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Home , Charles II of England, English Army, Northern Department, Principality of Orange, Secret Treaty of Dover, Stuart period

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DURING SIR 'S CAREER

JEREMY BLACK

SIR William Trumbull served as envoy, and subsequently as Secretary of State, during a period of major change in Britain's international position. He was Ambassador Extraordinary to Louis XIV of from 2 September 1685 to 12 October 1686, and then Resident Ambassador at Constantinople from November 1686 to October 1691.^ Although appointed to Constantinople in November 1686, Trumbull did not embark until 16 April 1687 and only arrived on 17 August 1687. He left on 31 July 1691. Trumbull was Secretary of State for the Northern Department from 3 May 1695 until I December 1697.^ When Trumbull left for Constantinople, was ruled by the Cathohc James II and was at peace. When he returned, James had been removed as a result of the invasion in 1688 by his nephew and son-in-law, William III of , and England was at war with Louis XIV, the Nine Years' War, otherwise known as the War of the League of Augsburg or King William's War. This shift has generally been seen as according with Britain's national interests: in a somewhat teleological account of foreign policy, conflict with France, a struggle for oceanic, colonial and commercial supremacy, have been seen as Britain's destiny. This interpretation was for long axiomatic. Indeed, it is necessary to turn back to the major works of the past in order to appreciate just how revolutionary modern 'revisionism' has been. Thus, Captain Montagu Burrows, R.N., Chichele Professor of Modern History at , wrote in The History of the Foreign Policy of Creat Britain (, 1895):

Happily for the world... the Revolution of 1688 once more opened up the way to the resumption of the Tudor Foreign Policy... Not one vv^ord too much has been said in praise of the benefit conferred upon England and the world by the Revolution. From the 5th of November 1688 dates the return of England to her old place... The nation had long been aware of the evils of a departure from the principles entwined with its whole earlier history, and exemplified in chief by the great Elizabeth.

Sir Adolphus Ward was less florid in his language, but, to him, the later Stuarts had depressed 'the English monarchy to the position of vassal state', while William III was 199 'one of the most far-sighted of great statesmen'.^ In such statements, historians were not only reflecting and sustaining the national historical myth, but also adopting a clear position on domestic history: the was seen as seminally good and necessary and thus the foreign policy changes that stemmed from it were likewise. On 17 November 1722 a leading newspaper, the London Journal, offered an assessment of the consequences of the Glorious Revolution. Designed to elicit support for the Protestant Succession, this account linked directly the international results of 1688, namely war with France, to the supposed domestic consequences had the Stuarts and France not been rejected in 1688: Without the Revolution there would have been no war with France, but then it is for this unhappy reason, because there could not have been one. But instead of it, there must have been a much greater evil; and that is, slavery to France, or to a government modeled and supported by it. I acknowledge that, without the Revolution, the expense of wars abroad, the lives of men fighting in defense of their country, and the effusion of much blood, had been saved. But instead of these, the writer argued, there would have been a bleak domestic prospect: arbitrary demands of taxes... Black Darkness - Deep Silence, never interrupted, unless by the groans of those who dare not any farther disturb it - the terrors of an Inquisition, or a High- Commission Court - one voice of bigots blaspheming, and of hypocrites affronting God - the profound quiet of slavery, in which all arts and sciences are by degrees sunk.

The striking feature of this classic statement of Whig behefs was that in 1722 Britain was in alliance with France, an alliance negotiated in 1716 by George Fs Whig ministers and which had recently borne fruit in the French disclosure of Jacobite plans, the Atterbury Plot. Such a contrast poses a question mark against the attempt to present foreign policy as dominated by ideological considerations. In replacing socio-economic determinism with notions of cultural, ideological and linguistic hegemony, scholars have often failed to appreciate the limitations of the latter, both in describing what was generally a more diverse and divided situation, and as a means of explanation. This can be an acute problem in studies of foreign pohcy, where politicians can be presented as trapped by a set of ideas of their own, or, more generally, by the dominant notions of the political society of the period. Any close reading of Anglo-French relations in the late- seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries suggests that the staple foreign policy item of the Whig creed - political, religious, cultural and economic hostility to France - was not matched by any consistent government policy. This creed, however, had considerable weight in terms of domestic political debate, and has subsequently been important in influencing historical judgements. In terms of the former, the seizure and development of the anti-French case by particular groups of politicians was of growing significance in the last forty years of the seventeenth century as hostility to Spain and the United Provinces became less valid as a basis of foreign policy and less significant as a domestic political issue. In terms of historical judgement, hostility to France and the argument that the pre-Revolution monarchy had slavishly followed French interests were used to

200 brilliant effect by Whig propagandists in the half-century after the Revolution. The argument had, of course, also been used before the Revolution, most notably in much of the polemical Whig literature of the Exclusion period. It was William III who negotiated the two Partition Treaties with Louis XIV (1698, 1700) by which the French monarchy was promised substantial territorial gains, and it was William who sought to gain European support for this new settlement. In it, everything really depended on Louis's good faith. Between 1716 and 1731 Britain and France were allies, and together they fought Spain in 1719-20 and confronted Spain and Austria in 1725-9. During the War of the Polish Succession (1733-5) the Walpole ministry did not oppose Bourbon successes at the expense of Austria.* And yet, at the same time. Whig propagandists stressed the pro-French policies of Charles II and James II, using them, as much as Stuart Catholicism, to argue that the Jacobites were un- British. Religion and international policy could thus serve as definers of nationhood. On 2 September 1749 the Remembrancer, a London newspaper, claimed, 'on the ruins of King James the Second's government a new one was established which undertook not only to perpetuate the of this country, but to restore the liberty of .' One might ask what Whig propagandists would have said of Charles II and James II, had they signed treaties for the partition of the comparable to those of William III, or in the enjoyed an alliance with France as close as that of 1716-31. Indeed subsequent writers were to point out that, having savaged the attempts of the Tory ministry of 1710-14 to improve relations with France, the Whigs were to do likewise. Thus, Smollett, in the Briton of 9 October 1762, defended the of 1713 and wrote of the ,

as soon as their adversaries had overwhelmed them with ruin, and established their own influence about the throne, beyond all possibility of reverse, the treaty of Utrecht, which they had branded as infamous and pernicious, they left unaltered and undisturbed; and instead of producing a fresh rupture in less than one year, it remained in full force very near thirty, a period of tranquillity almost unexampled in the annals of England, during which, she enjoyed, without interruption, every blessing which opulence and security could bestow. Smollett was correct to argue that the Whigs had stolen the Tories' 'Utrecht clothes'. More important, however, is the extent to which the Whig critique of Charles II and James II has been generally accepted by subsequent historians. Part of the problem lies in the notion of national interest. The idea that this lay in hostihty to France was one that was read backwards into the pre-Revolution period by those who witnessed and considered the wars between the two powers in the period 1689-1815. Thus, the apparent hostility to France represented by the of 1668 with and the Dutch was seen as the natural path to follow, and Charles II was criticized for taking the opposite course. The notion of national interest as defined by hostility to France was also read forward from the Hundred Years War. Furthermore, nineteenth-century historians found it difficult to accept that England had acted as a second-rank power in the period 1660-88, had indeed received French subsidies for part of the period. This

201 was explained by reference to the wishes of Charles H and James H, wishes that were held to lie behind their policies. The actions of many of the German rulers of the period towards Louis XIV were similarly explained and condemned by nationalist German historians. Pusillanimity, to national interests and Catholic convictions were the only possible explanations. The very notion of national interests, however, is one that faces considerable difficulties. Thus, in the Lords debate on 14 July 1986 concerning the forthcoming tercentenary celebrations, Lord Grimond thought them provocative to the Irish and, possibly, to Catholics, adding 'that the so-called revolution of 1688 was in fact a coup d'etat^ carried out largely by appealing to religious bigotry, and by treachery'. The Catholic peer Lord Mowbray and Stourton complained because of the subsequent treatment of Catholics, the Earl of Lauderdale because of that of , and Lord Glenamara, as Ted Short a headmaster and later Secretary of State for Education, declared, ' It was a pretty squalid affair. It amounted to nothing more than the ousting of the lawful, rightful King by religious prejudice... this squalid coup d'etaf} Members of the House of Commons, for example Tony Benn, were also critical of the Glorious Revolution. Other views were naturally voiced, but the variety of the opinions expressed are both a reminder of the complexity and controversial nature of assessing national identity and interests, and the danger of accepting the current scholarly preference for notions of cultural hegemony: attention to the celebration of the tercentenary can well lead to a neglect of conflicting voices. Nineteenth-century confidence in definitions of national interest relating to territorial consolidation and expansion, domestic order and stabihty and national strength, are of little help in the appreciation of the later . Domestically, there was no constitutional, political or confessional consensus. This of course lay behind the contentious politics of the 1680s, and also affected the diplomatic corps. TrumbuU's robust ensured that his career survived the Revolution of 1688, and that he had reason to regard the replacement of James II with some equanimity but that was not true of most of James's diplomats. In international terms it was far from clear whence the greatest opportunities for and threats to England came in the late seventeenth century. The close involvement of foreign powers in domestic English politics^ lent further complexity to the situation as the political significance of individual positions on domestic and international issues was far from consistent. Louis XIV's willingness to support both Charles II and his domestic rivals in the revealed the extent to which the external parameters of English politics were far from fixed. The intertwining of domestic politics and diplomatic developments was a characteristic feature of seventeenth-century international relations, not least those between England and France. In an age of kaleidoscopic unpredictability in the international sphere, the policies of rulers were far from consistent, and this was true of allies and rivals alike. Intervention in domestic politics therefore seemed prudent, and it was further encouraged by the knowledge or suspicion that rival rulers were acting similarly, as William of Orange was in England in the 1670s.

202 Foreign intervention in English domestic politics was encouraged and facilitated by the nature of the political system and, in particular, by the ability of opposition politicians to inconvenience the government in Parliament. More significant, in the case of England, was foreign concern about her international position. The period 1620-85 had underlined the volatility of English foreign policy, as well as witnessing several dramatic interventions in the affairs of her neighbours. She had gone to war with France once, Spain twice and the Dutch thrice. Cromwell's decision to support Mazarin against Philip IV of Spain had helped to tilt the balance of the Franco-Spanish confiict of 1635-59. In 1658 English Ironsides and French troops defeated the at the Battle of the Dunes and captured nearby . The of monarchs and ministers to the events of 1688 was affected not only by those events and by James II's policies, diplomatic and domestic, but also by their experiences over a number of decades. Most of the rulers and politicians alive in 1688, for example Louis XIV, Leopold I, William III and Frederick William of Brandenburg, could look back to decades of past hopes and concerns over English policy. It was clear that England could take a major role in international affairs, but also that she could be handicapped by domestic problems. Volatility in English foreign policy was a product of the volatility of English domestic politics, and hence encouraged foreign interventions in the latter: the Scots during the ; Spanish intrigues with republicans in the early ; William III and the opposition in 1672-4; and Louis XIV and the opposition in 1678. Louis's basic attitude to England was not very different from that to the German , and Sweden; only the techniques of intervention had to be varied especially because of the formation of parties and their infiuence on foreign policy decisions. Though foreign policy was constitutionally a matter exclusively for the , the exercise of this prerogative was very much mediated through, and affected by, the political system. The difiiculty, indeed artificiality, of assessing English national interests ensures that there is no secure base from which to judge the shifting relationship between Charles II and James II, and Louis XIV, a situation further exacerbated by the nature of the surviving evidence with its lacunae and ambiguities. Thus, for example, Charles II's intentions at the time of the Treaty of (1670) and the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672) have always been especially controversial, and there is still a lack of agreement. For K. H. D. Haley in 1986, Charles's policies in 1670-2 refiected a 'decision' in favour of a Europe dominated by Louis XIV, but for Ronald Hutton in the same year they were the products of a 'search for double insurance against isolation', removing 'the chance that the French would come to terms with the Dutch or Spanish'.^ Prerogative control over foreign policy ensured, however, that this relationship between monarchs was crucial. If the assessment of English policy towards France is embroiled in controversy and fraught with difficulties, the situation is a little clearer on the French side, a consequence of the greater stability and consistency of French decision making. The principal question has always been whether Louis XIV's failure to assist James II against the 203 threat of Dutch invasion in 1688 was a serious mistake that delivered the to William and the anti-French cause. This is best approached by appreciating that James was not a French client, that he did not wish to identify himself, or be identified, with Louis too closely. James appears to have realized that any attack on him by William would probably depend on the connivance of the Emperor, Leopold I, and his foreign policy was characterized by an attempt to maintain good relations with both Louis and his Catholic rivals, Leopold, Charles II of Spain and Pope Innocent XI. James wished to prevent war between Louis and his Catholic opponents, a war that he feared would drive them to support William, as they had done during the Dutch War of 1672-8, and were indeed to do, as war resumed from 1688 on. James's attitude hardly commended him to Louis, but, in truth, Louis's policy represented a continuation of that towards Charles II of England. He had sought to use England for French ends and to manipulate Charles and English politics accordingly. Thus, in 1672-3, when the two Kings were allied against the Dutch, Louis was opposed to Charles's objective of acquiring fortified Dutch coastal towns, and in the Cologne peace conference of 1673 he offered little support for English objectives. In the same year the absence of promised French naval assistance helped to defeat Charles's plan for a landing on the Dutch coast, and there was bitter public criticism of the French.^ Charles, however, also seems to have believed in 1672 that he was to a degree manipulating Louis. The clash between English and French objectives and policies was not limited to the waters of the North Sea. For Louis, the state and future of English politics were important primarily only if they served his foreign policy, and the wishes and interests of his English ally in this sphere could be sacrificed accordingly. In 1673 he pressed Charles II to yield to Parliament on religious issues and to revoke the Declaration of Indulgence, in order to obtain parliamentary support for the war. This angered James,® but Louis, as ever and understandably so, preferred to heed the immediacy of short-term considerations, rather than to consider the more problematic long-term perspective. Louis followed a similar policy in 1678 when the prospect of English support for his opponents led him to help overthrow the Danby ministry. In 1688 Louis adopted a similar short-term and manipulative approach, arising essentially from the international context of the Rhenish crisis of that year; though his policy seems also to have been affected by his attitude towards James. James, a sovereign ruler, understandably preferred to follow an independent line in foreign policy and not to subordinate his domestic views to the convenience of Louis. James was seen as a monarch who foolishly ignored the practicalities of his domestic situation,^^ and the French were unimpressed by his conduct in the crisis of 1688.^^ In addition, James's determination to follow his own line in international relations led to differences with Louis, as did specific problems in Anglo-French relations. D'Avaux, the French envoy at , reported on 24 July 1687 that he had been told that the English fleet had been ordered to make French ships in the Channel strike their flag to that of England and to attack if this mark of respect was refused. D'Avaux added, 'thus at the very time that the King of England was so cautious in every thing, not to affront 204 the States General who abused him, he took every opportunity of quarrelhng with the King my master, who was so strenuous in his interest'.^^ A Dutch invasion of England might well cause a lengthy conflict, possibly also an , that would exhaust both William and England, so that, whoever won, the result would benefit Louis. The French government certainly wanted to see civil war in England. ^^ There had been three Anglo-Dutch wars in the last forty years, and there was no reason why there should not be a fourth: a cause also of William's concern about James's intentions. Just as Louis welcomed the diversion of Austrian resources to fight the Turks, and viewed with disquiet any suggestion of a Balkan peace, so the prospect of an Anglo-Dutch conflict was pregnant with possibilities. The speedy collapse of James's position in England in late 1688 was not anticipated. This can be seen as a failure on the French part. Barrillon, their envoy, underestimated the extent and determination of English opposition to James, and, in his correspondence with Louis, the possibility of a total collapse of James's position was not raised. It is, however, worth pointing out that William's military and subsequent political victories were unpredictable. The idea of a successful landing of any sort was unlikely, given the possibilities of interventions by the weather and by Dartmouth's fleet. William perishing in a storm would not have been an unattractive prospect for Louis. Had William landed and James fought in the West Country or stayed subsequently in London, the crisis might well have been more protracted or had a different result. In addition, the Stuart position did not collapse in Ireland, and in 1690-1 William had to devote considerable effort to its conquest, a task that should not be treated as marginal and that has recently received more attention.^'* Even less than in 1672,^^ Louis did not seek a lengthy conflict in 1688 when he began hostilities in the Rhineland. He hoped that a military demonstration would obtain his objectives, and he did his best to win the neutrality of Spain, whose territories in the Low Countries had proved so vulnerable in the last war. Possibly an attack on , the Dutch fortress most vulnerable to French forces, would have helped James, but this was unclear, and Louis did not wish to the Dutch around William. In addition, James feared the close association with France that naval assistance would have entailed. On 4 October 1688, however, D'Avaux complained about the effect of the French moving east, into the upper Rhineland, rather than threatening the Dutch: 'the siege of Philipsbourg made the stocks rise and rendered the States General very insolent, from an assurance that the king would neither attack them nor the Spanish '. He added his view that measures should be taken to frighten the Dutch. Four days later, D'Avaux reported that Wilham might defer his invasion as long as it was possible that Louis would invade the .^^ Thus, Louis can be criticized for failing to assist James until after he had fallen. To do so, however, is possibly to underrate the unpredictability of international relations at a time when the opening of the Spanish Succession and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Europe appeared imminent, to endow Louis with a prescient awareness of England's future role against France, and to neglect the extent to which the purpose of allies and clients was to assist the furtherance 205 of policy, not dictate its course. There was no reason for Louis to suppose that England (still less with its Scottish and Irish complications) would be a major asset for William. Leopold Fs conquest of Hungary from the Turks threatened to upset the balance of Franco-Habsburg power.^^ It introduced a worrying note of volatility, without making it clear to Louis how best to respond. Furthermore, the attack on Maastricht, when suggested by D'Avaux, could not be mounted: the armies were already directed against Philippsburg. Military objectives could not be switched at short notice and at that time of the year, certainly not without logistical preparations. Arguably more serious for France in the long term than Louis's failure to back James II in 1688 was his support for James and his line after 1688, for that made it more difficult to develop better Anglo-French relations. Louis did not offer James consistent support, but he did send a contingent to Ireland in 1689-91 and lost part of his fleet in the 1692 project for an invasion on behalf of the Jacobite cause. Louis returned to the scheme in 1696 when, unable to defeat William in the Spanish Netherlands and promised Jacobite support in England, he concentrated troops near the coast, only to be dissuaded from acting by English naval moves. The extent to which French recognition of the male line of the Stuarts harmed relations is open to debate. Louis was willing to recognize William as King as part of the Ryswick settlement (1697), and acknowledge- ment of the Hanoverian succession was a central feature of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716-31. Louis's support for James IFs claims during the Nine Years' War, however, hindered negotiations with William, while his recognition of James III in 1701 made any last-minute attempt to prevent Anglo-French hostilities as part of the War of the Spanish Succession appear redundant. The English Ambassador at Paris, the , observed, 'It shows at least this court does not intend to keep any measures with His Majesty.'^^ If Anglo-French conflict is regarded as inevitable, then dissension over the succession might not appear important, but any stress on the play of contingency in the absence of defined and generally-accepted national interests, suggests that, on the contrary, Louis's policy towards the Jacobites was of great consequence. It helped to give Anglo-French rivalry an added degree of tension and made it recognizably different in type from that between France and the United Provinces. Pride, personal commitment and a sense of royal dignity were reflected in Louis's recognition of the Jacobite claim and, in turn, helped to make it difficult, though not impossible, to negotiate. On the English part, the recognition was a direct challenge to the domestic political situation. An issue that could dramatically change the nature of Enghsh politics and rehgion was placed at or near the forefront of Anglo-French relations, and it was not surprising that anxiety about France and Louis XIV increased. The rise in hostility to France has been dated to the later Stuart period, more especially to the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-4), the Franco-Dutch war (1672-8) or to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). French success in 1672, the replacement of the De Witt regime in the United Provinces, and the conduct of French naval operations, led to a major shift in opinion against France in 1672-3.^^ Parliamentary debates in the Commons in the mid-i67os

206 revealed concern and fury, because of feelings of insecurity, especially in 1677-8, anger about Colbert's tariffs and concern about the possible threat posed by the French fleet. The last has recently been seen as of major concern also to Charles and James, leading to the conclusion that Charles was prepared for war with Louis in 1678. Danby warned Charles in April 1677 that when mens feares are growne both so generall and so great as now they are by the successes of France, neither his Majestie nor any of his ministers shall have any longer creditt if acts do not speedily appeare some way or other to theire satisfaction. ^° This shift in Anglo-French relations can be related to a more general breakdown in the 'classical' French alignment with various northern European Protestant powers in the 1670S. This also led to the French attack on the Dutch in 1672, to the breakdown in relations with Brandenburg-Prussia and to a deterioration in those with Sweden. The previously important Huguenot component in French society and in the French army and navy was placed increasingly at risk. This shift ensured that Stuart of the non-Anglican English population became more contentious politically, as the reception of successive Declarations of Indulgence showed. Furthermore, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 seriously weakened James II, because of the association of his policies with those of Louis XIV, and also harmed the Dutch francophiles. A case, however, can also be made for suggesting that much of the rise in Anglo-French hostihty derived from the events of 1688-9: the Glorious Revolution, French support for James and the outbreak of war between the two powers. Louis's military support for the Jacobite cause in Ireland was significant, as Ireland was the focus and source of a number of English phobias. There is a sense in which English national consciousness and patriotism were given a tremendous boost and fresh definition by the Glorious Revolution. This consciousness was politically defined and partisan, directed against Jacobites and those held likely to support the exiled Stuarts, especially Catholics in England and, though to a lesser extent, Episcopahans in Scotland, as much as against the principal patron of the Stuarts, Louis XIV. Indeed, it could be argued that Louis established himself as the national enemy more by his real and apparent backing for the Stuarts and their British supporters, than by his activities on the Continent. English, still more British, patriotism was thus after 1688 necessarily divisive, and derived much of its drive from this partisan character. The Glorious Revolution led to the development of two competing theses of patriotism, one of which triumphed, and thus was able to define patriotism accordingly. Such a process was not new. It could be seen on every occasion in which domestic divisions and foreign policy had interacted, for example during the Henrician and the English Civil War, and had medieval roots, as with French intervention in English domestic politics in 1216-17 at the end of the reign of John and at the beginning of Henry Ill's minority. The expansion of the dimension of public politics in the early , thanks to the move to annual Parliaments and an active press free of pre-publication censorship, as well as the lengthy conflict with France for most of the period 1689-1713, ensured that the particular patriotic discourse 207 associated with the winning side in the British civil conflict of 1688-91 became well entrenched. It has also influenced scholarship on the subject. The Whig interpretation of domestic history may have been supplanted; but this is not true of work on foreign policy.^^ The problematic nature of national unity has received too little attention. Thus, Brinkmann argued that James * was in the impossible position of any government which has its support outside its proper national basis'. This problem can be seen in the eighteenth-century use of 1688. Thus, in 1787, Count Charles Bentinck pressed for British military intervention in the Dutch crisis on behalf of William V of Orange, 'I hope to hear soon of an English fleet on the coast: remember 1688. There is a sea port town ready to receive you.' Yet British activity was not only directed against a Dutch political movement, the Patriots, who could claim to be as representative of national interests as the house of Orange, but was also criticized by one prominent minister, the , Lord Thurlow, then the most obvious representative in the Cabinet of what can be referred to as the Tory strain in late-eighteenth-century politics.^^ That there was always a public debate over foreign policy, over goals as well as means, was amply demonstrated both during the wars of 1689-1713 and subsequently. The events of the period and the debates they gave rise to shaped the notions of national interests and thus patriotism that were to be so influential in public discourse and subsequent scholarship. It is therefore possible to focus attention on the specific events in international relations and British foreign policy during Trumbull's career, and to emphasize their importance. By directing attention to those years, greater stress is placed on the role of choice, for Louis had to decide how far he was to support James. His policies ensured that France clearly emerged as the leading challenger to the Protestant succession. Far from such a development being inevitable, it was actually at variance with one of the central themes of French foreign policy since the 1530s. France had been classically, though not invariably, associated with the Protestant cause against the Habsburgs, both in the Empire (Germany) and in the Low Countries. Louis's moves against the did not make such a strategy redundant, as his co-operation with William III in negotiating the Partition Treaties (1698, 1700) was to demonstrate. His support for the Jacobites, however, made co-operation with Britain more diflicult. Dynastic claims were not by their nature subject to compromise and Louis restricted his freedom of manoeuvre by sheltering James. The more distant and manipulative French policy towards the Jacobites that followed the death of Louis XIV in 1715 was more successful in respecting British sensitivity on the subject of the succession. On the other hand, an England under a suitably grateful and subservient James II or James III would have been the best possible scenario for Louis, albeit a risky and long term one which restricted his freedom of manoeuvre in the short term. Had Tourville been permitted by Louis to wait for the Toulon fleet in 1692, the battle of Barfleur might have been a French success, and had William been killed during the war, it is possible that the policies of reinsurance on the part of politicians who continued links with the exiled

208 James might have weakened the English response to a French invasion or a Jacobite rising. French support for the Jacobites proved to be a central feature of the Whig myth of the Glorious Revolution, helping to locate both France and , and making clear their guilt by association. Largely because French policy towards the Jacobites has not been placed in the context of Louis's wider relations with William and England, this myth has proved singularly durable. By directing attention, however, to the state of flux in relations, a more realistic appraisal of Louis's policies can be made. Given his ideological views and his concern in his later years with aflirming his role as a Catholic monarch, it is unreasonable to criticize him harshly for his recognition of the Stuarts, though it is appropriate to stress the serious consequences that it had.^^ In turning to consider the i68os it is necessary first to stress the unpredictability of international relations in this period. International relations were extremely volatile, to the extent that it was difficult, and even dangerous, for a government to seek to apply consistent principles, as was to be demonstrated by the heavy price paid by Louis XIV for the continuing support he gave to the Jacobites. In practice, in their foreign policies, governments usually were reacting to the pressure of events at home and abroad, rather than executing long-term, carefully calculated plans; and, when they chose a course of action it was usually in the light of patchy information and without being able to predict or control the consequences of their actions. It is possible to stress 'the beginning of a new era in European pohtics',^^ with French, and far more obviously, Turkish power ebbing, and Austria becoming more prominent. It can be argued that * there was no real danger of France being able to achieve the sort of successes feared' by those, such as Sir William Temple, who warned about a French threat. ^^ However, the success of the reunions policy and the paralyzing of William's attempts to aid Spain, by D'Avaux and the Louvestein party, indicate why contemporaries were impressed by French power, and they had reason to be so intimidated or frightened. It is scarcely surprising that the changes of the period were imperfectly understood and that, when they were grasped, it was unclear how best to respond. This was a particular problem for rulers who were not in the first rank, such as the Kings of Denmark and Norway, the Electors of Bavaria and Brandenburg, and the Dukes of Lorraine.^^ Charles II and James II could clearly be included in this list, and that is a measure of their problem, both in terms of their international position and with reference to the later reputation of their foreign policy. There was of course no rigid divide between first rank and other powers, but England seemed clearly absent from the first for two reasons. First, after the demobilization of the substantial army and navy of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, the forces that had given substance to Cromwellian foreign policy, England was not a leading military power. Her navy was still important, as was shown in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, though its relative strength was diminished by the growth of French naval power under Louis XIV, a growth that challenged English assumptions about the naval situation in the Channel. This lay behind the disputes about the precedence of the English flag that involved so much diplomatic effort. The became far 209 weaker after demobilization.^^ There was less prospect under Charles II of Continental intervention on the scale of 1658 when English troops had played a major role in the Spanish defeat at the Battle of the Dunes, though in 1678 the army of nearly 30,000 men raised by Danby was as large as the Cromwellian force in Flanders. The English were well aware of French military strength. It was mentioned in both Parliament and the press. The English Intelligencer of 16 August 1679 reported that the French army contained more than 140,000 men. In January 1686 Trumbull wrote from France, *Here is a considerable augmentation of the King's forces, but to what number I cannot yet positively know; and there are 6 millions added to the Marine.'^^ Instead of English military power, it was the memory of past strength, the Elizabeth and Drake, Cromwell and Blake myth, and the prospect that her potential strength might increase that were of importance to English politicians and foreign diplomats. Foreign powers sought to foster or prevent the latter by intervening in English domestic politics. The second reason why England did not seem a flrst-rank power was the state of these politics. England seemed unstable, due to and demonstrated by, both the problems successive governments faced in parliamentary management, and those caused by ministerial division. As a result, the politics of Charles IPs reign appeared repeatedly to demonstrate that royal and ministerial wishes could be thwarted and were unlikely to remain constant. ^^ Indeed, in seeking foreign support or in excusing particular steps, both Charles and his ministers made reference to the domestic problems they faced,^^ and thus contributed to the foreign impression of their weakness. In 1676 the French envoy Honore de Courtin observed, 'il arrive si souvent ici des changemens',^^ and later that year he added that fear of Parliament, rather than, to him, rational considerations based on diplomatic calculations, determined ministerial policy.^^ As a consequence, this policy could be driven towards aggressive positions at the expense of France,^^ while in order to lessen his domestic problems Charles could also seem to want peace.^^ Indeed, the confusion between the two possible responses to these problems, bellicosity and inaction, helped to make English policy seem especially volatile in the late 1670s and early i68os.^^ Charles II was well aware of this problem. In May 1677 he replied to a Commons address by stating that, should I suffer this fundamental power of making peace and war to be so far invaded (though but once) as to have the manner and circumstances of leagues prescribed to me by Parliament, it is plain, that no or state would any long believe, that the sovereignty of England rests in the ; nor could I think myself to signify any more to foreign princes than the empty sound of

Far, however, from seeing the domestic situation as a simple explanatory device to account for foreign policy, it is important to note its ambiguity and the variety of political uses to which it could be put. Thus, in the spring of 1678 James told Barrillon that war with France would diminish domestic hostility to him and enable to raise an army that could, if necessary, be used to suppress revolt. Barrillon replied that war would force the government to accept parliamentary limitations on the King's choice of

210 ministers and restrictions on Catholicism.^^ The army raised in 1678 represented an extension of ministerial patronage: a foreign policy development was thus turned to political advantage, indicating the primacy, or at least pervasive role, of domestic affairs. The varied use of the argument from the weakness of the English government underlines the need for a cautious use of statements about the relationship between domestic and international affairs. It is, however, clear that the and (1678-81) led, at the time, to the expectation that James would either be excluded from the succession or only gain the throne if he accepted limitations on his authority. In fact, as a result of the failure of Exclusion and the subsequent 'Tory reaction', James came to the throne in 1685 with more power and authority than could have been anticipated as recently as 1681. Furthermore, the international situation was more propitious than in recent years. The Truce of Ratisbon (Regensburg) of 1684 marked not a full settlement of differences, but at least a relaxation of the tensions created by Louis's reunions policy and by his determination that his gains should be recognized.^® As with domestic British affairs, so with those abroad: it is necessary to put aside the awareness of crisis, rupture and conflict from 1688 on and, instead, to pay attention to the particular conjuncture. The 1680s can be seen in terms of a general crisis,^^ but it is also worth noting that in Western Europe the period from the Truce of Regensburg to the outbreak of the Nine Years' War was peaceful. This contrasted with the situation for most of the previous thirteen years. It can, however, be suggested that, although the contexts were very different, the detente brought about by the Truce of Ratisbon resembled WilUam Ill's Partition Treaties, in that they all broke down after a short interval. Granted thus that there was flux and various possibilities, it can, nevertheless, be argued that in the period before 1688 developments were taking place which made the course of events from 1688 onwards more than the product of contingencies at the time. Clearly, not least in 1688, there were disputes, as well as intimations of a forthcoming war, as there had earlier been in the period before the outbreak of the Dutch War in 1672. It was, however, far from clear whether war would break out and, if so, between whom. Thus, at the beginning of January 1685, the Spanish envoy in London thought war inevitable over the French intimidation of Genoa, and Charles II wanted the dispute settled, as he feared that if war broke out, it would become general. And yet the issue did not lead to war. The same was true of the Baltic crisis of 1683, and again in 1686-9 as war between Denmark and its neighbours was averted.*^ War was also feared when the English and the Dutch clashed over trade in the East Indies, the English being driven out of Bantam in r682, but it was avoided. Thus, it is necessary not to regard war as inevitable and, indeed, to appreciate the extent to which opportunities for continued peace existed. In March 1687 Sir , Ambassador to the Imperial Diet, who the previous month had been displeased to hear James II called a 'bon fran9ois', felt able to write, I hope (now there is no danger of the public peace's being broke) the Ministers no longer live in a state of war and that I may play quietly at cards with the Countess of Crecy, without giving the Austrian jealousy.'*^

211 The opportunity for continued peace seemed particularly true of Britain, given Charles II's reluctance in his last years to adopt any interventionist role in Continental diplomacy.'*'^ This set the situation for James II's foreign policy and thus for Trumbull's Paris embassy. The Paris embassy would seem to be the key diplomatic post. It was, however, held by distinctly secondary figures. Trumbull, and his successor, Bevil Skelton, were neither important nor influential in their own right. This practice made it difficult for James to maintain the independent uncommitted stance which he wanted. All the important business was transacted by the French envoy in London. This approach had suited Charles with his secret set of policies, but handicapped James. Trumbull's embassy has been the subject of detailed study. Ruth Clark's monograph*^ was based on extensive work in English and French archives and has stood the test of time well. It is clear that the Anglican Trumbull, who was chosen as a result of the influence of the Earl of Rochester, was not in the confidence of his catholicizing monarch. Rochester, a prominent Tory and Anglican, was created Lord Treasurer soon after the accession of his former brother-in-law, James. Rochester supported good relations with William and reliance on the Tories, but, from the prorogation of Parliament in November 1685, Rochester's influence was increasingly supplanted by who advocated closer ties with France and was willing to support James's pro-Catholic policies. Though James did not decide to dismiss Rochester until December 1686, Trumbull's position was weakened from the outset by the change in the domestic situation. With Barrillon and Sunderland working together, any English diplomat in Paris had no influence and little real role. Nevertheless, James was firm on his royal dignity. Despite his conviction that Huguenot refugees had played a role in the Monmouth rising,^^ and French complaints,*^ Trumbull's pressure on behalf of the Huguenot wives of James's subjects and Trumbull's Huguenot servants was supported. The Monmouth rising did not necessarily commit James to Louis. Leopold I congratulated James heartily on his victory of Sedgemoor.*^ ^ Trumbull's manner was not conducive to easy negotiations, though, given the grandiloquent French tone of these years, it is clear that any robust defence of the English position was likely to cause offence. Trumbull himself reported in April 1686, The Emperor's envoy was yesterday at Versailles to press Monsr. de Croissy [French foreign minister] for some favourable answer to the memorial he gave in of several damages done by the French troops in the domains of the Emperor, signifying the ill consequences that might happen, if the Emperor should be obliged to take satisfaction upon the new conquests of the French adjoining: Adding that the Emperor was not in the condition of a slave with his hands tied in chains, otherwise than in the of Monsr. de la Feuillade. (This he thought fit to take notice of, upon occasion of one of the figures under the new statue, representing a slave in chains, with the arms of the Empire, the spread-eagle, by him.)*' It is scarcely surprising that diplomats found the triumphalist atmosphere at the French court unwelcome, though, in the case of Trumbull, Louis XIV suggested that given the current circumstances, in the aftermath of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it would

212 be better to have a Catholic than a Protestant envoy. He was also certain that Trumbull would serve James better at Constantinople than at Paris.*^ Trumbull had certainly had to cope with intrinsically difllicult, or even intractable, problems in Paris, both the effects of the Revocation in human detail, and the continuing resentment caused by French tariffs and restrictions on trade. These issues were far from inconsequential: they completely cut the ground from under the feet of D'Avaux at The Hague. In addition, Trumbull had to confront the delicate matter of Orange, on which it was scarcely surprising that he should antagonize Louis, James and William. Trumbull's move of embassy took him far from the centre of diplomatic activity in Western Europe and from the sensitive subject of Anglo-French relations, a move that was to ease his transfer of allegiance from James to William. The move had other advantages. Trumbull had found Paris cripplingly expensive,*^ but Constantinople, where the envoy's salary was paid by the Levant Company, was less costly. The Company paid more regularly than the crown. This, however, posed problems as the Company essentially sought a commercial representative and was unwilling to pay for political services.^^ Trumbull was therefore the envoy furthest from England at the time of the Glorious Revolution. The particular international and domestic conjuncture has received exhaustive treatment as a consequence of the recent tercentenary.^^ Though certain topics have had inadequate attention, for example Anglo-Spanish relations, there is little to add to the account of how William was able to negotiate a diplomatic cover and establish a military backing for his invasion and of how James miscalculated his response, both militarily and pohtically. When Bonrepaus urged him on 11 September to move troops from Ireland, James rephed that there was no hurry.^^ Trumbull was absent from the scene of crisis. He would scarcely have been an appropriate messenger for discussion about the dispatch of French warships to the Channel. By the end of his reign, James had been pushed, by the crisis in his relations with William, far closer to Louis than he would have sought at its outset. On 6 September he told Bonrepaus and Barrillon at Windsor that he had such confidence in Louis that he would never be jealous of his grandeur, but would be happy to see Louis conquer all Germany. Bonrepaus thought that it would be easy to persuade James to join Louis in a war with William.^^ Thus, already before William's invasion, James had been pushed towards the subservience to Louis that was to characterize his position after he left England. James had lost his earlier independent position when, in the aftermath of the suppression of the Monmouth rebellion, he had been both strong domestically and willing and able to negotiate with a number of Continental rulers, including William. Unpopular domestic policies had made intervention by William appear an option at the same time as James's closer relations with Louis seemed to make such intervention for William a desirable, even necessary, prelude to the resumption of Franco-Dutch hostilities. Trumbull played no real role in this crisis or in the deterioration of James's position. His rebarbative legalism and , the former a reflection of his legal career, had scarcely improved Anglo-French relations in 1686, but that had not then caused James serious 213 problems. However, as a diplomat at a turning point in British and Continental history, Trumbull's correspondence is of great value to scholars. At Constantinople, Trumbull was of most importance when serving William, for it was then that he sought to promote an Austro-Turkish peace in order that Leopold I and his German allies should concentrate their forces against Louis XIV. This involved Trumbull in opposition to French diplomacy, a position he found more conducive than his Paris embassy. However, the unwillingness of the two powers to compromise thwarted Trumbull and he was recalled at his own request in 1691.^* In some respects, Trumbull's pre-Revolutionary diplomatic career prefigured the new international order created in 1688-9. I^ Paris, in early 1686, he tried to act in conjunction with the Dutch envoy over Louis XIV's occupation of William's principality of Orange: in miniature this raised issues which were from 1689 to join England and the United Provinces in opposition to France, but in 1686 Louis would not admit the acceptability of joint representations in a matter in which he claimed that his sovereign rights were involved. Furthermore, although they were so dissimilar in personality, Trumbull was the mentor of Henry St John, later first Viscount Bolingbroke,^^ the most influential Tory Secretary of State of the early eighteenth century.

I would like to thank David Aldridge, David Davies, Cruickshanks (ed.). By Force or by Default? The Richard Harding, J. R. Jones, John Stoye and David Revolution of 1688 (, 1989), pp. Sturdy for commenting on an earlier draft, and the 135-58. Recent guides to international relations British and the Staff Travel and Research and to British foreign policy in this period are Fund of Durham University for their support. provided by Black, The Rise of the European 1 G. M. Bell, A Handlist of British Diptomatic Powers i(i79-i793 (London, 1990) and A System Representatives isog-1688 (London, 1990), pp. of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 125, 287. (Harlow, 1991). 2 J. C. Sainty, Officials of the Secretaries of State 5 The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5th ser., i66o-iy82 (London, 1973), p. m. vol. 478, cols. 676-8. ^ 3 Burrows, History., pp. 32, 34-5; Ward and G. P. 6 Paris, Archives du Ministere des Affaires Gooch (eds.), The Cambridge History of British Etrangeres, Correspondance , Angle- Foreign Policy 1783-igig^ vol. i (Cambridge, terre (hereafter AE. CP. Ang.) 129, ff. 20, 3&-1: 1922), pp. 38-9. For recent work on eighteenth- Louis XIV to Paul de Barrillon, envoy in century views of the Glorious Revolution, see K. London, 2 May, Barrillon to Louis, 2 May 1678; Wilson, 'Inventing Revolution: 1688 and K. H. D. Haley, William of Orange and the Eighteenth-Century Popular Vo\it\cs\ Journal of English Opposition 1672-4 (Oxford, 1953), and British Studies, xxviii (1989), pp. 349-86, and 'A ' English Policy at the Peace Congress of Dissident Legacy: Eighteenth Century Popular Nijmegen', in J. A. H. Bots (ed.), The Peace of Politics and the Glorious Revolution', in J. R. Nijmegen (, 1979), p. 146; J-R- Jones (ed.). Liberty Secured? Britain before and Jones, 'French Intervention in English and after 1688 (Stanford, 1992), pp. 299-334; R. B. Dutch Pohtics, 1677-88', in Black (ed.). Sher, '1688 and 1788: William Robertson on Errant and True Englishmen: British Foreign Revolution in Britain and France', in P. Dukes Policy 1660-1800 (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. i- and J. Dunkley (eds.). Culture and Revolution 23- (London, 1990), pp. 98-109. 7 Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: 4 J.M. Black, 'The Revolution and the Devel- Sir William Temple and John de Witt 1665-1672 opment of English Foreign Pohcy', in E. (Oxford, 1986), p. 318; R. Hutton, 'The making

214 of the , 1668-1670', Power 1650-1850 (Exeter, 1992), pp. 24-30, 32; Historical Journal, xxix (1986), pp. 297-318. A. Browning, Thomas Osborne Earl of Danby. II. 8 C. J. Ekberg, The Failure of Louis XIVs Dutch Letters (, 1944), p- 67. War (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 23-4, 88, 90, 154, 21 This is demonstrated most recently by H. M. 158-62; J. D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tar- Scott, 'The Second "Hundred Years War", paulins: The Officers and Men of the 1689-1815', Historical Journal, xxxv (1992), pp. Navy (Oxford, 1991), pp. 172-4. 443-69; on p. 450 he emphasizes the need 'for 9 Ekberg, Failure, p. 155. re-asserting the whig approach' and defends 10 Marquis de Chamlay, 'Memoire historique de ce 'interventionist' ministers. For a criticism of the qui s'est passe depuis la paix de Nimeque... 'British-Whig view', albeit of the early nine- jusqu'en 1688', Vincennes, Archives de la teenth century, P. W. Schroeder, 'Old Wine in Guerre, Ai 1183. Old Bottles; Recent Contributions to British 11 Paris, Archives Nationales, Archives de la Foreign Policy and European International Marine (hereafter AM), AE.B^ 758: Correspon- Politics, i-]Sg-iS4S\ Journal of British Studies, dance Consulaire Londres, Usson de Bonrepaus xxvi (1987), pp. 20-3. to French minister of the marine, Seignelay, 10, 22 C. Brinkmann, 'The Relations between England II Sept. 1688. and Germany, 1660-1688', English Historical 12 The Negotiations of Count D'Avaux, 4 vols. Review, xxiv (1909), p. 469. Bentinck to William (London, 1754-5), vol. iv, p. 129. Grenville, 31 Aug. 1787, BL, Add. MS. 59364, 13 C. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, 4 vols. (Paris, f. 71; Thurlow to Marquess of , 29 Sept. 1861-3), vol. iv, pp. 152-3; R. D. Martin, The 1787, and undated. Public Record Office (here- Marquis de Chamlay. Friend and Confidential after P.R.O.), 30/29/1/15, nos. 60, 69. On the Advisor to Louis XIV: The Early Years, use of the term Tory, J. J. Sack, From Jacobite to 1650-1691 (D.Phil., Santa Barbara, 1972), p! Conservative. Reaction and Orthodoxy in Britain, 207. c. 1760-1832 (Cambridge, 1993). On the con- 14 W. A. Maguire (ed.). Kings in Conflict. The tentious nature of national interests, see Black, Revolutionary War in Ireland and its Aftermath British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1689-1750 (Belfast, 1990); P. Wauchope, Pat- WS3-93 (Cambridge, 1994). A failure to probe rick Sarsfield and the Williamite War (Blackrock, this is a problem with L. J. Colley, Britons (New 1992). Haven, 1992) and with Steven Pincus's account 15 P. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the of 1688 in his unpublished paper, 'To Prevent a Dutch War (Cambridge, 1988). Universal Monarchy'. 16 D'Avaux, vol. iv, p. 238; AE. CP. Hollande 156, 23 Black,' Louis XIV's Foreign Policy Reassessed', f- 236. Seventeenth-Century French Studies, x (1988), 17 Martin, Chamlay, p. 184. pp. 199-212. An excellent, lengthy and wide- 18 New Haven, Beinecke Library, Manchester Box, ranging recent account of international relations Manchester to William Blathwayt, 16 Sept. is provided by C. Boutant, L'Europe au grand 1701; M.Thomson, 'Louis XIV and William tournant des annees 1680: La Succession Palatine III, 1689-1697', and 'The Safeguarding of the (Paris, 1985). Protestant Succession, 1702-18', in R. Hatton 24 J. T. O'Connor, Negotiator out of Season. The and J. S. Bromley (eds.), William III and Louis Career of Wilhelm Egon von FUrstenberg 1629 to XIV. Essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A. 1704 (Athens, Georgia, 1978), p. 200; Black, The Thomson (Liverpool, 1968), pp. 24-48, 237-51. Rise of the European Powers 1679-17^3, pp. 3-6. 19 S. C. A. Pincus, 'From Butterboxes to Wooden 25 J. L. Price, 'Restoration England and Europe', Shoes: The Shift in English Popular Sentiment in J. R. Jones (ed.). The Restored Monarchy from Hollandophobic to Francophobic in the 1660-1688 (London, 1979), p. 135. 1670s', Historical Journal {ionhcomm%). I would 26 G. Pages, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV, like to thank Dr Pincus for letting me see a copy 1660-1688(Pzris, 1905); G. Livet, 'La Lorraine of this piece. et les relations internationales au XVIIP siecle', 20 Davies, 'The Birth of the Imperial Navy? in La Lorraine dans PEurope des Lumieres (Nancy, Aspects of Maritime Strategy, c. 1650-90', in 1968), pp. 15-48; L. Huttl, 'Die Beziehungen M. Duffy (ed.), Parameters of British Naval zwischen Wien, Miinchen und Versailles wahr-

215 end des Grossen Turkenkrieges 1684 bis 1688', R. Beddard (ed.). The Revolutions of 1688 Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs^ (Oxford, 1991), pp. 197-8. xxxviii(i985), pp. 81-122; S. P. Oakley, William 41 Etherege to Nicholas Taafe, 12 Feb., Etherege to III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Charles, 2nd Earl of Middleton, Secretary of Years War 1689-97 (, 1987); J. Voss, State for the Northern Department, 20 Mar. *La Lorraine et sa situation politique entre la 1687, BL, Add. MS 11513, ff. 50, 64. On the France et J'Empire vues par le Due de Saint- general issue of the causes of war in this period, Simon', in J. P. Bled, E. Faucher and R. see Black (ed.). The Origins of War in Early Taveneaux (eds.), Les Habshourg et la Lorraine Modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987). (Nancy, 1988), pp. 91-9; Black, European 42 AE. CP. Ang. 149, ff. 12-13, 31; 154. f- 24: Powers, pp. 198-203. Barrillon to Louis, 4, 7 Jan. 1683, 8 Jan. 1685; 27 J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (London, Jones, Charles II (London, 1987), p. 180; 1976). Hutton, Charles II (Oxford, 1991), p. 427. 28 P.R.O., 78/150, f. 4: Trumbull to Robert, 2nd 43 R. Clark, Sir William Trumbull in Paris 1685- Earl of Sunderland, 16 Jan. 1686. 1686 (Cambridge, 1938). 29 J. J. Jusserand, A French Ambassador at the 44 AE. CP. Ang. 156, ff. 40-1, 46: Barrillon to Court of Charles the Second (London, 1892), p. Louis, 10, 13 Sept. 1685. 150. 45 AE. CP. Ang. 158, ff. 37, 40: Barrillon to 30 AE. CP. Ang. 118, ff. 156-7; 119, f. 70; 127, ff. Croissy, foreign minister, 10 Jan., Croissy to 21-2; 128, f. 40: Courtin, French envoy, to Barrillon, 17 Jan. 1686. Louis XIV, 4 June, Courtin to Pomponne, 46 AE. CP. Ang. 159, ff. 42-3: Barrillon to Louis, foreign minister, 27 July 1676, Barrillon to 15 July 1686; Clark, Trumbull, pp. 57-9, 63-5, Louis, 3 Jan., 9 Mar., 5 May 1678; Courtin to 67-70; J. Miller, James II (London, 1989), Pomponne, 20 Aug., Courtin to Louis XIV, 12 p. 145; Brinkmann, 'England and Germany', Oct. 1676, Barrillon to Louis XIV, 11 Apr. 1678, p. 467. Marquise Campana de Cavelli, Les Derniers 47 P.R.O., 78/150, f. 62: Trumbull to Sunderland, Stuarts a Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 2 vols. (Paris, 3 Apr. 1686. The reference is to the statue of 1871), vol. i, pp. 176-7, 180, 214. Louis on the Place des Victoires commissioned 31 AE. CP. Ang. 119, f. 23: Courtin to Pomponne, by Marshal Feuillade and recently erected; see 9 July 1676. illustrations in P. Burke, The Fabrication of Louis 32 AE. CP. Ang. 120, f. 26: Courtin to Louis XIV, XIV (New Haven, 1992), pp. 94-5. I Oct. 1676. 48 AE. CP. Ang. 159, f. 52: Louis to Barrillon, 2 33 Courtin to Louis XIV, 3 Dec. 1676; Cavelli, Aug. 1686. Derniers Stuarts, vol. i, p. 185. 49 Clark, Trumbull, p. 103. ^ 34 AE. CP. Ang. 120, f. 37: Courtin to Pomponne, 50 P. S. Lachs, The Diplomatic Corps under Charles 5 Oct. 1676. II and James II (New Brunswick, 1965), pp. 36, 35 AE. CP. Ang. 128, ff. 26, 28: Barrillon to 62; Etherege, who had served at Constantinople, Pomponne, 3 Mar., Barrillon to Louis, 7 Mar. to Trumbull, 10 Sept. 1686, BL, Add. MS. 1678; AN. AE. B^ 755: Barrillon to the minister 11513, f. 26. of the marine, Colbert, 14 Mar. 1678. 51 The most important works are Childs, The 36 Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix, p. 426. Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution 37 Cavelli, Derniers Stuarts, vol. i, pp. 213-14. (Manchester, 1980); W. A. Speck, Reluctant 38 W. Platzhoff, 'Ludwig XIV, das Kaisertum und Revolutionaries. Englishmen and the Revolution of die Europaische Krisis von 1683', Htstorische 1688 (Oxford, 1988); Cruickshanks (ed.), By Zeitschrift, cxxi (1920), pp. 377-412. Force or by Default?; C. Wilson and D. Proctor 39 A. Lossky, 'The General European Crisis of the (eds.), 1688. The Seaborne Alliance and Diplo- 1680s', European Studies Review, x (1980), pp. matic Revolution (London, 1989); G. H.Jones, 177-98. Convergent Forces. Immediate Causes of the 40 AE. CP. Ang. 154, ff. 17-19: Barrillon to Louis, Revolution of 1688 in England (Ames, Iowa, 4Jan. ibS$;Lossky, Louis XIV, William III and 1990); Beddard (ed.). Revolutions; J. I. Israel the Baltic Crisis of 1683 (Berkeley, 1954); J. (ed.). The Anglo-Dutch Moment. Essays on the Stoye, 'Europe and the Revolution of 1688', in Glorious Revolution and its World Impact

216 (Cambridge, 1991); L. Hobelt, 'Imperial Dip- 54 Trumbull, 'Memorials of My Embassy in Con- lomacy and the " Glorious Revolution "', Parlia- stantinople', BL, Add. MS. 34799; A. C. Wood, ments. Estates and Representation, xi (1991), pp. 'The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660- 61-7; J. R.Jones (ed.). Liberty secured? Britain 1762', English Historical Review, xl (1925), PP- Before and After 1688; L. G. Schwoerer (ed.), 545-6; L. Hobelt, 'Die Sackgasse aus dem The Revolution ofi688-i68g (Cambridge, 1992). Zweifrontenkrieg: Die Friedensverhandlungen 52 AN.AE.B^ 758: Bonrepaus to Seignelay, 11 xmi d&n Osm^ntn \()^\ Mitteilungen des Insti- Sept. 1688. tuts fur Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, xcvii 53 AN.AE.B^ 758: Bonrepaus to Seignelay, 7 Sept. (1989), pp. 329-80. 1688. 55 H. T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (1970), pp. 4, 7.

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