Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

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TOOLS FOR THE JOB: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

Funded by Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

Ingrid Macdonald and Angela Valenza, 2012

Cover photo: Christian Jepsen Yusuf Batil camp, Upper Nile state, South Sudan

Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI/HPG or NRC. This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission. The views expressed herein should not be taken, in any way, to reflect the official opinion of the European Commission or the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid department funds relief operations for victims of natural disasters and conflicts outside the European Union. Aid is channelled impartially, straight to people in need, regardless of their race, ethnic group, religion, gender, age, nationality or political affiliation. TOOLS FOR THE JOB: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

By Ingrid Macdonald and Angela Valenza

Norwegian Refugee Council and Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute October 2012 TEMA TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword v Preface vi Acknowledgments vii Executive summary viii 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Note on methodology 2 1.2 List of abbreviations 3 2. Beyond the theory 4 2.1 The legal framework underpinning the principles 4 2.2 NGO humanitarian frameworks that promote the principles 5 2.2.1 Global frameworks 5 2.2.2 Organisation-speciﬁc policies and procedures 6

3. Principles into practice 7 3.1 Applying the principles in the ﬁeld 7 3.1.1 Acceptance: securing and maintaining access 8 3.1.2 Militating against the misappropriation of aid 10 3.2 Strengthening the application of principles 11 3.2.1 Interpreting the principles 11 3.2.2 Principled decision-making 12

4. Principled humanitarian funding 14 4.1 Funding arrangements 14 4.2 Key funding obstacles 17 4.2.1 Challenges to needs-based funding 17 4.2.2 On-time and predictable funding 19 4.2.3 The transition gap 21 4.2.4 The impact of securitisation and politicisation 23

5. Overcoming obstacles to principled humanitarian funding 26 5.1 Deﬁning principled humanitarian funding 26 5.2 Screening for suitable funds 26 5.3 Navigating funding conditionality 27 5.4 Dialogue between NGOs and donors 28

6. Conclusion and recommendations 29 Recommendations 29 7. Bibliography 31

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

FOREWORD

“How can we help?” is the question many Europeans ask when confronted with the suffering of others. In a recent survey in the 27 Member States, 88% of European citizens stated that humanitarian aid is an important part of the answer. My responsibility is to translate our citizens’ wish for solidarity into action: making sure that the European Union’s assistance reaches those who need it the most.

The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are fundamental values that guide humanitarian work. Equally important, they are also operational tools for getting that work done. Thanks to their principled approach, humanitarian organisations are able to negotiate access to civilian populations in need. In the course of interviews carried out for this report, a humanitarian organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had to negotiate with an armed group in the far northeast of the country in order to get access to internally displaced people in desperate need of food and medical attention. The humanitarians demanded to be allowed in, explaining that they were not there to take sides and that the group had an obligation to allow a neutral organisation to provide assistance. Without their neutrality, those humanitarians would have never reached people in the direst of needs.

That is why in the European Union we support aid that is impartial, neutral and independent. This support is essential for our credibility as one of the world’s largest donors, while it also guar- antees that we bring the fastest, most adequate and most efﬁcient relief to victims of conﬂicts and crises.

Principled humanitarian action faces many challenges today. The humanitarian principles need to be respected and promoted more than ever. I am pleased to support this Norwegian Refugee Council and Overseas Development Institute report, which will contribute to a discussion on how governments, donors and humanitarian organisations can further strengthen the principled delivery of aid.

Kristalina Georgieva European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action v PREFACE

PREFACE

Along with many other humanitarian organisations, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) endeavours to access people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection during crises. We strive to employ the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality as a framework guiding our operations and tools for navigating the various operational challenges to access. Notwithstanding our best efforts, enduring internal challenges require increased attention from the humanitarian community.

We also face many external obstacles in the often hostile, unpredictable and highly politicised environments in which we operate. A key challenge can be inadequate funding, or funding that does not support principled humanitarian action. Despite repeated commitments by states in support of the humanitarian principles, translating these obligations into operational realities, including principled funding, requires renewed effort.

Thanks to the support of the European Commission’s department for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), NRC is addressing these issues through a project entitled Strengthening Principled Humanitarian Response Capa cities. This report presents the ﬁndings and analysis of case studies conducted in Afghani- stan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Pakistan and South Sudan with support from the Overseas Development Institute’s Humanitarian Policy Group. Other elements of the project include developing decision-making guidance for practitioners, seeking concurrence on what constitutes principled humanitarian funding and holding a high-level conference in Brussels on 4 December 2012.

I believe that this report will help to move the debate on the importance of the humanitarian principles forward, and I hope it will galvanise action to implement concrete safeguards for principled humanitarian funding.

Elisabeth Rasmusson Secretary General Norwegian Refugee Council

vi Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper was drafted by Ingrid Macdonald and Angela Valenza.

Samir Elhawary, Marit Glad, Ashley Jackson, Hannah Vaughan Lee, Sean Loughna, Arnhild Spence, Sara Tesorieri, and Eva Svoboda made valuable contributions. Sarah Bayne, Christophe Beau, Andy Featherstone, Adele Harmer, Irina Mosel, Tasneem Mowjee, Abida Nagra, and Dan Tyler contributed to special reports and the four case studies.

Special thanks are extended to Sara Pantuliano, Nicolay Paus, Elisabeth Rasmusson and Eli Waerum Rognerud for their comments. The members of NRC’s access advisory group also provided guidance and comments throughout the process.

NRC is grateful to ECHO and the NMFA for their valuable support to this project and report, as well as the hundreds of people who were interviewed and took part in consultations in Afghani- stan, the DRC, Pakistan and South Sudan, Brussels, Geneva, London, Oslo, and Washington, DC.

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background A recent poll conﬁrmed widespread popular support for continued European Union funding of humanitarian aid, with 88% of respondents in favour.1 At the same time, the harsh economic climate, increasingly complex emergencies and a politically polarised world are exerting pressure on humanitarian organisations and donors alike. Within this context, this report, Tools for the Job, based on case studies conducted in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan and South Sudan, considers principled humanitarian action from the perspectives of both non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors. It examines hurdles that can prevent humanitarian organisations from adhering to the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality, which serve as the basis for humanitarian action and assist humanitarian actors in overcoming challenges.

The humanitarian principles are grounded in international humanitarian law and have been re- afﬁrmed in various United Nations resolutions. Furthermore, they are integrated into frameworks developed by humanitarian organisations to guide them in their daily work; examples include the Code of Conduct for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the SPHERE Project. Many NGOs have since incorporated the principles into their policies and procedures.

The principles are thus not merely a theoretical or ideological concept, but reﬂect commitments made by states and are applied by organisations to safely access populations in need, to draw attention to vulnerabilities, and to negotiate with communities as well as local and international stakeholders (civilian or military).

Strengthening implementation of the principles within organisations Although legal and policy frameworks underpin the humanitarian principles and their daily use by organisations, critical challenges continue to hamper implementation. For example, even though there is strong general awareness of the principles, practitioners may still struggle to balance or prioritise them in a consistent and transparent manner. This report shows that training of international as well as local staff could be improved in order to ensure a common understanding of humanitarian principles and the need for their uniform application.

The risks associated with decisions to prioritise the principles are not only borne by an organisation, but also by the humanitarian community as a whole. When one humanitarian organisation prioritises (or compromises) a principle, that decision may have an impact on the perception and treatment of the wider humanitarian community. Adherence to principles could be enhanced through the development of clear guidance and systems for implementing and monitoring compliance, clear decision-making frameworks and investment in common NGO approaches, such as codes of conduct or ‘red lines’.

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viii Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strengthening principled humanitarian funding Given the extent to which humanitarian organisations rely on states for funding, the availability of donor support can determine whether principled humanitarian action is feasible. States have made high-level commitments to the humanitarian principles in the Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and their own national policies (Bayne, 2012; GHD, n.d.; EC, 2008).

Yet despite some improvements, global funding allocations still favour responses in geographically or politically strategic countries over neglected or protracted crises, rather than being directed primarily by needs and vulnerabilities. In addition, funding timelines and administrative procedures can hinder a principled response. Transitional strategies and funding may give preference to political or security strategies at the expense of humanitarian action, even when needs and risks are still evident. Securitisation strategies that seek to imitate or include humanitarian action within a single approach may also increase risks to the safety of both staff and aid recipients.

Recommendations

Humanitarian organisations should: sõ3EEKõTOõESTABLISHõCOMMONõPOSITIONSõONõWHATõCONSTITUTESõPRINCIPLEDõHUMANITARIANõFUNDINGõANDõ unacceptable donor conditions, in order to foster collective and more effective action. sõ%NCOURAGEõDONORSõTOõREMOVEõUNPRINCIPLEDõFUNDINGõCONDITIONS õBOTHõDIRECTõANDõINDIRECT õANDõ to recognize other key issues (such as the need for ﬂexible funding). To this end, they should strive to formulate practical arguments with reference to donor commitments under GHD and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. sõ%STABLISHõMECHANISMSõTOõSTRENGTHENõTHEõSYSTEMATICõIMPLEMENTATIONõANDõMONITORINGõOFõPOLICIESõ focused on the humanitarian principles, both within organisations and collectively. sõ3TRENGTHENõTHEõABILITYõOFõSTAFFõTOõINTERPRETõANDõPRIORITISEõTHEõPRINCIPLESõASõTOOLSõFORõNAVIGATINGõ obstacles, including methods to strengthen guidance for principled decision-making and consistent training and capacity building. sõ#ONTINUEõTOõINVEST õBOTHõINDIVIDUALLYõANDõJOINTLY õINõASSESSMENTSõTOõSTRENGTHENõNEEDS BASEDõPRO- gramming. In addition, they should engage in advocacy with donors to secure sufﬁcient funds ANDõTIMEõTOõCONDUCTõASSESSMENTSõASõAõBASISõFORõPROJECTõPROPOSALSõANDõDEVELOPMENTõ sõ!GREEõ Aõ COMPACTõ WITHõ DONORSõ ONõ MEASURESõ TOõ STRENGTHENõ ANDõ SAFEGUARDõ ADHERENCEõ TOõ THEõ humanitarian principles in the area of funding.

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action ix EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

States, including donor agencies, should: sõ!DHEREõTOõTHEõCOMMITMENTSõTHEYõHAVEõMADEõTOõTHEõPRINCIPLESõOFõHUMANITY õIMPARTIALITY õINDEPEN dence and neutrality as part of international law, national policies, GHD and, where relevant, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. sõ7ITHINõ THEõ '($õ GROUP õ DEVELOPõ CLEARõ INDICATORS õ GUIDANCEõ ANDõ COMPLIANCEõ MECHANISMSõ TOõ strengthen implementation of commitments to the humanitarian principles by individual member states and the group as a whole. sõ!CTIVELYõ SUPPORTõ BETTERõ NEEDSõ ASSESSMENTSõ ANDõ ANALYSISõ THROUGHõ THEõ )NTER !GENCYõ 3TANDINGõ Committee Needs Assessment Task Force, the Assessment Capacities Project and other mechanisms, and develop shared global indicators and mechanisms to promote allocations based on need, including through improved consolidated appeals plans and common humanitarian action plans. sõ!DOPTõSAFEGUARDSõTOõAVOIDõNARROWõDElNITIONSõOFõHUMANITARIANõACTION õANDõTOõSEPARATEõHUMANI- tarian action from crisis management, stabilisation, counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach-style strategies. They should avoid counter-terrorism measures that encroach on humanitarian action, including through the implementation of exemptions for principled humanitarian action and practitioners. sõ2EVIEWõDONORõPOLICIESõANDõPROCEDURESõTOõENSUREõTHEREõISõENOUGHõmEXIBILITYõTOõALLOWõPROJECTSõTOõ be driven by need. This should include the re-evaluation of time restrictions, administrative procedures and prioritised sectors and geographic areas on an ongoing basis and in consultation with implementing partners. sõ)NVESTõFUNDINGõINõACTIVITIESõTHATõENABLEõHUMANITARIANõORGANISATIONSõTOõSTRENGTHENõACCEPTANCEõ strategies, including the additional security and logistics costs required for operations in insecure or remote locations.

x Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

A recent poll confirmed widespread popular Although commitments to humanitarian prin- support for continued European Union (EU) ciples are based in law and policy frameworks, funding of humanitarian aid, with 88% of re- they remain difficult to reconcile with opera- spondents in favour. Nevertheless, humani- tional realities, both within and beyond the hu- tarian organisations are increasingly asked to manitarian community. By adopting measures demonstrate the relevance of principled hu- to ensure greater consistency of interpretation manitarian action, as separate from political of the principles and subsequent decision-mak- and security strategies. It follows that demon- ing, humanitarian actors could make significant strating operational relevance is a necessity for progress in strengthening principled action. humanitarian organisations, as are tangible ef- While states have made repeated commitments forts to strengthen implementation of the prin- to the principles, they should also renew efforts ciples of humanity, impartiality, independence to translate them into operational realities. This and neutrality. Given their high degree of de- report examines the impact of non-needs-based pendence on donor funds, these organisations funding, the transition gap and the lack of safe- must ensure continued state support for prin- guards for principled action in political and se- cipled humanitarian aid. curity strategies.

This report conﬁrms that humanitarian or- There is little doubt that humanitarian organi- ganisations strive to use the principles on a sations could, and should, do more to agree the daily basis to navigate operational challenges, parameters of principled humanitarian fund- facilitate access and improve their operations ing and apply a common approach with donors. — a subject covered at length in the report To Given the ﬁnancial and political pressure to in- Stay and Deliver (Egeland, Harmer and Stod- corporate humanitarian funds into integrated dard, 2011). The principles are instruments strategies such as the EU ‘comprehensive ap- enshrined in international law and essential to proach’, relevant measures are rapidly becom- gaining safe access to populations in need during a necessity rather than an option. ing crises. They provide humanitarian actors with tools that are either applied explicitly or embedded in broader strategies and activities.

This report outlines the legal framework underpinning humanitarian principles, and the various policy commitments and procedures humanitarian organisations have adopted and employed at the global, country and organisational levels. It covers two areas: 1) how practitioners use the principles in operations, why they are relevant and what challenges are associated with their implementation; 2) challenges and opportunities in terms of institutional funding, which impede or facilitate adherence to the principles.

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Note on methodology

Research for this report was primarily under- sõFeedback from a series of presentations on the taken by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), preliminary findings from the case studies and in collaboration with the Humanitarian Policy interviews with NGO, UN and donor represent- Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development In- atives in inter-agency NGO consortia and other stitute. Specialist consultants contributed as forums in Brussels, Geneva and Oslo. needed. The analysis draws on the following sõA review by an advisory group of humani- sources: tarian professionals and experts with back- grounds in NGOs, the RC, the UN, academia s Field research conducted in Afghanistan, and government. the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), sõA peer review by HPG researchers involved Pakistan and South Sudan. The research in- in the case studies. volved mainly interviews with both national and international NGO field workers. It also Some further considerations: entailed interviews with representatives from the UN; the International Red Cross and Red sõThe report focuses primarily on conflict and Crescent Movement (RC), including the Inter- complex emergency situations rather than national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); natural disasters. local and national authorities; diplomats; and sõ2EFERENCESõ TOõ HUMANITARIANõ ORGANISATIONSõ donors. More than 300 interviews were con- relate mainly to NGOs. The report draws on ducted overall, in one-to-one, focus group and information and interviews from across the workshop settings. Unless otherwise cited, humanitarian community, but the case stud- quotes and examples in the report are drawn ies focus on the perspectives and approaches from these sources; individual respondents adopted by NGOs, UN agencies and donors. are not identified in order to preserve their The report focuses on donors that form anonymity. part of the Development Assistance Com- sõA report commissioned to map the key trends mittee of the Organisation for Economic Co- influencing the humanitarian funding of eight operation and Development (OECD–DAC), European donors,2 and their relationship which comprises principally European and with principled humanitarian action (Bayne, North American states. It thus reviews com- 2012). Prepared by theIDLgroup, the report mitments made to the Good Humanitarian draws on interviews conducted in April 2012, Donorship (GHD) initiative, to the European and a review of third-party assessments and Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and in do- relevant literature. nors’ national policies. The report considers sõAn ongoing internal NRC project that in- funding by institutional donors rather than cludes case studies and that examines ob- private sponsorship, support from foundations stacles to operational access and methods of or donations, which are also important to hu- overcoming them. manitarian organisations (Stoianova, 2012). sõSecondary sources, drawing on the wealth sõReferences to ‘humanitarian action’ and of material already published (see the Biblio- ‘humanitarian aid’ cover assistance and graphy). protection activities.

2 dŚĞĞŝŐŚƚĚŽŶŽƌƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕/ƚĂůǇ͕ƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕WŽůĂŶĚ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ͘

2 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action INTRODUCTION

1.2 List of abbreviations

ACAPS Assessment Capacities Project CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CERF United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund CHAP Common humanitarian action plan CHF Common humanitarian fund DFID Department for International Development DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECHO Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (European Commission) ERF Emergency response fund EU European Union GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship HPG Humanitarian Policy Group IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally displaced person IHL International humanitarian law ISAF International Security Assistance Force LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NGOs Non-governmental organisations NMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs NRC Norwegian Refugee Council OCHA United Nations Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD–DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team QIP Quick impact project RC International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo UN United Nations

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 3 BEYOND THE THEORY

2. BEYOND THE THEORY

The humanitarian principles are based on com- Common Article Three of the Geneva Conven- mitments made by states; they have been re- tions, applicable in international and non-in- peatedly reaffirmed via national policies, the UN ternational armed conflict, states that ‘an im- Security Council and the UN General Assembly. partial humanitarian body, such as the ICRC, may offer its services to the Parties to the con- 2.1 The legal framework underpinning flict’. There is no provision that specifies that the principles humanitarian relief should be independent or The four principles commonly accepted as key neutral, but it is inferred from the fact that ‘au- foundations for humanitarian action, as set out thorities may refuse humanitarian action if it by the ICRC, are: interferes with a military strategy or aids the other side of the conflict’ (Collinson and Elha- humanity: to ‘prevent and alleviate human wary, 2012). In this context, neutrality aims to suffering wherever it may be found. Its pur- avoid offering military advantage to any side in pose is to protect life and health and to en- a conflict (Leader, 2000). sure respect for the human being.’ The principles were substantively reaffirmed impartiality: to ensure ‘no discrimination as in a 1991 UN General Assembly resolution that to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or establishes guiding principles for humanitarian political opinions. It endeavours only to re- action. It states that ‘humanitarian assistance lieve suffering, giving priority to the most ur- must be provided in accordance with the prin- gent cases of distress.’ ciples of humanity, neutrality and impartiality’ (UNGA, 1991). Over the past two decades, independence: to ‘always maintain their au- subsequent General Assembly and Security tonomy so that they may be able at all times to Council resolutions have consistently called on act in accordance with Red Cross principles’. member states and all other parties to respect and uphold the humanitarian principles to en- neutrality: not to ‘take sides in hostilities or sure the effective delivery of assistance. To- engage at any time in controversies of a po- day, the four principles continue to provide the litical, racial, religious or ideological nature’ ‘fundamental foundations for humanitarian ac- (Pictet, 1979). tion’ (OCHA, 2011a). They are not specifically referred to in the European Union Guidelines The Red Cross codified these principles in 1965 on promoting compliance with international to legitimise and support the movement’s en- humanitarian law, although these do reaffirm gagement in conflict situations. This frame- the importance for EU member states of ensur- work reflects obligations under international ing compliance with international humanitar- humanitarian law (IHL) — including the Fourth ian law (EC, 2005). Geneva Convention (1949) and sections of Ad- ditional Protocol I (1979) — to protect civilians affected by armed conflict and to provide them with assistance and medical care.

4 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action BEYOND THE THEORY

2.2 NGO humanitarian frameworks that promote the principles

2.2.1 Global frameworks The humanitarian principles directly informed the main inter-agency charter for humanitarian action, which was developed in 1994 and to which nearly 500 organisations are signatories (see Box 1).

Žǆϭ͘ŽĚĞŽĨŽŶĚƵĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůZĞĚƌŽƐƐĂŶĚZĞĚƌĞƐĐĞŶƚDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ E'KƐŝŶŝƐĂƐƚĞƌZĞůŝĞĨ ϭ͘ dŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝŵƉĞƌĂƟǀĞĐŽŵĞƐĮƌƐƚ͘ Ϯ͘ ŝĚŝƐŐŝǀĞŶƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĂĐĞ͕ĐƌĞĞĚŽƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĚǀĞƌƐĞ ĚŝƐƟŶĐƟŽŶŽĨĂŶǇŬŝŶĚ͘ŝĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƟĞƐĂƌĞĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŶĞĞĚĂůŽŶĞ͘ ϯ͘ ŝĚǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌƉŽůŝƟĐĂůŽƌƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚ͘ ϰ͘ tĞƐŚĂůůĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌŶŽƚƚŽĂĐƚĂƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͘ ϱ͘ tĞƐŚĂůůƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĐƵƐƚŽŵ͘ ϲ͘ tĞƐŚĂůůĂƩĞŵƉƚƚŽďƵŝůĚĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽŶůŽĐĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƟĞƐ͘ ϳ͘ tĂǇƐƐŚĂůůďĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŽŝŶǀŽůǀĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞďĞŶĞĮĐŝĂƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞůŝĞĨĂŝĚ͘ ϴ͘ ZĞůŝĞĨĂŝĚŵƵƐƚƐƚƌŝǀĞƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞĨƵƚƵƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƟĞƐƚŽĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŵĞĞƟŶŐďĂƐŝĐŶĞĞĚƐ͘ ϵ͘ tĞŚŽůĚŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞƚŽďŽƚŚƚŚŽƐĞǁĞƐĞĞŬƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞĨƌŽŵǁŚŽŵǁĞ ĂĐĐĞƉƚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͘ ϭϬ͘/ŶŽƵƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶ͕ƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚĂĚǀĞƌƟƐŝŶŐĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ͕ǁĞƐŚĂůůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌǀŝĐƟŵƐĂƐ ĚŝŐŶŝĮĞĚŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ͕ŶŽƚŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐŽďũĞĐƚƐ͘

To mark the tenth anniversary of the Code and sõthe ‘mounting dangers that complex emer- reinforce its role, a conference was held in gencies pose for humanitarianism’ (Barnett 2004. Participants reiterated the importance of and Weiss, 2008). the principles and identified areas for improvement, including the need for greater institution- The second trend concerns the unintended alisation of and compliance with the Code, and consequences of humanitarian action, in which the development of monitoring procedures. organisations ‘might be simultaneously improving the welfare of victims and inadvert- The Code is indicative of self-reflection within ently diminishing it as a result of other actions’ the humanitarian community in response to (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). In many of the cases the rapid growth of engagement (of NGOs in where unintended harm was done, the prin- particular) in conflict-affected countries during ciples were not upheld, raising critical ques- the 1990s. This period was marked by two de- tions about how such an ethical framework fining trends: can be better applied and adhered to (Leader and Mackintosh, 2000). These debates shaped sõAõ@GROWINGõWILLINGNESSõANDõABILITYõOFõOUTSID- much of the discussion and subsequent frame- ers to help those at risk, as expressed in the works for humanitarian action. expansion of the humanitarian system and funding’; and

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 5 BEYOND THE THEORY

At the same time, there was growing recogni- Liberation Movement/Army, the main opposition of the need to improve the management tion group; the 1995 Principles and Protocols and monitoring of humanitarian action and to of Humanitarian Operations and the 1996 Joint strengthen accountability. This trend has con- Policy of Operation in Liberia; and, more re- tinued as emergency aid has increased in real cently, the 2009 Inter-Agency Standing Com- terms and as the humanitarian system — and mittee Negotiation Ground Rules for Somalia. especially the NGO sector — has expanded (Stoddard, 2003). 2.2.2 Organisation-specific policies and procedures The following global policies and frameworks Many humanitarian organisations have incor- also incorporate the humanitarian principles: porated the humanitarian principles into their policies and procedures. The means of doing sõ4HEõDo No Harm framework helps humani- so vary, but the following list details some of tarian actors to identify indicators that assis- the typical approaches: tance may make, or is making, conflict worse. s The Sphere Project and Inter-Agency Net- sõPublic messaging and advocacy: Many or- work for Education in Emergencies Mini- ganisations engage in advocacy in support mum Standards project are initiatives aimed of the principles, including with political and at improving the quality of humanitarian as- military entities. The principles often form the sistance and accountability underpinned by basis of public messaging, especially in media the principles. A handbook associated with campaigns on conflict, security and aid. the latter project provides a set of common sõPolicies and codes: Many organisations in- principles and universal minimum standards clude the principles in their own policies and in life-saving areas of humanitarian response. codes of conduct. Some require staff to sign sõ4HEõPeople in Aid Code of Good Practice is these policies, acknowledging that they have a management tool that helps humanitarian read them and agree to adhere to them. and development agencies enhance the qual- sõTraining: Organisation-specific policies are ity of their human resources management. often included in training sessions, work- sõ4HEõ Active Learning Network on Account- shops and inductions. Some organisations ability and Performance is a sector-wide also illustrate the application of the princi- undertaking dedicated to improving perfor- ples through case studies. mance through increased learning and ac- sõSecurity management: Increased aware- countability (ALNAP, 2009a; 2009b). ness of the risks humanitarian actors face sõ4HEõ Humanitarian Accountability Partner- and the chronic insecurity of the environ- ship is a multi-agency initiative working to ments in which they operate, combined with improve the accountability of humanitarian the recognition by many agencies of the need action for people affected by disasters and to strengthen staff understanding of security other crises (HAP, n.d.). policies and protocols, have led the principles to be increasingly integrated into secu- Context-specific codes and frameworks have rity management, including guidance on ac- also been developed in attempts to translate ceptance strategies. This has been reflected the humanitarian principles into practice. Ex- in several inter-agency guides, such as the amples include the 1995 Agreement on Ground abovementioned To Stay and Deliver, as well Rules in South Sudan between the UN’s Op- as agency-specific initiatives. One NGO, for eration Lifeline Sudan and the Sudan People’s example, established ‘a guide for security

6 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

that includes communications with all actors ceived and actual), some organisations have to ensure access’; the organization produces recruitment policies to ensure that their staff an annual strategy guide to promote respect members reﬂect the ethnic diversity of the op- for ‘all authorities and different communities erational environment. Some also apply this who are in conﬂict’. concept to contractors and suppliers. Non- sõRecruitment and procurement policies: To discrimination is also normally a cornerstone promote the impartial distribution of aid (per- of recruitment and procurement.

3. PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

In their efforts to deliver aid effectively in cri- and apply them consistently in their decision- sis situations, organisations and practitioners making. Tangible progress could be made by: make daily use of the humanitarian principles — either explicitly or as part of their under- sõDEVELOPINGõCLEARõGUIDANCEõANDõSYSTEMSõFORõIM- lying approaches. The principles tend to form plementing and monitoring compliance with part of acceptance strategies and measures to the principles; mitigate the misappropriation of aid. Adher- sõDEVELOPINGõCLEARõDECISION MAKINGõFRAMEWORKS ence to the principles, however, has sometimes sõADOPTINGõCOMMONõAPPROACHESõAND presented difficulties for humanitarian actors. sõSTRENGTHENINGõ TRAININGõ OFõ STAFFõ ANDõ INTERNALõ As outlined by Collinson and Elhawary, much dissemination. attention has focused on the policies and activities of external actors: 3.1 Applying the principles in the field stabilisation operations blur the distinction be- The humanitarian principles tend to be em- tween military and humanitarian actors and bedded either within organisations’ strategies co-opt the humanitarian enterprise for politi- and procedures (as described in Section 2.2) or cal and military ends; UN integrated missions used to navigate obstacles that impede opera- undermine the neutrality of UN humanitarian tions. While the principles are often described agencies and their partners; counter-terrorism as tools for managing risk, caution is nonethe- legislation impedes the impartial delivery of aid less required to uphold their foundational ba- by criminalising assistance in areas controlled sis. For example, the principles of humanity by proscribed groups; national governments, and impartiality represent commitments first keen to assert their sovereignty, overstate and foremost by states to respect and protect their capacity to respond and deny humanitar- the fundamental rights and human dignity of ian access. Whilst these external factors are populations affected by crises. significant, greater scrutiny is required of the international humanitarian system itself, and 3.1.1 Acceptance: securing and the impact the system has on the ability of aid maintaining access agencies to provide relief and/or protection The things that are most useful for our op- (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). erations [when seeking acceptance] are non- discrimination and attention towards vulner- Humanitarian organisations and the wider sys- abilities. Neutrality and impartiality are very tem could improve adherence to the principles by important for perceptions, to earn trust. ensuring that practitioners understand them

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 7 PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

Safe access to populations in need during a crisis with parties to the conflict, favour or promote is key to a humanitarian organisation’s ability to a religion or ideology, or act as an instrument work.3 States have the primary responsibility to of government policy.5 Throughout the case assist people in need,4 but if they are unwilling studies conducted for this report, practition- or unable to do so, they should not impede de- ers stressed that they have sought to distance livery of impartial humanitarian assistance as themselves from the parties to a conflict or mil- long as it does not favour any of the parties to itary entities such as the International Security the conflict (Grombach-Wagner, 2005). Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan or the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mis- Typical obstacles to access, as emerged re- sion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo peatedly during the research for this report, (MONUSCO), largely to be perceived as neutral include: the unpredictability of belligerents; so as to be able to maintain effective access the politicisation and securitisation of aid; in- and operations. Acceptance strategies are usu- sufficient funds to match needs; unreasonable ally based on the premise that well-managed administrative demands imposed by some host perceptions lead to acceptance, which in turn states; criminality; counter-terrorism meas- facilitates access, although this approach has ures; and the proliferation of private sector not always proven to be true. entities and other groups seeking to duplicate humanitarian activities. Physical obstacles in- Organisations also seek to manage perceptions clude bad weather, poor infrastructure and re- by communicating who they are and what they current natural hazards, the impact of which do, often with either direct or inferred reference may be compounded by poor governance and to the principles. In the case studies, these refer- protracted conflict. ences could roughly be classified as follows:

To Stay and Deliver describes how, within the sõExplicit: principles are communicated at all legal framework, humanitarian organisations stages of contact, negotiation and discussion ‘have explored innovative strategies and op- as concepts to which an organisation strictly erational practices aimed at creating greater adheres. acceptance for their activities and increas- sõNegotiated: principles are integrated into ing access to affected populations’ (Egeland, messages about the organisation and ex- Harmer and Stoddard, 2011); these measures plained while discussing programme imple- have included the adoption of the humanitar- mentation with stakeholders. ian principles. The rationale is that humani- sõImplicit: principles are embedded into an or- tarian actors — and the civilians who receive ganisation’s best practice, but the fact is not their aid — will be perceived and accepted as overtly communicated. less of a threat if they do not align themselves

3 ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐĐĞƐƐĞŶƚĂŝůƐ͗ϭͿƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽƌĞĂĐŚƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶƐŝŶŶĞĞĚŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐ- ƟŽŶĂŶĚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚϮͿƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂīĞĐƚĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶƐƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚďĂƐŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͘^ĞĞ DĞƚĐĂůĨĞ͕'ŝīĞŶĂŶĚůŚĂǁĂƌǇ;ϮϬϭϭͿ͘ ϰ hE'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇƌĞƐŽůƵƟŽŶϰϲͬϭϴϮŽĨϭϵϵϭĐŽŶĮƌŵƐƚŚĂƚ͚΀Ğ΁ĂĐŚ^ƚĂƚĞŚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĮƌƐƚĂŶĚ ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚƚŽƚĂŬĞĐĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƟŵƐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĂůĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŽŶŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͛ ;hE'͕ϭϵϵϭ͕ƉĂƌĂ͘ϰͿ͘ 5 /ŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇƉŽůŝƟĐŝƐĞĚĂŶĚŝŶƐĞĐƵƌĞ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĞZ͕ƉƌŽƚĞĐƟǀĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐĐƵƌĨĞǁƐĂŶĚǁĂůůĞĚĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƌŽƵƟŶĞůǇƵƐĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƐƚĂīƐĂĨĞƚǇ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ͘

8 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

The principles may be used in negotiations and couldn’t serve anyone, and that it was bet- acceptance strategies in the following ways: ter to be able to operate and serve people. We went to the community and discussed the is- sõThe perception of being a principled hu- sue and people agreed that what happened manitarian actor can reinforce acceptance. was wrong. Ensuring that staff composition reflects the diversity of the operating environment can sõ4HEõPRINCIPLESõAREõUSEDõBYõHUMANITARIANõAC- reinforce the local perception of the organi- tors in agreements, negotiations and messag- sation as principled, transparent and ac- ing to build trust with governments and lo- countable.6 This has helped some organisa- cal authorities. Humanitarian organisations tions enhance acceptance and therefore their require government authorisation in order to ability to operate safely, but the approach is operate, and the principles provide a basis for proving increasingly challenging given the them to adopt a consistent position in their number of attacks and security incidents in- discussions with the relevant authorities. volving humanitarian actors (Collinson and This is especially true when the government Elhawary, 2012). concerned is a party to a conflict or may try to restrict access to territory controlled by an sõThe principles can help in negotiating com- armed group. In the case of Sudan, however, munity and local stakeholder politics. Ten- the government used the principles to target sions within communities can be exacerbated NGOs, accusing 13 organisations of failing to if an organisation or project is seen as taking adhere to them and expelling them from the sides with a specific group or individual. The country in retaliation for the International principles provide a platform for communi- Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant cation and negotiation, which humanitarian for President Omar al-Bashir in March 2009. actors can use to explain why they are unable to engage in favouritism and patronage, or sõ4HEõ PRINCIPLESõ PROVIDEõ Aõ BASISõ FORõ NEGOTIA- why they cannot align themselves with politi- tion with armed groups that control territory cal factions within communities. Interviewed or exert influence over it. This proved to be practitioners emphasised the importance of the case for one humanitarian organisation continuous communication with communi- in the DRC, which, having won government ties and other stakeholders before, during permission to operate, engaged in lengthy and after project implementation, in order negotiations with the armed group that con- to counter the rumours and allegations that trolled the area in question. The group’s routinely circulate. As highlighted by an aid local leaders initially demanded that the worker in South Sudan: organisation publicly acknowledge its le- gitimacy, but in response the NGO explained There were two communities in conflict, and that its role was to respond to the needs of one community was blocking access to a the population without taking sides. It also health facility in their area, which was sup- explained that it was the armed group’s re- posed to be open to both. It was a political sponsibility to grant access and guarantee se- issue, and we had to go and explain that this curity, which it eventually provided without wasn’t acceptable. So we closed for a few further demands for endorsement. days and told everyone that with it closed, we

6 hŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚEZŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂĐĐĞƐƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕:ĂŶƵĂƌǇƚŽƉƌŝůϮϬϭϮ

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 9 PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

sõEmbedding the principles within a broader ment of trust through needs-based and quality strategy is important during access negotia- aid delivery, building conﬁdence among com- tions. In Afghanistan, organisations adopted a munity members, using interlocutors strategi- contextualised approach to the principles, put- cally with armed groups and ensuring accept- ting forward strategies based on the establish- ance by elected ofﬁcials (see Box 2).

ŽǆϮ͘ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ͗ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐĐĞƐƐ /ŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĐŽŶŇŝĐƚĂŶĚŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞŝƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝ- ƚĂƌŝĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐƚŽŐĂŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶŶĞĞĚ͘^ŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐŚĂǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐĞƐƐ͕ďƵƚŵĂŶǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁ͘dŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĞŶĂďůĞĚ ŽŶĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůE'KƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶƚŽŶĞǁĂƌĞĂƐ͗

ͻKƵƚƌĞĂĐŚ͗dŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƵƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůǇƚŽƚĂůŬƚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂƌŵĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ͘ dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞďƌŝĞĨĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŵĞƚƚŚĞƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ͕ƌĞůĂǇŝŶŐďĂƐŝĐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶ͕ŝƚƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ͕ŝƚƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĂĐĐĞƐƐĂŶĚƐƚĂī ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŝƚƐǁŽƌŬ͘ ͻŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƟŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͗dŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐŽŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕ŝŵƉĂƌƟĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞʹĂŶĚƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞĚŝƐƟŶĐƟŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉŽůŝƟĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞŶƟƟĞƐʹŝŶƚŽĂ ĐůĞĂƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƟŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ͕ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶĂďŽƵƚŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌŝƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĚŽ͘ ͻďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌ͗dŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĂƚĂŝĚǁŽƵůĚĂƌƌŝǀĞĂƐĂŶĚǁŚĞŶƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚ͕ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶ ĞŶƐƵƌĞĚƚŚĂƚĨƵŶĚƐǁĞƌĞƐĞĐƵƌĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁĂƐŝŶŝƟĂƚĞĚ͘ ͻ^ƚĂĸŶŐ͗dŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƵƐĞĚƐƚĂīƉƌŽĮůĞƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞŝƚƐƚĞĂŵƐǁĞƌĞĞƚŚŶŝĐĂůůǇďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĂŝĚŝŶŐŝƚƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƟŽŶĂƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůĂŶĚŝŵƉĂƌƟĂů͘

3.1.2 Militating against the misappropriation of aid A distribution was underway in a particular Humanitarian organisations employ the prin- area, and a call came from a local authority ciples to help militate against the diversion accusing the NGO of racially motivated distri- and misappropriation of aid. Combating cor- bution. It turned out that one community had ruption can also improve local acceptance and been displaced and was in the area of another perceptions of an organisation as principled community. We were asked by community A and trusted. to conduct a separate distribution for them, not including community B. We refused, say- sõGiven that there is not usually enough aid to ing that the distribution was based on need meet all needs, the humanitarian principles and there could be only one recipient list. can provide transparent criteria for prioritisation. Organisations can face signiﬁcant pressure from authorities, armed groups and communities to support patronage systems, favour the most powerful rather than most efﬁcient contractors or divert aid to particu-

10 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

lar ethnic or politically aligned groups. Prac- – Representatives of national and local titioners observed that by consistently and NGOs said that the principles were equally transparently applying the principles in the relevant to their operations, but they had selection of beneﬁciaries and the monitoring less capacity, funding and support to en- of the project, they had been able to avoid sure consistent implementation. Despite such risks. In South Sudan, impartiality was the risks often faced by local and national used to circumvent community attempts to NGOs, the international humanitarian com- manipulate targeting and coercion by of- munity rarely seeks their opinions and in- ﬁcials to favour particular areas or popu- sight into the principles. Moreover, these lations. Impartiality also helped to reduce NGOs receive only limited support from do- community tensions: ‘We could argue [for nors, UN agencies and international NGOs action] purely from a position of authority to improve their capacity to incorporate the and this would be accepted, but you can’t humanitarian principles into their work operate that way. It will undermine commu- (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver, 2011). nity cohesion.’ 3.2 Strengthening the application of sõ4HEõ PRINCIPLESõ CANõ HELPõ STRENGTHENõ EMPLOY- principles ment, procurement and contractor policies While the principles are used to negotiate ac- and procedures. For example: cess and militate against the misappropriation of aid, there is plenty of room to improve – They can help to reduce pressure on local implementation. Consistency in interpretation staff working on remotely managed pro- and application, including in decision-making, jects. International organisations are in- are key areas for strengthening. creasingly using local staff and local or national NGOs to manage projects remotely as 3.2.1 Interpreting the principles a means of reducing security threats and The humanitarian principles provide for a costs. Aside from the ethical question of common approach and ways of working, de- outsourcing risk, remote management can spite different interpretations of their mean- increase pressure on local staff from com- ing among practitioners. When asked what munities and local stakeholders to engage they do and how they do it, practitioners did in favouritism, patronage and misappro- not necessarily articulate the principles word priation. Some try to counter such pres- for word, but it was often clear that they in- sure by citing impartiality and the need to formed a common approach to operations and be perceived as neutral, and by reiterating strategies. Practitioners could generally name these principles in monitoring, reporting the principles but described them in different and compliance procedures. ways. In particular, they:

– By emphasising the need for impartiality sõGENERALLYõUNDERSTOODõTHEõPRINCIPLEõOFõhuman- and the perception of neutrality in tender- ity and considered it the basis and justiﬁca- ing and procurement processes, organisation for operations; tions can reduce pressure from local pow- sõOFTENõCITEDõimpartiality when discussing good er holders and gatekeepers. Such practices practice in areas such as acceptance, beneﬁ- can also reinforce acceptance of the organi- ciary selection and monitoring; sation as being uncorrupted, transparent sõREVEALEDõTHATõTHEREõWASõLESSõCOMMONõGROUNDõ and accountable. concerning the principle of independence,

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 11 PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

which they often presented as a matter for While all the organisations I have worked host rather than donor government policies, for have some sort of policy reiterating the and which they considered less relevant in importance of humanitarian principles, in transition situations; practice I feel I play the role of the organisa- sõEMPHASISEDõ THEõ PERCEPTIONõ OFõ NEUTRALITYõ ASõ tion’s ‘bad conscience’ when it comes down to important in highly politicised and insecure the real decision-making. It is quite lonely to contexts such as Afghanistan; and argue against accepting funds, for instance, sõMENTIONEDõ CONCEPTSõ SUCHõ ASõ ACCOUNTABILITY õ when we can’t select our areas of intervention participation, transparency, predictability or beneficiaries based on needs, or we have to and the Do No Harm framework as equally work with partners that are not perceived by important in ensuring programme quality the population to be neutral. and acceptance. In particular, the principle of humanity — the Furthermore, the extent to which interview- imperative to save lives — may sometimes be ees promoted humanitarian principles among incompatible with impartiality and the other staff members, partners and affected popula- principles. Some form of balance or prioritisa- tions varied considerably, as not all NGOs have tion will normally be required, and this is often mechanisms in place to promote them system- influenced by the context and the stakeholders atically. Humanitarian organisations could sig- involved. As an example, in the DRC, due to the nificantly improve the consistent implementa- problems with the payment of civil servants, tion of the principles by elaborating clear and humanitarian organisations can be forced to simple internal guidance, ensuring relevant provide payments to security actors such as training and integrating them into monitoring the police or the army. This not only puts their and compliance frameworks. Despite the vari- neutrality and impartiality in question, but ous global, country and organisation-specific also puts them — in the case of British NGOs codes and policies, few organisations employ — in the uncomfortable position of potentially dedicated systems and training related to the breaching UK anti-bribery law. Certain organi- principles. Current tools and training frequent- sations felt justified in paying the military to ly appear to be tailored to local conditions, access victims and potentially save lives while with only limited adaptability when dynamics others argued that such an approach would change or practitioners move on to another lo- jeopardise all other organisations that refused cation. Humanitarian actors should emphasise to pay. Organisations also tend to rely on and the legal framework underpinning the princi- delegate to field staff in the expectation that ples to ensure that they are not treated as op- they will ‘get it right’. This can lead to incon- tional commitments; they should also demand sistency in the interpretation and application of that other stakeholders respect them as man- the principles, which constitutes a key risk for datory obligations. organisations and practitioners alike.

3.2.2 Principled decision-making It is not only the organisation concerned that Even though there is strong general aware- faces the risks associated with prioritising ness of the principles, it is often difﬁcult to ad- principles. When one organisation decides to here to all of them to the same standard at the prioritise or compromise a principle, it has same time, and many practitioners struggle to an impact on the perception and treatment of balance or prioritise them in a consistent and the wider humanitarian community, and this transparent manner. As one interviewee stated: clearly has implications for the local popula-

12 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE

tion. Such a decision may bring short-term Joint positions are considered to be difficult gains, but negative consequences in the long as it is a challenge to decide who is in and term. When an organisation uses a military es- who is out (what organisations are consid- cort to enable it to distribute food in a highly ered to be like-minded enough for our organi- insecure context, such as Afghanistan, the DRC sation to associate with?) and the challenge or Pakistan, it may compromise not only the of monitoring the adherence of organisations perception of its own neutrality but that of oth- once the joint position has been developed. ers, with repercussions for the future distribution of aid. Many practitioners, however, emphasised the importance of such efforts despite the chal- These dilemmas are not new, and humanitar- lenges, arguing that discussions about joint po- ian organisations employ a number of means to sitions in themselves served to highlight key di- address decision-making: lemmas across the community as a whole and facilitated the exchange of perspectives and sõOrganisations often have ‘red lines’ indi- lessons learned. cating standards below which operations are considered unacceptable or too restric- sõIn tandem with context analysis, the Do tive. Examples include a zero-tolerance pol- No Harm framework can help in decision- icy against sexual exploitation, insistence on making and prioritisation of the principles. anti-corruption guidelines, a refusal to pay Many practitioners called attention to the ‘taxes’ to armed groups and the imposition fundamental importance of the relationship of security thresholds, all of which reflect between the principles and the Do No Harm the humanitarian principles to some extent. framework for operations and decision- By using the principles to guide decision- making. When distributing aid in the DRC, making during the development of red lines, for example, strict adherence to impartiality organisations inform the development of can inflame ethnic or host community ten- context-specific minimum standards, which sions and place those in need at risk. In this can help them navigate complex operating situation, the Do No Harm framework allows environments. host communities to be targeted as a conflict mitigation strategy. In Sri Lanka, the princi- sõThe humanitarian community has on oc- ples were used by an international NGO in a casion agreed common red lines, such as decision-making process that led to its with- with the 1995 Agreement on Ground Rules drawal from the Menik Farm camp for inter- in South Sudan and the 1996 Joint Policy of nally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2009. While Operation in Liberia. These initiatives were thousands of IDPs were in need of assistance, relatively successful, but other attempts to the practice of internment by the military was establish country-specific joint positions have deemed to be causing unreasonable harm to failed to translate into practice or were not the population and badly compromising the consistently applied, as in the case of the principles of impartiality, neutrality and inde- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Ne- pendence (Nash, 2011). gotiation Ground Rule and the NGO Red Line Paper developed in Somalia in 2009. One practitioner reflected on complications inher- ent in reaching such agreements:

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 13 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

4. PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Given the extent to which humanitarian or- sõGlobal framework agreements with inter- ganisations rely on states for their funding, the national NGOs: Some donors, such as Den- availability of donor support can facilitate or mark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, impede principled humanitarian action. This are moving from project funding towards section reviews the challenges of inadequate supporting selected international NGOs via needs-based allocations, the transition gap as multi-year global partnership agreements, in well as the politicisation and securitisation of which a certain proportion of funding is left funding, and humanitarian organisations’ re- un-earmarked and thus remains available sponse to them. Some innovative coping strate- for sudden-onset disasters or the scaling up gies have been employed, but there is an ur- of programmes. gent need to further define what constitutes principled funding and to develop coherent ap- sõCommon funds for specific countries: Den- proaches towards donors. mark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK support common funds, often un-earmarked, 4.1 Funding arrangements for specific countries. Half of the UK’s allo- States have made a number of high-level com- cations for specific countries are channelled mitments to the humanitarian principles in the through CHFs and ERFs. Principles and Good Practice of Good Humani- tarian Donorship,7 the European Consensus on sõProject funding through international NGOs Humanitarian Aid8 and their own national poli- and UN agencies. France, Germany and Italy cies (Bayne, 2012). Several challenges continue provide project funding based on decisions to hamper implementation, however (see Box made in their respective capitals; the latter 3). European and North American donors seem two must do so due to restrictions imposed to channel country-based allocations largely by their legal frameworks for aid allocation. via UN agencies, the ICRC, international NGOs, In contrast, the UK’s Department for Interna- common humanitarian funds (CHFs) and emer- tional Development (DfID) provides funding gency response funds (ERFs), using the follow- based on the recommendations of humani- ing funding models (Bayne, 2012): tarian advisors in country offices.

7 ŽŶŽƌƐŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞŚŝŐŚͲůĞǀĞůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƟŽŶĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌĂŵĞ- ǁŽƌŬƐ͕ĂƐŐƵŝĚĞĚďǇ',͘>ĂƵŶĐŚĞĚŝŶϮϬϬϯďǇϭϴŵĂũŽƌĚŽŶŽƌƐƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĞīĞĐƟǀĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ͕ƚŚĞ',ŐƌŽƵƉŶŽǁĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐϯϳŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͘',ĞƐƚĂď- ůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĚŝƐƟŶĐƚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƟŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌĂŝĚƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĚŽŶŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĮĐĂůůǇĐŽŵŵŝƩĞĚƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŽƐƚƌŝǀĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞĂŶĚŇĞǆŝďůĞĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ĐŽƌĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ͕ŝŵƉĂƌƟĂůŝƚǇ͕ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͘ ϴ ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ',ŝŶŝƟĂƟǀĞ͕ĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŽŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝĚ͕ƚŚĞhĂĚŽƉƚĞĚƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŽŶ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝĚŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌϮϬϬϳ͘dŚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐĐŽŵŵŽŶǀĂůƵĞƐ ĂŶĚŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞh͛ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƟŽŶ͘/ƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂŶĚ/,>ĂŶĚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƚŚĞĚŝƐƟŶĐƚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌ- ŝĂŶĂĐƟŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶďƌŽĂĚĞƌĂŝĚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͘

14 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Žǆϯ͘^ƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨŬĞǇƚƌĞŶĚƐŝŶĚŽŶŽƌĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ

ͻŽŶŽƌƐŚĂǀĞŚŝŐŚͲůĞǀĞůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƟŽŶĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐ͘ ͻ/ŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĐŽƌĞĂŶĚŽŌĞŶƵŶͲĞĂƌŵĂƌŬĞĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŶĞůůĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵƵůƟͲ ůĂƚĞƌĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞhE͛ƐĞŶƚƌĂůŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ&ƵŶĚ;Z&Ϳ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ƐŚŝŌŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ͘DŽƌĞ ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͘ ͻdŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƟĐŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐĨŽƌĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŐůŽďĂůŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐĚŽŶŽƌƐ͛ŐĞŽ- ŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŝŶŐůŽďĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚůĞĂǀĞƐƌŽŽŵĨŽƌƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ŝŶŇƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƟŽŶ͘ ͻ^ŽŵĞĚŽŶŽƌƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐĞŶŵĂƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕ĂƌĞƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĨƵŶĚƐĨŽƌĨĞǁĞƌƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ĐƌŝƐĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƟǀĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƟŽŶƐ͘ ͻƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇůĞǀĞů͕ƐĞĐƚŽƌĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƟĞƐĂŶĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶŶĞĞĚƐ͕ǁŝƚŚ ŵŽƐƚĚŽŶŽƌƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇƌĞůŝĂŶƚŽŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ͘ ͻŽŶŽƌƐŚĂǀĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƐƚĂĸŶŐ͕ďŽƚŚĂƚŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĮĞůĚ͕ƉĂƌƚůǇĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨďƵĚŐĞƚĐƵƚƐ͘dŚŝƐůŝŵŝƚĂƟŽŶŚĂƐĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵŽŶŝƚŽƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ ĂŶĚƉŽŽůĞĚĨƵŶĚƐ͖ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ͖ĂŶĚƉůĂǇĂĐƟǀĞƌŽůĞƐŝŶĚŽŶŽƌ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶĨŽƌƵŵƐ͘ ͻDŽƐƚĚŽŶŽƌƐĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƟĐŽƌĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĨŽƌƐĞůĞĐƟŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĂƌƚ- ŶĞƌƐ͘dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƌĞůǇŽŶƚƌƵƐƚĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐǁŝƚŚĂŐŽŽĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƟŽŶĨŽƌ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŶŐŝŶĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŵĂŶŶĞƌ͘ ͻ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƟŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƌĞŽŌĞŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞƐĞůĨͲƌĞƉŽƌƟŶŐŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ͕ůŝŵŝƟŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƟĞƐĨŽƌĚŽŶŽƌŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚŽĨĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ͘ ͻŽŶŽƌƐĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐŽͲůŽĐĂƟŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶŽƌƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚĂĐƟǀŝ- ƟĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ͘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůƐŽĞīŽƌƚƐƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶ ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇůĞǀĞů͘ ͻŽŶŽƌƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ͘^ŽŵĞĚŽŶŽƌƐƚŚŝŶŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐŽĨĚŝīĞƌĞŶƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŝŶĂ ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƟĐǁĂǇ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞKʹĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ͘ ͻĞĐŝƐŝŽŶͲŵĂŬŝŶŐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌ- ĞŶƚ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽĐůĞĂƌĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĨŽƌǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƟƚƵƚĞƐůĂƐƚƌĞƐŽƌƚ͕ǁŚŽƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽƌŚŽǁƚŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇŝŶƉƌĂĐƟĐĞ͘ ͻDĂŶǇŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƵŶŝƚƐĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ͕ďƵƚ ŝƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌŚŽǁĨĂƌƚŚŝƐĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĮůƚĞƌƐĚŽǁŶƚŽĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͕ŽĸĐĞŽƌĮĞůĚůĞǀĞů͘ ^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗ĂǇŶĞ;ϮϬϭϮͿ

Official humanitarian funding reached approxi- based on needs alone (OECD, 2012a). Some mately $11 billion in 2011, yet this sum was still donors analyse a range of indicators annually insufficient to meet global needs (OCHA, n.d.). and develop vulnerability and crisis indices to Although many donors adopt policies that call determine the allocation of their resources.9 for needs-based funding, few make decisions Allocations, however, are often also influenced

9 ,KĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŬĞǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐĂŶŶƵĂůůǇƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĐƌŝƐĞƐŝŶĚŝĐĞƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĨŽƌŵŝƚƐ ĞĂƌůǇǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚŚĞůƉĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĮŶĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂůůŽĐĂƟŽŶĨŽƌŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĐƌŝƐĞƐ͘^ƉĂŝŶ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞƵƐŝŶŐ,K͛ƐŝŶĚŝĐĞƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶͲŵĂŬŝŶŐ;K͕ϮϬϭϮĂͿ͘

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 15 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

by what was provided the previous year (partly ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to to ensure stable funding flows), strategic geo- improve the system. These include not always political priorities, perceived comparative and being underpinned by sound needs assess- strategic advantages,10 historic or post-colonial ments, presenting inflated requests for some connections and the prioritisation of high-pro- projects and favouring high-profile, strategi- file emergencies.11 cally important or historically well-funded crises over protracted or forgotten ones (OCHA, The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which n.d.). That said, the CAP/CHAPs system is the is based on common humanitarian action plans closest thing to a global mechanism that do- (CHAPs), has become an increasingly important nors have to guide their allocations according influence on global donor allocations. The CAP, to need. Donors also use OCHA’s emergency however, has a number of weaknesses despite flash appeals in their global funding decisions substantial efforts by the UN Office for the Co- (see Figure 1).

&ŝŐƵƌĞϭ͘WĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨWĂŶĚŇĂƐŚĂƉƉĞĂůƐĨƵŶĚĞĚ͕ϮϬϭϭ

WĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨWΘ&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂůƐ&ƵŶĚĞĚϮϬϭϭ й&hE

ŝŵďĂďǁĞ zĞŵĞŶ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞWůĂŶ tĞƐƚĨƌŝĐĂ ^ƵĚĂŶ ^ƌŝ>ĂŶŬĂ&ůŽŽĚƐ&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂů ^ŽŵĂůŝĂ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞ>ǇďŝĂŶƌŝƐŝƐ WĂŬŝƐƚĂŶZĂƉŝĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞWůĂŶ;&ůŽŽĚƐͿ KĐĐƵƉŝĞĚWĂůĞƐƟŶŝĂŶdĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ EŝŐĞƌ EŝĐĂƌĂŐƵĂ&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂů EĂŵŝďŝĂ&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂů <ĞŶǇĂŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞWůĂŶ ,ĂŝƟ ů^ĂůǀĂĚŽƌ&ůĂƐŚƉƉĞĂů ũŝďŽƵƟƌŽƵŐŚƚƉƉĞĂů Z ŚĂĚ ĞŶƚƌĂůĨƌŝĐĂŶZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ

0 102030ϰϬ 50 60 70 ϴϬ 90 100

10 ŽŶŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĞŶŵĂƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƐŽͲĐĂůůĞĚ͚ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ͕͛ ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞǇĨƵŶĚĨĞǁĞƌƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĐƌŝƐĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƟǀĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƟŽŶƐ͘ 11 ŽŶŽƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĨŽƌĂǇŶĞ;ϮϬϭϮͿ͘

16 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

4.2 Key funding obstacles ure of global humanitarian need’ (OECD, 2012a, p. 21), donors can easily argue that 4.2.1 Challenges to needs-based funding it is difficult to compare needs across crises objectively, leaving room for prioritisation Needs assessments are essential to identifying based on other criteria. This leads to funding populations at risk, enabling prioritisation ac- distortions at the global level, which compro- cording to vulnerability and facilitating informed mises the ability of organisations to adhere to funding and response. ECHO has long sought the principle of humanity. Some practitioners to strengthen inter-agency cooperation on joint contrasted the difficulty of raising funds for a needs assessments. Its efforts have been com- neglected, protracted crisis such as the DRC plemented by the work of the Assessment Ca- with the ease of fundraising in a high-profile, pacities Project (ACAPS) and the development geo-politically important crisis such as Soma- of the multi-cluster initial rapid assessment lia, irrespective of the overwhelming needs in tool as part of a transformative agenda. Despite both situations. these undertakings, which were taken forward in the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force, con- sõThe categorisation and prioritisation of sistent methodologies and adequate capacity needs in different situations may not al- to collect and analyse data are lacking. Without ways reflect the reality on the ground and them, the following concerns arise: so distort funding allocations and response. Funding decisions and the resulting opera- sõPractitioners are acutely aware that a geo- tional response may be based on and rein- politically strategic crisis will normally re- force non-needs- or quasi-needs-based defi- ceive more funds than a protracted or ne- nitions, which can undermine the principles glected one, irrespective of need. As there is of humanity and impartiality, as in the DRC ‘currently no comprehensive, objective meas- (see Box 4).

Žǆϰ͘^ŚŽĐŬͲďĂƐĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞZ

/ŶƚŚĞZ͕ĚŽŶŽƌƐĚĞĮŶĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŶĞĞĚƐĂƐƚŚŽƐĞƌĞƐƵůƟŶŐĨƌŽŵĂƐŚŽĐŬŽƌ ͚ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ͛͘dŚĞĚĞĮŶŝƟŽŶĐŽǀĞƌƐŶĞĞĚƐƌĞƐƵůƟŶŐĨƌŽŵĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ͕ĞƉŝĚĞŵŝĐƐ ĂŶĚŶĂƚƵƌĂůĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ͘EĞĞĚƐďĞǇŽŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚĨƌŽŵƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐĂƵƐĞƐ͕ ĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ͘dŚŝƐƉƌĂŐŵĂƟĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƌĞŇĞĐƚƐĚŽŶŽƌƐ͛ƉƌŝŽƌŝƟƐĂƟŽŶĞīŽƌƚƐŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚ ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞŽǀĞƌĂůůŶĞĞĚƐ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞĚĞĮŶŝƟŽŶŚĂƐƉƌŽǀĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƟĐ͘dŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚŝƐŶŽƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐĐůĞĂƌ͕ƚŚĞĐŽŶŇŝĐƚĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŝƚŚŶĞĞĚƐĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƐŚŽĐŬƐ ůŝǀĞĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽǁŝƚŚĞƋƵĂůůǇƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŶĞĞĚƐ͘

/ŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ͕ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐŵĂǇŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĨŽƌŶĞĞĚƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐĂŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƐŚŽĐŬͲ ďĂƐĞĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ͘KŶĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐĨƵŶĚƐĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌĂƌĞĂ ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĨŽŽĚŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇǁĂƐĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇ>ŽƌĚ͛ƐZĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƌŵǇ;>ZͿĂƩĂĐŬƐ͖ǁŚĞŶ in ĨĂĐƚ͕ƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞƐǁĞƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƚŚĞE'KŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚĂƉƐĞƵͲ ĚŽͲƐŚŽĐŬͲďĂƐĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨŽƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŶĞĞĚƐ͕ƚŚƵƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐĞīĞĐƟǀĞŶĞƐƐ͘ŶŽƚŚĞƌE'KĐŝƚĞĚ ĚŽŶŽƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚŽŶůǇǀŝĐƟŵƐŽĨ>ZĂƩĂĐŬƐĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ƐƟŐŵĂƟƐĂƟŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƟŵƐĂŶĚĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞĞƋƵĂůǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶŶĞĞĚ͘

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 17 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

sõ4HEõPROVISIONõOFõAIDõEXCLUSIVELYõBASEDõONõSTA- justify prima facie allocations of resources tus can lead to distortions in response and without consideration of actual needs and undermine the principles of humanity and vulnerabilities. As stated in the case of DRC: impartiality. ‘Status’ recognises that particular groups may suffer systematic and specific Status can be seen as a precondition or a fil- threats, marginalisation and vulnerabilities ter. For example, if you work in an area of that require a targeted response. Based displacement, then you go by status first and on IHL, human rights law and refugee law, then by vulnerability. In the planning there is status recognises the need for special pro- also some space for host families, but in prac- tection of groups such as women, refugees, tice they are hard to identify. children, older people and ethnic minorities. Distortions can arise at the operational level, dŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƐƚĂƚƵƐŚĂƐĂůƐŽƌĂŝƐĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŝŶ however, when status arguments are used to ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ;ƐĞĞŽǆϱͿ͘

Žǆϱ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ dŚĞŶĞĞĚƐŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐĂƌĞƵŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ͕ďƵƚĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƟŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶĂƚƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨůŽŶŐĞƌͲƚĞƌŵƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌďŽƚŚƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐĂŶĚŚŽƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƟĞƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƟĐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ͕ǁŚĞƌĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐ͛ƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƟŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƟĞƐ͘/ŶƐŽŵĞĂƌĞĂƐ͕ƚŚŝƐůĞĚƚŽĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƟĞƐ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽďĞŶĞĮƚŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůŽĐĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƐƚĂǇĞĚƉƵƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƚǁŽͲĚĞĐĂĚĞĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ͘13ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ E'KƐĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇͲǁŝĚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶŶĞĞĚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇĨĂĐĞĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƌĞĚƵĐƟŽŶŝŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƌƌŝǀĂůŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐ͘

dŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐĂůƐŽƐŚŝŌĞĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ͕ǁŚĞƌĞŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵǁĞƌĞůŽĐĂͲ ƚĞĚ͕ǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽĐůŽƐĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐ ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͘ŽŶŽƌƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĞǇƉůĂŶŶĞĚƚŽƌĞĮŶĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƐƚĂƚƵƐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶĂŶĚĂĚũƵƐƚƚŚĞŝƌ ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ͘

sõSector or activity funding bias can compro- life-saving nature of the aid, but also some mise independent and impartial operations. donors’ preference for supplying excess ce- Donor preference for high-profile, ‘fashion- real supplies as in-kind contributions. These able’ sectors or activities can result in the dynamics can take shape at the expense of shifting of resources at the expense of oth- financial contributions for other sectors and er sectors, as was the case with sexual and can undermine needs-based programming gender-based violence (SGBV) in the DRC in as well as the principles of impartiality, inde- 2010 (see Box 6). The food sector is gener- pendence and humanity. ally the best funded, reflecting not only the

13 dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůƐŽĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĞƐďĞŝŶŐǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂƌĞĂŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶ͕ĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͘

18 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Žǆϲ͘^ĞĐƚŽƌĨŽĐƵƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞZ /ŶƚŚĞZ͕ĚŽŶŽƌƐŚĂǀĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƟĂůĨƵŶĚƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ^'s͘tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝƐǀĂƐƚ͕ƐĞǀĞƌĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇŚŝŐŚͲƉƌŽĮůĞĂƩĞŶƟŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚƵƌŝŶŐĂǀŝƐŝƚďǇh^^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞ͚ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĂďůĞ͛͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƉƌŽƉŽƌƟŽŶĂůƚŽŶĞĞĚƐ ŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ͘/ƚǁĂƐĞǀĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƟǀĞůǇĞĂƐǇĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽƐĞĞŬƐƵĐŚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ ƋƵĂůŝĮĞĚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ^'sͲƌĞůĂƚĞĚĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ͘dŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ^'sŵĂǇĂůƐŽďĞƉƌĞǀĞŶƟŶŐƚŚĞĚĞͲ ǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŵŽƌĞŚŽůŝƐƟĐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƌƚĂƌŐĞƟŶŐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌŚĞĂůƚŚŶĞĞĚƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐŵĂƚĞƌŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŶĚ,/sͬ/^͘^ŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚƚŽƚƌĞĂƚƌĂƉĞͲƌĞůĂƚĞĚĮƐƚƵůĂƐďƵƚŶŽƚ ƚŚŽƐĞĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇĐŚŝůĚďŝƌƚŚ͘

4.2.2 On-time and predictable funding the principle of humanity, is a daily operational battle. Physical access can be a major chal- Some areas are not secure and some are lenge when roads and infrastructure are poor not accessible physically. These limitations or non-existent, and this can be compounded inform where projects are located, and so by climatic and seasonal constraints, chronic the provision of assistance tends to be near poverty, under-development and corruption — the highway. as has been evident in South Sudan and the DRC. Remoteness is also often coupled with Principled humanitarian responses can be un- insecurity and chronic need, leading one aid dermined if some funding models, such as one- worker in the DRC to reﬂect: ‘Our organisa- year cycles, lack adequate support for logistical tion cannot really be seen as neutral. We only and administrative operational needs: work in areas controlled by the government’ sõHumanitarian organisations may not have (see Box 7). The issue is complicated further enough capacity or funds to operate in in- when political and military entities seek to secure or inaccessible areas, compromising blur lines, confuse identities and co-opt relief the humanitarian imperative and undermin- — as is evident in Afghanistan. Overcoming ing perceptions of neutrality and independ- these obstacles to ensure principled and ef- ence. Gaining access to vulnerable populations fective action can be expensive and requires wherever they are, which is directly related to sustained donor support.

Žǆϳ͘^ĂĨĞĂĐĐĞƐƐĐŽƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞZ It costs $50 to provide assistance to a child in Goma and $500 in a village far from the main towns. dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƟŽŶƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĂůůǇĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ͘/ƚŝƐĚŝĸĐƵůƚĨŽƌĚŽŶŽƌƐƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝīĞƌĞŶƚĐŽƐƚƐ͘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĮŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ͘/ŶĂǁĂǇ͕ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƟŽŶƐ͕ďƵƚĚŽŶŽƌƐĚŽŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƉĂǇƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƌĐŽƐƚ͘

ĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƌĞŵŽƚĞĂŶĚŝŶƐĞĐƵƌĞůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĞŶƚĂŝůƐĂĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůĮŶĂŶ- ĐŝĂůĐŽƐƚ͘ŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĂǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞŽĨĂĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůĂŶĚďĞƩĞƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͕ ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨŶĞǁďĂƐĞƐĂŶĚǁĂƌĞŚŽƵƐĞƐ͕ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŝƌŝŶŐŽĨƐƚĂī͘ ŝƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŵĂǇĂůƐŽďĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝĨůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƐĂĨĞůǇĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚďǇƌŽĂĚ͘

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 19 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Žǆϳ͘^ĂĨĞĂĐĐĞƐƐĐŽƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞZ;ĐŽŶƟŶƵĞĚͿ E'KƐŝŶƚŚĞZĐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞ,&ĂƐƌĞĐĞƉƟǀĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚĂďůĞƚŽĮŶĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƌĐŽƐƚƐ͘ ,KŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĐŽǀĞƌŚŝŐŚƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĐŽƐƚƐ͘'ƌĂŶƚƐĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĂƌĞƐŚŽƌƚͲƚĞƌŵ ĂŶĚƐŽĚŽŶŽƚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞůŽŶŐĞƌͲƚĞƌŵŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨŽĸĐĞƐŝŶŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ĂƌĞĂƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞŽĨĐŽŶƟŶƵĞĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ŐƌĂŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽŽůĞĚĨƵŶĚĂƌĞ ƌĞůĂƟǀĞůǇƐŵĂůůĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚĐŽǀĞƌĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƟǀĞĐŽƐƚƐ͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐƌŝƐŬĞƐƚĂďůŝͲ ƐŚŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ͕ƌĞĐƌƵŝƟŶŐƐƚĂī͕ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ͕ ŽŶůǇƚŽĨĂĐĞĐůŽƐƵƌĞĂŌĞƌĂǇĞĂƌ͕ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŶĞĞĚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵĞƚ͘

sõProject funding can suffer from short time- implementation is cut to six months, with se- frames, limited flexibility to accommodate rious implications for quality, needs-based changing needs, delays in disbursement programming. and burdensome reporting systems, all of which undermine the principle of humanity sõOne-year funding cycles may also compro- (Collinson, Buchanan-Smith and Elhawary, mise organisations’ ability to undertake needs 2009). A specific concern with the DRC’s six- assessments. In South Sudan, NGOs are ex- to 12-month funding cycle is that it is not pre- pected to provide needs assessments as the dictable enough to build an effective response basis for their project proposals. Without to a chronic crisis stretching over 15 years. funding up front, however, ‘it’s often a chick- Nor is it flexible enough to adapt to sudden en and egg situation. How can you do needs shifts in this volatile situation and rapidly assessments without the staff who can do it? emerging new needs. With the exception of A pre-implementation period for assessments CERF and flexible multi-year funding agree- would really help in the project cycle.’ 14 ments, delays in the disbursement of short- term project funds and the lack of flexibility sõPractitioners find the various donor funding to accommodate changing contexts can im- models to be confusing, with complicated, pede a timely and principled response. This time-consuming and unwieldy procedures is especially detrimental for national NGOs, that divert attention and resources from which rarely have the financial resources to operations. The case studies suggest that al- start projects on their own. The funding cal- though they are intended to promote flexibil- endar for South Sudan, which runs broadly ity, differing criteria for eligibility, application from January to December, means alloca- and reporting requirements, procurement tions are often not processed before March obligations and conditions and inconsistent or April, and the timetable does not accom- timeframes strain organisational capacity and modate the rainy season, which reduces ac- compromise organisations’ ability to respond cess to 60% of the country between July and quickly and appropriately based on need. September. As a result, the period for project

ϭϰ tŚŝůĞƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶZ&ĚŽĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŽƌƐƵĐŚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ͕ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŝƚŽƌĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŐŝƚ͘

20 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

4.2.3 The transition gap

The lack of clear safeguards for principled gap at the operational level, with variable re- funding during the transition gap has a sub- sults. Some key challenges include: stantial impact on principled humanitarian operations. Transition refers to the process by sõ(UMANITARIANõ ORGANISATIONSõ AREõ CONCERNEDõ which a country or location moves from armed that efforts by donors, the UN and the EU conflict to peace, stability and development. to improve coherence during the transition In theory, principled humanitarian action is period will encourage the integration of hu- phased out, and development and political en- manitarian activities and funding into politi- tities take over, working through local and na- cal and security strategies. This concern is by tional authorities and building their capacity in no means new and was raised as long ago the process. as 2008 (Donini et al., 2008). Scepticism will remain while donors’ stated commitments As recognised by the OECD–DAC and donors, to protect principled humanitarian space however, there is no linear or predictable tran- and action are not backed up by formal ap- sition from emergency to development (OECD, proaches that translate policy recognition 2010). Instead, as seen in the DRC and South into practical safeguards. Sudan, the different phases can exist simultaneously in the same locations, affecting the sõ4RANSITIONõ BRINGSõ NEWõ CHALLENGESõ INõ TERMSõ same communities. Change can also occur sud- of humanitarian organisations’ relationships denly, as a result of insecurity and the generally with national governments, political enti- unpredictable nature of the situation. Debates ties and national and international military over mandates, competencies and the status forces. During conflict or complex emergen- of ‘phases’ invariably reveal that the humani- cies such as those in Afghanistan and the tarian, development and political communities DRC, practitioners are generally reluctant to struggle to develop mutually beneficial ap- work with regional and UN missions that may proaches and instruments, resulting in a gap. be engaged in transition activities and con- sequently perceived as aligned with one of The OECD–DAC recently developed new fi- the parties to a conflict (Metcalfe, Giffen and nancing guidelines that acknowledge ‘the need Elhawary, 2011). They are also concerned to protect the neutrality and impartiality of hu- that where transition is focused on political manitarian aid, which initially might represent and security support for contested national a large proportion of total international as- authorities, as in Afghanistan and Somalia, sistance (OECD, 2012b). It provides no indica- it can compromise perceptions of neutrality. tion, however, of how such safeguards might This can present dilemmas for multi-man- be achieved beyond referencing GHD princi- date organisations in their relationships with ples. As a result, humanitarian, development government (see Box 8). and political entities try to reconcile the inher- ent tensions and complications of the transition

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 21 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

sõThe political desire to promote government onstrate peace dividends, even if local condi- ownership and leadership as part of transitions are inappropriate (see Box 9). tion may not always be realistic, but it can generate pressure to rein in humanitar- sõPractitioners and donors alike raised con- ian coordination and funding prematurely. cerns that humanitarian funds are often This was evident in South Sudan after the stretched to encompass both humanitar- signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agree- ian and early recovery activities during the ment in 2005 and with the international transition phase. Many NGOs resist fund- reconstruction effort in Afghanistan after ing from stabilisation or transition funds15 if 2001. In South Sudan, humanitarian organi- conflict and tensions are still high, as such sations recently moved towards a gradual financing can undermine perceptions of neu- handover of basic service delivery to local trality and compromise the impartiality of authorities, but a combination of renewed their response. This issue was raised as a conflict, a large influx of returnees and re- problem in the DRC, where humanitarian or- duced oil revenues has seen needs rise and ganisations have either had to use humani- government capacity decline. Nevertheless, tarian funds to cover all activities or take up some donors are still pressing humanitarian stabilisation funding in areas that are not actors to move towards development to dem- necessarily stable.

Žǆϴ͘DƵůƟͲŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĚĞďĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐĂƌĞ ĂďůĞƚŽƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĨƵůĮůďŽƚŚĂŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ͘

KƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽďĞĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌǁŚŝůĞĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŝŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ͕ĂŬĞǇƉŽŝŶƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝ- ĐŝĞƐĂŶĚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĐůŽƐĞůǇůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ͘dŚĞǇƐĂǇŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŝĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŽƌŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂƉĂƌƚǇƚŽĂĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ͘dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůƐŽƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ͕ƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌůǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚŽŶĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŵƵůƟƉůĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂƚ- ƚĞƌ͚ďůƵƌƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐ͛ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƉĞƌĐĞƉƟŽŶŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƐ͘

^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŵƵůƟͲŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚůŝŶĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝĨĂŶĂŐĞŶĐǇǁŽƌŬƐǁŝƚŚĂŶĞĚƵĐĂƟŽŶŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ŽŶĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůĂ͕ĞǆĂŵƐĂŶĚƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ͛ƉĂǇ͘ĚƵĐĂƟŽŶ͕ƚŚĞǇƐĂǇ͕ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌ- ǀŝĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ͚ďĂƩůĞĮĞůĚ͕͛ĂŶĚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶŚĂƐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŝƐĚŝƐƟŶĐƚĨƌŽŵĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĂƩĞƌƐŽƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͘

ŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂƌŝƐĞƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŝƐƉŽůŝƟĐŝƐĞĚĂŶĚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐǇĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͕ŽƌĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽƌǁŚŽůĞͲŽĨͲŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŽƌĂŐĞŶĚĂƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶůĞŐŝƟŵŝƐŝŶŐĂƉŽůŝƟĐĂůĮŐƵƌĞŚĞĂĚͶ ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐĞīĞĐƟǀĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ͘

15 ^ƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶĨƵŶĚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞh<ŽŶŇŝĐƚWŽŽů͕ƚŚĞƵƚĐŚ^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ&ƵŶĚ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͛ƐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚͲKƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇĂŶĚdƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶĂůŝĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚ^ƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶ&ƵŶĚ͘

22 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

sõThe transition process may leave little room Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic for advocacy on needs when the messages Republic of the Congo (STAREC) reportedly contradict donor and host government caused UN agencies to delay publicly ac- rhetoric about peace and stability. This was knowledging humanitarian needs on at least particularly evident in Afghanistan in 2007 one occasion.16 and 2008, when the security situation was rapidly deteriorating. Practitioners said that 4.2.4 The impact of securitisation and the caseload of conflict-related IDPs contin- politicisation ued to be overlooked despite their increas- There is widespread alarm across the humani- ing number amid escalating conflict. Con- tarian community at efforts by states to de- firming the findings of other studies (DARA, velop comprehensive political, development, 2010), respondents raised concerns about emergency response and security strategies. compromised data as a result of poor acces- Examples include the EU ‘comprehensive ap- sibility or a reluctance by national govern- proach’, the UN’s integrated missions, and ments, donors or other international actors counterinsurgency strategies. Practitioners are to publish findings that show rising needs or concerned that these strategies encourage the worsening conflict. In the DRC, MONUSCO’s politicisation and securitisation of humanitar- role as a supporter of the Stabilization and ian action and contribute to greater insecurity

Žǆϵ͘^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ͗ŝŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͍ ^ŽƵƚŚ^ƵĚĂŶ͛ƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƟŽŶŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŝŶ:ƵůǇϮϬϭϭŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚƉŽůŝƟĐĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶ͕ďƵƩƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƟŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶŇŝĐƚǁŽƵůĚƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƟŽŶ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ͘DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ͕ƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƌĂŝƐĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚŝŌŝŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĚŝĚ ŶŽƚƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĐŽŶƟŶƵŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚƌĞĂůŝƟĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ͘dŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƌĞŵŝ- niscent of ƚŚĞƉƌĞŵĂƚƵƌĞŽƉƟŵŝƐŵĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞϮϬϬϱƐŝŐŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞWĞĂĐĞŐƌĞĞ- ŵĞŶƚ͕ǁŚĞŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶ͕ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂŶĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůĞĚ͕ŽŶůǇ ƚŽďĞƌĞŝŶƐƚĂƚĞĚĂĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ͘

ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽŌĞŶĐŝƚĞĚŝŶĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶƉůĂŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞĐƚŽƌ͕ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚŬĞǇĚŽŶŽƌƐŚĂǀĞĚŝǀŝĚĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƟĞƐďǇƐƚĂƚĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ;ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ ŚĞĂůƚŚĐůŝŶŝĐƐͿĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇŶĞǁƉƌŝŽƌŝƟƐĂƟŽŶĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ͘dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƟƐĂƟŽŶŽĨĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇŶĞĞĚƐŽŶĐĞƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƟŽŶŚĂƐďĞŐƵŶƚŽƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞ͘^ŽŵĞĚŽŶŽƌƐĂƌĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞͲďĂƐĞĚĮŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ͕ďƵƚŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŝůůďĞƉŝůŽƚĞĚŝŶ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŝĸĐƵůƚĂŶĚĐŽŶŇŝĐƚͲƉƌŽŶĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ͕ĂŝĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐĨĞĂƌƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƟĂůŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶŚĞĂůƚŚ ŶĞĞĚƐ͘dŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇŽŶĂƐƐŝƐƟŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů:ƵďĂĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐ ǁŝƚŚƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚŶĞĞĚƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ͘

16 ĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ͕Z͕ϮϬϭϭ͘

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 23 PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

for aid workers, a reduction in operational ac- as governments and the military knew that cess and increased suffering of populations in the ‘last resort’ element only applied with need. Some examples include: regard to humanitarian assistance [not development] they sought to narrow down what sõAlthough humanitarian actors have repeat- is considered to be humanitarian to basically edly expressed concerns, military forces mere distributions of blankets and food. Any continue to implement humanitarian-style other activity was classified as ‘development’ quick impact projects (QIPs) with counterin- — thus free for anybody to undertake. surgency, force protection and intelligence gathering objectives. Such activities blur the lines between military and humanitarian en- sõCounterinsurgency and comprehensive tities, making it difficult for the civilian pop- security strategies redefine how civilians ulation to differentiate between them. They engage and are portrayed in the context also award aid based on political preference of armed conflict. Such strategies may ef- rather than need, and increase the risk of re- fectively compel humanitarian actors — and prisals by armed opposition groups against those who receive humanitarian aid — to humanitarian workers and the populations take sides or portray themselves as doing so, they assist. In Afghanistan, the Provincial as aid is distributed according to political and Reconstruction Team practice of providing military aims rather than to alleviate suffer- medical assistance or distributing medical ing on the basis of need. In Afghanistan, these supplies to ‘win hearts and minds’ exposes strategies have shifted the burden of risk medical staff and patients to the threat of at- onto the civilian population, who, by receiv- tack by insurgents (DARA, 2010). ing such aid, may be labelled collaborators. ISAF and the Afghan government have used sõArguments for securitisation strategies can the improvement in performance of schools unreasonably limit the definition of principled and health clinics as evidence of the success humanitarian action. In Afghanistan, ISAF of their counterinsurgency strategy, but such eventually recognised that the use of emer- co-option of the provision of basic public gency relief to support military objectives goods and services can leave civilians who contravened the notion of last resort, as set use them open to reprisal from the armed op- out in the 1994 Oslo Guidelines and the 2003 position, which sees them as contributing to Military and Civil Defence Assets Guidelines pro-government or ISAF campaigns. (UNDHA, 1994; OCHA, 2007). ISAF’s position, however, only applies to humanitarian aid. One respondent remarked that:

24 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

sõCounter-terrorism measures raise serious tied to counter-terrorism conditions, or do not obstacles to principled humanitarian ac- work in areas where there is a risk of engage- tion and to accessing populations in need ment with groups that may be blacklisted, a (see Box 10). Such measures generally seek decision that would undermine the principle to criminalise the provision of ‘material sup- of humanity. In Somalia, it has been argued port’ to designated terrorist or other pro- that ‘US counter-terrorism laws played [a] scribed (blacklisted) groups. Material sup- central role in obstructing assistance from port is deﬁned very broadly and can include reaching famine victims in desperate need humanitarian aid that may end up directly or of aid’ and that ‘humanitarian organisations indirectly beneﬁting a blacklisted group, re- avoided delivering food aid to drought-struck gardless of whether this was the intent. As areas controlled by al-Shabaab, over con- the Afghanistan case study reveals, many or- cerns about the likelihood of violating the ganisations thus either avoid funding that is USA Patriot Act’ (PressTV, 2012).

ŽǆϭϬ͘ŽƵŶƚĞƌͲƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨE'KƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƟǀĞƐƐƉŽŬĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚŽŶŽƌĐŽƵŶƚĞƌͲƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŝŶĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ͘^ŽŵĞE'KƐĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞh^ŐĞŶĐǇĨŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƌĞĚƵĐĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽďĞďůĂĐŬůŝƐƚĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŐŚĂŶdĂůŝďĂŶ͘KƚŚĞƌƐĂǀŽŝĚĞĚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶĂƌĞĂƐ ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚďůĂĐŬůŝƐƚĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ͘E'KƐĂůƐŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŚĂƚ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĐŽƵůĚĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŽĂŶĞŶƟƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶ͕ĂŶĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶŽƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂī͘

hŶƟů^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌϮϬϭϮ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂĚŶŽƚĐůĂƐƐŝĮĞĚĂŶǇŐƌŽƵƉƐĐůŽƐĞůǇĂĸůŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ĨŐŚĂŶdĂůŝďĂŶĂƐ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐ͘ǀĞŶƐŽ͕ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƉƌŽŚŝďŝƟŽŶƐĂƌŐƵĂďůǇĂīĞĐƚŽŶůǇ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͘ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĐůĂƌŝƚǇƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞĂŶĚŝŵƉůŝĐĂƟŽŶƐŽĨĐŽƵŶƚĞƌͲƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐǁŚŽŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞůŝƐƚƐ͘

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 25 OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

5. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Humanitarian organisations and practitioners drawn can also vary within organisations with deal with donor policies and practices that im- changes in personnel. There is a lack of agree- pede principled humanitarian action in a vari- ment as to what constitutes ‘tainted’ funds, but ety of ways. These range from acceptance of all some of the common factors identified were: funding regardless of the conditions to refusal based on the risks to principled action. Screen- sõContested donors: (1) donor agencies of ing of donors and funding is especially common countries considered a belligerent in the in more insecure and politicised contexts, such country in question (such as NATO members as Afghanistan. As with the use of the princi- in Afghanistan) or those whose contributions ples in acceptance strategies, however, there is would be hotly contested by key stakeholders little organisational or system-wide guidance (such as US funds in Somalia or Pakistan); on how and according to which criteria deci- and (2) funds from defence ministries chan- sions are made. nelled through military forces, such as QIPs or Commander’s Emergency Response Pro- 5.1 Defining principled humanitarian funding gramme funds. This study highlights that practitioners have a sõFunds linked closely to political or military diverse understanding of donor commitments to objectives: (1) stabilisation and peace-build- the humanitarian principles. Some interviewed ing initiatives (such as STAREC funds in the donors expressed surprise that partners rarely DRC or bilateral funds in Afghanistan tied to use the language of their national policies, GHD areas where donor country troops operate); or the European Consensus on Humanitarian and (2) humanitarian operations linked to Aid in their project proposals, lobbying and en- Clear, Hold, Build-style strategies, which aim gagement. to stabilise areas after military operations. sõFunds dependent on obligatory coordination Practitioners also have widely differing opin- or partnership with contested entities: ini- ions of what should constitute principled hu- tiatives that require coordination or regular manitarian funding. Without some consistency meetings with the military or certain minis- regarding the meaning of principled funding tries, and those that involve accepting man- and a better understanding of donor commit- datory visits from such entities at programme ments, it will be very difficult for humanitarian sites. organisations to advocate and secure strengthened adherence by donors. It may not be consistent across the humanitarian community or systematically applied within 5.2 Screening for suitable funds organisations, but the pre-screening of funds Many humanitarian organisations appear to implies that those accepted for use in humani- pre-screen funds for their suitability. Some tarian action (which organisations will have avoid funds they consider too politicised or discussed with donors) are already relatively militarised, and those that may compromise free of unacceptable conditions. A key risk for perceptions of neutrality and commitments to the humanitarian community is that ‘purely’ humanity, impartiality and independence. The humanitarian funds are ever more stretched criteria and process for determining suitability, to cover needs as states increasingly priori- however, vary across the humanitarian com- tise transition, politicisation and securiti sation munity (see Box 11). Where the line is strategies.

26 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Žǆϭϭ͘&ƵŶĚŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĨŽƌƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ͗E'KƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƟǀĞƐĨƌŽŵĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ WƌĂĐƟƟŽŶĞƌƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚŝŶĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐĂŶĚĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽ ƐĞůĞĐƟŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͗

͚tĞŚĂǀĞĂŐůŽďĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨŶŽƚƚĂŬŝŶŐh^ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚǁĞĚŽŶ͛ƚƚĂŬĞĨ/ŵŽŶĞǇŝŶ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶĂƐŝƚ͛ƐƟĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶŝŶ,ĞůŵĂŶĚͶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐďƵƚǁĞĨĞĞů ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐĞŶĚĂŝƐƐƟůůƉƌĞĞŵŝŶĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶͲŵĂŬŝŶŐ͘tĞƉƌĞĨĞƌEŽƌĚŝĐĨƵŶĚƐĂŶĚ ƵƐĞ^/΀^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶŐĞŶĐǇ΁ĂŶĚ΀ĂŶĂĚŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŐĞŶĐǇ΁ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘tĞĂůƐŽƵƐĞŽƵƌŽǁŶƵŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚŝŶĐŽŵĞ͛͘

͚tĞƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƵƐĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶĨƵŶĚƐĂŶĚǁŽŶ͛ƚƚĂŬĞh^ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƌĞ͛ƐĂƐƟŐŵĂĂƩĂĐŚĞĚ͘tĞ ŚĂǀĞŶ͛ƚŚĂĚĐŽŶĚŝƟŽŶƐŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶŽƵƌĨƵŶĚƐ͕ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŽŶĞĚŽŶŽƌƐƟƉƵůĂƚĞĚǁŚŝĐŚǀŝůůĂŐĞƐǁĞ ǁĞƌĞƚŽƉƌŝŽƌŝƟƐĞͶ/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚǁĂƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚůŽĐĂůƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐ͘ ŌĞƌĚŽŝŶŐĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚǁĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚƚŚŝƐ΀ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ΁͛͘

͚tĞŚĂǀĞĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨŶŽƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚWƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶdĞĂŵƐ΀WZdƐ΁ĂƐǁĞĂƌĞĐŽŶ- ĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽǀŝƐŝƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĨŽƌůŝĂŝƐŽŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞ͛ƐŶŽƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů WZdŝŶ<ĂďƵů͕ǁĞŚĂǀĞƵƐĞĚWZdĨƵŶĚƐĂƐǁĞĐĂŶĚĞĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ͛͘

͚tĞŚĂǀĞĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƉƟŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĚŽŶŽƌƐǁŝƚŚƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͕ ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚǁĞŚĂǀĞďƌŽŬĞŶƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶĂĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ͘tĞĚŽŶ͛ƚ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚĂŬĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ĨƵŶĚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh^͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŽƌ&/ĂŶĚǁŝůůƵŶĚĞƌŶŽĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂĐĐĞƉƚWZdĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ͛͘

5.3 Navigating funding conditionality Humanitarian organisations employ a variety Private funds are seen as crucial for many of strategies, ranging from accepting all funds organisations to safeguard principled action regardless of the conditions to refusal based and intervene in areas and sectors not pri- on the potential risks to principled action. The oritised by donors, or where donors are per- spectrum includes: ceived as overly politicised. sõPushback to donors: Some large organisa- sõConsent: Some organisations acquiesce to tions will engage in direct dialogue with do- conditions without further discussion with nors on the proposed conditions if they be- the donor, accepting that their programmes lieve doing so will improve their capacity to will to some extent be compromised. This is provide principled, needs-based assistance. especially the case for organisations lacking On occasion, this approach can lead donors secure or diverse funding. to lift conditions. sõAvoidance: Some organisations do not take sõCombining funding sources: Many organi- funds if doing so conflicts with their princi- sations strive to secure different sources of ples. Yet if the definition of humanitarian ac- funds and create a diverse base of public tion and the recognition of needs are compro- and private funding sources that is not reli- mised by political or security agendas, and ant on any one major donor while ensur- funds shift too quickly to transition, avoid- ing that their overall programme is in line ance becomes increasingly difficult. with organisational principles and policies.

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 27 OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Representatives of a number of organisations One example from the DRC shows that donors remarked that they had successfully pushed such as DFID and SIDA have demonstrated back on often well-intentioned but misguided flexibility in what they are ready to fund rather donor requirements. This shows that they can than following a strict interpretation of what play an important role in influencing donor be- constitutes humanitarian work. Respondents haviour. Ensuring that practitioners are edu- also mentioned that SIDA’s willingness to pro- cated about donor commitments (for example, vide multi-year funding and DFID’s interest in to GHD, relevant national policies or the Eu- project visits and constructive feedback helped ropean Consensus on Humanitarian Aid) could to bridge some of the gaps in understanding. potentially aid NGOs to successfully negotiate principled funding arrangements. Some donors do not have dedicated staff ex- perienced in humanitarian action based in 5.4 Dialogue between NGOs and donors country due to financial constraints or a lack While most practitioners — be they humanitar- of access, which can affect understanding of ian workers or donors — strive to adhere to the the context and operational realities. In such humanitarian principles, numerous obstacles cases, close and regular discussion with the can inhibit implementation. As the case studies NGOs concerned, and also with donors with a show, this may be due to different understand- field presence, can help practitioners to over- ing of the humanitarian principles. The rea- come limitations. For example, in Afghanistan sons can relate to the internal functioning and visits by donors who use armed escorts can management of organisations or donors, which jeopardise the perception of an NGO by the could be more easily addressed than external host community or armed groups. NGOs raised ones (such as the attitude of armed groups, in- this concern with donor representatives, who security or physical barriers). subsequently refrained from visiting a project.

The case studies offer examples of constructive While the examples above illustrate the impor- dialogue between NGOs and donors that helped tance of dialogue between NGOs and donors both sides to overcome some of the challenges that endeavour to adhere to a principled ap- cited above. For example, the participation of proach, it should be recognised that some of the donors in the Humanitarian Country Team as challenges to principled humanitarian action well as the Humanitarian Coordination Forum lie beyond such a dialogue, in which case solu- in South Sudan facilitates dialogue on the hu- tions need to be found through other means. manitarian situation and response efforts. It also provides an opportunity for advocacy with the government, with respondents reported that donors, especially those with good rela- tions with the UN Department of Safety and Se- curity, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudanese government, could be more outspoken on issues regarding the safety of staff.

28 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The principles of humanity, impartiality, inde- by seeking to apply filters to ‘tainted’ funding pendence and neutrality are codified in inter- or by employing strategies such as pushback, national law. They are also tools that humani- combining funding sources, acquiescence or tarian organisations use on a daily basis to avoidance. facilitate the safe delivery of aid to populations in need during crises. Humanitarian actors Humanitarian practitioners do not share a uni- have made various commitments to the princi- fied understanding of donor commitments to ples in global, country and organisation-specif- the humanitarian principles, and they have ic policies and frameworks, with the most im- widely differing opinions about what should portant being the Code of Conduct for the Red and should not constitute principled funding. Cross and Red Crescent Movement. NGOs use Without a more consistent sense of what prin- the humanitarian principles to: cipled funding means and an enhanced understanding of donor commitments, it will be sõSUPPORTõTHEõNAVIGATIONõOFõCHALLENGESõINõINSE- increasingly difficult for organisations to advo- cure, politicised and unpredictable contexts; cate and secure strengthened adherence to the sõASSISTõ INõ THEõ PERCEPTIONnACCEPTANCEnACCESSõ principles by donors. process, including negotiations with communities, armed groups and governments; and Recommendations sõenhance quality programming, including miti- gating the risks of aid being misappropriated. Humanitarian organisations should: sõ3EEKõTOõESTABLISHõCOMMONõPOSITIONSõONõWHATõ Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations con- constitutes principled humanitarian funding tinue to face critical challenges in reconciling and unacceptable donor conditions, in order their commitments with operational realities. to foster collective and more effective action. Improvements could be made by: (1) develop- sõ%NCOURAGEõ DONORSõ TOõ REMOVEõ UNPRINCIPLEDõ ing clear guidance and systems for the imple- funding conditions, both direct and indirect, mentation of the principles and monitoring and to recognize other key issues (such as the compliance with them; (2) developing clear need for flexible funding). To this end, they decision-making frameworks; and (3) investing should strive to formulate practical argu- in common approaches. ments with reference to donor commitments under GHD and the European Consensus on Humanitarian actors also encounter significant Humanitarian Aid. obstacles in their daily operations, not least in sõEstablish mechanisms to strengthen the sys- the area of principled funding, despite strong tematic implementation and monitoring of pol- commitments by European and North Ameri- icies focused on the humanitarian principles, can states to the humanitarian principles. En- both within organisations and collectively. suring needs-driven allocations, addressing the sõ3TRENGTHENõTHEõABILITYõOFõSTAFFõTOõINTERPRETõANDõ transition gap and safeguarding humanitarian prioritise the principles as tools for navigating aid from securitisation and politicisation are obstacles, including methods to strengthen key challenges. Humanitarian organisations guidance for principled decision-making and generally appear to be navigating them either consistent training and capacity building.

Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action 29 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

sõ#ONTINUEõ TOõ INVEST õ BOTHõ INDIVIDUALLYõ ANDõ sõ!CTIVELYõ SUPPORTõ BETTERõ NEEDSõ ASSESSMENTSõ jointly, in assessments to strengthen needs- and analysis through the IASC Needs Assess- based programming. In addition, they should ment Task Force, ACAPS and other mecha- engage in advocacy with donors to secure nisms, and develop shared global indica- sufﬁcient funds and time to conduct assess- tors and mechanisms to promote allocations ments as a basis for project proposals and based on need, including through improved development. CAPs and CHAPs. sõAgree a compact with donors on measures sõ!DOPTõSAFEGUARDSõTOõAVOIDõNARROWõDElNITIONSõ to strengthen and safeguard adherence to the of humanitarian action, and to separate hu- humanitarian principles in the area of funding. manitarian action from crisis management, stabilisation, counterinsurgency and com- States, including donor agencies, should: prehensive approach-style strategies. They sõ!DHEREõTOõTHEõCOMMITMENTSõTHEYõHAVEõMADEõ should avoid counter-terrorism measures to the principles of humanity, impartiality, that encroach on humanitarian action, in- independence and neutrality as part of including through the implementation of ex- ternational law, national policies, GHD and emptions for principled humanitarian action where relevant the European Consensus on and practitioners. Humanitarian Aid. sõ2EVIEWõDONORõPOLICIESõANDõPROCEDURESõTOõEN- sõWithin the GHD group, develop clear indica- sure there is enough ﬂexibility to allow pro- tors, guidance and compliance mechanisms to jects to be driven by need. This should in- strengthen implementation of commitments clude the re-evaluation of time restrictions, to the humanitarian principles by individual administrative procedures and prioritised member states and the group as a whole. sectors and geographic areas on an ongoing basis and in consultation with implementing partners. sõ)NVESTõ FUNDINGõ INõ ACTIVITIESõ THATõ ENABLEõ HU- manitarian organisations to strengthen acceptance strategies, including the additional security and logistics costs required for operations in insecure or remote locations.

30 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action BIBLIOGRAPHY

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34 Tools for the Job: Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action

Authors: Ingrid Macdonald and Angela Valenza, Norwegian Refugee Council.

Publisher: Norwegian Refugee Council Post box 6758 St. Olavs plass N-0130 Oslo Tel: (+47) 23 10 98 00 Fax: (+47) 23 10 98 01 E-mail: [email protected] www.nrc.no

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection