Why States Outsource the Use of Force to Domestic Nonstate Actors

Home , Curfewed Night, Ghulam Azam, Imtiaz Ahmed (brigadier), Liberation War Museum, Mujibism, Northern Light Infantry

Gambling with Violence:

By:

Yelena Biberman

Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

MAY 2014

This dissertation by Yelena Biberman is accepted in its present form

by the Department of Political Science as satisfying the

dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date______Ashutosh Varshney, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date______Peter Andreas, Reader

Date______Pauline Jones Luong, Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date______Peter M. Weber, Dean of the Graduate School

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YELENA BIBERMAN

Born January 18, 1982, in Babruysk, Belarus

Academic Positions

Visiting Assistant SKIDMORE COLLEGE, Saratoga Springs, NY Professor Government Department (Fall 2014-Spring 2015)

Visiting Instructor UNION COLLEGE, Schenectady, NY Department of Political Science (Winter and Spring 2014) Education

Ph.D. BROWN UNIVERSITY Political Science (September 2008-May 2014) Areas: Comparative Politics (high merit) and International Relations Dissertation: Gambling with Violence: Why States Outsource the Use of Force to Domestic Nonstate Actors Committee: Ashutosh Varshney (Chair), Peter Andreas, Pauline Jones Luong M.A. Political Science (2010)

M.A. HARVARD UNIVERSITY Regional Studies – Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia (2004-06)

B.A. WELLESLEY COLLEGE International Relations (2000-04) Magna cum Laude, Honors in International Relations

OXFORD UNIVERSITY Philosophy and International Relations (2002-03)

Publications

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles

“The Politics of Diplomatic Service Reform in Post-Soviet Russia,” Political Science Quarterly 126, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 669-680.

“Bureaucratic Partisanship and State Building: The Case of Ukrainian Foreign Ministry,” Problems of Post-Communism 58, No. 2 (March/April 2011): 17-27. . Awarded 2011 Millar Prize iv

“Assessing the Costs of Weak Diplomatic Institutions” (Ukrainian: «Оцінюючи Втрати Внаслідок Слабких Інститутів Дипломатії»), Academic Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine (Науковий Вісник Дипломатичної Академії України) Vol. 15 (2010): 228-234.

“Political Science and the Rules of Causal Inference” (Russian: «Политология и правила выявления причинно-следственных отношений»), Polis 10, No. 6 (2009): 168-176.

Submitted for Peer Review

“Why States Outsource Violence: Domestic Nonstate Actors in Pakistan and India’s Wars”

“Why States Turn Civilians and Militants into Counterinsurgents: Evidence from India and Turkey”

Selected Non-Peer Reviewed

“Pakistan,” The Islamic World: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Society, M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming.

“Generation Putin,” Foreign Policy, January 22, 2008.

“Between the East and West,” Moscow Times 4326 (Feb. 8, 2010), 7.

“Unwelcomed Missiles” (with Feryaz Ocakli), Russia Profile, December 29, 2009.

“Back on the Radar: The Organizers of Anti-Radar Demonstrations in the Czech Republic Claim that Ordinary People Want a Say in the Debate,” Russia Profile, July 28, 2009.

“Iran: Code Orange?” Foreign Policy In Focus, June 30, 2009.

“Learning from the Soviets in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy In Focus, June 20, 2008.

“Children of the Revolution: A New Generation of Russians Tries to Become Politically Active,” Russia Profile, February 5, 2008.

“Why Alma Mater Matters,” Russia Profile 5, No. 6 (July 2008): 8-9.

“A Rural Referendum: Villagers Hope Medvedev Will Continue Down Putin’s Path,” Russia Profile, March 3, 2008.

“Banking on Russian Women,” Passport Moscow (September 2008): 30-32.

“U.S.-Iran Relations Need Reform,” Wellesley News, September 2003.

Grants, Awards, and Fellowships

2014. Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Travel Grant

2013-2014. Watson Institute for International Affairs Graduate Fellowship [declined, to accept a teaching position at Union College]

2012-2013. Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

2012-2013. American Institute of Pakistan Studies Junior Fellowship

2012. Smith Richardson Foundation World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship

2011. Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy Research Grant (Special Recognition: John L. Stanley Award)

2011. James R. Millar Graduate Student Prize from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER)

2011. New York Public Library Short-Term Research Fellowship

2011. American Political Science Association Centennial Center for Political Science and Public Affairs Fellow

2011. Foreign Language and Area Studies Summer Fellowship, South Asia Summer Language Institute (SASLI), University of Wisconsin-Madison (Urdu)

2011-2012. Brown University Graduate School Internal Dissertation Fellowship

2011, 2012, 2013. Brown University Office of International Affairs Research Travel Grant

2010, 2011, 2012. Brown University Graduate School Research Travel Grant

2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. Brown University Graduate School Conference Travel Grant

2010. Brown University Political Science Department Methods Training Fellowship

2009. IREX U.S. Embassy Policy Specialist Fellowship

2009. Watson Institute for International Affairs Graduate Program in Development Summer Fieldwork Grant

2008-2009. Stanley J. Bernstein ’65 Graduate Fellowship, Brown University

2006-2007. Fulbright Fellowship

2005. Harvard University Davis Center Research Travel Grant

2005. Harvard University Ukrainian Institute Research Travel Grant

2005. Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Summer Fellowship

2002-2003. National Science Foundation Award for the Integration of Research and Education

2002, 2003. Francis Beirne National Essay Contest First Place Prize

2003. Target “All-Around” Award

2003. Wellesley Class Of ‘69 Community Service Award

2002. Centuria of Excellence Award

2001, 2002, 2004. Wellesley College Spirit of Service Award

2001. Youth Venture Grant

2001. Wellesley College First Year Academic Distinction

Conference and Workshop Presentations

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (2010, forthcoming 2014)

Modern South Asia Workshop at Yale University (2014)

International Studies Association Annual Meeting (2014)

Annual Conference on South Asia (2013)

Cambridge University Press Watson Seminar, book manuscript review (2013)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Strategic Use of Force Working Group (December 2013 and April 2013)

New England Political Science Association Annual Meeting (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014)

Jennings Randolph Senior Fellows and Peace Scholars Workshop, USIP (2013)

Midwest Political Science Association Conference (2009, 2012, 2014)

National Seminar for Research Scholars on “Understanding Pakistan,” Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India (2011) vii

Harvard University Post-Communist Politics and Economics Workshop (2011)

IREX/Woodrow Wilson Center Regional Policy Symposium (2009)

Inter-Ivy Sociology Symposium at Columbia University (2009)

Russian Academy of Education Conference on Professional Education, Chebaksary, Russia (2006)

Harvard University Graduate Student Conference on Comparative and Security Policies (2006)

Harvard University Davis Center Undergraduate Research Conference (2004)

Wellesley College Ruhlman Conference, Wellesley College (2004)

Wellesley College Tanner Conference (2003)

Invited Talks and Guest Lectures

Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY (March and December 2013; April 2014) Lectures: “The Breaking Up of South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh”; “Why States Outsource Violence: Lessons from South Asia”

Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia (March 2008; November and December 2012)

Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir (2012)

Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution at the Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India (2012)

IREX Regional Office in Kiev, Ukraine (2009)

American Center in Moscow, Russia (2008)

U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia (2008)

History of Russian-American Diplomatic Relations: 200 Years, FLEX Alumni Conference in Yaroslavl, Russia (2007)

Additional Training

Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies Basin Harbor Workshop (June 2014)

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Training in the field of strategic studies through a four-day pedagogical colloquium focusing on teaching an introductory course in strategic studies; syllabus construction; case teaching; use of film in the classroom; gaming and simulations; and staff rides

Pay It Forward: Women Helping Women in International Relations, International Studies Association Annual Convention (2014)

Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (2013)

Olympia Summer Seminars: Transformation of Conflict, Olympia, Greece (2012)

Staff Writer at Russia Profile Magazine in Moscow, Russia (2007-08)

Methodological Training

Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Geographic Information System (GIS) Institute (2012)

Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Syracuse, NY (2010)

Pedagogical Training

Brown University Sheridan Center Teaching Certificate I (2009-10) and Certificate III (2010-11)

College Reading and Learning Association Tutor Certification (2002-03)

Teaching

Instructor

States, Rebels, and Warlords, Union College (Spring Term 2014)

Politics of Modern South Asia, Union College (Winter Term 2014)

They Might Be Giants: The Global Rise of BRICS, Union College (Winter Term 2014)

Teaching Assistant

Politics, Economy, and Society in India, Brown University (Spring 2011)

The Roots of Radical Political Islam, Brown University (Fall 2010)

Politics, Markets, and States in Developing Countries, Brown University (Fall 2009)

Introduction to International Relations, Brown University (Spring 2010)

Volunteer Instructor

Albany Youth Leadership Institute in Albany, NY (2002)

Global Learning Non-Profit Organization in San Roque, Costa Rica (2001)

Founder and Director

College Prep Program in Albany, NY (Summers 2002 and 2003)

Selected Media Appearances

ForeignPolicy.com, Interviewed for article “Streetfighting Men: Is Ukraine’s Government Bankrolling a Secret Army of Adidas-Clad Thugs?” (February 6, 2014) Al Jazeera Arabic News Channel, Live Interview (April 18, 2008) The Wall Street Journal, The Informed Reader, Coverage of my Foreign Policy article “Generation Putin Eyes the World Warily” (January 29, 2008) Chinese Xinhua News Agency, Interviews (February 29 and March 3, 2008) Political Talk Show Narod Hochet Znat’ (TVS-Moscow Television Channel), Interview (November 30, 2007)

Languages

Urdu/Hindi – advanced introductory; Russian – fluent; Spanish – intermediate; Turkish – introductory; Belarusian, Ukrainian – working knowledge; Hebrew, Latin – introductory

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my main advisor, Ashutosh Varshney, for his faith in my commitment to understanding the extraordinarily rich history and politics of South Asia.

Without his intellectual guidance and moral support my exploration of South Asia would not have been possible. From the beginning of my graduate studies, Pauline Jones Luong was as a mentor and role model who patiently and cheerfully guided me through every step of the process. Peter Andreas’ counsel and unique insights were instrumental to the development of this dissertation from a question to what is contained in these pages. I have been very fortunate to have such a knowledgeable and supportive dissertation committee.

Feryaz Ocakli, my husband, profoundly influenced both my work and my life outside of work in more ways than I could possibly list here. My graduate school years at Brown were wonderful thanks to the friendship of Gavril Bilev, Maria Angelica Bautista, Daniel

Kushner, and Jeremy Johnson, the mentorship of Linda Cook, Melani Cammett, and

Richard Snyder, and the help and support of Suzanne Brough. The final chapters of this dissertation were written at the Lucy Scribner Library of Skidmore College, and I am especially grateful to Roy Ginsberg, Kirsten Mishkin, Kate Graney, Ron Seyb, Grace

Burton, Bob Turner, Aldo Vacs, Natalie and Flagg Taylor, and Barbara McDonough for their warmth and friendship. I am also thankful to Michele Angrist for her support and mentorship during my wonderful time teaching at Union College.

Archival research was indispensable to my findings, and so was the help of Nuzhat

Khatoon at the Asia Division of the Library of Congress, Thomas Lannon at the

Manuscripts and Archives Division of the New York Public Library, and Andrea Singer at

the Indiana University-Bloomington Library. The help and friendship of Abu Syed

Muhammad Belal, Samir Ahmad, Malik Hammad Ahmad, Farhan Zahid, Nickolas

Katsakis, and Oleg Ivanov enriched my work and research experience.

The chapters comprising this dissertation significantly benefitted from the excellent feedback I received at workshops, seminars, and conferences, as well as through correspondences and conversations. I am grateful to Stathis Kalyvas for his advice at my

Olympia Summer Seminars presentation and Stephen Biddle for a very insightful conversation at the Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy.

My dissertation also significantly benefitted from the comments of Paul Staniland, Lee J.

M. Seymour, Erica De Bruin, Kimberly Marten, Ariel Ahram, and Belgin Şan Akça at our

International Studies Association panel; the exceptional group of graduate students and

Roger Petersen at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Strategic Use of Force

Working Group; Uday Chandra, Sadia Saeed, and many others at the multidisciplinary

Modern South Asia Workshop at Yale University; Ana Arjona, Regina Bateson, and

Romain Malejacq at our Midwest Political Science Association annual conference panel;

T.V. Paul at our Annual Conference on South Asia panel; those who offered their comments at my invited talks at the Institute of Kashmir Studies at the University of

Kashmir, the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Jamia Millia

Islamia, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs; participants of the National Seminar for Research Scholars on “Understanding Pakistan” at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi, India, and the Jennings Randolph Senior Fellows and Peace Scholars Workshop in Washington, D.C. I am grateful to C. Christine Fair,

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Victor Asal, Robert Gerwarth, Brian Dudley, and Corinna Jentzsch for taking the time to read and critique my work.

Research for this dissertation was generously supported by the United States

Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship; American

Institute of Pakistan Studies Junior Fellowship; Smith Richardson Foundation World

Politics and Statecraft Fellowship; Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy Research Grant

(Special Recognition: John L. Stanley Award); New York Public Library Short-Term

Research Fellowship; Brown University Graduate School Internal Dissertation Fellowship; and Brown University Office of International Affairs as well as Graduate School Research

Travel Grants. My study of Urdu language at the South Asia Summer Language Institute

(SASLI) was made possible by the Foreign Language and Area Studies Summer

Fellowship.

My greatest debt is and always will be to my family. All that I will ever accomplish is because of their courage and wisdom to leave everything they had ever known and start a new life – to embrace the completely unfamiliar and to make it their own.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables page xvi

List of Illustrations xvii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter 2 A THEORY OF STATE OUTSOURCING OF 24

VIOLENCE

Chapter 3 THE HISTORICAL PUZZLE OF VIOLENCE 48

OUTSOURCING

Chapter 4 TARGET DENSITY VIS-À-VIS THE LOCAL 73

POPULATION: PAKISTAN’S OPERATION

GIBRALTAR (1965) AND OPERATION BADR

(1998-99)

Chapter 5 TARGET DENSITY VIS-À-VIS TERRITORY: 108

INDIA’S KASHMIR CAMPAIGN (1988-2003)

ACROSS TIME AND SPACE

Chapter 6 MILITARY CAPACITY: PAKISTAN’S 134

MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN EAST PAKISTAN

(1971) AND BALUCHISTAN (1973-77)

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Chapter 7 EMBEZZLERS AND REBELS IN RUSSIA’S 201

CHECHNYA CAMPAIGN

Chapter 8 AN UN-HALAL ALLIANCE? AGHAS, ISLAMISTS, 219

AND TURKEY’S SECULAR MILITARY

AGAINST KURDISH REBELS

Chapter 9 CONCLUSION 236

References 245

List of Tables

Tables

2.1: State Outsourcing Methods and Types of Nonstate Actors with page 27

Illustrative Examples

4.1: Area and Population in Kashmir in 1965 90

5.1: Area, Population, and Religion in Jammu and Kashmir State (1981) 123

6.1: Trends of Refugee Influx 163

6.2: Influx of Refugees from March 25 to December 15, 1971 163

6.3: Provincial Origins of Pakistani Military Officers, 1956 and 1965 169

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List of Illustrations

Figures

1.1: Prevalence of Pro-Government Militias, 1981-2007 page 3

2.1: Structural Conditions, Incentives, and the Outcome 25

2.2: Role of Target Density and Coercive Capacity in Outsourcing Outcome 29

2.3: Target Density 33

2.4: Military Capacity Chain 41

2.5: Military Capacity, Military Outcomes, and War Outcomes 45

4.1: Selected Dawn Headlines, August-September 1965 85

4.2: Operation Gibraltar Plan of Action (July-August 1965) 91

5.1: Rebel Violence in Jammu and Kashmir State (January 1, 1988-May 31, 122

1993)

5.2: Distribution of Rebel Violence by District (January 1988-June 1993) 124

5.3: Distribution of Deaths Resulting from Rebel Violence by District 124

(January 1988-June 1993)

5.4: Number of Insurgents Killed by Indian Army by Year, 1990-2003 131

6.1: Pakistan and India’s Relations with Great Powers, March-December 159

1971

6.2: Organization of Rebel Forces 181

6.3: Operational Sectors of Bangladesh Forces 183

6.4: Mukti Bahini Organization 184

8.1: Location and Number of Village Guards in 1988, 1990, and 1995 223

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Southeastern Turkey was a long way from home for Deniz,1 a recent conscript in the Turkish army. He was apprehensive about serving in the Şırnak province, where the militant organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was operating. In the summer of 2006, the twenty-two-year-old found himself in a military convoy heading to the region bordering Iraq and Syria. He was still outside the town of Cizre, nervously observing the sprawling mountainous landscape from his bus window. “Suddenly, I noticed three men wearing pushis [traditional Kurdish scarfs], shalvars, and other clothes just like the PKK terrorists,” he recalls. “They had long beards, bullet belts, and Kalashnikovs. I thought they were terrorists, and got scared. The other soldiers laughed at me. They told me that these men were not PKK, but local Kurds helping us to fight the terrorists. This gave me little comfort.”

Why would a state use nonstate actors in a military campaign? Why would it willingly forgo having a monopoly on the right to use physical force by “outsourcing” violence to individuals with no prior professional ties to state institutions? Security is conventionally viewed as the state’s quintessential and exclusive domain. Centralization, bureaucratization, and nationalization of coercion are deemed necessary for modernization

1 The name was changed to protect the identity of the interviewee, August 2013, Istanbul, Turkey. 1

and modern state-making.2 Yet, modern states often incorporate a variety of nonstate partners into their repertoire of coercion. Violent state proxies have been a staple of both the Cold War and the post-Cold War politics. The Colombian army created paramilitary groups to fight leftist insurgents. The British army and police in Northern Ireland have colluded with loyalist paramilitaries on targeted killings.3 China has increasingly delegated internal security to “units that are not formally government employees, and probably have little or no legal training.”4

Figure 1.1 displays the global prevalence and distribution of pro-government militias between the years 1981 and 2007. At least 64 percent of the 332 organizations identified had direct links to a state institution.5 Considering the challenges of collecting accurate data on violent groups’ ties to the state, the number likely underestimates the incidence of state-sponsored militias.

2 Among the prominent writings in this vast literature are Weber, “The Bureaucratization of the Army by the State and by Private Capitalism,” in Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 980-982; Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Macmillian, 1946); Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990- 1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002): 127-149. 3 John Stevens, “The Stevens Inquiry: Overview and Recommendations,” Metropolitan Police Service, United Kingdom, April 17, 2003, accessed April 1, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/northern_ireland/03/stephens_inquiry/html/. 4 “Unrest catches China’s police by surprise,” Financial Times, February 6, 2012, 3. 5 Between the years 1981 and 2007, at least 332 pro-government militias were in operation. Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, “States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 2 (March 2013): 253. 2

Figure 1.1: Prevalence of Pro-Government Militias, 1981-20076

States vary not only in when, but also in how and to whom they outsource violence.

They may co-opt an existing organization, hire a private firm, turn a blind eye to an already active group, or create a brand new organization. Among the different methods of outsourcing, the creation of an armed organization represents the most counterintuitive scenario. The strategic logic of creating an armed nonstate group is far less clear than that of co-opting a violent nonstate organization. The latter is an attempt to centralize authority, whereas the former challenges the conventional wisdom that states are averse to devolving their coercive power. States are supposed to seek to eliminate challengers to their authority, not create potential rivals. Hiring a private contractor can create problems with security

6 GIS map compiled using Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) dataset. Mercator projection used for better visualization of Europe. 3

and political accountability.7 However, these problems compound when security is delegated to individuals who have far less professional experience or discipline. Turning a blind eye to a nonstate actor’s violent behavior signals complicity. It represents passive support and crosses the boundary of the kind of behavior generally expected of a state.

Actually mobilizing and militarizing nonstate actors, however, far exceeds that boundary.

States can draw their nonstate assets from their own populations or work with groups outside their borders. The United States armed the Afghan mujahideen resisting the

Soviet Union following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.8 Iranian intelligence and diplomatic officials helped to organize the Lebanese Hezbollah.9 An example of a state using its own population is the Iraqi government raising a force of over 150,000 villagers and townspeople of Kurdish ethnicity to serve as members of the jash militia to combat

Kurdish rebels and, during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian forces.10 Nonstate actors originating inside the sponsoring state’s borders present a greater security threat to the state than those originating abroad. As the powerful terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba has shown, domestic nonstate actors can operate more effectively inside the sponsoring state, which makes them riskier partners.

The term outsourcing refers to a process whereby a principal (in this case, the state) contracts out to an external provider (the domestic nonstate actor) a function (the use of

7 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Deborah Avant, “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force,” International Studies Perspectives 5, no. 2 (2004): 153-157. 8 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004). 9 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 10. 10 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 354-357. 4

physical force inside or outside state borders) which is commonly performed “in-house”

(by the national armed forces). State outsourcing of violence to a domestic nonstate actor involves the expectation that the nonstate actor, if and when necessary, engages in armed combat. Functions such as spying or serving as a local guide do not involve “outsourcing of violence” because they do not involve the actual or threatened use of physical force.

The focus of this dissertation is on the particularly puzzling type of outsourcing by the state – the creation of irregular military units composed of nonstate actors. What makes the nonstate actors “nonstate,” even during the period they are effectively employed by the state, is their lack of prior professional affiliation with the state.11 Unlike their “regular” counterparts, nonstate actor-based organizations lack formal accountability and are significantly less transparent. They are ad hoc military formations that are institutionalized only temporarily, if at all, within the existing political structure. Their legal basis is usually ambiguous if not outright nonexistent. In fact, nonstate actor-manned armed organizations are deemed illicit by the international humanitarian law.

What distinguishes the modern state from its medieval and early modern predecessors is the possession of an unprecedented resource – the legitimate use of physical force. The state is the only organization that has the widely, if not universally, recognized right to use violence as a means of achieving its goals. No other organization is granted such power over the creation, and destruction, of security. No other organization so

11 Reservists and veterans, who are civilians with military experience, do not fall under the nonstate actor category because they are formally associated with the state’s military institutions through regular compensation and, in the case of the reservists, expectation of service. The mobilization of reservists and former soldiers by the state is a standard military practice, and therefore does not fall under the outsourcing category. 5

jealously guards it. The institutions of the standing army and police forces emerged as the

“regular” symbols and tools of state authority, as well as models for aspiring state builders.

Why would a state create an irregular military organization composed of domestic nonstate actors rather than invest in the regular armed forces? This is the first puzzle addressed by the dissertation.

The second puzzle addressed by the dissertation concerns the variation in the type of the domestic nonstate actor used by the state. This puzzle stems from an empirical observation that when states do outsource violence to domestic nonstate actors, they make their selection from two basic categories. The first comprises civilians with little or no previous combat experience. The second involves militants with a rebellious or criminal past. For example, the Guatemalan government recruited nearly one million peasant farmers to serve alongside the army during the three decade-long civil war.12 The Russian government used former rebels – many of whom had previously fought against the central government – to gain and maintain control of Chechnya.13 Under what conditions does a state use militants, and when does it involve civilians in operations in which armed combat is a real possibility?

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

There have been remarkably few systematic studies of state sponsorship of nonstate actor violence. While numerous works have been devoted to actors such as insurgents,

12 Amnesty International, “Guatemala: The Civil Defence Patrols Re-emerge,” September 4, 2002, accessed November 16, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d99cd394.html. 13 Anna Nemtsova, “The Chechen Boss,” Foreign Policy, April 1, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/01/the_chechen_boss. 6

warlords, terrorists, and, more recently, local self-defense organizations,14 surprisingly little has been done to understand state behavior vis-à-vis these actors. A major reason for the marked scarcity in the scholarship is the difficulty of studying the phenomenon empirically. Reliable and comprehensive data on the subject is not readily available.

However, by discounting the “irregular” practices of state coercion, our understanding of the origins and consequences of political violence remains partial and skewed.

Several empirically-rich studies have examined cases of states using nonstate actors for violent purposes.15 Although they have made a valuable contribution of bringing the phenomenon and its varied manifestations to our attention, these works lack a theoretical framework for explaining the variation in state sponsorship across multiple cases.

The existing literature on inter-state and civil conflict suggests several plausible explanations of state outsourcing of violence. These may be classified as (1) military weakness, (2) strategic motives, (3) patronage, and (4) learning.

14 Among the notable examples are Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Kimrebly Marten, Warlords: Strong- Arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Daniel Blocq, Formation of Armed Self-Defense Groups (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, in progress); Corinna Jentzsch, “‘Sharpen Your Hoes and Picks’: Peasant Mobilization for Self- Defense During” (paper presented at the seventh annual Harvard-Yale-MIT Conference on Political Violence, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, April 27, 2013). 15 Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005); Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability (New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002); Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (London: Zed Books, 1993). 7

The conventional wisdom deems nonstate actor violence a product of a weak military apparatus. The driving assumption has been that nonstate actors emerge and proliferate because states are too weak to contain them.16 Currently emerging is a new body of work which recognizes that states can play an active role in the rise of violent nonstate actors. It also links nonstate actor violence to military weakness, proposing that states use nonstate actors when, due to historical path-dependency, their militaries are not strong or organized enough to otherwise carry out the coercive task. In his study of cooperation between postcolonial states and militias, Ahram (2011) argues that cooperation with militias will occur only when a state did not inherit a bureaucratic military organization from the departing colonial powers and/or when it do not face a strong external competitor, which would force the state to build and centralize its armed forces.17 The underlying assumption is that states with strong, centralized militaries do not use violent nonstate actors. Similarly, Centeno (2003) views the development of a centralized military apparatus as antithetical to state-militia cooperation. He proposes that states that have not fought “total wars” – highly destructive wars which required the militarization of the entire society – have failed to undergo the kind of centralization and military development

16 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation 2003); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75-90; William I. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 17 Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 8

processes necessary to fight in the “regular” style. Consequently, these states have no choice but to rely on local militias during military conflict.18

The argument that weak military capacity leads states to outsource violence is intuitively appealing. However, it does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. It fails to account for the cases in which states have a strong and highly centralized military apparatus, but still sometimes engage nonstate actors in their military affairs. Among such cases are

Pakistan and Russia.19 Pakistan inherited the British colonial model of a highly centralized military apparatus. The military then grew stronger and more centralized, so much so that observers of Pakistan often evoke the saying: “whereas most states have an army, in

Pakistan the army has a state.” When it comes to having the experience with fighting “total wars” and military centralization, few states can compete with Russia.

Another strand of the emerging scholarship focuses on states’ strategic motives for using nonstate actors, such to weaken a neighbor20 or to lower the economic or political cost of the operation,21 with the latter often captured by the plausible deniability thesis.22

18 Miguel Centeno, “Limited War and Limited States” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, ed. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 19 The Russian military used former rebels to gain control of Chechen capital Grozny during the second Chechnya campaign. Leonid Berres, “Russia’s First Guerrilla,” Defence & Security, November 11, 1999; Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, RAND, 2001). 20 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: National Security Research Division/RAND, 2001); Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 21 The emphasis on the lower economic cost of using nonstate actors is prevalent in the privatization of security literature. 22 Michael G. Findley, James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young, “Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (January 2012): 235-248; Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns, “Force Multiplier: Pro-Government Armed Groups” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Sabine Carey, Bronia Flett, and Neil J. Mitchell, “The Nature, 9

The development of the concept of plausible deniability may be traced to the period when cash-strapped monarchs used mercenaries, privateers, and mercantile companies to carry out foreign ventures. As Thomson (1994) explains, “If a ‘private’ undertaking that a ruler authorized met with success, s/he could claim a share in the profits. If the enterprise caused conflict with another state, the ruler could claim it was a private operation for which s/he could not be held responsible.”23 In other words, nonstate actors allow the state to hide its involvement in the military venture, thereby allowing it to undertake operations which it otherwise could not afford either for economic or political reasons. The nonstate actors profit from loot, and the state benefits from anonymity.

The literature that emphasizes the political and economic benefits states reap from using nonstate actors in violent conflict explains why a state might be tempted to outsource violence. However, motives alone cannot bring about political outcomes. First, there is significant and puzzling variation in the practice of outsourcing violence by states despite the persistence of motives. For example, during Operation Gibraltar (1965), Pakistan pursued plausible deniability and used domestic nonstate actors. However, during the bloody military campaign in Baluchistan (1973-1977) and the covert operation in Kargil

(1998-1999), Pakistan sought plausible deniability but did not use nonstate actors.24

Structure and Environment of Pro-Government Militias: Notes from Peru, Spain, and the Former Yugoslavia” (paper presented at the workshop on Understanding Order, Cooperation, and Variance among Non-state Armed Groups, Queens University, Canada, 2009). 23 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21. 24 Pakistan’s quest for plausible deniability during the Baluchistan campaign (1973-1977) is documented in Guardian, January 24, 1975, 12; Guardian, February 21, 1975, 19. 10

Second, there is little evidence to suggest that nonstate actors are less financially burdensome to the state than the regulars. As the empirical record shows, the mobilization, supervision, and demobilization of the former often involves heavy and costly involvement by the latter. The creation of nonstate-based armed groups, as opposed to coopting or turning a blind eye to an already existing violent organization, is puzzling precisely because it is more financially burdensome for the state than boosting the capacity of the already existing regular forces. To the question of what happens when the regular forces are not up to the military task, the usual answer is not that the state then mobilizes the civilians or arms the militants. The usual answer is that the state simply does not fight.

Another weakness of motives-based explanations is that motives are notoriously difficult to measure. Causal accounts of violent behavior that rely on political actors’ expressed or presumed motives are often problematic. As Kalyvas (2006) points out, not only are actual motives very difficult to measure, they are also “typically subject to

(strategic or unselfconscious) reinterpretation and ex post rationalization by the subjects.

Even when fully revealed, intentions often turn out to be mixed or even contradictory.”25

For example, Christia (2012) observes that Afghan war commanders’ choice of allies was not based on the former’s stated motives – shared race, religion, or ideology with a given ally. After selecting their allies based on power considerations, the commanders “then construct justifying narratives, looking to their identity repertoires for characteristics shared with their allies and not shared with their foes.”26

25 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24. 26 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6-7. 11

An alternative explanation for why states outsource violence may be found in the political economic approach to violent conflict. From the transaction perspective, the relationship between the state and nonstate actors may be seen as involving the latter’s provision of irregular military service in exchange for privileges supplied by the former at mutually beneficial terms.27 The classic patronage-based relationship between the state and nonstate actors is illustrated by the British strategy in the volatile tribal territory of the

North-West Frontier. The British colonial presence in the Punjab beginning in the mid- nineteenth century deprived the North-West Frontier Pathan tribes of “a field for raids and booty.”28 Cognizant of the impending security threat, the British created an irregular armed force composed of local Pathan tribesmen. The salary and pension collected by the irregulars and their families were designed to keep the tribes from raiding and looting “the pride and backbone of British India” (i.e. the Punjab) while also maintaining some control over “the most vital and most vulnerable frontier of the British Empire” (i.e. the North-

West Frontier).29

Armed nonstate actors have also been found to exist in a symbiotic relationship with state officials in a democratic setting. In the case of Colombia, the right-wing paramilitaries originally created to fight leftist insurgents have delivered votes to some politicians who, in exchange, helped to ensure the paramilitaries’ survival.30 In addition to individual politicians, political parties have also been identified as often having direct links

27 Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (June 2010): 493-515. 28 Philip Mason, “Forward,” in Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), xiv. 29 Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts, 1. 30 Daron Acemoğlu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos, “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. 3 (2013): 5-44. 12

to violent pro-status quo organizations.31 The ties between the Rashtriya Swayamsevak

Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party in India as well as between Islami Jamiat-e Tulabah and the political party Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan (especially during the 1971 civil war)32 epitomize the trend.

Patronage is an important mechanism of the principal-agent relationship between the state and the state-sponsored nonstate actor. However, it is not the only mechanism.

Coercion is another. Ranging from torture to a promise of a reduced prison sentence – or in combination with positive inducements – coercion allows the state to recruit the more reluctant partners33 and to ensure their compliance during the military campaign.

Finally, learning is sometimes invoked to explain why a state might turn to the

“unconventional” military means, such as armed nonstate groups. It has been argued, for example, that the United States’ change in strategy from regular military-dominant to one involving the Vietnamese Irregular Defense Groups and Provisional Reconnaissance Units was a product of learning.34 A competing strand of the literature argues that the military’s capacity to learn is dubious, given the organizational impediments to change. The military’s reluctance or inability to learn is widely attributed to “a variety of rational,

31 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009). 32 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 66. 33 The reluctance to serve the state may come from ideological or very practical considerations. The nonstate adjuncts often become the favored targets of the insurgents, who see them as a serious threat to the insurgent operations and legitimacy while, at the same time, easier targets than their regular counterparts due to inferior equipment and training. 34 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005): 8-12. 13

organizational and cultural reasons,”35 such as organizational conservatism and “a tendency towards anti-intellectualism.”36

The argument about whether the military has the capacity to learn notwithstanding, the lesson of using nonstate actors in military operations has long been learned. From the

Byzantine Empire’s foederati37 to early modern Europe’s privateers, mercenaries, and mercantile companies,38 violence outsourcing has a long and well-traversed history. The modern state is far from unique when it comes to outsourcing violence. Violence outsourcing is also hardly unconventional in modern warfare. The key problem uniting the existing explanations of the phenomenon is: Under what conditions do the benefits of outsourcing offset the costs? This is precisely the question addressed in this dissertation.

The next sections explain how.

ARGUMENT AND CONTRIBUTION

This dissertation identifies the conditions under which states are likely to benefit from using domestic nonstate actors, as opposed to regular forces only, in violent conflict.

I identify the structures that generate the motives to outsource and the motives to use a particular type of a nonstate actor, as well as the condition that makes it possible for the

35 Kelly M. Greenhill and Paul Staniland, “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency,” Civil Wars 9, no. 4 (December 2007): 408. 36 John Kiszely, “Learning About Counterinsurgency,” RUSI Journal 151, no. 6 (December 2006): 18. 37 Contingent fighting forces composed of Arab tribes used by the Byzantine Empire. Jonathan P. Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44; Irfan Shahid, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1989), 368. 38 For an in-depth study of the British Crown’s delegation of state responsibilities to the East India Company, see Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 14

state to act on these motives. In doing so, I challenge the military weakness hypothesis, showing that it is, in effect, high military capacity that allows states to create and use armed nonstate organizations.

I argue that states are highly likely to create irregular military organizations when the target of the military operation is mixed with the local population, as irregulars can provide local knowledge and exposure reduction. When a target that is mixed with the local population is geographically dispersed, which is usually the case when it is scattered across remote villages, the state is more likely to use civilians. When the target that is mixed with the local population is geographically concentrated (e.g. in urban neighborhoods), militants are the preferred violent partner. Civilians are less militarily skilled, but are more numerically abundant and less costly to recruit in large numbers than their militant counterparts. Their quantitative advantage allows the state to cover more territory, while benefitting from their local knowledge. The militants’ qualitative advantage (i.e. combat skills) makes them useful for the more surgical type of operations in which the target must be isolated quickly and effectively (e.g. assassinations).

The benefits of outsourcing cannot be realized, however, without the organizational capacity to outsource. Organizing the nonstate formation requires a highly capable military apparatus. High military capacity allows the state to amass, arm, train, and transport a force which, as the empirical record shows, is often composed of thousands of members. It also allows the principal to ensure the compliance of the agents. Managing the nonstate partners, who have their own interests and often more on-the-ground information, requires a level of coercive power above that of the nonstate actor. High military capacity is necessary for

organizing, managing, and, at the end of the operation, terminating (or absorbing into the regular security apparatus) the nonstate formations. Using domestic nonstate actors entails the future prospect of reining them in, and military strategists need confidence that the military apparatus will be able to handle that responsibility at the end of the military operation or campaign.

Engaging in a military operation also makes the state more visible or vulnerable to its rivals. The second causal mechanism accounting for the role of military capacity is the potential threat posed by state and nonstate rivals. Embarking on a military adventure compels a state to be ready for the contingency of its rivals’ involvement. Consequently, the state must have enough military capacity to maintain domestic order and defend its sovereignty against foreign state and foreign-sponsored aggressors.

The proposed theory is probabilistic. Structural explanations are inherently vulnerable to unpredictable, or “irrational,” choices made by agents. Structures constrain and create opportunities for agents’ behavior, but they cannot fully eliminate the possibility that the agent may choose to act counter to his or her interests for psychologically or socially contingent reasons. At the same time, some structural conditions make certain choices simply impossible. For example, lacking high military capacity makes it impracticable for a state to create, equip, and manage irregular military formations. Target density, on the other hand, creates the incentives to outsource, but does not automatically determine outsourcing, not least because of the military capacity variable. Leaders may choose not to act on these incentives, or pursue other options for addressing the target density constraints by, for example, emptying villages or engaging in ethnic cleansing.

Empirically, however, these alternatives are often implemented in conjunction with the use of domestic nonstate actors. For example, the Ottoman state engaged in ethnic cleansing against its Armenian population, while the state-backed irregular cavalry units, called

Hamidiye troops, massacred Armenians.39 The Turkish state evacuated thousands of

Kurdish villages during its struggle with the PKK while, at the same time, used Kurdish villagers in its military operations against the separatist organization.

The mechanisms of local knowledge and exposure reduction come into play only when the military strategists have good reason to expect the prospective nonstate partner to actually have the local knowledge and the ability to blend in with the local environment.

In cases of civil war, states usually have direct access to nonstate actors with the necessary local expertise because these individuals are their citizens. In cases of inter-state conflict, states are not always endowed with the useful nonstate elements, such as co-ethnics, refugees, or migrants, with knowledge of the people and the area surrounding the military target. In such cases, states may opt for other types of nonstate partners (e.g. foreign nonstate actors or private security firms). While identifying the precise conditions under which states select other types of violent nonstate partners is beyond the scope of this dissertation, specifying the conditions that shape states’ strategy toward the use of domestic nonstate actors is a first step in this direction. It offers a new approach to explaining the broader phenomenon of state outsourcing of violence by shifting the focus from historical path-dependency and motives alone to military strategy.

39 For an excellent in-depth study of the Hamidiye troops, their relationship to the Ottoman state, and motivations for violence against the Armenian population, see Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 17

Understanding why modern states incorporate ununiformed citizens into their military apparatus deepens our understanding of the relationship between states and violence, what it means to be a “state,” and what constitutes “security.” I show that violent nonstate actors do not automatically signal state weakness or collapse. They can, in effect, indicate the presence of a strong and effective coercive apparatus. The Weberian conception of the state is not threatened by the phenomenon of states outsourcing violence to nonstate actors. Just because the modern state has a monopoly on all legitimate violence does not mean that nonstate actors have a monopoly on all “illegitimate” violence. The state is just as capable of illicit behavior as its nonstate counterparts.40 This dissertation also shows that the historical institutional path-dependency identified in the emerging literature is trumped by the strategic logic of outsourcing violence. No state is immune to outsourcing, or is destined to outsource in every military operation. The nature of the military target and the capacity of the military apparatus to put together and employ irregular forces significantly shape the outsourcing process.

METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION

This dissertation builds a theory of violence outsourcing using the method of a controlled comparison of most similar cases involving Pakistan and India. The comparative study is complemented with process tracing,41 for which I conduct fine-grained analysis of

40 For an overview of the state’s illicit practices in the global economy, see Peter Andreas, "Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons," Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 406-425. For the role of illicit economic activity in state formation, see Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 41 For an overview of the most similar case design and process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 81. For an in-depth analysis of process tracing, see David Collier, 18

individual cases and pay particular attention to temporality.42 In doing so, I identify the explanatory variables and the mechanisms that link them to the outcome. The controlled comparison of most similar cases consists of a combination of cross-case and within-case analyses. This approach allows me to isolate the explanatory variables which account for the variation in the outcome from the more case-specific factors derived from process tracing. It also allows me to “control” for the explanations identified as important in the previous literature.

I pair cases of military operations carried out by Pakistan that are very similar but nonetheless exhibit variation in the dependent variable. I also examine variation in outsourcing within the same military campaign carried out by Pakistan and India across time, which allows me to control also for the type of military campaign and violent conflict.

Why did Pakistan use civilians during Operation Gibraltar, but not in carrying out

Operation Badr? What explains the timing of Pakistan and India’s introduction of the different types of domestic nonstate actors into their military campaigns? Why did India begin using militants in 1992, but it was not until 1995 that it started using regular civilians?

To resolve these empirical puzzles, I closely examine each case and systematically compare multiple cases. I pay special attention to timing, and instances in which the state did not use domestic nonstate actors. By developing in-depth knowledge of each case and

“Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 823- 30. 42 For a detailed discussion of temporality, see Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Causal Mechanisms and Processes,” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 9 (September 2011): 1267–97. 19

comparing cases of use and non-use, I identify the conditions and mechanisms which lead to the striking difference in when and to whom states outsource violence.

The cases of Pakistan and India were chosen because existing theories would predict these states to rely exclusively on their regular military forces in military operations. Both Pakistan and India have a strong, highly centralized military apparatus.

While Pakistan has oscillated throughout its history between dictatorship and democracy,

India has for the most part maintained its status as the world’s largest democracy. That

Pakistan uses nonstate actors in its military operations comes as no surprise to most observers is a product of countless newspaper headlines exposing the practice. Pakistan is, however, not unique when it comes to outsourcing. India’s policy of arming nonstate actors abroad (e.g. East Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and at home (e.g. Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab,

Assam, Nagaland, and Chhattisgarh) is less-known but not necessarily less active. The high prevalence and variation in violence outsourcing by both Pakistan and India give us an opportunity to study the phenomenon and to generate hypotheses about its causes and mechanisms while controlling for many plausible alternative explanations.

After building a theory of state outsourcing of violence to domestic nonstate actors,

I use out-of-sample cases drawn from regions other than South Asia to test whether my theory “travels.” Russia and Turkey offer previously underexplored but empirically rich cases of state creation and use of irregulars for military purposes. Why did the Turkish state being using thousands of villagers in the mid-1980s to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK), and then, in the early 1990s, turn to militant Islamists? What led the Russian state to confront a rebellion in the Chechen Republic with former rebels? I conduct cross and

within-case analysis of Russia and Turkey’s most similar military campaigns in order to assess the empirical value of my theoretical claims.

DATA

Diversification and triangulation of data sources helped me to overcome the impediments to conducting research on a covert and controversial subject. My material comes from extensive cross-national archival research, interviews, memoirs, and nongovernmental organization and media reports. The archival work and interviews involved engaging multiple highly politicized research environments and, consequently, required preliminary and follow-up research. Because of the sensitivity of the topic, I kept some of my interviewees anonymous, and referred to them only by their role (e.g. activist, journalist).

I conducted fieldwork involving over 150 interviews and archival research in

Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, and New Delhi, India; Dhaka, Bangladesh; Moscow,

Russia; Diyarbakir, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey; London, UK; and Washington, D.C. I collected archival material, largely consisting of declassified government documents, at the following sites: Nehru Memorial and Library Archives in New Delhi, India; Liberation

War Museum Archives in Dhaka, Bangladesh; British Library – Asia, Pacific, and Africa

Collections (formerly the India Office Library); British National Archives at Kew; King’s

College London Archives; U.S. National Archives at College Park; U.S. Library of

Congress (Asia Division); Human Rights Association office in Diyarbakır, Turkey; New

York Public Library Manuscripts and Archives Division (New York Times Company

Foreign Desk Records); Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Human

Rights Watch Collection); and Indiana University-Bloomington Library. I also gathered rare secondary source material at the University of Kashmir Library in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Defence Studies and Analyses Library in New Delhi.

I conducted interviews with Pakistani, Indian, Kashmiri, Bangladeshi, British,

American, Turkish, and Russian subjects. They included acting and former state and military officials – ambassadors and foreign secretaries, policymakers, generals, soldiers and army officers (including those involved in counter-insurgency operations), intelligence officials, and bureaucrats – as well as local journalists, student activists, regional experts, human rights activists, and former militants.

I supplemented my findings from the archives and interviews with reports from non-governmental organizations, including the Human Rights Watch (New York),

International Crisis Group (Brussels), Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society

(Srinagar), AMAN Public Charitable Trust (New Delhi); Human Rights Center

“Memorial” (Moscow); Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research (Diyarbakır);

Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Istanbul); newspapers, including Dawn

(Pakistan) and Times of India (India); and memoirs of key political and military players, as well as victims and witnesses of the conflicts. I sought confirmation of my findings from sources with opposing ideological biases and, in many cases, abandoned findings which were not adequately supported by credible evidence.

ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION

This dissertation consists of nine chapters. I develop my theory in the chapter that follows. Chapter 3 discusses the historical puzzle of why state outsourcing of violence is

taking place at a time when, historically speaking, it is least expected. It is taking place at a time when the professional national army has become the globally dominant and legitimate means of coercion. Since the nineteenth century, the citizen-based professional armed forces model has become the “conventional” means of achieving “national” security goals. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I use cases drawn from South Asia to build my theory. I then explore the external validity of my argument with out-of-sample “shadow” cases drawn from Turkey and Russia in Chapters 7 and 8. The concluding chapter (Chapter 9) summarizes the dissertation, explores the theoretical and policy implications of my findings, and identifies directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

A THEORY OF STATE OUTSOURCING OF VIOLENCE

This dissertation addresses two puzzles. The first is states’ deliberate creation of violent organizations from those among their citizens who have no prior professional ties to state institutions. The second is the composition of these violent organizations. To address these puzzles, I disentangle the structures and incentives underlying them. I develop a model that identifies the structural conditions that (1) generate the incentives to outsource, and (2) make it for the state possible to act on these incentives.

I argue that target density – the spatial distribution of the military target across population and territory – creates the conditions that make it advantageous for military planners to use domestic nonstate actors in military operations. The domestic nonstate actors’ advantage vis-à-vis the regular forces operating in a hostile environment – local knowledge and exposure reduction – incentivizes the incorporation of “irregulars” into the state’s military apparatus. The relative advantages of the different types of nonstate actors, deriving from marked variation in their supply and military skills, significantly affect the military planners’ nonstate partner of choice. The benefits of using the domestic nonstate actors in a given military operation cannot be realized, however, without the capacity of the existing military apparatus to recruit, train, transport, and manage the irregular forces.

The ability of the state to overcome the logistical and principal-agent problems stemming from the use of nonstate actors – as opposed to exclusive reliance on professional soldiers

– is determined by the state’s military capacity. Figure 1 outlines the logic of the argument.

Figure 2.1: Structural Conditions, Incentives, and the Outcome

Structural Condition [Military Capacity]

Structural Condition Incentives to Outsourcing [Target Density] Outsource Outcome

THEORETICAL SCOPE

The focus of this dissertation is on the surprisingly common practice of states using domestic nonstate actors in military operations. The use of domestic nonstate actors for other coercive purposes – such as to break up a nonviolent protest – is beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, the proposed framework suggests a new way of looking at the broader phenomenon of outsourcing by focusing on the strategic opportunities and constraints of using nonstate actors, rather than treating it as deviant behavior to be explained by some underlying political, cultural, or psychological flaw.

The phenomenon of outsourcing is remarkably diverse. States vary not only in when, but also in how and to whom they outsource violence (Table 2.1 displays the universe of categories with illustrative cases). States may coopt an existing organization, hire a private firm, turn a blind eye to an active organization, or create a brand new outfit from scratch. For example, Pakistan has coopted Lashkar-e-Taiba, an organization responsible for terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, by allowing it to headquarter unimpeded near the city of Lahore in Pakistan and to operate its training camps in Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir. The U.S. federal government hired hundreds of heavily armed members of the private security firm then-called Blackwater to

“secure neighborhoods” in New Orleans following the Hurricane Katrina.43 When rural self-defense organizations unexpectedly sprung up in the Russian republic of Dagestan in response to the August 1999 rebel invasion, the Russian government turned a blind eye to their activities and used the momentum to push the invaders back to Chechnya.44

A stark example of a state creating from scratch armed nonstate actors of domestic origin is the Guatemalan government’s formation of the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil

(Civil Self-Defense Patrols). The government recruited, “often under threat of severe penalty or death,” nearly one million male campesinos (peasant farmers) primarily from rural Guatemala to serve alongside the army as civilian adjuncts.45 Following the end of the civil war, these individuals became a serious threat to local as well as national stability.

During the early Cold War period, the United States considered organizing a “Volunteer

Freedom Corps,” combat battalions operating in Western Europe composed of anti-

Communist escapees from European satellite states. These battalions were to be under the command of US officers. Escape and enlistment of the Corps was to be stimulated through

“psychological warfare measures.”46 Ultimately, the logistical problems of “recruitment,

43 Jeremy Scahill, “Blackwater Down,” The Nation, October 10, 2005, accessed May 22, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/issue/october-10-2005; Dina Temple-Raston, “Blackwater Eyes Domestic Contracts in U.S.,” National Public Radio, September 28, 2007, accessed May 22, 2012, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14707922. 44 Emil Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 4 (December 2005), accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.webcitation.org/5x3qOuZzo; Colin McMahon, “Moscow Caught Off Guard by Dagestan Rebels,” Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-09-07/news/9909070170_1_dagestani-chechnya-russian- warplanes. 45 Amnesty International, “Guatemala.” 46 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Special Estimate: Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a ‘Volunteer Freedom Corps’” (Declassified Secret Document), April 13, 1953, p. 1; accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000269304.pdf. 26

administration, and utilization of such a force” as well as fear of the Soviet Union’s counteraction, convinced the United States to abandon the project.47

Table 2.1: State Outsourcing Methods and Types of Nonstate Actors with Illustrative

Examples

State Outsourcing Method

Turning a Creation Cooptation Hiring blind eye

Patrullas de

Lashkar-e- Blackwater, Self-defense Defensa Taiba, 1990s- 2000s organizations Civil, 1960s- 2000s (United in Dagestan, 1990s

Domestic (Pakistan) States) 1999 (Russia) (Guatemala) Afghan

mujahideen, Kurdistan Executive Lebanese 1980s Workers’ Outcomes, Hezbollah, (United Party, 1990s 1995 (Sierra 2013 (Syria)

Foreign Nonstate Actor Origin Actor Nonstate States and (Syria) Leone) Pakistan)

States can draw their nonstate assets from their own populations or work with groups outside their borders. Iranian intelligence and diplomatic officials helped to organize the Lebanese Hezbollah.48 The United States armed the Afghan mujahideen following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. An example of a state using its own population is the Iraqi government raising a force of over 150,000 villagers and townspeople of Kurdish origin to serve as members of the jash militia to combat Kurdish rebels and, during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian forces.49

47 Ibid., 1-2. 48 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?” 10. 49 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 354-357. 27

Nonstate actors originating from inside the sponsoring state’s borders present a greater security risk to that state than those who originate from outside its borders.

Domestic nonstate actors can operate more effectively inside the sponsoring state, which makes them riskier partners. They are also more likely to persist in the post-conflict period.

Moreover, it is more difficult to cover the sponsoring state’s involvement in nonstate actor violence when the nonstate actor originates from inside the sponsor’s borders. Lashkar-e-

Taiba’s terrorist attacks on Indian soil were immediately traced to the Pakistani intelligence service, despite the Pakistani government’s fervent denial of any responsibility, as Lashkar- e-Taiba is conspicuously headquartered on Pakistani soil.

Nonstate actors vary not only in where they come from, but also in their relevant experience. Some had never held a rifle, while others had for decades engaged in guerrilla warfare. I disaggregate nonstate actors by their level of prior military experience. I refer to those who have very little or no prior military expertise50 as civilians, whereas those who have significant military expertise are referred to as militants.51 The logic of using civilians is distinct from that of using militants. Civilians require more military training, but are usually more abundant. States are likely to have fewer militants than regular civilians at their disposal. Civilians possess local knowledge of their area; militants might in addition have insider knowledge of the rebel organization or the targeted individuals. Not

50 “Very little military experience” means having some prior experiences, such as hunting or playing a contact sport, which might be useful for combat. For example, the Ukrainian government has been accused of using a former athletes (especially those with experience in the martial arts), the most notorious among them Vadim Titushko, against the 2013-2014 anti-government protesters. 51 Reservists and veterans, who are civilians with military experience, do not fall under the nonstate actor category because they are formally associated with the state’s military institutions through regular compensation and, in the case of the reservists, expectation of service. The mobilization of reservists and former soldiers by the state is a standard military practice. 28

surprisingly, state-sponsored death squads, which carry out targeted extrajudicial executions, are usually manned by militants.52

This dissertation addresses the puzzling scenario in which a state creates an irregular military organization manned by individuals residing within its borders. It offers a theory of state outsourcing of violence to domestic nonstate actors. It shows that target density creates the incentives to outsource violence and for the type of domestic nonstate actor to be used. Military capacity allows the state to act on this incentive. Figure 2 summarizes the argument. Next, I detail the hypothesized relationship between the dependent and independent variables and the mechanisms that account for this relationship.

Figure 2.2: Role of Target Density and Coercive Capacity in Outsourcing Outcome

Target Density Military Capacity Outcome

No Outsourcing no No Outsourcing low High Military Vis-à-vis Local Capacity? Population yes high low Outsourcing to Civilians Vis-à-vis Territory high no No Outsourcing High Military

Capacity? yes Outsourcing to Militants

52 Campbell and Brenner, Death Squads in Global Perspective. 29

TARGET DENSITY

Target density is the spatial composition of the main target of the military operation.

The term “target” refers to the main individuals, objects, or geographical area selected as the aim of military action.53 The goal of the operation may be to inflict damage on, capture, or otherwise manipulate the target for strategic purposes. The target is distributed along two critical dimensions that shape the logic of outsourcing: (1) population, and (2) geographical space. The former shapes the incentives for whether to supplement the regular forces with irregulars; the latter generates the preference for the type of domestic nonstate actor to be used.

Information Starvation

Target density influences the time it takes to carry out an operation and the casualty rate. In offensive warfare, time delays allow the opponent to exploit the advantages of defense54 and reduce the momentum of the attack (i.e. “defense in depth”). Exposure reduction is critical even for large armies to “survive long enough to make their numbers tell.”55 Civilian casualties can carry both political and military costs. A government responsible for a high civilian death toll may draw domestic criticism and condemnation by the international community. It can also make the civilian population hostile to the state and sympathetic to the adversary.

53 Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and Grace P. Hayes, Dictionary of Military Terms: A Guide to the Language of Warfare and Military Institutions (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1986), 215. 54 For advantages of defense, see Clausewitz, On War, 357-359. Clausewitz argues that defense is less difficult than attack because of the former’s passive purpose – preservation – rather than the latter’s more difficult task of conquest. 55 Stephen Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 208. 30

The most critical factor identified in the security literature as capable of substantially reducing the time and effort it takes for the regular forces to carry out an operation in a population-heavy environment is local knowledge.56 Lyall and Wilson

(2009) refer to the lack of local knowledge usually encountered by professional military personnel operating in conflict zones as “information starvation.”57 They attribute information starvation to the nature of modern warfare, more specifically the increased mechanization of militaries since the First World War. By reducing the logistical link between the soldiers and locals, the militaries’ increased reliance on mechanized forces has significantly inhibited information gathering within the local population.58

Also contributing to the regular forces’ information deprivation are the modern military recruitment and training practices, which involve detaching the soldier from the familiar environment. Emphasis is placed on service and loyalty to the state over one’s village, town, or city. The duration of training (usually no less than one year) and geographical separation from place of origin not only during the period of training, but also, in most cases and most importantly, during the time of service generates a trade-off between the soldiers’ military competence and local knowledge of the area of operation. In the non-military context, the institution of the police addresses precisely this trade-off.59

Police personnel undergo less rigorous physical training and are less heavily armed than their military counterparts but are expected to maintain familiarity with the communities

56 As Clausewitz famously pointed out, military operations take place in “a kind of twilight” due to “the general unreliability of all information.” Clausewitz, On War, 140. 57 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 75-78. 58 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines.” 59 I owe this insight to my conversation with Stephen Biddle at the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy in July 2013. 31

they serve. The problem of local knowledge is compounded when the military operates, as it often does, on foreign territory.

In a population-heavy environment, acquiring the target requires the support of the local population and forming local alliances, and distinguishing between friendly, neutral and adversarial elements.60 With the support of the population, observes Clausewitz,

“every kind of friction is reduced, and every source of supply is nearer and more abundant.”61 Mao Tse-tung famously compares guerrilla fighters and the local population to fish and water. Fighters, he argues, cannot operate on enemy territory without the help of the people, and “only undisciplined troops” would “make the people their enemies.”62

Knowledge of the local context and exposure reduction can be very low when the military operation takes place on an unfamiliar terrain. Local knowledge lowers the costs of military operations conducted in a population-heavy setting by facilitating precision and, in cases when it is required, stealth. Nonstate actors offset the professional military personnel’s information starvation by filling in the gaps in intelligence and local influence.

Minding the Gap

“The larger the area of operations that it [the initiator of the military campaign] must traverse, the more it is weakened,” observes Clausewitz.63 Military operations involve covering geographical space and, as Clausewitz reminds us, this carries costs for those in

60 The influential and controversial U.S. counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, attempts directly to address these challenges. It states that the primary task of a counterinsurgent is “to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.” U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 (December 2006), 18. 61 Clausewitz, On War, 364. 62 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Classic House Books, 2009), 41. 63 Clausewitz, On War, 365. 32

pursuit of a military target. In addition to the target’s spatial distribution vis-à-vis the local population, military operations display significant variation in the target’s distribution across territory. The former creates the incentive to outsource, while the latter determines the nonstate actor of choice. Figure 3 displays the distribution of the target (represented by the circle) along the two dimensions.

Figure 2.3: Target Density

When the target is spread across remote villages or rural regions, it displays low territorial concentration (Figure 2.3: Boxes I and II). When the target occupies an urban district, or a specific and narrow rural area, it displays high territorial concentration (Figure

2.3: Boxes III and IV). When the target is isolated from the local population, the regular armed forces are at their best because the target is clear. Selective violence, which is more

effective than indiscriminate,64 is easiest to implement for the regular forces when the target is not mixed with the civilian population.

When carrying out a military operation, the state’s ideal partner is a highly skilled fighter who also possesses deep knowledge of the locals’ “cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes.”65 Regular soldiers are the ideal fighters, but possess limited local knowledge. Among the nonstate alternatives, the ideal partner for the state is the militant – a skilled fighter with local knowledge. The downside of using militants is that their fighting expertise is precisely what makes them difficult to control.66

Moreover, the cost of failing to control them can be very high, as vividly illustrated by

Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban.67 The next-to-ideal nonstate partner for the state is the civilian, possessing high local knowledge but low fighting skills. The civilians’ low capacity to resist coercion and inflict physical damage makes them more amenable and less dangerous for the state.

Those who possess low levels of military expertise are usually more abundant and accessible to the state than those who possess high levels of military expertise. With the exception of full-fledged fascist regimes, modern states face a fundamental trade-off between the supply and the military proficiency of those among their citizens who are not professional soldiers. The modern state has, in fact, long labored to bring the population residing on its territory under its control by disarming or co-opting the precarious

64 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 165. 65 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 3-1. 66 Jha and Wilkinson, “Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill?” 67 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (January 2010): 47-59. 34

elements68 while simultaneously developing a distinct professional cadre of those who specialize in the management and application of violence.69 For example, the “pacification” of West European citizenry may be traced to the seventeenth century, when state rulers

“made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms, have made it seem normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians.”70

A historical outcome of modern state building is the scarcity of individuals with military expertise within the civilian population, and the consequent trade-off between military quality and quantity within the domestic “nonstate” ranks.71 Military expertise that does not directly derive from the formal state structures is often a product of rebellious or criminal activity. Recruiting rebel or criminal collaborators is usually more labor-intensive and costly than recruiting regular civilians, who lack any substantial military experience and, consequently, the capacity to resist coercive recruitment. In addition to the overall scarcity of militarily experienced civilians, the complications arising from recruiting militants also act to drive down the supply of militants relative to the supply of civilians at the disposal of the state. On the other hand, training militants is usually less time- consuming than training civilians, since the former already possess some military knowhow. The lower costs of training militants may offset some of their recruitment costs,

68 For Ottoman, Russian, and Chinese cases of states co-opting local militants and bandits in an effort to centralize authority, see Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. 69 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 17-18. Clausewitz, On War, 187. 70 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 69. 71 This scarcity can be mitigated but is, in practice, rarely eliminated through universal conscription. Full-fledged fascist regimes may be the exception. 35

depending on the militants’ prior skills and their opportunity cost of collaborating with the state.72

Managing regular civilians and militants during the operation also presents a different set of challenges. Both groups require supervision, but for different reasons. Prior military experience makes militants more capable of resisting coercion and riskier partners, thereby demanding more sophisticated mechanisms of control than those required for the regular civilians. Regular civilians, even after some training (which is usually modest), require more elaborate mechanisms of support and supervision. Consequently, civilians’ performance usually correlates with the difficulty of the task. The simpler the task, the more likely it is to be successfully carried out by a civilian. Militants, on the other hand, often possess some special tactical skills – such as the ability to carry out an assassination

– which can be exploited in military operations.

The fundamental trade-off faced by the modern state between the quantity and military proficiency of the domestic nonstate actors shapes the military planners’ incentives of using civilians as opposed to militants. These incentives are structured by target density.

The territorial dispersion of the military target shapes the benefits of using the more abundant (but less militarily proficient) over the less abundant (but more militarily proficient) nonstate actor, and vice versa. Whereas target density across the population shapes the incentives for military planners to use domestic nonstate actors in military operations, target density across geographical space determines the type of nonstate actor

72 Paul Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, No. 1 (February 2012): 16- 40. 36

used. We would expect to see civilians brought in when the target that is mixed with the local population is also spread widely across geographical space (Figure 3: Box II). We would expect to see militants used when the target that is mixed with the local population is geographically concentrated (Figure 3: Box IV).

In addition to the “irregular” options, the military also has a range of “regular” options at its disposal. Like their irregular counterparts, the regulars also vary in their level of military expertise and abundance. The trade-off that exists among the irregular ranks between quality and quantity also exists among the regular ranks. Therefore, in an environment that is not population-heavy, the type of regulars used is in large part determined by the territorial dimension of target density. In cases where the target is spread across a large territory, and not mixed with the local population, we would expect to see more of the less-skilled regulars (e.g. conscripts) used. When the target is territorially concentrated, but not mixed with the local population (e.g. in the mountains during the winter season), we would expect to see more of the highly-skilled regulars, such as special teams, in operation. Oftentimes, when the territory is not familiar to the regulars, civilians are used as guides or haulers, but do not engage in combat operations.

The comparative advantage of regular civilians over their militant and professional military counterparts – quantitative abundance and local knowledge, respectively – is realized when the target that is mixed with the local population is scattered across a large territory, such as in remote villages across a state. Regular civilians allow the state to fill in territorial gaps while, at the same time, providing the local knowledge necessary to carry out the operation more effectively and discretely. The militant’s comparative advantage –

no (or very little) training requirement and, in some cases, insider knowledge of rebel organizations or individual targets – is best realized when the target that is mixed with the local population is concentrated in a geographical area, such as an urban neighborhood. In such cases, militants can be used swiftly and effectively to isolate, capture, or otherwise manipulate the target.73

The urban territoriality of the target plays an especially important role in military operations involving counterinsurgency. This is because, during civil wars, cities tend to be under the control of governments, “even when these cities happen to be the social, religious, or ethnic strongholds of their opponents, whereas the insurgents’ strongholds tend to be in remote rural areas, even when rural populations are inimical to them.”74 Urban areas are easier for the state to police and monitor due to the typically higher state and military capacity there.75 Rural areas are often characterized by remote, thinly populated settlements and mountainous terrain, making even and effective state reach far more difficult to achieve. Consequently, states are likely to use civilians in the rural areas and militants in the urban centers.

MILITARY CAPACITY

73 Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 16. 74 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 12. 75 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 133; Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80; Paul Staniland, “Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 12 (December 2010): 1626-1627. 38

Military capacity is fundamental to state power, which shapes the complex dynamics of state building76 and international relations.77 Military capacity is the effectiveness with which an actor can use military means for the pursuit of political ends.

It operates on three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level involves, in the case of individual states, the defining of national security objectives and the development and exploitation of national resources for meeting those objectives. The operational level refers to the planning and conduct of military operations for the purpose of achieving given strategic aims. The tactical is the level at which individual battles and engagements are planned and carried out for operational and, ultimately, strategic purposes. While tactical triumphs do not guarantee military victory, neither operational nor strategic success is possible without tactical achievements. As Clausewitz observes, all military activity is “related directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.”78

The fundamental means of military action are the fighting forces, and the underlying determinant of military outcomes is the effectiveness with which they are employed on the field of engagement. Military capacity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels determines the ability of the state to use the fighting forces not only at the right place and the right time, but also in the right way. Human resource allocation usually takes place at the level of strategy. The recruitment, training, and arming of military

76 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” 77 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 109. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2004). 78 Clausewitz, On War, 95. 39

personnel set the foundations for operational and tactical performance. The logistical problems of movement and provisioning of the fighting forces are handled at the operational level, and their execution sets the stage for tactical maneuvering.79 Underlying successful tactical performance is disciplined and coordinated behavior of the military personnel.80

Military capacity cannot be measured by looking solely at the military organization as a whole. It stems from the multiple discrete activities the military performs in acquiring, delivering, and employing the means of violence. Each of these activities can contribute to a military’s effectiveness and create a basis for military advantage vis-à-vis the opponent.

My conceptual approach is modeled on Michael Porter’s classic “value chain” framework, which is applied in business management to capture a firm’s performance in competitive markets. The value chain disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities in order to measure the firm’s competitive advantage vis-à-vis its rivals.81 A weakness in any portion of the chain renders the firm a weak competitor. While the goal of the firm may be to achieve a cost advantage or differentiation (uniqueness) vis-à-vis its competitors,82 the purpose of the military is to achieve a destructive advantage over its rivals. In other words, the military seeks to achieve superior capability of inflicting physical damage on the opponent with minimum loss to itself. The firm sets out to “obliterate” its competitor in a figurative sense, while the military pursues this goal quite literally.

79 For a historical overview of logistical systems, see Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patten (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 80 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 213. 81 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Free Press, 1985), 33. 82 Ibid., 11. 40

Military capacity is thus conceptualized as a “collection of activities”83 performed in order to use the fighting forces in the right way at the right place and at the right time.

The primary activities involved in warfare begin with the state’s material base. The material base of military capacity comprises the defense budget, defense industrial base, human resources, and, in some cases, foreign military aid. These factors can be shaped by the military doctrine, civil-military relations, regime type, public opinion, and international alliances. As Figure 4 shows, transforming a state’s material base into military capacity requires the management of inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, and force employment.

Figure 2.4: Military Capacity Chain

Material Inbound Outbound Force Operations Base Logistics Logistics Employment

Inbound logistics refers to the activities associated with receiving, storing, and disseminating inputs to the product – the fighting force. It involves the recruitment of soldiers and officers as well as arms acquisition, maintenance, and allocation. Operations

83 Ibid., 36. 41

refers to the activities associated with transforming inputs into the final product form. It involves the training and arming of officers and soldiers. Outbound logistics are the activities associated with physically distributing the product, and, in the case of military capacity, applies to the movement and supply of troops.

Force employment is the exploitation of the product, or the tactical implementation of physical force.84 It involves the on-the-ground control and management of troops and supporting technology. Morale, professionalism, leadership, and skill play a decisive role at this stage.85 Morale facilitates the conversion of the fighting forces’ potential energy into kinetic – the potential to inflict physical damage into actual physical damage. Morale, professionalism, and leadership are interrelated. Clausewitz identifies the important role of the professional ethos – what he calls “military spirit” – which prioritizes obedience, order, rule, and method over “the natural tendency for unbridled action and outbursts of violence.”86 He points out that if the military spirit is absent, “it must either be replaced by one of the others, such as the commander’s superior ability [leadership] or popular enthusiasm [morale], or else the results will fall short of the efforts expanded.”87

Professionalism, leadership, and skill can increase the magnitude of the damage inflicted on the enemy and reduce that inflicted by the enemy.88 In modern continental warfare, for example, cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration increase tactical maneuverability while reducing exposure

84 Biddle, Military Power. 85 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 213. 86 Clausewitz, On War, 187-189. 87 Ibid., 189. 88 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 207-208. 42

to enemy fire.89 Technology can play a force augmenting role. It structures the tactical behavior of combatants. At the time of the engagement, technology shapes the range and lethality of weapons, and consequently the depth over which cover must be provided.90

Each link of the military capacity chain is subject to the military, political, social, cultural, and economic constraints on violent behavior. Domestic political factors, such as regime type and civil-military relations, shape the degree to which non-military considerations stemming from such sources as civilian leadership and public opinion influence military strategy and operational planning.91 International political factors such as alliances and international norms92 can affect states’ strategic and tactical calculations of whether and how to fight (e.g. whether to use chemical weapons; how to treat civilians caught in the crossfire). Economic factors such as national wealth, industrial base, and foreign aid endow the human and material capital that military institutions then turn into national destructive capability. Because wars always involve multiple parties interacting over some period of time,93 mechanisms of learning and innovation can also shape a state’s military capacity. These mechanisms allow the military to respond to conditions constraining tactical maneuverability, such as target density, in “nontraditional” ways, such as by incorporating domestic nonstate actors into the military apparatus. At the same time, it is important to note that learning and innovation do not necessarily mean improvement.

89 Biddle, Military Power, 35. 90 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 213. 91 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002); Huntington, The Soldier and the State. 92 Risa A. Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 17-18. 93 Clausewitz, On War, 78-80. 43

During World War I, for example, multiple bad innovations – such as the artillery-primary doctrine – were introduced.94

Analyses of organizational capacity inevitably raise the basic question: Capacity to do what? Military capacity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for winning a war.

War outcomes are determined by military outcomes, as well as the political and diplomatic factors governing conflict settlement. Moreover, as Clausewitz acutely observes, the ultimate outcome of war “is not always to be regarded as final” because the defeated party

“often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”95 Whether a state chooses to engage in warfare is determined by factors such as its assessment of the other side’s destructive capacity, cost tolerance, and the nature of the object at stake.96 What military capacity shapes directly is the military outcome, or the level of physical destruction undergone by the warring parties. Military outcomes derive from direct engagement of opposing fighting forces. They are shaped by the military capacity of all parties involved in the war as well as “friction.” War involves multiple parties, and each party brings its own military capacity to the game. Friction refers to the accidents or unanticipated complications (e.g. fog) occurring during military engagements. It can unpredictably thwart the influence of

94 Stephen Biddle, “Tactics and Technology,” July 12, 2013, Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 95 Clausewitz, On War, 80. 96 Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 3 (June 2007): 500-02. 44

military capacity on the military outcome.97 Figure 2.5 outlines the relationship between military capacity, military outcomes, and war outcomes.

Figure 2.5: Military Capacity, Military Outcomes, and War Outcomes

Military Capacity Military Outcomes War Outcomes

Military Capacity Political and Friction of Opponent(s) Diplomatic Factors

Mobilization, Control, and Deterrence

High military capacity is a necessary condition for state outsourcing of violence to domestic nonstate actors. A state lacking high military capacity is incapable of utilizing nonstate actors in its military operations and engagements. Incorporation of nonstate actors into the state’s military apparatus requires a well-functioning military capacity “chain” for the same reason as does the incorporation of state actors – i.e. individuals with robust prior institutional links to the state. In fact, militarizing nonstate actors – individuals with weak or no prior institutional ties to the state – on behalf of the state requires higher military capacity than does using their institutionalized counterparts, who already constitute the state’s coercive apparatus. Nonstate actors are less legible to the state than, for example,

97 An often-cited example of friction is the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Operation Allied Force). On May 7, 1999, five US guided bombs mistakenly hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade instead of the intended Yugoslav military supply building. 45

army recruits with their accompanying paperwork.98 Conceptualizing nonstate actors not as aberrations of military operations, but as actors positioned along a continuum of state- organized armed agents, makes it easier to see how military capacity shapes the state’s ability to organize nonstate military outfits.

The mechanisms of mobilization and control link high military capacity and outsourcing. High military capacity makes it possible for the state to mobilize – recruit, arm, train, and transport – a force which is usually composed of thousands of members.99

It also allows control: to cope with the principal-agent problem and ensure the compliance of the nonstate actors. Managing the nonstate partners, who have their own interests and often more on-the-ground information, requires a level of coercive power above that of the nonstate actor. It also requires superior leadership and skill on the part of the regulars charged with their tactical use to compensate for the irregulars’ inferior military training and discipline. Those with previous military experience (i.e. militants) demand more advanced mechanisms of coercion for mobilization and control than those with little or no previous military experience. In addition to being able to provide substantial material and security benefits, the state often needs to be capable of performing advanced techniques of interrogation, threat follow-up (e.g. the ability to deliver the threatened outcome to the militant’s family members if the former does not comply), and torture in order to compel

98 For a classic account of legibility, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). For more recent work, focused on state legibility of minority groups, see Ceren Belge, “State Building and the Limits of Legibility: Kinship Networks and Kurdish Resistance in Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 95-114. 99 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013), Replication Data; accessed April 22, 2013, http://www.prio.no/Journals/Journal/?x=2&content=replicationData#2010. 46

the militants to collaborate actively and exclusively with the state. In sum, high military capacity is necessary for mobilizing, organizing, managing, and, at the end of the operation, terminating (or absorbing into the regular security apparatus) the nonstate formations.

Finally, involvement in a military venture compels a state to be prepared for its rivals’ reaction. The state must, therefore, have high enough military capacity to be able safeguard its national interests and, at a minimum, defend its sovereignty (and the sovereignty of its allies) against potential aggressors. The case of the Volunteer Freedom

Corps clearly illustrates the deterrence mechanism at work. The United States was eager to create an armed nonstate force in Western Europe against the Soviet Union that would in the event of war between the two superpowers serve as a rallying point for all European defectors. However, during the early Cold War period, the United States and its European allies lacked the military capacity to deter the Soviet Union from threatening counteraction.

The project was, consequently, abandoned.

CONCLUSION

My theory identifies the structural conditions underlying the state’s motivation to outsource violence, as well as the structural condition that makes it possible for the state to act on this motivation. Target density – the spatial distribution of the military target across population and territory – shapes the advantages of using domestic nonstate actors in military operations. The domestic nonstate actors’ advantage vis-à-vis the regular forces

(i.e. local knowledge and exposure reduction) incentivizes the military planners to incorporate the irregulars into the military apparatus. The relative qualitative and quantitative advantages of the different types of nonstate actors effect the military planners’

choice of domestic nonstate partner. The benefits of using the domestic nonstate actors in a given military operation cannot be realized, however, without the capacity of the existing military apparatus to recruit, train, transport, and manage the irregular forces. The state’s military capacity determines the ability of the state to overcome the logistical and principal- agent problems stemming from the use of nonstate actors.

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORICAL PUZZLE OF VIOLENCE OUTSOURCING

States with capable, professional militaries at times engage in seemingly strange behavior: violence outsourcing. This behavior is taking place at a time when it is least expected – when the professional national army has become the globally dominant and legitimate mode of military mobilization. Since the nineteenth century, the citizen-based professional armed forces model has become the “conventional” means of achieving

“national” security goals.

Since the introduction of the bureaucratically organized and centralized national army model, security has become the state’s quintessential, exclusive, and rightful domain.

Outsourcing of violence does not fit our standard theoretical model of state behavior.

Consequently, the proliferation of violent nonstate actors such as insurgents and terrorists was initially attributed to state weakness and even the eclipse of the state as we know it, namely an organization with the exclusive right to use physical force in pursuit of its policy objectives. This dissertation contributes to the emerging body of literature identifying the state as a frequent sponsor of nonstate violence. While the rest of the dissertation explores the factors that make violence outsourcing probable, this chapter focuses on what made it possible during the least likely historical period.

This chapter disaggregates the “technologies of coercion”100 that have shaped the relationship between modern states and citizens (and, prior to them, monarchs and their subjects) from the medieval to modern period. I show how the dominant technology of coercion, namely the professional citizen army, has created the conditions which simultaneously constrain and encourage violence outsourcing. I argue that the key factor explaining the historical possibility of state outsourcing of violence to domestic nonstate actors at a time when it is least likely is the dialectical nature of violent conflict – namely, innovation in the technologies of rebellion.

TECHNOLOGIES OF COERCION

The citizen-based mass army model represents one of multiple different ways modern state leaders (and, prior to them, monarchs) used physical force in order to consolidate their authority within, and oftentimes also outside, of a given territory. This section disaggregates the dominant military mobilization practices from the medieval to modern periods into distinct “technologies of coercion” – tributary, commercial, citizen- army, and the newly emerging subcontractual. It demonstrates that each technology of coercion developed in response to the prevailing constraints and demands on central power.

It then produced new challenges and challengers, which in turn led to innovation in coercive practices. Outsourcing violence to nonstate actors while simultaneously maintaining conventional forces is one such innovation, which was made historically possible by major structural changes in inter- and intra-state competition. It signals not

100 See Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 415-429. 50

necessarily the breakdown but rather the adaptability of the state to its equally adaptable challengers – a new phase in the relationship between the source and the means of coercion.

TRIBUTARY

The tributary and the overlapping and subsequent commercial relationship between the sovereign and the means of coercion preceded the modern state. The “legitimacy” of political violence was the domain of the church, as well as a product of the formal and informal institutional practices (e.g. chivalry) developed by the growing warrior class. The scarceness of peace in the post-Pax Romana period – with waves of invasions by Goths,

Vandals, Arabs, and Vikings of the area which was to become Europe – made the knight

“the only fighting man of any consequence,” and land “the only source of wealth.”101 The mounted warrior became the most technologically advanced weapon of the Crown. The demands of war led to the professionalization of warfare. By the tenth century, it became

“a business for wealthy specialists who trained for it from early youth.”102 The rulers offered the knights land (“fief”) in exchange for their service. The knights were to give mounted service to their lord for a given number of days during the year.103

With the expansion and proliferation of the warrior class came internal disputes among the warriors and external misconduct (i.e. banditry). The latter reflected a larger trend: the commercialization of war. In an environment which lacked “any commonly

101 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 2. 102 Ibid., 3. 103 During the early classical period of the Ottoman Empire, a similar institution, called the timarli sipahi, functioned to provide the sultan his largest military force – the cavalry. The Ottoman sultan granted members of these forces fiefs of land in return for military service and training of soldiers. However, unlike the knights of the medieval Europe, the timarli sipahis were not granted legal ownership of their fiefs, which continued to belong to the Ottoman state. 51

accepted authority with the power to enforce its judgments,” the spoils of war, ransom and booty, “were no longer agreeable bonuses but, for a growing number of belligerents, the major object of their activity.”104 The monarchs initially sought to protect themselves and their lands from the bandits by supplementing the knights of their own households with stipendiary troops (soldi, or soldiers) – landless knights whose number grew across Europe with the establishment of peace from the invaders.

The period of security from external threat facilitated economic development and, consequently, the proliferation of capital in the hands of merchants and nobles. The cash fee the nobility paid the monarch in lieu of military service (“scutage”) functioned as the mechanism whereby monarchs extracted capital from the nobility, particularly to finance the bloody wars of succession. The nobility’s agitation by the war-making excesses of the twelfth- and thirteen-century monarchs resulted in a document that “gave birth to legal principles that grew over time to check arbitrary power, particularly demands by the executive branch.”105 The Magna Carta, which an English king was forced to sign by barons who were fed up with paying for his reckless military adventures, heralded a transformation in the relationship between the monarchs and their subjects. The changes it ushered, though not immediately, helped to shape modern democratic governance and citizenship. Hundreds of U.S. federal court opinions still cite the Magna Carta to justify their decisions.106

104 Howard, War in European History, 6-7. 105 Eric T. Kasper, “The Influence of Magna Carta in Limiting Executive Power in the War on Terror,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012), 548. 106 Ibid. 52

The tributary mode of military mobilization of subjects created and exploited a new and effective technology of warfare, which then structurally evolved into a new threat to central authority. The mounted warriors repelled the waves of mounted invaders and (partly due to the pressure of the Church) established a code of professional conduct. Feudalism served as the mechanism whereby the monarchs paid the warriors for their service and loyalty, while scutage provided monarchs with revenue. In doing so, it both enriched and made the Crown more powerful, but also generated unintended consequences. The nobility began to demand more political rights in return for their contribution to warfare. The nobles originally sought to limit the monarch’s military excesses and, most importantly losses, for which they had to pay. The Magna Carta represents a not immediately successful, but ultimately enduring, attempt to limit the coercive power of the sovereign vis-à-vis his noble subjects.

The institution of the knight and expansion of military activity also suffered notable unintended consequences: internal discord and the proliferation of banditry, with bandits comprising rising numbers of ex-combatants devoid of land and honor. Banditry presented an investment opportunity to an increasingly prosperous class of entrepreneurs. They began to organize and lease the ex-bandits/ex-combatants to the monarchs interested in waging war.107 A new technology of coercion – based on commercial relations between the monarchs and the means of coercion – thus took root.

107 In contrast, rather than relying on enterprising middlemen, the seventeenth-century Ottoman state, tsarist Russia, and late imperial China used the “bargained incorporation” approach to deal with the banditry problem. The state played off the different violent nonstate factions, while keeping them dependent on “state-servicing patronage.” For example, the Russian state absorbed and transformed the Cossack elites by co-opting them into the Russian gentry. The state positioned 53

COMMERCIAL

The commercial mode of military mobilization comprised three major institutions:

(1) the mercenary; (2) the privateer; and (3) the mercantile company. All three constituted a transaction between monarchs and organized private actors. The contractors leased mercenaries to monarchs usually in exchange for cash payments. The privateers and mercantile companies, on the other hand, received privileges. The Crown shared its increasingly uncontested “right” to use physical force (which was progressively wrestled from the Church) with the privateers and mercantile companies in exchange for their services. The privateers and mercantile companies were allowed to use coercion to pursue their economic interests, so long as these interests overlapped with those of the monarchs.

The system soon bore its own set of unintended consequences. The commercial approach allowed monarchs (and parliaments) to extend their coercive reach beyond their lands.

However, it also boosted banditry, increased the risks of inter-state warfare, and fueled organized piracy.

The shift from knights to mercenaries corresponded to the European monarchs’ general transition from fighting short defensive battles against external invaders108 to launching longer offensive military campaigns. The feudal military system was based on the principle of defense, and feudal military rights and obligations constrained monarchs from offensive warfare. During the fourteenth century, mercenaries became “a major

itself as a center of favors and rewards. The Cossacks were then used by the Russian state in military campaigns. See Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 16. 108 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 587. 54

export trade of the Middle Ages, and one of the first to establish a European market.”109

By the eighteenth century, all major European armies relied heavily on foreign mercenaries for troops. For example, half of the Prussian army comprised of mercenaries. More than

80 percent of its royal revenues went to pay for the foreign forces, which resulted in the saying: “Prussia is not a state with an army, but an army with a state.”110 With mercenaries, banditry reached new proportions: “when pay came too slowly or not at all, mercenaries commonly mutinied, lived off the land, became bandits, or all three at once.”111

The early institutionalization of mercenarism was marked by the rise of the condottieri, independent contractors who leased their forces to the monarchs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.112 The condottieri varied from leaders of small bands to nobles.

Some even established themselves as independent princes “with whom any contract was virtually a treaty between sovereign powers.”113 The leader in mercenary production during the eighteenth century was Hesse-Cassel, a small German state which subsisted on military contracts. Britain notoriously supplemented its troops with roughly 30,000 Hessian soldiers during the American War of Independence.114 The mercenaries acted with such barbarity in the early fighting in New York that many of the undecided colonists were roused into fighting against the British.115 Consequently, the term “Hessian” became synonymous with

“crass and unpatriotic – in short, mercenary” in American folk history.116

109 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 31. 110 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 32. 111 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 83. 112 Ibid., 122. 113 Howard, War in European History, 26. 114 David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998), 69. 115 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 33. 116 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 82. 55

The forces provided by the condottieri were predominantly mounted and could only be afforded by the wealthier monarchs. What made the commercial form of coercion affordable to the smaller powers was the “infantry revolution” of the fourteenth century.

Pierre Dubois’ influential Doctrine of Successful Expeditions and Shortened Wars, written in 1300, called for a new approach to battle (and siege) warfare. 117 The crucial change came with the bringing to the forefront of foot soldiers, who were previously “simply despised auxiliaries.”118 In the fourteenth century, English armies made a big impression on their neighbors with infantry troops (consisting of pikemen and archers) by securing a remarkable string of victories over their much larger adversaries, who relied on the traditional heavy cavalry. The foot soldiers used what were essentially “guerrilla” tactics of high mobility, ambush, and surprise. They were organized along guild lines into regular, uniformed militias.119 The infantry revolution transformed the composition, recruitment, and cost of armies. Pikemen and archers were usually drawn from the common populace, rather than the nobility, and required less expensive armor than their mounted mercenary counterparts.120

The commercialization of coercion also extended to naval warfare through the institution of privateering. Privateers were private vessel owners authorized by monarchs to attack enemy commerce and, in return, were allowed to keep some portion of what they captured as their pay. The practice fueled organized piracy. The case of the Cinque Ports illustrates the link between privateering and piracy. For over a century, the English king

117 Clifford J. Rogers, “The Age of the Hundred Years War,” in Maurice Keen (Ed.), Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 136. 118 Howard, War in European History, 14. 119 Rogers, “The Age of the Hundred Years War,” 137. 120 Ibid., 143-144. 56

turned a blind eye to the piracy of the Cinque Ports, as it honed the skills sailors needed when serving as the king’s wartime privateers. However, after the havoc sufficiently escalated, England passed an antipiracy statue, defining the practice as high treason. Piracy nevertheless continued, as “the ports were accustomed to engaging in piracy and because the well-born earned a good income by investing in piracy.”121 Piracy was not the exclusive domain of the private actors. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese used it to gain control of Indian Ocean trade. They turned their trading posts into extortion stations, where

“letters of protection” had to be bought by merchants to “protect” them from official

Portuguese piracy on the high seas.122

The third staple of the commercial era was the mercantile company. Mercantile companies were chartered by states to engage in long-distance trade or to establish, and sometimes even to govern,123 colonies. In the 17th century, the English Crown began to grant charters for joint-stock companies, such as the East India, Royal Africa, and

Hudson’s Bay companies. The companies were the forerunners of the modern corporation, as their shares were freely available and their shareholders were liable for only their shares of company stock. With mercantile companies, sovereigns “were able to exploit nonstate coercive capabilities in conquering or colonizing large areas of the globe.”124

The decline in the commercial mode of military mobilization began in the eighteenth century. Mercenaries, privateers, and mercantile companies proved too economically and politically costly for the monarchs to involve in their military affairs.

121 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 24. 122 Burton Stein, A History of India (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 204. 123 Stern, The Company-State. 124 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 41. 57

The rulers began “to enlist more and more of their own citizens, and to substitute them for foreign mercenaries where possible.”125 The Napoleonic wars demonstrated the potential of an army composed of “national” citizens. They sparked what Prussian soldier and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz describes as the transition from wars being “solely the concern of the government”126 to “the business of the people… whom considered themselves to be citizens.”127

CITIZEN ARMY

The institutionalization of the citizen-army model followed state monopolization of legitimate “intraterritorial” (domestic) violence, and resulted in its domination of legitimate “extraterritorial” violence. In the seventeenth century, monarchs gained the upper ground over their domestic rivals in terms of their coercive capacity and legitimacy.

They gradually “made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms, made it seem normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians.”128 This was accomplished through a combination of bargaining and coercion.

The coercive approach involved seizures of weapons at the end of rebellions, prohibitions of duels, controls over the production of weapons, introduction of licensing for private arms, and restrictions on public displays of armed force.129 The bargaining route engaged a broad range of societal actors, with the latter providing “war-making resources in exchange for property, political, and other rights.”130 As the state-builders institutionalized

125 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 82. 126 Clausewitz, 589. 127 Ibid., 592. 128 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 69. 129 Ibid. 130 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 3. 58

these bargains and expanded their own armed forces, the “distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ politics, once quite unclear, became sharp and fateful. The link between warmaking and state structure strengthened,” and Weber’s classical definition of the state

“as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” began making sense for European states.131

States’ monopolization of legitimate violence within their borders and the corresponding decline in the use of transnational nonstate actors (i.e. mercenaries, privateers, and mercantile companies) in favor of citizen-based armies led to the state’s

“monopolization of the authority to deploy violence beyond its borders and the state’s acceptance of responsibility for violence emanating from its territory.”132 The institution of neutrality, congealed as governments passed laws prohibiting their citizens from enlisting in foreign armies, led states to accept responsibility for all violence emanating from within their borders.133 The state thus became the main political player in

“international” relations. Its means of coercion, both internal and external, became its own citizens.

The first major power to experiment with a citizen army was France. Prussia followed, and its military model became the most widely imitated military organization.

Britain was the last major power to remove mercenaries from its repertoire of coercion.

131 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 70. 132 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 4. 133 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 31. 59

When it finally did, this “signaled the general acceptance of the new practice of war, after which rulers rarely considered using foreigners in their armies.”134

By substituting domestic knights with mercenaries, the monarchs expanded the size of their armed forces. The next great expansion of the size of the armed forces occurred when state-builders substituted mercenaries with citizen soldiers.135 Machiavelli had warned that profit-motivated soldiers were “useless and dangerous…disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and disloyal.”136 He argued that “without having one’s own soldiers, no principality is safe… One’s own soldiers are those composed either of subjects or of citizens or your own dependants.”137 A combination of factors led states to make citizens their weapon of “mass mobilization.” The rise of nationalism allowed states “to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers.”138 As Benedict

Anderson acutely observed, it is the tomb of the Unknown Soldier (not of the Unknown

Marxist or an Unknown Liberal) that most universally evokes the nationalist imagination

– a sense of sacred continuity to the cycle of life and death, a glorious past, and a limitless future.139 The Enlightenment-inspired ideas of the social contract and reason, which had contributed to the rise of nationalism, “provided a new way of thinking about the relationship of state to soldiers and citizenship to service.”140 It led military and

134 Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 41. 135 A notable exception to this trend is the French Foreign Legion. 136 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43. 137 Ibid., 50. 138 Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 81. 139 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), 10. 140 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 31. 60

constitutional reformers “to advocate citizen armies as part of a new relationship between citizens and states,”141 and those “who fought for profit, rather than patriotism, were completely delegitimized under these new conceptions.”142 At the same time, changes in transportation and communications technology, most notably the railroad, helped states to overcome the logistical problem of speedily transporting millions of troops and munitions.143

The citizen army transformed the relationship between the state, citizen, and violence. Under the tributary mode of military mobilization, monarchs were compelled to confer political rights to the landed classes, who ultimately owned the means of coercion.

Under the commercial mode of military mobilization, the monarchs bargained with merchants for access both to capital and means of coercion. These bargains resulted in the political empowerment of the merchant classes. The citizen-army mode of military mobilization extended political influence to the rest of the population – first only to those who could (or was allowed to) fight, and, over time, also to those who did not fight.

Preparation for and participation in military conflict has helped to transform the social contract between the governing and the governed,144 and led to the expansion of citizenship rights and social equality.145 Mass mobilization generated political pressures for countries

141 Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies,” 42. 142 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 31. 143 Massimiliano Onorato, Kenneth Scheve, and David Stasavage, “Technology and the Era of the Mass Army,” Unpublished paper, accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workshops/papers/History/scheve_mobilization-Oct12.pdf, 2. 144 Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State (New York: Free Press, 1994); Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999). 145 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); V. G. Kiernan, “Conscription and Society in Europe Before the War of 1914-1918,” 61

to adopt steeply progressive tax systems.146 Whereas before demobilization led to the proliferation of banditry, it now drew veterans and citizens to political and economic claim- making toward their governments as payment for their wartime sacrifices.147 For example, the origins of the U.S. welfare state have been traced to American citizens’ participation in the Civil War.148

The ideal type of the “citizen army” fails to capture a significant portion of the diverse global practices. Postcolonial states account for much of the discrepancy. The postcolonial armies diverged from those of the European ideal type for two fundamental reasons: (1) colonial legacy; and (2) the Cold War-dominated international system. The colonial experience had a profound impact on the technologies of coercion which emerged in the postcolonial context, and consequently the relationship between states, citizens, and violence.

The postcolonial army was largely constructed from the military forces left behind by the colonial rulers, which specialized in repressing the local populations rather than interstate warfare. It was by and large built on, as opposed to replaced, the coercive institutions of the colonial past. Its relatively well-equipped and trained armed forces often

in War and Society, ed. M.R.D. Foot (London: Elek Books, 1973); Gabriel Ardant, “Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of the Modern States and Nations,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760 to 1914. Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 146 Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, “The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation,” International Organization 64, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 529-61. 147 Alec Campbell, “Where Do All the Soldiers Go? Veterans and the Politics of Demobilization” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, ed. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 148 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 62

continued to be recruited disproportionally from one ethnic group and/or regional population, with significant implications for geographically uneven economic development within the state, as well as ethnic conflict,149 in the postcolonial period. The colonial institutions of coercion were relatively stronger than their civilian counterparts.

Consequently, postcolonial armies usually started off better organized and more effective than the civil bureaucracies. Unless the path-dependency was broken by, for example, a charismatic national leader (e.g. Jawaharlal Nehru in India150), the army tended to resist civilian control. The relative underdevelopment of civil institutions was commonly reinforced by the army’s political dominance. The relatively high organizational capacity and efficiency of the army often convinced not only the citizens, but also the military officials themselves that they were best suited to govern. As Charles Tilly observed, military officials “frequently felt, and said, that they knew better than mere politicians what the country’s destiny required, and how to maintain order on the way to fulfilling that destiny.”151

Concurrently, the international system led by the Cold War powers reinforced and stimulated the undemocratic trends. The armed forces of states which could generate revenue by selling commodities on the international market, buy arms overseas, and receive military aid from the great powers “enjoyed insulation from reliance on taxation and conscription.”152 Unlike the states which were built during the early modern period as,

149 Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkinson, “Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 4 (November 2012): 883-907. 150 Ashutosh Varshney, “India Defies the Odds: Why Democracy Survives,” Journal of Democracy 9, No. 3 (July 1998): 36-50. 151 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 200. 152 Ibid., 200-201. 63

to a large extent, products of negotiation between monarchs and their subjects, the states which emerged during the Cold War era encountered abundant foreign sources of funding.

Some postcolonial states “were paid not to fight.”153 Most, however, were paid for ideological allegiance. “Propped up by the forces unleashed by the Cold War, local elites in the developing world did not fear falling, should they become unpopular; nor, supported by transfers of aid from abroad, did they need to bargain with their citizens to secure public revenues,” observes Robert Bates. 154 “They therefore did not need to be responsive to their people or democratic in their politics, for want of the kinds of pressures that in the past had compelled governments to become democracies.”

The corrosive foreign influence on democratic governance was not limited to the postcolonial states. A startling illustration of this is the secret “stay-behind” army of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The army, code-named “Gladio” (the sword) in Italy, was a clandestine network set up in sixteen European countries (including Turkey) by U.S. and British intelligence agencies. It was modeled on the British Special Operations

Executive (SOE), which during World War II parachuted into enemy-held territory and fought a secret war behind enemy lines. The number of recruits per country ranged from dozens to thousands.155 The Gladio force’s initial objective was, in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, to strengthen and set up local resistance movements inside enemy-held territory. Gladio soldiers, some of whom trained with special U.S. and British forces, were equipped with machine guns, explosives, munitions, and high-tech

153 Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 77. 154 Ibid., 82. 155 John Prados, “Foreword,” in Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, xii. 64

communication equipment, which they hid in arms caches in forests, meadows, and underground bunkers across Western Europe.156 They were recruited from “strictly anti-

Communist segments of the society… [including] moderate conservatives as well as right- wing extremists.”157 While the Soviet invasion was not materializing, the Gladio network engaged in covert campaigns against the domestic political forces of the left. In countries such as Belgium, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, Gladio forces were involved in terrorist activities and human rights violations, which they blamed on the

Communists in order to discredit the left at the polls. Their activities led to “massacres, torture, coup d’états and other violent acts,” while the Gladio network enjoyed “the encouragement and protection of selected highly placed governmental and military officials in Europe and in the United States.”158 The “deep state” phenomenon in Turkey is widely attributed to the Cold War “stay-behind” army initiative.

SUBCONTRACTUAL

The structural constraints and the unintended consequences of the tributary mode of military mobilization led to the rise of the commercial arrangement between monarchs and the means of coercion, which in turn gradually transformed into the dominant citizen army model. The latter confronted its own share of constraints and unintended consequences – most notably, the development of robust insurgency. The subcontractual mode of military mobilization, whereby states outsource some of their security

156 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, 1. 157 Ibid., 1-2. 158 Ibid., 246. 65

responsibilities to nonstate actors, reflects an adaptive response to the pitfalls of the professional national army model.

The end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of great power support of both state and nonstate proxies, and a sharp decline in world’s active military forces. By “loosening a torrent of professional soldiers made redundant by global military downsizing,”159 the end of the Cold War contributed to the proliferation of private security contractors.

Between 1987 and 1996, the world’s active military forces declined by 20 percent (from

28.3 million to 22.7 million),160 and the ex-soldiers needed something to do. Several

“security consultancy” firms based in the United Kingdom and South Africa capitalized on the supply of military professionals, as did the condottieri in late medieval Italy. They became involved in the resource wars of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the Pretoria- based Executive Outcomes (EO) hired former apartheid soldiers to defend the clan chiefs of Sierra Leone’s capital city of Freetown and help reassert their monopoly over the diamond trade.161

The decline in superpower sponsorship led to significant changes in warfare: a relative decline in interstate wars162 and a notable transformation in civil warfare. The number and proportion of civil wars in which the military technologies of the rebels are notably inferior to those of the states declined significantly. There was a dramatic rise in

159 Ulric Shannon, “Private Armies and the Decline of the State,” in Violence and Politics: Globalization’s Paradox, ed. Kenton Worcester, Sally Avery Bermansohn, and Mark Ungar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 34. 160 Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Conversion Survey 1998: Global Disarmament, Defence Industry Consolidation and Conversion (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1998), 39. 161 Shannon, “Private Armies,” 34-35. 162 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. 66

the proportion of civil wars in which all sides were evenly matched, either at a high or at a low level of technology.163 These changes created a unique environment in which a relatively small group of professional subcontractors could help tilt the balance in favor of one side over another. For example, when a military deadlock emerged between the better armed and trained Serbian forces against the more numerous Croatian and Bosnian forces during the war in former Yugoslavia, a Virginia-based private company, Military

Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), tilted the military balance in favor of the latter. It contributed to the defeat of the Serbian forces by transforming the Croat “ragtag militia” into a “modern Western-style army” capable of staging a surprise offensive called

“Operation Storm” – a turning point in the war.164

Over the past two decades, states of varied conventional military capacity have increasingly subcontracted professional military services, from logistical to intelligence to combat. Nonstate professionals are hired to provide security for international organizations, multinational firms, national governments, and even local communities. All multilateral peace operations conducted by the United Nations in the 1990s involved private military or security companies.165 Even countries with strong security institutions have increasingly relied on private contractors. As Allison Stanger argues, “the U.S. government can now conduct neither its foreign policy nor its wars and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan without expensive and unprecedented support of contractors… private companies have become a permanent feature of what used to be

163 See Table 2 in “Civil War Onsets, by Technology of Rebellion (1944-2004)” in Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System,” 423. 164 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 5. 165 Avant, “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force,”. 67

called governance, both at home and abroad. They are deployed to run American prisons, collect our taxes, interrogate prisoners of war, and guard American diplomatic personnel.”166 The ratio of contractors to active-duty personnel employed by the United

States government in the first Gulf War was 1 to 50, whereas during the 2003 invasion of

Iraq, it rose to 1 to 10.167

Private military firms offer states with weak conventional military capacity like

Sierra Leone the option of renting a professional armed force against a more powerful rebel group. Subcontractors free the conventionally weak states (which have the natural resources to pay for private contractors) from engaging in the challenging task of mobilizing an effective national military or petitioning strong allies, a task complicated by the loss of great power interest in their former client regimes. Like other nonstate actors, private contractors also make it easier for the conventionally strong states, like the United

States, to engage in unpopular and risky military campaigns. For example, the Texas-based construction and engineering firm Brown & Root Services helped the United States to intervene in the Kosovo civil war and the ensuing humanitarian crisis. It allowed the U.S. government to alleviate the problem of public opinion (which was against the military campaign) by providing logistics to U.S. forces, thereby substituting roughly 9,000 reservists.168

The institutionalization of private contracting was marked by the establishment of the industry trade association called the International Stability Operations Association

166 Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 2. 167 Avant, “Privatization of Security,” 153. 168 Stanger, One Nation Under Contract, 6. 68

(ISOA). It was formed in 2001, and is headquartered in Washington, D.C. The organization’s stated mission includes promoting “high operational and ethical standards of firms active in the peace and stability operations industry,” and engaging “in a constructive dialogue and advocacy with policy-makers about the growing and positive contribution of these firms.”169 In other words, it acts to institutionalize a shared standard of professional conduct and performance while lobbying for the growth of the private security industry.

The end of the Cold War also coincided with important developments in communications and transport technologies which diminished the need for armies of scale and increased the demand for specialization. Elinor Sloan argues that the 1990s witnessed a “revolution” in military technologies. First, precision-guided munitions – which were first developed in the latter stages of the Vietnam War, but whose accuracy dramatically increased since the mid-1980s – have enabled the application of “precision force.” The latter refers to the use of deadly violence with greater speed, range, and accuracy. “At a time when there is growing public intolerance for casualties, precision-guided munitions also offer the possibility of destroying military targets without substantial ‘collateral’, that is, civilian, damage,” Sloan explains.170 Second, force-projection capabilities have significantly developed in the area of “low-observable” technologies, or stealth. Third, new military technologies reducing the “fog of war,” particularly sensors in satellites, manned aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e. “drones”) “can now monitor virtually

169 “Mission Statement,” International Stability Operations Association, accessed November 8, 2012, http://stability-operations.org/index.php. 170 Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 4. 69

everything that is going on in a particular battle are dramatically improving battlespace awareness” and “real-time knowledge of the disposition of all enemy and friendly forces.”171 Finally, the advancement of cyber-warfare technologies is also reducing the need for mobilizing and militarizing large numbers of citizens.

The increased use of private firms by states for military purposes further underlines the puzzle of states outsourcing violence to domestic nonstate actors, specifically the practice of creating from scratch domestic nonstate actor-manned irregular organizations.

Why would a state mobilize civilians or militants when it has not only the regular army, but also, potentially, private contractors ready to do the job? The next section addresses this precise question from a historical perspective.

THE LOGIC OF STATE OUTSOURCING OF VIOLENCE

State outsourcing of violence is a product of the dialectical nature of violent competition, notably the relationship between the state and its violent competitors. Rebel technologies underwent dramatic transformation beginning in the 1930s, with the rise of sophisticated guerrilla tactics (pioneered by Mao Zedong). These tactics were designed specifically to undercut states’ conventional methods. During the Cold War era, guerrilla capacity was substantially boosted, both in material and in ideological terms, by state sponsorship.172 The nonstate proxies opportunistically exploited their patrons in pursuit of their own agendas, which often led states to diversify their irregular assets by forming links

171 Ibid., 5-6. 172 Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System,” 420. 70

with multiple nonstate clients, thereby fostering the proliferation of different types of armed groups.

Not unlike those of states, rebels’ “technologies” have, over time, evolved in response to the constraints and incentives they faced when confronting conventional – professional citizen army – forces. Until roughly the end of the Second World War, the classic technology of rebellion – guerrilla warfare – was highly localized and crude. It was based on “the mobilization of primarily conservative, local sentiments and/or local patronage tribal and kin networks,”173 and was usually crushed by the conventional apparatus. In the early twentieth century, states (and empires) witnessed a new challenge to their authority, which looked a lot like their conventional forces. Between 1917 and

1923, Europe and parts of the former Ottoman Empire witnessed the spread of “military or quasi-military organizations and practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military formations.”174 However, with the start of the Cold War, guerrilla warfare experienced a global comeback in a new, advanced form of “robust insurgency.”175

As the French Revolution demonstrated the potential of the citizen army, so did the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions demonstrate the power of advanced guerrilla tactics.

The global proliferation of robust insurgency did not end the dominance of the citizen army model, which was ill-equipped for irregular warfare. This was due to a parallel development in inter-state competition which made conventional military capacity more important than ever: the dawn of the nuclear era. Strong national armies became as

173 Ibid. 174 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1. 175 Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System,” 419. 71

necessary as ever to compete (and to survive) in the international system. In particular, they were necessary to prevent nuclear wars. The logic, which was reflected in the “flexible warfare” doctrine of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was that conventional forces were necessary to respond to crises which were too small to warrant the use of nuclear weapons and to prevent small crises from getting out of control. “For a quarter century the declared rationale of maintaining strong conventional forces was to prevent this awful dilemma from arising,” observes military historian Martin van

Creveld.176 “In case it did arise, starting the war with conventional forces would hopefully buy time for negotiation.”

Robust insurgency challenged states to come up with nonconventional means of addressing intra-state conflict while also maintaining conventional military strength.

Nonstate actors often brought the expendability, maneuverability, local knowledge, and other skills necessary for twentieth-century guerrilla warfare. The new technology of rebellion also created fresh opportunities for states to weaken their state rivals. As

Machiavelli warned: “When once the people have taken arms against you, there will never be lacking foreigners to assist them.”177 With the advent of robust insurgency, state fomenting of rebellion within their rivals’ borders became a practice of unparalleled possibility.

The transformation in inter-state competition, especially with the start of the Cold

War, led to a corresponding transition in the technologies of rebellion at the intra-state level. States’ main domestic rivals – the rebels – increasingly turned away from crude

176 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 19-20. 177 Machiavelli, The Prince, 87. 72

guerrilla and conventional paramilitary tactics to advanced guerrilla warfare. The turn to advanced guerrilla tactics by states’ domestic rivals, especially with the start of the Cold

War, made it costly for states not to think outside of the citizen army framework. Nonstate actors allowed states to maintain their conventional coercive capacity – albeit in increasingly shrunken form – while, at the same time, still challenging the rebels on their own terms and confronting other states through proxies.

CONCLUSION

The development of robust insurgency – which effectively exploited the weaknesses of the citizen army model – incentivized states to outsource violence to nonstate actors both for defensive and offensive purposes. Meanwhile, the dawn of the nuclear age resurrected the relevance of the citizen army. Large, well-equipped conventional armies became a critical ingredient of nuclear nonproliferation – a force of deterrence. The citizen army is still the dominant form of military organization. The private firm is emerging as its viable alternative, but is unlikely to replace it in the near future.

Given this, state formation of irregular outfits composed of civilians or militants – as opposed to regular soldiers or private contractors – presents a real puzzle. However, rather than a harbinger of state failure, it represents an adaptive response to an equally adaptive adversary.

CHAPTER 4

TARGET DENSITY VIS-À-VIS THE LOCAL POPULATION

PAKISTAN’S OPERATION GIBRALTAR (1965) AND OPERATION BADR (1998-99)

The princely state of Kashmir and Jammu seemed destined to become an Asian

Switzerland. The maharaja’s vision was of “a neutral, independent mountain state enjoying the respect and friendship of its neighbors.”178 Instead, Kashmir became a site of violent and enduring conflict between two powerful states. It took less than three months for the newly independent Pakistan and India to go to their first war over the Hindu-ruled, Muslim- majority region, imbuing with new meaning the old Pathan proverb: “To every man his own country is Kashmir.”179 The newly-formed United Nations coordinated a ceasefire agreement in 1948. Kashmir was divided into India- and Pakistan-controlled territories, but its status was left pending a plebiscite of its people. The plebiscite is still pending.180

Pakistan’s strategic assessment of the Kashmir situation has since been at odds with that of India. According to the Indian narrative, Kashmir is “an integral part of the Indian

Union” both symbolizing and legitimizing India’s secularist national identity.181 To

178 Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir (New Delhi, Penguin/Viking, 2007), 25. 179 Ibid., 41. 180 For a succinct overview of the plebiscite situation, see Victoria Schofield, “Kashmir’s Forgotten Plebiscite,” January 17, 2002, BBC News, accessed September 25, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm. 181 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Current Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: The Aftermath of the India-Pakistan War” (Secret), September 25, 1965; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. For in-depth comparative analysis of the role of Kashmir in Indian and Pakistani national identity, see Ashutosh Varshney, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem” in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G.C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992): 191-234. 75

Pakistan, the line dividing the India-controlled territory and its Pakistan-controlled counterpart is “a temporary arrangement” awaiting resolution.182 Since Pakistan and India gained independence in 1947, Pakistan had initiated multiple military ventures to gain control of the former princely state. The most similar among these ventures are Operation

Gibraltar (1965) and Operation Badr (1998-99). Both were covert operations. Both involved penetrating the India-controlled Kashmir territory in order violently to raise and resolve the question of Kashmir’s status in Pakistan’s favor. Both occurred at a time when

Pakistan’s relationship with India was considerably improving, while relations with neighboring Afghanistan and major powers, most notably the United States, were friendly and stable. In both cases, Pakistan had a highly capable and effective military apparatus.

There was one notable difference, however. In 1965, Pakistan was under military rule, whereas in 1998-99 it had a civilian-based democratic government.

Existing explanations would make three divergent predictions about Pakistan’s outsourcing strategy in the 1965 and 1998-99 military operations. Arguments that stress the role of military weakness and vulnerability would predict Pakistan using domestic nonstate actors neither in Operation Gibraltar nor in Operation Badr, since both occurred during a period of high military capacity and relative stability. Given the covert nature of the operations, theories emphasizing plausible deniability would envisage outsourcing in both cases. The logic of plausible deniability may also point in a different direction. A military dictatorship is far less affected by public opinion than its civilian democratic counterpart and would, therefore, be much less motivated to seek plausible deniability.

182 Farzana Shakoor, “The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis,” Pakistan Horizon 52, no. 3 (July 1999), 50. 76

Outsourcing would, therefore, be expected during Operation Badr but not during Operation

Gibraltar.

All of these theoretical predictions fail on empirical grounds. In 1998-99, the

Pakistani military relied on experienced soldiers and officers, whereas in 1965, roughly seventy percent of the military force was composed of civilian newbies. What explains the discrepancy between the expected and observed outsourcing outcome? This chapter demonstrates that target density vis-à-vis the local population had a significant impact on

Pakistan’s military strategy. Target density created the incentive for the Pakistani military to use domestic nonstate actors in the covert operation of 1965 but not in 1998-99.

Ironically, the latter occurred at a time when Pakistan was running a different military campaign in Kashmir that was manned overwhelmingly by nonstate actors. Clearly, the

Pakistani strategists had by then forgotten the lessons of 1965, perhaps blinded by the success of the irregular strategy in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Target density vis-à- vis the local population created the incentive for the state to outsource violence in the 1965 and not in the 1998-99 covert operation. High military capacity allowed the state to act on this incentive by making it possible to recruit, train, arm, transport, and lead thousands of civilians with little or no prior military experience.

The main military target of Operation Gibraltar had a very different spatial relationship to the local population than did the target of Operation Badr. Operation

Gibraltar’s target comprised the “pro-Pakistan elements” within the local population. The goal was to identify and rouse these individuals against India through propaganda and persuasion and, when necessary, coercion. The rebellion would create the conditions

necessary for Pakistan officially to intervene to aid the rebels and generate international pressures to force a Kashmir settlement. Pakistan’s military target was in effect “mixed” with the local population, which totaled about 3.5 million, included hostile pro-India elements, and was scattered across over 50,000 square miles.183 The roughly 7,000 civilians recruited from Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir were to give the Pakistani army an edge in the field. They were to use their cultural and social ties to and knowledge of the area to identify and, when necessary, create by force reliable local partners.

The main target of Operation Badr comprised not of individuals, but of high- altitude sites in the snowbound and thinly populated Northern Areas. The goal of the operation was to occupy an area of roughly 50 square miles in the inhospitable mountains of the Kargil district. The strategic purpose of the operation was to revive the waning

Kashmiri insurgency and, as in the case of the 1965 operation, generate international pressures to force a Kashmir settlement. The roughly 2,000 Pakistani troops employed in the operation were dressed in civilian clothes in order to make their activities seem in line with the decade-long Kashmiri insurgency. However, because mingling with and handling the local inhabitants was unnecessary (as the target area was unpopulated), the Pakistani military strategy involved only the regular troops, who were specially trained in high- altitude warfare. Had the target been located in a population-heavy environment, the

Pakistani military would have very likely used domestic nonstate actors in Operation Badr.

It would have had the incentive, and the military capacity, to do so.

183 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Basic Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: Kashmir” (Confidential), September 1965; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 78

The next sections detail and compare Operation Gibraltar and Operation Badr. I outline the important similarities between the two cases, with particular attention paid to military capacity because of its theoretical role in the subsequent chapters. I then show how a crucial difference between the cases – target density vis-à-vis the local population – led to the divergent outsourcing outcomes.

OPERATION GIBRALTAR

In early 1964, Pakistani President Ayub Khan set up an organization called the

Kashmir Cell to find “a means of de-freezing Kashmir.”184 According to one of its prominent members, army chief Mohammad Musa, the Kashmir Cell met “off and on, to review the developments in [India-] occupied Kashmir and the strategy we might adopt to exploit them.”185 Other members included defense secretary, director of the intelligence bureau, chief of general staff of the army, and director of military operations. Foreign

Secretary Aziz Ahmed served as the chairman. Secretary to the president and other senior officers were sometimes invited to the meetings, which were held at the residence of the secretary of education, in order to keep them secret.186 Musa recalls that the Kashmir Cell’s deliberations “were not recorded on the plea that the cell was merely a ‘loud-thinking’ body that, in view of their highly sensitive nature, it would not be advisable to put on paper anything about the issues considered. We were told that the chairman himself apprised the

President, verbally, of the proceedings of the meetings.”187

184 Verghese Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through A Realist Lens (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 38. 185 Mohammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983), 4-5. 186 Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2009), 76. 187 Musa, My Version, 5. 79

In December 1964, Ayub instructed the Kashmir Cell to prepare a plan to induct guerrillas into Kashmir. In May 1965, he directed the army headquarters to strategize and execute the operations. Ayub’s decision has been widely attributed to an unlikely source – a civil bureaucrat. Widely cited is the influence of the “honeyed word[s]”188 of Foreign

Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was one of Ayub’s “favored ministers.”189 Bhutto was known for his rigid line on Kashmir, which included the conviction that Pakistan should not compromise with India even on Jammu and Ladakh (the regions with non-Muslim majorities).190 Ironically, Pakistan’s first military dictator Ayub was more flexible on the

Kashmir issue than was his civil confidant.191 An Indian journalist once asked Ayub why he risked a war with India by sending infiltrators into Kashmir, to which Ayub replied:

“Don’t ask me, ask Bhutto.”192 In another revealing incident, a British diplomat describes questioning Bhutto about the 1965 operations. The diplomat said that he had always been astounded that the Foreign Minister was able to persuade Ayub to embark on the infiltration scheme. The foreign secretary clearly supported Bhutto, but how was he able to persuade the generals? The diplomat then describes Bhutto’s response: “Mr. Bhutto smiled and did

188 Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army War of 1965 (Dehradun, India: Natraj Publishers, 1977), 20. 189 Shaukat Qadir, “The War of 1965: This Indo-Pak War Was a Comedy of Errors,” Defence Watch 8, no. 5 (January 2009), 32. 190 Confidential Report by N.J. Barrington, “Mr. Z.A. Bhutto,” October 13, 1967; Dominions Office, Records of High Commissioners: DO 134/36, British High Commission Correspondence on Zulfikar Ali Khan Bhutto, 1963-1968; National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom. 191 For example, Ayub believed that Ladakh “had best be left for others to worry about.” U.S. Embassy, Ankara, to U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., November 7, 1967, “Subject: Conversation with President Ayub,” General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969; Record Group 59, Box 2203, Folder “Political Aff. & Rel. India-Pak, July 1, 1967; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 192 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965 (History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992), 55. 80

not deny that he had instigated the affair… Mr. Bhutto obviously rejoiced in the fact that other people, even those close to the President… had not been consulted.”193

The infiltration plan called for the militarization of thousands of Pakistani civilians who resided in the Pakistan-controlled area of Kashmir, called Azad Kashmir.194 The militarization of Azad Kashmiri civilians was a product of state policy, rather than spontaneous eruption of popular sentiment, as the Pakistani sources initially claimed. This claim is summed up in the following:

The four million downtrodden and oppressed Kashmiris at last reorganized themselves to win their long-cherished goal of freedom with a firm resolve to offer the greatest sacrifice that man can ever be called upon to make. The valorous bands of freedom- fighters rose against the occupation forces. All odds were against them, yet they stood stubborn and fearless. With an unshakable faith in the Supreme Power and the cause of righteousness, they pitted against a well-equipped enemy and a five-hundred-million strong nation which lack the humane qualities of civilized people. Having no material advantage or supremacy whatsoever over their oppressors the fearless Mujahids punched and shocked the power-drunk Indians and thus turned a new page in their saga of liberty.195

193 Confidential Report by N.J. Barrington, “Mr. Z.A. Bhutto” (October 13, 1967); British High Commission. 194 Pakistan was awarded the Azad Kashmir (“Free” Kashmir) territory after the 1947-48 Indo- Pakistani War over the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu. In 1965, Azad Kashmir comprised 4,500 square miles and had a population of roughly 1 million. CIA, “Intelligence Memorandum: Kashmir.” 195 Muhammad Ayub Khan in Ayub: Soldier and Statesman. Speeches and Statements (1958-1965) of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and a Detailed Account of the indo-Pakistan War (1965), ed. Rais Ahmad Jafri (Lahore, Pakistan: Mohammad Ali Academy, 1968), 16. 81

In mid-1964, Indian observers reported “feverish activity,” as training camps appeared at various centers in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.196 In May 1965, after Ayub firmly decided that Pakistan would infiltrate Kashmir, the Azad Kashmir administration ordered universal military training of its citizens between the ages of 16 and 45. A resolution, adopted by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (a major political party in Azad Kashmir) on May 27, 1965, called upon Azad Kashmiris to join the “razakar”

(volunteer) movement in large numbers to undo the ceasefire line which divided their homeland. 197 A “mujahid” (holy warrior) force, officially called the “Gibraltar Force,” was thus set up under the Pakistani army.198

The Gibraltar Force consisted of roughly 7,000 Azad Kashmiri civilian recruits, 199 and comprised about 70 percent of the entire formation.200 It was not an ad hoc hodgepodge, but a deliberate, carefully planned, and strategically organized military force.

The Azad Kashmiri civilians were trained and led by regular army personnel, and divided into eight to ten Forces, each having six Units of five Companies. Each Force was commanded by an army major and given a code name. Each Company was commanded by an army officer of the rank of captain or below and known by the name of the commander. A typical Company was made up of Azad Kashmiri civilians, an officer, several junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers, key personnel from the Azad

Kashmiri battalions or units of the Northern Scouts, and several other ranks from the

196 Criminal Investigation Department, Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, Sabotage and Infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir, India, 1966), 12. 197 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 47-48. 198 Sita Ram Johri, The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965 (Lucknow, India: Himalaya Publications, 1967), 85. 199 Musa, My Version, 36. 200 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 60. 82

Special Service Group (which handled the explosives).201 Though the ratio of regular civilians to professional combatants varied from company to company, the former usually constituted the bulk of Company personnel.202

Training of the Azad Kashmiri civilians started in May 1965. During that time,

United Nations officials noticed the concentration of large numbers of personnel in Azad

Kashmir organized for training in small groups, and that 19 Baluch Regiment members were missing from their normal station. The training was carried out under the auspices of

Azad Kashmir sector commands and at the location of the Azad Kashmir battalions in each sector. The period of training was usually seven weeks, but was as little as three weeks in some cases. The training syllabus covered weapons training, patrolling, night marching, field craft, and personal maintenance under guerrilla warfare conditions. Special commando type training covered the preparation of ambushes, use of explosives, jungle fighting, and raiding parties. Regular officers served as instructors, and officers of the 19

Baluch Regiment provided specialist instruction.

The logistical planners took advantage of the Gibraltar Force members’ unique capacity to engage the local population. Rations allotted varied from four to seven days’ worth of cooked or dry food. The rest of the food was to be purchased from the locals.

Forged registration cards and some cash were carried at Company headquarters for the purchase of local food. The infiltrators’ uniforms were taken away prior to their launch into

Jammu and Kashmir. Civilian clothes – green and Mazari shirts and a Salwar – along with

201 Ministry of Defence, “The India-Pakistan War, 1965,” Secret Report, May, 1966; Ministry of Defence, Communications and Intelligence Records: DEFE 44/102, India-Pakistan War of 1965, May 1966; National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom. 202 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 60. 83

jungle boots were issued to them.203 Some were issued women’s clothing and wigs.204 The arms, ammunition, equipment, and clothing were supplied by the Pakistani government.

Pakistani markings were erased from the weapons and equipment.205 The Pakistani government also supplied propaganda material for distribution to the local civilian population.206 See Appendix A for examples of this propaganda.

Prisoner of war interrogation reports revealed that although members of the

Gibraltar Force were supposed to have been volunteers, “an element of coercion” was involved in their recruitment.207 Moreover, the Azad Kashmiri participants appear to have known very little about their mission. They were told that they would be involved in “an ordinary hit and run exercise in the enemy territory.”208 The secrecy of the operation was maintained well into September, by which time the war between Pakistan and India was in full swing. Meanwhile, the Pakistani state publicly promoted the idea of civilian volunteers in Kashmir. Figure 4.1 shows several examples of the headlines appearing in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn between August and September 1965.

203 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 61. 204 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), “The India-Pakistan War, 1965,” Secret Report (May, 1966). 205 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 61. 206 Ministry of Defence, “The India-Pakistan War, 1965,” Secret Report, May, 1966. 207 Criminal Investigation Department, Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, 31. Also see Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), “The India-Pakistan War, 1965,” Secret Report, May, 1966. 208 Criminal Investigation Department, Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, 36-37. 84

Figure 4.1: Selected Dawn Headlines, August-September 1965

OPERATION BADR

In 1965, an influential civil servant, who later became a “democratic” president, convinced a military dictator to infiltrate Kashmir. In 1998, the situation was reversed: the infiltration of Kashmir (codenamed Operation Badr) was incited during the tenure of a democratically-elected leader by a military officer, who later became a military dictator.

Operation Badr involved nearly 2,000 regular Pakistani troops crossing the line-of-control and occupying the inhospitable mountains of the Kargil district.209 The academic literature dealing with the Kargil crisis dates the conflict as starting in the year 1999. In fact,

Operation Badr was put into effect in November of 1998.210

209 Incidentally, Kargil was on the Pakistani side of the line-of-control until 1971, when Indian forces evicted the troops there by a surprise attack. Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of Kargil,” RUSI Journal (April 2002), 5, accessed August 20, 2012, http://shaukatqadir.info/pdfs/Kargil.pdf. 210 Author’s interview with William Milam (U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, 1998-2001), Washington, D.C. (November 14, 2011). 85

The objectives pursued by Pakistan were: (1) to revive the decade-old Kashmiri insurgency211 (which began to wane in the mid-1990s); (2) to internationalize the Kashmir issue and attract third-party mediation of the conflict;212 and (3) to cut off one of India’s vital road links to Ladakh, the northernmost region of the state, and thus compel the Indian forces to withdraw from the strategic 21,500-feet high Siachen Glacier.213 The first two objectives were similar to the ones Pakistan pursued through Operation Gibraltar in 1965.

The third objective was ancillary – India had already opened a less vulnerable route to

Ladakh.214 Its underlying aim was “to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.”215

The plan to infiltrate the Kargil district has been popularly attributed to then chief of army staff Pervez Musharraf. It had actually existed in as early as 1987. Still, Musharraf

“was just the kind of guy to actually execute it.”216 The Kargil plan was, in part, a response to India wrestling control in 1984 over the Siachen Glacier, located in the Himalayan region between India and Pakistan.217 On and off fighting between India and Pakistan over

Siachen and similar parts of the region ensued for nearly two decades (until a ceasefire

211 Sumit Ganguly, “Slow learning: Lessons from India’s counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009), 82. 212 S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security,” Security Studies 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2003): 86. 213 “Pakistan admits its troops are fighting in Kargil-Drass sector,” Times of India (June 18, 1999): 12. 214 William B. Milam, Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 34. 215 Qadir, “An Analysis of Kargil,” 5. 216 Author’s interview with Shuja Nawaz, Washington, D.C. (November 8, 2011). 217 In his memoir, Musharraf describes the Kargil conflict as merely “the latest in a series of moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan along the Line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound Northern Areas. India would capture a location where they felt that our presence was thin, and vice-versa.” Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 87. 86

went into effect in 2003). The Kargil plan was reportedly twice presented to then Prime

Minister Benazir Bhutto, who rejected it.218 It was refined by Musharraf when he was director-general of military operations in 1993-1995.219 Musharraf put Operation Badr into effect in November 1998, before the area became snowbound.220

U.S. ambassador to Pakistan William Milam reports confronting the Pakistani officials about the infiltration and being told that the infiltrators were mujahideen over whom Pakistan had no control.221 However, as Milam soon learned, Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif was aware of the operation – after it was already underway, but before the Lahore summit. The Lahore Summit, which took place in February 1999, involved Sharif and

Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee. The two sides pledged bilateral cooperation in security, especially in the nuclear sphere. Sharif was briefed about the military operation in January 1999, but appeared to have failed fully to grasp its implications.222 Sharif was notorious for his “limited attention span.”223 Musharraf’s direct role in the Kargil intrusion was revealed through a disclosure of telephone conversations between him and his chief of general staff, which were intercepted by the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s external

218 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 511. 219 Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 91. 220 Author’s interview with Milam, November 14, 2011. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 As the Kargil Review Committee report (2000) put it, “Those who knew Nawaz Sharif personally believe that he has a limited attention span and is impatient with detail. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so warmly welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in Lahore.” 87

intelligence agency).224 Musharraf famously said that “the scruff of their [Kargil infiltrators’] neck is in our hands, whenever you want, we could regulate it.”225 The statement implied that Pakistan had full control over the infiltrators. In a March 2013 interview he gave to the Indian news channel NDTV, Musharraf even admitted to have secretly visited the Kargil infiltration area, which was technically Indian territory, ahead of the conflict.226

However, in his 2006 memoir, Musharraf insisted that the infiltrators were

“thousands of mujahideen, mostly indigenous to Indian-held Kashmir but also supported by freelance sympathizers from Pakistan.”227 The Indian authorities initially thought that

“Jehadi militants” had occupied Kargil. However, as the war progressed, the Indian army began recovering documents, weapons, equipment, as well as corpses of regular officers and soldiers. It also captured prisoners belonging to the Northern Light Infantry and other battalions of the Pakistan army. The high-altitude operation was also recognized as too

“sophisticated” to have been planned and carried out by nonstate actors.228 “There was no doubt left that we were fighting regular Pak Army and not Jehadi militants,” explains V.D.

Malik, Indian army chief during the Kargil War.229

224 Ved Prakash Malik, “Musharraf’s Kargil Lie Nailed,” Hindustan Times (December 9, 2001), article emailed to author by General Malik (Indian army chief during the Kargil war) on November 10, 2011. 225 “Transcripts of conversations between Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff and Gen Parvez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan,” India Today, accessed September 2, 2012, http://web.archive.org/web/20080701220255/http://www.india-today.com/kargil/audio.html. 226 “Full transcript: General Pervez Musharraf speaks to NDTV,” NDTV, accessed August 2, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/full-transcript-general-pervez-musharraf-speaks-to-ndtv- 342621. 227 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 88. 228 Author’s interview with a research analyst at the Pakistan, South Asia, and Afghanistan Research Group, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, UK, February 10, 2012. 229 Malik, “Musharraf’s Kargil Lie Nailed.” 88

Operation Badr involved an estimated 1,500 to 2,400 Pakistani personnel.230

Assessments of the number of regular troops to irregular militants vary from “virtually all”

(director general of military intelligence estimate) to 70 percent (Intelligence Bureau estimate) to 60 percent (Research and Analysis Wing and Border Security Force estimate).

The estimate of the director general of military intelligence that all of the infiltrators were regulars was based on testimonies of prisoners of war; captured identity cards, diaries/registers, and personal effects of Pakistani army personnel; matching of bodies with identity cards; the fighting skills displayed by the infiltrators; and the weaponry used.231

The other agencies based their claim about the presence of militants on radio transmissions, statements by Pakistani leaders and leaders of militant groups, and newspaper reports.

“However, it has been argued that radio transmissions by militants and some of the statements issued by the militant leaders and others might have been part of the deception plan to support the Pakistani thesis that this was an operation planned by militants,” points out the official report by the Kargil Review Committee, which concludes that the ratio of regulars to irregulars was likely 70:30.232 According to the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan during the Kargil intrusion, the irregulars were used only for “donkey work” (i.e. carrying supplies).233 They were neither armed nor trained for military purposes.

The High Commissioner of India to Pakistan during the Kargil war argues that

Kashmiri militants were supposed to have entered the scene during the second phase of

230 Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 82. 231 Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, 97. 232 Ibid. 233 Author’s interview with Milam, November 14, 2011. 89

Operation Badr, once Pakistan’s regular army personnel got there and held the territory.234

Pakistani ex-brigadier Shaukat Qadir confirms that the operational plan was that, by July of 1999, the mujahideen from Jammu and Kashmir would “step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication, at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. Thus creating an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat, this would force India to the negotiating table.”235 However, this part of the plan never materialized, and, based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to assess whether using militants from India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir during the operation was indeed

Pakistan’s intention.

Target Density

The main targets of Operation Gibraltar were the “pro-Pakistan elements” within the local population. The potential Kashmiri allies were mixed within a population of nearly 3.5 million, which included hostile “pro-India elements.” The target was also scattered across over 50,000 square miles of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 236

Table 4.1: Area and Population in Kashmir in 1965237

Area Population (in square miles) Territory controlled by India Anantnag 2,097 654,368 Baramulla 2,536 604,659 Doda 4,380 268,403

234 Author’s interview with Gopalaswami Parthasarathy (High Commissioner of India to Pakistan, 1998-2000), New Delhi, India (October 8, 2011). 235 Qadir, “An Analysis of Kargil,” 5-6. 236 The population and area figures collected from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum: Kashmir.” 237 Ibid. 90

Jammu 1,249 516,932 Kathua 1,024 207,430 Ladakh 37,754 88,651 Poonch 1,689 326,061 Srinagar 1,205 640,411 Udhampur 1,731 254,061 53,665 3,560,976

Territory controlled by Pakistan Azad Kashmir 4,500 1,000,000 Gilgit Agency 27,000 160,000 31,500 1,160,000

Total 85,165 4,720,976 Note: Area and population statistics for Indian-controlled Kashmir are taken from the 1961 census; statistics for Pakistani-controlled Kashmir are based on 1965 CIA estimates. The objective of the Gibraltar Force was to set off an uprising in Kashmir, which would create the conditions necessary for Pakistan officially to intervene to aid the rebels and generate international pressures to force a Kashmir settlement.238 Figure 2 shows the plan of action. Gathering intelligence in order correctly and effectively to identify, recruit, and mobilize the target, without becoming exposed, required a great amount of local knowledge and an ability to operate across the urban and rural areas of the state undetected by the Indian authorities. The Kashmiris who lived in Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir possessed the required skills when it came to Kashmiri culture and geography. The regulars, who were overwhelmingly of Punjabi and Pathan origin, formed the spine of the irregular Azad Kashmiri-dominated Gibraltar Force.

238 Ibid. Musa, My Version, 35-36. 91

Figure 4.2: Operation Gibraltar Plan of Action (July-August 1965)

Prior to the operation, Pakistan lacked “live contacts” with the Kashmiris in Jammu and Kashmir.239 It did not carry out any preliminary reconnaissance missions.240 The Azad

Kashmiri civilians were used to establish contact with the civilian population. In doing so, they were to distinguish friendly and neutral Kashmiris from their hostile counterparts, and turn the former into collaborators and, ultimately, rebels. The Azad Kashmiris were also used to blend the Gibraltar Force (the rest of which was composed of regular Pakistani troops) in with the local population in order to avoid detection by the Indian authorities.

The Azad Kashmiris were instructed to identify and seek support from the “pro-

Pakistan elements” within the local population. The initial task was to establish bases for operations at various points across the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the help of friendly locals. The infiltrators were then, using the intelligence and manpower provided by the

Pakistan sympathizers, to attack Indian civil and military personnel and government institutions in different parts of Jammu and Kashmir “so as to disperse the Indian army and

239 Sayyid Ghaffar Mahdi, Mehdi Papers (Karachi, Pakistan: Mehdi Foundation, 1985), 53. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 53. 240 Ministry of Defence, “The India-Pakistan War, 1965,” May, 1966. 92

police forces as much as possible.”241 While doing this, the infiltrators were to seek out and provide support to the local pro-Pakistan elements.242

In some cases, particularly in the Poonch District, the infiltrators even tried to establish parallel administrations. Local residents were nominated to hold posts as revenue and police officials. In some places, the infiltrators set up local “Inqlabi” (“Revolutionary”) councils to run the administration. A secret 1966 report by the Criminal Investigation

Department of Jammu and Kashmir also cites instances of infiltrators imparting training in the use of firearms to the local population.243 In his memoir, Musa recounts that the infiltrators were to distribute arms to the local Kashmiris.244

The importance of connecting with the local population is illustrated by a popular story of the infiltrators’ first encounter with the Kashmiris. On August 4, 1965, according to the story, a group of grazers were tending to their cattle on a pasture located in the high mountains of Baramula District. Suddenly they encountered armed men coming from the mountain passes. The commanding officer of the column of the infiltrators collected and addressed the herdsmen. He told them that his force had come from Pakistan to liberate the

Kashmiri Muslims from the yoke of Indian imperialism, and that this was the beginning of a “Jihad” in which every Muslim had to participate. The herdsmen were sworn to secrecy and given money. Some of them were directed to go down and collect provisions for the

241 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 63. 242 Johri, The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, 46. 243 Criminal Investigation Department, Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, 41. 244 Musa, My Version, 35. 93

infiltrators, while others were questioned about the disposition of the Indian Army units and other strategic information.

Towards the evening, the Pakistani infiltrators permitted several of the herdsmen to go down to their village, called Darakasi, to run some errands. One of the herdsmen, a young man named Mohammad Din, insisted that the villagers find a way to alert the Indian authorities. In order not to arouse suspicion of the infiltrators, he told his companions to carry on as usual, while he himself set out on a marathon run to the nearest Indian defense post.245 The failure of the infiltrators’ to win over the herdsmen – which may have been better accomplished had the unit’s Azad Kashmiris, as opposed to their commanding officer, addressed the herdsmen – ultimately led the Indian authorities to the trail of

Pakistan’s secret plan.

In addition to being able successfully to appeal to the Kashmiris, it was equally crucial for the infiltrators to be able to blend in with the local population. For example, the infiltration plan for the Valley of Kashmir required the infiltrators to mingle unnoticed with thousands of people congregating to celebrate the festival of Pir Dastgir Sahib on August

8, 1965. On the next day, which coincided with the anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh

Abdullah (the popular leader of Kashmir largest political party), a processional demonstration was to take place in the capital city Srinagar. The infiltrators were to sneak into the procession and stage an armed revolt. Certain groups of the infiltrators were to participate in these processions and attack the government buildings, police on duty, and

245 Criminal Investigation Department, Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, 43. 94

the markets, so as to compel the police to resort to force and thus start a chain reaction of further protests and violence.

In the chaos and confusion, certain well-organized groups of infiltrators had been earmarked to storm the radio station, airfield, and other vital centers of the government.246

Meanwhile, other columns further south and in the north-east of the Valley were to cut roads to isolate Srinagar. Then, according to the operation plan, a newly constituted

“Revolutionary Council,” whose formation was announced earlier by Pakistani authorities from a ghost station, would broadcast an appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries, especially Pakistan. (Appendix B shows several of the threatening letters written by the Revolutionary Council to the Indian authorities.) The broadcast would be the signal for the Pakistan officially to move its army into Kashmir.247

OPERATION BADR

The main target of Operation Badr was very different from that of Operation

Gibraltar. It comprised the “commanding heights”248 – unoccupied high-altitude sites – of the inaccessible and snowbound Northern Areas. The thinly populated Northern Areas presented Pakistan with high target density. The target was isolated from the population and spatially concentrated. Over the course of the operation, Pakistani troops occupied an area of about 50 square miles with 132 posts of various sizes. Each post typically housed

4 to 12 soldiers.249 Because of the extreme harshness of the terrain and climate, Indian

246 Ibid., 38. 247 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 65. 248 The term was used by an Indian brigadier in a Los Angeles Times interview. “Pakistan admits its troops are fighting in Kargil-Drass sector,” 12. 249 Qadir, “An Analysis of Kargil,” 5. 95

forces abandoned many of their defensive positions there during the winter season until late spring. Pakistan took advantage of this situation. The regulars were dressed in civilian clothes in order to pass for Kashmir-based insurgents.250

It took nearly six months for the infiltration to be detected on what the Pakistani senior officers called “No Man’s Land.”251 Pakistan strategically used troops that were already deployed in the Northern Areas. The move helped the military to avoid doing any large-scale movement of forces from outside the area, which would have attracted attention and undermined the covert nature of the military operation. Moreover, the Northern Area troops were already fully acclimatized to the harsh weather conditions, which reduced their need for special training. The Pakistani troops were instructed to occupy a series of heights across the line-of-control252 in the Kargil sector “in the unheld gaps in between the defended positions, which were not occupied and where patrolling was difficult in winter due to hazardous terrain and extreme climactic/snow conditions.”253 On May 3, 1999, the infiltrators were finally discovered by shepherds, who were occasionally used by the Indian

Brigade Intelligence Team for intelligence gathering.254

Military Capacity

250 This maneuver went against article 44 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which requires combatants to “to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” 251 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 513. 252 The ceasefire line separating India-controlled Kashmir from its Pakistan-controlled counterpart since 1948 was designated the “Line of Control” following the Simla Agreement, which India and Pakistan signed on 3 July 1972. The line continues to serve as a de facto border, but does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary. 253 Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, 93. 254 Ibid. 96

Both Operation Gibraltar and Operation Badr were carried out at a time when

Pakistan enjoyed a hitherto unprecedented magnitude of military power. In 1965,

Pakistan’s military capacity was boosted by high economic growth and development, which vastly improved the military’s material base, revised officer training practices, and substantial foreign military aid. It was tested and shown robust by the preceding conflicts with Afghanistan and India.

OPERATION GIBRALTAR

At independence, most of Pakistan’s military units were not at full strength. Many vacancies were filled by recruits who had little or no educational background. Training was initially modeled on the British system, and British officers served as instructors and unit commanders. Pakistani officers and enlisted men were sent to British military schools for advanced training. In the mid-1950s, increasing emphasis began to be placed on American training methods. American advisers and Pakistani officers returning from United States military schools provided the guidance and direction. By September 1965, about 25 percent of Pakistan’s 8,000 officers had been trained in the United States.255

In the five years preceding Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan had increased the defense budget by nearly 40 percent.256 The defense expenditure had nearly doubled over the

255 Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 573. 256 From $208 million (1961-1962) to $289 million (1965-1966). Chakravorty, History of the Indo- Pak War, 8. 97

previous decade,257 and increased by 21 percent between the years 1963 and 1964.258 The number of army personnel was boosted from 160,000 in 1961 to 230,000 in 1962.259 In

1964, the number of Air Force personnel was enlarged from 15,000 to 17,000-25,000 and the number of aircrafts increased to about 200. The ratio of labor force in Pakistan’s regular armed forces increased from 7 percent in 1961 to 10 percent in 1964.260 In June 1965, the

Pakistani government made it compulsory for all employers in the country to release military reservists on recall by the defense headquarters and to ensure re-employment and promotion upon their return from service.261

Numerous economic and social indicators also show that, in 1964 and 1965, the material base of Pakistan’s military regime had drastically improved. The annual growth rates of Pakistan’s GNP and GDP between 1960 and 1965 were the highest in the country’s prior history, averaging 6.8 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively. This too was the case for

Pakistan’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors, with annual growth rates averaging 2.1 percent for the former and 5.2 percent for the latter.262 The average daily number of factory

257 The defense expenditure figures for the year 1964 capture Pakistan’s coercive capability better than the 1965 figures because the latter are inevitably augmented by the expenses from the 1965 war. Pakistan’s military expenditure in 1964 was 1.2 billion Rs [Pakistani rupees], as compared to 653.2 million Rs. in 1954. Amina Ibrahim, “Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? Economic Factors of Pakistan’s Military Coups,” Working Paper Series, No. 09-92, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (February 2009), 29. Javeed Ahmed Sheikh, “Security Perception of Weak Nations: A Case Study of Pakistan in Security for the Weak Nations: A Multiple Perspective, ed. Syed Farooq Hasnat and Anton Pelinka (Lahore: Izharsons, 1986), 95. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86 (New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1998), 125. 258 From 954.3 million Rs. in 1963 to 1156.5 million Rs. in 1964. Ibid. 259 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 8. 260 Ibid. 261 Johri, The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, 85. 262 Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics and Planning and Development Division, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume I (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Islamabad, June 1998), 53. 98

workers had jumped nearly 50 percent from 1960 to 1965, while the total wages paid to factory workers increased by over two-third the prior amount.263 While the number of industrial disputes had varied dramatically over the previous five years, it reached a relative low of 81 in 1965 (having dropped from 107 in the previous year).264 Domestic banking in

Pakistan was booming. The number of Pakistani banks was at its hitherto all-time high, and the number of their branches had quadrupled over the previous five years.265

Access to and consumption of electricity has been widely used as a measure of development. The number of Pakistan’s electricity consumers had steadily increased since the country’s founding, but more than doubled in the years between 1960 and 1965.266

Pakistani citizens’ access to other important public goods was also on the rise. The number of health facilities was on a steady upward trajectory, while the population per hospital bed figure was at its hitherto all-time low, indicating that more Pakistanis had access to health services than ever before.267 Access to education was also on the rise. The number of primary schools increased by 19 percent, the number of middle schools had increased by

55 percent, and the number of secondary schools had increased by 38 percent over the previous five years.268 It has been argued that much of the economic and social improvement was driven by the over $1 billion in foreign aid Pakistan had secured for the

263 Pakistan Labour Division, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume II (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Islamabad, June 1998), 116. 264 Ibid., 121. 265 From 358 in the year 1960 to 1521 in the year 1965. State Bank of Pakistan, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume I, 41. 266 Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume I, 134. 267 Pakistan Ministry of Health and Planning Commission, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume I, 198. 268 Pakistan Ministry of Education, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume II, 162. 99

years 1960-1965,269 which came from the United States, China, Canada, Japan, Sweden,

Switzerland, Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and even the country to which Pakistani propagandists colorfully referred to as a nation lacking “the humane qualities of civilized people” – India.270 However, Pakistan’s economic and social gains should not be dismissed as mere products of foreign assistance.

The ability of the state to turn economic assistance into tangible benefits for its citizens attests to its high capacity.271

In addition to economic aid, Pakistan actively tried to achieve and, in many cases, successfully secured military assistance from the great powers over the years leading up to the 1965 war. Pakistan had signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United

States in 1954, and, since then, received a total of $4.2 billion in U.S. military aid.272

Starting in the early 1960s, Pakistan sought to build an alliance with China while maintaining its relationship with the United States. In 1962, it began voting in favor of

China’s entry into the United Nations (from 1954 to 1961 Pakistan voted against it). In

1963, Pakistan signed a border agreement with China, which was believed to have

269 CIA, “Intelligence Memorandum: The Aftermath of the India-Pakistan War.” 270 India provided economic assistance to Pakistan of roughly $87 million specifically through the Indus Tarbela Development Fund. Economic Affairs Division, reported in Government of Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan, Volume III (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Islamabad, June 1998), 667-668. 271 The CIA report cited earlier (entitled “Intelligence Memorandum: The Aftermath of the India- Pakistan War”) attributing Pakistan’s economic performance mainly to foreign aid also acknowledges that Pakistan’s development program was “more attuned to the realities of the situation” than that of India. 272 The figures used to calculate this number were adjusted for inflation and presented in 2009 constant U.S. dollars. “Sixty years of US aid to Pakistan: Get the data,” The Guardian Datablog, accessed September 2, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty- matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan#data. 100

contained secret military clauses.273 The frequency of exchanged visits between Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers and other high level officials noticeably increased between the years 1964 and 1965. During the exchanges, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai voiced full support of Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir issue, and Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted at

Chinese military support for Pakistan, but without formally pledging it.274 The Chinese may have kept at least some of their unofficial promises. A secret British government document suggests that several hundred of the Pakistani infiltrators were trained in

China.275

Pakistan’s military strength, as compared that that of India, was also unusually high in 1965. According to an official Indian assessment, “in several crucial items, Pakistan enjoyed qualitative superiority over India. In numerical strength, the two sides [Pakistan and India] were roughly equal.”276 Pakistan had a sizable advantage over India in terms of number and quality of tanks and their equipment, especially in medium tanks. Although

India had more artillery pieces, Pakistani artillery was better equipped with the latest U.S. weapons, and its anti-tank fire-power was double that of India. “Although in numerical strength, the Indian infantry appeared to be larger than Pakistan’s, in effective strength both were more or less equal,” states the Indian Ministry of Defense record of the 1965 war.277

Most of the Indian mountain divisions were positioned along the northern borders with

273 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 7. 274 Ibid. 275 From K.R. Crook, British High Commission, Dacca, to N.J. Barrington, Rawalpindi, “Shamsuddin,” Public Record Office (December 29, 1965), in The British Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents, 1958-1969, ed. Roedad Khan [compiled and selected by] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 423. 276 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 14. 277 Ibid., 13-14. 101

China on the Pakistani side, and one of India’s seven infantry divisions was located in East

Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan’s army strength of six infantry and two armored divisions on the

West Pakistan border was not inferior to that of India, which had eight infantry divisions

(four of them under-strength) and about three armored brigades there.

Pakistan’s Air Force was smaller in size as compared to India’s, but it was more modern. Pakistan had US-built NATO-standard modern air bases, and a micro-wave communication network linking these bases. Pakistan’s supersonic interceptor aircrafts, equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, were more powerful than India’s supersonic jet fighter aircrafts, which were acquired from Russia. While Pakistan had limited naval strength, so did India. Plus, except for Pakistan’s “inconsequential” bombardment of

Dwarka, no naval activity took place in the September 1965 war.278 While, in finite military terms, India won the 1965 war with Pakistan, its performance was, according to a U.S.

Central Intelligence Agency assessment, “quite uninspiring” – India’s actual military losses were greater than those of Pakistan.279 Even Army Chief Mohammad Musa, who staunchly opposed Operation Gibraltar, argued that Pakistan could have mobilized enough military capacity to fight an open war against India had the Pakistani commanders been given more time to prepare.280 Another prominent critic of the launching of Pakistan’s 1965 operations, Sayyid Ghaffar Mahdi, the commander of the special services group whose

278 Ibid., 14. 279 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Current Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: Outcome of India-Pakistan Warfare” (Secret), October 1, 1965; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 280 Musa, My Version, 3-4. 102

officers took part in Operation Gibraltar, also argues that “With sound military planning… it [Operation Gibraltar] would have certainly succeeded.”281

Between 1960 and 1965, two major events demonstrated Pakistan’s military capacity. First was a conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the North-West Frontier region of Pakistan. In 1960, Afghanistan Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan sent troops across the border into Bajaur, located at Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA) of Pakistan, in order to “manipulate events in that area and to press the

Pashtunistan [Pakhtunistan] issue.”282 The Pakistani government quickly defeated the

Afghan military forces. The two countries then severed ties, just as Afghanistan’s major export crops, grapes and pomegranates, were ready to be shipped to India.283 Pakistan held up the equipment and material provided by foreign aid programs to Afghanistan, much of which passed through Pakistani territory, as well closed its border to nomads who had long been spending winters in Pakistan and India and summers in Afghanistan. The United

States attempted to mediate the situation, but its role was limited due to its alliance with

Pakistan.284 Afghanistan’s ensuing economic decline led Daoud to resign and Afghanistan to change its policy. Thus the Pashtunistan issue was resolved without destabilizing

Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and FATA regions with the help of Pakistan’s military power, economic coercion, and diplomatic maneuvering.

281 Mahdi, Mehdi Papers, 53. 282 Pakhtunistan issue refers to the merger of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan for the establishment of a homeland for the Pakhtun people. Armed Conflicts Event Data, “Pashtunistan Crisis 1960-1963,” accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.onwar.com/aced/nation/pat/pakistan/fafghanpakist1961.htm. 283 The Soviet Union then stepped in to buy the crops and airlift them from Afghanistan. The rest was flown directly to India by Ariana Afghan Airlines. 284 Armed Conflicts Event Data, “Pashtunistan Crisis 1960-1963.” 103

The second event which demonstrated Pakistan’s military capacity and international sway occurred at the Rann of Kutch, at the northern edge of a salt marsh located in Gujarat, India. The boundary of the Rann of Kutch had never been properly demarcated.285 Indian and Pakistan police patrols first accidentally clashed there on

January 25, 1965. On April 9, 1965, Pakistan attacked an Indian post in the Rann of Kutch in battalion strength, and achieved a quick military victory. The crisis quickly worsened, until finally tampering off to an unwritten ceasefire by the end of April. Meanwhile, both sides built to a major confrontation in the Punjab and the East Pakistan area. India took the

Pakistan post at Kargil, along the Kashmir ceasefire line, but then withdrew under pressure from the United Nations Secretary General. British Prime Minister’s subsequent efforts to get both parties back from the edge of war in the Punjab, and secondarily in Bengal and the Rann of Kutch, resulted in a formal agreement providing for mutual withdrawal from the Rann, then from other international borders, followed by a series of steps leading by the end of the year to formal arbitration of the Kutch dispute.286 “India’s failure to hit back in full force, at Kutch or elsewhere along the Pakistan border, was taken to be a proof of timidity and lack of confidence. The short statured and unassuming Lal Bahadur Shastri

[India’s second prime minister], who had succeeded the great Jawahar Lal Nehru [who passed away in 1964], appeared to be no match for the hefty and imposing Ayub Khan,” reflected an Indian government account.287 The Rann of Kutch dispute demonstrated both

285 R.W. Whitney to Martin, “Rann of Kutch,” April 22, 1965; Dominions Office Records: DO 196/360, Boundary Dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch, February 1965- April 1965; National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom. 286 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “India-Pakistan Chronology Since Beginning of Rann of Kutch Dispute in January,” September 9, 1965; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 287 Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, xxi. 104

Pakistan’s coercive military capacity vis-à-vis India, as well as the willingness of the international community to get involved in Pakistan-Indian affairs to avoid a full-scale war.

OPERATION BADR

At the time Operation Badr was carried out, Pakistan was experiencing an unusually long period of stability within its borders. The state had rebuilt its military capacity since the devastating military defeat inflicted by India and East Pakistani rebels in 1971, and consequently successfully dealt with the Baluchistan insurgency (1973-1977), the Sindhi-

Muhajir conflict (1984-1992), and the Bajaur insurgency (1994). Pakistan was instrumental to USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989. Its covert role in Afghanistan was generously funded by the United States, thereby dramatically boosting the country’s military strength and experience running successful covert operations. Over the 1990s,

Pakistan established friendly relations with the Taliban government, which helped to secure order in the turbulent region bordering Afghanistan.

Perhaps at no other time in Pakistan’s history did the state experience such a boost in military power as it did in 1998. At the time Operation Bard was set in motion, Pakistan’s defense expenditure was 5 percent higher than it was in the previous year, and had increased by 46 percent over the previous five years.288 During the same five-year time period, the number of armed forces personnel was increased by nearly 44 percent.289 This was remarkable considering the already substantial resources the Pakistani military acquired, most notably from the United States, during the 1980s Afghan war. Most

288 Ibrahim, “Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy?” 29. 289 World Bank, “Data: Pakistan,” accessed August 19, 2012, http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan. 105

importantly, however, the Kargil plan was carried out within months of Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

During the 1999 fighting, Indian strategists considered crossing the line-of-control into Pakistani Kashmir, thereby “opening a second front in less difficult terrain.”290

However, Pakistan’s nuclear power “curtailed the Indian military’s options to expel the

Pakistani forces and strictly prevented any operations on Pakistani soil.”291 Nuclear proliferation in South Asia, signaled by the 1998 nuclear weapons testing by both India and Pakistan, attracted strong international attention and concern. U.S. president Bill

Clinton described the region as “the most dangerous place in the world.”292 Pakistan was in a strong position to count on the United States to intervene to resolve the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons served as “instruments by which Pakistan could galvanize international intervention on its behalf in the event that the political-military crisis spun out of control.” 293

Pakistan’s high military capacity in 1964-1965 and 1998-99 was ample for mobilizing irregular forces. The operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Kashmir in the 1990s relied heavily on irregulars and demonstrated that Pakistan was willing and able to use nonstate actors despite the historical lessons of 1965. What made the 1998-99 covert operation different from its 1965 counterpart was the density of the military target vis-à- vis the local population. The target of Operation Badr was uninhabited, while that of

290 Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 83. 291 Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 61. 292 Charles Babington and Pamela Constable, “Kashmir Killings Mar Clinton Visit to India,” Washington Post (March 22, 2000): A1, cited in Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 79. 293 C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” Asia Policy 11 (January 2011): 120. 106

Operation Gibraltar was heavily mixed with the local residents. Actively engaging the locals was an essential part of Operation Gibraltar, and the Azad Kashmiri recruits possessed the knowledge and skills necessary for addressing the problems of information starvation and tactical exposure.

CONCLUSION

The paired comparison of Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar and Operation Badr illustrates how the military target’s spatial relationship to the local population directly shapes the state’s incentives to use domestic nonstate actors in military operations. Whether the state has the ability to act on these incentives is a function of its military capacity, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.The type of nonstate actor the state is incentivized to use for military purposes, on the other hand, is significantly influenced by the second critical dimension of target density – the distribution of the military target across territory.

The next chapter examines target density and its effect on outsourcing.

107

CHAPTER 5

TARGET DENSITY VIS-À-VIS TERRITORY

INDIA’S KASHMIR CAMPAIGN (1988-2003) ACROSS TIME AND SPACE

In the late 1980s, India faced a growing crisis in Kashmir. Strikes, public protests, and occasional terrorist violence turned into massive demonstrations and systematic attacks on state officials and institutions. A rigged election and subsequent crackdown on those who worked for the defeated opposition party294 roused the onset of an uprising. Hundreds of Kashmiris crossed the Line of Control into neighboring Pakistan to receive arms and training.295 A militant nationalist organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

(JKLF), emerged as the vanguard of the insurgency. The Kashmiri insurgency waned by

2003. Although insurgent violence did not cease completely, it was no longer “the primary means by which Kashmiri political aspirations for political change are manifested.”296

This chapter examines India’s military campaign in response to the Kashmiri uprising, with a focus on explaining the different types of domestic nonstate actors used by the state. It shows that the Indian state’s use of domestic nonstate actors in the violent

294 Many of the young men who worked for the Muslim United Front (MUF), a coalition of local political parties, were imprisoned for months without charge or trial; some of them were tortured. Sumantra Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century” in Ethnonationalism in India, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 215. 295 Upon their arrival in Pakistan, the insurgent hopefuls were “taken, often blindfolded, to secret training camps and taught to make bombs, fire anti-aircraft guns and wage guerrilla war.” Mehboob Jeelani, “The Departed: The Return Home of Kashmir’s Disillusioned Militants,” Caravan, September 1, 2012, accessed September 5, 2012, http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/departed. 296 Staniland 2003, 940. 108

conflict was shaped by target density and military capacity. The initial locus of insurgent violence was the Kashmir Valley, and in particular the capital city Srinagar. The rebels rallied and mixed with the local population, much of which was sympathetic to their cause.

At the onset of the conflict, the Indian government deferred to the local police forces, which proved ill-equipped for handling an insurgency. It was after Indian military capacity in

Kashmir was significantly augmented, with the introduction of the army and federal security forces, that the Indian state began using former rebels in its counterinsurgency campaign. The ex-insurgent collaborators helped the Indian government challenge the

JKLF pro-Pakistan successors and to reassert control over Srinagar and other major areas of the Kashmir Valley, where the rebels were concentrated.297 The success bred an unintended consequence: the insurgency spread from the Kashmir Valley, particularly to the large tracts of the Jammu region. The geographical dispersal of the target prompted a change in India’s strategy. The military began recruiting villagers into its coercive apparatus. It armed and trained thousands of civilians with no previous military experience to fight insurgents in the remote areas.298

Changes in military capacity and target density shaped the Indian state’s outsourcing strategy. India initially confronted a target that was geographically concentrated and mixed with the local population. However, like Pakistan in its eastern wing in 1971 (Chapter 5), the Indian state began its campaign in Kashmir with low military

297 Praveen Swami, “A Beleaguered Force,” Frontline 16, no. 3 (January 30-February 12, 1999), accessed January 12, 2013, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1603/16030410.htm. 298 Author’s interview with Radhavinod Raju (former Indian Police Service officer of the Jammu and Kashmir and in the Central Bureau of Investigation; first director-general of National Investigation Agency, the federal agency approved by the Indian government to combat terrorism in India; headed Special Investigation Team, which investigated the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi), October 10, 2011, New Delhi, India. 109

capacity in the region. It was after India’s military capacity significantly increased that the government began using militants in its counterinsurgency campaign. After the target scattered across remote rural areas, the Indian state began militarizing civilians to fill the gaps in territory and local knowledge.

MILITANTS INCORPORATED

India’s use of domestic nonstate actors may be traced to the December 1992 murder of human rights activist H.N. Wanchoo. It was allegedly ordered by a Border Security

Force officer and carried out by former insurgents who were compensated with their release from prison. Other assassinations in 1993 and 1994 also appeared to have been the work of hired gunmen working for the security forces.299 In 1994, the Indian armed forces began using militants on a routine basis.

The timing of India’s incorporation of domestic nonstate actors into the state’s coercive apparatus coincides with the increased supply of ex-insurgents from the demilitarization of the JKLF, which was in large part a product of Indian’s growing military capacity in the region. However, it would be inaccurate to attribute India’s policy of using these nonstate actors solely to the JKLF’s collapse. The collaborators were a mix of both surrendered and captured insurgents. They were motivated by diverse factors. Many of those who had been captured by the Indian government were forcibly recruited. Sometimes family members of these individuals were held hostage until the captured insurgents agreed to work with the security forces. On other occasions, the Indian security forces detained

299 Human Rights Watch/Asia, India’s Secret Army in Kashmir: New Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict. Vol. 8, No. 4, May 1996. 110

and tortured those suspected of being insurgents. The Human Rights Watch/Asia reported interviewing many detainees who were told by the security forces that the torture would end only if they agreed to work with their captors.300 Other ex-insurgents had voluntarily surrendered and opted to serve the Indian armed forces. Many of those who surrendered were fleeing their former comrades,301 while others sought material gains and the opportunity to carry out attacks on their rivals. Some were “genuinely disillusioned by what they perceived as Pakistan’s corrupting influence and the willingness of the pro-Pakistan hard core to perpetrate violence against those among their own people who did not agree with them,”302 while others had family members who were victims of insurgent violence and sought revenge.303 Many of those who had surrendered, but refused to work for the

Indian armed forces, were routinely detained and tortured.304

The Indian government incorporated the ex-insurgents into its coercive apparatus through two main channels. The first was the special counterinsurgency division of the

Jammu and Kashmir police, known initially as the Special Task Force, and later as the

Special Operations Group (SOG). The SOG was formed on June 2, 1994. It started its operations in Kashmir with just ten personnel who were a mix of surrendered insurgents

300 Ibid., and author’s interviews in March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 301 Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 25-28. 302 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 133. 303 Human Rights Watch/Asia 1996, and author’s interviews in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, March 2012. 304 Rakesh Shukla, “The Life and Death of a Surrendered Militant,” Himal Southasian, February 20, 2013, accessed March 25, 2013, http://himalmag.com/component/content/article/5148-the-life- and-death-of-a-surrendered-militant-.html. 111

and those who had previously served at another wing of the Jammu and Kashmir police.

According to a 2006 estimate, the number of SOG recruits grew to about 4,000.305

There was no command structure to the SOG. Each district had a senior superintendent and a superintendent of police who was in charge of the SOG. “[The] SOG does not exist on papers, yet they [the SOG forces] are all over the Valley… people recount ruthless tales of extortion, rape, molestation, robbery, kidnapping and killing,” described a

Kashmiri human rights group, which also estimated that the SOG was involved directly or indirectly in about 80 percent of counterinsurgent operations in the Kashmir Valley.306 The human rights organization also reported “many instances where the SOG men interfered in settling personal scores and land disputes.”307 The SOG was notorious “for corruption and brutality.”308 It had the highest number of custodial killings, after the Border Security

Force.309 A frequently cited case of SOG brutality and unaccountability is the Pathribal massacre. The SOG claimed to have killed five foreign militants who were allegedly responsible for the murder of 35 innocent Sikhs in Chittisnghpora in March 2000. SOG members were usually awarded bonuses and promotions for eliminating militants, which, according to local Kashmiri activists, had led to high incidence of “fake encounters.”310

Those shot were discovered to have been innocent villagers of Pathribal in South Kashmir.

The SOG founder came under suspension, but was subsequently exonerated.

305 Public Commission on Human Rights, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, 1990- 2005 (Srinagar: Coalition of Civil Society, Bund, Amira Kadal, 2006), 243. 306 Ibid. 307 Ibid. 308 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, 134. 309 Public Commission on Human Rights, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, 244. 310 Author’s interview with local Kashmiri activists, March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 112

The second channel through which the ex-insurgents were incorporated was that of the Special Police Officer. Hundreds of ex-insurgents were given the status of special police officers and attached to paramilitary and army units operating in their localities.

These included the four “specialized and notoriously brutal” counterinsurgency formations collectively called the Rashtriya Rifles.311 The Rashtriya Rifles was an elite army unit created in 1993 specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. The official rules for the employment of the special police officers specify that those enrolled should be “out of respectable and law abiding residents of the area.” Special police officers were to be armed with Lathies or canes, but not required to wear regular police uniforms.312

The SPO scheme is not unique to Kashmir. It is a practice that dates back to the

British colonial period. Different Indian states have used at least 70,000 domestic nonstate actors, militants and civilians, in this manner to fight insurgents.313 In 2011, the Supreme

Court of India condemned the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh for arming over 6,000 young men in the tribal tracts to confront the Naxalite-Maoist insurgents.314 Since the

1960s, the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency had spread to nearly one-quarter of Indian territory, and was identified in 2006 by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”315 The Supreme Court of

311 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, 134. 312 Author’s interview with a Kashmir-based activist, March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 313 Supreme Court of India, Nandini Sundar & Org. versus State of Chhattisgarh Order, July 5, 2011, 28. 314 The insurgents claim to represent the peasants and tribals who were displaced when mining and land rights over their resource-rich land were granted to Indian and multinational companies. Between 1951 and 1990, 8.5 million individuals were displaced by the developmental projects, while only 25 percent of them were rehabilitated. Supreme Court of India, Nandini Sundar & Org. versus State of Chhattisgarh Order, 13. 315 Simon Robinson, “India’s Secret War,” TIME, May 29, 2008, accessed February 16, 2013, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1810169,00.html. 113

India described arming civilians with little or no training and an unclear chain of command to control their activities as “tantamount to sowing of suicide pills that could divide and destroy society.”316 The practice, according to the Indian Supreme Court, constitutes a violation of basic human rights as well as presents a serious security challenge not only to the armed youths (and their communities), but also to the state itself due to its high potential for backlash.

The Kashmiri ex-insurgents, whom the Indian government called “renegades,” were popularly known as Ikhwanis, a reference to the most notorious state-sponsored organization of former insurgents called Ikhwan-ul Mulsimoon (“Muslim Brotherhood”).

The Indian government used the renegades in a number of ways. Former insurgents usually participated in joint patrols, and received and carried out orders by security officers. For example, they served as provocateurs during demonstrations by starting stone pelting.317

Many acted as informants who watched and reported on the activities of their comrades, while others acted as spies by infiltrating existing insurgent organizations. Most notably, however, the Indian state used them to assassinate pro-Pakistan political and militant activists.318 Their main targets were powerful insurgent organizations such as the Hizb-ul

Mujahidin, the Harkat-ul-Ansar, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba,319 as well as members of the banned pro-Pakistan party Jamaat-e Islami. Similarly, between 1998 and 2001, the Indian state of Assam tacitly supported surrendered militants carrying out extra-judicial killings,

316 Supreme Court of India, Nandini Sundar & Org. versus State of Chhattisgarh Order, 18. 317 Author’s interview with Khurram Parves (Kashmir-based human rights activist), March 23, 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 318 International Crisis Group, “Kashmir: The View from Srinagar,” Asia Report 41, Islamabad/Brussels, November 21, 2002, 10. 319 Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinyak, “A Dangerous Liason,” India Today (March 15, 1996): 53. 114

known as the “secret killings.” The state-sponsored militants targeted the rebels, their families, and suspected sympathizers of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).

Most of the killings followed the same pattern: “In the name of search operation, SULFA

[surrendered militants] members, aided by security forces, would enter the house of the victim at midnight, pick up their target and then the bodies would be found the next morning. In some cases, they [state-sponsored militants] would forcibly enter and gun down everyone who came to the firing line. Some were taken to the police stations, never to return back.”320

The renegades in Kashmir did not wear uniforms, which made it impossible for their members to be identified by the civilians. The Indian military forces monitored the activities of the militants closely. Some of the renegades were housed in military compounds.321 “Many militia members [renegades] wear civilian clothes but live in military camps, are fully armed and harass people in full view personnel,” summed up non- profit organization International Crisis Group. “There are any number of reports of abusive militia members taking refuge on military bases after fleeing angry locals. If arrested, most militia members are released through the intervention of military personnel.”322

There were about four or five renegade outfits operating in the Kashmir Valley.

The most notorious of them, the Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon, was headed by the folk singer and former JKLF militant Kuka Parray. The Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon was composed of former members of many of the rebel organizations. Most of them had been detained by the

320 Mrinal Talukdar, Utpal Borpujari, Kaushik Deka, Secret Killings of Assam: The Horror Tales from the Land of Red River and Blue Hills (Assam, India: Nanda Talukdar Foundation, 2009), 8. 321 Public Commission on Human Rights, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, 244. 322 International Crisis Group, “Kashmir: The View from Srinagar.” 115

security forces prior to joining the Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon.323 The organization worked with the Rashtriya Rifles and the State Task Force, while at the same time it was involved in illegal timber trade324 and running drugs.325 During their enlistment period, “they fight the guerrillas on their own terms, but their actions have also generated some complaints among the local populace.”326

Another prominent outfit of former insurgents was called the Taliban. The name was deliberately chosen to create confusion with the militant Islamist Afghan group of the same name. The Indian Taliban’s principal patron was a powerful Congress leader in

Kashmir. The organization worked with the Indian army and the Special Operations Group, and was used in part for many of the patrolling responsibilities of the security forces.327

CIVILIANS INCORPORATED

As the insurgency spread beyond the Kashmir Valley in 1995, the Indian government created a civilian-based security institution – the Village Defense Committees

(VDCs). The VDCs are “self-defense” organizations set up “in remote and inaccessible mountainous parts of the state.”328 Men and women were given arms and trained to fight the insurgents. Mainly Hindu, but also some Sikh, villagers were recruited.329 Muslims were treated as unreliable by the VDC organizers due to their potential sympathy for the

323 Human Rights Watch/Asia 1996. 324 Sidhu, Asif, and Cyrus, “Appendix,” 53. 325 Swami, “A Beleaguered Force.” 326 Lester W. Grau, “Kashmir: Flashpoint or Safety Valve?” Military Review (July-August 1999), accessed August 10, 2011, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/kashmir/kashmir.htm. 327 Human Rights Watch/Asia 1996. 328 “475 special police officers killed in Kashmir militancy,” Indo Asian News Service. March 31, 2012. Accessed September 15, 2012. http://in.news.yahoo.com/475-special-police-officers-killed- kashmir-militancy-100356335.html. 329 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, 152. 116

insurgents. For example, there were no VDCs in Muslim-populated rural areas of

Poonch,330 which is peculiar given its proximity to the border area with Pakistan.

According to an official statement released by the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative

Assembly on March 30, 2012, the number of VDC volunteers was roughly 6,000.331 The number is likely to be significantly underestimated. A reputable Kashmiri NGO puts the number in the Jammu province at over 15,000.332 A prominent Kashmiri journalist estimated the number to be as high as 23,000.333

“The VDCs are frequently valorized in the Indian media as the vanguard of patriotic resistance to Pakistan and its agents, and vilified by pro-Pakistan and pro-independence elements in Jammu and Kashmir as unsavoury auxiliaries of a repressive Indian occupation,” observed Sumantra Bose, and described a vivid encounter with VDC members:

The VDC members I met matched neither of the two caricatures. They were poor, simple villagers, dressed in soiled, tattered clothes and scuffed shoes, clutching antiquated .303 rifles with a self-consciousness that bordered on the comical. They had many complaints – poor and irregular pay for their services from the authorities, a strictly rationed supply of bullets, and above all, the ridiculously inadequate calibre of their weapons. The .303 rifle, they explained, can fire only one bullet at a time, and it takes quite a bit of time to reload and fire again. The standard firearm of the ‘militants’ (as the guerrillas are known in Jammu and Kashmir) is, of course, the AK-47 automatic assault rifle. They had nothing but contempt for the authorities who had equipped them with such substandard weaponry, and they were visibly apprehensive about the dangerous conditions in the area. When I enquired as to what motivated them to enrol [sic] as VDC members at all if

330 Sumantra Bose, “Session 3 – Geography, Politics and the Fighters of Kashmir: An Eyewitness Account,” Conflict in Kashmir Seminar, London School of Economics and Political Science, accessed September 15, 2012, http://fathom.lse.ac.uk/seminars/10701013/. 331 Indo Asian News Service, “475 special police officers killed in Kashmir militancy.” 332 Public Commission on Human Rights, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, 247. 333 Author’s interview with a Kashmir-based journalist, March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 117

the terms were so poor and the treatment of the authorities so callous, they replied, ‘We have to be prepared to defend our village to the best of our ability if the need arises’. In other words, a minimum guarantee of survival and security, rather than a patriotic resolve to defend India's frontiers against external and internal foes, was what motivated these ragged-looking but curiously gallant grassroots warriors.334

The VDC system created new security problems. There was widespread misuse of weapons. Many VDC members used their government-provided arms to settle personal scores. There were also reports of accidental firing, as well as instances when the VDC member allotted the weapon had died, but the family continued to have possession of it.335

The arming and training of selected ethnic groups aggravated the existing communal tensions at the local level between the Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. The administration of the Doda community, where the measure was first introduced, initially opposed the VDC system for the fear of it leading to communal violence.336 In one reported incident that took place in Doda after the VDC system was introduced, an intoxicated VDC member tried to rape a Muslim girl. The girl resisted, and pushed him. The attacker fell from the hill, became seriously injured, and died in a Jammu hospital. The incident sparked a series of clashes between Hindus and Muslims. As a result, four Muslims were stone beaten and thrown into the river.337

334 Bose, “Session 3.” 335 “Jammu and Kashmir Police takes stock of village defence committees,” Indo-Asian News Service, September 7, 2012, accessed September 15, 2012, http://www.sify.com/news/jammu-and- kashmir-police-takes-stock-of-village-defence-committees-news-national- mjhqE8ghccg.html?ref=false. 336 Public Commission on Human Rights, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, 247. 337 Ibid. 118

“Hindus and Muslims have been living amicably in the areas but with the introduction of the VDCs, a change in the attitude of the people is perceptible,” reported a

Kashmiri NGO.338 “The Army and the VDC people say that they will kill the Muslims in the same way as militants kill Hindus. This has developed feelings of hatred between the two communities, which was not there before the formation of VDC.” In 1996, members of the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the right-wing Hindu nationalist militant organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), volunteered for the VDC system, and successfully used it to score “political mileage” for the BJP in the

1996 general election.339

The VDCs also became the favored targets of the insurgents. Compared to the insurgents, they were poorly armed and trained, and thus were easy prey. Several villages were attacked by insurgents because of the presence of the VDCs there.340 This further defeated the VDCs original security purpose.

Like its SPO counterpart, the VDC scheme was not new or limited to Kashmir. For example, it was used in the Indian counterinsurgency campaign against the Sikh rebels in the Punjab. The Sikh uprising began in four districts bordering Pakistan. The 1984 Indian army action against the Golden Temple in Amritsar radicalized the moderates, and led to the assassination of India’s third prime minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh

338 Ibid., 248. 339 Ibid., 247. 340 International Crisis Group, “Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias,” ASIA Briefing (Kathmandu/Brussels, February 17, 2004), 4-5. “Four village defence committee men killed in JK,” Reuters, June 9, 2002, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=11379. 119

bodyguards.341 The Indian government first sent federal police to restore order, but it “did not have the local knowledge to mount an efficient counterinsurgency campaign or the size and capacity to suppress the rebellion with force.”342 The Indian government then sent in the army to occupy the state of Punjab. The army failed to eliminate the insurgency, and instead “squeezed the militancy in to the rest of the state.”343 As the target spread geographically across the Punjab, the Indian government raised and armed village defense committees, composed of regular civilians, to “take on the militant menace.”344

“Eventually the rebels began to congregate back to the border districts where they had the greatest popular support,” describes Sunil Dasgupta (2009).345 Special task forces, composed of former members of the self-defense groups who had previous military experience, were then created “to target and eliminate specific rebel leaders.”346 India’s counterinsurgency campaign in the Punjab thus illustrates the role of target density and military capacity in determining whether the state uses domestic nonstate actors, as well as the type of domestic nonstate actor the state employs. Those with previous military experience were used for targeted missions when the target was geographically

341 For an in-depth account of the events leading up to the Indian army’s attack on Sikh rebels in the Golden Temple at Amritsar, see Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle (London: Rupa and Company, 1985). 342 Sunil Dasgupta, “Paramilitary Groups: Local Alliances in Counterinsurgency Operations,” Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series 6 (June 2009), accessed October 11, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/06/counterinsurgency-dasgupta. 343 Ibid. 344 Ram Narayan Kumar et al., “Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab” (Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003), 105. 345 Dasgupta, “Paramilitary Groups.” 346 Ibid. 120

concentrated. The civilians – members of the village defense committees – were brought in in response to the target being geographically scattered.

As of February 2014, the Indian government continues to use SPOs and VDCs in its counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir, despite the unintended consequences and public criticisms of this policy. In 2008, a survey was conducted in 30 villages (of 510 respondents) across Kashmir to assess experiences with violence and mental health status among the conflict-affected Kashmiri population. The study found that 86 percent of their respondents had been exposed to crossfire, 83 percent had seen round up raids, 67 percent observed torture, and 13 percent witnessed rape. One-third of the respondents experienced forced labor, 17 percent arrest or kidnapping, 13 percent torture, and 12 percent sexual violence.347 The conflict has claimed over 70,000 lives.348

In the next sections, I examine the role of target density and military capacity in shaping India’s outsourcing policy in Kashmir.

TARGET DENSITY

The insurgency began in March 1988 with a bomb blast at the telegraph office on

Srinagar’s main street. The JKLF claimed responsibility for the blast.349 “The long, hot summer of 1989 saw languid Srinagar descend into violence,” described an observer. 350

347 Kaz de Jong, et al, “Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: Exposure to Violence,” Conflict and Health 2, no. 10 (2008), accessed March 28, 2012, http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/11. 348 Basharat Peer, “What Lies Beneath,” Foreign Policy, September 29, 2011, accessed October 27, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/29/kashmir_mass_graves. 349 Wajahat Habibullah, My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospects of Enduring Peace (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 66. 350 Ibid., 68. 121

In December 1989, the JKLF kidnapped the daughter of India’s newly appointed home minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, and then freed her when the government gave in to demands for the release of five detained militants. As Figure 5.1 shows, rebel violence grew dramatically over the next several years. By 1992, as the Indian regular armed forces gained strength and effectiveness in the region, it experienced a sharp decline.

Figure 5.1: Rebel Violence in Jammu and Kashmir State (January 1, 1988-May 31, 1993)351

6000

5000 Total Incidents 4000 Attacks on Security Forces 3000 Attacks on Others 2000 Explosions and Arson 1000 Number of Violent Incidents Violent of Number Other Incidents 0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Year

Until 1995, the Kashmiri uprising was confined to the Kashmir Valley, the smallest of three administrative subdivisions (Ladakh and Jammu being the other two) in India’s

Jammu and Kashmir state.

351 Data source: Indian Army, cited in D. Suba Chandran, “India and Armed Nonstate Actors in the Kashmir Conflict,” in Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, ed. Sidhu, Asif, and Samii, 56. 122

Table 5.1: Area, Population, and Religion in Jammu and Kashmir State (1981)352

Region353 Area (sq/m) Population % Muslim % Hindu % Other Kashmir 8,639 3,134,904 94.96354 4.59 0.05 Valley (52.36%) Jammu 12,378 2,718,113 29.60 66.25 4.15 (45.39%) Ladakh 33,554355 134,372 46.04 2.66 51.30356 (2.24%) Total 54,571 5,987,389 64.19 32.24 3.57

The violent incidents concentrated mostly in the urbanized districts of Srinagar,

Baramulla, and Anantnag. Between 1991 and 1992, old-city areas in Srinagar, Baramulla, and Sopore “had in effect become no-go zones for Indian forces.”357 Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the geographical distribution of violent incidents carried out by the rebels between the years 1988 and 1993 and the resultant deaths across the state of Jammu and Kashmir.358

Rebel activity was highest in the Kashmir Valley. The bulk of rebel violence, 93 percent, and the vast majority of deaths, 95 percent, took place there. The hotbed of rebel activity was Srinagar. Over half (58 percent) of all Kashmir Valley violent incidents, and over one- third (35 percent) of all Kashmir Valley deaths from rebel violence, occurred there.359

352 Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India; and Census 1981, Government of India, cited in Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 125. 353 India’s Jammu and Kashmri state contains 14 districts: Kashmir Valley has six (Anantnag, Badgam, Baramulla, Kupwara, Pulwama, Srinagar), Jammu also six (Doda, Jammu, Kathua, Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur), and Ladakh two (Kargil, Leh). 354 The share of Muslims increased after the exodus from the Kashmir Valley of 150,000-200,000 Kashmiri (Hindu) Pandits during the Kashmiri uprising. 355 This figure includes areas of Ladakh (Aksai Chin) held by China. 356 Mostly Buddhist. 357 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, 179. 358 Data Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1993, cited in Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 130. 359 Ibid. 123

Figure 5.2: Distribution of Rebel Violence by District (January 1988-June 1993)

Figure 5.3: Distribution of Deaths Resulting from Rebel Violence by District (January 1988-June 1993)

124

The rebels rallied and mixed in with the local population, much of which was sympathetic to their cause. “Valley Kashmiris took pride in the militants’ exploits because the ‘boys’ had somehow restored Kashmir’s pride,” summed up an observer.360

By 1993, the Indian military apparatus achieved high military capacity in the

Kashmir Valley, and the JKLF lost the leading role in the insurgency to its rival group, the

Hizb-ul Mujahideen. The JKLF did not have the organizational capacity and resources to withstand the “massive military power of the Indian state.”361 Its initial patron, the

Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), also contributed to the JKLF’s demise. The Kashmiri nationalist organization’s main goal was Kashmir’s independence, rather than accession to Pakistan, which was the ISI’s objective. The JKLF’s rallying cry was Kashmir banega khudmukhtar (“Kashmir will be sovereign”), while the slogan of the

Hizb-ul Mujahideen was Kashmir banega Pakistan (“Kashmir will be one with

Pakistan”).362 In 1991, Pakistan began to shift its support from the JKLF to the Hizb-ul

Mujahideen and orchestrate splits and defections in the former. Pakistan-trained insurgents were held in special esteem within the insurgent community, while those who trained in

Kashmir were regarded as of inferior quality.363 In 1994, the debilitated JKLF surrendered and its leader called for peaceful struggle. The Hizb-ul Mujahindeen emerged as the dominant insurgent organization in the Kashmir Valley.

360 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, 147. 361 Ibid., 166. 362 Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century,” 216-217. 363 Shobna Sonpar, Violent Activism: A Psychological Study of Ex-Militants in Jammu Kashmir (New Delhi: AMAN Public Charitable Trust, April 2007), 45. 125

Another major change occurred in the mid-1990s. It was the growing presence of non-local fighters in the insurgency. Until the mid-1990s, the guerrilla ranks were composed overwhelmingly of residents of Indian-controlled Kashmir. From the mid-

1990s, however, growing numbers of radical Islamists from Pakistan, patronized by the

ISI’s department dedicated to operations in Kashmir, began to infiltrate across the Line of

Control (LoC), which separated India-controlled Kashmir from its Pakistan-controlled counterpart. By the late 1990s, the insurgents were a mix of local and non-local elements

(see Figure 4). Estimates of the number of non-indigenous fighters in Kashmir vary significantly. Most Indian officials prefer the number to be high to highlight Pakistan’s role in the conflict. For example, the Times of India quoted an Indian officer estimating that

“Foreign mercenaries constitute about 70 per cent of militants operating in Kashmir and among them about 80 percent are Pakistanis.”364 Independent Kashmir-based journalist

Parvaiz Bukhari estimates that up to 3,000 non-indigenous insurgents operated in

Kashmir.365 Others argue that the number of the non-indigenous insurgents was significantly lower.366

The jihadi volunteers who arrived from across the LoC introduced a new tactic into the insurgency from 1999 onward: fidayeen (suicidal warfare).367 Typically, two-man fidayeen units armed with automatic rifles and grenades would launch frontal attacks on

364 “Pak nationals being inducted to keep militancy alive in J&K,” Times of India (April 19, 1999), 7. 365 Author’s interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, March 22, 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. 366 For example, Khurram Parves, a human rights activist based in Srinagar, estimates that the total number of foreign militants was “never more than 300.” Author’s interview with Parves, March 23, 2012. 367 The jihadis began to practice this form of warfare shortly after Pakistani regular forces had infiltrated into a remote part of Indian-controlled Kashmir’s sparsely populated Ladakh region around the small town of Kargil in early 1999, and were forced to withdraw. 126

military camps, police stations, and government officers, as well as such targets as airports, railway stations, and Hindu civilians. The most deadly jihadi groups of Pakistani origin,

Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for the majority of fidayeen assaults) and Jaish-e-

Mohammad, gradually recruited some locals to their cause (the two-man fidayeen squads often consisted of one local and one non-local militant).368

Between 1994 and 1995, Delhi reasserted control over Srinagar and other urban centers. However, the insurgency did not die out, but relocated.369 Its locus moved out of population centers into remote rural areas. The insurgency spread from its initial bastion, the Kashmir Valley, to large tracts of the Jammu region, and mixed with the local, usually village, population there. By the late 1990s, topographically rugged areas of the Jammu region with predominantly Muslim or mixed Muslim-Hindu populations emerged as the new strongholds of insurgency.370

MILITARY CAPACITY

Throughout late 1988 and 1989, JKLF and other pro-independence groups carried out a series of attacks on government buildings and state officials. Strikes and “Black days” were observed throughout the Kashmir Valley. By January 1990, the “simmering rebellion” of 1988-1989 erupted into “mass resistance” to Indian rule in the Kashmir

Valley.371 From July to September of 1990, the Kashmir Valley was brought under martial

368 Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century,” 218. 369 Murtaza Shibli, “Kashmir: Islam, Identity and Insurgency,” Kashmir Affairs (January 2009), 25. 370 Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century,” 218. 371 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii, “Appendix: Chronology of the Kashmir Conflict,” in Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, ed. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 258. 127

law as the Indian government enacted an Armed Forces Special Powers Act and a

Disturbed Areas Act to back up existing Jammu and Kashmir emergency regulations.372

The initial response of the Indian government to insurgent violence was to treat it

“as a routine law and order problem to be handled through conventional law enforcement techniques by local police forces.”373 The 34,000 local policemen proved ill-prepared when it came to handling the insurgency. New Delhi also grew suspicious of their loyalty, since many of them had social and family ties to the militants.374 The Indian government then brought in the army and federal security forces, the Central Reserve Police Force, the

Border Security Force, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. The number of Central Reserve

Police Force and the Border Security Force personnel grew roughly tenfold between the years 1989 and 1993.375

The Indian army’s role expanded in 1993 with the introduction of the Rashtriya

(National) Rifles, an elite army unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. In mid-1993, the total strength of regular Indian army troops in the Jammu and

Kashmir state was between 300,000 and 400,000.376 The local Jammu and Kashmir policemen were removed from the counterinsurgency operations. They were believed to be sympathetic to the insurgency. In April 1993, army and paramilitary troops were used to crush a week-long police protest, which involved at least 1,400 police officers. The

372 Ibid., 258-59. 373 V. G. Patankar, “Insurgency, Proxy War, and Terrorism in Kashmir” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009), 70. 374 Ibid. 375 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 145. 376 Ibid., 146. 128

protesters alleged the torture and killing in the custody of paramilitary troops of a local police constable, who was detained on suspicion of aiding the rebels.377

“Indian troops had been ill-prepared for dealing with the forces arrayed against them,” explains Praveen Swami. “By 1992, however, the rudiments of a counter-terrorist grid were in place.”378 The Indian government’s strategy consisted of wearing down the insurgents through sizable force deployments and cordon-and-search operations.379 During the latter, the military used captured militants to identify the insurgents and their supporters from a pool of suspects. The informants wore face masks to hide their identities in order to avoid retaliation.380 Other measures included the counterinsurgency grid and road-opening parties. The insurgency-affected areas of Jammu and Kashmir were divided into forty-nine sectors. Military units were placed in each sector, and were expected to control them over time. Each grid quadrant had Quick Reaction Teams at the platoon level, which could be deployed promptly as needed. The road-opening parties involved deploying platoons every morning along arterial roads at dawn and then combing them for mines and improvised explosive devices. Once the military cleared the road, it was open for normal traffic.381

Among the most controversial tactics was cordon-and-search. It was referred to as a “crackdown” and ill-famed for victimizing urban neighborhoods and entire villages. The

Indian armed forces engaged in other notorious practices such as imposing curfews,

377 Ibid., 114. 378 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (London: Routledge, 2007), 179. 379 Ganguly, “Slow learning,” 81. 380 Author’s interview with a Kashmir-based journalist, March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. Ganguly, “Slow learning,” 84. 381 Ibid. 129

shooting unarmed protestors, torturing detainees, and disappearances.382 Their methods were supported by the Armed Force (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990.

The Act provided members of the armed forces with immunity from criminal prosecution and civil suit for acts undertaken in exercising powers such as to arrest without warrant, shoot-to-kill, and destroy property in the “disturbed areas.” 383 In practice, it also meant that the Indian forces were not held accountable for illegal acts and human rights abuses, which further fueled the sense of injustice underlying the conflict.384

India’s military apparatus in the state of Jammu and Kashmir was achieving significant results by 1993. As Figure 5.4 shows, it became more effective at killing insurgents.

382 Basharat Peer, Curfewed Night: One Kashmiri Journalist’s Frontline Account of Life, Love, and War in His Homeland (New York: Scribner, 2010). Bose, “The Kashmir Conflict in the Early 21st Century,” 216. 383 Ministry of Home Affairs, Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990, accessed June 2, 2012, http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/Armed%20forces%20_J&K_%20Spl.%20powers%20act,%201990.p df. 384 Interviews with human rights activists and victims of human rights abuses in March 2012, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. See also Human Rights Watch, “Getting Away with Murder: 50 Years of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,” August 2008), accessed April 8, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/2008/india0808/india0808web.pdf. 130

Figure 5.4: Number of Insurgents Killed by Indian Army by Year, 1990-2003385

2500

2000

1500 Total Insurgents Killed 1000 Foreign Insurgents Killed 500

0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002

The leading insurgent group, the JKLF, had lost Pakistan’s support. By 1993, three out of four of its initial leaders were arrested or killed. It lost nearly all of its top commanders and the best among its fighting forces.386 By 1994, almost all of the insurgent groups in Kashmir were in disarray. The JKLF surrendered and its leader called for peaceful struggle. Groups like Al-Jihad, Muslim Janbaz Force, Al-Umar, and Jamiatul

Mujahideen had entirely vanished.387 The Pakistan-supported Hizb-ul Mujahideen

(“Warriors of the Faith”) was left as the only Kashmiri insurgent group with any presence or credibility.

Rebel violence was “most effective” in 1989-90.388 A major threat to the Indian state thereafter consisted of mass demonstrations, which “symbolized the people’s total

385 Data source: Indian Army, cited in D. Suba Chandran, “India and Armed Nonstate Actors in the Kashmir Conflict,” in Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, ed. Sidhu, Asif, and Samii, 56. 386 Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 25. 387 Shibli, “Kashmir,” 25. 388 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 166. 131

rejection of state authority.”389 By 1993, the Indian government “was confident that the mass movement in the valley was weakening. There were no more large-scale demonstrations in the streets. People appeared to want their lives to return to normal.”390 It was only then that the Indian military began recruiting militants for military and security purposes.

CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that the variation in India’s use of domestic nonstate actors across time and space can be best explained by the variation in the spatial density of the military target and India’s military capacity. In the beginning of the conflict, the target was geographically concentrated in the Kashmir Valley and mixed with the local population.

However, India’s military capacity was initially low in the region. Only after the Indian state built high military capacity in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which led to its successes over the nationalist insurgents, did it embark on the policy of using militants in its counterinsurgency operations. By taking advantage of the ex-rebels’ skills – insider knowledge of rebel organizations and military competence – the Indian state significantly weakened the pro-Pakistan insurgent organizations, which replaced their nationalist predecessors. The rebels responded by scattering geographically, especially into the remote, populated areas of the Jammu region. The Indian state responded by bringing in the civilians into its counterinsurgency campaign in order to fill the territorial and local knowledge gaps in its operations.

389 Ibid. 390 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 163. 132

133

CHAPTER 6

MILITARY CAPACITY

PAKISTAN’S MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN EAST PAKISTAN (1971) AND BALUCHISTAN (1973-77)

Since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan experienced two major civil wars.391

The first took place in East Pakistan in 1971, and the second in Baluchistan in 1973-77.

This chapter examines Pakistan’s use (and nonuse) of domestic nonstate actors in the military campaigns the aim of which was to suppress a large-scale rebellion in a province.

The Pakistani military did not use domestic nonstate actors in the Baluchistan campaign and in the beginning of the East Pakistan campaign. During the course of the East Pakistan military campaign, however, the Pakistani government brought in domestic nonstate actors. In order to understand why, I conduct a combination of cross-case and within-case analyses. I combine a paired comparison of two similar cases with an in-depth “time series” analysis of the case which displays temporal variation in the dependent variable. The exercise reveals that military capacity and target density account for Pakistan’s strategy vis-à-vis domestic nonstate actors. While target density will be examined, the main analytic focus of this chapter is on military capacity. This focus serves to (1) unearth the mechanisms through which military capacity affects outsourcing, and (2) complement the previous chapters the focus of which is target density.

391 Following Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Pease Research Institute (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, a major civil war is defined as one which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 134

BALUCHISTAN CAMPAIGN, 1973-77

Pakistani Baluch “nationalists” have demanded greater autonomy, more control over revenues from Baluchistan’s gas fields, and greater funds for development since 1948.

Their demands have been largely ignored by the federal government, which had led to four conflicts – in 1948, 1958-1959, 1962-1963, and 1973-1977.392 The insurgency launched in

Baluchistan in 1973 was “the most cohesive and violent” rebellion hitherto faced by

Pakistan.393 Some 55,000 rebels394 fought against 80,000 Pakistan army troops.395 The

Pakistan army forces included the 17th, 18th, and 33rd Infantry Divisions and a brigade each from the 10th and 11th Infantry Divisions. They employed modern weapons systems against rebels armed with bolt-action rifles and an occasional G3 automatics captured from the government forces.396 The Pakistani troops were supported by the Pakistani Air Force and the Iranian Air Force.397 Iran supplied Pakistan with Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships, which were then flown by Iranian pilots. During the five-year period of the Balochistan uprising, the Pakistani army engaged in 178 major and 167 lesser battles with the rebels.

At least 5,300 rebels and 3,000 Pakistani soldiers were killed.398

392 The most recent (fifth) conflict, led by the Baluchistan Liberation Army, started in 2003. 393 Jason R. Murtha, The Strategic Importance of Balochistan, Thesis (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2011), 45. 394 The number of rebels at the height of the insurgency. Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Papers, no. 65 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2006), 7. 395 Alok Bansal, “Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan,” in Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present, ed. Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 253. 396 Ali, The Fearful State, 151. 397 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 253. 398 Ali, The Fearful State, 151-152. 135

The uprising followed President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s dismissal of the moderate nationalist government of Baluchistan. Having achieved a landslide electoral victory in

1970, Bhutto “gradually became more authoritarian. He used martial law powers to punish several individuals and groups that had crossed his path during his political career. By the time he dismissed the Baluchistan government, his critics saw Bhutto as an elected civilian strongman.”399 Bhutto blamed leaders of the National Awami Party (which came to power in Baluchistan and the NWFP in 1972 after forming an alliance with an Islamist party) for

“arming their followers, seeking the further breakup of Pakistan, and undermining the government effort to modernize the province through the construction of roads and schools and the maintenance of law and order.”400

In February 1973, Pakistani intelligence discovered arms shipment consigned to the

Iraqi embassy in Islamabad by the government in Baghdad. According to Pakistan intelligence, these weapons were to be delivered to Marri tribe militants who were involved in anti-Pakistan activities and also had the support of the chief minister of the province.

Bhutto put the province under governor’s rule, which meant his direct control. In response, large numbers of Marri tribesmen and Baluchi students took to the hills in armed insurrection against the government of Pakistan. An organization called the Baluch

People’s Liberation Front came up under the leadership of the chief of the Marri tribe, who took refuge in Afghanistan, drawing support from both Kabul and Baghdad. Bhutto ordered the army to suppress the Baluch separatist movement, and launched a full-scale military

399 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 102. 400 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 220. 136

operation. The extent and nature of the operation were kept secret from the rest of the

Pakistani public401 and denied to the international community.402

The original insurgent tribal armies comprised about 500 Maris and 400 Mengals.

By late 1974, however, around 55,000 Baluch were up in arms, some 11,500 of them organized into hard-core units. They operated in small bands of 30 to 50 fighters covering a particular stretch.403 Baluchistan covered nearly 40 percent of the land area of Pakistan.

Between 40,000 and 80,000 square miles of its territory were “wracked by unrest.”404 The uprising “enjoyed broad-based support across Baluch society, as well as nationalist and leftist forces throughout the country.”405 Many intellectuals and activists from the Punjab and other provinces, motivated by Marxist-Leninist principles, joined the struggle. Within

Baluchistan, the prominent sardar leadership of the National Awami Party was joined by the urban intelligentsia and the professional class. The Baluch Students Organization was especially active, and captured the imagination of a large number of the Baluch youth. “The insurgency was able to withstand tremendous levels of state repression largely because of the active involvement of a wide cross-section of Baloch society,” explained a Pakistani scholar.406

The guerrilla operations were divided into two major theaters. The first was the

Marri country in the north. The army launched its operations there on August 21, 1974.

401 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 335. 402 “Pakistan denies role in Baluchistan war,” Guardian, February 21, 1975, 19. 403 Ali, The Fearful State, 151. 404 Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, “Balochistan versus Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 45/46 (November 10-23, 2007): 75. 405 Ibid. 406 Ibid. 137

The Marri area’s biggest battle took place in September 1974. The rebels were forced to take sanctuary at Chamalang and, in a two-day battle, the Pakistan army and the Huey

Cobra helicopter gunships lent by the Shah of Iran devastated the area. Pakistan Air Force jets, Iranian gunships, and government forces surrounded the hills. The rebel area commander was forced to surrender, along with 44 fighters and about 1,000 non-combatant tribesmen. Seventeen thousand guerrillas were estimated to have been killed in that encounter.407 The second major area of insurgency was led by the Popular Front for Armed

Resistance Against National Oppression and Exploitation in Baluchistan, and was dominated by the Mengal tribesmen. This force was composed of about 4,500 rebels operating in the Kalat, Makran, and Las Bela districts. The Pakistani army launched an offensive against the Mengal strongholds on October 26, 1974. Commandos of the army

Special Services group raided suspected guerrilla hideouts. Mountain villages were flattened by pack artillery howitzers and ground attack fighters.408

The uprising ended only after a negotiated settlement by army chief general

Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had ousted Bhutto in a coup in 1977. Zia withdrew the army and released thousands of Baluch leaders and activists. He then resorted to divide-and-rule policies. The military empowered Pashtun Islamist parties in Baluchistan to counter the

Baluch nationalist and to promote the military’s agenda in neighboring Afghanistan, which was then engulfed in a U.S.-led, Pakistan-supported anti-Soviet jihad.409

407 Ali, The Fearful State, 150-151. 408 Ibid. 409 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan,” Asia Report, no. 119 (September 14, 2006), 6. 138

Existing theories would predict Pakistan using irregulars in the 1973-77

Baluchistan campaign. First, the campaign took place at a time the Pakistani military was in a uniquely weak state, having just been crushed in East Pakistan by the Indian military and rebel forces and further undermined by the civilian head of state. Second, throughout the Baluchistan campaign, Pakistan actively pursued plausible deniability. Those who lived in Pakistan in the 1970s report being completely unaware that the Baluchistan crisis was taking place. It was not reported in the Pakistani news. In January 1975, British newspaper

Guardian publicized “the little reported but bitter civil warfare” in Baluchistan. The article described “an uneasy silence” in the Pakistani press about the military campaign in

Baluchistan.410 It challenged the Pakistani government’s claim that “At no stage has the

Pakistan Air Force been used for bombing… no village, base or band has been subjected to an aerial attack.” “Clearly facts do not support this statement,” wrote the Guardian reporter, who visited the region and observed “bomb craters and large fragments of bombs.”411

The Pakistani government quickly responded with a rejoinder to the article. It insisted that the Pakistani army was present in Baluchistan only to build roads. “The only

‘fighting’ now going on in Baluchistan on a large scale is over demands for more roads, trucks, schools, tube-wells, hospitals and outposts of civil administration,” it retorted.412

The Pakistani government did indeed invest in developmental activities involving road- building and electrification, “hoping to create new patron-client networks [with tribes not

410 “Pakistan’s two-year civil war,” Guardian, January 24, 1975, 12. 411 Ibid. 412 “Pakistan denies role in Baluchistan war,” 19. 139

engaged in combat] to weaken the hold of nationalists.”413 However, the development scheme was taking place alongside a large-scale and brutal military campaign. Only the regular forces were used in the military operations.

EAST PAKISTAN CAMPAIGN, 1971

Pakistan’s 1970 general elections were the country’s first ever to be held nationwide, based on universal adult suffrage, which included all women, and on a one- person, one-vote basis. The widespread enthusiasm about the astounding democratic development – a military ruler voluntarily relinquishing power to elected civilian authority

– was, however, short-lived. An unexpected electoral outcome quickly triggered a political crisis, soon to be followed by mob violence, a military crackdown, a civil war, massacres, terrorism, an inter-state war, and, finally, secession. This section focuses on Pakistan’s military campaign to regain control of the country’s eastern wing. The campaign took place between March 25, 1971, when the Pakistani government initiated a military crackdown, and December 16, 1971, when the Pakistani army surrendered to the joint command of the

Indian and rebel forces.

Existing theories would predict Pakistan using irregulars in Operation Searchlight, the first phase of the military campaign. At the time of the operation, Pakistan had an inadequate number of troops in the country’s rebellious eastern wing, which was geographically separated from its western counterpart by roughly 1,000 miles of hostile

Indian ground. The brutality of the crackdown made the Pakistani government’s involvement a prime candidate for plausible deniability. Existing theories would predict

413 Ali, The Fearful State, 152. 140

the state’s use of nonstate actors, most notably members of the Bihari population,414 to create doubt about Pakistan’s role in what the U.S. Consul General in Dacca labeled

“selective genocide.”415

Operation Searchlight was carried out exclusively by the regular troops. The introduction of the domestic nonstate actors to Pakistan’s military campaign came at what might, at first glance, seem like a strange time: after the Pakistani state had built up its military capacity and secured all major towns in the province. Why did Pakistan wait until its military controlled most regions in East Pakistan to introduce the non-state elements into the war effort?

The objective of Pakistan’s initial plan, code-named Operation Searchlight, was to suppress the “rebellion”416 in the country’s eastern wing. The uprising was led by a political party, the Awami League, which had three months earlier won the national elections. The

Awami League was “a vast umbrella sheltering many disparate elements – poor peasants, militant students, workers, middle class professionals, and wealthy businessmen and

414 The term “Bihari” (“outsider,” in Urdu) was collectively used by the Bengalis to refer to the Urdu-speaking non-Bengali Muslims from the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar who had migrated to East Pakistan (East Bengal) after the partition of India in 1947. The Biharis made up much of the East Pakistan’s managerial class. Their population in East Pakistan in 1971 was over 700,000. S.N. Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War” (History Division, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, 1992), 185. The Bengali-speaking majority of East Pakistan viewed the Biharis “as a foreign element” and discriminated against them, perhaps in part because the Bengalis resented “the fact that these non-Bengali Muslims have succeeded in dominating such as large portion of the business community.” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Directorate of Intelligence. “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” Intelligence Memorandum (Secret), March 1, 1971 (National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD), 7. 415 Blood sent a telegram captioned “Selective Genocide” on March 28, 1971, only three days after the start of the crackdown. Archer K. Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited, 2006), 213. 416 “Operation Searchlight,” copy of original document, in Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1997), Appendix III, 228. 141

industrialists” bound by “Bengali nationalism, or, put another way, anti-West Pakistan feelings.”417 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) – “a man of action”418 – headed the Awami

League. The party had won 160 seats (out of a total of 300) in the national assembly, which gave it an absolute majority.419 The electoral victory offered the Awami League an opportunity to redress the regional disparity and discrimination between the two wings. It also evoked fears in the West Pakistani political establishment that Mujib would now pursue his “true” secessionist intentions.420 Mujib had since 1966 campaigned for extensive provincial autonomy and has called for a constitution based on a six-point program that would leave the central government with responsibility only for defense and foreign affairs.

East Pakistan’s population of 73-75 million occupied a land the size of which was slightly smaller than the state of Iowa. The average population density was roughly 1,300 persons per square mile, and rapidly rising.421 The annual per capita income in East

Pakistan was about US$60, which in real terms was not much higher than the level in 1948 and far below that in West Pakistan.422 The population was 90 percent rural and only about

20 percent literate.423 East Pakistan received less than 20 percent of foreign aid to Pakistan,

417 From American Consul, Dacca [Archer K. Blood] to U.S. Department of State, “East Pakistan: Qualitative Appraisal of the Awami League” (Confidential), Airgram, January 29, 1971, in The American Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents, 1965-1973, ed. Roedad Khan [compiled and selected by] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 457. 418 Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh, 46. 419 Though, the Awami League had no elected representatives from West Pakistan. 420 From American Embassy, Islamabad, to U.S. Department of State, “Conversations with West Paks and Bengalis” (Confidential), Airgram, June 4, 1971, in Khan, The American Papers, 599. Henry Kissinger, who served at the time as the U.S. National Security Advisor, also observed that “Mujib’s version of autonomy seemed indistinguishable from independence.” Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 852. 421 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” 3. 422 The per capita income in West Pakistan was 61 percent higher than that in East Pakistan. Haqqani, Pakistan, 61. 423 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” 4. 142

and purchased about 40 percent of West Pakistan’s industrial products at artificially high prices protected by tariffs.424 Observers described East Pakistan as gradually slipping into

“a virtual semicolonial political status.”425 An army officer from West Pakistan was struck by dramatic scenes of poverty during his visit to Dhaka in 1970:

The women had hardly a patch of dirty linen to preserve their modesty. The men were short and starved. Their ribs, under a thin layer of dark skin, could be counted even from a moving car. The children were worse. Their bones and bellies were protruding.

Some of them toyed with a bell dangling from their waist. It was their only plaything.

Whenever I stopped, beggars swarmed round me like flies. I concluded that the poor of

Bengal are poorer than the poorest of West Pakistan. I started finding a meaning in the allegations of the economic exploitation of East Pakistan. I felt guilty.426

The idea of Mujib leading the entire country as the new prime minister was vehemently opposed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the major political party in West

Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Bhutto threatened to boycott the national assembly sessions, and sought a formula that would allow him at least to share power with

Mujib. What followed was a counterintuitive scenario: a military ruler, General Yahya

Khan, making “strenuous efforts to bring the politicians, Mujib and Bhutto, to the negotiating table to arrive at a means of transferring power to the new assembly and an elected government.”427 The negotiations were failing, and, on March 1, 1971, Yahya

424 Muhammad Anisur Rahman, My Story of 1971: Through the Holocaust That Created Bangladesh (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Liberation War Museum, 2001), 17. 425 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” 8. 426 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 3. 427 Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 23. 143

announced the postponement of the national assembly. The Awami League responded with a call for a hartal, a mass protest. Between March 1 and 25, 1971, “violence including lynching of non-Bengalis, especially Biharis, became a daily occurrence.”428 The Pakistani army was ordered to stay in the cantonment and refrain from any action.429 On March 15,

Yahya arrived in Dhaka for negotiations, but on March 25 he abruptly departed, and a military crackdown followed.

The basic plan of Operation Searchlight was drafted on March 18, 1971 by Major-

General Rao Farman Ali and Major-General Khadim Raja. They used an ordinary school pencil on a light blue office pad.430 General Abdul Hamid Khan (army chief) and

Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan – both of whom were in direct contact with Yahya Khan

– slightly revised and then approved it on March 20, 1971.431 Unlike the earlier contingency plan, which was code-named Operation Blitz, Operation Searchlight called for achieving objectives with maximum use of force. Operation Blitz had called for enforcing martial law in its classical role. It was planned for the worst-case scenario (e.g. the declaration of

East Pakistan’s independence) during the elections, and the Pakistani planners deemed it no longer relevant after the elections.432 Operation Searchlight was a response to Mujib’s de facto rule in East Pakistan, and its fundamental aim was to re-establish central authority.433

428 Bose, Dead Reckoning, 30. 429 Ibid. 430 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 63 431 Ibid. 432 Bose, Dead Reckoning, 48. 433 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 63. 144

The Pakistani government flew in troops from West Pakistan to supplement the

12,000 soldiers from the 14th Infantry Division already stationed in the eastern wing, thereby raising the troop strength to 34,000.434 According to the transcript of the tape recording of conversations between Pakistani army units operating in Dhaka on the night of March 25, 1971, the Pakistani army encountered “Lot of [.]303 fire” at Dhaka

University.435 Much of the Bangladeshi literature argues that the Pakistani army carried out a massacre of innocent and unarmed civilians, most notably students and faculty members, at Dhaka University. As a retired lieutenant-general of the Bangladesh army describes:

The sleeping Bengalees were attacked at night by the soldiers of Pakistan Army… The intellectual group or brains of the nation including the students and teachers of Dhaka University had to pay very heavily. About 300 Professors and students of Dhaka University were killed in the first night. The peace loving Bengalees rose up in mass to save their prestige, honour, dignity and culture as well as the brutality of the occupation army was resisted on all fronts in whatever capacity they could.436 This narrative is challenged by Sarmila Bose (2011), who argues that many of those encountered by the Pakistani army at Dhaka University were not students, but outsiders who had come to the university for military training. 437 The brutality of the crackdown is, however, widely acknowledged in the literature.438 The transcript of the tape recording reveals that the Pakistani soldiers were ordered to issue a public warning that “Any person seen putting up road blocks will be shot on the spot, number one; number two, road blocks

434 Haqqani, Pakistan, 78. 435 “A partial transcript of the tape recording of some conversations between some of the Pakistani Army units operating in Dacca on the night of March 25, 1971” (1:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., March 26, 1971), 1971: Documents on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by Pakistan Army and Their Agents in Bangladesh during 1971 (Dhaka: Liberation War Museum, 1999), p. 169. 436 Abu Salah Mohammed Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Columbia Prokashani, 2002), 29. 437 Bose, Dead Reckoning, 53. 438 Haqqani, Pakistan, 71-72. 145

put up in any locality, people from that locality will be prosecuted and will houses left and right, left and right of that block be demolished.”439

The military planners presumed that all of the 18,000 Bengali troops of the

Pakistani military would revolt in reaction to the operation. Consequently, in addition to arresting the Awami League leaders and supporters, the Pakistani troops were to disarm those of Bengali ethnic origin within the Pakistani military establishment. The operation was carried out with limited success. Mujib was arrested on the night of the army crackdown and flown to West Pakistan. However, most of the Awami League leaders and their sympathizers, which included thousands of youths, escaped the Pakistani offensive to neighboring India. With Indian help, they formed a government-in-exile and a large guerrilla force, the size of which ultimately reached roughly 100,000 fighters.440

Pakistan’s response to the botched operation was to boost the presence of the regular forces in East Pakistan. The number of regular troops was augmented to roughly

70,000.441 The martial law authorities also reorganized and reconstituted the shattered East

Pakistani internal security services with three institutions – the East Pakistan Civil Armed

Force, the Internal Security Force, and a new East Pakistani police force.

Pakistan’s initial move to bring in the irregulars took place at what, at first glance, may seem as the most puzzling time. It was after the state had successfully secured major

439 “A partial transcript of the tape recording,” 167. 440 Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State,” Asian Survey 13, no. 2 (February 1973): 200. 441 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of National Estimates, “Memorandum: The Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Six Months Later,” p. 2 (Secret), September 22, 1971; Richard M. Nixon National Security Files, 1969-1974, India-Pakistan War of 1971, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Also see Kissinger, White House Years, 863. 146

urban areas and much of rural East Pakistan. The militarization of regular civilians occurred in two waves. The first came in late May and the second in early August. Both took place after Pakistan gained high military capacity in East Pakistan and followed each of the two waves of rebels penetrating the province and mixing in with the local population

(in May and July).

CIVILIAN “VOLUNTEERS”

In late May, the Pakistani military began to organize “volunteers” to assist in the civil war efforts. On June 1, 1971, Governor of East Pakistan Lieutenant General Tikka

Khan issued the East Pakistan Razakar Ordinance, thereby officially instituting the force of civilian volunteers, called Razakars.442 The Razakars were to be men between the ages of 18 and 45 years, though preference was given to the young.443 Their names were to be suggested by special bodies called Peace Committees. As a secret Pakistani government document instructs: “The recruitment will be carried out mainly through the org [sic] of loyal political leaders and prominent members of Peace Committees. The political leaders and members of Peace Committees will stand surety for the Razakars who are enrolled and will be answarabled [sic] for conduct of Razakars.”444

442 The term razakar means “volunteer” in Urdu. It was originally used to describe the private militia employed in 1947-48 by the Nizam (ruler) of Hyderabad to resist the princely state’s accession to India. The estimated 150,000 Razakars were affiliated with the Muslim political party Ittehad-ul- Muslimeen, which advocated Hyderabad’s independence. On September 13, 1948, India invaded Hyderabad with a military campaign code-named Operation Polo. The Razakars were outmatched by the Indian army, and Hyderabad – famous for its abundant polo grounds – was soon incorporated into the Indian Union. 443 “Guidelines Regarding East Pakistan Razakars Organization,” Secret Memo from K.A. Khabir, Deputy Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan, to Deputy Commissioner, Mymensingh; July 7, 1971; Liberation War Museum Archives, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 444 “Enrolment [sic] of Razakars” (Secret), Memo to ASMILA Tangail, etc.; July 17, 1971; Liberation War Museum Archives, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 147

The Peace (or “Shanti”) Committees served as the civil link between the Pakistani military and local civilian populations. They performed some governmental functions445 and operated on multiple levels – district, subdivision, thana, and village – across East

Pakistan. Their members were civilians whose responsibilities included recommending reliable Razakar recruits to the Pakistani government, as well as gathering local intelligence and providing local assistance to the Pakistani army.446 Peace Committee members were the elderly and prominent among the “patriotic elements.”447 They appear to have been motivated by a mix of religious ideology, political ambitions, and the material gains to be reaped from collaboration with the Pakistani government. Many of them were members of the pro-Pakistan parties, most notably the Jamaat-e-Islami,448 the Muslim League, the

Nizam-e-Islami, and the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan. Some were simply “adventurers who sought only plunder and loot.”449 The latter were considered more easily influenced by selective use of terror, and consequently were the preferred targets of the guerrillas.450

The main criteria for the Peace Committees’ selection of the Razakars consisted of the young volunteers’ “[l]oyalty to Pakistan and physical fitness.”451 Military experience

445 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum: The Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Six Months Later,” 2. 446 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 118. 447 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 105; Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 185. 448 Jamaat was a “well-organized and well-financed” political party, but its electoral performance was poor due to a lack of “the kind of individuals within its ranks who can secure votes.” From Joseph J. Sisco to Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of State, “South Asia Military Supply Policy,” Action Memorandum of Conversation, Karachi, Pakistan, June 5, 1970, in ed. Khan, The American Papers, 375. 449 Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited, [1980] 2009), 96. 450 Ibid. 451 “Guidelines Regarding East Pakistan Razakars Organization,” July 7, 1971. 148

was never mentioned in the secret government documents containing instructions for

Razakar recruitment. The scheduled length of Razakar training was only ten days. It was conducted by non-commissioned officers, with each officer taking on a group of about fifty volunteers. Fifty (out of a total of 80) periods of training were devoted to rifle handling and firing practices; twenty periods were for learning guard duties, patrolling procedures, and fieldcraft. The remaining ten periods were reserved for political indoctrination.452 The initial offer of employment extended for a period of six months. The Razakars wore ordinary civilian clothes, to which a blue arm band with the word “Razakar” written in red color in Bengali language and an accompanying identity pass were later added.453 They had a simple command system up to platoon level, with each platoon comprising 15-20 volunteers, and were typically armed with .303 rifles and allotted 50 bullets.454

The official mission of the Razakars was to assist the Pakistani troops. Their duties included apprehending rebels as well as collecting intelligence.455 Razakars were also used to guard roads, bridges, railway lines, and vital installations. They patrolled areas as well as reinforced posts, border outposts, and isolated regular army detachments.456 To take advantage of the Razakars’ local knowledge, the secret memo outlining the Razakar

Ordinance instructed to keep the civilian recruits as much as possible “in their own areas near their home.”457

452 Ibid. 453 Ibid. 454 “Enrolment [sic] of Razakars,” July 17, 1971; Liberation War Museum Archives. 455 “Guidelines Regarding East Pakistan Razakars Organization,” July 7, 1971. 456 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 118. 457 Ibid. 149

Distinguishing between rebels and peaceful civilians was an especially critical but difficult task for the regular Pakistani military personnel. By mid-April, the Pakistani army successfully took control of most major urban centers. However, restoring order over the remainder of the province proved particularly tricky. The “alien” nature of the Pakistani regular force – mainly comprised of Punjabis and Pathans from the west and Biharis from the east458 – made it difficult for the Pakistani authorities to gather intelligence and local support. The Razakars’ capacity to distinguish between peaceful residents and hostile elements made them particularly useful for securing the rural areas. However, it also made the Razakars more vulnerable, as their families became easy targets for the guerrillas.

Consequently, the Razakars at times cooperated with the rebels.

A former guerrilla recounted an experience with Razakars whom he encountered while crossing the border into East Pakistan after receiving training in India. The Razakars

– roughly eight to ten in number – were guarding the road which he, along with his fifteen comrades, sought to cross. The Razakars said that they would allow the young men to cross, but refused to let them carry over their bags. When asked why, the Razakars explained that the night before a guerrilla had killed a Razakar’s wife and children, and so extra precautions had to be taken. As this conversation was taking place, one of the guards shouted that a Pakistani army convoy was approaching. The guerrillas panicked. Luckily, they were accompanied by an experienced soldier, a jawan who had previously served in the East Pakistan Rifles. He gave them instructions to divide and hide – half inside a nearby

Chinese-made bunker, and the other half were to cross and hide on the other side of the

458 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 165. 150

road. The convoy approached, and the Razakars stood visibly nervous, perhaps suspecting that what they just observed was a tactical maneuver on the part of the rebels. A major at the front of the car shouted in Urdu to inquire if everything was okay. “Thik hai” [All is fine], hurriedly answered the Razakars. After the convoy left, the guerrillas regrouped, and the Razakars addressed them. “Look, we helped you,” one of them said. “Now you must go and help us. You have to get us justice [for the family members which were killed].”

The former guerrilla recounts: “We did just that. One of the first things we did when we arrived at the sector command headquarters was to complain [about the situation]. And that particular individual [who had killed the Razakar’s wife and children] was disarmed.”459

The Razakars generally were less prone than their “regular” counterparts to sacrificing their lives for the cause of united Pakistan. As a Bangladeshi scholar and witness to the conflict, Talukder Maniruzzaman, observes, the Razakars lacked “the fanaticism and commitment to the Pakistan cause which could help develop in them the underground mentality necessary for countering underground guerrillas.”460 He notes that they were more likely to flee, leaving behind their weapons, or surrender upon encountering the guerrillas. Some of them even joined the rebel ranks.461 Siddiq Salik, a Pakistan army officer who served during the 1971 war, concurs that the Razakars “were an asset as long as they were deployed with the Army, but could not be relied upon for independent assignments.”462

459 Interview with Imtiaz Ahmed (former Mukti Bahini rebel and professor, Dhaka University), March 15, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 460 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 114. 461 Ibid. 462 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 105-106. 151

The use of the term Razakar was not always limited to the volunteers mobilized by the Government of Pakistan under the Razakar Ordinance. It is sometimes used in the

Pakistani and Bangladeshi literature to refer to all who volunteered to fight for a united

Pakistan, including the al-Badr and al-Shams Brigades (which will be discussed later).

Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, who served as the Eastern Commander (having replaced Tikka

Khan in April), dedicated his memoir to Razakars.463 Many of the pro-liberation sympathizers apply the term pejoratively to refer to any de facto or suspected Pakistan loyalist. Many innocent civilians have suffered from being accidentally or intentionally mistaken for Razakars.464 At the same time, some of the pro-liberation activists were sympathetic to the Razakars because of their ordinary civilian background. As one former guerrilla fighter explains: “I never fought a war with Razakars. I never considered Razakars my enemy. They may have a rifle, and loot. They can have two girls. But, they were the have-nots, the underdogs of the society.”465

The second wave of nonstate actor militarization took place in August. It was in

May that the Pakistani military first encouraged the student wing of the Islamist party

Jamaat-e-Islami,466 the Islami Jamiat-e Tulabah (IJT), to organize a group of pro-united

463 Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998). 464 Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1972,” 201. 465 Interview with Qamrul Hassan Bhuiyan (a.k.a. Quamrul Islam) (former Mukti Bahini rebel and Chairman, Center for Bangladesh Liberation War Studies), March 14, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 466 According to the Chairman of the War Crimes Facts Finding Committee M.A. Hasan, some of the Islamists who collaborated with the Pakistan army in 1971 are (as of 2012) still receiving pensions from the Pakistani government. Author’s interview with M.A Hasan (Chairman of the War Crimes Facts Finding Committee, Bangladesh), March 13, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Jamaat- e-Islami’s collaboration with the Pakistani army continues to stir controversy with the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunal in 2010. The purpose of this national Bangladeshi court is to try those accused of 1971 war crimes, which include torture, rape, mass- killing, and other acts of genocide. Those lined up for trial include leaders and former leaders of 152

Pakistan volunteers and recruit Biharis to join their ranks.467 However, in August, having confronted a new wave of guerrilla activity (the midsummer surge), the Pakistani military took a more hands-on approach. It organized the Islamist volunteers into two separate groups. Members of the first, which was named al-Badr (“the moon,” in Arabic), undertook

“specialized operations”; members of the second group, the lesser-known al-Shams (“the sun,” in Arabic), were “responsible for the protection of bridges, vital points and other areas.”468 Between September and October, the Pakistani military also actively armed the al-Badr and al-Shams Brigades.

The interests of the two traditional opponents – the military and the Jamaat – had converged during the Jamaat’s national campaign against the Pakistan People’s Party and the Awami League. The Pakistani government, ran by the military, used the Islamist party to balance the most powerful political forces in the two wings of the country. It also encouraged the IJT to become the main force of the campaign. The Jamaat’s collaboration with the Pakistani army was inspired by more than merely the drive for political limelight given its poor electoral performance. The ideological motivation was summed up by a

Jamaat leader, Ghulam Azam, in the Daily Sangram in 1971: “Pakistan is the house of

Islam for the world Muslims. Therefore, Jamaat activists don’t justify living if Pakistan disintegrated.”469

the Jamaat, which is allied with the main challenger (the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) to the current party in power, the Awami League (headed by late Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina). “The trial of the birth of a nation,” The Economist (September 15, 2012): 41-43. 467 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 66; Julfikar Ali Manik, “Focus back on, 8 years after,” The Daily Star, May 12, 2009, accessed May 4, 2012, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=87828. 468 Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, 78-79. 469 Manik, “Focus back on, 8 years after.” 153

The al-Badr Brigade was the most controversial of the nonstate outfits sponsored by the Pakistani state against the East Pakistani secessionists. It served multiple functions.

It acted as a death squad by identifying and killing high-profile supporters and sympathizers of the secessionist movement. Its victims included professors, journalists, writers, and doctors.470 A major goal of the al-Badr Brigade, the Bangladeshi literature argues, was “to create a vacuum of ‘intellectual leadership’”471 in East Pakistan. Al-Badr members have also been accused of manning camps in which the rebels were interrogated, tortured, and killed.472

EXPLAINING THE USE OF IRREGULARS IN EAST PAKISTAN

Understanding why the Pakistani state brought in the Razakars and the al-Badr and al-Shams Brigades into its military campaign requires disentangling “thickened” history473 and paying special attention to the timing of actions and events. In the next sections, I use the case of the 1971 military campaign to test the conventional explanations – plausible deniability and military weakness – and my theory, which identifies the causal role of target density and high military capacity.

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Plausible deniability is widely cited as the reason why states use nonstate actors in certain, often covert, military operations. The idea is that states use nonstate actors to hide

470 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 97. 471 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 118. 472 A Killing Squad of Pakistan Army, documentary film, Laser Vision Exclusive; Dhaka, Bangladesh. 473 For the concept of “thickened” history, see Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 27. 154

their involvement in a given military venture. Nonstate actors allow the state to deny its responsibility for illicit, unpopular, or particularly brutal acts. However, the conditions which lead states to pursue plausible deniability have yet to be specified.

States can pursue plausible deniability in military operations when faced with high disapproval costs from domestic and/or international audiences. No military venture is ever fully approved by all interested parties, and so there are always some disapproval costs to bear for military action. The question is: When are the disapproval costs bearable?

Disapproval costs at the domestic level derive from public opinion, which is more politically consequential for democratic regimes than for their non-democratic counterparts. We would, therefore, expect the nondemocratic regimes to be more likely than the democratic regimes to disregard plausible deniability and bear the ensuing disapproval costs. At the same time, at the international level, disapproval costs derive from the state’s relative power vis-à-vis other states. States that are not particularly internationally powerful can mitigate disapproval costs by having a powerful and reliable ally. We would, therefore, expect states that (1) are governed by undemocratic regimes, and (2) are either (a) internationally powerful or (b) durably allied with another powerful state474 to be the least likely to pursue plausible deniability.

This was precisely the case for Pakistan in the run-up to the 1971 military campaign. Pakistan’s regime, at the time, was undemocratic: the country had been under martial law since 1969. On the international front, Pakistan alone lacked the power to

474 By which I mean a state having an alliance with an internationally powerful state that would be so durable as to not be affected by the former’s involvement in a given military venture. 155

withstand international pressure, but it was not alone. It had a durable alliance with the

United States.

From the perspective of the United States, East Pakistan’s geopolitical endowment made it “one of the world’s greatest potential nightmares.”475 Pakistan’s military crackdown in East Pakistan occurred at the time the United States was busy winding down the war in Vietnam and building a diplomatic relationship with China. Consequently, as then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger recalls, “there was almost nothing the [Nixon] Administration was less eager to face than a crisis in South Asia.”476

The 1971 crisis took place in the backdrop of major shifts in cold war politics which increased the significance of South Asian security for the great powers. The Sino-Soviet ideological conflict of the 1950s and 1960s and the ensuing 1969 border clashes between the two countries made South Asia a militarily important zone for both Moscow and

Beijing.477 The former turned to India and the latter to Pakistan as a regional ally. The Sino-

Soviet discord also facilitated the late 1960s-early 1970s U.S. efforts to establish a diplomatic link to China, at a time when the U.S. war in Vietnam was clearly going nowhere and the U.S. could not afford China “entering the Vietnam war or… attacking any other vital American interest.”478 Pakistan played a critical intermediary role in the U.S.

475 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” 3. 476 Kissinger, White House Years, 842. 477 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited, 2011), 206. 478 Kissinger, White House Years, 689. 156

effort to establish high-level contact with China. It was not the only channel considered by

U.S. President Richard Nixon,479 but it was the one which proved most effective.

By the time of Pakistan’s military crackdown in East Pakistan, the U.S. had come to think of Pakistan as the “sole channel to China; once it was closed off it would take months to make alternative arrangements.”480 Nixon directly approached Yahya about

China on October 25, 1970. He told the Pakistani president, who was scheduled soon to visit Beijing, that the U.S. wanted to establish “secret links” with China to enable the two countries to communicate “what was really on their minds and yet have absolute discretion.”481 By December 1970, the Pakistani channel produced an important positive response from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Yahya was quick to point out that it was

“significant” that Zhou neither accepted nor rejected the proposal as soon as it was made, but first consulted with the top Communist Party leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. “This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility,” Yahya observed, optimistically adding that at no point during his conversation with the Chinese leaders “did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States.”482 By April 1971, the United States and China

479 Romania was the other option. William Burr, “The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China,” September 1970-July 1971, Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, February 27, 2002; The National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed May 14, 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/#3. 480 Kissinger, White House Years, 854. 481 “Meeting Between the President and Pakistan President Yahya,” White House Oval Office, October 25, 1970, Memo (Top Secret/Sensitive); The National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed May 14, 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-03.pdf. 482 “Chinese Communist Initiative,” Memorandum (Top Secret/Sensitive) from Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon, December 1970; The National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed May 14, 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch- 06.pdf. 157

were engaged in signaling – the Chinese with “Ping-Pong diplomacy” and Nixon with public statements of interest in visiting China.

On July 8, 1971, Yahya facilitated Kissinger’s first secret trip to China to lay the groundwork for Nixon’s official visit. In preparation, Kissinger had scheduled a tour of

Asia that was intentionally “as boring as it was possible… to shake press attention.”483 His plan worked, and by the time he arrived in Islamabad, only one American journalist was around to cover the event. Then, Yahya’s scheme – code-named Operation Marco Polo – went into effect. During a dinner hosted by the Pakistani president, Kissinger faked feeling ill, and Yahya pretended to urge him to go and spend a few days in the mountains to recuperate. Yayha even sent a decoy motorcade from Kissinger’s residence to the mountains. The following morning, Kissinger headed for a military airfield, and a Pakistan

International Airlines plane took him to Beijing.484

Even though Pakistan was a key player in the U.S.-China rapprochement, the

United States preferred to promise Pakistan support in case any threat against it materialized over supplying it weapons.485 The United States did, however, turn a blind

483 Kissinger Video Interview, “Nixon’s China Game,” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), Special Feature, 2000, accessed May 14, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/sfeature/kissinger.html. 484 Kissinger recalls that when he and his Secret Service staff boarded the plane, they encountered four Chinese men in Mao suits sitting there. Zhou had sent them to escort Kissinger to China. Kissinger was not aware of this, and so “our Secret Service people nearly had a heart attack,” likely thinking that this was a kidnapping. Kissinger Video Interview, “Nixon’s China Game.” 485 This approach was initially taken to evade Pakistan’s request for arms after December 1961 Indian attack on Goa and the India-Pakistan war of 1965. Kissinger, White House Years, 895. The only concrete gesture Nixon made toward Pakistan for its assistance with China prior to the March 1971 crackdown was to approve a modest, $40-50 million, package of military equipment for Pakistan in the summer of 1970. It was to be a “one-time exception” to the US arms embargo, and included some twenty aircraft and 300 armored personnel carriers, but no tanks or artillery. Ibid., 849. 158

eye to the accounts of “selective genocide” pouring in from the State Department. Nixon’s reliance on Yahya for the China connection, and belief that Pakistan would soon “learn the futility of its course,” led to U.S. “policy of restraint” vis-à-vis the crisis in East Pakistan.486

What this meant in practice was privately trying to persuade Yahya to accept East

Pakistan’s autonomy, while also sending “clear signals” to the Soviet Union not to support

India in an invasion of Pakistan.487

Figure 6.1: Pakistan and India’s Relations with Great Powers, March-December 1971

Soviet Rising tensions Rapprochement United China Union States

Military Intermediary alliance role Diplomatic alliance

Military tensions India Pakistan

During Pakistan’s military campaign, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan became complicated by the unprecedented rebellion within the U.S. State Department ranks against

Nixon’s approach to Pakistan.488 Few outside Nixon and Kissinger’s inner circle knew anything of the China initiative, and the State Department was among the organizations

486 Ibid., 855. 487 Richard Nixon, The Memories of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 526. 488 See memoir by U.S. Consul General in East Pakistan who was recalled by Nixon after protesting against the atrocities committed in East Pakistan by the Pakistani troops. Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh. 159

kept in the dark.489 Confronted with evidence of genocide against the Hindu population of

East Pakistan490 and completely unaware of the China initiative, the State Department began to act autonomously. In April, without clearance with the White House, it began limiting Pakistan’s economic aid and initiated a new arms embargo. Some $35 million in arms to Pakistan was cut off, leaving roughly $5 million “trickling through the pipeline.”491

India’s relationship with the United States, meanwhile, was in “a state of exasperatedly strained cordiality, like a couple that can neither separate nor get along.”492

India consequently drew closer to the Soviet Union. In August 1971, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with India specifying mutual strategic cooperation between the two countries. When India finally attacked Pakistan, the Soviet Union moved its troops to the

Chinese border “in an unsubtle attempt to tie up Chinese forces and prevent them from going to the aid of Pakistan.”493 In hindsight, Kissinger reflected: “What prompted Yahya to his reckless step on March 25 [the day of the crackdown] is not fully known.”494

Had Pakistan sought to shield its involvement in the “reckless” military venture with nonstate violence, it would have prepared and used the Razakars during Operation

Searchlight. The brutal methods used by the Pakistani army immediately attracted negative publicity and condemnation. By the time Pakistan began using the Razakars, in late May, there was little left to deny. The domestic and international disapproval costs of the military

489 Lawrence Lifschultz and Kai Bird, “Bangladesh: Anatomy of a Coup,” Economic and Political Weekly 14, no. 49 (December 8, 1979): 2004. 490 Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh, 213-216. 491 Kissinger, White House Years, 854. 492 Ibid., 849. 493 Nixon, The Memories of Richard Nixon, 526. 494 Kissinger, White House Years, 852. 160

campaign were mitigated by (1) the fact that the campaign’s initiator was a military dictator whose political tenure did not depend on public opinion, and (2) Pakistan’s strong alliance with the United States. Pakistan’s 1971 military campaign shows that plausible deniability is not always what drives the state’s decision to use nonstate actors in military operations.

MILITARY WEAKNESS

Another line of argument about what drives states’ use of nonstate actors in military operations is military weakness. The idea is that states incorporate nonstate actors into their military apparatus in order to augment their military power. The observable implication of this argument would be Pakistan using domestic nonstate actors when it was (1) militarily weak; and/or (2) directly threatened by India, which, unlike the rebels, had the military capacity to defeat Pakistan. What we observe is Pakistan bringing in the irregulars not in response to military weakness or the Indian threat, but the spatial distribution of the target across the local population and territory. And it is having high military capacity that allows it to do so.

Next, I examine the question of the Indian threat, and whether its timing had anything to do with Pakistan’s policy of militarizing domestic nonstate actors. I will then discuss military capacity and its causal role in bringing about the outsourcing outcome.

Finally, I will show how target density shaped the Pakistani strategists’ decision about when and to whom to outsource violence.

THREAT FROM INDIA

161

According to the main document outlining Pakistan’s defense policy, India was the

“greatest, continuing and immediate military threat” to Pakistan.495 However, Pakistan’s initial move to incorporate the civilians into its military apparatus took place at a time when the relationship with India was still relatively peaceful. It was when the Indian government still expected that the Pakistani government would reach a negotiated resolution to the conflict with the rebel leaders who were, after all, fairly elected and enjoyed widespread support in East Pakistan.

The main objectives of India’s patronage of the rebel forces, at the time, were to maintain order within the Indian territories bordering East Pakistan while putting some pressure on the Pakistani government to come up with a political resolution. Millions of refugees were pouring into India, with roughly 80-90 percent of them Hindus496 (see Tables

6.1 and 6.2). The conflict in East Pakistan was threatening to destabilize the already volatile states of West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, which were already experiencing terrorism and insurgency. According to Sisson and Rose (1990), who in 1978 interviewed key political leaders and their principal advisers in India, Pakistan, and

Bangladesh, the decision that India would resort to the direct use of force against Pakistan was made in July. 497 It was made in response to Pakistan’s initial success in quelling the

495 “The Military Concept of National Defence,” in Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report of Inquiry into the 1971 War, as declassified by the Government of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2000), 165. 496 The Hindus constituted about one-sixth of East Pakistan’s total population. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum: The Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Six Months Later,” 8. 497 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 213. 162

rebels, which signaled to India that Pakistan was no longer likely to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict.498

Table 6.1: Trends of Refugee Influx499

Month Average daily Monthly arrivals April 1971 (10th to 30th) 57,000 1,221,000 May 1971 102,000 3,158,000 June 1971 68,000 2,056,000 July 1971 26,000 797,000 August 1971 34,000 1,055,000 September 1971 27,000 804,000 October 1971 14,000 425,000 November 1971 8,000 217,000 Backlog 166,000 Total 9,899,000

Table 6.2: Influx of Refugees from March 25 to December 15, 1971500

State Total Influx West Bengal 7,493,474 Tripura 1,416,491 Meghalaya 667,986 Assam 312,713 Bihar 8,641 Total 9,899,305

498 Ibid., 141-142. 499 Sheelendra Kumar Singh et al., ed., Bangladesh Documents: Volume Two (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1999), 82. Volume first published in 1972 by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. 500 Ibid., 81 163

The Indian government neither expected nor desired for the political crisis in

Pakistan to escalate to civil war proportions. It assumed that the Pakistani military leaders and the civilian contenders Bhutto of West Pakistan and Mujib of East Pakistan would eventually negotiate a settlement. When rumors of possible military action by the Pakistani government reached New Delhi, the Indian government responded cautiously. It expected that the Pakistani authorities’ threat of military action was a bargaining tool, and if any such action was carried out, it would be short in duration and followed by renewed negotiations toward a political settlement with Mujib and the Awami League. After all,

Mujib and the Awami League enjoyed major public support in East Pakistan, and there was no other political body with which the military governors could negotiate. However, as a precaution, India began a gradual, but substantial, buildup of its military forces in West

Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. The official line was that the Border Security Force (BSF) required assistance in carrying out its border security responsibilities because of the developments in East Pakistan.501

Following Pakistan’s crackdown of the eastern wing, India granted refuge to

Awami League and other political leaders and cadres from East Pakistan, as well as elements of the East Pakistan Rifles, East Bengal Regiment, and the East Pakistani Police.

This policy was not new. India had done the same with other neighboring states, such as during the 1959 rebellion in Tibet and the December 1960 royal coup in Nepal. At the same time, the Indian government’s public statements remained carefully worded “to avoid the impression that India would provide material assistance to the East Pakistani ‘rebels’.”502

501 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 144. 502 Ibid., 142. 164

The Indian government’s initial support of the rebel forces, collectively referred to as the Mukti Bahini, was driven by two main objectives: (1) to keep the Bangladeshi resistance movement from the hands of the ultra-leftists, who could threaten the stability of the Indian states bordering East Pakistan, especially West Bengal and Tipur; and (2) to put pressure on the Pakistani government to make basic concessions, rather than help to create an independent Bangladesh. Only when it became clear that India’s plan for reviving the dialogue between the Pakistani military and the Awami League was failing – and the

Soviet support of India to balance the Chinese threat was secured503 – did the Indian planners decide to engage Pakistan in an inter-state war. The monsoon season offered a timely occasion for a midsummer surge in Mukti Bahini operations, which in turn laid the groundwork for the Indian invasion.

MILITARY CAPACITY

Pakistan’s military capacity in East Pakistan varied significantly during the 1971 military campaign. At the onset of Operation Searchlight, Pakistan’s coercive capacity was weak in East Pakistan for three major reasons. First, prior to the operation, Pakistan had a relatively small military presence in East Pakistan, as its defense policy deemed the best defense against India was an offensive capability in West Pakistan. Second, Pakistan was limited in the number of troops it could bring from West Pakistan into East Pakistan at the start of the operation due to India’s ban of all Pakistani flights over Indian territory. Third, the operation planners presumed that all Bengali troops would revolt in response to the operation, and most of them did.

503 The Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in August 1971. 165

The military consequently failed to capture the vast bulk of the operation’s target –

Awami League leaders and activists. They escaped to neighboring India, and were joined by thousands of new supporters. Within a month, however, the Pakistani state significantly increased its military capacity in East Pakistan by augmenting the regular forces and rebuilding the major internal security outfits. By the end of April, Pakistan had achieved a high level of military capacity in the province, which allowed it to secure most of the urban and some rural areas. The success provoked a rebel backlash. Pakistan overcame the first rebel offensive, which, in turn, convinced the Indian strategists that Pakistan was now unlikely to negotiate with the Awami League leaders, which was India’s preferred outcome. The decision to engage Pakistan militarily in an inter-state conflict soon followed. As Wayman, Singer, and Goertz (1983) have observed, high military capacity can have an adverse effect on a state’s security of provoking an arms buildup and military adventurism on the part of the rivals.504 Indeed, the case of the 1971 civil war shows that increasing military capacity does not necessarily increase security. It led Pakistan to confront a more determined and organized rebel force and, ultimately, a militarily stronger state rival.

At the onset of Operation Searchlight, the total strength of Pakistan’s military establishment was 324,500 officers and enlisted men, with the army accounting for roughly

93 percent of the total.505 The strength was a nearly three-fold increase over that of 1965,

504 Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer and Gary Goertz, “Capabilities, Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 498. 505 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Asia and Australia,” The Military Balance 70, no. 1 (1970): 67. 166

when Pakistan last fought a war with India.506 However, Pakistan’s military presence in

East Pakistan was limited to one infantry division – the 14th Division, supported by the East

Pakistan Rifles. Pakistan’s defense policy deemed the defense of East Pakistan against

India, which was viewed as posing the most serious military threat to Pakistan,507 to lie in

West Pakistan. The hitherto main document outlining Pakistan’s strategic concept of defense – the War Directive issued by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (Yahya

Khan’s predecessor) on August 9, 1967 – stated: “Even if the hostilities commence in East

Pakistan, strategic factors dictate that major and decisive battles will be fought from West

Pakistan.”508 Cashman and Robinson (2007) argue that the strategy of attacking India on the western front while fighting a defensive war in the east first emerged (and failed) in the

1965 war. By 1971, the belief that defense of the east began in the west had become an

“unquestioned assumption at the core of Pakistan’s military planning, it was the standard plan for fighting a war with India.”509 At the same time, India was perceived less a threat in East Pakistan than it was in West Pakistan. As the former U.S. consul general in Dhaka observed: “The people of East Pakistan were much more relaxed about India. Calcutta, the capital of the Indian state of West Bengal, was still a favorite city of Muslims in East

506 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Central Treaty Organization,” The Military Balance 65, no. 1 (1965): 28. 507 “The Military Concept of National Defence,” in Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report of Inquiry into the 1971 War, as declassified by the Government of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2000), 165. 508 War Directive of 1967, cited in “The Military Concept of National Defence,” in Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report of Inquiry into the 1971 War, as declassified by the Government of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2000), 166. 509 Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson, “The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971,” in An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq, ed. Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 257. 167

Pakistan, their place of choice to spend the winter holiday season. Kashmir [which very much concerned West Pakistanis] had little interest in East Pakistan.”510

Another factor that limited Pakistan’s military presence in East Pakistan was a highly unequal recruitment policy, which favored West Pakistanis over their East Pakistani counterparts. The preference given to the West Pakistanis (i.e. Punjabis and, to some extent, Pathans) over the East Pakistanis (i.e. Bengalis) in the armed forces dated back to the British colonial period. Bengalis dominated the British Indian army until 1857, the year of the Sepoy Mutiny. The British blamed Bengali soldiers for the outbreak of the rebellion.

According to the British, the Bengalis’ “ethnic majority in the Indian Army and… defiance resulted in a war between the Indian soldiers on the one hand and the British troops and their loyalists such as Punjabis, on the other.”511 The Sikh princes of the Punjab assisted the British during the revolt by providing soldiers and support. After the revolt was successfully suppressed, the balance of recruitment was tilted towards North India, especially the Punjab.512 As Ian Talbot (1998) explains, “The British attached great significance to the ‘steadfastness’ or ‘treachery’ of communities during the 1857 revolt.

They richly rewarded those who had stood by them in their darkest hour.”513 By 1875, the

Punjabis constituted about 44 percent of the Bengal Army and the Punjab Frontier Force.514

The British Eden Commission of 1879, which assessed the organization of the Indian army,

510 Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh, 2. 511 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan,” Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies, no. 24 (2010): 6. 512 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 2000), 39-40. 513 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 61. 514 Rizvi, Military, 37. 168

described the Punjab as the “home of the most martial races of India” and “the nursery of the best soldiers.”515 In 1947, the year Pakistan achieved independence, Bengalis represented only 1 percent of the Pakistani army.516 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the

Pakistan army recruits were drawn from the same areas of the Punjab where the British formerly used to recruit.517 The East Pakistanis constituted over half (roughly 54 percent) of the total population of Pakistan, but less than ten percent of the military establishment.518

Table 6.3 displays the stark disparity in the military employment and recruitment practices between the two wings.

Table 6.3: Provincial Origins of Pakistani Military Officers, 1956 and 1965519

Rank West Pakistan East Pakistan 1956: in actual numbers Lieutenant generals 3 0 Major generals 20 0 Brigadiers 34 1 Colonels 49 1 Lieutenant colonels 198 2 Majors 590 10 Navy officers (all ranks) 593 7 Air force officers (all ranks) 640 40 Total 2,127 (97.2%) 61 (2.8%) 1965: in percent

515 “Report of the special commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council to enquire into the organisation and expenditure of the Army in India” (Eden Commission). Simla: Government of India, 1879; “Appendices to the report, Simla/Calcutta: Govt of India, 1879- 80.” IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1687, 1879-1880. British Library, London, United Kingdom. 516 Haqqani, Pakistan, 61. 517 Soherwordi, “‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan,” 31. 518 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?” 12. The figure is 9 percent according to a Bangladeshi source: Bangladesh Press Release, “All Bengali Diplomats in Pakistan’s U.S., U.N. Missions Quit,” Mujibnagar (August 4, 1971), in Bangladesh Liberation War Mujibnagar Government Documents, 1971, ed. Sukumar Biswas (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Mowla Brothers, 2005), 151. 519 Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Pakistan, 564. 169

Army officers (6,000) 95 5 Navy officers (800): Technical officers 81 19 Nontechnical officers 91 9 Air force officers (1,200): Pilots 89 11 Navigators 73 27 Technical officers 83 17 Administrative officers 69 31 Education officers 87 13

Despite Yahya Khan’s July 28, 1969 pledge to double the recruitment of East

Pakistanis into the army, an atmosphere of distrust continued to prevail among Bengali and

West Pakistani officers. A former Pakistani army officer recounted a West Pakistani officer’s complaint that when the last (pre-1971 civil war) batch of East Pakistani recruits was about to sail for Karachi, an East Pakistani colonel allegedly told them: “You are proud

Bengali soldiers now. You are not going there to polish the shoes of Punjabi officers. Soon they will be polishing yours.”520 The former chief of army staff of the Bangladesh army recounted his days as a Pakistani officer: the West Pakistanis, he said, often referred to the

Bengalis as “rice-eaters,” thereby implying that they were weak. So, one day, he arranged with the cooks to replace the usual bread with rice, which caused a stir among his fellow officers.521

The discrimination and distrust led the Pakistani strategists to the conclusion that all Bengali troops, including the regular East Bengal battalions, would revolt in reaction to

520 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 11. 521 Author’s interview with K.M. Shafiullah (Second in Command of Second East Bengal Regiment; Brigade Commander of S-force of the Bangladesh Forces during the 1971 war, and Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army,1972-1975), March 16, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 170

Operation Searchlight. The East Pakistani armed forces composed of Bengalis – the East

Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles, and the Ansars – were suspected of Bengali nationalism. The Pakistani army command initially advised Yahya not to count on the

Bengali troops to support the operation. There was evidence that the Awami League had developed an intelligence network and support within the Bengali units of the armed forces.522 By March 22, the commanding officers began to express fears that the East

Bengal Regiment was now responsive only to the directives of the Awami League. They insisted that the only way to forestall mutiny was preemptive action against the Bengali military and police units. Otherwise, they argued, “the army in the East Pakistan might be divided, if not destroyed.”523 According to the Operation Searchlight plan of action, because the Awami League had widespread support “even amongst the E.P. [East

Pakistani] elements in the Army,” the operation had to be “launched with great cunningness, surprise, deception and speed combined with shock action.”524

The Pakistani authorities sought to keep the Bengali troops’ disarmament secret not only for tactical, but also for public relations reasons. Pakistan began receiving negative international news coverage immediately after all foreign journalists were expelled from

Dhaka during the early days of the crackdown. A Pakistani army officer who worked in the army’s public relations directorate suggested that the Pakistani authorities counter the blame for killing unarmed innocent civilians by disclosing the defection of the East Bengal

Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, and the East Pakistan Police. “I received a sharp rebuke in

522 Bose, Dead Reckoning, 32. 523 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 156. 524 “Operation Searchlight,” copy of original document, in Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1997), Appendix III, 228. 171

return,” recounts the officer. “I was asked, ‘Do you want to destroy the image of the finest army by telling the world that its discipline has collapsed?’”525

The disarmament of the Bengali elements within the Pakistani military and police forces was largely a failure. All but a few Bengali units were successfully disarmed; the rest headed for the Indian border and became the backbone of the “mighty army”526 of the rebel forces. In some cases, Bengali troops retaliated by killing West Pakistani officers.

Ironically, some of the first refugees to arrive in India were actually West Pakistani officers trying to escape from the retaliation of the Bengali troops.527

Finally, the ability of the Pakistani commanders to bring in new troops from West

Pakistan to East Pakistan – without attracting too much attention and maintain an element of surprise – was made difficult by India’s ban on all Pakistani flights over Indian territory.

On January 30, 1971 two Kashmiri Muslims hijacked an Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft and ordered it to land in Lahore, West Pakistan. When, on February 3, the hijackers destroyed the aircraft, the Indian Government prohibited flights over India by Pakistan until the question of compensation was satisfactorily settled. The Pakistan Government claimed that the hijacking and destruction of the aircraft was an Indian plot, while Mujib described it as “a conspiracy by the Pakistan government to postpone the transfer of

525 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 91. 526 Quote by Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of exiled Government of Bangladesh, speech broadcast by Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra on April 11, 1971, cited in Habibul Alam, Brave of Heart: The Urban Guerrilla Warfare of Sector-2 during the Liberation War of Bangladesh (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Academic Press and Publishers Library, 2006), 28. 527 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 160. 172

power.”528 The mystery of the hijacking has not been solved, but the ban forced Pakistani aircrafts to fly via Sri Lanka and added 2,000 miles to their normal flight route.

After the military action in March, the center of decision-making in Pakistan shifted from the Office of the President and the headquarters of the chief martial law administrator to the general headquarters of the army. The change reflected Yahya’s “perception that the central government’s problems in the east were primarily military ones and his greater ease among the officers with whom he had spent his career.”529 The move was followed by the augmentation of Pakistan’s military presence to roughly 70,000 regular troops (from the initial 34,000). Three institutions – the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force, Internal Security

Force, and a new East Pakistani police force – were assembled for the maintenance of law and order.

The primary purpose of the Internal Security Force was to defend against attacks on strategic communication centers, railroad bridges, transportation networks, and power installations. The roughly 3,000 Internal Security Force personnel were recruited mainly from West Pakistan. The new East Pakistani police force was to supplement and, ultimately, replace its predecessor. At the end of May, roughly 6,000 West Pakistani policemen arrived in Dhaka for a six-month tour of duty.530

The East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) was in part designed to replace the

East Pakistan Rifles (EPR). Prior to its disbandment in late March, the EPR was a

528 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 102 (footnote 36). 529 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 166. 530 The figure of 6,000 was estimated based on Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 164, and Biswas, Bangladesh Liberation War Mujibnagar Government Documents, 149, estimates of 5,000 and 7,000, respectively. 173

paramilitary organization responsible for anti-smuggling duties, collection of border intelligence, and limited defense. The majority of EPR riflemen revolted after the crackdown. Out of the sixteen wings of East Pakistan Rifles, only one or two wings remained loyal.531 The East Pakistan Rifles were then immediately disbanded. The new

East Pakistan Civil Armed Force was formed in April 1971. By June 1971, approximately

8,500 EPCAF members were recruited from West Pakistan and 4,500 from East

Pakistan.532 Among them were reservists, pensioners, the West Pakistani representatives of similar police and paramilitary forces, such as the Punjab police and the West Pakistan

Rangers,533 as well as “a sizable number of Scouts from the North West Frontier.”534

Building military capacity in East Pakistan made it possible for the Pakistani state to recruit, train, and manage tens of thousands of civilians. As the first phase of the military campaign (Operation Searchlight) illustrates, a military cannot build and maintain irregular forces without first solving the problems required for the operation of the regular forces.

The Pakistani state possessed the material base, which included a strong defense industrial base and supply of potential irregular recruits (e.g. Biharis). However, problems of inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, and force employment first had to be addressed before bringing in the civilians.

TARGET DENSITY

531 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 185. 532 Ibid. 533 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 117. 534 Salik, Witness to Surrender, 90. 174

The March 1971 plan called for the operation to be launched “all over the Province simultaneously,” with Dhaka (the administrative capital of East Pakistan) requiring special attention due to its political and strategic significance. Those who were identified for arrest were “top political leaders and top student leaders” and “extremists amongst teaching staffs, cultural organisations”; the East Pakistani troops were to be “neutralized.”535

At the onset of the operation, much of the target was concentrated in Dhaka, with the rest effectively scattered across East Pakistan. The Awami League enjoyed high levels of support across the entire province, where it received a 75 percent vote-share in the 1970 elections.536 By the time of the crackdown, Mujib was the de facto leader of East Pakistan.

His popularity and agenda soared since the 1968-69 “Agartala conspiracy” trial, when the

Government of Pakistan accused him of fermenting a secessionist movement with Indian support.537 An ensuing massive popular uprising in East Pakistan forced the government to withdraw the case and Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, to resign.

The Pakistani army, composed of West Pakistani regular troops, failed successfully to capture the target during the March crackdown due to the army’s low capacity, which included significant limitations in its local knowledge and public support. The Bengali troops and police forces were deemed unreliable when it came to taking action against the

Awami League and were scheduled to be disarmed. According to a high-ranking officer stationed in East Pakistan at the time, the West Pakistani troops did not know what the

535 “Operation Searchlight,” copy of original document, in Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997), 228 (Appendix III). 536 Bose, Dead Reckoning, 21. 537 J.F.R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, [1997] 2004), 31. 175

Awami League leaders looked like and were “unable to discriminate differences in the features of their Bengali brethren.”538 At Dhaka University, soldiers confused faculty members who had similar names and consequently executed the wrong target.539 In order to ease the task of identifying the Awami League leaders for the army units charged with arresting them, government agents marked the targets’ houses with chalk.540 However, this technique may have inadvertently alerted the targets. Out of the 465 Awami League members of the national and provincial assemblies, all but nine escaped to India.541 Sisson and Rose (1990) argue that “The army was able to capture only those leaders who, for whatever reason, had decided not to try to escape into India. Those who sought to avoid arrest were able to do so.”542

The West Pakistani troops were even less equipped to capture the target in the countryside. There they had virtually no local knowledge there. This may help to explain why they resorted to attacking the Hindus, who were not the intended target of Operation

Searchlight. The brutality and acts of genocide543 committed against the Hindu population may have served to signal the army’s strength to the rebels and potential collaborators. It drew in supporters who were motivated by the prospect of a share in the loot of Hindu shops and permanent possession of Hindu homes and land.544 However, the army’s treatment of the Hindus was a product not of high military capability, but of inability

538 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 159. 539 Rahman, My Story of 1971. 540 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 158-59. 541 “Chronology: Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1947-1971,” Archives Direct, British National Archives at Kew, accessed at Public Workstation at Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2011. 542 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 158-59. 543 Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh, 216. 544 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 112. 176

effectively to isolate and capture the actual target of the operation. It led to millions of

Hindu refugees pouring across the Indian border, drew negative publicity and condemnation, and attracted sympathy for the rebel cause.

Immediately following the crackdown in the eastern wing, India granted refuge to

Awami League and other political leaders and cadres from East Pakistan, as well as members of the East Pakistan Rifles, East Bengal Regiment, and the East Pakistani police.

According to Maniruzzaman (2009), the Awami League leaders were already assured of

India’s support, in terms of food supply at the border and political asylum, in early March.

Having been tipped off about the likely use of military force, some of the Awami League leaders contacted a top official of the Indian Deputy High Commissioner’s office at Dhaka.

The Indian official traveled to Delhi, on the pretext of his daughter’s illness, to consult the authorities, and came back with a positive response.545

On April 4, 1971, as Pakistan was regaining control over most major urban centers, a group of Bengali senior army officers gathered at Teliapara, in the Sylhet district which bordered India, and prepared the Bangladeshi strategy of the “liberation war.” After the

Teliapara Document was approved by the Bangladesh government-in-exile and Indian staff officers, a massive program of recruiting and training guerrillas began.

The Pakistani army was at this time successfully reclaiming East Pakistani territory, which was now including most of the East Pakistani border areas.546 However, it had failed to capture the vast bulk of the target, which temporarily relocated to India in order to gather

545 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 103. 546 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 144. Salik, Witness to Surrender, 90. 177

force. Joining the rebel force became for many “a romantic affair.”547 “There were thousands and thousands of youths offering themselves,” recalls former rebel Mofidul

Hoque.548 There was indeed a marked abundance of volunteers seeking to join the Mukti

Bahini ranks.549 For example, in a youth camp near Agartala, in July 1971, there were 3,000 young men waiting for over two months to receive military training. The conditions they faced at the camp were “pitiable, and food and water supply almost non-existent,”550 but that did little to deter the recruits. Notably, very few of the recruits came from the refugee camps. Out of approximately 100,000 guerrillas trained throughout the secessionist struggle, less than one percent of them were from the refugee camps.551

Educated young men were a favored target of Pakistani forces, and so a large number of school and university students, especially those living in the border areas, crossed into India. The majority of guerrillas recruited to the Mukti Bahini were students drawn primarily from lower-middle class and middle class families. Some portion of them came from industrial labor, while others were from families of small businessmen and cultivators.552 Another major group of recruits came from the peasantry.553 The students formed “the most politically conscious group,” but their divergent views “often led to the sharpening of the political rivalry amongst different groups.”554 It was the peasants who

547 Author’s interview with Rashed Uz Zaman (Faculty Member, University of Dhaka), March 13, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 548 Author’s interview with Mofidul Hoque (former Mukti Bahini rebel and Director, Liberation War Museum), March 15, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 549 Author’s interview with Sarwar Ali (former Mukti Bahini recruiting officer), March 17, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 550 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 164. 551 Ibid., 154. 552 Muniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 109. 553 Author’s interview with Mofidul Hoque, March 15, 2012. 554 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 164. 178

“turned out to be the best material for guerrilla warfare, as they did not have any vanity or false pride… They never grumbled for the lack of jungle boots, or a blanket or even food.”555 In sum, the Mukti Bahini fighters were largely comprised of Bengali students and peasants, and most of them were of rural background.556 This facilitated the rebel forces’ task of mixing with the local population and scattering across the entire province.

On April 17, 1971, at Baidyanath Tala, the Awami League leaders issued a declaration of independence announcing the formation of the “Sovereign People’s

Republic of Bangladesh.” India’s support of the Bangladesh government-in-exile was, at that time, far from unconditional. The Indian government publicly ignored the declaration of independence of the Bangladesh government-in-exile (until December 1971). At the same time, it closely supervised the Government of Bangladesh headquarters in Calcutta.

The Awami League’s occasional public statements, for example, could only be issued after the Indian External Affairs Ministry’s “representative” in Calcutta had seen them.557 While the Awami League officials resented their state of dependency on India, they had no alternative. The great powers were directly tied either to Pakistan or India, and so could not be relied on for foreign support. India was equally careful in its establishment of training camps for the Bangladeshi liberation forces. It sought to ensure that they were under the control of “reliable, moderate Awami League Leaders or officers from the East

Pakistani Rifles or police rather than the more radical political elements in the

555 Ibid. 556 Author’s interview with Mofidul Hoque, March 15, 2012. 557 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 143. 179

resistance.”558 Initially, the Indian Border Security Force had the primary responsibility for the supervision of these camps, but on April 30, the task was transferred to the Indian army.

By early May, Pakistan regained control over most of the border areas with India.559

In order to counteract the apparent success of the Pakistani army, the first part of the

Teliapara plan was set into motion. The target thus returned to East Pakistan. Mukti Bahini fighters crossed the border and mixed in with the local population across the province.

Habibul Alam, who joined the ranks of the Mukti Bahini fighters in April, describes his responsibilities in Dhaka:

We repeatedly thought about the possible targets for guerrilla actions inside Dhaka. The targets had to suit the needs of the unusual times and simultaneously had to be effective in terms of strategic considerations as well as public morale… Firstly, the purpose was to prove to the public the presence of freedom-fighters in Dhaka city and show the international media at large that the city was not really under the control of the Pakistani army. Secondly, to inflict casualties on the army and destroy some of the important establishments to cripple the economy of Pakistan. Finally, to aggravate the situation, expedite the collapse of the Pakistani government and at the same time be a source of annoyance for the Pakistani junta.560

Major-General Sarkar of the Indian army was appointed as the Chief Liaison

Officer between the Bangladesh Government-in-exile and the Indian army, with Brigadier

Das on constant duty at the Bangladesh Government Headquarters. A regular Armed

Forces Headquarters, with ten officers under Colonel Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmani, was set up. Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Rab was appointed as the Chief of Staff, located within Bangladesh, while Osmani was based in India. Group Captain A.K. Khandker was

558 Ibid. 559 Ibid., 144. 560 Alam, Brave of Heart, 88-89. 180

appointed Deputy Chief of Staff with his office in Calcutta. On July 15, the Bangladesh

Comanders met Syed Nazrul Islam, the acting President of Bangladesh, and Tajuddin

Ahmed, the Prime Minister, and formally swore allegiance to the Government of

Bangladesh in an oath-taking ceremony.561

Figure 6.2: Organization of Rebel Forces562

Defense Minister

Commander-in-Chief

Chief of Staff Secretary, Chief of Staff Ministry of Eastern Area Defense

Deputy Chief of A COS Eschelon Hq Staff, Operation, Intelligence A COS Logistics Youth Camp Personnel Training

Intelligence Recruiting, Pension Operation A COS Operation Records, Casualties, Gratuities Equipment Reiforcements Shaheed

Publicity, Propaganda, Transit Camps Training Psychological Warafe

Civilian Affairs Logistics Communication Civil Laison

Control of Arms Ammunition

The Teliapara plan called for a large guerrilla force to be raised and trained. Its tasks would be to liquidate collaborators of the Pakistani army, destroy communication lines, and engage in hit-and-run operations against isolated posts of the Pakistani forces.

The objective was to undermine the image of the Pakistani army’s victory, and to create

561 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 154. 562 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 126. 181

perpetual tension for the Pakistani forces and their supporters.563 Secondly, the regular units of the Mukti Bahini were to be enlarged, divided into sector troops, and positioned in different areas to give cover to the guerrilla operations. Figure 6.3 shows the widespread distribution of the sectors. Third, the best among the regular units and guerrillas were to be recruited to form a regular force. This special unit would launch full-scale direct attacks on

Pakistan army strongholds once the guerrillas and sector troops had demoralized them and cut off their lines of logistic support.564

563 Interview with Shafiullah (one of the architects of the “Teliapara Document” and S-Force Brigade Commander), March 16, 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 564 Muniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 107-108. 182

Figure 6.3: Operational Sectors of Bangladesh Forces565

Figure 6.4 shows the organization of the Mukti Bahini as it emerged from “a spontaneously-formed, ill-assorted disorganised rabble” to “a very large, complex organization of armed and trained men owing allegiance to the provisional government of

Bangladesh, and operating under its own officers with their own chain of command.”566

The case of the Mukti Bahini illustrates that an organization of such a force requires a high

565 Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 129. 566 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 153. 183

degree of military resourcefulness and effectiveness on the part of the sponsoring state – in this case, India.

Figure 6.4: Mukti Bahini Organization567

Mukti Bahini

Niyomito Bahini Gano Bahini

Swadhin Bangla Regiment Mukti Fauj Bichchu Toofan Bahini Suicide Squads Regular Sector Troops (Scorpion) Squad (Storm Troops) Batallions

The Niyomito Bahini was the official Bangladesh Army. At the heart of this force were the EBR battalions; the rest of the Niyomito Bahini manpower came from the defectors of the East Pakistan Rifles and Police, as well as civilian volunteers. The relations between Niyomito Bahini and guerrillas were not always cordial. There were at least two pitched battles between them.568 Niyomito Bahini enjoyed better service conditions than their irregular counterparts. There were also some conceptual differences between the two.

567 Ibid. 568 Ibid., 168. 184

The Niyomito Bahini preferred to do sabotage work away from the locale of Pakistani troops, while the irregulars preferred to directly confront the Pakistani troops.569

The Suicide Squads’ primary task was to kill prominent workers of the Jamaat-e-

Islami and the Muslim League, as well as Razakars and Pakistani government officials.

These units “had orders to commit suicide, if necessary, to avoid arrest.”570 The suicide instruction is notable because the official document entitled “Directives for Guerrilla

Fighters,” written by Major M.A. Manzoor, specifically instructed the Mukti Bahini that

“to live is the most vital aspect for guerrilla. Do not do anything that brings threat to your existence.”571

The Bichchu (Scorpion) Squad had a female wing, which consisted of young girls whose duty was to carry out sabotage, subversion, and espionage work in big tows like

Dhaka and Chittagong. The Toofan Bahini (Storm Troops) acted like commandos. Finally, the Sangram Parishads were the grass-roots organization which sustained guerrilla warfare.

It was organized by the Awami League in early 1971 in every village and town, but was operating underground after March 25, 1971.572

In addition to the Mukti Bahini forces, the Pakistani army encountered several other rebel groups. Among them was the Mujib Bahini, originally named the Bangladesh

Liberation Force. The Mujib Bahini was a force loyal to Mujib and his ideology of nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy (called “Mujibism”). It was formed

569 Ibid. 570 Ibid., 167. 571 M.A. Manzoor, “Directives for Guerrilla Fighters” in ed. Biswas, Bangladesh Liberation War Mujibnagar Government Documents, 1971, 566-567. 572 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 167. 185

from university students belonging exclusively to the Student’s League, the student wing of the Awami League. Four devoted followers of Sheikh Mujib were the leaders of this force, whose strength rose to about 8,000 in November. Its members were given special training for 45 days in guerrilla warfare and ideology. Mujib Bahini was built up by Major

General S.S. Uban as an elite force with its own wireless system and special code of communication, outside the control of Osmani and even the Bangladesh government-in- exile. This, according to Prasad (1992), “caused much misunderstanding between various authorities concerned.”573 Some of the members of Mujib Bahini wore Indian uniforms and carried sophisticated weapons. Some claim that the Mujib Bahini force was created to serve as “an extra insurance lest the control of the Mukti Bahini fell into the hands of the ultra- leftists.” Others argue that it was formed to provide the political infrastructure by giving ideological motivation to the Freedom Fighters inside Bangladesh to fight against the

Pakistani army.574

Another resistance group encountered by the Pakistan army was the Uban Force, a special organization of 1,800 men. It did not belong to either the Indian army or the Mukti

Bahini. It was active particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to harass the Pakistani forces and destroy their lines of communication in the area. It was a small commando force, of which no more than 400 were deployed in action at any point of time. Major General Uban was under the administrative control of Special Secretary to the Cabinet, while he was guided by the Chief of Army Staff as far as his operations were concerned. Although

Lieutenant General Aurora arranged for its supplies and logistics, neither the Eastern

573 Ibid., 168. 574 Ibid. 186

Command of the Indian Army, the Bangladesh government-in-exile, nor the Mukti Bahini had anything to do with the operations of this special force. Uban commanded both the

Mujib Bahini and this special commando force, but they operated separately exclusive of each other’s area of control or operation.575

Eleven independent guerrilla groups also operated inside East Pakistan. They were equipped primarily with weapons snatched from the Pakistani forces. In the Jessore-Khulna sector, six groups led by Khizir and Riyasat (100 men), Sahjahan (250 men), Zia (200 men), Arifin (not known), Mehdi (75 men), and Hemayet (500 men). In the Dhaka-

Comilla-Chittagong sector, two groups led by Nurul Afsar (400 men) and Haroon (100 men). In the Mymensingh sector, three groups led by Kader (approximately 17,000 young men), Abdul Mannan (85 men), and Anwaruddin (100 men). Out of all these groups, five cooperated with the Mukti Bahini. However, two belonged to the pro-Chinese National

Awami Party, and were actively hostile to the Mukti Bahini.576

The Kader Bahini was the most important of these local forces. Abdul Kader

Siddiqui, popularly known as Tiger Siddiqui, was a former non-commissioned officer of the Pakistani army and Awami League student leader. He organized a force of some 17,000 men, consisting of school and college students of the age group 14-24, mostly of peasant origin, plus an auxiliary force of over 70,000 volunteers, mostly rural school students. The majority of the 95 company commanders of the Kader Bahini were college students in the

20-24 age group. Following some successes, which built people’s confidence in this force and swelled the ranks, Kader established contact with the Government-in-exile and the

575 Ibid., 169. 576 Ibid. 187

Indian Army.577 The Indian army provided arms, ammunition, wireless sets, and also some training. Kader Siddiqui claims to have captured 7,000 Pakistani soldiers and 14,500

Razakars by December 15, 1971.578

The Mukti Bahini training period was initially two weeks, but was later extended to five weeks. The young recruits learned how to use light automatic weapons, mortars, and explosives. A special six-week training was given at Chakulia in Bihar to those who were to serve as guerrilla leaders.579 However, the overall impact of the Mukti Bahini prior to the monsoons (June-September) was “minimal.”580 The proximate reasons for this were the guerrillas’ lack of arms, the regular troops’ lack of ammunition, and both forces’ lack of “the functional training necessary to conduct a guerrilla war, although few reportedly lacked the spirit to launch one.”581 The underlying causes for the “minimal” effectiveness of the Mukti Bahini prior to September 1971 were the India government’s serious reservations about fully arming and training a force it could, ultimately, not fully control.

By July, however, it became clear that India’s plan for resuscitating the dialogue between the Pakistani military the Awami League was failing. The Mukti Bahini could neither establish any authority in the rural areas nor prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control all over the major urban centers along the East Pakistani-Indian border.

The monsoon season provided the opportune time for the surge in Mukti Bahini operations.

The weather significantly reduced the Pakistani army’s maneuverability because of its

577 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 112. 578 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 170. 579 Muniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, 108-109. 580 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 182. 581 Ibid., 182-183. 188

dependence on vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Indian personnel, usually disguised, became directly involved in Mukti Bahini activities, and the Indian army’s efforts to train the Mukti Bahini radically increased.

As many as 20,000 guerrillas every month were to be inducted and trained, starting in September. By December, there would be more than 100,000 guerrillas in East Pakistan.

Even if only thirty percent of them were properly activated, they would sufficiently off- balance the Pakistani army and tie down one-third of them in counterinsurgency operations.

This would provide an opportune moment for India to start a formal war.582

The Pakistani military was strongly alarmed by the sudden expansion of Indian- supported Mukti Bahini activity in July, and brought in a second wave of civilian

“volunteers” – the al-Badr and al-Shams Brigades. An accurate count of al-Badr and al-

Shams members is not available. Roughly 37,000 al-Badr members along with other civilian volunteers were arrested after the war.583 The Pakistani army had raised about

35,000 civilian volunteers (excluding the EPCAF).584 Several thousand of the

“collaborators” were likely to have avoided arrest by escaping to West Pakistan; up to a third were likely to have been killed during the conflict, especially considering that most

582 Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions: Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971 (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Ananya, 2011), 293. 583 M.A. Hasan, A Killing Squad of Pakistan Army, documentary film (31:56), Laser Vision Exclusive; Dhaka, Bangladesh. 584 “Guidelines Regarding East Pakistan Razakars Organization.” The popular claim that the Pakistani government had planned to recruit 100,000 Razakars (Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 187; Salik, Witness to Surrender, 105; Muniruzzaman 2009: 96) is not supported by the official government documents. The same sources cite 50,000 as the final number of recruits; the former Commander of Eastern Military High Command A.A.K. Niazi has identified the number as 40,000 (Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 253 [footnote 10]). 189

of them were poorly trained and armed. According to Vali Nasr, the al-Badr and al-Shams volunteers also “paid dearly,” not just during operations but also after Dhaka fell and

“scores were settled by Bengali nationalists.”585 Based on these deductions, we may roughly estimate the number of al-Badr and al-Shams members to have been about 7,000-

12,000.

The link between the al-Badr and al-Shams Brigades and the Pakistani government was direct but covert. Both of the organizations were under the direct control of the Civil

Affairs Adviser to the Governor of East Pakistan.586 However, the Brigades never become part of Pakistan’s formal military structure.

The Pakistani strategists estimated that the midsummer surge in guerrilla activity was the initial stage of a limited Indian military intervention in East Pakistan. The Pakistani government thus ordered full mobilization of its own reserve forces in West Pakistan. This caught India by surprise. The Indian government “entertained suspicions of its own that

Pakistan would try to ‘redo 1965’ by launching a limited war centered on Kashmir to win concessions or at least reassurances on East Pakistan from India.”587 This triggered India’s immediate counter-mobilization, which also allowed it “to disguise the mobilization of forces it had intended to carry out on both the eastern and western fronts a few weeks later as a response to Pakistani actions rather than as preparation for its own military campaign in East Pakistan”588

585 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 67. 586 Prasad, “Official History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,” 187; Nasim, Bangladesh Fights for Independence, 118. 587 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 211-212. 588 Ibid. 190

In mid-October, India began using its artillery much more extensively to support the rebel operations in East Pakistan. Indian forces, including tanks and air power several occasions, were also brought in to back up the Mukti Bahini. While the Mukti Bahini

“rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack,” some substantial areas of East Pakistan were brought under their tenuous control by mid-

November.589 During the first three weeks of November, while the scope of Indian military involvement increased substantially, the Indian units would usually hit their objective in

East Pakistan and then withdraw to Indian territory.

On the night of November 21, the Indian forces did not withdraw. Instead, several

Indian army divisions, which were divider divided into smaller tactical units, occupied

Pakistani territory as part of the preliminary phase to the offensive directed at capturing

Dhaka. While the Indian government characterized these de-facto preparatory tactics as a

“defensive” response to Pakistani shelling of Indian territory, it planned to initiate a formal war with Pakistan on December 6, with the launching of an all-out offensive to capture

Dhaka. The Indian strategists were pleasantly surprised and greatly relieved when, on

December 3, the Pakistani air force in West Pakistan suddenly struck at major Indian air installations in northwestern India.590 The war ended less than two weeks later with

Pakistan’s unconditional surrender to the joint Indian and rebel forces.

EXPLAINING THE NONUSE OF IRREGULARS IN BALUCHISTAN

589 Ibid., 212. 590 Ibid., 214. 191

Pakistan’s loss of its Eastern Wing (which became Bangladesh) in 1971 had significantly undermined the state’s coercive capacity. The country lost 54 percent of its population. Its army had been weakened, humiliated, and cut down to size.591 Nine thousand troops were lost, and more than 90,000 officers and men were taken prisoner.592

Moreover, Pakistan was disillusioned with its allies.593

Pakistan’s military lacked the capacity to recruit, arm, train, transport, and manage domestic nonstate actors during the 1973-77 Baluchistan campaign as it had done in East

Pakistan in May-December 1971. Pakistan’s armed forces were so organizationally weak following the humiliating defeat in a two-week war with India that they voluntarily turned the government over to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after 13 years of ruling the country.594 President Bhutto used Pakistan’s enormous military, economic, and social losses in 1971 as an opportunity further to weaken the army.595 He began a campaign to publicize the military’s surrender ceremony at Dhaka. The army opposed this campaign, but could not stop Bhutto, who used the previous regime as a surrogate for the army as a whole in his public speeches. Furthermore, as Shuja Nawaz points out, Bhutto “could have sent home many of the discredited generals but chose to keep many of them while sending

591 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 81. 592 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), 272. 593 As Stephen Cohen put it, “Pakistan’s friends, including America, had done nothing to help it [Pakistan], and the widespread international support for India had been especially galling since most Pakistani strategists believed that from the beginning New Delhi was behind the East Pakistan separatist movement.” Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 75. 594 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Directorate of Intelligence, “Memorandum: Bhutto to Visit Washington,” January 29, 1975; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 595 Author’s interview with Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (US Ambassador to Pakistan, 1996-1998), Cambridge, MA, February 14, 2011. 192

home some of the brighter ones, especially those who had opposed military action in East

Pakistan.”596 In 1972, Bhutto created a civil task force of the federal government (Federal

Security Force) as a potential rival to the army.597 In 1973, he survived a coup attempt by army officers.

While Pakistani military was growing weaker, so was the economy. The Arab Oil

Embargo contributed to Pakistan’s economic decline, as did the government’s “economic mismanagement.” Pakistan’s foreign debt rose to $7 billion, which was roughly equivalent to 6 percent of the country’s national wealth. Between 1974 and 1977, the economy grew at a rate of only 2.7 percent, or 0.3 percent less than the rate of population growth. Per capital income declined and, despite Bhutto’s socialist credentials, income distribution worsened.598

Meanwhile, Pakistan faced a major challenge from neighboring Afghanistan. The

Afghan monarchy was overthrown in 1973, and Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased under the regime of Sardar Muhammad Daoud. Daoud had never recognized the Durand

Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and was a strong advocate of

Pakhtunistan (i.e. the merger of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and

Afghanistan).599 Between 1973 and 1977, Afghanistan and Pakistan fought a proxy war.

Daoud supported Baluch rebels in Pakistan, while Pakistan backed the Afghan Islamist insurgents from Afghanistan who had taken refuge in Peshawar. After coming to power

596 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 323. 597 Ibid., 321. 598 Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2003), 27. 599 Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, 80. 193

(about 5 months after the insurgency in Baluchistan had begun), Daoud established training camps for the Baluch rebels, training 10,000-15,000 tribesmen for war against Pakistan.600

“Despite fresh infusions of U.S. and Iranian military aid, the Pakistani armed forces are unable to mount a definitive campaign against the insurgent regime [in Baluchistan], because another carefully coordinated rebellion breaks out among the 12 million Pushtuns straddling the northwest sector of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,” historian Selig

Harrison summed up Pakistan’s predicament.601

CONCLUSION

Tracing Pakistan’s 1971 and 1973-77 military campaigns shows the weakness of the conventional explanations in accounting for the state’s incorporation of domestic nonstate actors into its military apparatus. Had plausible deniability or military weakness been a cause of outsourcing, we would have seen Pakistan using domestic nonstate actors from the very beginning of the campaign, as it had done in 1965, and in the Baluchistan campaign. In Baluchistan, only regulars were used in the military operations against the rebels. It was not until the state built high military capacity in the country’s remote eastern wing and the target penetrated the local population across the province and that outsourcing occurred in East Pakistan. While the Pakistani troops had the military capacity to recruit, arm, train, and manage thousands of irregulars, they lacked the local knowledge required to catch the rebels embedded in the local communities and the numerical presence required to cover the entire territory of rebel operations. These tactical disadvantages where reduced

600 Haqqani, Pakistan, 174. 601 Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan,” Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Autumn 1978): 137. 194

by the use of irregulars, though at the same time introduced new challenges and unintended consequences, which ultimately led to Pakistan’s military defeat.

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Appendix A

Disparities between West and East Pakistan602 Employment Statistics, 1968-69 (percentages)

Sector West Pakistan East Pakistan Central Civil Service 84% 16% Foreign Service 85% 15% Army 95% 5% Navy (technical) 81% 19% Navy (non-technical) 91% 9% Air Force Pilots 89% 11%

Employment Statistics, 1968-69 (in number)

Sector West Pakistan East Pakistan Armed Forces 500,000 20,000 Officers of the rank of 16 1 General in the army Pakistan International 7,000 280 Airlines (PIA) P.I.A. Directors 9 1 P.I.A. managers 9 0 Railway Board Directors 7 1 Foreign Heads of Missions 60 9

Social Welfare Statistics, 1968-69

West Pakistan East Pakistan Population 55 million 75 million Total number of doctors 12,400 7,600 Total number of hospital 26,000 6,000 beds Rural Health Centers 325 88 Urban Community 81 52 Development Centers

602 Islam, A Tale of Millions, 32-37. 196

Average Annual Budget, 1968-69

Total Revenue Rs. 6,000 million West Pakistan East Pakistan Expenditure on Total 60% 50% 10% Defense Civil Expenditure Total 40% 25% 15% Note: East Pakistan provided 60% of total revenue, but received only about 25% of its expenditure; West Pakistan provided 40% in the central exchequer received the remaining 75% Foreign Trade and Exchange Earnings, 1958-68

West Pakistan East Pakistan

Export Import* Export Import

41% 70% 59% 30%

*Major portion of this was spent on various development projects

Percentage of allocation of Funds for Development Projects, 1968-69

Item West Pakistan East Pakistan Foreign Exchange for 80% 20% various developments Foreign Aid (excluding 96% 4% U.S. Aid) U.S. Aid 66% 34% Pakistan Industrial 58% 42% Development Corporation Pakistan Industrial Credit & 80% 20% Investment Corporation Industrial Development 76% 24% Bank House Building 88% 12%

TOTAL 77% 23%

197

Education, 1947-48 versus 1968-69

Area West Pakistan East Pakistan 1947-48 1968-69 1947-48 1968-69 Primary Schools 8,413 39,418 29,663 28,308 4.5 times increase Decrease (in spite of increase in number of children) Secondary Schools 1947-48 1965-66 1947-48 1965-66 2,598 4,472 3,481 3,964 176% increase 114% increase Colleges (various types) 40 271 50 162 675% increase 320% increase Medical/Engineering/Agricultural 4 17 3 9 colleges 425% increase 300% increase Universities 2 6 1 4 654 18,708 1,620 8,831 scholars scholars scholars scholars Increase in scholars 30 times 5 times

198

Appendix B Strategy and Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare603 Translated from Bangla

Ambush and deceive: the best tactic for guerrillas is ambush. In enemy controlled areas, it requires working with small number of men and arms, so, anything other than ambush can bring massive counter attack and can incur unexpected amount of damages. Therefore for ambush tactic, the guerrillas have to act in the following methods: Attack where enemy suspects no threat of attack. Do not repeat the action in the same area; then enemy may be cautious and can attack. Operate during nights. Follow no regular method; change it whenever you need. Be cautious always.

Caution: to live is the most vital aspect for guerrilla. Do not do anything that brings threat to your existence. Remain vigilant always so that enemy cannot do surprise attack on you. Speed: guerrillas do not have the transport system that the soldiers use in regular warfare. Therefore guerrilla activities should be around the area where modern transports of the soldiers cannot reach. Guerrilla speed is necessary for: Creating obstacle Surprise For speed guerrillas have to be Physically light Physically and psychologically firm Thoughtful and good planner

Attack: guerrilla would be active in attack. In case of attack from enemy, frontal encounter has to be avoided.

Spirit: the spirit of guerrilla has to be of supreme kind as well. Their attitude has to show that they are from the same family, same ideals and fighting for the same cause. Guerrilla never flees while his fellow is in danger.

Discipline: guerrilla even endangers his life but obeys the command of the leader. ‘DO’S’ AND ‘DON’TS’ FOR FREEDOM FIGHTERS Do’s: Be always informed about enemy Be careful about agents of the enemy; they are spread everywhere. Camp has to be saved by way of cautionary arrangements like observation post, patrol, password, etc. Assemble all power and attack where enemy is weak; skip when enemy is more powerful. Guerrilla has to be running always-withdraw immediately after any operation.

603 Booklet by M.A. Manzoor, “Directives for Guerrilla Fighters” in ed. Biswas, Bangladesh Liberation War Mujibnagar Government Documents, 1971, 566-567. 199

From any destructive attack in response to guerrilla activities, village has to be protected. Guerrilla has to show respect to women; care the children. They will save both in case of danger. The honesty, justice and integrity of freedom fighters have to be displayed to the people. Don’ts: Do not involve in indiscriminate killing. Do not involve in civil conflict; do not use arms to revenge of past civil conflict. Freedom fighters would never be engaged in unjust activities of looting, killing, rape, or extortion- the punishment is sentence to death. Do not touch looted goods in any operation. In case of control of any government food store room, it has to ensure that the goods of the store are distributed among the locals; don’t involve yourself. If any enemy agent is killed, his or her heir would inherit his or her property. Do not discuss the plan for operation with anyone who does not need to know that. Do not remain stuck in one place-it would be suicidal if not in movement always.

THE LEADER OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAS TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING DUTIES:

Make all administrations of Pakistan state including police non-functioning. Take necessary security measures to protect people from oppression of Pakistani soldiers, Razakars and police forces. Supply foods to civilians during famine. Manage medication to patients if possible. Keep all schools of children running and keep all men like, blacksmith, small entrepreneurs, and farmers active in their professions. Be careful about honesty, discipline, strong belief to our cause among the freedom fighters.

OATH I thereby promise witnessing Allah/Vogoban that, I am ready to sacrifice my life for the liberation of Bangladesh. I also promise that:-

I will remain obedient to People, and obedient to governmental and freedom fighters legally. I will employ all strength in the welfare of people in all ways even sacrificing my life. I will engage in the destruction of our primary enemy Pakistani army. I will not involve in looting, burning, and unsocial activities, will not touch any looted goods. I will not abuse women and children. I will not kill any Bengali or not assist to kill if arms not taken against freedom fighters.

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CHAPTER 7

EMBEZZLERS AND REBELS IN RUSSIA’S CHECHNYA CAMPAIGN

Does an explanation of state outsourcing of violence that is based on military capacity and target density travel beyond South Asia? In this chapter, I evaluate the explanatory power of the argument proposed and supported in the previous chapters vis-à- vis the existing explanations based on military weakness and plausible deniability with two cases drawn from post-Soviet Russia. Russia’s military campaigns in Chechnya provide an opportunity to gauge the competing explanations in a non-South Asia context. Russia’s historical and political endowment is very different from those of Pakistan and India. While

Pakistan and India are former colonies, Russia was at the helm of an empire and, later, a co-architect of the bipolar Cold War system. Russia’s military was never as politically powerful as has been that of Pakistan, and the country had not had the decades-long experience with democracy as had India. Despite their major historical and political differences, Russia, Pakistan, and India responded very similarly to the military capacity and target density constraints on military operations. It was neither military weakness nor plausible deniability that led Russia to form a military outfit composed of domestic nonstate actors, but the spatial distribution of the military target and the military’s capacity to mobilize and support the irregulars.

Chechnya, located in southeastern Europe’s Caucasus region, is one of Russia’s twenty-one ethnically-defined republics. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in

1991, Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev declared Chechnya’s independence from Russia.

201

Russian president Boris Yeltsin responded by sending troops to Chechnya’s capital

Grozny, but Dudayev’s forces prevented them from leaving the Grozny airport. Yeltsin refused to recognize Chechnya’s independence, fearing a “chain reaction of further declarations of independence” by the “more important” republics.604 On November 26,

1994, the Russian security service (then called the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and is now known as the FSB) supported Chechen opposition forces in their attempt to capture Grozny. The failure of this “poorly prepared and disastrously executed” maneuver left the Kremlin with “a difficult choice between an ignominious retreat and a decisive military intervention by Russian federal forces.”605 On November 29, 1994, the Russian air force bombed Grozny. Two days later, the army launched a full-scale ground assault on the city, with a mission to “restore constitutional order” in the rebellious republic.606

The Russian military failed to overcome the Chechen resistance and, in 1996, withdrew its forces under a peace agreement that gave Chechnya considerable autonomy, though not full independence. The Chechen chief of staff who organized the defense of

Grozny, Aslan Maskhadov, was elected president. Under his tenure, Chechnya plunged into chaos and economic collapse. Maskhadov’s political rival, Shamil Basayev, established a network of military officers who then turned into rival warlords. Organized crime and kidnappings became rampant.607 In August 1999, Basayev and Saudi-born Ibn

604 Anna Politkovskaya, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 17-18. 605 Dmitri V. Trenin and Aleksei V. Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 21. 606 Whereas the Russian Interior Ministry was in charge during the First Chechen War, the Ministry of Defense was made “top dog” during the Second Chechen War. Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 135. 607 The number of armed groups active in Chechnya between the years 1996 and 1999 increased to 157. Chechnya became the biggest producer, consumer, and dealer in weapons and narcotics in 202

al-Khattab led roughly 1,500 fighters into neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state. To their surprise, instead of a mass anti-Russia uprising, the village-by-village operation was met with a spontaneous mass mobilization of Dagestani civilians against the invaders.608 By mid-September 1999,

Russian forces, with significant help from the local police and civilians, succeeded in recapturing the villages that fell under the control of the militants and pushed the invaders back into Chechnya.

After a series of apartment bombings, which killed nearly 300 people in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia, newly appointed Russian prime minister (and former head of the

FSB) Vladimir Putin sent federal forces into Chechnya. On September 23, 1999, the

Russian air force bombed Grozny. Maskhadov responded by declaring martial law and called for a ghazevat, or holy war. The Kremlin denounced Maskhadov and proclaimed the

Moscow-based State Council of the Republic of Chechnya, which was formed by former members of the Chechen republican legislature, the only legitimate Chechen authority. In

December, the Russian military began a full-scale attack on Grozny, the locus of Chechen resistance. A centerpiece of the operation was an outfit comprising hundreds of former rebels led by an ex-Grozny mayor and convicted embezzler, Bislan Gantamirov, who was released from prison to lead the irregulars. The gantamirovtsy (“Gantamirov’s men”) made

South Russia. Pro-regime groups controlled oil pipelines and the illegal trade in oil products, while the other organized criminal groups specialized in robberies, kidnappings, and trade in “live” goods. Between 1996 and 1999, more than 3,500 Chechens were kidnapped for ransom. Dzhabrail Gakaev, “Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya,” in Chechnya: From Past to Future, ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 31-32. 608 Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”; Colin McMahon, “Moscow Caught Off Guard by Dagestan Rebels,” Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-09-07/news/9909070170_1_dagestani- chechnya-russian-warplanes. 203

it possible for the Russian troops to capture Grozny in February of 2000. The Russian government then turned to Gantamirov’s rival, former anti-Russia rebel Mufti Ahkmad

Kadyrov. The Chechen cleric was appointed to head the administration in Chechnya, and his kadyrovtsy (“Kadyrov’s men”),609 a mix of ex-rebels and inexperienced hopefuls, helped to establish Moscow’s control over the rest of the republic. In April 2009, under the presidency of late Kadyrov’s son, Russia officially ended its “counterterrorism” campaign in Chechnya.610

THE PUZZLE

When Yeltsin launched a full-scale ground assault on Grozny on December 31,

1994, the Russian state and military institutions were in dismal condition. An opinion poll conducted in October 1994 revealed that 95 percent of Russians were under the impression that real power in their country lay in the hands of the “mafia.”611 Real national output was falling rapidly, and, by 1994, the withholding of wages and government pensions and allowances became “common practice, with arrears for some extending months and even

609 The ex-cleric was assassinated in 2004 by Basayev’s forces. Putin then redirected his support to Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, who was the commander of the kadyrovtsy. By 2006, the kadyrovtsy squad boasted at least 5,000 armed members. Emil Souleimanov, “Russian Chechnya Policy: ‘Chechenization’ Turning into ‘Kadyrovization’?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 8, no. 11 (May 31, 2006), 4. Many of them were integrated into the system of Russian law enforcement agencies and security authorities. Moreover, the control over all Ministry of Internal Affairs structures of Chechnya was gradually transferred to Kadyrov’s associates. In 2007, after Kadyrov turned 30 (which made him eligible for presidency), Putin signed a decree installing him as the acting president of the Chechen Republic. Human Rights Center Memorial, “The Chechen Republic: Consequences of ‘Chechenization’ of the Conflict,” 2006, accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/texts/6chechen.shtml. 610 Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,” New York Times, April 16, 2009, accessed March 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html?_r=0. 611 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 213. 204

years.”612 The capacity of the Russian armed forces to carry out combat missions in 1994 was estimated to have been five to six times lower than what it was in 1991.613

Some accounts of the first Chechnya campaign speculate that the Russian officials misjudged Russian military preparedness.614 Often cited is Defense Minister Pavel

Grachev’s promise to win with “one paratroop regiment in two hours.”615 However, just ten days before the start of the war, Grachev identified serious problems in a top-secret directive. These included the armed forces’ low level of combat capabilities and mobilization readiness, inadequacy of operational planning capability, poor training of soldiers, and high suicide rates and overall number of crimes committed in the force.

Grachev most likely “privately understood the true problems in the force but put on the face of public bravado.” 616 Russia’s military weakness was far from a secret to the Russian military establishment: a total of 557 officers of all ranks were disciplined, sacked, or resigned in protest against the first Chechen war, for which they felt the Russian armed forces were unprepared.617 With the conspicuous Chechnya campaign, Yeltsin was putting his hard-earned “superpresidency”618 on the line. The Russian public was “overwhelmingly opposed” to the war,619 and the political opposition forces – including the ultra-nationalists and communists – were gaining momentum.

612 Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 230. 613 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” article first appeared in Parameters (Summer 1999): 87-102, accessed April 1, 2013, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/battle.htm. 614 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, x-xi. 615 Politkovskaya, A Small Corner of Hell, 19. 616 Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny.” 617 Lieven, Chechnya, 106. 618 Colton, Yeltsin, 5. 619 Politkovskaya, A Small Corner of Hell, 20. 205

At the start of the second Chechnya campaign, the situation was very different. The

Russian strategists “carefully studied the mistakes of the first war” and consequently made

“key improvements” in multiple areas.620 The reforms improved the material conditions of the Russian armed forces and made them more effective. For example, during the first

Chechnya campaign, multiple ministries and organizations with troops deployed to

Chechnya each had their own competing command structures; coordination between

Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs units, between ground and air forces, and among troops on the ground was “abysmal.”621 For the second Chechnya campaign, command and control was simplified and improved with a single hierarchy under the

Ministry of Defense; force coordination and synchronization of air and land operations

“improved vastly.”622 In sharp contrast to the first war, within several months of the second campaign the Russian troops controlled about 80 percent of Chechen territory.623

Again, in sharp contrast to the first war, the majority of the Russian public supported the second Chechnya war,624 especially after a series of apartment bombings in

Russia that were widely attributed to unidentified “Chechens.”625 While in 1994, the bombardment of Grozny “provoked such fierce protest that the President was forced to declare publicly that he had ordered it stopped,” in 1999 “no passions were raised by the deaths of innocent people.”626 At the same time, Yeltsin was also no longer clutching his

620 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, xi. 621 Ibid. 622 Ibid., xii. 623 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 35. 624 Emil Pain, “The Chechen War in the Context of Contemporary Russian Politics,” in Chechnya: From Past to Future, ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 69. 625 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 38. 626 Pain, “The Chechen War in the Context of Contemporary Russian Politics,” 68-69. 206

post. Having picked Putin as his premier and manager of the day-to-day coordination of the military campaign, Yeltsin “chose for himself the lame-duck status.”627 His appointment of Putin as prime minister came right after Basayev entered Dagestan. On

December 31, 1999, Yeltsin suddenly abdicated his position, making Putin the acting president. Putin’s “forceful prosecution of the war,” and increasing of pension payments from the federal budget, quickly mobilized public support.628 It also heralded the beginning of the rebuilding and strengthening of the Russian state.629

The existing theories would predict Russia outsourcing violence in the first

Chechnya campaign. It took place at a time when the Russian state and military were exceptionally weak. Yeltsin’s political vulnerability and domestic public opinion against the Russian troops’ involvement in Chechnya also generated the incentives for the state to pursue plausible deniability. However, the Russian state formed irregular outfits of domestic nonstate actors not during the first, but during the second campaign in Chechnya.

It outsourced violence by creating military organizations composed of former rebels and civilians only after the military had regained its capacity.630 Yeltsin had voluntarily withdrawn from the political scene, and thus had nothing at stake. The Russian public was fully on board with the second Chechnya campaign. The Western leaders supported

Russia’s first campaign in Chechnya, and maintained the same position at the onset of the second war. While they voiced some concern over the use of force against innocent

627 Colton, Yeltsin, 433. 628 Ibid. 629 For comprehensive analysis of the successes and limitations of rebuilding state capacity and quality under Putin, see Brian D. Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 630 Prior to regaining military capacity, the Russian government’s actions were limited to co-opting and turning a blind eye to the already existing groups. 207

civilians, Western observers “still acknowledged the Russian right to defend its territorial integrity.”631 Thus, unlike during the first Chechnya campaign, during the second

Chechnya campaign there was little need for plausible deniability. Why, then, did the

Russian government outsource violence to domestic nonstate actors during the second, and not the first, military venture in Chechnya? What explains the discrepancy in the outcome predicted by the conventional explanations?

As the next sections demonstrate, the Russian state’s use of domestic nonstate actors in Chechnya is best explained by the structural constraints and opportunities generated by (1) the state’s military capacity and (2) the spatial composition of the military target.

LESSONS FROM THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

The low coercive capacity of the Russian state at the onset of the first Chechnya campaign made it virtually impossible for it to mobilize an irregular outfit composed of domestic nonstate actors, despite the supply of Russia supporters, as well as a significant need for their assistance inside Grozny. The Russian security apparatus was in such disarray that it was barely able to carry out its regular military functions. It was in no position to recruit, organize, and control an irregular outfit.

The objective of the Chechnya campaign was to depose Dudayev’s rule, headquartered in Grozny. There was a marked supply of pro-Russia elements inside

Chechnya. In fact, by the summer of 1994, Dudayev had little control of the republic

631 Mike Bowker, “Western Views of the Chechen Conflict,” in Richard Sakwa, ed. Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 231. 208

outside of Grozny.632 The pro-Russia armed forces of Dudayev’s opposition controlled the republic’s northern regions,633 and some were also stationed east634 and southwest of the capital.635 Grozny was historically a mainly ethnic Russian-inhabited city.636 It was home to thousands of ethnic Russians who could potentially serve as collaborators,637 while in

Moscow alone, the number of ethnic Chechens, who could potentially fill the ranks of irregulars, was roughly 40,000.638 However, the military strategy relied exclusively on the regular troops. Earlier covert attempts to support Chechen opposition factions failed. They resulted in the capture of the supporting Russian troops,639 and forced Yeltsin to respond militarily. The episodes revealed the extent of degradation in Moscow’s military capacity.

In particular, they exposed the Russian state’s inability to assist, let alone put together, an irregular military outfit.

Preparations for war began in the fall of 1994. 640 The final decision was taken at the Security Council meeting on November 29, 1994. Among the attendees were Russia’s defense minister, head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, foreign minister, and

632 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 163-167. 633 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 20. 634 Yury Golotyuk, “On the Eve: Bad Peace Before a Good Quarrel,” Current Digest of the Russian Press 46, no. 31, August 31, 1994, 1. 635 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 163. 636 Anatol Lieven, “Gracious Grozny,” National Interest, September 18, 2008, accessed April 4, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/article/gracious-grozny-2865. 637 Most of the Russian population lived in the center of the city. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny.” 638 Tishkov, Chechnya, 69. 639 The Federal Counterintelligence Service recruited tank drivers from an elite division based near Moscow and supplied them with forty tanks. The tanks and their Russian army tank crews supported the anti-Dudayev forces which on November 26, 1994 attempted an assault on Grozny. They were “spectacularly” defeated, as the infantry “was easily separated from the armor, the tanks were bombed and stopped, and the tank crews were taken prisoner.” Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14. 640 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 221. 209

interior minister. Excluded from the decision-making process were the General Staff and the command of the North Caucasus Military District.641 On December 11, Yeltsin’s decree authorizing the invasion came into force. The plan was for three columns, starting from points north, west, and east of the republic, to converge on Grozny.642 Between 30,000 and

40,000 Russian servicemen and several thousand military vehicles (including hundreds of tanks) were to be used. A government spokesman in Moscow initially denied that an invasion was underway, even after columns of vehicles were spotted moving through north-west Chechnya.643 The military strategy was similar to the one used by the Soviet forces in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Victory would be achieved

“through awe”644 – by intimidating Dudayev’s supporters with a show of force.645 It relied on the assumption that there would be no large-scale armed resistance in Chechnya.

At the onset of the campaign, the Russian armed forces were in such disarray that, as Anatol Lieven observed, “there seemed to be a real possibility that the unity of the

Russian army would crack, and with it the obedience of junior commanders to the Defense

Ministry and the military hierarchy.”646 The dissolution of the Soviet Union had a profound and destabilizing effect on the state of the Russian armed forces. By 1994, Russia’s military budget was dramatically reduced from its Soviet levels. Only half of the $12 billion allocated to the military had been paid out. “Troops were unpaid, training was sparse, equipment went disrepaired; morale collapsed,” describes former USSR and Russia-based

641 Lieven, Chechnya, 105. 642 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 223. 643 Ibid., 225. 644 Ibid., 222. 645 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 12. 646 Lieven, Chechnya, 102. 210

journalist Robert Seely. “In the sudden absence of purpose, dramatic lowering of prestige, and multiple day-to-day problems, the armed forces experienced a breakdown of basic discipline, resulting in a sharp rise in offenses ranging from violence and drunkenness to the illegal sale of weaponry.”647 At the onset of the first Chechnya war, the Russian army had not held divisional or regimental field exercises since 1992. The military was receiving roughly 30-40 percent of its requirements for funding and supplies, and suffered significant shortages of junior officers. Not a single regiment was functioning at full strength.648

The Russian strategists calculated that, while Chechnya possessed an enormous arsenal of weapons, only Dudayev’s presidential guard stood ready for battle. “What

Moscow did not understand was that because the civilian population, too, possessed a multitude of weapons, they could quickly be mobilized for combat,” argues Russian scholar Valery Tishkov.649 From early December, Chechen volunteers, expecting a Russian military attack, began arriving in Grozny,650 which, in 1994, had nearly 490,000 residents.651 More than 300,000 of them fled Grozny to escape the rocket bombardments by federal forces, but the remaining population “was used as a human shield by the fighters.”652 The city housed many multiple-story buildings and industrial installations covering some 100 square miles.653 The Chechen resistance has been preparing for the battle of Grozny for at least 3-4 months prior to the Russian campaign, putting into practice

647 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 220. 648 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 14. 649 Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 69. 650 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 170. 651 Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny.” 652 Richard Sakwa, “Introduction: Why Chechnya?” in Chechnya: From Past to Future, ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 28. 653 Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny.” 211

“all the things that the Soviet analysts had identified as key lessons of World War II.”654

The rebels were well trained and many of them were veterans of the Soviet military. Most of them knew Grozny well, and their light weapons facilitated their mobility across closely set buildings and underground passages.655

The Russian armed forces were reluctant to get involved in domestic disputes.

Lieven describes witnessing a “near mutiny” of the western column, when it encountered unexpected resistance from the civilian population while advancing to Grozny. On

December 13, the column confronted a crowd of Chechen women performing a zikr (ritual prayer) on the road. They told the Russian soldiers that to advance they would have to drive over them. The head of the column announced that he would not kill civilians, and refused to advance any further.656 He then walked hand in hand down the village high street with a group of elderly women, shouting: “It is not our fault that we are here. We did not want this. This operation contradicts the constitution. It is forbidden to use the army against peaceful civilians.”657

The roughly 6,000 troops that finally made it to Grozny658 were not adequately prepared for the “urban battlefield or for any other,” as they were composed of “conscripts and haphazardly assembled ad hoc units” most of whom had not trained together before being sent to Grozny.659 The poor organization was reflected in the high rate of fratricide

654 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 16. 655 Ibid., 17. 656 Lieven, Chechnya, 103. 657 Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 226-27. 658 Grachev had a force of some 38,000 men, but only 6,000 of them entered Grozny on New Year’s Eve. Dudayev’s forces numbered roughly 15,000 men. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny.” 659 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 14. 212

(mistaken killing of Russian soldiers by Russian soldiers). It accounted for estimated 60 percent of Russian casualties in Chechnya.660

The inability of the Russian state effectively to prepare and manage its own regular forces made it impossible for it to mobilize and employ an irregular outfit, despite the existing supply of pro-Russia elements inside and outside of Chechnya. An irregular outfit would have been especially useful in Grozny. The Russian army had remarkably little understanding of the city and the target of the operation. It relied on outdated maps and lacked intelligence on centers of resistance.661 The ground assault on Grozny was launched on December 31, the day the Russian media were on a holiday over the New Year.662

During the subsequent “siege,” which lasted roughly seven weeks, the city was open to the south and east, which allowed the Chechen fighters to receive continuous reinforcement and resupply.663 The nonstate actors could have assisted the Russian forces to navigate the streets and people of Grozny, where the rebels mixed with the local population, and cut the rebel supply lines. This is precisely the purpose for which an irregular outfit was formed during the second Chechnya campaign, by which time the Russian state had built up its coercive capacity.

LESSONS FROM THE SECOND CAMPAIGN

In November 1999, a month after the start of the second Chechnya campaign,

Yeltsin released from prison a convicted embezzler. The ex-mayor of Grozny, who was

660 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 16. 661 Lieven, Chechnya, 109. 662 The storming of Grozny by Russian troops on December 31 was “the real starting point of the first Chechen campaign.” Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 22. 663 Lieven, Chechnya, 109. 213

jailed for misappropriating federal funds allocated for the restoration of the Chechen capital, was to lead an irregular military outfit comprising former rebels. The 5,000 to 6,000

Chechen militants664 were to assist the Russian federal troops in gaining control of

Grozny.665

Bislan Gantamirov was initially “an active adherent” of Dudayev. However, in

1993, after clashing with the Chechen president over oil business revenues, he became a major figure in the anti-Dudayev movement. Up to 3,000 militants were then under his command.666 Gantamirov’s release from prison immediately prompted Russian newspaper

Kommersant to speculate that it was intended to help the Russian army to take over

Grozny.667 Gantamirov then publicly announced his intent “to assume command of all armed forces which will be formed out of Chechen population” and, afterward, to assume an official political post in Chechnya.668

The gantamirovtsy equipped with arms, including submachine guns, by the federal forces.669 Their main purpose was to help the Russian troops navigate the “local peculiarities” of Grozny, serving as “a kind of a buffer between the federal troops and local residents.”670 The Russian military estimated that 4,000 out of roughly 10,000 to 12,000

664 Olga Alenova and Musa Muradov, “The Efficiency of Gantamirov’s Regiment Has Been Tested in Combat,” Kommersant Daily, December 3, 1999, 3. 665 Yuri Bagrov, “Pro-Russian Militia Leader Resigns,” Associated Press, April 18, 2000, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2000/Pro-Russian-Militia-Leader-Resigns/id- 5d2d85ad00cfb67090cc10fd5909868b. 666 Berres, “Russia’s First Guerrilla.” 667 “Russia-Press-Review,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, November 6, 1999. 668 “Russia-Chechnya-New-Man,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, November 14, 1999. 669 Alenova and Muradov, “The Efficiency of Gantamirov’s Regiment Has Been Tested in Combat.” 670 Ibid. 214

people remaining in Grozny were rebel fighters.671 Others estimated the number of civilians in Grozny to be as high as 35,000.672 Russian officials helped Gantamirov to put together a 500-member irregular armed force. It was charged with “fighting a way into central

Grozny pressing from three directions.” The plan of the Grozny operation envisioned a

“‘web-like’ pattern of the presence and action of federal troops in Grozny. With

Gantamirov’s groups in vanguard fighting, the army’s special task units and armour will be moving to their rear. After Grozny is under the ‘web’, the third stage of the operation will start, which is destruction of the rebel manpower.”673

Rather than keeping secret or denying the role of the nonstate actors in the second

Chechnya campaign, the Russian officials publicly highlighted and sometimes even overemphasized the role of the gantamirovtsy. “If anybody is going to enter Grozny, it will be the volunteers of Bislan Gantamirov,” pronounced the commander of the unified federal group in the North Caucasus in early December.674 “The main load of fulfilling tasks in

Grozny is on the [Gantamirov] militia,” stated a Russian Air Force commander in late

December, but acknowledged that “the army cannot be totally excluded” from action.675

The irregular outfit was accompanied in the city proper by an assault force of 4,000-5,000 regulars.676 The illicit nature of creating and arming an irregular rebel force was not lost on the leader of the State Council of Chechnya Malik Saidullaev, who conducted negotiations

671 “Russia-Chechnya,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, December 11, 1999. 672 Aslan Ramazanov and Maxim Stepenin, “Feds Begin to Launch Assault against Chechen Capital,” Kommersant-Daily, December 15, 1999, 1. 673 “Russia-Chechnya-Grozny,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, December 25, 1999. 674 “Federals Unlikely to Storm Grozny, Warlords Ready to Pay Anything for Escape,” Military News Agency, December 12, 1999. 675“Russia-Chechnya-Grozny,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, December 25, 1999. 676 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 44. 215

on the Russian side to surrender Grozny: “I cannot understand why he [Gantamirov] and his supporters were armed, I cannot think of an appropriate Russian law that allows such an action.”677

Tens of thousands of insurgents mixed with the civilian population of Grozny, despite the military’s efforts to drive the civilians out of the city. Maskhadov deemed

Grozny “the main theater, the place where the most damage could be inflicted on the

Russians” due to the Chechen insurgents’ superior cultural and territorial command of the city.678 The fighters in Grozny constituted “the core of the resistance.”679 As during the first Chechnya campaign, the Russian armed forces required assistance in identifying and isolating the enemy in order to gain control of the city. However, the mobilization and use of gantamirovtsy, which led to Russia’s ultimate victory in Grozny, would not have been possible without the significant boost in Russia’s military capacity prior to the second

Chechnya campaign.

The difference in Russia’s military capacity in the first and second Chechnya campaigns was stark. For example, at the beginning of the first Chechnya war the number of operational group of the federal forces was 24,000, but at the start of the second campaign it neared 100,000.680 The principle of volunteer participation of conscript soldiers in combat, which existed during the first war, was abolished.681 Shifts in the

677 Musa Muradov, “The Guerrilla Fighters are Going to Withdraw from Grozny,” Kommersant Daily, December 10, 1999, 3. 678 Akhmadov and Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle, 177. 679 Ibid., 178. 680 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 131-132. Pavel K. Baev, “Chechnya and the Russian Military: A War Too Far?” in Chechnya: From Past to Future, ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 119. 681 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 132. 216

military budget led to improved access to arms and equipment. Military morale and efficiency were also boosted through improved coordination, which enhanced the efficiency of the armed forces. A single command and control system was put in place and, while did not eliminate all problems, marked “a clear improvement.”682 The majority of the Russian public was fully on board with the campaign while the insurgency no longer enjoyed the same level of support in Chechnya, which further increased the morale and performance of the Russian troops. Russia’s military pre-Chechnya victory in Dagestan, which was supported by self-organized civilian defense groups, signed the improvement.

After establishing control in Grozny, Moscow switched its support from

Gantamirov to Kadyrov. What made Kadyrov attractive to the Russian government was that while he was powerful, he was not too powerful.683 Kadyrov’s influence was at that time limited to Chechnya’s northern and northeastern regions, where separatist sentiments had been traditional weaker and federal controls tighter. Kadyrov has never been supported by the majority within Chechen society,684 and so was more dependent on the Kremlin than would have been Gantamirov. The former mayor of Grozny emerged as a war hero. While he was working for the Russian government, the Russian authorities cultivated an image of Gantamirov as “a courageous man who has a great authority in Chechnya.”685 The former mayor of Grozny was also associated with normalcy by many in the capital city.

Grozny’s residents could “still remember that it was under Gantemirov that things got back to normal: The markets began operating, apartment buildings started being rebuilt, and

682 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 51. 683 This logic of alliances is consistent with Christia’s (2012) findings on Afghan commanders’ alliances. 684 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier, 37. 685 Loris Gukasyan, “Russia-Chechnya-Voluntee,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, December 10, 1999. 217

schools and hospitals opened.”686 After Gantamirov and his men had served their military purpose, the Russian government then handed over the reins of Chechnya to Kadyrov and his men.

CONCLUSION

Post-Soviet Russia’s campaigns in Chechnya support the argument that military capacity and target density play a key role in the state’s outsourcing behavior. Had the

Russian military been stronger and better organized, there is good reason to expect that domestic nonstate actors would have played an important role in Russia’s first Chechnya campaign against the insurgents, who mixed with the local population. Had the Russian military been as weak and unorganized as it had been during the first Chechnya campaign, it would have unlikely outsourced violence to militants to navigate Grozny during the second Chechnya campaign.

686 “Russia’s No. 1 Guerrilla – Yeltsin Pardons Beslan Gantemirov – He Might Be Useful,” Current Digest of the Russian Press 51, no. 45, December 8, 1999. 218

CHAPTER 8

AN UN-HALAL ALLIANCE?

AGHAS, ISLAMISTS, AND TURKEY’S SECULAR MILITARY AGAINST KURDISH REBELS

This chapter explores the theory of state outsourcing of violence proposed in the dissertation with a case study of Turkey’s military campaign against Kurdish separatists. It probes whether target density and military capacity better explain Turkey’s military incorporation of domestic nonstate actors than the leading alternative explanations, which underscore military weakness and the causal role of plausible deniability.

The case of Turkey fully supports the argument that the spatial distribution of the military target shapes both the incentives and the methods of outsourcing. The insurgents strategically mixed with the local population throughout their campaign, and the Turkish state immediately responded by bringing in the domestic nonstate actors. When the insurgency was spread out across hundreds of remote villages of southeastern Turkey, the state used civilians – villagers with little or no previous military experience – to cover the large territory. When the insurgents moved into urban neighborhoods, the state brought in militants – Islamist “contras” and ex-rebels – to carry out selective violence (e.g. assassinations).

Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign also carries important insight about the role of military capacity in violence outsourcing. The military campaign against the Kurdish insurgents began with Turkey’s low military capacity in the region, as the bulk of the

219

military strength was initially concentrated on the Greek border and the military was geared toward international, rather than domestic, warfare. However, the state was able to bypass the constraint by using local Kurdish clan networks to recruit and organize the nonstate counterinsurgents. The initial clan-based recruitment, supported by the state’s previously established connection to specific local tribes, allowed the state to bring in thousands of domestic nonstate actors into its counterinsurgency campaign. However, as soon as the state built high military capacity in the region, it began recruiting the domestic nonstate actors directly. The case of Turkey thus also suggests that when target density is favorable to outsourcing, but high military capacity is absent, a state may turn to other mechanisms of outsourcing. Before the military developed the capacity to itself recruit and organize the nonstate actors, it co-opted local clan chiefs (aghas) who were ideologically opposed to

Kurdish separatism to supply the irregular manpower.

The next section describes the background of the Kurdish insurgency campaign and

Turkey’s response. The sections that follow assess the role of target density and military capacity in shaping the state’s strategy vis-à-vis domestic nonstate actors.

INSURGENCY BEGINS

In the 1970s, Turkey’s major cities were on fire. Right-wing and left-wing political organizations violently clashed on the streets of Ankara and Istanbul. The 1970s was also a time when a wave of Kurdish youth from predominantly rural southeastern Turkey arrived in the major cities to study and work.687 Among the first-generation Kurdish

687 Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2007): 11. 220

university students were the founders of a militant organization that combined Marxism-

Leninism with Kurdish separatist nationalism – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The goal, as articulated by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, was to liberate “Kurdistan” from

Turkish colonialism. Its attainment required not only attacking the institutions and agents of Turkish repression, along with their foreign supporters, but also the reorganization of the feudal power structure of Kurdish society.688 In 1975, Öcalan and his six friends embarked on a tour of the Kurdish-majority territory, starting with their home regions, to recruit followers. The PKK was officially established on November 27, 1978 near the city of Diyarbakır, the prospective capital of a pan-Kurdish state.

Selected PKK members initially received military instruction at Palestinian training camps, until the organization established its own training camps in the early 1980s in Beka

Valley, in Syrian-occupied Lebanon.689 Base camps were set up in northern Iraq.690 The

PKK inaugurated its violent campaign on August 15, 1984 with an attack on two gendarmerie stations. The ensuing activities, including the recruitment of followers, spread from the border areas to the rest of the Kurdish-majority region. The region is predominantly rural, characterized by low population density. In the 1980s, 62 percent of the population lived in villages, and roughly 36,000 settlements had less than 2,000 inhabitants.691 Basing its logistics network on local production and relying on the local

688 Belge, “State Building and the Limits of Legibility,” 105. 689 Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci, and I. Sevki Eldivan, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against the PKK: The ‘Fish’ or the ‘Water’?” in Sıddık Ekici, Ahmet Ekici, David A. McEntire, Richard H. Ward, and Sudha S. Arlikatti, eds. Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), 269-270. 690 İsmet G. İmset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992) 38-41. 691 Matthew Kocher, “The Decline of PKK and the Viability of a One-State Solution in Turkey,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies 4, no. 1 (2002), 4. 221

rural population for recruits, intelligence, and shelter, the PKK became entangled with the inhabitants in thousands of villages.692

TURKEY TURNS TO CIVILIANS

The PKK strategically organized “in small insurgency groups because it was almost impossible for security forces to co-exist and create security bases in and around every hamlet and small village in order to control the area.”693 In response, the centerpiece of

Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategy in rural Kurdistan became civilians with little or no military experience. In April 1985, eight months after the PKK’s first violent attacks, the

Turkish government amended the Village Law of 1924 authorizing the provincial governors to appoint “temporary” (paid) and “voluntary” (unpaid) village guards in provinces determined by the Council of Ministers.694 The “village guard” system695 was first launched in nine provinces, and expanded to 22 provinces in 1993. The maps below display the geographical distribution and size of the village guard system across time.696

The village guard system was instituted first along Turkey’s southeastern border region

(adjoining Iraq and Syria), and then expanded across the Southeast, in response to the geographical expansion in PKK violence.

692 Ibid., 5. 693 Mustafa Coşar Ünal, Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (New York: Routledge, 2012), 51. 694 Belge, “State Building and the Limits of Legibility,” 106. 695 The scheme was reminiscent of the Hamidiye, the local militia system used in the early days of the republic. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 424. For a detailed account of the Hamidiye, see Klein, The Margins of Empire. 696 The data was provided by Minister of Internal Affairs Nahit Menteşe to Mehmet Emin Sever of the Social Democratic People’s Party at the April 18, 1995 Turkish parliamentary session, in response to a parliamentary inquiry about the village guards. DISSA 2013. 222

Figure 8.1: Location and Number of Village Guards in 1988, 1990, and 1995

223

The new legislation allowed the Turkish military to train and arm civilians to guard their villages against PKK militants. In reality, many of them served in offensive operations. They typically walked in front of the regulars while carrying automatic rifles and radios.697 Most of them did not wear a uniform, though some of them preferred the uniform because they were otherwise the first ones to be targeted by the PKK.698

Village guard recruits received two weeks of training699 at military bases.700 Their syllabus covered the use of weapons, wireless communication technology, and basic tactics. The civilian counterinsurgents learned the tricks of the trade, such as keeping their heels to the side while exchanging fire with the enemy, as the PKK snipers were notorious for shooting off their targets’ heels.

The civilian counterinsurgents were tied to the army and gendarmerie (rural military police).701 As one Turkish Ministry of Interior official complained: “The civilian authority did not often even know when, where, and how they [the village guards] were used.”702 The Turkish government supported the village guards “both financially and

697 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, “Turkey: Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey,” 6, no. 12 (October 1994), 27. 698 Author’s interview with a Kurdish academic and field researcher who interviewed dozens of village guards, Ankara, Turkey, August 17, 2013. 699 Gergin, Balci and Eldivan, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against the PKK,” 273. 700 Author’s interview with Mesut Değer, former parliamentarian from Diyarbakır on Republican People’s Party (CHP) ticket, Ankara, Turkey, August 17, 2013. Değer led the investigation of the government’s relationship with the village guards and illicit organizations, especially the Hizbullah. 701 The gendarmerie is formally under the control of the Turkish Minister of Interior. Its members are trained as soldiers and spread across a network of police stations and outposts to control rural areas, patrol villages, and gather intelligence. Evren Balta, “Military Success, State Capacity and Internal War-Making in Russia and Turkey” (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 2007), 139. During conflict, the gendarmerie is under the jurisdiction of the military. 702 Author’s interview with an official from the Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, August 16, 2007. 224

logistically,”703 and made no effort to keep the system a secret.704 The existence of the village guard system, composed of Kurdish “volunteers,” signaled the Kurdish people’s support of the Turkish government. The PKK, threatened by local collaboration, called for the village guards’ “mass destruction” in its 1987 “Decree on Village Guards.” Turkish soldiers taken prisoner were often exchanged, while captive village guards faced summary execution.705 The PKK carried out numerous violent raids and attacks specifically in the villages whose members had volunteered to become part of the village guard system. The majority of the civilian casualties between the years 1986 and 1988 were of individuals living in the villages whose members participated in the village guard system.706

Turkey was militarily unprepared for an insurgency. The military apparatus was oriented towards inter-state warfare, particularly with neighboring Greece. On July 19,

1987, the Turkish Parliament granted a state of emergency rule (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) in eleven provinces that faced substantial PKK activities and violence. An OHAL governor was appointed to synchronize and coordinate the security forces (military, gendarmerie, and police) while exercising certain quasi-martial law powers, such as restricting press and freedom of expression and association, over roughly 6 million people.707 By 1993, the

Turkish military apparatus was reoriented toward internal war-making. One-third of the armed forces were now permanently deployed in Southeastern/East of Turkey.708 As Chief

703 Ünal, Counterterrorism in Turkey, 51. 704 Author’s interview with a Kurdish academic and field researcher, Ankara, August 17, 2013. 705 Human Rights Watch 1994, 28. 706 Ünal, Counterterrorism in Turkey, 54. 707 Ibid., 56. 708 Evren Balta, “Causes and Consequences of the Village Guard System in Turkey,” Conference Paper, Mellon Fellowship for Humanitarian and Security Affairs Conference, CUNY- Graduate Center, New York, December 2, 2004, 11. 225

of Staff during this period, General Doğan Güreş explained: “As far as strategic concepts are concerned, I have changed the priorities of the Turkish armed forces vis-à-vis possible threats. From now on internal threat is the first priority for the Turkish Army.”709

From 1985 to the early 1990s, prior to building high military capacity in the region, the Turkish government relied on an indirect mechanism of recruiting domestic nonstate actors: the clan system. Security officials recruited village guards through informal deals with influential clan leaders. At their disposal was a secret list of loyal clans.710 The first clans to collaborate with the state were those identified with the right and far-right (ultra- nationalist) political parties. Some of them “were already in conflict either with the PKK directly, or with local clans which enjoyed PKK support.”711 By acting as intermediaries, the influential aghas made it possible for the Turkish military quickly to recruit large numbers of civilian counterinsurgents. Of the most notorious clans was the Jirki clan in

Hakkari, whose chief was still wanted for the killing of six gendarmes in 1975. The tribal chief struck a deal with state officials, and after a token court appearance, raised a force of

Jirkis as village guards around Beytussebap. Another Hakkari chief demanded the release of his son from prison before providing village guards. The clan leaders usually collected the monthly salaries of their clan’s village guards.

As the state built up its military capacity in the region in the early 1990s, the Turkish government turned to a more direct means of recruiting the village guards. In the early

1990s, it switched from clan-based to village-based recruitment, directly approaching the

709 Cited in Balta, “Causes and Consequences of the Village Guard System in Turkey,” 11-12. 710 Author’s interview with a prominent Turkish journalist, Istanbul, August, 2013. 711 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 424. 226

villagers about becoming adjunct counterinsurgents.712 Some villagers were co-opted while others were coerced into service. The official village guard salary was significantly higher than the average per capita income in the region, which was plagued by high unemployment and underemployment. The monthly stipend of a village guard in 1992, for example, was approximately $250 in areas where the annual per capita income was about

$400.713 Especially in the 1990s, military territorial commanders often credibly threatened individuals with village evacuation if they refused to serve as village guards.714 Conversely, there was no legal requirement to join the village guard system, “but security forces often make village guard service an informal requirement for return [to their villages].”715 There were cases of village guards being tortured for refusing to join operations.716

INSURGENCY GOES URBAN

On December 16, 1990, the OHAL governor was granted the authority to evacuate residential areas and transfer the local population. An official from the Diyarbakır branch of the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Association estimates that roughly

4,000 villages were forcefully evacuated in the 1990s.717 OHAL officials report 905 villages and 2,523 hamlets (a total of 378,335 forced migrants) evacuated in and around the provinces under emergency rule by 1997, while some nongovernmental organizations estimate the number of the internally displaced persons in the region between one and four

712 Author’s interview with a Kurdish academic and field researcher, Ankara, August 17, 2013. 713 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 424. 714 Gergin, Balci and Eldivan, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against the PKK,” 274. 715 Holly Cartner, Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Letter to Minister Aksu calling for the Abolition of the Village Guards,” June 7, 2006. 716 Author’s interviews with a lawyer and member of Goc-Der migrant’s association and a lawyer associated with the Diyarbakır Bar Association, Diyarbakır, Turkey, August 14, 2013. 717 Author’s interview with an official of the Human Rights Association, Diyarbakır Branch, Diyarbakır, August 13, 2013. 227

million in 2005.718 Population resettlement is a classic tool of counterinsurgency. The logic is that “since the government does not have the capability of dispersing and projecting its military strength to cover these important remote settlements… it must bring the inhabitants of these villages to areas which it can directly control.”719 The cities and large towns of southeastern Turkey were the strongholds of the Turkish government, and consequently the Kurdish villagers were moved into the urban areas.720

A major consequence of the village evacuation policy was the accelerated urbanization of Kurdistan. The absolute size of the rural population in the OHAL provinces fell by 11.9 percent from 1990 to 1997, despite a population growth of 14 percent. The population of district centers in the same region increased by 45 percent. The rural depopulation in the OHAL region proceeded nearly three times faster than in the rest of

Turkey, while the OHAL population grew faster.721 An unanticipated outcome of the heavy inflow of Kurdish villagers into the cities of southeastern Turkey was a corresponding inflow of PKK sympathizers and followers. Starting in 1990, the PKK began operating in the cities of southeastern Turkey.722 As a former sub-provincial governor and official with the Turkish Ministry of Interior describes: “As a result of the village evacuations, the

PKK’s military power in the rural areas was broken, but it resulted in the urbanification of

718 A reputable Turkish nongovernmental organization, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), describes that the figure of three to four million as “a rather high estimate.” A. Tamer Aker, The Problem of Internal Displacement in Turkey: Assessment and Policy Proposals (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2005), 4. 719 John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965), 100. 720 Kocher, “The Decline of PKK and the Viability of a One-State Solution in Turkey,” 5. 721 Ibid., 6-9. 722 Author’s interview with an official of Mazlum-Der (religiously conservative human rights association), Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. Author’s interview with a Kurdish academic and field researcher, Ankara, August 17, 2013. 228

the PKK. From then on, the migrants from the villages formed the support bases of the

PKK in the cities.”723

The towns of Cizre and Bismil (Diyarbakır Province) had several PKK-occupied

“liberated zones.”724 In Cizre, the Nur and Cudi neighborhoods were under PKK control.725

Multiple armed confrontations involving the PKK took place in the Bağlar and Suriçi districts of the city of Diyarbakır.726 The Petrol district of the city of Batman had a strong

PKK presence.727 The PKK was highly active in the Hakkari Province, especially in the towns of Yüksekova and Şırnak. 728 The latter was turned into a city as the army built up its capacity there against the PKK with a large military installation. About 950 houses in

Şırnak became unusable after the military bombed them while targeting PKK supporters.729

TURKEY TURNS TO MILITANTS

As a bulk of the insurgency concentrated in urban neighborhoods, the Turkish military turned to militants. The adjunct counterinsurgents in the urban centers comprised members of the Islamist organization called Hizbullah730 and ex-insurgents recruited into a shadowy state organization called Jandarma Istihbarat Teskilati (Gendarmerie

Intelligence Organization – Jitem).

723 Author’s interview with an official from Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, August 16, 2007. 724 Author’s interview with an official of Mazlum-Der, Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 725 Author’s interview with an official from Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, August 16, 2007. 726 Author’s interview with an official of Mazlum-Der, Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 727 Author’s interview with an official from Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, August 16, 2007. 728 Author’s interview with an official of Mazlum-Der (religiously conservative human rights association), Diyarbakır, Turkey, August 15, 2013. 729 Author’s interview with an official from Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, August 16, 2007. 730 The Turkish Hizbullah, comprising Sunni members, is not linked to the Shia organization operating under the same name in Lebanon. 229

The Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey traces its origins to the Iranian Revolution. Some youths in Diyarbakır and the surrounding provinces were inspired by the revolution and traveled to the Iranian city of Qom for short-term religious training.731 The pro-Iranian

Kurdish youths began to organize in Diyarbakır at the Menzil bookstore. However, after the 1980 Turkish military coup, the organization splintered. The moderate faction pursued political and social activities, while its radical counterpart, now meeting at the Ilim bookstore, argued that armed warfare was the only way to bring about an Islamic revolution in Turkey. What also separated the radicals from the moderates was that the former deemed religion, not ethnic identity, as the main source of unity. Incidentally, the Ilim faction leader, Huseyin Velioglu, is known to have studied at the Ankara Political Science Faulty during the same time as Öcalan.

The Ilim faction of the Hizbullah (henceforth referred to as “Hizbullah”) was “a mainly urban phenomenon,”732 operating in cities such as Nusaybin, Batman, Diyarbakır, and Van.733 It began its violent urban campaign against PKK members and sympathizers in October 1991. By 1992, it became “the second most violent and ruthless organization – after the outlawed PKK.”734 The locals began to refer to the organization as “Hizbul- contra” due to its widely known connection to the state, as evidenced by the high degree of immunity it enjoyed from the secular Turkish government and military.735

731 İsmet, The PKK, 123. 732 Human Rights Watch, “What is Turkey's Hizbullah? A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder.” February 16, 2000. 733 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 73. 734 İsmet, The PKK, 124. 735 İsmet, The PKK, 124; Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 73; author’s interview with Mesut Değer, Ankara, August 17, 2013. 230

The state strategically used the Hizbullah as hit squads, deliberately pitting “the

Kurdish Islamists against the atheist PKK.”736 The Turkish military pursued covert collaboration with select Hizbullah leaders, and government agents infiltrated the organization. Most of the rank and file members of the organization were not aware of their leaders’ collaboration with the state.737 Most of the violence was carried out by boys under the age of 18.738 Their targets were PKK insurgents and suspected PKK sympathizers.739

The young militants “operated in broad daylight in the mainly Kurdish cities of southeastern Turkey. People who opposed the government’s policy were being killed at the rate of two a day; in all, more than a thousand people were killed in street shootings from

1992 to 1995.”740

The state allowed the militants to operate with impunity in public areas, such as busy streets and coffee houses. Even when the assassins were apprehended by the public and taken to police custody, “they were let go with bogus claims, like they ran away from the second floor of the police station. The people who reported assassins to the police were often then assassinated by the Hizbullah.”741 The year 1993 witnessed the largest number of incidents caused by Hizbullah militants. In the town of Silvan, about 300 people were assassinated that year. In the city of Diyarbakır, about 800 individuals and in the city of

Batman 300 or so people were killed.742 As a former parliamentarian who headed the

736 Author’s interview with an official of Mazlum-Der, Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 737 Author’s interview with a lawyer who handled legal cases involving the Hizbullah in Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 738 İsmet, The PKK, 123. 739 Human Rights Watch, “What is Turkey's Hizbullah?” 740 Ibid. 741 Author’s interview with a former state official, Ankara, August 2013. 742 Author’s interview with Author’s interview with Mesut Değer, Ankara, August 17, 2013. 231

investigation of the state’s relationship with the Hizbullah put it, “This is at a time when the area was so securitized that if a kid throws a stone at somebody, he would be immediately surrounded by ununiformed police. But these assassins could walk in broad daylight, shoot someone in the head, and walk away.”743

The Hizbullah militants were notorious for their execution and torture methods.

Their signature execution style was shouting the Tekbir before shooting their victims with one bullet in the head. Their weapon of choice was usually a Makarov pistol.744 The

Hizbullah’s signature method of torture was the domuz bağı (hogtie). Corpses were frequently found in refrigerators.745 Court testimonies indicate that the Hizbullah executions usually took place in the morning or the evening, when the targets were leaving their homes or traveling to work. Each operation was carried out by two to four militants.746

In addition to the Hizbullah “contras,” the Turkish military also employed ex-PKK militants. The Turkish state has never officially accepted the existence of Jitem, but the organization is widely viewed in the country as an important element in the government’s struggle against the PKK. Soner Yalçın, a controversial journalist who wrote an early and influential account of Jitem, argues that the organization was initially founded as part of the Özel Harp Dairesi (Unconventional War Directorate) in the General Staff of the Turkish

Armed Forces.747

743 Author’s interview with former parliamentarian from Diyarbakır on Republican People’s Party (CHP) ticket Mesut Değer, Ankara, Turkey, August 17, 2013. 744 Author’s interview with a lawyer in Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 745 Ibid. 746 Author’s interview with a lawyer in Diyarbakır, August 15, 2013. 747 Soner Yalçın, Binbaşı Ersever'in İtirafları (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1994). 232

With the rise of the PKK’s guerrilla activities, Jitem started recruiting captured and surrendered militants into special hit squads. The mechanisms by which the state used the ex-insurgents show that maintaining control of the militants was a top priority. Militant adjuncts with knowledge of the PKK’s hideouts, contacts in the cities and rural areas, and combat experience were considered valuable assets. Ex-insurgent prisoners were used in assassinations against Kurdish militants and PKK sympathizers.748 The assassinations usually took place in cities. Jitem officers occasionally took the ex-insurgents to sting operations in specific villages, during which time they were closely monitored and supervised. At the end of the operation, the militants were returned to their prison cells.

Keeping the militant adjuncts in prison when they were not in use ensured the state’s close scrutiny and control of their activities.749 Yalçın claims that an influential officer in Jitem,

Major Cem Ersever, formed a team of over forty ex-militants and village guards that he used to assassinate his rivals as well as those of the state.750 The militants who worked for

Jitem were often promised reduced prison sentences, and practically, impunity before the law.751

By the late 1990s, the Turkish state gained the upper ground against the PKK. The

Turkish security forces captured Öcalan in 1999. This marked the beginning of a new PKK strategy in which emphasis was placed on political participation (i.e. working with the legal

Kurdish parties) over violence. The goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state was abandoned in favor of a negotiated settlement based on Kurdish rights and some form of

748 Author’s interview with a Kurdish expert, Ankara, August 2013. 749 Author’s interview with a human rights activist in Diyarbakir, August 2013. 750 Yalçın, Binbaşı Ersever'in İtirafları. 751 Author’s interview with a Kurdish expert in Ankara, August 2013. 233

autonomy within Turkey’s existing borders.752 The Turkish government lifted the state of emergency law in 2002. Its strategy shifted from counterinsurgency-based coercive policies to gaining support from the Kurdish population through non-military means, including social, education, health, and economic policies753 and negotiating a peace agreement.754

CONCLUSION

Turkey’s 1985-2002 military campaign supports the contended role of target density and military capacity in shaping state strategy vis-à-vis domestic nonstate actors.

The rebel strategy of mixing with the local population incentivized state outsourcing of violence to domestic nonstate actors. When rebel activity spanned hundreds of remote villages across a territory which the military could not adequately cover on its own, the state incorporated civilians to serve as nonstate counterinsurgents. When the rebels moved to select cities and concentrated in urban neighborhoods, the state turned to militants to carry out selective violence, most notably assassinations.

The military capacity of the state also significantly shaped the outsourcing process.

During the first two years of the counterinsurgency campaign, the state’s military capacity in the region was low due to the military’s focus on inter-state warfare, with Greece in particular. As a result, the state initially relied on an indirect recruitment mechanism: the

752 Jake Hess, “The PKK’s Tentative Peace with Turkey,” Foreign Policy (June 19, 2013), accessed November 27, 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/19/the_pkk_s_tentative_peace_with_turkey. 753 Gergin, Balci, and Eldivan, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against the PKK,” 264. 754 For recent coverage of the negotiation process, see Sebnem Arsu, “Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw from Turkey,” New York Times, April 25, 2013, accessed November 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from- turkey.html?_r=0. 234

local clan network, with which the state was uniquely connected and familiar due to a secret list created in the 1970s of loyal clans. After the state gained high military capacity in the region, it became primarily responsible for recruiting and exploiting domestic nonstate actors against the rebels.

235

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

“Like all Englishmen, and most Southerners, [Arthur] Fremantle would rather lose the war than his dignity.” Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels, 133-34

“As anyone who has ever been in combat will tell you, the last thing you want is a fair fight.” Mark Bowden, The Atlantic, August 13, 2013

Gentlemen’s warfare now seems like a naive and antiquated notion. Shelved is the idea that a war is a noble pursuit governed by fair rules and won by those on the side of the angels. The horrors of world wars, as well as the increased effectiveness of those refusing to play by the ostensible rules, shattered the belief that angels were anywhere near the battlefield. Dispassionately explaining that which shocks and disgusts is a classic dilemma.

The cynicism it often evokes is well captured by a War and Peace character – a professional soldier whose experience led him to believe that military genius was a myth, as war did not follow intelligible rules. “What science can be there be in a matter in which… nothing can be determined and everything depends on innumerable conditions, the significance of which becomes manifest at a particular moment, and no one can tell when that moment will come?” laments Tolstoy’s character.755

In the post-world war years, the dilemma inspired the “realist” study of international politics, fueled by the notion that values and morality were a product of

755 Cited in Cohen, Supreme Command, 235. 236

power, and not the other way around.756 However, the assumption that war was governed by intelligible rules was far from abandoned. According to the now-dominant convention, underlying these rules are not ethics, but social processes. Violence comprises the building blocks of social order.757 When, why, and how wars are fought is a product of predictable interplays of structure and agency. What at first glance may seem unusual and grotesque in effect “displays some critical recurring elements.”758 War, like other political phenomena, is a function of rational behavior interacting with structural forces, many of which may be outside of individual control, but not outside of logic.

This dissertation builds on the rationalist approach to war. It recognizes that not all aspects of war can be explained. Remarkable and surprising patterns have, nevertheless, characterized violent conflict across diverse social and cultural contexts. The more specific contributions of this dissertation are as follows. First, it provides a better understanding of a phenomenon that has been widely regarded as too unusual or intractable for a systematic analysis. Second, it brings back the military-strategic logic to the study of armed conflict.

The existing literature on the “unconventional” or seemingly novel aspects of modern warfare – especially following the latest round of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq

– has turned a blind eye to the underlying conventional military drivers and constraints of armed conflict.

756 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 109. 757 Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, “Introduction: Integrating the Study of Order, Conflict, and Violence,” in Kalyvas, Stathis N., Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, eds. Order, Conflict, and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 758 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 6. 237

Third is the empirical contribution of this dissertation. Several of the cases examined in this dissertation have for the first time been subjected to fine-grained analysis.

Those which have previously been investigated, such as the Kargil conflict and the 1971

Pakistani civil war, had yet to be thoroughly examined for the presence (or absence) of state outsourcing of violence. Moreover, analysis of the existing literature on the empirical cases revealed empirical inconsistencies, ideological biases, and a lack of important details.

This is not surprising considering the controversial and highly non-transparent subject matter. However, the partiality of even the authoritative narratives required not only extensive triangulation of secondary sources, but also significant integration of primary sources, such as archival documents and interviews.

Fourthly, this dissertation offers a theory that applies to both inter- and intra-state conflict. The current trend in the security literature is to treat these conflicts and, consequently, their causes as separate and distinct. While there are important differences, there are also important common processes and mechanisms – as well as connections – underlying the two types of conflict.759 One of them – state outsourcing of violence – and its causes – target density and military capacity – are identified in this study.

ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL

This dissertation tackles two puzzles. The first is states creating armed groups comprising domestic nonstate actors – individuals with no previous professional ties to state institutions. The second is the state’s choice of proxy. Using on a controlled

759 The idea that different types of violent conflict contain recurring elements is well developed by the “dynamics of contention” research agenda. See Doug McAdam, Sidney, Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 238

comparative study of cases of military campaigns in South Asia, I show that state outsourcing of violence follows a military-strategic logic of warfare. I disentangle the agential and structural factors driving state behavior.

Target density, the spatial distribution of the military target across population and territory, creates the incentives for the military strategists to incorporate domestic nonstate actors into the military apparatus. The domestic nonstate actors can provide the regular armed forces with local knowledge and exposure reduction during a military operation, thereby significantly increasing the chances of success. The relative strategic advantages of civilians and militants, derived from a marked difference in their quality and quantity, shape the state’s choice of which domestic nonstate actors to use.

Underlying the two types of domestic nonstate actors is a trade-off between quality and quantity. The former is more likely to be prioritized when the target is territorially concentrated, as is typical when the target is embedded in specific urban neighborhoods.

A concentrated target requires a proxy that can execute a violent task quickly and efficiently, before the target changes position or the conditions for the operation worsen.

Militants’ relative experience, derived from their rebel or criminal background, makes them preferable to the relatively less experienced civilians. Civilians are more likely to be prioritized when the target is territorially scattered and, consequently, requires sizable, locally-informed manpower to fill wide territorial gaps.

The operational benefits of using the domestic nonstate actors cannot be realized, however, without the capacity of the existing military apparatus to recruit, train, transport, and manage the irregular forces. Military capacity significantly effects the ability of the

239

state to overcome the logistical and principal-agent problems stemming from the use of nonstate actors. High military capacity is, therefore, a necessary condition for state creation of violent organizations comprising domestic nonstate actors.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What is to be done about state outsourcing of violence? What are the policy implications of my findings? What can the United States do to sever the precarious links between violent nonstate actors and their state sponsors?

Over the past decade, these questions are increasingly asked about one country in particular – Pakistan.760 Far from being the only state actively involved in this controversial practice, Pakistan has emerged as the poster child of state outsourcing of violence. Its geostrategic position and cultural endowment make it a critical country for the US to understand and engage. Ironically, better understanding Pakistan’s security strategy involves, in large part, recognizing that Pakistan is not very unique. What drives Pakistan to outsource violence is not its “hard” nature, but the type of military-strategic logic that has driven countries as diverse as India, Guatemala, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States to venture outside their “regular” military channels.

Nonstate actors can be very useful for navigating contexts that are – for historical or political reasons – illegible to the state. While weak states often have no choice but to partner with an already existing armed nonstate group, it is only the militarily strong states that can afford to create violent nonstate actors.761 Pakistan’s outsourcing proclivity is not

760 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 761 Granted, even a strong military cannot guarantee that these organizations will not, one day, turn against the state. 240

a product of a political or religious culture incapable of playing by fair rules – the rules of

“gentlemen’s warfare.” It is a product of its high military capacity combined with low social legibility. In other words, Pakistan’s high “despotic” power and low “infrastructural” power762 increase the likelihood of it using violent nonstate agents for security or military purposes. This is similar to why some states use nonstate providers of healthcare and education for social welfare purposes.763 Moreover, modern warfare – more specifically, its mechanized and professional nature – has also made it difficult for regular soldiers to

“read” the local population and environment. Nonstate actors such as civilians and militants can provide the regulars with valuable local knowledge and exposure reduction in order to carry out the operation with maximum success.

At the crux of state outsourcing of violence is high military capacity combined with low social legibility – some of it a product of a state’s low infrastructural power, while much of it is also a factor of modern warfare. Weakening military capacity is not an option, especially for countries such as Pakistan, which face serious external and internal security challenges. The best bet lies in addressing the infrastructural dimension. Building the state’s infrastructural reach is a capital-intensive effort that also requires political will and leadership. Some states – including many in Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the

East Asian “Tigers” – have achieved high infrastructural power through authoritarian measures. Others, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, are presently charting the slower, democratic course. The size of the state and population density, as Sub-Saharan African

762 Mann, War and Capitalism. 763 Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” World Politics 62, no. 3 (July 2010): 381-421. 241

states have shown, can slow the process even further.764 However, the existence of the so- called “brown areas”765 poses a fundamental challenge to the state’s legitimate guardianship of security. For example, a corporation can serve, and historically has served, all of the state’s typical functions – from collecting taxes to dispensing justice through a system of courts, to building an army.766 What distinguishes a modern state from a governing corporation, as Max Weber has acutely observed, is its widely-accepted right to use physical force to achieve its goals. This right is a historical product of the interaction between, as Charles Tilly reminds us, coercion and capital in the European context.767 The state’s lack of capacity or unwillingness to deliver security evenly within its borders may lead the population to accept the legitimacy of the state’s competitor – an insurgent organization or a foreign government – to assume control of the ungoverned space. The

Taliban’s current rule over Pakistan’s tribal areas is a clear example.

The argument for widening the state’s infrastructural reach inevitably runs into the high modernism critique. As James C. Scott has pointed out, there are important limits to

“seeing like a state” which can lead to counterproductive outcomes.768 And while technology is increasingly making it possible to track citizens, as the recent National

Security Agency (NSA) privacy scandal in the United States has underscored, it also evokes ethical and political dilemmas.

764 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic Development,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2012). 765 Guillermo O'Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21, no. 8 (August 1993), 1359. 766 Stern, The Company-State. 767 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States. 768 Scott, Seeing Like a State. 242

Even if the issue of the state’s infrastructural power is addressed, we are still left with the more fundamental problem for military operations: the informational constraints of modern warfare. The question of how to stop states from using civilians, ex-rebels, or criminals for navigating unfamiliar local contexts requires the construction of a stronger norm against the practice, which is already deemed illegal by international humanitarian law. There exists a taboo against the use of nuclear and chemical weapons as well as children in war.769 No taboo currently exists against the use of nonstate actors.

Understanding why this is the case is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, convincing states to abandon the practice and embrace the rules of “gentlemen’s warfare” will require that the international and regional powers first embrace the notion themselves.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This project can be expanded into a vibrant research agenda on “illicit” security.770

First, analysis can be extended to the other types of outsourcing methods – cooptation, hiring, and turning a blind eye – and the scope of nonstate actors considered can be expanded to include those of foreign origin (see Table 2.1). Second, the project raises several interesting and important questions to be addressed in future research: How can the violent nonstate actors be successfully disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated in the post- conflict period? For example, the village guards in Turkey have found it very challenging to find alternative ways to make a living. This problem, also faced in other post-conflict

769 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 770 To borrow from Peter Andreas’ “illicit international political economy” research agenda. See Peter Andreas, “Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine Side of Globalization,” Review of International Political Economy 11, no. 3 (August 2004): 641-52. 243

states in the Middle East as well as South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, poses a serious threat to law and order. Another direction of inquiry concerns the micro-level patterns of violence, the study of which has been advocated by Stathis Kalyvas.771 What are the conditions under which the nonstate actors are effective? When and why do they get out of control? What explains the different types of abuse of the civilian population by the state- sponsored violent nonstate actors?

Finally, the project raises questions that are fundamental to our understanding of democratic governance. How can democratic governance coexist with such illiberal norms as expecting a select group of individuals, be they professional soldiers, to fight till death, if necessary? How can it coexist with such an undemocratic institution as the military? Are there limits to outsourcing violence which democracies, as opposed to their non-democratic counterparts, will not cross? Or, as the old saying goes, is all fair in love and war?

771 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (September 2012): 658- 668. 244

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Ahmed, Imtiaz. Former Mukti Bahini rebel and professor, Dhaka University, Dhaka,

Bangladesh, March 15, 2012.

Ali, Sarwar. Former Mukti Bahini recruiting officer, Dhaka, Bangladesh, March 17, 2012.

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Hasan, M.A. Chairman of the War Crimes Facts Finding Committee, Bangladesh, Dhaka,

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Agency, the federal agency approved by the Indian government to combat terrorism

in India; headed Special Investigation Team, which investigated the assassination

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Shafiullah, K.M. Second in Command of Second East Bengal Regiment; Brigade

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of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army (1972-1975), Dhaka, Bangladesh, March

16, 2012.

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14, 2011.

Zaman, Rashed Uz. Faculty Member, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh, March 13,

2012.

279