1 U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: Iran’s Perceptions of its External Relations and their Implications for Strategic Competition with the U.S. in the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – May 2011 By Alexander Wilner May 19, 2011 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] 2 The Burke Chair has compiled a series of chronological reports with the assistance of Adam Seitz of the Marine Corps University that focus on Iranian perceptions of national security and assess Iran’s intentions concerning competition with the US. The latest version of these reports is entitled “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iran’s Perceptions of its Internal Developments and their Implications for Strategic Competition with the U.S. in the Gulf,” and is available on the CSIS website at http://csis.org/publication/us-and- iranian-strategic-competition-3. Previous versions include: “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iran’s Perceptions of its Ballistic Missile Program and Competition with the US in the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – Feb. 2011,” http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic- competition-2, and “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iranian Views of How Iran’s Asymmetric Warfare Developments Affect Competition with the US in the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – Feb. 2011,” http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-1. The Iranian government’s statements and diplomatic activity provide valuable insight into the country’s strategic competition with the US. They help show how the regime perceives its relationship with the international community and responds to external pressure. The regime’s multifaceted engagement with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and the South Caucasus as well as its burgeoning diplomatic activity in Africa and Latin America provide key insight into the Iranian government’s outlook and strategic goals. On April 17, 2011, the head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, made statements regarding how Iran perceives its role in the Gulf in response to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) assertion that Iran has meddled in Bahrain’s social unrest: “The [P]GCC should not put the blame for the ongoing developments in Bahrain on Iran. The Islamic Republic seeks peace in the region.” “Iran's policy on Arab countries in the Persian Gulf has not changed and we still believe in good relations with these states.” “The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most influential country in the region which tightens regional security and has played a valuable role in defusing crisis and establishing security.”1 The articles in this report provide a far more detailed picture of how such statements reflect Iran’s view of diplomatic developments since Sept. 2010 and the general outlook and priorities of the regime. They highlight an increasingly assertive and confrontational approach to Iran’s engagement with the international community – particularly with the US and American regional 1 “Iran MP Urges PGCC to Stop Blaming Iran.” PressTV. 19 April ‘11 3 allies. Additionally, they help provide insight into Iran’s foreign policy goals, its actions abroad, and how it perceives competition with other states. These articles also reflect Iran’s efforts to counter US and Western diplomatic influence in the face of mounting international criticism and pressure concerning the country’s nuclear program and human rights abuses. Iran has sought to do so by engaging regional states that maintain historic cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with Iran, courting post-colonial developing countries in Africa with anti-colonial rhetoric, and seeking to boost ties with other diplomatically-isolated regimes in Latin America such as Venezuela and Bolivia. These developments indicate Iran’s increasing defiance regarding the concerns of the international community, and reflect a pattern of Iranian diplomatic engagement aimed at circumventing US influence and diplomatic reach. This collection of statements also reflects that two central themes relevant to Iran’s competition with the US have come to dominate its foreign policy and diplomatic developments since Sept. 2010: Growing concern over and rhetoric regarding the WikiLeaks revelations that Gulf Arab nations are increasingly alarmed about Iran’s nuclear program as well as massive US arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE aimed at containing Iran. Efforts at cultivating partnerships with regimes in Latin America that are ideologically hostile toward the US such as Venezuela and Bolivia. Gulf Region The US presence in the Gulf and the US relationship with Iran’s Sunni-dominated Arab neighbors in the region have long ranked as some of Iran’s top foreign policy concerns. As one of the oldest nations in the world and the largest, most populous state in the region, Iran sees itself as a natural and legitimate power in the Middle East. For example, Alaeddin Boroujerdi made the following statement on April 17, 2011: “The [P]GCC should not put the blame for the ongoing developments in Bahrain on Iran. The Islamic Republic seeks peace in the region.” “Iran's policy on Arab countries in the Persian Gulf has not changed and we still believe in good relations with these states.” “The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most influential country in the region which tightens regional security and has played a valuable role in defusing crisis and establishing security.”2 2 “Iran MP Urges PGCC to Stop Blaming Iran.” PressTV. 19 April ‘11 4 Additionally, on April 30, 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, allegedly made similar claims of historical Iranian regional dominance when speaking on Iran’s "National Day of the Persian Gulf:” "The Arab dictatorial regimes in the Persian Gulf are unable to contain the popular uprisings." "Instead of trying and failing to open an unworkable front against Iran, these dictators should relinquish power, end their savage crimes and let the people determine their own future." “The Persian Gulf has always, is and shall always belong to Iran." "With the arrival of the British and later the Americans in the region, plots were hatched to try and change the name with fake identities... to distort the history and identity of the Persian Gulf."3 4 Iranian news outlets later denied that General Firouzabadi made these statements. The US and its regional allies, however, have sought to counter Iran. For example, on Oct. 20, 2010, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a 60 billion $US arms sale to Saudi Arabia.5 The deal includes 84 F-15 Saudi Advanced (SA) fighter aircraft, upgrades for the existing fleet of Royal Saudi Air Force F-15S multi-role fighters, 70 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters (24 of which will be equipped with the Longbow Fire Control Radar system), 72 UH-60M Blackhawk utility helicopters, 36 AH-6I “Little Bird” light attack helicopters, and 12 MD-530F light turbine helicopters, among other weapons systems.6 Similarly, the US and the UAE announced a 5 billion $US arms sale on on Nov. 8, 2010 that included the sale of 60 AH-64D Apache helicopters.7 On Oct. 21, 2010, the UAE also opened a new naval base at Al Fujairah near the eastern entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.8 The establishment of the base came after repeated Iranian affirmations that the country would close the Strait of Hormuz or otherwise disrupt world petroleum shipments if it were attacked or threatened. Less than two months later on Dec. 10, 2010, the commander of the IRGC navy, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, stated that his forces “are in complete control of the Strait of Hormoz and the Sea of Oman.”9 3 “Gulf 'Belongs to Iran': Top Military Officer.” Associated Free Press. 30 April ‘11 4 “Iran Says Remarks of Top Army Officer on Persian Gulf Quoted Falsely.” Iranian Students’ News Agency. 3 May ‘11 5 Wasserbly, Daniel. “US Reveals Details of $60bn Sale to Saudi Arabia.” Jane’s Defence Industry. 28 Oct. ‘10 6 Wasserbly, Daniel. “US Reveals Details of $60bn Sale to Saudi Arabia.” Jane’s Defence Industry. 28 Oct. ‘10 7 Gelfand, Lauren. “US Agrees $5bn Boeing Apache Deal with UAE.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. 9 Nov. ‘10 8 “UAE Opens New Strait of Hormuz Naval Base.” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly. 25 Oct. ‘10 9 “IRGC May Change Its Agenda in Persian Gulf, Says IRGC Commander.” Fars News Agency. 10 Dec. ‘10 5 The arms deals also come at a time when WikiLeaks has revealed regional fears of Iran’s regional designs and burgeoning nuclear program. According to the classified diplomatic cables released by the group, the leaders of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE voiced their concerns to US diplomats regarding Iran’s nuclear program. For example, the UAE’s Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, has warned US officials since 2006 that they needed to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, and Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz has urged the US government to “cut off the head of the snake” in reference to Iran’s nuclear program.10 Iran’s response rarely lashes out at its Sunni neighbors directly, but rather tends to blame the US for plotting to spread “Iranophobia” and fear of Shiism to manipulate its allies into buying military hardware. On Dec. 13, 2010, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi responded to US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ assertion that “Iran’s combative policies cause everyone to worry,” stating, “It is the warmongering and interventionist American leaders who try to harm good relations between the countries of the region by designing false matters and creating divisions.”11 Furthermore, Vahidi went on to state that the US’ Iran “scenario” is intended to create an “excuse for its illegitimate presence and the sale of weapons in the region,” and claimed that “the region’s people are not afraid of Islamic Iran,” but rather are worried about the “warmongering American regime… which has sacrificed millions of people for its transgressive policies.”12 Additionally, on Sept.