English Summary The Pahlavi dynasty (1925 to 1979) changed considerably the Iranian state and soci- ety. But the way Rezā Khān came to power in the 1921 coup, far from being reported as a simple historical fact, is still usually described through a number of misleading stereotypes. Official history before the 1979 Revolution portrayed Rezā Khān (later Shāh) as the principal initiator of the plan and a patriotic hero who staged the opera- tion by temporarily manipulating the British and their confidant Seyyed Ziyā od-Din Tabātabāʾi. Later accounts often tend to stress the leading role of the British officers, among them Gen. Ironside, for having organized the coup in order to circumvent social disorder, thus leaving the oil wells and the Indian border protected from the upheavals and revolutionary turbulence. Our knowledge of this important event lies upon few reliable witnesses and a great number of British reports and memoirs. The version given by Seyyed Ziyā himself does not mention any British involvement and gives only a side role to Rezā Khān. The British diplomats officially did nothing to intervene but, in order to justify their posi- tion, they tend to minimize any Persian initiative and instead magnify their own influ- ence as decisive. General Ironside’s memoirs, based on diaries which are no longer available to researchers, completely ignore Seyyed Ziyā’s role and further show Rezā Khān as a mere puppet in his hands. Another book of memoirs by a first-hand wit- ness and participant, Edmonds’s East and West of Zagros, now offers a more balanced account where both Seyyed Ziyā and Rezā Khān can be credited for having a leading role in the plot. The two diaries published in the present volume give a different framework to understand the crisis. They are written by French diplomats who were not directly involved in operational decisions and had contrasting opinions concerning British policies in Persia. Capt. Ducrocq, the French military attaché with strong national- ist feelings, felt a great deal of sympathy for Iranian politicians who were trying to resist British pressure. His obsession was the threat of a Bolshevik invasion and also to denounce the British involvement in Persia by corrupting its elite and manipulat- ing the public opinion, to the detriment of French commercial and political interests. In the period before the February 1921 coup, Ducrocq gives day to day information about some major moves such as: – how Colonel Starosselsky was first locked into British manoeuvre with the intention of using his experience to merge the Persian Cossack Brigade with their Russian officers into the future unified army, and how Starosselsky was later dragged into a trap and thrown away from Persia; English Summary 685 – how the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement (or, in French dispatches, “Arrangement”) was signed and became the centre of political negotiations between British diplo- mats and Persian politicians; – how the threat of possible Bolshevik invasion was used by the British in order to hasten a solution that prompted the withdrawal of Norperforce from Qazvin. On the coup itself, Ducrocq’s own reaction echoes Iranian opinions and feelings: he doubts from the very beginning the official discourse and attributes responsibility to the British. But he hesitates in some occasions, thinking either that the Bolsheviks were behind it, or that the coup was favourable to French interests (Seyyed Ziyā send- ing French trained officers to inform the legation and trying to show consideration for French influence and thus signalling a balancing act to British pressure). Accordingly, Ziyā himself had been manipulated and could be thrown away as soon as he would no longer be deemed useful, a remarkable premonition of Ducrocq (entry of 6 March 1921). Many details on British actions, on General Dickson’s elimination are given. On a late visit to the Gilān front with British officers overseeing the retreat to Qazvin (April 1921), Ducrocq has a very interesting conversation with Major cj Edmonds where new trends of British policies are featured in terms of no more direct rule but indirect influ- ence and links with local nationalists or democratic strategies. Hélène Hoppenot, wife of the French chargé d’affaires, gives a more realistic descrip- tion of British diplomats and their behaviour with Iranian authorities. Her diaries, full of gossip and wit, on the whole provide plenty of valuable information and material on everyday life, particularly on the upper-class women who were being secluded in their quarters. Incidentally, meeting on official occasions, she has first-hand descriptions of court ceremonies, and portrays Ahmad Shāh more critically than any other sources. On the very day of the coup, Hélène has an argument to “prove” that British dip- lomats were not aware of what was going to happen: she was riding, on Sunday the 20th, near the Qazvin Gate with a political officer of the Norperforce, Wickham, when the Cossacks were stationed nearby and the Englishman did not try to divert her to another direction (21 February 1921). She gives her own report of how the situation was perceived among expatriates, particularly diplomats. A good deal of important information is given in these two diaries about the social life of foreign diplomats in Tehran, with colourful portraits of individuals such as Percy Cox, Herman Norman, Col. Starosselsky, and Gen. Dickson. Persian personalities are described as seen by foreigners, but with their own idiosyncrasies, their attitude towards European culture, and their behaviour towards women. Despite a negative impression about the land and the people in the first pages of each account (a clear sign that these diaries remain as written daily, without any later edits or revisions), we see how both Ducrocq and Hoppenot eventually became friends .