Israelis had produced, or could construct a bomb. One scholar argued that Kennedy merely accepted a partial victory.983 However, rendering Dimona under an American system of inspections, safeguards, and monitoring had long been one of the administration's main goals.984

On August 23rd, the Americans were mostly pleased with a resolution to Dimona. They still held certain reservations concerning Eshkol’s reply. The State Department was not entirely pleased with these new Israeli concessions. The NSC was uneasy about keeping Nasser out of the loop as this could have devastating consequences. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s response to

Eshkol should be "prompt and cordial".985 The administration settled on Eshkol's supposed offer, as "probably" the best case scenario "in terms of bilateral inspection of the Dimona complex" by way of an Israeli compromise.986 While Eshkol agreed to discuss regular inspections, he simply ignored the Kennedy demand for confirmed regular bi-annual inspections. Furthermore, even though Eshkol had granted unprecedented access to the uranium fuel cycle, the Americans worried that this would only entail the reactor, not the full complex, notably "the fuel fabrication

982 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation August 20th, 1963. Israel's Atomic Energy Activities. Participants: Patrick R.H. Wright First Secretary British Embassy, William R. Crawford Jr. Officer in Charge NEA/NE Lebanon-Israel Affairs. Israel, General 8/20/63-8/22/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. This should be qualified somewhat. The CIA shared that they believed the French raised concern on Israel’s program. 983 Bass frames this as Kennedy, somewhat arbitrarily, "opted to declare victory". 233. 984 Cohen and Burr, "Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential,” Apr 21st, 2016. As outlined in the previous chapter, Kennedy wanted Dimona brought under IAEA or some sort of international inspections. He settled for American inspections. 985 Memorandum for the President from Komer Aug 23rd, 1963. (Bundy attached) Israel, General 8/23/63-8/27/63. NSF, Box 119a JKPL, Boston, MA. 986 Memorandum for the President from Acting Sec of State Ball "Reply to Israel Prime Minister on Dimona Inspections," Aug 23rd, 1963 (attachment).Israel, General 8/23/63-8/27/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. Also, Doc 317. 685-686. FRUS, Vol. XVIII. 343

facilities or plutonium separation plant" which Kennedy explicitly cited.987 Yet again, State's response indicated, after all these Israeli concessions, their blatant lack of faith and suspicion of additional facilities at Dimona. The main lingering American concern was Eshkol’s insistence that Nasser not be notified of inspections. Specifically, the Americans wanted to avoid a war started by Nasser over Dimona.988 Still, this was the best outcome they could expect on Dimona, despite the only concrete assurances of multiple inspections of the reactor. The issue of dissemination to Nasser would have to be addressed as this was unacceptable over the long term.

Lastly, now that this issue was concluded, and the issue of security guarantees and Dimona were separated, perhaps the security guarantee could be addressed.989 Clearly, Dimona damaged relations and pushed any bilateral security or military deals and interactions down the line. Only after Dimona was resolved could security discussions resume.

On August 27th, Kennedy sent his response to the Israeli concessions on Dimona. After a best-case-scenario conclusion, Kennedy had decided the Israelis should be praised. In his view at this juncture, the diplomatic rift and unprecedented crisis had concluded. The Israelis could be welcomed back to positive American-Israeli relations. Barbour questioned Eshkol and the Israeli change of heart which prevented Nasser from receiving information about Dimona. Eshkol retorted bluntly "when you don't have certain weapons, may be just as well not (to) tell everybody."990 Eshkol showcased to the Americans what has become the policy of Israeli ambiguity, unbeknownst to Barbour at the time. Even if the United States were going to restrain

987 Memorandum for the President from Acting Sec of State Ball "Reply to Israel Prime Minister on Dimona Inspections," 1-2.Aug 23rd, 1963 (attachment).Israel, General 8/23/63-8/27/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 988 Ibid, 2.; FRUS, Vol. XVIII, Doc 317. 687. 989 Ibid. 990 Ibid. 344

nuclear weapons development in Israel (and they would fail in this endeavour), Nasser was not to be reassured that everything was alright.

President Kennedy's final letter on Dimona was warm and reinforced strong American-

Israeli relations -- now that these thick and potentially devastating clouds had passed, relations could resume. He praised Eshkol for "generously agreeing to invite our scientists to visit the

Dimona complex on the regular basis". This is somewhat comical, given the extent of American arm-twisting which led to this "invite". Furthermore, Kennedy commended Eshkol for acting out of "deep wisdom" given the "atomic realities which the atomic age imposes on the community of man."991 While it was clear that Kennedy's tone was positive and relations appeared to have returned to near normalcy, Kennedy did continue to advance American reservations. He reiterated that a pre-start-up visit would occur and this should be quickly scheduled. He tied the

Israeli nuclear program to his larger concern for nuclear weapons, as he argued that nuclear energy should only be used for the "welfare of man". Internally, Kennedy informed his administration that while he did not condone Eshkol’s stance, he understood his reasoning for keeping Nasser in the dark. Kennedy believed that this could lead others, like Nasser to seek nuclear weapons for Egypt.992 Though the Dimona issue was largely taken off the American-

Israeli table with his admission that he understood Eshkol' reasoning for not informing Nasser,

Kennedy essentially became the first President to allow Israeli nuclear deterrence to foster.

After the summer of 1963, Dimona was largely removed from American-Israeli relations.

There would be sporadic episodes when Israelis and Americans discussed the potential of

991 Department of State Telegram Amembassy Tel Aviv Eyes Only Verbatim Text from Secretary of State Aug 26, 1963. Re Dimona visits Letter Kennedy to Prime Minister Eshkol. 1. Israel: Security 1961-1963. January 30th, 1961-Oct 2nd, 1963 Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-119a-006. POF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 992 Ibid, 2. 345

nuclear weapons in meetings; however, the agreement on inspections satisfied Kennedy.993 There were continued questions about Israeli missiles and whether they could be tied to nuclear warheads as late as November.994 Yet, Dimona was finished as a diplomatic problem for

Kennedy. The CIA and intelligence monitoring continued under President Lyndon Johnson, but this was done quietly as it was prior to the 1960 failure. Dimona still remained an issue in the bilateral relationship for Komer, Talbot, McCone, and the Kennedy holdovers under Johnson.

The issue of Dimona once again went internal for the Americans until the end of

Kennedy's term and was not raised between both parties. Unfortunately, given Kennedy's assassination (November 22nd), 1963 marked the only year in which Dimona was not inspected at least once.995 The Americans never ceased to believe that Israel abandoned their desire for nuclear weapons. What changed in their minds was that Kennedy forced Eshkol into diplomatic submission. The Americans falsely believed that with inspections and continued intelligence gathering, Israel could be prevented from effectively developing weapons. This is the crucial point. It was not as if Kennedy and his administration suddenly trusted Israel on Dimona.

Instead, they believed through this system of upcoming comprehensive inspections, they would prevent Israel from going nuclear or at least discern Israel's actual progress.

On October 2nd, the Americans decided not to offer Israel a security guarantee. Kennedy did this for several reasons: fear of destabilizing the region. The Administration, as the superpower, chose to divorce the issue of the security guarantee and Dimona. Once they had

993 In a State Department paper from September 18th, even the reluctant Department agreed that they were content for the moment on Dimona. Given that Israel signed the Test Ban Treaty and the "fairly satisfactory reply regarding Dimona inspections", the Administration could rest somewhat. Subject Israel Security Guarantee: Reply to BG's May 12 Letter, (undated paper) attached to Department of State Circular September 18th, 1963. Israel, General 9/63/-9/30/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL. Boston, MA. 994 In State preparation papers for the November 12th-13th-talks between Israel and the United States, Komer and Rusk surmised that the missile issue could be a problem if Israel had nuclear weapons design issues. Memorandum for President Kennedy from Komer. Nov 5th, 1963. Israel, General 11/1/63-11/6/63. NSF, Box 119a. JKPL, Boston, MA. 995 Kroenig, 78. Unless there was an inspection that is still classified, and given American priorities is unlikely. 346

assurances on an inspection schedule, they did not need any potential negotiating tactics with

Israel. Since Kennedy had decided by March onwards that Dimona needed to be addressed with

"all feasible measures", the negotiation was actually long finished. This was the only incidence in Kennedy's Presidency when the Americans unilaterally dictated policy to the Israelis.

None of this suggests Kennedy or the administration disliked or turned on Israel -- this was far from the case. President Kennedy declared a "special relationship". He believed in Israel; it aligned with his worldview. Nevertheless, the Dimona issue had a decisive impact on

American-Israeli relations for the majority of 1963.

Herbert Druks concluded that Ben-Gurion had to pursue nuclear weapons for what he felt was best for Israel's survival and security. The Israelis encountered many American developments which rendered this goal anathema to Kennedy’s tolerance. After his experience during the Missile Crisis in 1962, along with what he learned after the Hawk episode, Kennedy could not tolerate Israeli nuclear weapons.996 Dimona was not just a bilateral issue for the

Americans, it was unprecedented, due to its: global implications; what an Israeli nuclear weapon would mean for the Middle East; global nuclear proliferation; and its challenge to American power projection.

Kennedy’s dissatisfaction with Dimona peaked from March-to-August of 1963. For three years, he witnessed how the Israelis were lying while continuing to proliferate. A confrontation was eminent, given: the introduction of UAR missile development; the uncovering of Operation

Damocles; a worsening intelligence conclusion; and his sustained focus after the Missile Crisis.

From May-to-August when Kennedy sent multiple threatening messages to Ben-Gurion and

Eshkol, Dimona consumed all aspects of American-Israeli relations. 1963 represented a tense period for American-Israeli relations as the United States shut down all bilateral progress.

996 Druks, 145. Druks argues that Israel was "a bit naive" on the Kennedy Administration's concerns. 146. 347

Dimona threatened to completely derail any future progress in relations, specifically, the bilateral security dimension. No major arms were sold during this crisis. After the Hawk sale and until

Dimona inspections were firmly agreed upon, no real progress occurred. Even if Dimona had no permanent effect on the overall bilateral relationship, up until August 1963, it bore potentially disastrous consequences. Dimona was the dominant issue in 1963, and could have erased thirteen years of incremental progress and goodwill between two allies. Only by Israel acceding to

Kennedy's demands did American-Israeli relations continue to foster. The President’s firm stand against the Israelis, as well as positive responses from Levi Eshkol, ended this distressing situation and avoided a potential catastrophe. Kennedy’s positive worldview of Israel collided with his direction to take all feasible measures to stop an Israeli bomb. When he felt that the

Israelis adhered to this demands, he allowed positive American-Israeli relations to resume.

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Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This dissertation is a case study in Presidential priorities. John F. Kennedy developed a positive view of Israel over his time as Congressman and Senator. He brought his worldview which respected and favoured Israel into his Presidency. Conversely, he long valued the need to stem global proliferation. In the late-1950s, Kennedy grew increasingly interested in nuclear proliferation and made this an election issue in 1960. When both priorities collided over Dimona, he chose to prioritize nonproliferation. All considerations involving Israel were made with

Dimona in mind, including: positive bilateral interactions during 1961-1962, and the Hawk sale.

As Dimona grew more dangerous, Kennedy subordinated all decisions on Israel to his efforts to prevent an Israeli nuclear bomb. The why is the dominant question emphasized in this dissertation. Kennedy’s reasoning for his Dimona decisions reveals a specific course on nonproliferation and his complete Israeli policy. Kennedy’s worldview, ideology, and kindred alliance with Israel collided with, and were ultimately dominated by, his pragmatic crisis- manager actions. Troubling intelligence supplied the key evidence for his decisions. As soon as the President realized action had to be taken against Israel, his preference for Israel was irrelevant. Until Dimona was resolved (March through mid-August), all American-Israeli security considerations, relations, interactions, and positive progress were paused.

Kennedy’s handling of Dimona represented his strongest diplomatic triumph. He was the only president who stood firmly against the Israeli program, and used nearly all resources at his disposal to achieve a tight surveillance structure. Kennedy induced Israeli Prime Ministers to capitulate to American inspections and a (seemingly false) non-weapons pledge. Ironically, as

Kennedy “won” the diplomatic battle on Dimona, he “lost” the proliferation war. It is believed

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that Israel attained nuclear capabilities sometime in the mid-1960s.997 Kennedy’s 1963-actions and his all-encompassing diplomatic efforts only delayed covert Israeli actions.

Kennedy’s Presidency marked the ultimate fork in the road for American-Israeli relations. The bilateral relationship really blossomed after his Presidency. Had the Israelis not complied on Dimona, all previous bilateral progress would have been for naught. The Dimona issue has been underemphasized in the historiography. Dimona was at the center of all

American-Israeli decisions, particularly in 1963. While he never ceased to respect Israel, he could no longer trust them, regarding nuclear weapons and a regional arms race. Hence,

Kennedy’s Israeli policy is more complex than has been presented. Kennedy’s threats to the future of the relationship were genuine. He demanded change to an issue the Israelis deemed vital for their survival. Israel’s pursuit to defend itself clashed with American strategic goals: power projection; Middle Eastern stability; and an end to global proliferation. Israel had the most to lose, and acted accordingly. They merely out-waited Kennedy, and benefitted from this untimely death. Kennedy, Komer, Bundy, Barbour, and Rusk all attempted to neuter Dimona, and ultimately failed. While Kennedy diplomatically bested David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, and

Israel, secretly, Israeli proliferation resumed.

Kennedy's major contributions to American-Israeli relations involved the Hawk Missile sale in September of 1962, and his admission at the end of 1962 that a "special relationship" existed between both countries. Kennedy's Israeli policy was by no means flawless, yet he created a solid basis which enabled the relationship to grow.998 These positive developments were diametrically-opposed to his perception that Dimona could have derailed all American-

997 Exactly when the Israelis went nuclear is still up for debate. It appears in 1966, Israel conclusively acquired a “nuclear capability” indicating weapons. Karpin, 268. He surmises there was likely a “critical mass test” on November 2nd, 1966. 998 Reich, 148. Kennedy specifically allowed for a surge in the amount of aid in 1962. Feldman Oral History Interview JFK #12, 578. JKPL, Boston, MA. 350

Israeli progress. Only with the Dimona issue in check could relations progress, including: a system of American inspections; an Israeli pledge not to seek a weapons program and; continued intelligence monitoring. Dimona was the central issue in understanding Kennedy's relations with

Israel as all future decisions hinged on how they responded to his demands.

Israel fit within Kennedy's positive view in the Cold War: an enormous economic success, a liberal democracy, and a staunch non-communist state which was stable in a region plagued by turmoil. Though scholars have labeled Kennedy as a pragmatist who based his decision to sell the Hawk and his general decisions regarding Israel on cold, realist calculations999 -- this depiction lacks nuance. Ideologically, Kennedy’s perception of Israel, the

Jewish State, fit his pro-economic, democratic, and anti-communist worldview.1000 Undeniably, his fear of a conventional arms imbalance in the Middle East precipitated his decision to sell the

Hawks. Correspondingly, he gauged there would be no negative political benefits.1001 This decision was easier because Israel shared his worldview and stance in the Cold War. His Israeli policy was a mix of ideology and realism; however, pragmatism largely defined his foreign policy.1002 His own terminology of a "special relationship" embodied the shared narrative and ideological connectedness between both countries. Kennedy also respected Israel’s defense and their perception of threats. He generally supported the Israeli government’s decision as long as an Israeli priority did not interfere with: regional stability, American power projection, or his pre-eminent concern, nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, Dimona challenged all three tenets and was deemed unacceptable. During the Suez War, the Americans learned an insightful lesson on Israel. It was very unwise to oppose the Israelis on what they deemed necessary for their

999 Bass, 8-9. 97. Ben-Zvi, "Stumbling Into Alliance": 227. Perra, 6. 1000 After in-depth analysis, this study strongly sides with Zachary Goldman's interpretation: 50-51. 1001 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 37. 1002 Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, 132. 351

defense.1003 While this was the case on Dimona, there was one difference: because Dimona challenged multiple American goals, it constituted a national security imperative for the

Americans, and Israel’s considerations were discounted.

While Kennedy was content with permitting the Israelis to gain the upper-hand on the

Hawk negotiations, levels of aid, and what he considered minor bargains, nuclear weapons constituted a different matter entirely. Dimona marked the zenith of a collision of interests between the Americans and the Israelis. In the Israeli view, the project was entirely necessary and worth pursuing. For the United States, this was non-negotiable and intolerable for the region and wider nuclear proliferation. The Israelis proliferated at an ideal time (end of the 1950s into the 1960s). Nonetheless, when it came to global proliferation, they unfortunately encountered the staunchest anti-proliferation president. It was merely bad luck on their part.1004

The Israelis employed the full force of their diplomacy, delay tactics, covert methods, and nuanced strategies to keep the Americans off-the-scent of the true nature of the facility. They performed a master class in deception, composure under duress, and successful diplomacy.

Consistently, Ben-Gurion, Harman, Gazit, Meir, and Eshkol kept the secrets of Dimona and never fully allowed the Americans to uncover Dimona’s true capabilities. Despite intense

American diplomatic pressure and ever-increasing intelligence monitoring, the entirety of

Dimona’s capabilities remained secret. Though Kennedy employed his best efforts, the Israelis stood firm. They had to concede to American inspections and demands; however, their secrecy was maintained at a vital proliferation period.

Nuclear proliferation was Israel’s top priority and a nuclear program needed to be pursued at all costs. Despite Ben-Gurion and Eshkol's long-term goal of a full security alliance

1003 Hersh, 43. 1004 Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, 145. 352

and treaty, the Israelis gambled all their efforts on Dimona and were willing to renounce all other defense considerations with the Americans for a nuclear option.1005 The problem was that

Dimona was top priority for Kennedy and the United States, especially in 1963, when other global issues dissipated. When Kennedy and all the Superpower’s resources were brought to bear on Israel, there was little choice for the Israelis except to agree to inspections and his demands.

Dimona was non-negotiable for Kennedy and the Americans by 1963, for a number of reasons:

Firstly, a nuclear race would be disastrous in one of the most dangerous regions in the Cold War.

Secondly, Kennedy's foreign policy, especially in 1963, prioritized nonproliferation. As he neared the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, no further proliferation would be tolerated. Israel needed to be halted so others would not challenge the Americans.1006 Thirdly, nuclear weapons even by allies affected the American model of the world, their global reach, super-power status, and the most commonly cited term, their power-projection.1007 When this clash occurred, it was the Americans who compelled the Israelis to agree to their demands. This was the only true one-sided American "victory" during Kennedy's Presidency within the diplomatic American-Israeli "bargain". The Americans succeeded because Kennedy assigned the upmost importance to Dimona (evident in NSAM 231). While this issue existed within the bilateral security relationship, it simultaneously constituted a global concern. Dimona was the only incidence over the three years when the United States asserted their power and role as the patron in the special relationship. Dimona was never a negotiation between two equal parties.

This showdown involved the orders of the Superpower onto Israel, the medium size state trying

1005 Ben-Zvi, "Stumbling Into Alliance": 240-241. 1006 Cohen, “Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”: 5. 1007 Matthew Kroenig widely popularized this conclusion -- specifically, the damage a Chinese weapon would cause -- the same was true for an Israeli or Egyptian nuclear weapon. 18, 28, 67. Maddock believes this was the unofficial reason the Americans opposed proliferation. 2. Gavin also reached this conclusion as the real reason for American nonproliferation incentives. 27. 353

to defy the Americans on nuclear weapons. Kennedy forced the Israelis to acknowledge that they needed the Americans. Israel compromised on Dimona instead of facing retribution.

Ironically, this was actually an Israeli victory. According to Mordechai Vanunu's expose, it is clear that the inspections which were initiated under Kennedy and continued until 1969 did not dissuade an Israeli bomb or "discover" any weapons program. Fake walls, the underground, hidden plutonium treatment facility, and false control rooms gave the illusion of peaceful cooperation to the Americans. The Americans won the diplomatic conflict over Dimona, and so perhaps halted further regional proliferation. They "lost" the longer war: Israeli proliferation. The

United States had the illusion of control. The Israelis always held the real power on Dimona.

Kennedy made immense strides against global proliferation with his stand against Israel. It would be years before India successfully attained a weapon.1008 Ironically, he only slowed somewhat Israeli nuclear progress. By September of 1963, Kennedy was pleased with Israel’s response. He never knew the full picture on what was going on in Dimona, but he took all measures to try and uncover the truth.

Concerning Kennedy’s overall Israeli policy, the Israelis profited from stronger

American-Israeli relations. Their Dimona program, while subject to inspections and delays, also advanced.1009 McGeorge Bundy regretted years later that the inspections were not as thorough as he would have liked.1010 The Israelis outmaneuvered the Americans and were well-prepared for the visit. The CIA, State Department, and holdovers from Kennedy's Administration, specifically, Robert Komer and McGeorge Bundy never relented on their probing and surveillance of Dimona. They did not return to trusting Israel on Dimona. They merely accepted

1008 While officially, India went nuclear in 1998 with a number of tests, 1974’s Smiling Buddha evidences nuclear weapons. 1009 Bass, 189 argues that both the special relationship and Dimona progressed. Karpin illustrates that the Israelis progressed on Dimona and received conventional weapons. 238. Mearsheimer and Walt, 35. 1010 Bundy, 510. 354

that one of their goals was attained and continued all measures to gather intelligence on the

Israeli facility. Due to Israeli deception, the visits found nothing of interest during the 1960s.

The President and Dimona: Kennedy’s Israel Legacy

President Kennedy's assassination (November 22nd, 1963) complicates his legacy, leaving many to purport what he may have done or aspired to do. Concerning Dimona, Kennedy's legacy and actions have been interpreted as overwhelmingly positive. Scholars even advance many counter-factual arguments in differentiating the late President from those who came before and after him. Some have rationalized that it would be very difficult to believe that Kennedy would have reacted in the same manner, as President Eisenhower did during the 1958 "discovery" of

Dimona. Kennedy would not have delivered the same non-response during a presentation of U-2 photographic evidence.1011 Other scholars have speculated that Kennedy would have been much more assertive and rigorous towards the inspection process than his successor, Lyndon B.

Johnson.1012 While counter-factual assertions are impossible to prove, this dissertation corroborates the position of many scholars who support Kennedy’s nonproliferation actions over both his predecessor and successor. Kennedy’s adaptive crisis-manager persona is solidified.

Though a morbid concept, solely regarding the Dimona project, the Israelis benefitted from the

President's abrupt death. The documents indicate that Kennedy was fully invested in a Dimona resolution. While he had achieved annual inspections, he was determined to increase these visits.

His final actions indicate he would have continued to pursue Dimona. Nonetheless, scholars are left to ponder the road not taken.

Kennedy was involved on Dimona much earlier than the traditional literature demonstrated. From his inauguration, he was acutely interested in, and kept abreast of,

1011 Montgomery and Mount: 377. 1012 Rabe, 164. 355

intelligence on Israeli nuclear progress. Other pressing issues -- including the Cuban Missile

Crisis and a deteriorating intelligence picture -- temporarily diverted his complete attention from

Dimona. Still, proliferation remained his priority and Israel was at the center.

Kennedy has been widely acclaimed as the quintessential nonproliferation President of the Cold War. While many scholars praise Kennedy to illustrate how Johnson did not assess his concerns on Dimona to the same extent1013, Johnson continued along Kennedy's path albeit was less directly involved and would not threaten the relationship.1014 Nonetheless, certain scholars criticize Kennedy’s nuclear nonproliferation legacy pertaining to how he handled Dimona.

Francis J. Gavin describes Kennedy's Dimona policy as "ambivalent and confused"1015 – a conclusion which is not supported in this dissertation. Findings from this research evidence

Kennedy had a coherent, unified, and sustained plan to stop an Israeli nuclear bomb. He pushed for sustained inspections, and increased intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of Dimona.

He continually prodded Israeli leaders and ministers about their end goal and plans for Dimona.

From the outset, Kennedy's policy involved getting peaceful reassurances from the

Israelis, intelligence collection to uncover the true Dimona capabilities, and an Israeli agreement for continued inspections. Once Israeli intentions and specific responses were unclear or not entirely satisfactory (as in the Waldorf-Astoria meeting), Kennedy recalibrated and expedited his other initiatives, namely intelligence-gathering efforts. Overall, Kennedy was successful in his strategy -- he rendered Dimona, at least publicly, peaceful through inspections and Israeli concessions. Akin to other American Presidents, he did not uncover the truth on Dimona through

1013 Maddock states that Johnson "squandered" the policy he inherited on nuclear proliferation, 284. Karpin, 258. Cohen argues that "no President did more with nuclear proliferation than Kennedy”, Israel and the Bomb, 99; Reed and Stillman bluntly state that Kennedy's nonproliferation policy ended with his death, and Johnson went another direction, 83. 1014 Kroenig, 79. 1015 Gavin, 99. 356

intelligence. Parenthetically, the CIA came closer than under his predecessor. Though he had to settle (at least temporarily before his death) for annual inspections instead of his (and the administration’s) preference for bi-annual inspections1016, by his own admission, Kennedy took all "feasible efforts" to get some sort of American inspection teams into the Dimona facility and succeeded.1017 Diplomatically on Dimona, Kennedy's policies were strong and effective.

Matthew Kroenig advances certain interesting conclusions. He too credits Kennedy with taking all "reasonable limits" to uncover the truth about Dimona. Kroenig cites two specific responses to Dimona which, at least theoretically, Kennedy and his Administration could have acted upon: firstly, they could have attacked Israel pre-emptively to curtail or eliminate the program; secondly, and more realistically, Kennedy and his Government may have limited or put sanctions on private financial contributions from American citizens and groups to Israel.1018

Under any circumstances, Kennedy could never attack Israel, an ally albeit unofficially, over their nuclear program. This conclusion was not based on any Israeli lobby or domestic criteria, rather Kennedy’s personal affinity for Western allies, and Israel in particular. Unlike enemy China, which Kennedy continually debated either attacking directly or through a proxy, this was out of the question for Dimona.

Limiting the funding for Israel was likely viable; however, it would have come at a devastating cost domestically. In 1960, Kennedy who had won the closest election in American history (prior to 2000) would have suffered tremendously had he limited any type of aid to Israel.

Kennedy received 82% of the Jewish vote in 19601019; therefore, any limits on money to Israel

1016 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 177. Cohen notes that Johnson also failed in getting this system in place. 1017 Reed and Stillman, 82. The authors concede this did not help the Americans "get the real story". 1018 Kroenig, 78. 1019 Mearsheimer and Walt, 163. 357

would have angered many Democratic supporters, both Jewish and Christian alike.1020

Furthermore, it is unclear how much Kennedy knew about The Committee of Thirty, if indeed he had any knowledge. Kennedy’s exact knowledge on American donations to Dimona is problematic -- an archival gap and historical blind spot. Specifically, the role of mega

Democratic financier Abraham Feinberg is troubling. While Feinberg, a peripheral figure under

Kennedy, was an adviser on Israel, Kennedy’s understanding of Feinberg’s role in Dimona is inconclusive. Kennedy’s admission (May, 1963) to French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de

Murville (addressed in chapter 7) that should Israel proliferate the United States would be blamed, due to wider financing for Israel, is also ambiguous. It appears Kennedy was referencing aid, military contributions, and wider American governmental funding for Israel. Conceivably, it may refer to specific knowledge he uncovered on domestic funding for Dimona. The complete extent of Kennedy’s knowledge on American involvement and financing for Dimona will likely remain unknown. What is apparent, outside of limiting direct financing to Israel from private

American citizens, is that he took all measures at his disposal to stop an Israeli bomb. He could not have attacked a proliferating ally, least of all Israel -- unlike the cases of American enemies such as China under Kennedy, and more current threats, such as Iran and North Korea.

Kennedy’s respect for Israel also eliminated any possibility he would discuss particulars of the program with the American public. After all, limiting individual American funds to Israel would require an explanation. While he was deeply concerned about Dimona in private, he remained calm and reassuring on the threat in public. Accordingly, he advanced a policy that publicly dismissed an Israeli weapons program, and sold Dimona as peaceful. Lastly, he could not limit

1020 Even Robert Komer, Kennedy’s NSC point man on the Middle East, who consistently argued that the Israel lobby had no effect on Dimona, conceded that on annual aid levels, the lobby’s impact was real. While he admitted this was legitimate, he said Israel lobbying groups were influential in determining annual aid levels for Israel. Komer Oral History Interview # 5, 73. JKPL, Boston, MA. 358

private financing from American citizens to Israel, specifically to Dimona. No doubt, limiting all private donations to Israel would have been political suicide at that stage in history for a young,

Democratic, first-term President, who had won the election by the narrowest of margins.

Kennedy’s respect for Israel developed over a number of years. Predictably, Israel’s deception on Dimona was perceived as betrayal, and ultimately angered the President. Once

Kennedy realized he had been lied to, and the Israelis were continuing to develop a weapons program while assuring him it was peaceful, he responded decisively. Still, amidst his deepest resentment and anger towards Israel, he was not going to attack their program, or do anything to directly threaten their security. Kennedy consistently assured Ben-Gurion should the need arise the United States would defend Israel. Those closest to the Israelis in his Administration argued that domestic Jewish influence would have prevented any sort of Arab attack on the Jewish

State.1021 Israel had great support within the United States which ultimately contributed to Israeli security and prevented a serious Arab attack. Kennedy found himself in a dilemma: He was a staunch believer in Israel as an ally. He needed to take all realistic measures to stop Dimona.1022

Dimona’s lasting impact on American Nonproliferation

Several lessons for American nonproliferation policy emanate from the Dimona case.

While present proliferation concerns stem from American enemies, Israel represented a unique proliferation problem. Though not an official NATO ally, Kennedy’s special relationship admission acknowledged a close bond between both nations. This really did not help Israel proliferate. Parenthetically, the realization that Kennedy could not have cut off funding for Israel was one of the only benefits Israel received as an American ally. One could argue that

Kennedy’s positive worldview of Israel allowed him to delay action against an ally. Yet, this

1021 Barbour Oral History Interview #1, 18. JKPL, Boston, MA. 1022 Kroenig’s “reasonable limits” is a very appropriate label. 359

investigation rebuts this position. Ally or enemy, Kennedy confronted nuclear proliferation. By

1963, with the release of scathing intelligence reports, Department of Defense proliferation studies, the American discovery of Operation Damocles, and a developing Egyptian rocket program, Kennedy administered a complete diplomatic assault on Israel. Though he never cut funding, or attacked Israel, his threats to the relationship indicated to Israeli Prime Ministers that devastating repercussions loomed. The first pertinent finding from this case, which can be incorporated in wider nonproliferation responses, involved Israel’s status as an ally: Israel did not really benefit from being an American ally. The only tangible benefits of Israel’s warm relations with the United States involved the initial “discovery” of Dimona. The Israelis knew how to deceive American intelligence. The Americans were equally guilty in that they never perceived an ally as a threat, certainly not Israel in 1960. This contributed to a delayed American discovery of and reaction to Dimona.1023 This was not wilful ignorance on the part of President

Eisenhower and the Americans, whose image of Israel was nonthreatening. Accordingly, Israel, an ally, low on American security priorities, was discounted as a proliferation problem.

Efforts to uncover the truth about Dimona were greatly increased under Kennedy. Upon understanding they had been deceived, the Americans changed course and intelligence-gathering on Israel was launched and sustained. Israel exploited the Americans earlier. Yet, once they were identified as a threat, Kennedy responded vigorously.

The first lesson involved the American response to Israel: The Israelis were treated as any other proliferation threat. The Israeli case illustrates that ally or enemy alike, when an American president is committed to stopping a proliferating state, nearly all options are available.

Dimona’s proliferation legacy is complex and demonstrates the limits and failures in American nonproliferation policy. Despite Kennedy’s best efforts -- “all feasible measures” to uncover the

1023 Montgomery and Mount: 377. 360

truth on Dimona through intelligence – to ensure no weapons development by way of inspections, the Israelis covertly progressed. Perhaps, the second pertinent lesson for current proliferation concerns is: Israel, despite the best American efforts of a highly-committed (even unprecedented) President eventually achieved nuclear capabilities. Current policymakers, or individuals concerned with American proliferation challenges involving potential enemies, can benefit greatly from this problematic Dimona case. The coherence and magnitude of Kennedy’s response to the Israeli program evinces a step-by-step guide on one American nonproliferation response: Kennedy launched intelligence-gathering to identify the threat; when a threat was detected he increased monitoring and took direct diplomatic action against Israeli leaders; lastly, after Israeli compliance, he enabled the resumption of strong, friendly relations. Kennedy’s stand against the small Jewish state’s nuclear program created ramifications for American nonproliferation policy which continue to the present.

Dimona also serves as a warning to American nonproliferation policymakers: a state, secretly determined to proliferate, no matter the cost (fiscally or politically) is very difficult to stop. Furthermore, even by examining the American sources, it was evident that two successive administrations (Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s) were outmaneuvered by their Israeli counterparts.

The Americans forced the Israelis to cooperate, yet Dimona remained intact and an Israeli weapon, supposedly, was achieved. Caution is in order, however, on declaring “victory” prematurely when addressing proliferation threats. Dimona affords the best evidence for hubris in American nonproliferation “successes”. Kennedy openly won the diplomatic confrontation; however, Israel ultimately achieved their goal.

Finally, Israel constituted one of Kennedy’s many nuclear challenges. He was always cognizant of India and the threat of wider proliferation -- his actions on Dimona were enacted

361

with India in mind. He had to stop a friendly, small ally in order to set the precedent to a much larger, more powerful Cold War player1024 -- another lesson for policymakers. In essence, when threatened by widespread proliferation, Kennedy acted against multiple proliferating states simultaneously. The Israeli case demonstrates a momentary victory for American nonproliferation policy. Kennedy forced the Israelis to comply, or so he thought. In retrospect, as the real story came out, he really forced them to temporarily appease the United States. In summation, Kennedy’s Dimona policy is complicated. He must be judged on what he knew. He believed he had achieved great success at stopping their program. He did all in his power diplomatically. Subsequently, he achieved a one-sided diplomatic victory over Eshkol and Israel.

Retrospectively, with a fuller picture, Kennedy affected the Dimona program, yet his victory was not detrimental to actual Israeli nuclear progress.

Dimona versus the Special Relationship

Kennedy's Israeli legacy has continually risen since his Presidency. This study argued that the traditional accounts of American-Israeli relations concerning Dimona and nuclear proliferation have been too forgiving towards Israel. More recent studies have identified

Kennedy’s ever-increasing frustration and lack of patience with the Israelis.1025 By March of

1963, Kennedy and his Administration had reached the point-of-no-return on Dimona. They no longer trusted Israel on nonproliferation. Dimona hijacked his ideological sympathy. The State

Department understood that American-Israeli relations comprised the national aspirations of two separate nations. "It would be fortuitous to the extreme if there were a perfect congruence of

American and Israeli views on the Near East situation or if the interests of both parties in this

1024 Avner Cohen has made this point in several of his works, dating back to 1998. Cohen, “Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”: 5 He is more concerned with wider proliferation, than the specific concern of India. 1025 Perra,138. Cohen and Burr, “Concerned about Nuclear Weapons Potential,” Apr. 21, 2016. 362

area totally coincided. The differences between us are normal and we must have the moral stamina to acknowledge their existence."1026 It was legitimate for the Israelis to pursue nuclear weapons for their own survival. Conversely, this constituted a national security problem which interfered with American power projection. Any additional proliferation was against the interests of the United States. Unfortunately for Israel, this included their allies.1027

Dimona marked one of the many differences of opinion within the special relationship.

Notably, this conflict was of an unprecedented scale given its global repercussions. Solid diplomacy by the Israelis and an intensive system of deception allowed for the program to continue. Kennedy's persistent and unflinching focus, predominantly in the latter half of 1963, left the Israelis with little option but to comply on visits and they acquiesced to the Americans.

Unfortunately, for Israel on nuclear proliferation, while the Americans could acknowledge this difference of opinion, they could not tolerate its continued existence.

Mordechai Gazit’s argument that Dimona had no effect on the bilateral security dimension is not supported by this dissertation. Dimona was omnipresent for Kennedy and his

Administration. American intelligence never stopped monitoring Dimona after the flawed

American discovery in late 1960. Komer, Bundy, and Kennedy scrutinized intelligence after the

Ben-Gurion-Kennedy meeting of May, 1961. A myriad of internal papers from the Departments of Defense and State, specifically, the Policy Planning Council's multiple works on nuclear proliferation drove an increased focus on Dimona. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy could not tolerate any country developing nuclear weapons. After reading an alarming array of information, pertinently intelligence reports in 1963, Kennedy confronted the Israelis. During

1963, Dimona dominated every facet of American policy and their interactions involving Israel.

1026 Department of State "Israel's Quest for Security," June 5, 1963. 5. Folder Israel Security Guarantee 1963. NSF, Box 427. JKPL, Boston, MA. 1027 Mearsheimer and Walt also made this point in their work. 148. 363

Kennedy’s distrust of Israel increased after: long term monitoring of Dimona; multiple options to address the Israelis; and finally, his process of decision-making which led to his confrontation with Israel. Doubt arose from suspicious optimism in early-1961 to informed scepticism into

1962 to distrust, frustration, and anger by mid-1963. This analysis of Kennedy’s transformation reveals the complexity of Dimona and the assessment of his Israel policy.

Certain scholars contend that Kennedy was not genuine in his threat to "seriously jeopardize" the future of American-Israeli relations.1028 This thesis refutes that view. Gazit argued that Kennedy’s threats were not "believable". He contends this "pressure policy was completely incompatible with the attitudes” of Kennedy regarding “Israel and to American Jews, as evidenced by US diplomatic documents".1029 Kennedy liked Jews, but that did not create a more pro-Israel policy.

Dimona was treated differently than all other American-Israeli interactions. This was not a bargain, rather a one-way dictation. While it may have appeared as a negotiation strategy temporarily due to talk of linking a security guarantee with Dimona inspections, Kennedy ultimately rejected this approach. The security treaty was divorced from Dimona in the

President’s mind. The CANE arms initiative was conceived with Dimona in mind; however,

Kennedy used this mission as one option in a much larger methodology to address Israeli proliferation. Ultimately, when this initiative failed, he continued with his preferred and consistent diplomatic pressure. Kennedy’s letters to Israeli Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and

Eshkol along with immense scrutiny on France and Israel, and negotiations to inspect reactors globally, left Israel no option but to comply. It was Kennedy’s direct threats, his actions to constrict Israeli excuses, and a united administration which compelled Israel to submit.

1028 Gazit, 231. 1029 Ibid. 364

There is no archival proof to substantiate that Dimona was tied to the supply of conventional arms, specifically the Hawks in 1962. Definitively, Dimona was never tied to any other issues in the relationship.1030 This conclusion had remained somewhat unclear over the years as Myer Feldman and Robert Komer informed Avner Cohen that Dimona and conventional arms were linked.1031 Cohen argued that there was a "tacit linkage" between a security guarantee and Dimona inspections and weapons development.1032 This link with arms never formally existed. Any linkage with a security guarantee did not involve inspections and was likely never truly considered by Kennedy. Despite Kennedy's "any feasible measures" NSAM in March 1963, he had decided that Dimona needed to be addressed, not as a negotiation, rather a presidential stand towards a client state. While there is ample evidence that the security guarantee had been debated in discussions concerning Dimona, it was never actually proffered.

Ironically, Gazit unintentionally admitted that in 1963 it would have been a "bleak picture of American-Israeli relations if Eshkol rejected Kennedy's requests". Israeli Ambassador

Avraham Harman delivered this prediction before the potential Israeli response to Kennedy's most threatening letter of July 5th.1033 Gazit noted that the consequences of Israeli refusal of

"requests" (really, “demands”) could have been devastating. This vital Israeli response is abundantly clear in American documents: had the Israelis refused, American-Israeli relations would have been completely re-evaluated. Even the Israelis believed Dimona was an

1030 This conclusion was first suggested by David Schoenbaum in 1993. Schoenbaum, 137. Warren Bass concluded that Dimona had no proven linkage. Bass, 147. Bass argues maybe there was some sort of linkage in Kennedy's policy indirectly but no documents prove this. 204. It has been accepted in recent historiography that the two "parallel tracks" or paths were not linked. Goldman: 44, 46. Furthermore, the security guarantee was never formally linked to inspections, or actual Israeli concessions on Dimona. 1031 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 174. McGeorge Bundy and Komer both wrote that Dimona was in fact tied to Dimona -- despite this archival evidence, uncertainty remains. 1032 Ibid, 166. 1033 Ibid, 162. To see Gazit was the source, see p. 389, footnote 34. This comes from two interviews in 1994 and 1995. 365

"insurmountable hurdle" for relations.1034 They were right -- had they rejected Kennedy's demands, this would have been insurmountable.

Scholars have highlighted Kennedy, Barbour, Komer, and State's admission to the

Israelis that Dimona "transcended bilateral relations".1035 This did not indicate that a problem which superseded or transcended the relationship absolved any consequences within bilateral relations. Furthermore, it is illogical and has been disproved through Kennedy's letters to Eshkol.

This terminology was utilized by the Administration to emphasize to the Israelis Kennedy’s concern for Dimona. Kennedy's letters threatened the bilateral relationship -- not any global relationship. Dimona was unprecedented, due to: global repercussions for other proliferating countries along with the threat of regional nuclear war, if Egypt went that route. The Israelis were not absolved from bilateral repercussions because the Americans deemed Dimona to have global implications. They merely informed the Israelis of the "transcending" importance to stress the severity of their impending response. Instead of "taking the easy way out"1036 with this designation, Kennedy made an example of Israel for his wider global nonproliferation efforts.1037

Cognizant of the global and regional implications, he had India and Egypt in mind as he acted on

Dimona, Specifically, he was angry with Israel. They had lied to him consistently and were no longer deserving of American trust. Additionally, Israel had the unfortunate timing of proliferating during Kennedy's Presidency. Unlike India and Egypt, Israel had betrayed their closest ally. Repercussions ensued within the bilateral dimension. Kennedy, the most ardent opponent in the Cold War, would not allow selective proliferation. In 1963, exasperated with

Israeli excuses, he responded.

1034 Gazit, 233. He asserts this was the belief of Eshkol’s aides. This likely represented his thoughts in 1963. 1035 Shalom especially highlighted this designation. 37. 1036 Ibid, 38. 1037 Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy": 5. Cohen argued Kennedy used Israel to "make a point". 366

In conclusion, Kennedy greatly admired and supported the small country of Israel, a democracy, a non-communist ally, a progressive, economic society. Furthermore, by 1962, he had sold Hawk missiles and declared the existence of a special relationship. These positive actions and ideology collided with the emerging problem of Dimona. By 1963, Kennedy understood the situation was untenable. Preventing a nuclear bomb outranked his worldview.

Kennedy’s respect for Israel defined relations in 1961and 1962. By 1963, these relations were challenged by mistrust, frustration, and anger. Kennedy acted upon this anger and sense of betrayal stemming from Israeli deceit to confront the Israelis. A very tense-1963 led to a diplomatic stand-off between the American and Israelis. Kennedy “won” this diplomatic battle compelling Levi Eshkol to agree to Dimona inspections, and by extension, American intelligence on Israeli nuclear progress. Ultimately, Kennedy, a strong American President on Israel, “lost” the actual war on Dimona. While slowed by his actions, Israel continued their deception to supposedly attain a nuclear weapon. After Kennedy believed he had rendered Dimona peaceful, his mistrust was subdued and his respect for Israel permitted the resumption of positive relations.

The special relationship, which he anointed in 1962, prospered after the summer of 1963.

Kennedy’s relations with Israel were overwhelmingly positive. During an unprecedented period of tense relations in 1963, when Dimona could have derailed the relationship, Kennedy’s actions and Eshkol’s reactions allowed for continued relations. The conclusion of this dissertation bolsters Kennedy’s Israeli legacy. He labeled the bilateral bond, and sold Israel unprecedented arms. Most importantly of all, he stood up to Israel on an unprecedented threat and forced the

Israelis to acknowledge the supposed power discrepancy in the special relationship.

367

Bibliography