Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2019-12-16 Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona Cahill, Adam Cahill, A. (2019). Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111354 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Respect and Mistrust: Kennedy, Israel, and Dimona by Adam Cahill A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2019 © Adam Cahill 2019 Abstract This dissertation is an examination of American-Israeli relations through the lens of American nonproliferation policy, pertaining to the Israeli nuclear program known as Dimona. President John F. Kennedy held a favourable view of Israel; he admired the Jewish state as it fit neatly within his worldview of a nation worth supporting in the Cold War. Kennedy’s dominant priority of nonproliferation, stopping the Israelis from developing a nuclear program, overruled this positive view of Israel. For the first two years of his Presidency, 1961 and 1962, Kennedy tolerated Israeli behaviour and maintained a positive view of Israel. By 1963, he adopted one of the firmest stands of any President against Israel, notably the most severe approach to Dimona. Due to troubling intelligence, he no longer trusted the Israelis regarding their nuclear intentions and confronted them accordingly. This study investigates this clash of presidential priorities. It delves deeper than existing scholarship into why Kennedy chose his specific course of action in 1963 and how this confrontation affected bilateral relations. It argues that though Kennedy and the United States “won” the diplomatic standoff on Dimona, the Israelis outsmarted their counterparts and ultimately achieved their aims. Despite Kennedy’s sustained concern and the deployment of nearly all means at his disposal, he and the Americans “lost” the war on Israeli nuclear proliferation. The dissertation concludes that though Dimona constituted a serious diplomatic rift, decisive actions by Kennedy and equally astute measures by Levi Eshkol and skilled Israeli diplomats guaranteed that the American-Israeli special relationship continued. Despite Kennedy’s best efforts, coordinated deception and organized Israeli diplomacy ensured the Americans never truly deciphered the extent of Israeli nuclear progress. This case study of ii Israeli nuclear proliferation best exemplifies how Kennedy and the United States responded to potential proliferation threats at a key juncture in the Cold War. iii Acknowledgments This dissertation has taken me throughout North America and the Middle East. I lived in Israel for two years prior to writing my thesis. The research was undertaken in the United States and Canada. I have benefitted from the influence of many individuals who contributed directly to this work. My supervisors, Dr. John Ferris and Dr. Stephen Randall, went above and beyond in consistently and meticulously reading drafts, making insightful suggestions and improving the work. Dr. Michael Keren's input was also fundamental to this process. Dr. Paul Chastko was a vital part of my committee. To my committee, I am deeply grateful. Given the nature of archival research, I am indebted to many different institutions for supporting this project. The University of Calgary provided funding, specifically, the George A. Self Graduate Scholarship and the Queen Elizabeth II Doctoral/Graduate Scholarship. I held the Kahanoff Family Israel Studies Fellowship for four years -- my many thanks to the Kahanoff family. In 2015-2016, I received the Rabin Scholarship for the Advancement of Peace and Tolerance from the Canadian Friends of the Hebrew University. I want to offer my thanks to all the staff at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library/Marjorie Blum Kovler Foundation provided me with the Marjorie Kovler Research Fellowship which was invaluable to my research and multiple trips to Boston. I am equally indebted to the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin and the Moody Foundation of Galveston, Texas, for the Moody Research Grant. I owe a large deal of gratitude to the many talented and patient archivists at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the National Archives II in Maryland, and at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa. I have greatly benefitted from Israeli scholars who write for an English audience and who welcome iv outsiders to discuss matters of central importance to their country. While in Israel, several scholars shared their time and insight on aspects of Dimona, national security and other issues which contributed to my thesis. Ori Rabinowitz gave a great deal of her time in enlightening me on Dimona and the debate in Israel. I am deeply grateful for all her help. Adam Raz, Zaki Shalom, David Tal, and Uri Bar-Joseph also shared their time and expertise. These conversations significantly aided my research; my many thanks to these fine scholars. To my mentor, who was a significant influence enabling me to undertake my doctoral studies, a heartfelt thanks to the late Lewis "Skip" Fischer. To say that I have a supportive family is a gross understatement. Thanks to my sister, Alana, who was kind enough to listen to my many discussions on the project. She also provided refuge while I was in Ottawa. My parents, Brian and Mildred Cahill, were my biggest supporters. Their help and unwavering patience allowed me to complete this project. My girlfriend, Devonne, has had to endure too many discussions about my thesis for the entirety of this project. She also tolerated me living half a world away for sustained periods. I am forever indebted for her kindness, unfaltering optimism, patience, and sense of humour during this process. While many individuals aided the completion of this project, any shortcomings are mine alone. v Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………… ii Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………………... iv Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................... vi Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………………. 1 Chapter Two: Kennedy’s View of Israel……………………………………………………….. 28 Chapter Three: The Hawk Sale and Positive Relations (1961-1962)………………………….. 66 Chapter Four: Dimona’s Origins……………………………………………………………... 113 Atoms for Peace………………………………………………………………………………….123 Collision Course: The United States, Israel, and Dimona…………………………………138 Chapter Five: The American Discovery of, and Reaction to, Dimona…………………………….155 Chapter Six: Respect and Suspicion, 1961-1962……………………………………………………..200 Kennedy’s Introduction to Dimona……………………………………………………………203 The Threat of an Israeli Nuclear Weapon……………………………………………………209 Inspection and the road to the Waldorf-Astoria…………………………………………….220 The Waldorf-Astoria Meeting and the creation of the Dimona Rules…………………….232 Increased scrutiny of Dimona………………………………………………………………….240 1962: The push for inspections; Internal studies; and Dimona on the backburner?......253 Kennedy after the Missile Crisis……………………………………………………………….262 Chapter Seven: Mistrust and Confrontation, 1963…………………………………………………..273 The unified front against Dimona: Kennedy finalizes his Approach……………………..286 The Superpower Re-emerges…………………………………………………………………..302 The Integrated Path to Preventing an Israeli Bomb………………………………………..305 vi Dimona and American Policy………………………………………………………………….311 Kennedy, Dimona, and the Special Relationship……………………………………………319 Kennedy’s Dimona Ultimatum…………………………………………………………………334 Chapter Eight: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...349 The President and Dimona: Kennedy’s Israel Legacy……………………………………..355 Dimona’s lasting impact on American Nonproliferation…………………………………..359 Dimona versus the Special Relationship……………………………………………………..362 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………368 vii Chapter One: Introduction Within the historiography of American-Israeli relations, John F. Kennedy's Presidency is remembered for three issues: the sale of Hawk missiles which altered the arms relationship between these states; his statement that the United States had a "special relationship" with Israel equal only to that with Britain;1 and his actions to prevent an Israeli nuclear program which was based near the town of Dimona. Kennedy began a military relationship, coined the term which describes that bilateral bond today, and spent years addressing the troublesome Dimona project which he inherited from his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The threat of Israeli nuclear weapons challenged Kennedy’s Israel policy. This dissertation focuses on that preoccupation with nonproliferation and American efforts to prevent an Israeli bomb. In late 1960, the United States uncovered what they believed to be an Israeli nuclear facility near Dimona in the Negev Desert.