DOCSLIB.ORG

The Russian Armed Forces: High Expectations?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Russian Armed Forces: High Expectations? Alexander Khramchikhin, Vitaly Shlykov THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES: HIGH EXPECTATIONS? From: Alexander Khramchikhin To: Vitaly Shlykov Subject: who is threatening us after all? Hello, Vitaly! Speaking about the future of the Armed Forces, it makes sense to speculate about the chal lenges and threats that the Russian military should be prepared for. If we take the open sources – published concepts and doctrines, the Russian politicomilitary leadership, at least, has a vague understanding of the character of external threats that the country is facing. The provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation are so unclear that they leave enough room for any interpretations and conclusions (or, in other words, no specific conclu sions can be made on the basis of such documents). The «Actual Development Tasks for the Russian Armed Forces» published in October 2003 is a much more specific document (even though its status can be called into question), but it is full of internal contradictions. Let me emphasize a few principal ones. For instance, the «Actual Tasks» maintains that «the Russian military policy has adapted to a new global reality… In particular, nuclear warfare and largescale conventional wars with NATO or any other U.S.led coalition have been eliminated from the list of the most probable conflicts.» However, in the process of describing the types of modern wars and contemporary armed VIEWPOINTS conflicts, the document argues that «the weapons used in modern warfare make it necessary to possess the forces and means to attack the military instruments of the adversary (long range highprecision weapons, strategic aircraft) stationed beyond the actual conflict zone.» At present, the only country (beside the Russian Federation) that has longrange highpreci sion weapons and strategic aircraft is the United States. As far as it concerns future wars and conflicts, military construction and combat training, the «Actual Tasks» state that the «outcome of the armed struggle in general will mainly be deter mined by confrontation in the aerospace and on the sea, while ground forces will fix the attained combat results and provide for the achievement of the political goals.» It is quite obvi ous that the United States is again regarded here as one of the major adversaries. On the other hand, later on the document speaks mainly about combat training of the Army within the pla tooncompanybattalion paradigm.» For instance, «the forces in the armed conflicts will not face a typical enemy, but rather a mixture of units with different equipment and levels of train ing. Those units may actively apply the tactics of guerrilla warfare, subversive and terrorist operations.» Only a short paragraph is devoted to the Air Force, while the Navy is not men SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (86), Volume 15 57 tioned at all. Thus, the major kind of wars that the Russian military will be involved in is not the war with the United States, but the Chechentype conflicts. In general, there is an impression that this document was written by several groups of authors, each of which has a different view on military construction, and then all parts were mechani cally brought together. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) apparently suffers from tough contra dictions between those who cannot neglect the changing character of wars in the last 15 years, and the proponents of the «armor attack mentality» of the 1940–1950s. There are also evident differences between those in the national politicomilitary leadership who see lit tle sense in confrontation with the United States and those for whom it is the only essence of life. Moreover, the practitioners, who passed through two wars in Chechnya, also have some influence. As a result, the opinions of all the aforementioned groups were mechanically assem bled into the single document. The challenges originating from the West and the so called international terrorism are looked at in an exaggerated way, through the prism of myths, while the Chinese threat is completely ignored. Yours, A. Khramchikhin From: Vitaly Shlykov To: Alexander Khramchikhin Subject: the army should be flexible and can easily be tuned Hi, Alexander, You argue that the existing official documents do not clearly define the types of wars and con flicts that Russia should be ready for – either with the enemy possessing longrange highpre cision weapons and strategic aircraft, or with the enemy using the tactics of guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism. For me the answer is obvious – to both of them. And to dozens of other threats, wars, and conflicts (information warfare, cyber warfare, etc.) that we are currently not even aware of. By asking for specific instructions of the politicomilitary leadership with respect to threats to be repelled, you merely replicate the position of the Russian generals of the last 15 years. It is quite simple – give us such a military doctrine that has a clear range of all threats and equip us with arms and resources to resist them. And we will do everything all right. And now let us imagine that the Russian president and the government accept this recom mendation and will mark the Chinese threat as the major one, while NATO will be perceived as a paper tiger. It would be good to see the scenario for military construction and development in this case. I assume that Russia needs such defense that has a potential for selftuning, for preventing and confronting any possible threats and conflicts. And it would be advisable to consider the ways to create such defense, instead of speculating on one threat after another in accordance with some selfinvented range of challenges. To set up such a selfadapting defense system, one needs something more important than weapons, i.e. education, decisionmaking ability, independence and creativity of thinking, ini tiative of the officers top down, and some mobilization mechanism enabling the economy to shift from peaceful state to wartime mode and back with sufficient flexibility as far as the requirements of the military to the materiel and other resources are concerned. Naturally, the establishment of such system would require the formation of a brand new army and the replacement of the presentday narrowminded defense industry with the sector capable of manufacturing both military and civilian products on the basis of the same tech nologies and enterprises. Yours, V. Shlykov 58 THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES: HIGH EXPECTATIONS? From: Alexander Khramchikhin To: Vitaly Shlykov Subject: be ready for everything? Vitaly, And still I have got a question. Is it possible to carry out any military construction on the basis of the existing doctrines? If not, on what should it rely at all? Why are the generals not correct in claiming for the doctrine? Isn’t it the task of the political leadership of the country? Is it nor mal that the president has no military staff, nor even a military advisor? Bearing this in mind, is it possible for a person who made no attempts to understand the mili tary topics beyond PReffects, lead the development of the selftuning, innovative army? Does he realize what it is all about? I could not expect you to say that the generals should set tasks for themselves. I have two claims against Boris Yeltsin as far as the military construction is concerned. First – he rejected the idea of building an army from the scratch. Second – he permitted the generals to set the tasks for themselves. The mission of the political leadership of the country is to set the tasks for the generals, so that the latter could think about optimal ways to implement them. These tasks can be called a doctrine, a national security concept, or any other name – it does not really matter. And there is no need to explain to you that we are not the country that can do without any such document or set of documents at all. Of course, Hungary or Belgium does not need a military doctrine, while we do. It is also clear that such country as Russia may confront different challenges. The same can be said about the United States as well. However, Washington does not have several armies and pays only for the one, various components of which are meant for repelling different threats. And American generals get orders and tasks from politicians. I may have a wrong understand ing of your «selftuning army» concept, but it seems that in peaceful times such army should nearly be virtual. I have serious doubts that in case of real war (any) it will be able to react (to any threat) with such approach. Anyway due to the vagueness of the definition, it is difficult to have a dispute on this matter. How can a selftuning army be built without defining specific adversaries and taking into account possible current and future wars and geopolitical situation of the Russian Federation? In the European part of the country we at least possess a welldeveloped transportation net work, while in Siberia and in the Far East any grouping should be formed in advance, since it would be difficult (or even impossible) to reinforce them in case of war. In fact, why does the U.S. politicomilitary leadership easily name the list of nations that pose or may pose a threat to the United States, even though some of these challenges exist only as hypothetical types? VIEWPOINTS Due to the abstract and controversial character of the major doctrines, the military construc tion cannot be carried out on the basis of these documents. Hence, it is impossible to say how much the practice of military construction in Russia complies with these documents. And in this respect, it is impossible to analyze the defense budget of Russia, which is also not transparent and is highly confidential in nature.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • THE PHOENIX LIBERATOR, February 4, 1992
    THE PHOENIX LIBERATOR FEBRUARY 4, 1992 VOLUME XVIII #3 L.A. Rescinds Contract To Japan l/23/92 #l HATONN Savings & Loan debacle as to risk is just an unfair method of doing tract for the metro-line didn’t make being destroyed by exposure. He is a business--at the expense of citizens in the national news UNTIL the citizens As I monitor your “news” this highly paid businessman now--on the both nations. It is an example Of spoke up and demand& change. It day I wonder that you have as good a b asis of business gleaned from iou- thousands of such transactions taking d oes NOT demand violence--IT DE- grip on happenings as You do. But the-people for Japan place in the secret halls of ma- MANDS NUMBERS! FRANKLY, through it all, Americans in point-- Is Hatonn against Japanese busi- nipUhtiOnS every day, all over your ITDEMANDS NUMBERS OF VOT- you are being heard above the roar of ’ness? No--I love Japan as much as I globe. Another interesting point is ERS~ the lions. What may seem like a small love the United States of America. It that the incident of awarding the con- - thing in the overall scheme of politi- cians is a start indeed. The crowd of 10 Billion More Fol workers and patfiots caused the Los Space Shuttle: Cover for Angeles politicians to back down on a Israel ? plan to -give a multi-million dollar l/23/92 #l HATONN contract to Japan. You will find that Happenings At Edwards actuailly you will have gained little in What is Bush going to do about actual “funding” but you will have the $10 billion for Israel? It is a big made your point.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception: a Finnish View
    CERI STRATEGY PAPERS N° 5 – Séminaire Stratégique du 13 novembre 2009 Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception: A Finnish View Dr. Stefan FORSS The author is a Finnish physicist working as Senior Researcher at the Unit of Policy Planning and Research at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and as Adjunct Professor at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University in Helsinki. The views expressed are his own. Introduction “The three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia. And not only for Finland, but for all of us.”1 This quote is from a speech by Finnish Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies in Washington in September 2007. His remarks were immediately strongly criticised as inappropriate and it was pointed out that his view didn’t represent the official position of the Finnish Government. Mr. Häkämies seemed, however, to gain in credibility a month later, when a senior Russian diplomat gave a strongly worded presentation about the security threats in the Baltic Sea area in a seminar organised by the Finnish National Defence University and later appeared several times on Finnish television.2 The message sent was that Finnish membership in NATO would be perceived as a military threat to Russia. This peculiar episode caused cold shivers, as it reminded us of unpleasant experiences during the post-war period. The Russian military force build-up and the war in Georgia in August 2008 was the ultimate confirmation for all of Russia’s neighbours, that the Soviet-style mindset is not a thing of the past.
    [Show full text]
  • The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today's
    Occasional Paper 11 The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia Raymond A. Zilinskas Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University MR. CHARLES D. LUTES Director MR. JOHN P. CAVES, JR. Deputy Director Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally focusing on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The Center’s mandate includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning effective responses thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated the Center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint professional military education system. Education programs, including its courses on countering WMD and consequence management, enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, and operations. As a part of its broad outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors. Visit the center online at http://wmdcenter.ndu.edu. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia Raymond A. Zilinskas Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper, No. 11 National Defense University Press Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Globalização Militar E a Ordem Militar Internacional: Comparando As Indústrias De Defesa Do BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China E África Do Sul)
    UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL FLUMINENSE INSTITUTO DE CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS E FILOSOFIA DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA ANTONIO HENRIQUE LUCENA SILVA Globalização Militar e a Ordem Militar Internacional: comparando as indústrias de defesa do BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) Niterói/RJ Setembro de 2015 PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA CURSO DE DOUTORADO Tese Globalização Militar e a Ordem Militar Internacional: comparando as indústrias de defesa do BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) ANTONIO HENRIQUE LUCENA SILVA Tese para apresentação perante Banca Examinadora do Programa de Pós- Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade Federal Fluminense, como exigência final para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciência Política, na área de Estudos Estratégicos Data de aprovação: 08/09/2015 Banca Examinadora: Prof. Dr. Luiz Pedone – Orientador da Tese e Presidente da Banca Examinadora (UFF) Examinador Titular Interno: Prof. Dr. Eurico de Lima Figueiredo (PPGCP/UFF) Examinador Titular Interno: Prof. Dr.Waldimir Pirró e Longo (INEST/UFF) Examinador Titular Externo: Prof. Dr.Williams da Silva Gonçalves (UERJ) Examinador Titular Externo: Profª. Drª. Maria Regina Soares de Lima (IESP-UERJ) Examinador Suplente Interno: Prof. Dr. Márcio Rocha (PPGEST/UFF) Examinador Suplente Externo: Prof. Dr. William de Sousa Moreira (EGN) S586 Silva, Antonio Henrique Lucena. Globalização militar e a Ordem Militar Internacional: comparando as indústrias de defesa do BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) / Antonio Henrique Lucena Silva. – 2015. 286 f. ; il. Orientador: Luiz Pedone. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) – Universidade Federal Fluminense, Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia, Departamento de Ciência Política, 2015.
    [Show full text]
  • Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change
    arctic security in an age of climate change This is the first book to examine Arctic defense policy and military security from the perspective of all eight Arctic states. In light of climate change and melting ice in the Arctic Ocean, Canada, Russia, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, and the United States, as well as Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, are grappling with an emerging Arctic security paradigm. This volume brings together the world’s most seasoned Arctic political-military experts from Europe and North America to analyze how Arctic nations are adapting their security postures to accommodate increased shipping, expanding naval presence, and energy and mineral development in the polar region. The book analyzes the ascent of Russia as the first “Arctic superpower,” the growing importance of polar security for NATO and the Nordic states, and the increasing role of Canada and the United States in the region. Dr. James Kraska serves as the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U.S. Naval War College, where he also teaches on the faculty of the International Law Department. Kraska is a commander and judge advocate in the U.S. Navy. He has served as legal adviser to joint and naval task force commanders in the Asia-Pacific and has completed four Pentagon major staff assignments. He was the principal military contributor to the president’s U.S. Arctic Region Policy, and he coordinated Arctic issues and law of the sea for the armed forces at the National Security Council and International Maritime Organization. Author of Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea (2011), Kraska also holds appointments as Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and as Guest Investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Woods Hole, Massachusetts.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Power Structures
    RUSSIAN POWER STRUCTURES – PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLES IN RUSSIAN POLITICS Russian Power Structures - Present and Future Roles in Russian Politics R This report scrutinises the present and future roles of the Russian power structures in Russian politics and the functions that these u s power structures fill in Russia. Eight leading experts in various s i a fields analyse different aspects of Russian power structures and n JAN LEIJONHIELM & FREDRIK WEstERLUND (Eds.) their impact on Russian politics. P o w e The report is based on material from the conference “Russian r Power Structures – Present and Future Roles in Russian Politics”, S t r which was organised by the Swedish Defence Research Agency u c t (FOI) in cooperation with the Swedish Defence Commission and u r held in Stockholm on 17 October 2007. The report consists of e s papers presented at the conference and, reflecting the structure of the conference, the report consists of five parts: Russian Power Structures and Politics, The Military Agenda, Economy and Military Industry, Health Problems and a Summing up. Jan Leijonhielm & Fredrik Westerlund (Eds.) For a selection on other recent FOI-reports on Russia, please look at the last pages of this report. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Russia Sustain Its Military Capability?
    Can Russia Sustain Its Military Capability? Stephen Blank Summary Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and subsequently accelerating militarization has forced us to re-examine Russian defense policy as a central focus of foreign attention. The war in Ukraine, Russia’s intervention in Syria, increasing signs of a manufactured war psychosis inside Russia and the visible improvements in the capabilities of the Russian military obliges us to reckon with these events, ongoing trends in Russian defense policy, and their implications. Given the structural economic crisis that has been aggravated by declining energy prices and Western sanctions we must also probe the question as to just how sustainable Russian defense policy is. The argument advanced here is that Putin has reconfigured the system throughout his 16-year tenure in office to produce a system resembling in critical respects the Soviet one. Therefore despite the pressures now operating on the system, it can for some time to come provide the Russian military with modern conventional and nuclear weapons even though it will probably not realize the full demands of the government. Nevertheless, and despite the strong constellation of interests favoring this militarization, it will increasingly run into difficulties given the structural problems plaguing Russia. Moreover, as in Soviet if not Tsarist times, this unchecked militarization will encounter barriers it cannot overcome; without fundamental changes in policy, these will lead the country into crisis. But whether Putin or whoever succeeds him will grasp that insight and meet those challenges remains, as of today, and as seen by Russian analysts, quite unlikely. If that assessment is right, then sometime in the future— though we cannot say when or how it will occur—a deep structural crisis is in the offing.
    [Show full text]
  • War in Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection 1996-07 War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy Tsypkin, Mikhail Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/46051 War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy Mikhail Tsypkin, Editor Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California July 1996 Mikhail Tsypkin is an Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. The Department ofNational Security Affairs is grateful to the Office ofNaval Intelligence and the U.S. Army War College for supporting the War in Chechnya conference, the papers of which comprise this report. The opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and do not represent positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Office ofNaval Intelligence, the Army War College, or any other governmental agency. The Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, supports graduate education to student officers from all Department of Defense components in the fields of Area Studies, Strategic Planning and International Organizations and Negotiations, Resource Planning and Management for International Defense, Intelligence, Civil-Military Relations, and Special Operations. NSA faculty consist of twenty-five full-time professors of political science, history and sociology, as well as approximately ten visiting lecturers each year. This faculty actively conduct research on scholarly and policy-relevant topics, the results of which are published in books, academic journals and official reports. This book is part of a publication series- National Security Affairs Reports- featuring NSA faculty research, conference proceedings, and edited texts.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia in Decline ______
    RUSSIA IN DECLINE __________________________________________________ S. Enders Wimbush and Elizabeth M. Portale, Editors Foreword by Paul A. Goble Washington, DC March 2017 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Published in the United States by The Jamestown Foundation 1310 L Street NW Suite 810 Washington, DC 20005 http://www.jamestown.org Copyright © 2017 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written consent. For copyright and permissions information, contact The Jamestown Foundation, 1310 L Street NW, Suite 810, Washington, DC 20005. The views expressed in the book are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Jamestown Foundation. For more information on this book of The Jamestown Foundation, email [email protected]. ISBN: 978-0-9986660-0-6 Cover art provided by Peggy Archambault of Peggy Archambault Design. Jamestown’s Mission The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism. Origins Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Tangled Webs
    TANGLED WEBS "GOTCHA"--VOLUME I "Tangled webs are woven when the lies of Man are spoken. In the weaving is deceit, from which Man shall find no safe retreat. Through TRUTH shall come thine only route, for God attends the final bout". BY GYEORGOS CERES HATONN/ATON "dharma" A PHOENIX JOURNAL TANGLED WEBS "GOTCHA"--VOLUME I "Tangled webs are woven when the lies of Man are spoken. In the weaving is deceit, from which Man shall find no safe retreat. Through TRUTH shall come thine only route, for God attends the final bout". BY GYEORGOS CERES HATONN/ATON "dharma" A PHOENIX JOURNAL Page 2 COPYRIGHT POSITION STATEMENT AND DISCLAIMER The Phoenix Journals are intended as a "real time" commentary on current events, how current events relate to past events and the relationships of both to the physical and spiritual destinies of mankind. All of history, as we now know it, has been revised, rewritten, twisted and tweaked by selfishly motivated men to achieve and maintain control over other men. When one can understand that everything is comprised of "energy" and that even physical matter is "coalesced" energy, and that all energy emanates from God's thought, one can accept the idea that the successful focusing of millions of minds on one expected happening will cause it to happen. If the many prophecies made over thousands of years are accepted, these are the "end times" (specifically the year 2000, the second millennium, etc.). That would put us in the "sorting" period and only a few short years from the finish line.
    [Show full text]
  • From Ryan to Reykjavik: the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Ending the Cold War
    5 From RYaN to Reykjavik: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Ending the Cold War Jacob W. Kipp At a time of increased tensions between Russia and the West over its annexation of Crimea and engagement in a bloody civil war in eastern Ukraine, it is right and appropriate to reflect upon the terrible tensions of the late Cold War at the end of 1970s and early 1980s. By ordering a strategic nuclear exercise during the current crisis President Vladimir Putin has sought to reassert the role of nuclear weapons as the defining element in strategic stability.1 Timed to begin on the day before “Victory Day,” May 9th, the exercise was intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in case of a global, thermonuclear war. At the end of the exercise Putin noted: “We all had a chance to observe the high readiness and coherent grouping of the country’s strategic offensive and defensive forces.… This is a reliable guarantor of sover- eignty and territorial integrity of Russia and plays an essential role in ensuring global and regional security.”2 Today the nuclear arsenals are considerably small- er than three decades ago, but they still remain a defining element of national power. And operational strategic exercises involving nuclear forces reflect both readiness and not-too-subtle political signaling. But a Russo-Ukraine confron- Jacob W. Kipp, “From RYaN to Reykjavik: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Ending the Cold War,” Essay, Enduring Legacy Project, John A. Adams ’71 Center for Mili- tary History & Strategic Analysis, Virginia Military Institute, 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • What Motivates Russia? the Role of Wahhabism in Russian Cooperation with China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Sco)
    WHAT MOTIVATES RUSSIA? THE ROLE OF WAHHABISM IN RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) by MICHAEL D. ZBORAY A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Global Affairs written under the direction of Professor Simon Reich and approved by _____________________________ _____________________________ _____________________________ _____________________________ Newark, New Jersey October 2016 © 2016 Michael D. Zboray ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION What Motivates Russia? The Role of Wahhabism in Russian Cooperation with China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) By MICHAEL D. ZBORAY Dissertation Advisor: Professor Simon Reich This dissertation was made possible by a nationally competitive fellowship from IREX. I received six months of financial support from IREX’s Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program (IARO) that funds policy-relevant research in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia. The fellowship was sponsored by the U.S. Department of State and allowed me to conduct field research in Moscow and Kazan between January 2014 and July 2014. I also traveled to Shanghai and Beijing for a total of four weeks to interview Chinese researchers. This fieldwork consisted of archival research and semi- structured interviews with policy experts. I use both qualitative and quantitative approaches including a modified Q-analysis to derive findings. The dissertation focuses on analyzing Russia’s motivations for participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an understudied, yet vital, regional organization – the largest in the world. The Russian-Chinese relationship is the fulcrum of a broader membership that includes eighteen other members, notably India and Pakistan.
    [Show full text]