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Atlantic Council 11th Floor, 1101 15th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Address Services Requested U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations The Atlantic Council is a non partisan organization that promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the global challenges of the 21st century. 1101 15th St. NW • 11th Floor • Washington, DC 20005 • 202-778-4950 • acus.org February 2010 The Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors The Atlantic Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century. The Council embodies CHAIRMAN *Daniel W. Christman Paul G. Kaminski *Helmut Sonnenfeldt a non-partisan network of leaders who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by stimulating dialogue and *Chuck Hagel Wesley K. Clark Arnold Kanter Richard J.A. Steele Curtis M. Coward Francis J. Kelly Philip Stephenson discussion about critical international issues with a view to enriching public debate and promoting consensus on appropriate CHAIRMAN, *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *James V. Kimsey *Paula Stern responses in the Administration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors, and the media in the United States and INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD W. Bowman Cutter *Roger Kirk John Studzinski among leaders in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. The Council is also among the few forums conducting educational and Brent Scowcroft Brian D. Dailey Henry A. Kissinger William H. Taft, IV exchange programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders so that they will come to value U.S. international engagement Kenneth W. Dam *Geraldine S. Kunstadter Peter J. Tanous PRESIDENT AND CEO and have the knowledge and understanding necessary to develop effective policies. Paula Dobriansky Philip Lader Peter Thomas *Frederick Kempe Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Anthony Lake Paul Twomey Through its diverse networks, the Council builds broad constituencies to support constructive U.S. leadership and policies. CHAIRMAN EMERITUS Conrado Dornier Robert G. Liberatore Henry G. Ulrich, III *Henry E. Catto Its program offices publish informational analyses, convene conferences among current and/or future leaders, and contribute William H. Draper, III Henrik Liljegren *Ronald P. Verdicchio Stanley Ebner *Jan M. Lodal Enzo Viscusi to the public debate in order to integrate the views of knowledgeable individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds, VICE CHAIRS Thomas J. Edelman John R. Lyman Carl E. Vuono interests and experiences. *Richard Edelman *Brian C. McK. Henderson Stuart E. Eizenstat Wendy W. Makins Charles F. Wald *Franklin D. Kramer Robert F. Ellsworth *Barry R. McCaffrey Jay Walker A rapidly evolving and uncertain world – in which new challenges and threats can develop either suddenly or over time *Richard L. Lawson Lawrence P. Fisher, II James P. McCarthy Mark R. Warner – demands a reevaluation of traditional security relationships and strategies. The Council’s Program on International Security *Virginia A. Mulberger Barbara Hackman Franklin Eric D.K. Melby J. Robinson West examines U.S. relationships with allies and adversaries in an effort to build consensus around policies that contribute to a *W. DeVier Pierson *Chas. W. Freeman Jack N. Merritt Togo D. West, Jr. more stable, secure and well-governed world. *John L. Fugh Franklin C. Miller John C. Whitehead TREASURERS Carlton W. Fulford *Judith A. Miller Maciej Witucki *Ronald M. Freeman Jacques S. Gansler George E. Moose R. James Woolsey *John D. Macomber Robert Gelbard William A. Nitze Dov S. Zakheim Richard L. Gelfond Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg SECRETARY HONORARY DIRECTORS Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. Philip A. Odeen *Walter B. Slocombe David C. Acheson *Sherri W. Goodman Ana Palacio DIRECTORS James A. Baker, III John A. Gordon Torkel L. Patterson *Robert J. Abernethy Frank C. Carlucci, III C. Boyden Gray William J. Perry Timothy D. Adams Warren Christopher Janet Mullins Grissom *Thomas R. Pickering *Carol C. Adelman Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Marc Grossman Andrew Prozes Michael A. Almond Colin L. Powell Stephen J. Hadley Arnold L. Punaro Michael Ansari Condoleezza Rice Ian Hague Joseph W. Ralston *David D. Aufhauser Edward L. Rowny Harry Harding Norman W. Ray Nancy Kassebaum Baker James R. Schlesinger Rita E. Hauser Stanley R. Resor *Donald K. Bandler George P. Shultz Marten H.A. van Heuven Joseph E. Robert, Jr. Susan M. Blaustein William H. Webster James R. Hogg Jeffrey A. Rosen *Julia Chang Bloch Richard C. Holbrooke Charles O. Rossotti LIFETIME DIRECTORS Kathy Bloomgarden Mary L. Howell Michael L. Ryan Lucy Wilson Benson Beth A. Brooke Benjamin Huberman Marjorie M. Scardino Daniel J. Callahan, III Harold Brown *Robert E. Hunter William O. Schmieder Steven Muller Dan W. Burns Robert L. Hutchings John P. Schmitz R. Nicholas Burns Mansoor Ijaz Jill A. Schuker *Richard R. Burt *members of the William Inglee Patricia Sherman Executive Committee Michael Calvey Jeremy M. Isaacs Matthew R. Simmons Sarah C. Carey Robert Jeffrey Kiron K. Skinner Michael P.C. Carns A. Elizabeth Jones William Y. Smith U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations February, 2010 Foreword U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations Adversarial relationships, such as those between the This analytic compendium was prepared by Dr. Katzman United States and Iran, are always subject to sudden in his personal capacity as a longtime expert on Iran. It change. In cases where this has occurred, adjusting to does not refl ect the views of the Congressional Research that change has always been more complicated than Service, where he is a Middle East expert, or of the Library anticipated. In the case of the United States and Iran, we of Congress or any Member of the U.S. Congress. must factor in the additional complication of three decades of estrangement that began with the November 4, 1979 This project is made possible by a grant from the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and a subsequent United States Institute of Peace. The opinions, fi ndings, break in offi cial relations that continues today. Increasingly conclusions and recommendations expressed in this frequent offi cial contact concerning Iran’s nuclear program publication are those of the author and do not necessarily and its infl uence in Iraq and Afghanistan only increases refl ect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, the the urgency of considering the implications of a changed Atlantic Council or any others. relationship. Although the timing and conditions of a tipping point toward better U.S.-Iran relations cannot be foreseen, The Council also wants to thank Ken Katzman for his and although a worsening of those relations is also thorough research and insightful analysis. In addition, possible, it is nevertheless useful to think about how we we are grateful to Dick Nelson, the Project Director would proceed in a more positive direction. and to the Steering Group composed of Flynt Leverett, George Perkovich and Judith Yaphe for their important With that in mind, the Atlantic Council of the United States contributions to this effort. Magnus Nordenman helped edit in a project led by Dick Nelson and Kenneth Katzman and format the Compendium. provides here a crucial reference document of the policies, laws and regulations that currently govern U.S.-relations Frederick Kempe with Iran. This would be the starting point from which the President and CEO desired changes must proceed. It is part of an Atlantic Council series that deals with the process of reversing adversarial relationships once geopolitical conditions on both sides permit such changes. i Table of Contents Section 1. Overview . 1 Section 2. Major Policy Statements . 3 President Obama’s Nowruz Message . 3 President Obama’s Address at Cairo University, June 4, 2009 . 4 Statement by President Obama on a Time Frame to Judge Irans’s Willingness to Compromise on the Nuclear Issue . .10 Statements by President Obama on the Iranian Presidential Election . .14 President Bush’s Nowruz Message in 2008 . .16 President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” State of the Union Message . .16 Memorandum Outlining “Grand Bargain” Between Iran and the United States . .19 Section 3. Terrorism-Related Sanctions . 21 State Department Report on Terrorism for 2008: Discussion of Iran . 21 Export Administration Act . 22 Arms Export Control Act . 31 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 . 36 Assistance to Victims of Terrorism . 39 Determination of States on the “Not Cooperating” (with U.S. Anti-Terrorism Efforts) List . 42 List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations . 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations . 43 Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001) . 45 Major Iranian Entities Designated Under Executive Order 13224. 48 Executive Order 13438. 50 Entities Designated Under Executive Order 13438 as Threatening Iraqi Stability . 52 Section 4. International Sanctions. 57 Excerpts of 2003 IAEA Report Outlining Iran’s Nuclear Program . 57 2004 “Paris Agreement” . 61 Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme. 62 UN Security Council Resolution 1737. 63 UN Security Council Resolution 1747 . 67 UN Security Council Resolution 1803. 72 Table of Contents (continued) Section 5. U.S. Proliferation Sanctions . 77 Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005 . 77 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Energy Policy Act of 2005 . 84 Iran-Syria-North Korea Non-Proliferation Act . 87 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act . 92 Section 6. Trade and Investment Sanctions . 97 Trade and Investment Ban: Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995 . 97 Major Treasury Department Regulations Implementing or Modifying the Trade Ban . 99 Ban on U.S. Persons Serving As Facilitators of Trade with Iran . 99 Section 7. Foreign Assistance Sanctions . .113 Foreign Assistance Act Restrictions on Aid to Iran (and Other State Sponsors of Terrorism) .
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