Intelligence Perspectives January 18, 2018 Protests in Iran

Inside the Middle East – Intelligence Perspectives January 18, 2018 Protests in Iran: The Mullah's Regime Autumn Information: Public protests which began in the city of Mashhad on December 28, 2017 ignited a wave of mass demonstrations in dozens of cities across Iran, including in major cities such as Isfahan and Tehran. To date, according to sources associated with the Iranian opposition, forty-five people have been killed during the demonstrations and hundreds - perhaps thousands - have been arrested. In response to the demonstrations, the Iranian Mullah regime deployed the anti-riot units of the Basij force (The Basij is an oppressive paramilitary police force in charge of public order, morality, etc. who subdued the 2009 protests) and attempted to completely block access to the internet and communication platforms. The Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, officially responded to the demonstrations by saying “people are entitled to protest yet it must be done within the frame of law.” Iran's Supreme Leader, 'Ali Khamenei, who was silent during the first days of the protests, described the protests as “meaningless” and calling the protesters “traitors.” Major General Mohammad 'Ali Jafari, the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards announced that the “civilian disobedience has been defeated.” Though as of now the protest wave indeed seems to be contained, that statement must be taken with a grain of salt, since the Mullah regime censors and blocks social media platforms, there is a very limited foreign media presence in Iran, and even the press that is there has limited access to information and does not have the ability to cover the events because it is restricted by the authorities. Analysis: 2009 Protests and Current Protests – Similarities The current burst of demonstrations is fueled by the same frustrations which ignited previous large-scale protests - including the ones that followed the elections in June 2009. People are suffocated by economic and societal challenges and are infuriated with government corruption and the suppression of individual rights. The lifting of the sanctions on Iran, because of The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal), generated expectations among the public for a tangible improvement of the Iranian economy, which would positively impact Iranians everyday life. Those expectations were not met. Thus, the sentiments of disappointment and frustration deepened. The slogans chanted by protesters, such as “Death to the Dictator” or “Down with the Regime” have also been expressed in previous demonstrations. Like in the 2009 protests, people again chanted “We will die for Iran, not Lebanon or Gaza” expressing the discontent and resentment Iranians feel about the fact that the regime allocates significant resources, financial and other - to support its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip in the service of the Mullah's aggressive regional policy. 2009 Protests and Current Protests – Differences The 2009 protests centered around the fact that the regime had falsified the results of the elections, claiming that the then President - Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won the elections. The regime claimed that he had beaten the reformist camp led by Mehdi Karruobi and Mir Hossein Mosavi - both of whom have been under house arrest since 2009.The current protests are fueled first and foremost by economic stresses. The volume of protests is smaller than 2009. The 2009 protesters were primarily the middle-class and students. The current protesters are mostly the lower middle-class and the poor. While in 2009, Tehran was the major stage for demonstrations, the current protests have spread to dozens of cities. Moreover, they began in the conservative and religious city of Mashhad – the home of the Mullah regime’s support base as well as the home of 'Ali Khamenei - the Iranian Supreme Leader. Why, of all places, did the protests begin in Mashhad? Mashhad is the second largest city in Iran and has a population of 3 million people. The economic and societal challenges facing Mashhad are particularly acute. Mashhad's major income sources is tourism - and primarily Shi’ite pilgrimages from the Arab Gulf. The growing tension between Iran and the Arab Gulf Monarchies - particularly after the January 2016 burning of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by an angry mob - significantly reduced the numbers of tourists visiting from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Not far from the Afghan border, Mashhad also has the largest population of Afghans in Iran. Lacking citizenship and deprived of social rights, Afghans in Iran became a low-cost labor source, at the expense of Iranians – and particularity in Mashhad. Over the past year 160,000 families living in Mashhad lost their money and savings following the bankruptcy of major banks in the city. The reason for that was a failed housing project named “Shandiz” that was run by senior officials in the Mullah regime. The combination of these factors result in growing stresses in the city – unemployment, staggering poverty, violence, the spread of narcotics - and accordingly, a growing number of drug addicts. Mashhad – to a large extent – is a microcosm of the challenges inside Iran. A demonstration purportedly also took place in the city of Qom - a major center of Shi’ite theologians, and a significant stronghold of the Mullah regime. The fact that the demonstrations took place in Mashhad and Qom reflects another significant difference between 2009 and now – the current protesters included some Shi’ite clerics. The 2009 protests had a clear political agenda – they were protesting the fact that their votes, and the victory of the reformist camp, was completely disregarded by the Mullah regime. The current protests centers around the demand for an improved economy. The 2009 protests had clear leaders – Karroubi and Mousavi. The current protests have no identifiable leaders. In that context, the major Iranian opposition to the Mullah’s regime based in France, called The National Council of Resistance (NCRI) – is lobbying for international support for the protests and for the ousting of the Mullah regime. However, it is not clear whether the NCRI has the ability to lead the protest inside Iran. The 2009 protests did not receive the support of President Barrack Obama or the United States administration. The current protesters have received the clear support of the Trump administration. The 2009 protests were violently crushed by the Mullah regime from day one. On the other hand, the response of the regime – as of now – to the current protests - can be described as relatively restrained. The Iranian President, Rouhani addressed the nation, acknowledged the people’s challenges, and legitimized the right to protest. The relatively mild response of the regime to the current protests probably stems from two primary reasons: the regime fears that a tough response will further fuel the protests and the regime evaluates the demonstrations will die out soon. In 2009, according to the World Bank, only fourteen percent of Iranians had access to the internet; by 2016 over half the country had access to the world wide web. In 2009 there were 52,000,000 cell phone subscriptions; in 2016 the number of subscriptions exceeded 80,000,000. Moreover, in 2009 there were 1,000,000 smart phones in Iran; today reportedly there are 48,000,000. Twitter was a major player in the 2009 protests – but the technology and access has so significantly evolved since then that it is difficult for the regime to restrict access to the multitude of messaging apps. Social media platforms such as Instagram, Facebook Live, Whatsapp - and particularly Telegram - reportedly the most popular app in Iran, with an estimated 80 million users, did not exist in 2009. These apps are not only being used to communicate information outside of Iran – the encrypted technology of Telegram and other communication platforms is allowing users to communicate, organize and strategize over secure channels. Like in the 2009 protests, people again chanted “We will die for Iran, not Lebanon or Gaza” - expressing the discontent and resentment Iranians feel about the fact that the regime allocates significant resources, financial and other - to support its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza Strip in the service of the Mullah's aggressive regional policy. Though the refrains are similar, at the end of 2017 in the context of the Mullah regime’s regional policy and the public protests, there is a major difference from 2009 to 2017. The Mullah regime’s regional policy has substantially expanded, and the regime is massively involved militarily – both directly and by the use of agents and proxies – in three additional arenas - Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. That fact results in two major outcomes which further fuel the current protests. One, is the fact that the resources the Mullahs regime allocates to enhance and promote its aggressive regional policy are exponentially larger than 2009. Though no reliable figures are available - however, the resources spent likely amount to dozens of billions of dollars. The second outcome of the aggressive regional policy is the Iranian death toll sustained in these conflicts on behalf of the Mullah’s regime. Though, again, exact numbers aren’t clear – it is estimated that at least a few hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers – including senior IRG officers, have been killed in the war in Syria as Iran attempts to keep Assad in power for their own hegemonic goals. In addition to the Revolutionary Guard casualties, according to a source evaluated as reliable, more than 2,000 Fatemiyoun militants have been killed in Syria through the beginning of 2018. The Fatemiyoun is a militia made up only of Afghans that the Iranian Mullah regime created to fight in the war in Syria to save the Assad regime. According to various official estimations there are between two and four million Afghans living in Iran - the majority of whom have no citizenship or legal status.

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