Decline of the Dreadnought : Britain and the Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1993 Decline of the Dreadnought : Britain and the Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922. Raymond C. Gamble University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Gamble, Raymond C., "Decline of the Dreadnought : Britain and the Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922." (1993). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1191. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1191 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 31EDbbD13S7b7S7 DECLINE OF THE DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN AND THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921-1922 A Dissertation Presented by RAYMOND C. GAMBLE Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1993 Department of History © Copyright by Raymond C. Gamble 1993 All Rights Reserved DECLINE OF THE DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN AND THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921-1922 A Dissertation Presented by RAYMOND C. GAMBLE Approved as to style and content by: Mary Wi/ckwire, Chair Stephen Pelz, Member Roland Sarti, Member 6eor^e Su>€ner, Member Robert Jones, Dep^Stlrtment Department of History DEDICATION This work is dedicated to the memory of FRANKLIN B. WICKWIRE, a gentleman and a scholar. 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people have assisted me in the preparation of this study. Dr. Mariam Chrisman of the Department of History at the University of Massachusetts took patience with a beginning graduate student and encouraged me to write the best work within my grasp, rather than to wait for a perfected product. Lieutenant Colonel James Wheeler of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, where I was privileged to serve as a member of the faculty, strongly encouraged me to continue beyond my first graduate degree and made time available for further research. The Science Research Laboratory at the United States Military Academy provided funds to support the research upon which this work is based. Dr. Franklin Wickwire of the Department of History at the University of Massachusetts kindly spent untold hours polishing the initial drafts of this manuscript. My dissertation committee, chaired by Dr. Mary Wickwire, greatly improved the final product. I alone bear responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation. Special thanks go to my wife Sharon, whose encouragement and great patience made this work possible. V ABSTRACT DECLINE OF THE DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN AND THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921-1922 FEBRUARY 1993 RAYMOND C. GAMBLE, B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Mary B. Wickwire This dissertation examines Britain's decision to cede naval parity to the United States at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The study recognizes that scholarly opinion emphasizes the role of economic weakness in Britain's decision to accept capital ship limitation. The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet and Admiralty records at the Public Record Office, London. The accounts of the various subcommittees of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet Finance Committee are essential. Three sets of records are particularly helpful for the Conference itself: the papers of the British Empire Delegation, the State Department's Conference on the Limitation of Armament , and Butler and Bury's of the Documents on British Foreign Policy . The papers members of the British government provide limited assistance. At the turn of the century, the Royal Navy, imbued with the Alfred Thayer Mahan's doctrines of sea power, enjoyed the nation's confidence. The Great War vi damaged the reputations of both the battleship and its most ardent supporters. At the Paris Peace Conference, the United States challenged the supremacy of British sea power. In the face of the continuing American naval construction, the British policy of supremacy with economy became untenable* The Jutland and submarine controversies of 1920 exacerbated the government's loss of faith in the battleship and led to an investigation into the future weapons of the Navy. The Imperial Conference of 1921 precluded the possibility of Dominion support for a naval building program or a decision to renew the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in the face of American opposition. The British Empire Delegation at the Washington Conference sought the maximum relief from naval expenditure consonant with traditional measures of national security. In the face of American proposals for Anglo-American equality and a ten- year holiday in naval construction, Britain salvaged superiority in cruisers and a two new battleships. These results lead to the conclusion that the Cabinet no longer believed that the battleship remained the ultimate arbiter of naval disputes. The Cabinet therefore choose to disregard the advice of the Admiralty and accept the naval limitation agreement. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ^ ABSTRACT CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1 1. BRITAIN'S MATERIAL POSITION 6 2. THE MOST FORMIDABLE FORCE, 1905-1914 39 3. A GREAT PASSIVE VICTORY 7 3 4. CONFLICT AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE Ill 5. TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY, 1919-1920 151 6. THE PARTICULAR WEAPON 196 7. IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1921 242 8. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 303 CONCLUSION 415 BIBLIOGRAPHY 419 INTRODUCTION This work developed from a question posed by a cadet at the Unites States Military Academy. After listening for most of a semester to an interpretation of modern history colored by frequent and respectful references to the power of the Royal Navy, he wanted to know why the British had agreed to the limitations on their naval strength imposed by the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The resulting treaties struck the cadet as a repudiation of longstanding British national policy; the question struck his teacher as worthy of investigation. Since the Restoration, a long line of British statesmen pursued the security and prosperity of the British Empire through adherence to three constant principles: a balance of power in Europe, the defense of imperial possessions, and, above all, the command of the seas. The Royal Navy served as the twine which bound the Empire together. Why, in 1921, had London agreed to a conference on naval disarmament? The answer, in short, reflected the changes wrought by the First World War. When George Nathaniel Curzon, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., F.R.S., Baron Curzon of Kedleston, Baron Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale, and 1st Earl of Kedleston, assumed duties as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in January, 1919, the traditional formula for security seemed inadequate. The First World War had imposed to new a massive strain on the Treasury and had given rise . challengers for naval supremacy, Japan and the United States of America. The war had also complicated the formulation of British national policy; the official British mind, once comfortably insulated in a small office in Whitehall, increasingly felt the pressure of public opinion and the Dominions. The tension between retaining command of the seas, establishing satisfactory foreign relations, and relieving the current economic burden caused division within the Lloyd George ministry. British participation in the Washington Naval Conference reflected a resolution of that tension I suggest that a specific pattern of events informed the British decision to accept President Harding's invitation to Washington. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Royal Navy, imbued with the doctrine of sea power espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan, enjoyed the nation's confidence. The First World War damaged the reputations of both the battleship and its most ardent supporters. At the Paris Peace Conference, the United States challenged the supremacy of British sea power. In the face of the continuing American naval construction, the British policy of supremacy with economy became untenable. The Jutland and submarine controversies of 1920 exacerbated the government's lack of confidence in the capital ship and led to an investigation, independent of the Admiralty, into the future role of the capital ship in the Navy. The Imperial Conference of 1921 precluded the possibility of Dominion support for a naval building program or a decision to renew the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in the face of American opposition. Thus, the British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.) at the Washington Conference sought the maximum relief from naval expenditure consonant with traditional measures of national security. In the face of sweeping American proposals for Anglo-American equality and a ten-year holiday in naval construction, Balfour salvaged superiority in cruisers and a small program of new battleship construction. The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet and Admiralty records. The Admiralty records on m.ost issues contain the Board's position and reasoning in considerable detail, largely in the form of Board minutes and memoranda to the Cabinet. The Cabinet papers, which far too often register conclusions with only scant summaries of the preceding discussions, are generally less