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Allies For All Times? A Study on the Disintegration of Greek Interstate Alliances in the Classical Period
Connie Galatas Department of History McGiIl University, Montreal
August 2008
A thesis submitted to McGiIl University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Arts
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1+1 Canada Acknowledgements
First I would like to thank my family for their constant support. To my parents, especially my mother, thank you for your wise words and for providing me with the means to complete my masters. I would also like to thank my brother Christos, who assisted me in putting my thesis in its final form. Though he is studying Medicine, we still share a similar passion and interest for ancient history. To my friends, I appreciated your words of encouragement and I would like to thank Sarah Limoges in particular for editing a small part of my paper. I am also grateful to Karen Connors and the other ladies in McGiIFs History department for helping me submit the final product. I would like to thank Professor Michael Fronda for offering his seminar on interstate relations and foreign policy in the ancient Mediterranean. It was partially this course that influenced me to focus on Greek diplomacy. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Hans Beck, not only for his time and effort, but for providing me with the tools and guidance throughout my university education to be able to write my thesis. His work on federalism is another factor that inspired me to write my thesis on the disintegration of Greek interstate alliances.
Truly, I want to thank you all. Sa? e??a??st? p??a p???.
Connie Galatas Abstract
The following offers a new perspective to explain the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation in the early half of the fourth century B.C. Members of both these alliances had legal and conventional expectations regarding what they had to give and what they could receive from their associations. Tensions and conflicts arose within an alliance once an individual polis did not fulfill its duties and obligations. There were two factors that persuaded a member not to meet their expected responsibilities: one was the role of a polis' factions and the other was the intervention in the association's affairs by a third party. It was primarily the failure of an alliance's members to meet each others expectations that inevitably led to the dissolution of these interstate organizations.
La suivante offre une nouvelle perspective sur la dissolution de la Ligue Péloponnésienne, ainsi que de la Fédération Béotienne durant la première moitié du quatrième siècle av. J.-C. Les membres de ces deux alliances avaient des attentes envers ce qu'ils devaient à leurs associations, ainsi que ce à quoi ils devaient s'attendre de celles- ci, et ce légalement et traditionnellement. Tensions et conflits se mirent de la partie lorsqu'un polis refusait de remplir ses devoirs et ses obligations. Ceci était dû à deux facteurs distincts: l'un fût le rôle des partis internes du polis, et l'autre de l'intervention d'un tierce parti dans les affaires internes de l'association. C'était surtout dû à l'incapacité des membres de se rejoindre quant à leurs attentes envers l'un et l'autre qui mena inévitablement à la dissolution de ces organisations. Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Methodology 4
Section 1 : The Peloponnesian League 9
I) Sparta's and her Allies' Expectations 11 II) From the Peace of Nicias to the Early Fourth Century 18 III) Domestic Politics 27 a. Sparta's Political Factions 29 b. The Allies and Their Factions 42
rV) Third Party Intervention 45 V) Summary 49
Section 2: The Boeotian Federation 51
I) Differences between the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation 52
II) The Expectations of the Members in the Boeotian Federation 54 III) Events from the Fifth and early Fourth Centuries 61
G/) Domestic Politics 75 V) Third Party Intervention 83
VI) Summary 87
Conclusion 89
Bibliography 94 Galatas 1
Introduction
The study of Greek interstate alliances in the classical period is a topic that has been discussed by both ancient and modern authors. For the most part, these discussions have centered on why an individual polis would want to create and be a part of a multistate association. It seems that some poleis thought that they would have a greater chance to preserve their independence against an already present or potential threat if they combined their military resources with one another. As such, alliances, like the Hellenic League of the fifth century, were designed to ensure the collective security and defence of its members.1 Other Greek interstate alliances, however, were formed to facilitate the communication and interaction between a group oí poleis who shared the same cultural and ethnic background. The Delphic Amphictyony, for instance, was an alliance between twelve tribes that were responsible for the maintenance and organization of all religious affairs surrounding Apollo's sanctuary.
Whether military, political or social in nature, all these alliances have one common characteristic: they helped govern the relationship and interaction between small and great poleis. Thus, another reason why many scholars have studied these associations is because of the prominent role that they played in terms of shaping and influencing Greek interstate relations; especially concerning issues of war and peace. However, to fully understand the impact that these alliances had on Greek diplomacy, one has to consider both the causes for their integration as well as their disintegration. In the past, many scholars explained the collapse of these Greek alliances by focusing on one single
1 According to Bennett and Oliver collective defence and collective security differ from one another. The former was designed to offer a group of states mutual protection against an outside attacker. The latter, meant that the alliance could also attack others to ensure the security of its members. See Bennett & Oliver 2002: 147. For a discussion on the Hellenic League see Larsen 1933: 267. Galatas 2 event. For example, there seems to be a general consensus that the Peloponnesian League fell apart in 371 B.C. after Sparta was defeated by Thebes in the Battle of Leuktra." In addition, most authors point towards the introduction of the Kings' Peace in 386 to describe the dissolution of the Boeotian League.
These types of explanations are problematic because they tend to look at internal and external factors separately instead of collectively. Greek interstate relations was a complex system where a multiple of variables worked together and against one another; consequently, it is insufficient and misleading to look at a single episode to explain the disintegration of an alliance. This problem can be avoided by focusing on the local and foreign factors that shaped the type of relationship that individual members had with one another. In other words, the successes and failures of an alliance primarily depended on whether there was a favourable or unfavourable relationship between the allies. One way to determine the relations between a group of poleis is by examining their expectations concerning their duties and obligations. When these expectations were met, there seems to have been a fairly 'good' relationship between the members of an alliance; which meant that conflict was kept at a minimum and there was no desire to break up the union. On the other hand, tensions arose when the alliance failed to meet the expectations of its members. As the allies became more and more disgruntled with one another, their desire to abandon or disband the alliance also increased.
The following will discuss how the disintegration of Greek interstate alliances in the Classical period can be explained by examining whether or not an alliance met the expectations of its members. In order to do so, this paper will focus on two associations
2 From this point onwards all dates are B.C. unless otherwise indicated. For discussion on the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League see Beck 2000: 1056; Hamilton 1991: 219. 3 Buckler 1979: 50; Hack 1978: 217; Seager 1974: 36; Smith 1953: 274. Galatas 3 in particular: the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation. These two alliances were primarily chosen because of the influential role they had in shaping Greek diplomacy during the fifth and early fourth centuries. There never seems to have been a war or peace conference during this period that did not involve the presence or active participation of both alliances. The sources also tend to describe the type of interaction that individual members had with one another during these events. Thucydides, for one, explains how many allies of the Peloponnesian League were dissatisfied with the terms offered in the Peace of Nicias and subsequently abandoned the alliance. These examples in turn provide us with an easier opportunity to examine the relationship and expectations of each alliance's members. Another reason why these two organizations were selected was because they differed in nature with each other. The Peloponnesian League was strictly a military alliance (symmachia) that was negotiated between Sparta and other individual poleis. As such, it mainly dealt with issues in regards to war and peace. The Boeotian Federation {koinon), on the other hand, was a social, economical, political and military alliance. Therefore, it dealt with a wider variety of issues including citizenship, trade, and religious affairs.7 By comparing the two, one can see if an alliance's failure to meet the expectations of its members had the same impact in bringing about the dissolution of a symmachia and a koinon. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how these two organizations and their members interacted and perceived one another since their histories overlap chronologically.
4 This paper will mainly refer to the Boeotian League from 447-386 B.C. 5 See section on the Peloponnesian League below. 6Bederman2001: 162. 1 Ibid., 167. Galatas 4
Methodology
Before turning to these two case studies, a word needs to be said about the methodology this paper will use. As mentioned above, there seems to be a direct correlation between the successes and failures of an interstate alliance and the type of relationship that a group of poleis had with one another. However, the following study will focus particularly on the interaction between an alliance's hegemon and the rest of its members. For the most part, the hegemon of an interstate alliance had the greatest say in governing the affairs of the association. As such, if there were any tensions and disputes they tended to be between the hegemon and the other poleis of an alliance. Both
Thucydides and Xenophon describe how many problems in the Peloponnesian League were between Sparta and her allies. Similarly, conflicts in the Boeotian Federation were usually among Thebes and other Boeotian poleis? This situation does not imply that there were no disputes between other members. What it does suggest is that many individual city-states relied on the hegemon to ensure that the alliance met their expectations.
The issue is how does one define and measure what the expectations of the poleis were regarding their duties and obligations. When a polis joined an interstate alliance it had two types of expectations: the first was in terms of what it had to contribute to the alliance; the second involved what the alliance owed the city in return for its support.
Many of these expectations were outlined in a treaty or constitution of an alliance, while others were applied by convention. In local and foreign politics, conventions had just as much weight in moulding the affairs of the Greeks as written decrees. For instance, the Greeks expected that their ambassadors would not be abused when visiting another state,
See section on the Peloponnesian League. 9 See section on the Boeotian Federation. Galatas 5 despite the absence of any universal law forbidding the mistreatment of any foreign representative. Conventional laws were usually derived from long-lasting traditions which were imbedded within a community's ideals. Even though they were not written down in a formal document, they still formed a part of a citizen's or polis' expectations.
There are two major differences between written decrees and conventional laws.
On the one hand, conventions tend to be more normative in nature. In other words, a written law dictates the actions and behaviours of a citizen or polis by explicitly stating what they can or cannot do, whereas a conventional law is based on what a citizen or polis thinks that they should or should not do. In one respect, this difference makes it harder for conventional laws to be enforced. Not only can conventions differ depending on a polis' environment or situation, but they are also subject to interpretation to suite the immediate needs and interests of a polis. For example, both the members of the
Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation expected to be autonomous though there was no written decree prior to the King's Peace which stipulated that they had to be.
The trouble was that there were different opinions in regards to whether a polis was autonomous as a member of an interstate alliance.
It was primarily the inability to reconcile the differences of these conventional expectations that contributed to the disintegration of both the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation. When a polis saw that an alliance was not fulfilling their expectations concerning their responsibilities, they could quickly refer back to the treaty or constitution that they agreed on to make their case. The Corinthians, for one, implicitly mention how Sparta was violating the written terms of the alliance by failing to come to Galatas 6 their defence against Athens.1 A polis could not refer to any document to support their cause when they were dealing with a conventional expectation. It was more common for a city-state to stop fulfilling its own responsibilities rather than argue that the alliance was not meeting its expectations. In addition, a. polis could decide to leave the association altogether if it felt that it went against its interests. Conflicts arose when another member of an alliance disagreed with a polis' complaints. In turn, they accused them of being the first ones to not fulfill their duties and obligations. As mentioned above, there were different social, political and military reasons for a polis to want to join an interstate organization. Its willingness to do so, however, primarily depended on whether becoming a member suited its interests. If it did, a polis was more than willing to supply its contributions and fulfil its responsibilities under the alliance. On the other hand, a polis refused to meet its obligations if it thought that belonging to an interstate alliance jeopardized its ideals and welfare. There were two factors that influenced a polis' perception and reception of an interstate alliance. The first deals with the role of an individual's domestic politics, whereas the second examines the impact of third party intervention.
There are many different aspects one can look at when studying the domestic politics of a polis, yet what seems to have had the greatest impact in shaping the relationship between an alliance's members is a polis' political factions. There are a few important characteristics to note about these factions. Contrary to our own modern definitions, political 'groups' were not about "advocating beliefs and values that legitimated the socioeconomic condition in which people lived."11 Nor were they about luThuc. 1.70-71. "Caprara 1999: 176. Galatas 7 representing the different 'ideologies' present within the community. Greek factions were highly personalized; it was a way for a limited group of individuals to get involved in the political process by supporting a leader who they thought would profit them the most.12
Furthermore, leaders of these factions "differed less on substantive issues and more from consideration of their own reputations and power."13 Thus, the primary goal for the members of a faction was to support a leader and his policies that directly benefited them and not necessarily their society at large. The main goal of a faction's leader was to promote the policies that would continue to earn him the support of his followers but which would also serve his own basic interests of accumulating glory and power.
Most scholars agree that political groups struggled for political power. For De Ste. Croix, stasis was mainly a class conflict between the rich and the poor.15 In contrast, Lintott argues that this struggle for power was between different aristocratic groups.1 Gehrke also pays less emphasis on class-conflict and suggests that factions were quite
? ? personalized and were ways for aristocrats to gain political power. However, it is a
1 Q misconception that different factions controlled the politics of a polis. Members of a faction actually used their "clout" to influence other individuals within their societies to support their policies.19 Therefore, the source of their power was being able to consistently convince the majority of citizens and political officials in their polis to support their proposals.
12 According to Gehrke aristocrats in particular formed these factions to gain political power. See Gehrke 1985:291-296. 13 Thompson 1973: 47. Although Thompson is referring to Spartan factions, his theory can also be applied to the notion of all Greek factions. Also see Gehrke 1985: 291-96. 14 Also see Gehrke 1985: 268-303. 15 De Ste. Croix 1981:31-80. 16 Lintott 1981:91-120. 17 Seen. 12 18 Bonner 1910:46. '9BuCk 1994: 13. Galatas 8
There was also a very close relationship between the intervention in a polis' affairs by a third party and the rivalries between these political groups.' Third party intervention is when a non-member decides to interfere in a city's or an alliance's internal politics. For instance, Persia constantly intervened directly and indirectly in the local affairs of the Greek poleis and their interstate associations. Whether by providing financial or military support or creating a universal peace, the Persians helped changed the relationships of an alliance's members. However, Persia usually interfered in the internal politics of the Greeks at their own request. It was common for many factions to invite the Persians to meddle in the affairs of their polis when they lacked the support to carry out their own agenda. The Persians in turn used the opportunity to promote their own interests; which primarily was to keep the Greeks away from Asia Minor. Thus, though these two variables differed in nature, they were closely connected with one another. Often the domestic politics of a polis influenced or welcomed an external party to intervene in their alliance's affairs. Moreover, the policies of a political faction were influenced by the actions of a third party. In brief, by studying the expectations of individual members, one can examine both the internal and external factors that led to the disintegration of the Greek interstate alliances in the Classical period. Furthermore, by examining the relationships between individual poleis, this paper can also reveal some fundamental problems within Greek interstate relations.
2USeen. 14. 21 See Lewis 1977 for a list of examples. Galatas 9
The Peloponnesian League
The Peloponnesian League is not only the earliest and longest-lasting military
99 alliance in the classical period, yet it can also be considered as one of the most successful. From the Persian Wars down until the Battle of Leuktra, the Spartans and her allies were able to secure the independence of the Péloponnèse from an external threat.
However, despite its military accomplishments, many members still abandoned the alliance and joined forces with Sparta's long time enemies. In 395, for instance, both Corinth and Thebes formed an alliance with Argos and Athens to challenge Sparta's hegemony in Greece. According to Xenophon, the Persians played an active role in bringing these poleis together by providing them with the financial incentives to wage war on Sparta.23 In the end, Tithraustes' plan to evict the Spartans from Asia Minor by stirring up trouble for them in Greece was fruitful. Within a year, Agesilaos and his men were recalled to fight the new quadruple alliance that had formed and Asia Minor was once again left in the hands of the Persians.24 Unlike Xenophon, Diodorus and the Oxyrhynchus historian argue that it was the shared hatred that these allies felt for Sparta, rather than the gold that they received from the Persians, which led to the war.25 Many were angry with Sparta for having enslaved the Greeks instead of giving them their autonomies as she had promised.26 Others were upset that Sparta had refused to share the spoils of war after they had endured the same hardships and dangers.27
11 Beck 2000: 1055; Birgalias 2003: 19; Yates 2005: 23 Xen. 3.5.1-2. Also see Cartledge 1987: 358. For the purpose of this paper Xen. will refer to Xenophon's Hellenica. 24 Xen. 4.2.1-3. 25DiOd. 14.82.1; Hell. Oxy. 7.5. 26DiOd. 14.17.6-7, 14.82.1; Isoc. Panegyrics 122. 27Xen. 3.5.12. Galatas 10
The situation in 395 was not the first time that a member of the Peloponnesian
League had become disgruntled with Sparta or had attempted to leave the alliance. Decades earlier during the Peloponnesian War, Mantinea, followed by other League members, had joined the Argive alliance because they were unsatisfied with the terms offered in the Peace of Nicias.28 What is remarkable about the early fourth century is the number of allies who became hostile towards the Spartans and the reasons for this change in behaviour. It seems that Sparta and the rest of her allies accused one another of not fulfilling their duties and obligations. In other words, each side accused the other of violating the terms of the League by failing to meet their responsibilities. In turn, it was the inability to reconcile their differences concerning each other's expectations that contributed to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. Thus, even though the Battle of Leuktra might have marked the official end of the Spartan alliance,29 it can only be considered the final nail in the coffin.
Thuc. 5.29. Galatas 11
I) Sparta's and her Allies' Expectations Concerning Their Duties and Obligations
In the sixth century, the Peloponnesian League was nothing more than a series of bilateral treaties between Sparta and other poleis.30 On the one hand, Bolmarcich and Yates suggest that these individual treaties were used by the Spartans to set up a system of loyal oligarchic governments amongst their allies. By doing so, the Spartans thought that their allies would be more inclined to support Sparta's policies in the long run.
Lendon, on the other hand, argues that these contracts were merely "pre-war arrangements" between Sparta and other city-states.32 In other words, these treaties were temporary agreements that were designed to outline the responsibilities of two allies during a period of war. Despite these different views, there are two important aspects to note about the nature of these treaties. Firstly, they were used to shape and govern the relations between the members of an alliance by creating certain duties and obligations that each ally had to fulfill. Moreover, by the fifth century these treaties were the same
for all of Sparta's allies; which implied that Sparta had the same expectations in regards to what the allies owed her and what she owed them. It also meant that Sparta could begin to treat all her allies as a collective unit that we now recognize as the Peloponnesian League.33 Whether or not these treaties formed the basis for a League 'constitution' is irrelevant for this paper.34 The main concern is to discuss the different
30 Birgalias 2003: 22; Cartledge 1987: 1 1 ; Kagan 1969: 17. 31 Bolmarcich 2005: 9; Yates 2005: 74. 32 Lendon 1994: 164. 33 According to De Ste. Croix, only an "inner circle" of Spartan allies formed part of the Peloponnesian League. For a full discussion see De Ste. Croix 1972: 102-105. 34 For example, Larsen argues that constitutional laws are adopted and embodied in the form of decrees and treaties and then are ratified by an exchange of oaths. See Larsen 1933: 265. Also see De Ste. Croix 1972: 106. What is important to realize is that the concept of a constitution differs when dealing with interstate organizations. The emphasis is not on the relationship between the people and their government but between states and other states. In the absence of any international law, this makes it hard for a constitution's principles to be enforced. Galatas 12 expectations between Sparta and her allies in order to examine what led to the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League. As a military alliance, Sparta and her allies expected to provide one another with mutual protection against any internal and external threat. First and foremost, the Spartans used their allies' military resources to reassure themselves that any potential helot rebellion would be ineffective. 35 What made Sparta different from other poleis was that she used the helots as her own Greek slave population.36 These individuals were primarily responsible to farm the lands of the Spartiates in order to provide them with enough revenue to afford their costs of living.37 Without any social or political rights, it is not surprising that the helots tried to revolt from Sparta. A successful uprising, however, would have been disastrous for the Spartans and their way of life. Both
Thucydides and Plutarch record how the Spartans themselves tried to prevent such a rebellion from happening by killing hundreds and even thousands of helots in the "best shape and condition."39 Sparta also made it difficult for the helots to revolt by making her allies swear that they would come to her defence in the case of an uprising and that they would refuse to help any helot who had managed to escape. For example, the Tegeans had agreed in their treaty with the Spartans to "expel the Messenians from their land and not make them ???st???."40 Though the exact meaning of this agreement is debated by many scholars,41 what is important to realize is that the Spartans took the necessary
35 Yates 2005: 74. Also see Bernstein 1997: 280; Cartledge 1979: 138. 36Cartledge2001:24. 37 For example, the Spartans would use the money they gained to pay for their armour and their syssition fees. 38 For example, the helots revolted against the Spartans twice during the eighth and seventh centuries. 39 Plut. Lye. 28. Plutarch also writes how one of the first tasks of the ephors when they were elected, was to declare war on the helots "so that killing them would not pollute the killer." Also see Thuc. 4.80. 40Arist. Quaest. Graec. 292B. 41 Bolmarcich 2005: 13-16; De Ste. Croix 1972: 97; Yates 2005: 73-74. Galatas 13 precautions to ensure that they would have permanent control over the helots. In essence, the Peloponnesian League was used by Sparta as a security shield to prevent any helots from revolting.4 Sparta also expected her allies to provide her with their military resources when facing an external threat. These obligations were usually outlined in their treaties. For instance, Sparta's allies were expected to "follow her whithersoever she may lead" concerning issues of war and peace. Furthermore, the allies were expected to have the "same friends and enemies" as the Spartans.45 As the hegemon of the Péloponnèse, Sparta had the necessary "military expertise" and resources to command the League's army. 46 Thus, it is understandable why the allies would agree to leave Sparta in charge of their troops in battle. It seems that the Spartans were never really impressed with the actual fighting capabilities of her allies. On more than one occasion, the Spartans actually insulted the allies for their behaviour in battle.47 Nevertheless, Sparta still desired their military support for one reason: it provided her with a massive body of soldiers that she could use. It was also a strategic move on behalf of the Spartans to oblige her allies to have the same friends and enemies as her. It was very plausible that a polis could negotiate separate alliances with two poleis that were adversaries. As such, if these opponents would be at war with one another the polis would be forced to choose which
Similarly, in the peace treaty between Athens and Sparta in 422-21 B.C. the Athenians swore that they "would come to the aid of Sparta with all their strength" in case of a helot uprising. See Thuc. 5.23. Although, Athens was not a member of the Peloponnesian League, one can use this example to show the impact that the helots had in terms of shaping Sparta's foreign policy with other states. 43 Bernstein 1997:286. 44 For examples see Meiggs-Lewis 67; Xen. 2.2.20, 4.6.2, 5.3.26. Also see Cartledge 1987: 10; De Ste. Croix 1972: 107; Hamilton 1991: 74. 45 According to Larsen "having the same friends and enemies" was the "normal phraseology" that was connected with a symmachy. See Larsen 1933: 274. 46 Forrest 1986:32. 47 For example, Agesilaos claimed that the Spartans were the only real soldiers amongst the allies. See Plut. Ages. 26. The Spartans also made fun of the Mantineans for running away from enemy peltasts. See Xen. 4.4.15-19. Galatas 14 ally, if any, it wanted to support. Sparta removed the potential for this dilemma by obliging the League's members to have the same friends and foes as her. Thus, Sparta guaranteed that her allies would not have a problem choosing whether they should send their support to Sparta or her enemies. Before the allies would send their military contingents, they expected that the Spartans would consult them in the League's assembly. Larsen notes that the Peloponnesian League's synedrion must have been created during the late sixth century.48 According to Herodotus, Cleisthenes had bribed the oracle of Delphi to tell the Spartans that it was their responsibility to help the Athenians remove the Pisistratids from power; which they did.49 Eventually, King Cleomenes found out that he had been deceived by Cleisthenes and began assembling the League's army to seek revenge.50 The Corinthians were the first to realize that sending their military contributions was a mistake since the expedition was designed to satisfy Cleomenes' interests and that Athens had posed no real threat to the Peloponnesians.51 In the end, Corinth decided to abandon the Spartan king in the field followed by the rest of Sparta's allies. The League's assembly was created shortly thereafter to ensure the allies that they were not some sort of military arm that the Spartans could use or abuse to suit their own selfish interests. Each ally had one
c'y vote regardless of the size of their military contributions, " and the majority decision of the assembly was binding on all members.53 In theory, Sparta's allies had the power to
48 Larsen 1933:259. 49 Hdt. 5.63. 50 Hdt. 5.74. 51 Hdt. 5.75. 52 Beck 2000: 1055. 53 Birgalias 2003: 24. The sources never discussed how the allies voted or what consisted of a majority vote. Lendon for one suggests that the allies voted by shouting much like the Spartans did in their own assemblies. In addition, he claims that there was a coercive element to the Assembly's voting where the Galatas 15 veto any expedition they wanted to, yet this ability never implied that the allies could "initiate action."54 Only Sparta had the right to call a League assembly and control the League's forces.55 In this respect, Lendon argues that the "meetings of the League, and the votes at those meetings, were manifestations of the realities of power rather than constitutional nicety." The meetings themselves were "informal, irregular and ad hoc" and there was no explicit or even implicit mention in the treaties that we have that Sparta was responsible to hold an assembly. Nonetheless, it seems that over the decades Sparta's allies developed an expectation that they would be consulted. The allies also expected that the Spartans would come to their defence against any external threat. Moreover, even though the members of the Peloponnesian League agreed to follow Sparta's command and to have the same friends and enemies as her, they still expected to be autonomous. There are usually two ways that modern scholars choose to describe autonomia: in the positive sense and in the negative sense. Cartledge writes that in the positive sense "it meant the right of a state to live according to its own political
CO norms, to make its own laws and to conduct legal justice as it wished." For example, in
405, the Samians were granted Athenian citizenship and were guaranteed their complete autonomy in terms of running their internal affairs. In the negative sense, autonomia meant the absence of an external party interfering in the affairs of a polis by placing harmosts and garrisons or by forcing it to send tribute.60 One of the first stipulations in the allies "feared Sparta's wrath if they opposed the demands she thought legitimate." See Lendon 1994: 171- 72. 54 Bernstein 1997:288. 55 De Ste. Croix 1978: 111-12. 56 Lendon 1994: 177. 57Ibid., 171. 58 Cartledge 1987: 249-250. See also Beck 2003: 184. 59 Todd 96. 60 Ibid., 250. See also Cawkwell 1981: 73; Ryder 1965: 20. Galatas 16 charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy was that all its members were allowed to have their autonomia; meaning that they would not be forced to pay tribute and that
Athens would not impose any garrisons or governors within their cities. In contrast, there is no explicit or even implicit mention of autonomia in the treaties of the
Peloponnesian League. Regardless, Sparta's allies still expected to run their internal affairs as they saw fit and without any external intervention. As Ostwald mentions, many poleis believed they were "historically entitled" to their right of autonomia. In other words, it was a conventional expectation that as a member of an interstate alliance, a polis would still be able to govern its internal affairs. There is a debate among modern scholars whether or not the members of the
Peloponnesian League were truly autonomous. In one respect, Sparta's allies were not completely independent in their foreign policy decisions. Not only were they expected to follow Sparta whithersoever she may lead, but they also could not negotiate peace without Sparta's approval. The fact that they were expected to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans also seems to suggest that the allies were treated as Sparta's "subordinates."64 On the other hand, throughout the majority of the Peloponnesian League's history, Sparta left her allies to govern their own local affairs without imposing any garrisons or governors. In addition, the allies were allowed to conduct their own private wars with one another without the League's approval. These examples imply that Sparta's allies were fairly autonomous. For Sparta's allies, the Peloponnesian League
61 Todd 123. 62 Ostwald 1982: 6. 63 See n.40. 64 Bolmarcich 2005: 28. Also see Cartledge 1976: 91; De Ste. Croix 1972: 108. 65 For a list of private wars fought by the allies see Birgalias 2003: 25. This changed in the fourth century. See below for details. Galatas 17 was a compromise of sorts since they willingly gave up having an independent foreign policy in order to gain Sparta's protection. At the same time they still expected Sparta to leave them have their local autonomies and to consult them before using their troops.
The last aspect to note about the nature of the treaties between Sparta and her allies is that they did not specify how long their alliance was meant to last. 7 The lack of any time specification suggests that the Peloponnesian League was meant "for all times" and that in turn, secession from the alliance was prohibited.68 Before the start of the Peloponnesian War, however, the Corinthians make an interesting point while addressing the Spartans: "[Sparta] give your allies and especially Potidaea, the help you promised and invade Attica at once. Do not let your friends and kinsmen fall into the hands of the bitter enemies. Do not force the rest of us in despair to join a different alliance. If we did so, no one could rightly blame us [. . .]. The people who break a treaty of alliance are the ones who fail to give the help they swore to give, not those who have to look elsewhere because they have been left in the lurch."
This passage illustrates that secession was possible if and only if the hegemon of an alliance failed to meet the expectations of her allies. In their speech, the Corinthians emphasize that they would be justified in abandoning the alliance because Sparta had failed to protect her allies. In other words, it was Sparta who was responsible for breaking the terms of the treaties. With the start of the Peloponnesian War, there was a growing trend where both Sparta and her allies did not meet each other's legal and conventional expectations. It was the refusal of each side to fulfill their responsibilities that was
&bLarsen 1944: 150. 67 Bederman 2001 : 162. Some treaties did specify the number of years that an alliance would last whereas others did not. 68 See Mosley 1971 : 322 for examples of alliances lasting for all times. See De Ste. Croix 1972: 107 and Larsen 1933: 267 for secession not being allowed. 69ThUC. 1.71. Galatas 18 chipping away at the foundation of the Peloponnesian League until it eventually collapsed.
II) From the Peace of Nicias to the Early Fourth Century
Immediately after Corinth's speech, Sparta summoned her own assembly which decided to wage war on Athens in order to protect her allies. It was only a few years later that Sparta and some of the League's members again accused one another of not fulfilling their obligations. In 422-421, Athens and Sparta agreed that peace should be made provided that "each party give back what it had acquired during the war."70 As soon as these terms were negotiated, Sparta called the Peloponnesian League's assembly to vote on whether or not they should accept the peace. The majority of the allies, with the exception of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, voted in favour of it. As such, Sparta expected all the allies to abide by its terms, yet, some allies refused to do so arguing that the peace was unfair.72 One of their complaints was that only Athens and Sparta were allowed to make any amendments to the treaty: "the right thing, they thought, was that alterations should be made only with the consent of all the allies."73 In this episode, it seems that both Sparta and her allies failed to meet each others expectations concerning their duties and obligations. On the one hand, the allies were at fault for rejecting the peace after a majority voted to accept it in the League's assembly.
On the other hand, one of the reasons that some of the allies refused to abide by the peace was because it had changed the framework of their alliance with the Spartans. Though
70ThUC. 5.17. 71ThUC. 5.18. 72 Thuc. 5.22. 73 Thuc. 5.29. See also Thuc. 5.18, 5.23. Galatas 19
Sparta followed the League's protocol by consulting her allies, the actual treaty permitted Sparta in future to make any amendments without having to do so. Thus, by agreeing to the treaty, the Spartans were officially recognizing that they did not have to consult their allies on all issues concerning war and peace. As Thucydides states, "it was this clause which was chiefly responsible for creating the disturbance throughout the Péloponnèse and making the states suspect that Sparta was planning to enslave them with the aid of Athens."74
Within a relatively short period of time, the Peace of Nicias caused more problems for the Spartans than it solved. Many poleis decided to abandon the Spartan alliance and join forces with Argos since they were unable to come to an agreement over the terms of the peace. In response, Sparta accused her allies of violating the terms of their treaties. For example, the Spartan ambassadors had told Corinth that
"if she were to desert Sparta and join Argos, she would be guilty of breaking her oath; she was already in the wrong in refusing to accept the treaty with Athens, when it was expressly laid down that a majority vote of the allies should be binding on all, unless the gods or heroes prevented it in any way." It seems that Corinth refused to meet her obligations, not only by rejecting the peace after it had been approved by the majority of the allies, but by even threatening to side with Argos. The first members of Peloponnesian League that deserted Sparta and joined forces with Argos were Mantinea and Elis.7 Others, such as Tegea, were invited to do the same but they claimed that "they would do nothing against the Spartans."77 Similarly, the Boeotians did not leave the Spartan alliance, though their reasons differed from those of
Thuc. 5.29. Thuc. 5.30. Thuc. 5.31. Thuc. 5.32. Galatas 20 the Tegeans.78 Thus, not all members of the Peloponnesian League saw the Peace of Nicias as violating the terms of their treaties with the Spartans. Overall, these examples illustrate that tensions arose between the hegemon of an alliance and its members when each side failed to meet the conventional expectations of the other. The Spartans for one traditionally expected the allies to obey the majority decision of the League's assembly. The allies, on the other hand, expected that Sparta would consult them on all issues regarding war and peace. By the fourth century, there were even more allegations between the two parties which led to more hostilities. The main problem for the Spartans was that some of her allies refused to send their military contributions. According to many scholars, the only time when Sparta's allies were exempted from sending their troops was when it violated a previous oath that they had sworn. For instance, when Sparta and her allies attacked Corinth in 394, Phlius claimed that they were in a "sacred period of truce and so [they] did not join the expedition."80 Similarly, the Corinthians told the Spartans that another reason that they did not accept the Peace of Nicias was because the treaty violated a previous oath that they had sworn. In other situations, some members of the Peloponnesian League had plainly withheld their military contributions.82 From the time of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta experienced a significant decline in its population.83 The reason for this decline is not as important as the fact that Sparta
/8 Thuc. 5.3 1 . See n. 287-293 below. 79 This "escape clause" is usually referred to as "gods and heroes." See Cartledge 1987: 12; De Ste. Croix 1972: 104, 116;Larsen 1933: 260; Lendon 1994: 166. 80Xen. 4.2.16. 81 Thuc. 5.30 82 Xen. 2.4.30, 3.2.25; Diod 14.17.7. 83 Oliva 1971: 170; Cartledge 1979: 308. Galatas 21 could field fewer soldiers.84 Consequently, the Spartans became more dependent on the troops that their allies supplied. One of Sparta's solutions to this shortage of man power was to "amend" the terms of her treaties with the allies. For example, under Agesilaos, individual members were prohibited to fight their own private wars when the League's army was in the field.85 This prohibition ensured Sparta that her allies would not be preoccupied with other military affairs when she requested their troops. Moreover, Sparta allowed her allies to send money instead of their military forces. In general, Sparta's
on military campaigns had become more frequent and lasted longer. As a result, the military contributions were becoming a drain on many cities' populations and economies since individuals were spending most of their time fighting instead of taking care of their lands and families.88 It would have been much cheaper for some poleis to supply Sparta with money rather than to send their troops. Sparta must have also realized that it was to her own advantage if some of her allies sent money since she could use these financial contributions as she saw fit.89 Xenophon also writes that anyone who failed to supply their financial or military contributions could be fined by Sparta.90 In other words, it would have cost the allies more if they failed to meet their financial or military contributions. Essentially, this method was a way for Sparta to coercively encourage her allies to send their armies or their money. By 377, the Spartans had also reorganized the contributions of her allies by dividing the members of the Peloponnesian League into ten
Some scholars argue that this drop was primarily caused by "the deficiencies of the system of land tenure and inheritance." Bernstein 1997: 291; Hodkinson 1989: 94. 85 Xen. 5.4.37. 86 Xen. 5.2.21; 6.2.16. 87 Ryder 1965:7. 88 Smith 1953:276. 89 For instance she could use the money to hire mercenaries or to build ships. 90 See n. 86. Galatas 22 districts.91 According to Diodorus, these divisions were created by the Spartans to bring "greater perfection" in the organization and distribution of their allies' soldiers and
92 services.
What made the allies refuse to send their military or financial contributions was the fact that Sparta was not meeting their expectations. Thus, since Sparta had failed to meet her duties and obligations, the allies had felt justified in not meeting theirs. One of the reasons why the allies were upset was because Sparta expected them to send their contributions regardless of whether or not she consulted them in the League's assembly.
This situation is best noted by the Athenian Autocles, who was sent to Sparta in 371, along with Callias and Callistratus, to negotiate peace between the two poleis.
Surprisingly, Autocles attacked the Spartans during his speech for their behaviour towards their allies. One of his criticisms was that Sparta treated the members of the
Peloponnesian League as though they were her subordinates rather than her allies.
"You make enemies of other powers without any previous consultation with your allies, and then you lead your allies against them. And so it often happens that these so-called 'independent' states are forced to march against people who want to be on 93 the best possible terms with them."
Autocles' accusation of Sparta never consulting her allies is not entirely true. For example, in 382 the ephors had summoned an assembly of the Spartans and her allies to listen to Cleigenes' request for the Peloponnesian League to help Acanthus against an invading Olynthus.94 Unfortunately, this is one of the few instances where Xenophon
91 Diod. 15.31.2. 92 Ibid. 93 Xen. 6.3.8. 94Xen. 5.2.1. Galatas 23 records that the Spartans called a League Assembly.95 It is very possible that Xenophon did not record every instance where the Spartans summoned a meeting of their allies. However, the speech by Autocles implies that Sparta more often than not demanded her allies to send their contributions without consulting them. In one respect, the allies were not bound to meet their responsibilities towards the League given that Sparta had failed to meet their expectations in regards to being consulted.
Though some allies refused to send their contributions, others tended to say the things that the Spartans wanted to hear9 and act as the Spartans had commanded. One of their incentives for doing so was that Sparta began dealing with her allies more harshly when they did not meet their responsibilities. In 401, for instance, Sparta had attacked
Elis for refusing to accept the Peace of Nicias, for siding with Argos and Mantinea during the Peloponnesian War, for debarring the Spartans from competing in the Olympic Games and for prohibiting King Agis from sacrificing to Zeus.97 As Xenophon writes, "with all these reasons for anger, the ephors and the [Spartan] assembly decided to make the Eleians see reason."98 According to Buckler, "the significance of the Eleian war was manifold." 99 It revealed that Sparta was more than willing to use her forces to punish her allies who refused to meet their obligations.100 In addition, Sparta re-established its "predominant position within the Péloponnèse" by eliminating Elis as a major threat.
With Elis' power reduced, Sparta ensured that "no one south of Arkadia and Argos could
95 Lendon only lists two examples in Xenophon where Sparta had consulted her allies and provides another four possibilities of when Sparta might have called a League assembly. I think his reference to Xen. 5.4.37 is actually Xen. 5.2.37. See Lendon 1994: 160. 96 For example, after Cligenes speech the allies made a number of speeches which were mainly in favour of what the Spartans wanted to hear. See Xen. 5.2.20. 97 Xen. 3.2.21-22. Also see Diod. 14.17.4-8. 98 Xen. 3.2.23. 99 Buckler 2003: 20. 100 /fcí'í/.; Cartledge 1987: 352. 101 Buckler 2003: 20. Galatas 24 gainsay Sparta's dictates or contest its exploitation of fertile land." The Spartans were also aware that many of her allies who refused to meet their obligations eventually deserted the alliance in favour of ones with Sparta's enemies and tried to convince other
League members to do the same. Therefore, Elis' behaviour threatened Sparta's internal and external security and needed to be dealt with. The Eleians were not the only ones that the Spartans "brought to their senses" by waging war on them.103 In 385, Sparta attacked Mantinea for having supplied Argos with corn when Sparta was at war with them.1 They also accused the Mantineans of fighting "badly and unwillingly" and taking pleasure in Sparta's failures.105 The Spartans punished the Thebans as well for refusing to send their military contributions and for ruining Agesilaos' sacrifices at Aulis.
Not only had Sparta attacked her allies, but she also began interfering in their domestic politics by placing harmosts and governors to regulate their local and foreign policies. I07 Thus, those who had failed to meet the expectations of the Spartans were deprived of their autonomia. In 395, the Thebans describe this situation to the Athenians in an attempt to convince them to join forces and challenge Sparta's supremacy.
Thebes claimed that many members of the Peloponnesian League were angry at the Spartans for placing their garrisons and governors within their cities. As such, they complained that these institutions made them feel more like Sparta's slaves than allies. Even Isocrates notes how the Spartans had changed their policy from previous decades
102 Ibid. 103Cartledge 1987:353. l04Xen. 5.2.1-2. 105 For the Mantineans making fun of the Spartans for their military defeat see Xen. 4.5.15-19. 106 For Thebes refusing to follow Sparta see Xen. 3.5.5. For the episode at Aulis see Xen. 3.4.4. 107 Buckler 2003: 31-33; Cartledge 1979: 278-79; Hamilton 1990: 80. 108 Xen. 3.5.8-15. 109 Xen. 3.5.13-14. Galatas 25 by actively interfering in the local politics of her allies.110 Initially, there were some attempts by the Spartans to reverse their policies by abolishing the boards of ten governors (dekarchies) that Lysander had created '' ' and by threatening to punish any Spartan general who used their authority to mistreat or abuse any of the allies. Despite these attempts, the Spartans still continued to intervene in the local politics of their allies by supporting and imposing oligarchies. For example, in 385 the ephors decided to help reinstate some oligarchic exiles from Phlius who had asked for Sparta's help.113 During their speech these exiles
"pointed out that so long as they had been at home in Phlius the city had welcomed the Spartans inside its walls and its forces had joined in all expeditions made under Spartans leadership; but after they had been driven into exile the people of Phlius had refused to follow Spartan leaders anywhere and [...] would not receive the Spartans inside their walls."
The Phliasians thus argued that their city tended to fulfill its duties and obligations when it had a similar type of government to that of the Spartans. 4 After this speech, Sparta decided that some of her allies should be punished for not meeting their responsibilities and should be "reorganized in such a way that disloyalty would become impossible."
In the case of Phlius, the government had decided to reinstate the oligarchic exiles on behalf of Sparta's request. In turn, Sparta did not interfere in their domestic politics.116 In contrast, when Sparta waged war on Elis it took the opportunity to place in power an oligarchic faction that was loyal and supportive of her policies.117 Similarly, due to
Isoc. Panegyrics 126. 111 Xen. 3.4.2. 112 Xen. 3.2.6. Though the ephors were talking about the treatment of Sparta's allies in Asia Minor, the same can be said about the situation in the Péloponnèse. ll3Xen. 5.2.8-9. 1,4 Bolmarcich 2005: 16-18. 115 Xen. 5.2.1. 116 The Spartans went to war with Phlius later on. See below for details. 117 Buckler 2003: 17-18; Cartledge 1987: 353; Hamilton 1991: 126. Galatas 26
Mantinea's rebellious behaviour, Sparta decided to replace their democratic government with an oligarchic one.1 18 For the next couple of years Phlius, Elis and Mantinea had remained loyal allies of the Spartans, which suggests that Sparta's plan was working.
This policy, however, was only successful in the short run for as soon as an external power provided these poleis with an opportunity to abandon the Spartan alliance they did so.
There were also other ways that Sparta prevented her allies from being disloyal.
For example, she had forced most of her allies to tear down their walls "saying that, unless this was done, [she] could not feel confident that [they] would not side with [Sparta's] enemies."119 The Spartans had also forced the Eleians to leave the Triphylian towns autonomous and had required Mantinea to divide its population into its original constituent villages.120 In effect, the Spartans robbed Elis and Mantinea of their sources of power in order to ensure that they would not abandon the Spartan alliance and join forces with her enemies as they had both done so in the past. Lastly, the amendments that
Sparta made to the treaties further deprived her allies of their right to govern some of their foreign policy issues. The allies could no longer carry out their private wars as they used to and there was a coercive element behind them supplying their financial or military contributions. Overall, Sparta managed to alienate her allies by not meeting their conventional expectations concerning their right to be autonomous. Inevitably, tensions and resentment began between Sparta and her allies as each side failed to meet the expectations of the other. On the one hand, Sparta complained that her allies were refusing to send their military contributions and abandoning the alliance in
118 Buckler 2003: 194; Cartledge 1987: 259; Hack 1978: 217; Hamilton 1991: 125; Rice 1974: 167. 119 Xen. 5.2.1-2. Also see Xen. 3.2.21-22. 120 For Elis see Xen. 3.2.23. For Mantinea see Xen. 5.2.5. Galatas 27 favour for ones with Sparta's enemies. In other words, Sparta accused her allies of violating the legal terms of their treaties by not following Sparta during battle and by not having the same friends and enemies as her. On the other hand, the allies blamed the Spartans for not fulfilling their responsibilities as hegemon of the alliance. Not only had Sparta demanded to use the league's forces without consulting the allies, but she also began interfering in their domestic politics by imposing oligarchies or by placing harmosts and garrisons. As such, the main problem for the allies was that Sparta had failed to meet their conventional expectations. The inability of both sides to reconcile their differences concerning their expected responsibilities is what led to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. In order to understand what caused an individual polis not to meet their obligations, one has to examine the impact of a polis' domestic politics and the role of third party intervention.
Ill) Domestic Politics
As discussed above, this paper will mainly focus on the role that factional politics played in terms of shaping the relationship between Sparta and her allies. As Mosley
121 writes, "a frequent cause of change in external policy was a change of internal regime." Therefore, the type of relationship between Sparta and her allies depended on the internal policies of a political faction. In the early fourth century, the Peloponnesian League became an instrument that different political factions used in order to advance their own interests. These groups were less concerned about meeting the expectations of their allies and cared more about how they could gain political influence and fame within their
121 Mosley 1971:326. Galatas 28 immediate and surrounding societies. The leader of a faction in particular pursued policies that suited his immediate interests and that were not necessarily for the benefit of his state and its allies. In Sparta, there were three political factions which shaped the city's politics. 122 One group which was led by King Pausanias was opposed to Sparta's new imperial policy. It believed that Sparta should pay greater emphasis to her situation in the Péloponnèse rather than trying to extend her influence in Asia Minor. In contrast, there was an aristocratic faction led by King Agis that was in favour of Sparta's newly acquired empire, yet disapproved of the amount of power that Lysander had managed to acquire. Lastly, there was Lysander' s faction that endorsed the maintenance of Sparta's new empire at whatever the cost. The factions that tended to support Sparta's empire were the ones that were mainly responsible for the tensions between Sparta and her allies. For instance, they were more than willing to interfere in the domestic politics of the
League's members as long as it meant that Sparta would have an empire. Thus, because of their behaviour, Sparta had failed to meet the expectations of her allies in terms of allowing them to be autonomous. A polis ' factional politics also shaped the type of relationship that it had with the
Spartans. In most poleis there were four major political groups competing for power: there were those who either supported an oligarchic or democratic government and those who tended to have either a pro-Spartan or anti-Spartan foreign policy. Sometimes the goals of these factions overlapped so that there could be a pro-Spartan faction that desired their polis to have an oligarchic government and an anti-Spartan faction that endorsed democracy. In a way, the pro-Spartan and oligarchic factions allowed and even invited
Sparta to meddle in the local affairs of their polis. They saw Sparta's intervention as a
122 For a full discussion see Hamilton 1970: 294-314 and Rice 1974: 164-182. Galatas 29 way to gain more political power, whereas the majority of their fellow citizens saw this interference as a violation of their right to govern their local politics. The anti-Spartan and democratic factions were also responsible for some of the tensions between Sparta and the allies. These political groups were usually the ones that convinced their polis to refuse to send their military or financial contributions. Consequently, these different factions were the cause behind many of Sparta's and her allies' accusations in terms of each side failing to meet the expectations of the other.
Ill a) Sparta's Political Factions
For the most part, many of Sparta's political factions revolved around the households of the two Spartan kings. Both the Agiads and the Eurypontids depended on their followers to support their own policies concerning local and foreign issues.
However, by the fourth century, there was a new faction that had emerged in Sparta that was independent of the two kings. This new political group was led by Lysander who was seen as the hero of the Peloponnesian War. According to our sources, Lysander was a mothax which meant that one of his parents was of helot origin.124 On the one hand, Oliva argues that only "under very exceptional circumstances" were these individuals granted any citizen rights. Cartledge, in comparison, suggests that the mothakes were allowed certain citizen rights, such as being able to participate in the agoge. What is important to realize is that Lysander did not form part of one of the aristocratic families that controlled and shaped Spartan politics. As such, he began to create his own group of
123 Hamilton 1970:296. 124 Plut. Lys. 1 for information regarding his father. 125OIiVa 1971: 177. Also see Cawkwell 1983: 194. 126 Cartledge 1979:315 Galatas 30 supporters that would advocate his interests within Sparta. "Lysander's men," as Plutarch calls them, were quite successful in promoting his policies. For example, they were able to convince the ephors to use the gold and silver that Lysander had sent to preserve Sparta's empire.127 In return for their loyalty, Lysander used his military authority to reward his followers with their own military and political offices. He made some of his close associations into harmosts while others were sent as garrison commanders overseas. Diodorus explains how Lysander's friend Thorax used his position as harmost of Samos to create a "small fortune" for himself.128 Xenophon also writes how many Spartiates
1 79 were eager to be sent abroad in order to accumulate more wealth and prestige. What Lysander did was offer his followers an opportunity to increase their own reputation and influence provided that they endorsed his imperialistic policies within Sparta. In addition, Lysander had managed to create a group of loyal supporters amongst some of Sparta's allies; many of whom were not part of the Peloponnesian League. Once again, he used his position of authority to place his friends in power by setting up a system of dekarchies and oligarchies. Lysander then used these "puppet" governments to shape and control their foreign policies to suit his own interests. In essence, he created "a new class of client-states, tied to Sparta by a system of harmosts, and governed by narrow oligarchies devoted to himself."131 Lysander was always quick to come to the defence of the oligarchs he placed in charge in order to ensure that they would continue to support his interests within their polis. Xenophon, for instance, explains how Lysander
127 Plut. Lys. 17.4. 128DiOd. 14.3.5. 129 Xen. Lak. Pol. 14.3-5. 130 Cartledge 1979: 268. Buckler calls these boards often the most "sinister branch of Lysander's power." See Buckler 2003: 34. 131 Hamilton 1970:297-298. Galatas 31 had already sent money to support the Athenian oligarchs even before the Spartan assembly voted on the issue.132 Lysander was also able to create a network of his own personal allies in Asia Minor. Even after his death the Greeks in the east worshiped him as a god and renamed their festival of Hera to Lysandreia, in honour of him. One of the reasons that Lysander was so popular was because he placed his followers in power in their respective cities.134 It comes as no surprise that the allies sent ambassadors to the Spartans requesting Lysander' s return after he had been replaced by Callicratidas.135 Once Lysander had left, so were his promises of political advancement. Despite his personal accomplishments, Lysander was partially responsible for the growing tensions between Sparta and some of her allies.1 He had rewarded his local and external supporters by interfering in the domestic politics of Sparta's allies. The harmosts, garrisons, dekarchies and oligarchies that Lysander set up might have given him the necessary local and foreign support he needed to pursue his interests; however they also deprived Sparta's allies of their right to autonomy. It was not long before these poleis began to complain to Sparta that they were being mistreated. In response to such protests Sparta tried reversing some of Lysander' s policies. Not only did they dissolve all of Lysander's dekarchies, yet they also "proclaimed that all cities should return to their ancestral constitutions."138 This proclamation in turn dismantled Lysander's network of loyal oligarchies by leaving the citizens of a polis decide what type of government they wanted for their city. Moreover, it was a way for Sparta to show that she was willing to
,32Xen. 2.4.28. 133 Plut. Lys. 18.1-3. 134 Plut Lys. 5.3. 135 Xen. 2.1.6. l36David 1981: 18. 137 For example, the allies complained that Thibron had used his military authority to plunder them. See Xen. 3.1.8. 138 Xen. 3.4.2. Galatas 32 meet the conventional expectations of her allies by allowing them to be autonomous. The ephors even threatened to punish any of their generals who used their position abroad to mistreat the allies.139 One might argue that these actions on behalf of the Spartans were primarily intended to undermine Lysander's power. Though he was popular amongst his allies, Lysander was envied by the Spartan aristocracy. Many conservative Spartiates were angry at the amount of fame and power that he received due to his military accomplishments. Those who had accompanied Agesilaos' campaign against the Persians in 396 argued that "they found themselves being treated as Lysander's subordinates rather than the king's advisors."140 Even the Spartan kings tried robbing Lysander of any further achievements. King Pausanias, for one, had convinced the ephors to send him to deal with the Athenian oligarchs and democrats fearing that "Lysander would take Athens as his personal property" if he was sent alone.141 During the campaign, Lysander's ability to influence the outcome of the situation was checked by the actions of Pausanias and the ephors.142 In Asia, Agesilaos feared that any of his personal accomplishments would be attributed to Lysander and as such he made him into one of his meat carvers.143 Overall, it seems that the ephors' actions were meant to weaken Lysander's power by depriving him of his support network. However, their immediate reaction to the situation also suggests that they took the allies' complaints seriously. In other words, they removed any institution or individual who threatened the autonomy of their allies.
140 Plut. Ages. 7. 141 Xen. 2.4.29. 142 Xen. 2.4.29-40. 143 Plut. Lys. 23.5-7; Plut. Ages. 8. Galatas 33
After Lysander's death, there were two political factions that competed for power. As mentioned earlier, the faction that was led by Pausanias and later on by Agesipolis, argued that Sparta should abandon the empire she inherited from the Athenians and focus on maintaining a favourable relationship with her allies in and surrounding the Péloponnèse. In contrast, the political group led by Agis and then Agesilaos thought that the Spartans should preserve their new empire. Once again, the policies of the latter faction continued to cause more problems between Sparta and her allies. Agesilaos learned first hand that "friendship was the hidden lubricant of Spartan domestic politics" and that it also "greased the wheels of the Peloponnesian League."144 Agesilaos realized that he would not have become the next Spartan king without the support of Lysander and his men. When King Agis died, there was a debate whether Leotychidas, his son, should succeed to the throne or whether his brother, Agesilaos, should be the next Spartan King. In the end, it was Lysander and his men that convinced the Spartans to chose Agesilaos over Leotychidas. 145 With this example in mind, Agesilaos began to create a group of local and foreign supporters that would help him promote his own policies as Lysander had done. Agesilaos eventually became extremely popular with Sparta's aristocracy and even more popular among the Spartan citizens. For instance, Plutarch records how Agesilaos gave a new cloak to every new elected geron and had speedily met with the ephors when he was summoned.146 He also mentions how the king always helped his friends and even enemies at whatever the cost.
l44Cartledge 1987:243. 145 See Plut. Ages. 3; Xen. 3.3.1-4. 146 Plut. Ages. 4-5. A geron was a Spartan male citizen over the age of 60 who sat on Sparta's council called the gerousia. He held the position for life along with 27 other gerontes. Galatas 34
Furthermore, Agesilaos realized that he needed a group of external followers to ensure that his policies and interests would prevail. One of the first times he noticed this is when he was recalled from Asia Minor. If Corinth and Boeotia had been loyal allies of
Sparta and in particular supported Agesilaos there would have been no war; which meant that the Spartan king could continue expanding Sparta's empire in the East and in the process increase his own reputation. However, this situation was not the case. Xenophon writes that when Agesilaos was recalled it was "bitter news for [him] to hear. He had splendid prospects in front of him and could see himself being robbed of them. Nevertheless [. . .] he said that it was a matter of necessity to go to the help of the fatherland."148 This incident made Agesilaos aware that he could not achieve his personal interests without the support and loyalty of the Peloponnesian League. Therefore, following in Lysander's footsteps, Agesilaos began setting up a system of loyal oligarchies that would promote his goals.14 There was one major difference between the oligarchies Lysander had created and the ones Agesilaos had established. Lysander had tended to set up these oligarchies amongst Sparta's allies in Asia Minor who were not necessarily members of the Peloponnesian League. Agesilaos, on the other hand, focused on establishing these oligarchies amongst the League's members. Perhaps Lysander would have also started to directly interfere in the League's affairs if he had the political power to so. Despite his connections, Lysander knew that his authority was limited because of his social status.150 Unlike Agesilaos, he did not have the support of the ephors and the gerousia to continuously promote his own interests. In one respect,
l49David 1981:26. 150 This might also explain his plot to change the Spartan constitution by removing its dual kingship. See Plut. Lys. 24. Galatas 35
Lysander's oligarchies might have caused many Greek poleis to have an unfavourable view towards Sparta, yet, it was Agesilaos' oligarchies that were seen by the members of the Peloponnesian League as a violation of their autonomies.
In the pursuit of glory and power, Agesilaos was not really concerned with these accusations by the allies. Once again, his focus was on creating a group of external supporters that would be loyal to Sparta and particularly to him. Agesilaos thought that the best way to do this was by making each League member have an oligarchic constitution. As previously mentioned, Sparta decided to help some oligarchic exiles to return to Phlius.151 What was not said earlier was the fact that Agesilaos used the opportunity to place his friends in power. For the past few decades, Agesilaos' family had been supportive of the oligarchic faction at Phlius. As such, it is not surprising that
Agesilaos would try to convince his government to help the exiles. In the end, the ephors sent the following message to Phlius:
"[They] said that the exiles were friends of Sparta and had been unjustly driven out. They [also] added that in their view what should be done was that the exiles should be recalled, but should be recalled not as a result of compulsion but with the consent of their own people."
After this message, Phlius decided that they would allow these exiles to return rather than run the risk of Sparta invading their polis. In other words, Phlius did not have a say whether or not they should reinstate the exiles but decided on what grounds they would recall them. According to Buckler it was "only the good sense and the forbearance of the
Phliasians that prevented a second Mantinea."
151 Seen. 113. 152RiCe 1974: 174. l53Xen. 5.2.9. 154 Buckler 2003: 197. Galatas 36
Within a relatively short period of time, these individuals returned to Sparta arguing that they were being granted unfair trials over some disputed territories.155 This complaint "angered the government at Phlius" which decided to "impose a fine on all who had gone to Sparta without being authorized by the state."156 The ephors decided that this time the government of Phlius was behaving "outrageously and they ordered mobilization." No doubt, Agesilaos was involved in convincing the ephors to wage war on Phlius.158 As Xenophon puts it "Agesilaos was far from displeased at this decision, for the friends of his father Archidamus were in the party of Podanemus, now among the restored exiles, and his own friends were in the party of Proeles, the son of Hipponicus."159 However, not everyone was content with the ephors' decision arguing that "for the sake of a few individuals [the Spartans] were making themselves hated by a city of more than 5,000 men."160 Those who were opposed to the campaign were probably the supporters of Agesipolis, who believed that the Spartans should refrain from interfering in the domestic politics of their allies. Agesipolis also opposed the war because Phlius provided him with its financial contributions while he was on campaign.161 It is worthy to mention that the Phliasians themselves thought that Sparta would not actually wage war on them. On the one hand, they believed that Agesipolis would come to their defence as he most probably did. Moreover, they assumed that
Agesilaos was prohibited from commanding Sparta's troops so long as Agesipolis was at
Xen. 5.3.10-11. Xen. 5.3.12. Xen. 5.3.14. Rice 1974: 173. Xen. 5.3.14. Xen. 5.3.16. Xen. 5.3.10. Galatas 37 war in Olynthos.162 What is important to note is that Phlius did not think that Sparta would abstain from interfering in their local affairs because she was expected to leave the allies be autonomous. Furthermore, this passage challenges an earlier claim that was made by the oligarchic exiles. As mentioned above, the exiles enticed the Spartans to help them by stating that in their absence, the democrats in Phlius had refused to send its military contributions and prohibited any Spartan from entering their city walls. This was not necessarily the case, since Phlius had promptly provided King Agesipolis with their financial contributions while he was in Olynthos.1 4 What it does suggest however, was that Phlius preferred Agesipolis' reign to that of Agesilaos'. Thus, an ally's relationship with Sparta depended on the type of political faction and leader that was in charge. Before leading his men to Phlius, Agesilaos said that "the object of this expedition is not to do harm, but to do good to those who have been harmed."165 However, Agesilaos mainly used the opportunity to set up his oligarchic friends in power to ensure that Phlius would support his interests in the future. What was relevant for Agesilaos was whether or not he could rely on Phlius to support his own interests over those of his political opponents. In this case, the answer was that he could not since Phlius tended to be loyal to Agesipolis. Eventually, the Phliasians asked Agesilaos if they could send an embassy to Sparta so that they could "surrender their city unconditionally."166 Xenophon writes that Agesilaos felt offended that the Phliasians treated him "as though he lacked
Both of Sparta's kings were allowed to be in the field simultaneously until 504 where there was a "new law in Sparta" forbidding this action. For details see Hdt. 5.75. 163 See n. 93. l64Cawkwell 1976:74. l65Xen. 5.3.14. ,66Xen. 5.3.23. Galatas 38 the authority himself, and [so] he sent his friends in Sparta, through whom he had it arranged that all decisions with regards to Phlius should be left to him."167 Not only did Agesilaos force Phlius to restore the exiles, but he also left them to determine which Phliasians would be allowed to live and which would be put to death. He additionally allowed these former exiles to draw up a new constitution for their city.168 The significance of this event is manifold. Firstly, Agesilaos' attack on Phlius was not only
"to do good to those who had been harmed" but to establish his long time family friends in power.169 By doing so, he guaranteed that they would support his decisions and interests in the long run. In the process, however, Agesilaos had failed to meet the expectations of Sparta's allies. The Phliasians were far from autonomous to govern their own affairs after Agesilaos gave the city over to the oligarchic faction. The war on Phlius was also a blow to Agesilaos' rival. Though Agesipolis found support amongst the democratic Phliasians, he was unable to come to their aid. Lastly, it is interesting that
Phlius wanted to surrender their city to the Spartan government as opposed to Agesilaos. This act suggests that Phlius sought the support of Agesipolis' followers in order to negotiate lighter terms of their surrender. Agesilaos probably anticipated what the Phliasians had tried to do, and in response sent members of his own faction to convince his home government that the fate of Phlius should be left up to him. The events surrounding Sparta's attack on Mantinea were not unsimilar to that of
Phlius. According to Diodorus, the Spartans used the conflicts between the democratic
Xen. 5.3.24. Xen. 5.3.25. See n. 165. Galatas 39 and oligarchic factions to interfere in the domestic politics of her allies. In the case of
Mantinea, Cartledge writes that
"the citizen-body was divided politically in two different ways, There was first an ideological division between the oligarchs, who desired revolutionary change, and the case majority who favoured the existing democratic politela. Secondly, there was a division in respect of foreign policy between, on the one hand, the oligarchs, who apparently favoured Sparta [. . .] and on the other, two groups of democrats, of which
one was pursuing a pro-Argos line and171the other was hoping in a Utopian way to be able to adopt an independent stance." Surprisingly, Agesilaos refused to lead Sparta's troops against Mantinea arguing that his father was aided by the city years earlier against the Messenians.172 However, Agesilaos never tried to convince the Spartans that they should leave the Mantineans handle their own affairs. Instead, he watched as Agesipolis was forced to lead Sparta's army to attack
Mantinea for its past digressions and replace its democracy with an oligarchy to prevent any future problems. What the sources do not reveal is that Agesilaos intentionally wanted Agesipolis to go to Mantinea in the hopes of undermining his opponent's policy.173 Agesipolis for one "enjoyed a great popularity among the depressed classes at Sparta and among the allies" because he tended to have a less imperialistic policy than Agesilaos.174 Like his father, Agesipolis also had a lenient policy towards the democratic factions of Sparta's allies. In this episode, Agesipolis is being forced to go against his very own principles by attacking Mantinea and by replacing its democracy with an oligarchy. If he carried these actions out, Agesipolis would "have been embroiled in the policy which Agesilaos advocated, and there in no position to criticize it." Although Agesipolis was forced to carry out the ephors' orders, he still was able to promote his
"uDiod. 15.5.2. 171 Cartledge 1987:259. l72Xen. 5.2.3. l73Cawkwell 1976: 64; David 1981:28. 174 Smith 1953:279. 175 Rice 1974: 168. Galatas 40 own policy. Pausanias reminded his son that as king he had the ability and authority in the field to treat the allies, and especially the democrats, with clemency.176 It appears that the main reason Pausanias returned from his exile was to warn his son about Agesilaos'
1 77 "trap" of trying to undermine him among his group of supporters. Thus, the invasion of Mantinea had just as much do with the rivalry between Sparta's factions as it did with Sparta's attempt to punish an ally for not meeting their duties and obligations.
It was Sparta's internal political struggles that prevented her from having any
1 7R consistent foreign policy in the fourth century. At times, personal ambitions and the struggle for political power made it hard for the allies to predict and understand Sparta's actions towards them. There are two events in particular, which show how Sparta's internal struggles shaped the relationship she had with other poleis. These two episodes include Phoebidas' seizure of the Cadmeia and Sphodrias attempted raid on the Piraeus. Though Thebes and Athens were not members of the Peloponnesian League, one can still use these two events to describe Sparta's general policies towards other poleis. According to Xenophon, Leontiades, who was a pro-Spartan Theban, convinced Phoebidas that he
1 7Q would do a "very great service to [his] country" if he seized Thebes' citadel. Following
Leontiades' advice, Phoebidas seized the Cadmeia during the Thesmophorian festival. Instead of receiving praise from Sparta, Phoebidas was placed on trial for having acted without the state's approval.180 Immediately, Agesilaos intervened on Phoebidas behalf arguing that the Spartans should judge whether his actions were harmful or beneficial to
"" Xen. 5.2.6. 177 David 1981:27. 178 Hamilton 1970:314. 179 Xen. 5.2.26. Diodorus, on the other hand, writes that Phoebidas was merely following Sparta's order when he attacked Thebes. See Diod. 15.20.1-2. 180 Xen. 5.2.32. Galatas 41 the state.181 In the end, Phoebidas was acquitted of the charges and only had to pay a fine.182 Scholars have often questioned why Agesilaos chose to defend Phoebidas. On the one hand, some have argued that Agesilaos was the architect behind the attack on Thebes and that Phoebidas was merely obeying his "unofficial orders."183 As such, Agesilaos decided to defend Phoebidas in order to cover his own involvement in the affair. More importantly, Hack points out that Agesilaos used Phoebidas' trial to "[enunciate] the same policy he had pursued in Mantinea and Phlius."184 What Agesilaos was trying to do then was validate his actions in getting involved in the local politics of Sparta's allies. Therefore, even though he might have been the "villain" of the whole affair, Agesilaos
1 SS used the opportunity to once again advocate his imperialistic policies. The same can be said about his defence of Sphodrias' attack on Athens a few years later. Once again, Xenophon explains that it was the Thebans that induced Sphodrias, who was the Spartan governor at Thespiae, to invade Attica in the attempts to cause a war between Athens and Sparta.186 Thus,
"after giving his troops an early dinner, he led them out from Thespiae, saying that before dawn they would be in Piraeus and at the end of their march. However, when the sun rose he was still at Thria. He now made no attempt to disguise his presence but seized cattle and looted houses on his way back."
As Buckler and Beck note, "nothing about these events make sense as the ancient sources present them."188 Sphodrias must have realized that it would be impossible to make it in one night to the Piraeus from where he was stationed. Furthermore, he could have offered
181 Ibid. 182DiOd. 15.20.2. 183 Buckler & Beck 2008: 78; Rice 1974: 180-182. 184HaCk 1978:225. 185 Buckler & Beck 2008: 78. 186 Xen. 5.4.20. 187 Xen. 5.4.20-21. 188 Buckler & Beck 2008: 80. Galatas 42 a number of excuses to explain his presence in Thria, yet he chose to raid it. The Spartans themselves were "dumfounded by the whole affair."190 They were able to convince Athens that this action was not a state initiative by placing Sphodrias on trial.
However, once again Agesilaos used his "personal authority" to get Sphodrias acquitted; though he was a supporter of his rival, King Cleombrotos.192 Even Agesilaos' supporters had come to the defence of Sphodrias arguing that he had "consistently acted well and honourably" throughout his life and that "Sparta needed soldiers like this."193 As David puts it, Sphodrias' trial was used as the "king's political battlefield."194 In return for getting him acquitted, Agesilaos expected Sphodrias and his political group "to put up less, and less effective, resistance to his foreign policy schemes in the future."
Agesilaos' decision to support Sphodrias "was a brilliant political move." This incident shows how Agesilaos placed his own interests above the duties and obligations that Sparta owed the allies. Sphodrias' exoneration meant that Sparta saw nothing wrong with his actions, which in turn further angered the Athenians.
Ill b) The Allies and Their Factions
As previously mentioned, there were four types of political factions that influenced a polis ' relationship with Sparta. On the one hand, there were those who either supported an oligarchic or democratic government, whereas there were others who tended m Ibid., 81. 190 Xen. 5.4.22 191 Xen. 5.4.24. l92Mossé 1999:44. 193 Xen. 5.4.32. 194 David 1981:33. l95Cartledge2001:66. 196 ¡bid., Galatas 43 to have either a pro-Spartan or anti-Spartan foreign policy. In the attempt to increase their own political influence, many of these factions appealed to other cities for help. For example, some oligarchic groups were responsible for inviting Sparta to interfere in their local affairs; hoping that with Sparta's help they could gain complete control over the politics of their city. At times, the local struggles between these factions also made it difficult for Sparta to know whether a polis was actually a friend or a foe. The political groups who sought Sparta's aid tended to persuade their polis to fulfill their duties and obligations, while those who opposed Sparta usually convinced their polis to abandon the
Spartan alliance altogether. There are a couple of examples that illustrate the impact that these different factions had on the relationship between Sparta and her allies.
In 395, Corinth decided to side with Argos, Athens and Thebes to challenge Sparta's hegemony in the Péloponnèse; though there were still many citizens within the city that promoted a favourable relationship with Sparta. Within two years of the war many Corinthians desired peace seeing that "their own land was being wasted and many of their own people killed" whereas their allies "enjoyed peaceful conditions and their fields were under cultivation."1 7 However, those who started the war feared that "unless the peace party were suppressed, there was a strong likelihood that Corinth would revert to her alliance with Sparta" and that they would be punished.198 In order to prevent this from happening, they had planned to kill all those who supported a favourable relationship with Sparta on the last day of the festival of Artemis Euclea. Xenophon explains, how "men were killed while standing in a group of friends, or sitting down, or
97 Xen. 4.4.1. Galatas 44 in the theatre, or even sitting as judges in musical or dramatic competitions."1 Seeing what was taking place, Pasimelus and Alcimenes of Corinth asked for help from the nearby Spartan polemarch Praxitas.200 The latter agreed to join the Corinthian exiles in
901 battle against the Argives and those who committed the massacre in Corinth. After winning the battle, Praxitas began to demolish a section of Corinth's wall and set up a few garrisons in its territory.202 This example demonstrates that Corinth's loyalty towards Sparta depended on which political faction was in charge.203 Even though Corinth was officially still at war with Sparta, some individuals invited her to intervene in their city's local politics. In one respect, these individuals were the ones who robbed their city of its autonomy by allowing a foreign party to interfere in their internal affairs.
The political situation in Thebes is another example which shows the impact that these factions had on Greek diplomacy. Though Thebes had remained an oligarchy, its foreign policies were dictated by two political factions: one of which was pro-Spartan and the other which was anti-Spartan.204 Thebes failed to meet the expectations of the Spartans when Ismenias, Antitheus, Androcleidas who were members of the anti-Spartan group, had the most political influence. According to Hack, it was Ismenias and his party
90S who had prohibited Agesilaos from performing his sacrifices at Aulis. So long as the pro-Spartan faction led by Leontiades, Asias and Coiratadas were in power, the Thebans fulfilled their duties and obligations as a member of the Peloponnesian League.
Leontiades argued this point during Phoebidas' trial. He was able to convince Sparta that
!99Xen. 4.4.3. 200 Xen. 4.4.7. 201 Xen. 4.4.10-14. 202 Xen. 4.4.13. 203Cartledge 1987:254-256. 204 Hack 1978: 212. Also see Mosley 1971: 326. 205HaCk 1978:213. Galatas 45 the actions of Phoebidas were in the interests of promoting a favourable relationship between Thebes and Sparta.20 What he meant was that Ismenias, who was responsible for many of the tensions between Sparta and Thebes, was captured by Phoebidas. As such, the Spartans did not have to worry about Thebes' behaviour. Soon after Phoebidas' release, Ismenias was placed on trial for
"having worked in the interest of foreigners, of having made friends with the Persian satrap against the interest of Greece, of having taken money from the king, and of being chiefly responsible, with Androcleidas, for all the disorder which had taken place in Greece."
The trial of Ismenias shows how Sparta got involved in the politics of Thebes at Leontiades' request. In other words, leaders of individual factions were to blame in terms of welcoming Sparta to interfere in their local autonomies. One of Leontiades' motives was to undermine the political influence of Ismenias and others who formed a part of his faction. Although Leontiades managed to rid himself of Ismenias, he did not entirely remove the anti-Spartan sentiment that was present in Thebes.
IV) Third Party Intervention
For this section, the following will focus on whether Persian intervention caused the collapse of the Peloponnesian League and if so to what extent. Persia had constantly interfered in the politics of the Greeks by providing them with military and financial resources to carry out wars with one another. One of the reasons that Persia was able to maintain her hegemony in the East was by playing off weaker and stronger Greek states.
For instance, in 395 Timocrates instigated problems for Sparta by providing Argos,
Xen. 5.2.33-34. Xen. 5.2.35. Galatas 46
Athens, Thebes and Corinth with the financial means to transform their animosity towards Sparta into a full scale war. As a result, Agesilaos was recalled from his Asian campaign and for the moment Persia was alleviated from Spartan attacks.209 However, this method of supplying weaker states with military and financial contributions was proving to be unsuccessful. For as soon as one power stopped attacking them, another would start their campaign. Thus, once the Greeks handled their political affairs at home, they would inevitably focus their attentions on Persia and the Greeks in Asia Minor. After fourteen years of fighting with the Greeks, Persian interests finally prevailed under the King's Peace.210 Once again it aimed at making the Greeks preoccupied with their own affairs so that Persia could concentrate on her own internal problems. The contents of the Peace were as follows:
"I, King Artaxerxes, regard the following arrangement as just: The cities in Asia and, among the islands, Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to me. The other Greek cities big and small should be left to govern themselves, except for Lemnus, Imbros and Scyros, which should belong to Athens, as in the past. And if either of the two parties refuses to accept peace on these terms, I together with those who will accept this peace, will make war on that party both by land and by sea, with ships and with „212 money.
The first stipulation granted Artaxerxes recognition that he controlled the Greeks in Asia Minor; something that no other Persian King had managed to do.213 In addition, it showed how the Spartans were more than willing to sacrifice the autonomy of the Greeks in Asia Minor in order to preserve their own hegemony.214 The second clause was the first time
208 Xen. 3.5.1-2; Hell. Oxy. 7.2-5. According to Xenophon the Athenians did not accept Persian money although they were more than willing to go to war with Sparta. 209 Xen. 4.2.3 210 Buckler 2003: 170. 211 For example, without being attacked by the Greeks, Artaxerxes was able to focus his attention on Egypt. See Hamilton 1991:308. 212 Xen. 5.1.31. 2l3Seagerl974:37. 214 Hamilton 1991: 306. Also see Cartledge 1979: 285; Devoto 1986: 191-192. Galatas 47 that "the autonomy of all cities, large and small, had been recognized in a treaty ratified by the leading states and by the King."215 The article itself seems to have been largely set in place by the Spartans. As Badián notes, the notion of "large and small states" had become a standard phrase of the Spartans.216 Moreover, "the king himself surely had no reason to think in terms of that distinction and to formulate it - any more than to insist on the autonomy of the cities."217 The last term made it seem that Persia was the prostates
91 C (protector) of the peace though in practice the Spartans assumed this role. Scholars have often argued that Sparta used the peace as an excuse to violate the autonomy of her allies. For instance, Buckler argues that Agesilaos sent Agesipolis to
9 1 Q Mantinea because he did not want to be the first to violate the terms of the peace.
There are many problems with this approach. Firstly, the Spartans do not mention that they were acting on behalf of the King's Peace when they attacked their allies and infringed on their autonomies.220 Nor did any other polis, such as Athens or Thebes, accuse Sparta of violating the terms of the Peace when she attacked her allies. On the one hand, it is possible that "no Greek state could object if Sparta wished to discipline a member of her own League; no one would have been so foolish as to risk war in the
99 1 Péloponnèse against Sparta for the sake of any member state." It is also possible that not all Greek states swore to the agreement. According to Badián "the wording of the
999 edict makes it clear that it was imposed only on the two sides at war." As such, it was only a bilateral agreement between the Greek belligerents and Persia as opposed to some
215 Ryder 1965: 41. Also see Buckler & Beck 2008: 10. 216 Badián 1991:35 217 Ibid., 36. 2l8Cawkwell 1981:78. 219 Ibid., 192. 220 Seager 1974:39-45. 221 Rice 1974: 166. 222 Badián 1991:39. Galatas 48 sort of "common peace."223 However, as Beck notes, the Greeks were later summoned
794 not only to listen to the terms but to accept the King's Peace. *" Thus, it seems that the
225 King's Peace evolved from "a reconciliation between Sparta and Persian interests" into a universal peace when the Spartans asked the other Greeks to ratify it.
It is a misconception that the King's Peace caused or made Sparta act a certain way. The Spartans had their own incentives for interfering in the local autonomies of her allies and they did not need to justify their actions using the King's edict. What is important about the King's Peace is that it provided Sparta, and in particular Agesilaos'
227 faction, with the freedom and opportunity to "dominate others." Since she was no longer at war with Persia, Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth, Sparta could focus on the relationship with her allies. When Agesilaos had left Asia he was "no Hannibal leaving in defeat and despair."229 He realized that in order for him to return, he had to first settle the affairs of the Greeks. It was at the Spartans' will whether they would use the autonomy clause to justify their actions. For example, they had used it to dismantle the Boeotian Federation with the help of Thebes' pro-Spartan supporters,230 yet they did not use it to justify intervening in their allies' affairs. Obviously, by supporting or imposing oligarchic regimes Sparta was not allowing her allies to have much autonomy. Agesilaos and his faction wanted to create stability in Greece by placing their friends in power so that they could return to Asia Minor without having to fear a Greek uprising. Therefore,
223 Ibid. 224 Buckler & Beck 2008: 10-11. 225 Ryder 1965: 36. 226 Hamilton 1991:316. 227Larsen 1944:230. 228RiCe 1974: 172. 229 Badián 1991:26. 230HaCk 1978:214. Galatas 49 the Spartans used the King's Peace to try to settle the affairs amongst their allies and the other Greeks, but they did not plan to uphold the peace in the long run.
V) Summary
Sparta's behaviour in the fourth century might have won her an empire but, in the end it cost her the support of her allies. As Isocrates notes, one of the reasons many grew hostile towards the Spartans was because "they no longer kept the laws which they had inherited from their ancestors nor remained faithful to the ways which they had followed in times past, but conceived that they were licensed to do whatever they pleased."
Sparta had constantly interfered in the domestic politics of her allies whether it was by imposing harmosts and garrisons or by forcing a polis to adopt an oligarchic constitution.
In the process, these actions violated the autonomy of the allies. Some members of the Peloponnesian League felt more like Sparta's slaves rather than allies since she had demanded to use their troops without necessarily consulting them and punished those who chose to withhold their contributions. By acting as such, the Spartans failed to meet the expectations of her allies. In turn, many poleis felt that the Peloponnesian League went against their basic interests and welfare and decided to abandon the alliance in favour of one with Sparta's enemies. By the Battle of Leuktra, few allies had chosen to remain by Sparta's side. Moreover, Sparta's defeat did not "evoke universal tears."232 There are two factors that influenced the relations between Sparta and her allies; the first concerned the role of factions. In Sparta, individuals such as Lysander and
Agesilaos tried to create a network of supporters to promote their policies and interests.
231 Isoc. On the Peace 102-103. 232 Smith 1953:276. Galatas 50
However, as these individuals and their factions sought to advance themselves politically, they had failed to meet the expectations of the allies. Agesilaos was more than willing to interfere in the domestic politics of the Peloponnesian League's members so long as it would ensure him that they would support his interests in the future. The factions of individual poleis also shaped the interaction that they had with Sparta. In the pursuit of power, some of these factions invited Sparta to get involved in their internal affairs. On the other hand, others grew weary of Sparta's behaviour and began to refuse to meet their responsibilities that they owed to the League. Another factor that shaped the relationship between Sparta and her allies was the intervention of a third party. In an attempt to keep them out of Asia Minor, the Persians kept providing the Greeks with the resources to fight one another. In addition, though the King claimed to be the prostates of the Peace, he primarily left it up to the Greeks to enforce his terms. Once again, while the Greeks bickered amongst themselves, the Persians were free to occupy themselves with their own internal affairs. After the King's Peace the Spartans were able to concentrate on creating a stable environment in Greece. Unfortunately the way in which they sought to do so created even more havoc. As many have pointed out, the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League and the subsequent decline of Spartan hegemony, was the Spartans own fault.
Hamilton 1979: 208; Cartledge 1987: 347. Galatas 51
The Boeotian Federation
Most scholars agree that what makes the Boeotian alliance unique is the fact that it was the first attempt by the Greeks to establish a federal state.234 Thus, unlike the Peloponnesian League, the Boeotian Federation was a social, economical, political and military alliance between a group ofpoleis who shared in the same traditions and ethnicity. Moreover, what makes the Boeotian Federation interesting is the numerous times that it was dissolved and re-established throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.
For the purpose of this paper, the following will mainly focus on what led to the disintegration of the Boeotian alliance from 447-386. There seems to be a general consensus that Agesilaos was primarily responsible for the federation's collapse. According to Xenophon, Agesilaos prevented the Thebans from swearing to the King's
Peace unless they would leave all the Boeotian cities to be autonomous. In essence, he was telling the Theban ambassadors that they should break up the Boeotian federal state. Uncertain of what they should do, the ambassadors returned to Thebes to relay Agesilaos' demands. In the meantime, Agesilaos "hating the Thebans as he did," started preparing for war in case they refused to meet the terms of the Peace. Before he could deploy his troops, the Thebans had sent word that they would "allow the cities of [Boeotia] to be self-governing."236 Agesilaos thus successfully used the autonomy clause of the King's Peace "as a weapon with which to dissolve the Boeotian confederacy" and in turn undermine Thebes' power.
234 See Buck 1995:5. 235 See n. 3. 236 Xen. 5.1.32-33. 237 Beck & Buckler 2008: 72. Galatas 52
However, as Larsen points out, Agesilaos was not the only one who was responsible for causing the disintegration of the Boeotian alliance. For example, many of its members such as Plataea and Orchomenos, had grown unsatisfied with the federation and were more than willing to abandon it. One of the reasons that they were displeased was because the alliance had failed to meet their expectations. Many members of the federation had also grown particularly hostile to Thebes' growing hegemony. Therefore, the King's Peace might have marked the official end of the Boeotian League but it was not the sole factor that led to its dissolution.
I) Differences between the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation As already mentioned, the Boeotian Federation was a different type of alliance than that of the Peloponnesian League. By examining some of these differences one can better understand how the inability to meet one's duties and obligations brought about the disintegration of many interstate alliances. One of the major differences was that the Peloponnesian League was a series of bilateral treaties between Sparta and other weaker poleisP9 As such, Sparta's allies did not necessarily owe each other anything; their responsibilities in the League were only towards Sparta. In a way, there was a horizontal type of relationship between Sparta and her allies. What this means is that Sparta had her duties that she owed the allies and in turn her allies had their own obligations that they owed Sparta. If we had to use a diagram to explain this situation, one can imagine Sparta on the right side and an individual polis on the left, with two sets of arrows between them; one running from Sparta to her ally and the other running from the ally to Sparta.
238 Larsen 1968:38. 239 Cartledge 2000: 406. Galatas 53
These arrows signify the different obligations that Sparta and her ally owed one another. In turn, one can image the Peloponnesian League as a number of individual poleis on one side and Sparta on the other with these two types of arrows flowing between them. Based on this image, there is nothing that ties Sparta's allies with one another other than the fact that Sparta expected them to fulfill the same responsibilities. Therefore, if there were any conflicts in the League it tended be between Sparta and an individual ally. These tensions themselves began when one side failed to meet the expectations of the other. Again referring back to our diagram, it meant that one side did not have an arrow running between them and the other party. The Boeotian Federation functioned differently. As it will be shown, this alliance had a constitution that outlined the duties and obligations of all its members. For the most part, all members of the federation had the same type of responsibilities. Thus, legally they all had the same expectations in terms of what they had to contribute to the federation and what they could receive from it. Another difference with the Spartan alliance is that the Boeotian Federation had a central government that regulated the affairs of the alliance. Essentially, its main task was to ensure that the expectations of its allies were being met. Overall, there seems to have been a vertical type of relationship between the members of the Boeotian Federation and the central government. Once again, if we had to picture this relationship, one can imagine the central government on top and the individual members on the bottom with a double arrow linking them together. Since the federal government was formed by the different members of the alliance, it represented their collective expectations concerning one another's duties and obligations. However, some allies had a greater say in shaping the affairs of their alliance than others. Galatas 54
As such, not only were there disputes between different members of the Boeotian Federation, but there also were disagreements in regards to the type of central government the Boeotians had created. In the end, the inability to reconcile these differences in expectations is what led to the inevitable disintegration of the Boeotian federal state.
II) The Expectations of the Members in the Boeotian Federation
There were two types of duties and obligations under the Boeotian Federation; the first was in regards to what the allies owed the federal government and the second was what the federal government owed them. All members of the alliance were expected to provide one another with mutual protection against an external threat. Thus, they were expected to send the central government their military and financial contributions. Each polis and their dependencies, which were smaller poleis that were dependent on or subordinate to a more dominate po/w,240 were divided into eleven districts. Salmon has argued that these districts were created "dans le but de distribuer proportionnellement les bénéfices et les charges de la confédération."241 According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, all mere had to supply one thousand hoplites and one hundred cavalry to the federal government.242 In total, the league could mobilize up to 1 1,000 hoplites and 1,100 cavalrymen for the defence of its members. In addition to these military contributions,
24U Bakhuizen 1994: 310; Buckler and Beck 2008: 14; Bonner 1910: 409. For example, Chaeronea was thought to be a synteleia of Orchomenos. 241 Salmon 1985: 302. 242HeIl. Oxy. 16.4. Galatas 55
94^ each district had to pay taxes. For the most part, the federation's expenses were kept at a minimum except when it came time for war.244 In return for their military and financial contributions, each district was allowed to participate in the politics of the federal government.
However, not all Boeotians within each district were permitted to do so. Larsen writes that there were two types of citizens under the Boeotian alliance: those who were "active" and those who were "inactive."245 Many historians agree that only citizens who met a necessary property qualification could participate in the federal politics of the Boeotian Federation. 246 As in most Greek states, citizenship was based on hoplite status; thus an individual who had a sizeable piece of land could produce enough revenue to pay for his own armour.247 In other words, those who could defend their polis were allowed to actively participate in its political affairs. The same principle seems to have been true for an individual to partake in the federal politics of the Boeotian alliance. Larsen estimates that over half of the adult male population could not vote or run for office at the federal level, though they were still allowed to hold property, sue in the law courts and conclude
94R legal marriages with other citizens. Moreover, the number of active citizens that could get involved in the federal politics of the league varied according to the size of their districts. The Boeotians had a "kind of primitive representation by population,"249 where the number of representatives at the federal level was "in proportion to population or,
243 Many scholars argue that in 447/6 there were 9 districts and only after the incorporation of Plataea did the number increase to eleven. See Bruce 1968: 190-199; Hammond 2000: 87; Larsen 1968: 37; Salmon 1978: 132. 244 Larsen 1968: 36. 245 Larsen 1955:41-42. 246 Bonner 1910: 406; Cartledge 2000: 404; Larsen 1955: 42. 247 Hammond 2000: 84. 248 Larsen 1968:33-34. 249BuCk 1981:49. Galatas 56 rather, to the number of active citizens" in each district. Thus, "numerically [the
Boeotian federal state] was a genuinely representative system, even though strictly it represented only the minority of propertied, first-class Boeotian citizens."251 The executive branch of the alliance's federal government was the boeotarchia, which was responsible to levy and command the league's military forces and represent
9S9 the union in foreign policy issues. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, there were eleven boeotarchs in total, numbering one per meros. Some poleis had more districts than others and consequently were able to send more boeotarchs. For example, Thebes was allowed to send four officials whereas "Haliartus, Lebadea and Coronea provided another who each of the cities sent in turn."254 Thus, each polis was allowed to send a boeotarch once every three years. There is a debate among scholars regarding how an individual became a boeotarch. On the one hand, Cartledge suggests that a polis most
9SS likely elected an individual that it wanted to represent its interests. On the other hand,
Salmon and Buck agree that a boeotarch could have been selected by lot as he could have been elected by an individual's polis}5 What we do know for certain is that the boeotarchia was an annual office. In addition, the boeotarchs themselves took daily turns
9S7 as commander in chief of the federal army while they were in the field. However, "à l'époque de l'expansion thébaine, le commandement suprême de l'armée béotienne est entre les mains d'un des béotarques de Thèbes, soit sur la demande de ses collègues, soit
250 Larsen 1955:41. Also see Bruce 1968: 195; Salmon 1978:216. 251 Cartledge 2000: 405. 252 Botsford 1910: 285-88. However, it is important to note that the Boeotarchs did not have complete control over the League's foreign policy. When dealing with important issues, the Boeotarchs would consult the League's synedrion. See Cook 1988: 67. 253HeIl. Oxy. 16.4. 254HeIl. Oxy. 16.3. 255 Cartledge 2000: 405. 256Salmon 1978: 137; Buck 1981:50. 257 Thuc. 4.91-93. Also see Larsen 1968: 35. Galatas 57 sur la désignation de l'Assemblée." ' One can argue that it was natural for the Boeotians to turn to Thebes to lead the army since she was the most powerful polis in the region. It might also have been a Theban expectation that they would get to lead the federal army since they had provided a little over a third of its troops.259 Even though it was a "Boeotian novelty" to have an executive board from the different districts of the League,260 Thebes as the hegemon still held "exceptionally strong powers." Each mews also had the right to send sixty councillors to the central government. Once again, scholars are unsure whether these individuals were chosen by lot or elected by their polis?02 What we do know is that each district had to pay their councillors for their services.263 Furthermore, the synedrion was divided into four equal sections so that only a quarter of the councillors (165 / 660) would serve as an executive board at a time. Bonner has argued that the structure of the federal council was modelled on those of its individual members.264 In contrast, Buck suggests that the Boeotian allies adopted this quadripartite system only after it had been implemented at the federal level.265 Regardless of where it first emerged, this quadripartite division brought a couple of advantages. First, it allowed each district "to spread the load of business".266 This meant that it gave its citizens a chance to carry out their daily jobs while also being able to participate in the federal politics of the alliance. The system was also financially cheaper for a district since it only had to provide pay for fifteen councillors at a time instead of sixty. Lastly, "this
258 Salmon 1978: 139-140. Salmon also mentions that is was "très probable que le commandement en chef en temps de guerre est attribué a Thèbes de façon permanente tout comme Athènes [...] et Sparte." 259Md.259 260'Buck- 1981:49. 261 Hammond 2000: 87. 262 According to Larsen they were probably elected. See Larsen 1955: 46. 263 Hell. Oxy. 16.4. Also see Bonner 1910: 414; Larsen 1968: 36. 264 Bonner 1910:409. 265BuCk 1994:6. 266 Cartledge 2000: 404. Galatas 58 quadripartition also embodied the principles of rotation and brevity in office." 7 It seems that despite its oligarchic structure, the Federation had some democratic features. Only during "major decisions" would the whole assembly be called.268 The council was responsible to handle a wider variety of issues which included assigning tasks, setting policy, ratifying agreements with other states and taking care of "important religious matters."269 It would always convene at Thebes' citadel which according Larsen was
970 selected because of its geographical location in Boeotia. However, it seems that the Cadmea was chosen in order to maximize Theban representation and participation in federal affairs. After all, Thebes held 240/660 councillors, which was "just over thirty-six percent of the total [and] which was surely sufficient to ensure a majority on most major issues."271 In contrast other poleis were only allowed to send their representative once every two or three years. In addition, the Thebans ensured that their councillors would always have a say in governing the affairs of the federal state. For instance, a polis which was further away, such as Orchomenos, might not have been able to send its councillors in time when an immediate decision needed to be taken. The alliance's federal judicial system was also held in Thebes.272 The jurisdiction of this court "was practically confined to offences against the league, and disputes between individuals who belonged to different communities in the federation."
Depending on the size of their population, each district would send a number of
267 ¡bid. 268BuCk 1981:49. 269Buck 1979: 125. 270 Larsen 1968:35. 271 Cartledge 2000: 406. 272 ibid. 273 Bonner 1910:412. Galatas 59 individuals to serve as judges and jurors, and would also provide for their pay. The presence of a federal judicial body suggests that citizens were equally liable to obey their own laws as they were to follow the laws of the league. Hence, having a federal judicial system reminded individual poleis and their citizens that their actions and behaviours towards the federal state were subject to scrutiny. Although all members of the Boeotian Federation delegated a "genuine prerogative to the central government," they still "enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy."276 As in the case with the Peloponnesian League, there is no mention in our sources prior to the Kings' Peace that the Boeotian poleis had to be autonomous. Nevertheless, it was a part of their expectations that in return for their military and financial contributions they would be allowed to govern their own internal politics without any outside interference. As Ostwald puts it "from the point of view of the weak state, autonomia, is therefore not much more than a plea that a strong state should respect the independence which it has traditionally enjoyed."277 Levy also makes an interesting observation claiming that autonomia "combine une valeur minimale et une valeur maximale. Avec sa valeur maximale le terme désigne une indépendance complète [...] l'autonomie minimale [est un] privilège d'étendue variable concédé par la puissance dominante [dans une alliance]."278 Members of the Boeotian alliance were not completely autonomous since they depended on the federal government to handle their foreign policy issues. However, "being autonomous was perfectly compatible with membership in an alliance system, as long as conditions were not imposed unilaterally upon the ally by the
274SaImOn 1985:302. 275 Bonner 1910:414. 276 Beck 2001: 358. 2770stwald 1982:9. 278 Levy 1983: 266. Galatas 60 hegemon, and as long as the hegemon did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the ally."279 Based on the evidence that we have, there is no specification in regards to how many years the Boeotian alliance was supposed to last. As such, it is reasonable to
assume that the federation was meant for all times. One of the reasons that the Federation fell apart in the fourth century was because it failed to meet the expectations of its
immediate and external allies. On the one hand, some members accused one another of failing to meet their duties and obligations. These types of conflicts were primarily between Thebes and the other members of the alliance, since the former had the most political influence in shaping the alliance's affairs. Moreover, some poleis believed that the structure of the Boeotian Federation itself was not meeting its basic interests or
expectations. The success of a federal state directly depended on "the willingness of its member states to accept (and at times obey) the decisions of the central government."
When a polis decided that the alliance was not compatible with its own welfare it became unwilling to fulfill its duties and obligations to the central government. This belief, in
turn, is what led to the disintegration of the Boeotian Federation. There is one more point that needs to be made. Many Boeotians were not only members of the Boeotian alliance but also of the Peloponnesian League. There also
seems to have been an alliance on the whole between Sparta and her allies and the Boeotian Confederacy. An alliance between two interstate associations is likely to
result in conflict given that the members of each organization is forced to prioritize their
obligations that they owe to their immediate regional alliance and those that they owe to
279 Hansen 1995:35. 280 Beck 2001: 361. 281 See pages below. Galatas 61 the other association. As previously mentioned, the primary political unit when examining interstate relations is the polis. Thus, first and foremost, a polis acts in its own best interest and welfare. If these conditions are met, they may then fulfill any obligation that they owe to their regional alliance. Only once they have fulfilled these obligations can they meet any duties that they owe to another interstate organization. As soon as a polis begins to prioritize which interests and duties should come first, there is room for a dilemma. As seen in the case of the Peloponnesian League, a polis could decide that fulfilling its duties as a member of the alliance was not in its own best interest. The failure to meet their obligations caused tension and hostilities with Sparta and caused the disintegration of the League itself. The same concept can be applied to the alliance between two interstate associations. In some situations, a League could refuse to help another interstate alliance because it went against its general interests or because it
violated the obligations that it owed to its immediate members. Conflict usually arose between the leaders of these two alliances, as in the case between Sparta and Thebes,
when each side accused the other of not fulfilling their responsibilities.
Ill) Events from the Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries
One of the major problems that the Boeotian Confederacy faced was concerning
whether a polis considered itself to be autonomous as a member of the alliance. This debate was seen as early as 447, when the Boeotians had re-established their federation.
According to Diodorus, the Spartans played an active role in helping Thebes reform the Boeotian confederacy. Their immediate goal was to create a strong Thebes to serve as "a Galatas 62 counterweight to the increasing power of the Athenians." Not only did the Spartans "compel the cities of Boeotia to subject themselves to the Thebans," but they also helped them build their walls. Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries Sparta had ordered both her allies and her enemies to demolish their fortifications. As such, it seems questionable whether the Spartans were truly helping the Boeotians build theirs. However, if we assume that Diodorus is right concerning Sparta's involvement, the episode reveals that many Boeotians were opposed to the re-establishment of the federation. Diodorus does not write that the Spartans had helped the Boeotians become allies of the Thebans. On the contrary, Sparta forced the Boeotians to become Theban subjects suggesting that the cities were deprived of their autonomies.
The situation in Plataea also illustrates the debate whether belonging to a
OSA federation was compatible with autonomia. In the past, the Thebans had tried to coercively incorporate Plataea into the Boeotian alliance. In response, the Plataeans had sought help from the Athenians. Before Thebes and Athens could wage war with one another Corinth intervened and acted as an arbitrator. They declared that "there should be no interference from Thebes with any Boeotians who might not wish to belong to the Boeotian state."285 However, over half a century later it seems that some Plataeans had changed their minds. As Thucydides writes, members of a Plataean faction led by
Nauclides invited the Thebans into their city and requested to join their alliance. According to Buck, the fact that Thebes only sent a small force suggests that the majority of the Plataeans were willing to become members of the Boeotian Federation. One can
282DiOd. 11.81.3. 283 See Elis example above. Also see Xen. 2.2.20. 284BuCk 1994: 11. 285HdI. 6.108. 286 Thuc. 2.2. Galatas 63 assume that these individuals did not see the federal alliance as prohibiting their polis to be self-governing. Unfortunately, there were still those in Plataea who were opposed to the Thebans and the alliance so when the opportunity presented itself, they attacked the Thebans and expelled them from their city.287 In comparison to Nauclides and his followers, these individuals believed that being a member of the Boeotian Federation went against their interests. It was only in 427, that the Plataeans unwillingly became members of the Boeotian alliance. Immediately afterwards, the Thebans began to remove all those who favoured Athens and were hostile to the federal state. They also began to place individuals from Thebes to occupy and inhabit the territory of Plataea. Bruce notes that it was this action that increased the number of Theban boeotarchs from two to four.288 This new land provided many Thebans with enough revenue to elevate their own social status so that they could participate in the federal affairs of the alliance. In brief, the episode demonstrates how Thebes did get involved in the domestic politics of her allies when it benefitted her and that some members of the federation were far from being autonomous.
Throughout the fifth century the Boeotians had remained relatively loyal allies of the Peloponnesian League.289 On the one hand, this favourable relationship was to be expected since some Boeotians, in particular Thebes, owed Sparta for helping them to re- establish the Boeotian Federation. It was only during the Peace of Nicias that the Boeotians believed that their alliance with the Sparta did not suit their goals. As mentioned earlier, Sparta had summoned all her allies to vote whether or not they should
Thuc. 2.3-4. Bruce 1968: 196-199. Cook 1988:57-58. Galatas 64 accept the terms of the peace that they negotiated with Athens. Only the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians had opposed the peace, while the majority of the allies voted in favour of it. The Spartans expected that all her allies would agree to the peace since there was a majority vote, yet, the Boeotians refused to do so. It seems that they did not want to hand over some of their territory that they had gained over the first ten year period of the Peloponnesian War. In turn, this episode suggests that the
Boeotians placed the interests of their own alliance above those of the Peloponnesian League.291 This prioritization can also explain why they took over Herakleia. The Spartans founded this colony in 426, since it was "strategically placed as a base against Euboea and controlled the road to Thrace." Seven years later, however, the Boeotians had taken over Herakleia and had expelled the Spartan governor for his "incompetence in governing the place."293 They justified their actions by arguing that they feared Athens would have occupied Herakleia while Sparta was preoccupied with the affairs in the Péloponnèse.294 In other words, the Boeotians were arguing that their actions were in the best interests of the Spartans. Even if this statement were true, it does not explain why they chose to expel the Spartan governor. One might argue that his "incompetence in governing the place" had caused Herakleia to want to side with Athens. By removing him and taking over the city, the Boeotians ensured that Herakleia would remain loyal to Sparta. However, it seems that the primary motive for the Boeotians to take over Herakleia was to protect their own territory. As Cook mentions, this Spartan colony had occupied a strategic location in northern Greece. If Herakleia would have
290 See n. 70-72. 291BuCk 1994:9. 292 Cook 1990: 58. 293 Thuc. 5.52. 294Md. Galatas 65 gone over to Athens, not only would it have been a disadvantage to Sparta but it would have also threatened Boeotian security. Thus, the Boeotians' actions were chiefly based on securing their own welfare as opposed to helping the Spartans against the
Athenians.
Even though the Boeotians refused to swear to the Peace of Nicias and seized
Herakleia, they still remained Sparta's ally. Thucydides mentions that the Boeotians had no reason to abandon the alliance since "they did not suffer from Spartan interference, and they thought that the democratic government at Argos would be less congenial to their own aristocratic government than was the constitution of Sparta." In addition the
Boeotians "were afraid of acting in opposition to Sparta by entering into a league with Corinth, which had revolted from the Spartan confederacy."29 On the one hand, these examples suggest that the Boeotians met some of their duties and obligations that they owed to the Spartans. For instance, they continued to have the same friends as Sparta and had refused to ally with her enemies. These passages also illustrate that the Boeotians had their own personal incentives for not abandoning the Peloponnesian League. In the first example from Thucydides, the Boeotians feared Argos would interfere in their domestic politics by replacing their oligarchic governments with democratic ones. As such, it was to their advantage to remain Sparta's ally since she left them to be autonomous. Fear also played a role in terms of the Boeotians not joining the Corinthian alliance. They were probably worried that some of their own allies would justify abandoning the Boeotian Federation if they were to join a polis who had revolted from Sparta' alliance. Thus, once
JL MUL<. _/.-' 1 . Thuc. 5.38. Galatas 66 again, the Boeotians placed their own interests and welfare above those of the
Peloponnesian League. This prioritization can also help explain why the Boeotians wanted to negotiate a separate alliance with Sparta in 420. Thucydides writes that in order for the Spartans to regain possession of Pylos, they had to give Panactum back to the Athenians. During this period, Panactum was held by Boeotia, thus the Spartans
"had sent an embassy with the request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners should be put into Spartan hands [...]. The Boeotians, however, said that they would do so only on condition that Sparta made a separate alliance with them as she had done with Athens."
There are many possibilities for why the Boeotians sought a new type of alliance with Sparta. Buck, for one, writes that "the separate alliance meant that the Boeotians became an ally [of Sparta's] on equal terms rather than [being] a subordinate like the rest of the members of the Peloponnesian League." The problem with this view is that Sparta's allies were not always treated as her own personal subjects. If they were, Sparta would have been able to impose the Peace of Nicias as opposed to calling a League assembly to let her allies vote on the issue. Another explanation is that the Boeotians wanted to have a separate alliance that would lessen their duties and obligations to the Spartans. What this means is that the Boeotians did not want to have the same responsibilities that the rest of the Peloponnesian allies had. Once again, this explanation is problematic because the
Spartans still seemed to have the same expectations concerning what the Boeotians owed them. For example, they still expected the Boeotians to follow Spartan leadership and to have the same friends and enemies as them.
Buck 1994:22. Galatas 67
A third possibility is that the Boeotians wanted a separate alliance with Sparta that acknowledged the Boeotian Federation as a whole. There are some obvious consequences with this type of explanation. First, one has to assume that the Boeotians each had their own individual treaties with Sparta in the past, so that when the primary sources mention
'the Boeotians' they are not always or necessarily referring to the Boeotian Federation. Furthermore, it would make sense that the Boeotians needed a different type of alliance since Sparta's treaties were designed and intended for an alliance with other poleis. The Boeotian alliance, however, was a completely different political entity. Therefore, the nature of these treaties themselves had to be modified. It is also necessary to comment on the Athenian alliance that the Boeotians referred to and wanted to model their own treaty on. Shortly after the Peace of Nicias, the Spartans "proceeded to form an alliance with Athens."299 There are five major points to consider from this treaty. The first clause stipulated that the Spartan Athenian alliance was only meant to last for the next fifty years as oppose to all times. Moreover, it guaranteed the mutual protection between the two parties against a potential threat. Athens even swore to come to the aid of Sparta in case of a helot rebellion. It also stated that peace can only be made by Athens and Sparta
"jointly and simultaneously." Similarly, any amendments to the treaty could be made by either Sparta or Athens, provided they do it together. Lastly, the Spartans and Athenians
agreed "that this treaty shall be sworn to by the same people on either side who took the oath for the previous treaty" even though their allies were not present.300 There were two major differences between the terms of this treaty and the ones that Sparta usually negotiated with her allies. First and foremost, the alliance was
299 Thuc. 5.22. 300ThUC. 5.23-24. Galatas 68
intended to last for fifty years, rather than for all times, provided that both sides met their
duties and obligations. In addition, the fact that Sparta's allies were bound to the terms of the treaty, although they were not present, suggests that the alliance recognized both parties' hegemony over their regional associations. In one respect, it would not be surprising if Thebes was behind this Boeotian request for a separate alliance. The
Thebans probably felt that it was equally as important for Sparta to acknowledge their hegemony over the Boeotian Federation as she had recognized Athens' hegemony of her empire. One might disagree, by pointing out that nowhere in the text is Thebes' name explicitly mentioned. However, it is important to realize that it did not have to be. The
only thing Thebes had to do was to convince the other districts of the Boeotian Federation to vote in favour of negotiating a separate alliance with Sparta. Thus, it is very
plausible that the Boeotians wanted an alliance with Sparta that acknowledged their regional association.
In the end, Sparta was faced with a dilemma. If it had negotiated a separate
alliance with the Boeotians it would be in violation of the terms of their alliance with
Athens since "it was laid down in the treaty that neither side should make peace or war
without the other." Nevertheless, the Spartans wanted to have "Panactum to offer in
exchange for Pylos." They finally chose to grant the Boeotians their request and granted them a separate alliance. Though Thucydides does not explicitly mention the terms of this
new agreement, he does note that the Athenians saw this alliance as a direct violation of their terms with Sparta. They "pointed out that unless Sparta would give up her alliance
with the Boeotians [...] [they] would enter into an alliance with Argos and the friends of
Cartledge 1987:9. Galatas 69
Argos."302 The Spartans once again chose to honour their new alliance with the Boeotians as oppose to fulfilling Athens' request. Consequently, Athens made a treaty with Argos and resumed the war with Sparta. By the fourth century the Boeotian alliance was faced with both internal and external problems. As Buck notes, though the Boeotians were "still officially allies [of the Spartans they] were now coldly correct and unfriendly."304 Plutarch best illustrates this type of relationship when he has Lysander ask the Boeotians whether he should march through their territory with his spears held upright or levelled. At times, it seems that it was difficult for Sparta to know whether she could count on the Boeotians as a friend or a foe. The Spartans had also grown increasingly hostile towards the Boeotians, and in particular Thebes, for failing to meet their expectations concerning their obligations as an ally. For example, the Thebans had refused to hand over some of the Athenian democrats that Sparta wanted to put on trial and even voted to punish anyone in Thebes who did not grant these individuals any help.306 Thebes had also managed to insult Sparta's king by ruining his sacrifices and by refusing to contribute its military contingents.307 In turn, the Thebans and the Boeotians accused the Spartans of not meeting their expectations. They were upset that the Spartans did not share the spoils of the Peloponnesian War with them as they had done so in the past.308 Moreover, "hostility to Sparta developed as a result of Lacedaemonian high-handedness towards her allies and
302 Thuc. 5.46. 303 Thuc. 5.47. 304BuCk 1994:26. 305 Plut. Lys. 22.2. 306Lendon 1989:302. 307 See n. 86. 308 Cook 1988: 83; Lendon 1989: 302; Perlman 1964: 70. As both Botsford and Larsen note, the Boeotians had benefitted financially as an ally of Sparta's towards the last few years of the Peloponnesian War. See Botsford 1910: 297; Larsen 1968: 37. Galatas 70
fear [. . .] of Spartan plans for expansion."309 It appears that the Boeotians were increasingly concerned that Spartan hegemony would inevitably threaten their security.
Apart from this external threat, the Boeotians had to contend with their own internal problems. Many members of the Boeotian Federation seemed more than willing
to break away from the alliance for the following reasons. As Hansen notes, "alliances between independent poleis were frequently turned into hegemonic leagues or even empires"310 and the Boeotian federal state was no exception. By the end of the Peloponnesian War, Thebes had become the official hegemon of Boeotia. Though other poleis still participated in the federal government of the alliance, it seemed that the Thebans had a firm fix in governing the league's policies. On the one hand, the
proportional representation of the Boeotian federal government has been admired because it was a new political innovation that allowed all members to have a say in governing the affairs of the alliance. However, it primarily worked to the disadvantage of most
Boeotians. In essence, proportional representation based on population was a way for stronger poleis to control weaker ones. With 4/1 1 boeotarchs and 240/660 councillors, the
Thebans only needed the support of two more districts to hold a majority. In contrast,
O 1 1 other poleis sent one boeotarch and sixty councillors every three years. Thus, the
political influence and participation of weaker states was limited and minute in
comparison to stronger states. In a way, proportional representation made the weaker poleis subject to the commands of the Thebans and other stronger members.
3uy Bruce 1960:79. 310 Hansen 1995:28. 311 For example Haliartos, Lebadea and Coroneia formed one district, as such, they took turns to send their one boeotarch. It was the same situation also fro Acaephinium, Copae, and Chaeronea. See Hell. Oxy. 16.3. Galatas 71
Therefore, many members of the Boeotian Federation became unsatisfied with the political structure that they themselves had created. As a result, they began to abandon the alliance in order to gain control over their own political affairs. As Larsen notes, "Orchomenos, in the effort to cut loose from Boeotia, became a staunch ally of Sparta."312 Perhaps the Orchomenians hoped that the Spartans could help them gain hegemony over Boeotia as they had helped the Thebans do so a few decades earlier. What drove the Orchomenians to revolt from the Boeotian alliance in the fourth century was their rivalry with Thebes and their "disaffection with the federation."313 When the league was founded in 447, both Thebes and Orchomenos had two districts, and as such, had an equal amount of representatives in the federal council. After 427, the Thebans gained another two districts from Plataea which set off the balance of power between the two hegemonic rivals.314 In other words, "the confiscation of Plataean territory was for the benefit of Thebes, not of the league."315 In one respect it was "Theban attempts to manipulate the federal constitution [that] led [...] to increasing tensions." When the Orchomenians initially joined the Boeotian Federation, they expected to have an equal share of the decision making power as the Thebans; once this was not possible, they decided that the alliance went against their interests and decided to abandon it.
Members of the Boeotian Federation were also unsatisfied with the alliance because they believed that it had deprived them of their autonomies. It is important to realize that there is a major difference when examining the notion of autonomia to
312 Larsen 1968:38. 313 Buckler and Beck 2008: 19. 314 For the feud between Thebes and Orchomenos see Botsford 1910: 273-74; Buck 1972: 94-101; Cartledge 2000: 406; Hamilton 1979: 196. 315 Bonner 1910:414. 316 Ibid. Galatas 72 explain the dissolution of the Boeotian Federation in comparison to the Peloponnesian League. In terms of the later alliance, there are plenty of explicit and implicit examples where Sparta robbed her allies of their autonomies either by imposing harmosts and garrisons or by interfering in their domestic politics.317 In the fourth century there are similar examples that illustrate how the Thebans subjugated her allies instead of leaving them to be autonomous. Xenophon writes that Phocis was forced to become a subject of Thebes.318 Furthermore he notes how Thebes promised not to interfere in the local affairs of their allies but did so nonetheless by changing their type of constitution to suit its own interests.319 Isocrates also notes how the Thebans treated the Plataeans as slaves by
190 placing garrisons and governors within their city to regulate their politics. The problem with these examples is that they come after the dissolution of the Boeotian Federation in 386. Although the Thebans had attempted to re-establish their alliance, it had taken a completely different form after the King's Peace.321 There appears to have been more of a theoretical debate whether or not a polis could be autonomous under a federation from 447-386. In turn, it was the failure to resolve this debate that inevitably contributed to the dissolution of the Boeotian association. Many modern scholars have discussed whether a polis could be autonomous as a member of an interstate alliance. Keen, for one, argues that the Thebans did not see a conflict between being a member of the Boeotian Federation and having one's
199 autonomy. For instance, if the Thebans did not believe that the Boeotians were
317 See p. 23-25. 3l8Xen. 6.5.23. 319 For an example see Xen. 7.1.42-43. 320 Isoc. Plataicus 18-20. Also see Isoc. On the peace 115. 321 See Buckler & Beck 2008: 87-98, 165-179. 322 See Keen 1996: 113-125. Galatas 73 autonomous, then swearing to the King's Peace would have been an act of "perjury." After all, one of the main stipulations of the treaty was to allow all Greek poleis, whether great or small, to be autonomous. Keen suggests that "the impiety implicit in breaking oaths as one swears them seems rather un-Greek." Therefore, for the Thebans, being a member of an interstate alliance was compatible with having one's own autonomia.
However, as Hansen rightly notes, "the Thebans did not expose themselves to perjury. On the contrary they declined Agesilaos' offer to swear to the whole peace including the autonomia clause."324 There was no attempt on behalf of the Theban ambassadors to even challenge Agesilaos' accusation that the Boeotians were not autonomous. Instead, they returned to Thebes in order to discuss Agesilaos' demands and eventually told the Spartans that they would leave the Boeotians to be autonomous. Another disputed point between Hansen and Keen is concerning Antalkidas initial trip to Sardis in 392. According to Xenophon, the Thebans disapproved of the peace because they feared that the Spartans would use the autonomy clause "to grant independence to the Boeotian cities."325 However, they were not the only ones to have feared the use of the autonomy clause. Even Athens was afraid that she would have to leave Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros to be self-governing and Argos feared that they would have to let go of Corinth. On the one hand, Keen explains that the Thebans feared that the autonomy clause would be used against them, regardless of whether or not the Boeotians were autonomous.326 Hansen, on the other hand, argues that there is "no reason to suppose that the Athenians and the Argives had infringed upon the autonomia of the klerouchies and
323 Keen 1996: 115-116. 324 Hansen 1996: 129. 325 Xen. 4.8.15. 326 Keen 1996: 119. Galatas 74
Corinth respectively, whereas the Thebans had not infringed upon the autonomia of the other Boeotian cities." "
What both authors seem to agree on is that autonomia was not only a matter or interpretation but manipulation. For example, when Agesilaos had asked Epaminondas whether Thebes would leave the Boeotians independent, Epaminondas replied with his own question whether Sparta would leave the Laconian cities autonomous. Keen notes that "what Epaminondas seems to be saying is this: 'If our leadership of the Boeotians is a breach of autonomia, then so is yours of the perioikoi, but since I do not think our leadership of the Boeotians is a breach of autonomia, so therefore neither is yours of the perioikoi'."329 Even though this example occurs after the disintegration of the Boeotian Federation in 386, it is still useful to understand how "autonomia meant different things to different people."330 Moreover, it shows that the notion of autonomia was not only an issue for the members of the Boeotian alliance, yet, it was a concern for external parties such as Sparta and Persia. The inability to reach an accord concerning whether or not a polis was autonomous under a federation, led to further tensions between members and non-members. Consequently, it was these conflicts that contributed to the dissolution of the Boeotian alliance.
In brief, there were two types of expectations that the Boeotian Federation failed to meet: those of its immediate members and those that it owed to the Peloponnesian
League. Though all members could participate in the federal affairs of the union, the league's policies were essentially dictated by Thebes. In addition, many members
Hansen 1996: 130. Plut. Ages. 28. Keen 1996: 116. Galatas 75 realized that the federal alliance did not suit their basic interests and did not allow them to be autonomous. In other words, conflicts arose once the Boeotian alliance went against the welfare and interests of a polis. Secondly, the Boeotian Federation did not meet the expectations of the Spartans. Thebes, in particular, began to form an unfavourable relationship with Sparta by failing to meet its duties and obligations. As a result, Sparta began looking for ways to undermine Thebes' growing power. The remainder of this paper will focus on the role of domestic politics and the impact of third party intervention in order to understand what caused this unfavourable relationship between the members of the alliance and between Thebes and Sparta.
IV) Domestic Politics
As previously mentioned, there were plenty of factions that influenced and shaped the domestic and foreign policies of a polis. These groups were primarily formed "to seek power" and to pursue a common interest. 331 Furthermore, differences and disputes between factions were usually political struggles between individuals concerning specific issues rather than ideological ones.332 They would also do anything to enhance their own political influence and reputation even if it meant cooperating with their polis' enemy. In Boeotia there were two types of political groups that influenced the politics of the federal state: there were those who belonged to the oligarchic or democratic faction and those who supported either a pro or anti Spartan foreign policy. According to Larsen, there were some Boeotians who "preferred the democracy of Athens to their own
11 Buck 1994: 12-13. 12CoOk 1988:72-73. ;3Bruce 1960:75. Galatas 76
[oligarchic] government,"334 while others supported the oligarchy already set in place. The tensions between these oligarchic and democratic factions were sometimes dangerous for the wellbeing of the Boeotian alliance since both factions placed their loyalty to their political programs above the loyalty to their state. ' As such, they were more than willing to invite external parties to interfere in their local politics. In addition, becoming a member of the Boeotian alliance often depended on which faction had the most influence in a polis. For example, some oligarchic Plataeans invited the Boeotians to their city in order to change their democracy into an oligarchy and gain political power.336 However, their ploy failed when the democrats revolted and killed the small force of Thebans that had entered into their polis.331 As was previously shown, Sparta had removed political groups and changed the constitution of their allies to prevent them from being disloyal.338 The same can be said about the Thebans. Once Plataea was in their possession, those who were in favour of democracy and Athens were removed from power and expelled from the city.339 Most of these individuals found refuge with Athens, but what is important to realize is that there was a direct correlation between the political faction that had the most influence and a polis' views towards Thebes and the Boeotian alliance.
The pro and anti-Spartan factions, however, had the greatest impact in bringing about the disintegration of the Boeotian Federation. In Thebes, Leontiades, Asias and
Coeratadas favoured Boeotia's alliance with Sparta while Ismenias, Antitheus and
334Larsen 1955:40. 335 Ibid., 48. 336Buck 1994: 11. 337 Thuc. 2.2-4. According to Buck the fact that Thebes only sent a small force suggest that the majority of the Plataeans were willing to join the alliance. See n.104. 338 Seen., 113. 339 ? Larsen 1955:40. Galatas 77
Androcleidas were opposed to it.34 Bruce makes an interesting point that usually "democracy or oligarchy in home affairs acquired, broadly speaking, an implication of pro-Athenian or pro-Spartan outlook in foreign affairs."341 In the case of Thebes, it remained an oligarchy from 447 until the King's Peace. Thus, "friendship or hostility to Sparta was not determined on constitutional grounds." In one respect, it is not surprising to find a pro-Spartan faction in Thebes, since the Spartans were partly responsible in restoring Thebes as hegemon of Boeotia and since the Boeotians had prospered as an ally of the Peloponnesian League. On the other hand, it is understandable that an anti-Spartan coalition had emerged by the fourth century. This group was not necessarily pro-democracy or pro-Athenian, but resented and feared Sparta's growing empire. 4 Many scholars have tried to pinpoint when each faction had control of Theban politics and subsequently had command over the federal government of the alliance.
After all, the Oxyrhynchus historian writes that the rest of the Boeotians "joined one or other of the factions." 345 However, this paper agrees with Cook that neither Ismenias nor Leontiades' faction 'controlled' Boeotian politics at any given time. Instead, each faction took turns persuading and convincing the majority in their local and federal councils to support their policies. Both Lendon and Cook have argued that the many individuals belonged neither to Ismenias' or Leontiades' faction. 4 There seems to have been a "floating body of individuals" that could change their minds to favour either political
340HeIl. Oxy. 17.1; Xen. 5.2.25. 341 Bruce 1960:75. 342 Ibid., 76. 343 See n. 270. 344 Bruce 1960: 78; Perlman 1964: 64. 345 Hell. Oxy. 17.1. 346 Cook 1988: 82; Lendon 1989: 31 1 Galatas 78 group. For instance, Ismenias and his anti-Spartan faction probably convinced Thebes to remove Agesilaos' offering from the altar. Buckler notes that Agesilaos was partially at fault for the affair because he knew that only the Boeotian priests were allowed to perform the sacrifices. Regardless of whether Agesilaos was to blame, it is obvious that Thebes' reaction to Sparta depended on the reaction of the political faction that had the most influence. As Hack writes, Ismenias used the situation "to demonstrate that the
Thebans were freeing themselves of Spartan control." He was sending a message that Sparta could not violate the traditional rights and expectations of her allies without meeting any consequences. Another example in regards to the impact that a polis' factions had was Thebes' refusal to help the Eleians revolt from the Spartans. Cook writes that Leontiades' faction probably convinced Thebes to refrain from aiding Elis and to remain an ally of Sparta.349 However, it was probably Ismenias' faction that persuaded the Thebans not to send their military contingents to help the Spartans. This episode demonstrates how Thebes could follow the policies of both political factions at the same time. In addition, it shows how different political groups determined whether a polis would fulfill its duties and obligations that it owed to another interstate alliance. The impact that these two factions had on the politics of Thebes and the federation can also be seen behind the Boeotians' decision to go to war with Sparta over a regional dispute between Phocis and Locris. According to Xenophon, Ismenias and his faction had planned the whole affair between Phocis and Locris in order to start a war with Sparta.
Buckler 2003: 61. Hack 1978:212. Cook 1988:83. Galatas 79
"[They] were well aware that the Spartans would never break their treaties with their allies, unless someone committed an act of war first. They therefore induced the Opuntian Locrians to levy money from some territory of which both they and the Phocians claimed to be the owner. The Theban view was that, if this happened, the Phocians would invade Locris, and in this way they were quite right."
Ismenias' faction then convinced the Thebans and the other members of the Federation that they should attack Phocis to help their Locrian ally. Once Thebes was involved, Phocis sent an envoy to Sparta requesting her help. The Spartans, in turn, decided to aid the Phocians not only because it was part of their obligations to come to the defence of a League member, but also because they were eager for the opportunity to go to war with Thebes to punish them for their past behaviour.351 The Oxyrhynchus historian describes the event as well, though his version differs from that of Xenophon. He writes that
"the party of Androcleidas and Ismenias hastened to engage the people in war against the Spartans, wanting to overthrow their empire so that they would not be swept aside by the Spartans because of the pro-Spartan party."'
In this account, Ismenias' primary concern was to look after his own welfare as opposed to doing what was best for the Federation. Fearing that they would be forced to leave
Thebes and Boeotia, they devised a plan to attack Sparta. They knew "that it would be difficult to attack them openly, since neither the Thebans nor the Boeotians would ever be persuaded to make war on the Spartans, who were supreme in Greece." As such, they decided to cause a war between Phocis and Locris. Unlike Xenophon's account, the Phocians decided to invade Locris' territory after they had stolen some of their sheep.
350 Xen. 3.5.3. 351 Xen. 3.5.4-5. 352HeIl. Oxy. 18.1. 353HeIl. Oxy. 18.2. Galatas 80
Nevertheless, the end result was that Thebes decided to side with Locris and Sparta had come to the defence of Phocis. 5
Although the details of these two versions differ, it seems that the leaders of the anti-Spartan faction instigated the war with Sparta by causing conflict between Phocis and Locris.355 Over the years, scholars have focused on whether or not Ismenias was truly responsible for provoking the war with Sparta. Bruce writes that if Ismenias' party was in control at Thebes he would not have needed a trick to go to war with Sparta. Moreover, he sees no "personal benefits" for Ismenias to want to start a war with the Spartans despite the presence of Leontiades' faction in Thebes. 5 The problem with this view is that Ismenias did not have complete control over Theban politics. His faction competed with that of Leontiades' to convince the Thebans and Boeotians to adopt his policies.
Buck also questions the guiltiness of Ismenias, arguing that this episode is used to justify
OCT later on the charges and accusations Ismenias faced during his trial. Others, however, have argued that Ismenias purposely took advantage of the situation between Locris and Phocis because he feared and resented Sparta's expansionistic policies.358 Hamilton suggests that it was a combination of Persia's financial contributions, Timocrates visit and Conon's successes that "gave Ismenias' faction confidence" to challenge Sparta's hegemony.359 After all, there was "no other logical explanation for the Theban presence in Phocis, if not to provoke war, as the sources explicitly state."
Hell.Oxy. 18.3-4. Hamilton 1979: 193-194. Bruce 1960:81-83. Buck 1994: 34-35. Cook 1990: 57; Hamilton 1979: 208; Lendon 1989: 301; Perlman 1964: 65. Hamilton 1979: 198. Also see Perlman 1964: 79; Lendon 1989: 311. Hamilton 1979: 197. Galatas 81
For the purpose of this essay it is irrelevant whether Ismenias and his faction purposely instigated the war between Phocis and Locris. What is of interest is Thebes' and Sparta's reaction to the situation. The Oxyrhynchus historian writes that this was not the first time that Phocis and Locris had come into conflict with one another.361 However, we can assume that it was the first time that they appealed to their allies for help. By doing so, they created conflict between two interstate organizations. As Beck puts it "the true significance of this border dispute lay not in cattle but rather in its potential to initiate a war on a system-wide scale."3 2 In theory, Thebes and some other Boeotian allies, "had withdrawn [from the Spartan alliance] in everything but name."363 As such, the Spartans still expected the Boeotians to fulfill their duties and obligations as a member of the
Peloponnesian League. In other words, Sparta expected the Boeotians to continue having the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and to supply them with their financial or military contribution. It is interesting that before going to war the Spartans had sent an envoy to Thebes "telling the Boeotians not to make war on the Phocians" and if they felt that "they were wronged in any way, they ordered them to obtain justice from them in a meeting of their allies."364 Most scholars agree that Sparta ordering Thebes not to interfere was quite "insulting" to the Thebans. As Cook states:
"Ismenias and his group were certainly convinced that Sparta was a threat to Boeotia [. . .] [and] this was the perfect situation to test Sparta's intentions. If Sparta had been mainly concerned with her traditional domination of the Péloponnèse [...], there would have been no crisis, and Boeotia would have established her authority to direct matter in her own area. That Sparta went so far as to order Boeotia to submit a grievance in central Greece to the arbitration of the Peloponnesians confirmed all their fears [...]."
361 Hell. Oxy. 18.3. 362 Buckler and Beck 2008: 24. 363 Lendon 1989: 307. 364HeIl. Oxy. 18.4. 365 Lendon 1989:312. 366CoOk 1988:84-85. Galatas 82
However, there are some problems with this explanation. If the Spartans were so keen on going to war with Thebes, why did they offer to handle the situation diplomatically through the Peloponnesian League's assembly? One might argue that the Spartans were mocking the Thebans by offering them to present their case knowing that Sparta and the rest of the allies would side with Phocis over Locris. Alternatively, this passage suggests that Sparta expected the Thebans and the Boeotians to fulfill their duties and obligations as a member of the Peloponnesian League. The ambassadors that were sent were there to remind the Boeotians that they were responsible to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans; which meant that they would not attack Phocis. In a way it seems that war was inevitable because Thebes was faced with conflicting obligations. Locris was a member of the Boeotian Federation and expected
Thebes and the rest of the Boeotians to come to its immediate defence. The issue was that
Phocis happened to be a Spartan ally and in theory the Boeotians were responsible to have the same friends and foes as Sparta under the terms of their alliance. In the end, Thebes chose to honour the obligations it owed to the other members of the Boeotian
Federation instead of the Peloponnesian League. On the one hand, Ismenias might not have provoked the conflict between Phocis and Locris, but he certainly took advantage of the situation to advocate his policies. It was Ismenias and his faction who led the charge to protect Locris and publically illustrate that Thebes was placing the interests and the welfare of the members of the Boeotian alliance above those of the Peloponnesian
League. In turn, Ismenias and his followers were "not only an anti-Spartan faction but a pro-Boeotian expansionist faction."367 Once again this example illustrates the impact that
367CoOk 1990:60. Galatas 83 a polis' political factions had in terms of shaping the relationship between two interstate alliances.
V) Third Party Intervention
As Gehrke has noted, there is a close connection between a polis' factions and the intervention by an external party. In an attempt to promote their own policies, many political groups often invited a foreign power to get involved in the affairs of their polis or alliance. The Thebans in particular seem to have a long tradition where they would seek external support to advance their own political agendas. For instance, when they sought an alliance with Athens during outbreak of the Corinthian War, they told the Athenians that it was one individual and not their state as a whole that wanted to destroy their city and enslave its inhabitants in 404. Moreover, when they wanted the Greeks' support they claimed that the only reason why they helped Persians in the early fifth century was because there was a dynasteia in charge of Thebes. However, when the
Thebans sought help from the Persians they were quick to mention how they willingly
¦5-71 fought alongside them during the Battle of Plataea.
Leontiades' faction, for one, played a prominent role in terms of inviting the
Spartans to interfere in Thebes' affairs. According to Xenophon it was Leontiades that convinced Phoebidas to seize Thebes' citadel. Although this example occurred after the dissolution of the Boeotian Federation it is still useful to depict how these factions were responsible in allowing others to shape their internal politics. In 382, Leontiades' words
368 See n. 14. 369 See Xen. 3.5.8-15 for Thebes' speech to Athens. 370 Cartledge 2000: 402. 371 Xen. 7.1.33. Galatas 84 had an "intoxicating effect" on Phoebidas "who was a man with such a passion for doing
something distinguished that he would prefer it to life itself. He was not however, thought to be a reasonable man or of really good judgement."372 Leontiades feared that Ismenias and the other members of the anti-Spartan political group would drive him and his pro- Spartan faction from Thebes.373 His solution was therefore to get rid of Ismenias by asking the Spartans for help. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, this was not the first time Leontiades tried to remove Ismenias and his anti-Spartan faction from Thebes.374 It was only with the help of Phoebidas, that he was successful in doing so. Leontiades also played an active role in terms of exonerating Phoebidas and convicting
Ismenias. Essentially he argued that Phoebidas had done Sparta a great favour by capturing the leader of the anti-Spartan faction in Thebes. Leontiades implied that with
Ismenias gone Thebes would remain a loyal Spartan ally and would not try to undermine her supremacy.375 In other words, many of the conflicts that had happened between Sparta and Thebes was Ismenias' doing. In the short run, Leontiades had successfully gained control of Theban politics by removing Ismenias with Sparta's help. In the long run, however, his actions had worked to his disadvantage. As Buckler puts it:
"by seizing the Cadmeia, the Spartans united the Thebans in a way that no local leader could. Theban politics was no longer a matter of pro-Spartan against pro- Athenian, but of Theban against outsider. Since the pro-Spartan group had promoted the Spartan occupation, and had identified itself with it, the pro-Athenian circle stood forth as the champion of a free and autonomous Thebes."376 Apart from Sparta, the Persians also intervened directly and indirectly in the
politics of the Boeotians. On the one hand, the Persians provided the Thebans with the
372Xen. 5.2.28. 373HaCk 1978:222. 374 Hell. Oxy. 18.1. 375 Xen. 5.2.34. 376 Buckler 1980: 15. Galatas 85
"Vin financial resources to instigate war with Sparta. According to some, it was this money that gave Ismenias the confidence to challenge Spartan hegemony during the Boeotian War. However, it is again a misconception that the disintegration of the Boeotian
Federation was actually caused by Persia and the King's Peace. Though King Artaxerxes claimed to be the prostates of the peace, he did not actively interfere in the domestic politics of the Boeotians. One can assume that the intention of the King was to leave the
Greeks bicker amongst themselves so that he could focus on the internal affairs of Persia. One way to do so was by not defining the notion of autonomia. Thus, he left it up to the Greeks to figure out when a polis or an alliance was violating the autonomy of another polis. Therefore, what the King's Peace did was expose the problems of the Boeotian
Federation concerning whether a polis could be autonomous as a member of a federal state. The King never said that being a member of a federation was incompatible with autonomy. It was Sparta, and mainly Agesilaos, who developed this remark. Most scholars tend to agree that the autonomy clause was a Spartan invention. As Badián writes, there was nothing to suggest that the King thought in terms of the autonomy of both great and small poleis.31s The ambiguity of the term left it to be interpreted and manipulated to suit the personal interests of an individual polis. Only in 371 did the Spartan Prothous try to convince the Greeks to establish a concrete definition of autonomia. He proposed to the Spartans to disband their armies in Phlius and hold an assembly with all the Greek states to discuss the issue. However, "when the Spartan
Hamilton argues that Timocrates was sent twice to Greece to provide money to the poleis who were hostile to Sparta. See Hamilton 1979: 190. 378 Seen. 216. Galatas 86 assembly heard this from him they considered that he was talking utter nonsense." It was not that the Greeks could not come up with a definition of autonomia, but an issue of whether they wanted to. In a way, it was easier and to the advantage of stronger poleis to have no definition of autonomia so they can use it to suit their own interests.
What is surprising during the events surrounding the King's Peace is that the Thebans did not even challenge Agesilaos' accusations. Years later when Agesilaos told Pelopidas to disband the alliance, the latter responded that he would only do so if Sparta left Messene to be autonomous.380 There is no such response or defence by Thebes in 386 to argue that they did not have to dissolve their alliance because the members were already autonomous. This silence can imply one out of two things. First, the Boeotians were not really autonomous and the Thebans knew this. That is why they were so adamant against the peace in 392. 381 On the other hand, perhaps Leontiades' faction convinced the Thebans that it was in their best interest to accept the peace and have a favourable relationship with Sparta. What is important to realize is that the Persians were not the ones who ordered the Thebans to break up their federal alliance. Nor did they command the Spartans to use the King's Peace to do so. There were already tensions between the members of the alliance that dealt with the concept of autonomia. In turn, the peace had provided Sparta with the means to legitimately exploit this issue and cause the collapse of the Boeotian Federation.
0 See p. 84. 1 See n. 325. Galatas 87
VI) Summary
When Cleigenes asked Sparta for help against the Olynthian confederacy he argued that
"the cities which have been forced against their will to share a common citizenship with Olynthus will soon revolt if they see that there is any opposition. But this league may not be so easy to dissolve once the various people have become closely bound to each other by intermarriage and by property relationships [...] and once they recognize that it pays to be on the side of the winner."
This comment is not necessarily true for the Boeotian Federation. It seems that the longer the alliance lasted the more reasons it had to fall apart. Despite the cultural links that they shared, some Boeotians thought that the disadvantages of being a member of the alliance outweighed the advantages. In theory, all members of the federation had a say in terms of governing the affairs of the federal state. However, with the system of proportional representation weaker states played a very limited role in regulating the politics in the central government. In comparison, with the most amount of representatives Thebes managed to control the federal state to suit its own policies and interests. As such, many poleis felt that they had turned into Theban subjects and tried abandoning the alliance.
Moreover, many poleis accused the alliance of not meeting their expectations in regards to their right to autonomia. There was mainly a theoretical debate whether a. polis believed that autonomia was compatible with being a member of the Boeotian Federation. As a conventional expectation, the right to one's own autonomia meant different things to different people. For the Thebans, the alliance might not have violated the autonomies of its members; on the other hand, most members agreed that it did. Once
Xen. 5.2.18-19. Galatas 88 again, the inability to reach an agreement over this type of dispute led to the dissolution of the alliance.
Another factor that led to the collapse of the Boeotian Federation was the unfavourable relationship that it developed with Sparta. The Boeotians were forced to prioritize whether they should fulfill their duties and obligations they owed to their federation above those of the Peloponnesian League. On more than one occasion, it was apparent that the interests of the federal state were more important than the responsibilities they owed to Sparta. The role of factional politics also influenced the type of relations that Sparta and the Boeotians had with one another. Ismenias and his political group challenged Sparta's hegemony and convinced Thebes to not fulfill its duties and obligations of that it owed under the Peloponnesian League. Leontiades and his faction promoted a favourable relationship between the Spartans and the Thebans. These factions were also responsible for allowing a non-member to interfere in the federal state's affairs. In other words, they were the ones that allowed Sparta or Persia to shape the policies of the Boeotians. For instance, Persia played a direct role by sending Timocrates to provide the Thebans with enough money to wage war on Sparta. In comparison the King's Peace had an indirect impact in bringing about the disintegration of the alliance. It essentially exposed some fundamental problems that the Boeotians struggled to deal with in regards
to the notion of autonomia. However, it was Sparta and not the Persian King that
declared that the Thebans should dissolve their federation in accordance with the
autonomy clause of the Peace. Therefore, the Boeotians Federation might have been officially dissolved in 386, yet, the King's Peace was not the sole factor that led to its
disintegration. Galatas 89
Conclusion
The Greeks had many motives for creating their different interstate alliances.
Some authors take what modern political scientists call a liberal approach by arguing that these alliances were designed to benefit all members in their interstate community by promoting stability. For instance, Larsen suggests that they were used to establish peace and unity; though these attempts were unsuccessful. He states that "it was the spirit of freedom for oneself but not for others which was largely responsible for the failure of Greek movements for unity." Others take what political scientists refer to as a realist approach which suggests that "international organizations are important only as reflections of great-power values and norms regarding appropriate state behaviour in international relations." According to Beck, Greek alliances, as well as multilateral obligations and peace treaties, were tools that powerful states used to perpetuate their own power and pursue their own interests. 386 Regardless of which view one takes, it is obvious that these interstate associations had an impact in terms of shaping Greek diplomacy and governing the interaction of great and small poleis. However, in order to understand the role that these alliances had on Greek interstate relations, one has to consider both the factors that led to their integration as well as to their disintegration.
The collapse of the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation was caused by a multiple of internal and external variables, but what they all have in common is that they affected whether an alliance met the expectations of its members and vice versa. When a polis decided to join an interstate association, it had certain expectations in
383 Pease 2008: 58. 384 Larsen 1962:231. 385 Pease 2008: 44. 386 Buckler & Beck 2008: 2. Galatas 90 terms of what the alliance owed them and likewise what they owed the alliance. Most of these expectations were outlined in a written treaty or constitution. For example, the treaties of the Peloponnesian League stipulated that Sparta and a polis would come to each others defence against an external or internal threat. Conversely, other expectations were based on conventions. Though autonomia was not mentioned in the treaties of the Peloponnesian League or the constitution of the Boeotian Federation, all poleis expected to be able to govern their internal affairs as they saw fit. There was usually a favourable relationship between the members of an alliance when each side fulfilled their duties and obligations. In contrast, tensions and conflicts arose when one party failed to meet their responsibilities and many poleis abandoned the alliance once it did not meet their expectations and their interests. Under the Peloponnesian League, these conflicts were mainly between Sparta and her individual allies. The allies expected that Sparta would offer them protection against a potential threat, would leave them to govern their own affairs, and would consult them on issues of war and peace and when she wanted to use their troops. Sparta, however, expected her allies to come to her defence against an external or internal threat, to provide her with their military contributions, to follow her command whithersoever she may lead and for them to have the same friends and enemies as her. By the fourth century, both parties accused one another of violating the terms of their agreement by not meeting their responsibilities. The allies accused the Spartans of depriving them of their autonomies and for using their troops without always consulting them. Sparta, in comparison, was upset with her allies for constantly siding with her enemies and for Galatas 91 failing to provide her with their military and financial contributions. In the end, the inability to reconcile these faults is what led to the collapse of the Peloponnesian League.
For the Boeotian Federation there were two types of expectations. The first was in regards to the duties and obligations that the alliance owed its immediate members. All poleis expected that the alliance would protect them against a potential threat, would allow them to participate in the federal affairs of the government and leave them have their autonomies. In turn, the allies were to follow the decisions of the Boeotian federal government and provide it with their financial and military contributions. The Boeotians were also expected to meet their duties and obligations as an ally of the Peloponnesian League. Throughout the fourth century, the Boeotians placed the interests of the federation above those of the Spartan alliance. By doing so, the Spartans accused the Boeotians, and mainly the Thebans, of failing to meet their responsibilities. Thus, the alliance between the Boeotians and Peloponnesians was bound to resolve in conflict since they were forced to prioritize their obligations.
The domestic politics of a polis, and in particular its political factions, was one factor that shaped the type of relations that an alliance's members had with one another.
In the pursuit of power, these factions did not care whether they violated the terms of their agreements with their allies. Some of Sparta's factions, for instance, justified interfering in the local politics of her allies by creating a network of loyal supporters to promote their policies and interests. As such, they were responsible for creating an unfavourable and hostile relationship between Sparta and her allies by robbing them of their right to autonomia. Similarly, the factions in the poleis of the Boeotian Federation cared more about pursuing their own agenda than meeting the expectations of their allies. Galatas 92
Leontiades for one invited the Spartans to interfere in the politics of Thebes in order to
remove his political opponent. In a way, many political factions were to blame for inviting an external member to get involved in the affairs of their alliance and of their polis. Therefore, another factor that shaped the relations between the members of alliance
was the role of third party intervention. Persia had consistently and persistently intervened in the politics of the Greeks by providing them with the financial and military
means to wage war on one another. The King's Peace also had an impact on their affairs. Though the King declared himself as prostates of the Peace, it was mainly left up to the
Greeks to decide and interpret when an individual polis was violating the autonomy of another. In this respect, Persia had a direct and indirect role in terms of bringing about the
disintegration of both the Peloponnesian League and the Boeotian Federation. Sparta and Thebes as well interfered in the politics of their allies usually on behalf of their request. As seen with Elis and Plataea, both Sparta and Thebes used the opportunity to reshape the
internal affairs of these poleis to suit their own agendas. Studying the expectations of the Greeks not only reveals what led to the
disintegration of an interstate alliance, but it also highlights some of the fundamental issues that the Greeks themselves struggled to cope with. One of the problems they faced
was trying to determine whether autonomia was compatible with being a member of an interstate alliance. Though all the Greeks agreed that everyone should be autonomous
"few wished to share it with others"; in turn the "constant abuse of it would leave it threadbare political slogan rather than a reality."387 Even the sole attempt to establish a concrete definition of autonomia was regarded as "nonsense." It is not that the Greeks
Buckler 2003: 15. Galatas 93 could not define autonomia, but rather that they did not want to. By leaving the term ambiguous, the Greeks, in particular the hegemons of an alliance, could manipulate it to suit their own interests.
In general, when two poleis formed an alliance they specified the length in time that the terms of their agreement would last. Some alliances were meant to last for five or ten years, whereas others were meant for all times.389 For the most part, when a group of poleis formed an interstate alliance, they intended it to be a permanent organization. Though the Peloponnesian League lasted over a century, and the Boeotian Federation had a "heroically long lifespan of sixty years,"390 this allies "for all times" attitude was nothing more than ideal. So long as an alliance met its basic interests, ? polis would be more than willing to meet its responsibilities. However, a. polis was quick to abandon the alliance and form new relations with other strong poleis once it decided that the association did not suit its basic needs and wants.
Bederman 2001: 162; Larsen 1933: 266. Cartledge 2000: 411. Galatas 94
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