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77-18,713

I MAZZARELIA, Mario Dominic, 1941- THE BRITISH CATHOLIC PRESS m O THE RISE OF NAZI G E R M ^ 1933-1940.

The American University, Ph.D., 1977 History, modem

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 4sio6

0 1977

MARIO DOMINIC MAZZARELLA

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE BRITISH CATHOLIC PRESS

AND

THE RISE OF NAZI GERMANY

1933-1940

by

Mario D . Mazzarella

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Signature of ^pjimmittee:

Chairman Dr. Qarl G. Anthqr

Dean of the College ean T.

Da r Ira Klein

1977

The American University Washington, D. C. 20016

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Simple justice demands that recognition be granted to at least some of the many people and institutions without whose aid and guidance this dissertation could not have been written. First in line for thanks is my dissertation committee, Drs. Carl G. Anthon, Jean T. Joughin and

Ira Klein who directed my research and writing. The staffs of the libraries of The American University, Georgetown University and Catho­

lic University, the Library of Congress and the Public Record Office in London were invaluable aids to research. Those individuals who granted me interviews in England greatly enriched my research, my under­

standing; my disagreement with some does not in the least diminish my regard for any. Thanks are due to my colleagues at Christopher Newport

College who kindly granted me sufficient leave to complete the bulk of

the work. Mrs. Edna Carney produced the excellent final copy. Special

thanks go to my wife, Kathy, for typing several preliminary drafts, for

editing my grammar and for her never-failing encouragement and support.

Finally, thanks are due to my parents and teachers for their support and

guidance throughout my academic career. For their help, and the help of

all those mentioned above, I thank God.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. Introduction and Background: The British Catholics. . . . 1

The Catholic Community...... 1 Composition...... 3 Growth...... 3 Influence ...... 6 Unity and Diversity...... 7

Catholic Social and Political Principles...... 8

Expositors of Principles...... 10 The British Hierarchy: Manning to Bourne...... 10 The Papacy...... 13 English Catholic Press...... 19 Publicists...... 30

S u m m a r y ...... 41

II. Appeasement and the Accession of H i t l e r ...... 42

Evolution of the Appeasement Policy ...... 42 Post-war disillusionment...... 42 Treaty revision, arms and the League...... 43 Appeasement formulated...... 46

The Accession of Hitler ...... 54 Hitler's attitude to Britain...... 54 British reaction to Hitler...... 54

Consolidation of the Nazi regime...... 56 Tightening the g r i p ...... 56 The Nazis and the German Catholic Church...... 61 The Concordat...... 67 Nazi Persecution of the Church...... 69 German Anti-Semitism and Nazi Persecution of the Jews...... 73

German Foreign Policy ...... 81 General policy lines...... 81 British response...... 82 A u s t r i a ...... 84 Catholic concern...... 84 1934: the abortive P u t s c h ...... 86

iv V

II. (Con't)

Mussolini's Italy ...... 88 Debate; Catholic principles and Italian Fascism . 88 Italian foreign policy...... 93

Communism: Threat and Challenge...... 93

Treaty Revision ...... 95

Fascism in England...... 98

S u m mary...... 102

III. Disruption and Disarray ...... 104

Overview 1933-1937 ...... 104

Stresa...... 107

Ethiopian Crisis...... 109 P r e l u d e ...... 109 War; sanctions or alliance?...... 110

Remilitarization of the Rhineland...... 118

Spanish Civil W a r ...... 124 Outbreak...... 124 England divided ...... 126

Neville Chamberlain and his policy...... 139

Catholics and Politics...... 143 Peace and w a r ...... 143 Fascism and reform...... 148

Mit brennender Sorge...... 155 Continuing persecution...... 155 The encyclical...... 161

Summ a r y ...... 168

IV. From Vienna to Munich ...... 171

A nsc h l u s s ...... 172 Hitler vs. Schuschnigg...... 172 Crisis and c o u p ...... 174 Reaction...... 176 Nazism and Austrian Catholics ...... 178

Munich...... 182 Background...... 182 VI

IV. (Cou't)

May Crisis...... 185 The Munich Crisis ...... 188 To the brink...... 189 Munich: the settlement...... 201 Assessment...... 202 Aftermath...... 209

Nazi Persecution of the Jews...... 212 Persecution increases ...... 212 Crystal Night ...... 215 Reaction...... 215

Fascism-Communism-Democracy...... 222

Summ a r y ...... 226

V. From Prague to Danzig ...... 229

Pius XII: Failed detente...... 229

Spanish Civil War ends...... 229

Prague c oup ...... 230 Lull...... 230 Hitler marches...... 231

Diplomatic revolution ...... 231 Guarantees...... 232 I t a l y ...... 242 Vatican peace effort...... 245 The Russian question...... 247

Polish crisis ...... 252 Pressure m o u n t s ...... 253 Nazi-Soviet Pact...... 254 W a r ...... 260

S u m m a r y ...... 261

VI. The Twilight War...... 263

Catholics and the War ...... 264

Conspiracy at Rome...... 281

Attack in the West...... 284

Fall of Chamberlain and end of appeasement...... 286

Italy goes to w a r ...... 292 vil

VI. (Con't)

Summary...... 295

VII. Summary and Conclusions...... 297

APPENDIX...... 311

SOURCES CONSULTED...... 313 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

THE ENGLISH CATHOLICS

Introduction

When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on 30 January

1933, it was widely recognized that the difficulties of maintaining peace in Europe had been increased. To prevent war, the government of

Great Britain, throughout the decade of the 1930s, pursued a policy known, then as now, as "appeasement." The outbreak of the Second World

War in September 1939 fixed the stamp of failure on that policy. But, more than that, after 1939 appeasement itself was widely blamed for having contributed to the conditions that brought about the war.

Much has been written on appeasement since 1939. In recent years

the historical literature on the subject has begun to move beyond

examining the circle of government officials responsible for setting policy to exploring the role of public opinion in shaping and imple­ menting appeasement. This study will focus on English Catholic press

opinion and its reaction to the rise of Nazi Germany and the appeasement

policy.

There are several reasons for choosing the English Catholic press. First, during the 1930s English Catholics were a small but highly self-conscious group within the overall British population. As

such, they shared in the common conceptions and misconceptions of the

1 2

British people during these years. Second, this group was part of a

universal Church with a single head, the Pope, who could speak authori­

tatively to Catholics everywhere, and who himself had to formulate

policy towards Nazi Germany as the official, spiritual head of that

Church. These dual influences, British and Catholic, imparted a unique

character to the reaction of English Catholics. On one hand, they were

exposed to pressures arising from British society at large; on the other,

they were exposed to the impact of Catholic opinion at home and abroad,

opinions which sometimes paralleled and sometimes diverged from those

of the general British public. These influences shaped the attitudes

and thinking of English Catholics who, in turn, made a unique contri­ bution to the thoughts and feelings which produced appeasement.

Specifically, this study will seek to determine what influence,

if any, the religious orientation of members of the Catholic press had

on their reaction to the consolidation and expansion of Nazi power from

1933 to 1940; the Nazi persecution of religious groups, especially the

Roman Catholic Church; the extent to which Vatican policy and statements

influenced English Catholic opinion towards Germany; and to find the

location of the opinion of the Catholic press along the spectrum of

British thought and attitudes in the years of the Nazi rise to power.

Finally, a closer look will be taken at the policy of appeasement from

the vantage point offered by a study of unpublished records from the

offices of the British Cabinet and Prime Minister. It is hoped that,

by means of this study, a deeper insight will be obtained into the

motivations, intentions, and actions of the British government and the

general British population in the decade of the 1930s. The English Catholics

When Catholic Emancipation was passed in 1829, there were scarcely 50,000 Roman Catholics left in England.^ Two events raised their numbers to where Catholics could exert at least some influence on English affairs: the Oxford movement and the Irish migrations.

The few hundred Oxford converts, exemplified by John Henry

Newman, were significant for their intellectual eminence and zeal. But it was the wave of Irish immigrants pouring into the great urban areas of England in the wake of the Potato Famine which brought about the O Catholic revival there. By 1890, approximately four-fifths of

England's Catholics were Irish.^ Similar in social and cultural back­ ground, the older group of English Catholics and the Oxford converts had come together by 1900. But this upper-class, Conservative-Liberal- voting group and the socially lower. Labor-voting Irish long resisted union.^ The recognition of the Irish Free State in 1921 began the easing of hard feelings between the English and the Irish and, as the ethnic consciousness of the Irish began to fade, their children began

Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Nineteenth Century in Europe; Background and Roman Catholic Phase, vol. 1 of Christianity in a Revolutionary Age (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 454 (hereafter referred to as 19th Century). p Joseph L. Altholz, The Churches in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 98 (hereafter referred to as Churches).

^Denis Gwynn, "The Irish Immigration," in Catholic Emancipation, 1829-1929 (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1929), pp. 265-6.

^Waldemar Gurian and M. A. Fitzsimmons, The Catholic Church in World Affairs (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954), p. 343. to come together with the older Catholic stream.^

But this amalgamation process took a long time to be completed.

One reason was the different issues that concerned the native English

Catholics and the converts on one hand, and the Irish immigrants on the other. The first two groups were concerned to demonstrate that patriotic loyalty was compatible with Catholicism. The native Catholics tried to do this by remaining as unobtrusive as possible, the converts by addressing their fellow Englishmen as both loyal and Catholic Eng­ lishmen. The Irish, however, continued to identify themselves not with

England, but with Ireland and Irish interests, to the annoyance of native English Catholics.

By 1933, the issue of Irish independence which had done so much to exacerbate ill-feeling between the Irish Catholics and native

Englishmen had been solved. But the old, ghetto-like mentality only slowly declined throughout the decade of the 'thirties, a process slowed by occasional outbursts of anti-Catholic violence in Belfast and elsewhere. The issue was finally buried by the increased social mobil­ ity made possible for Catholics (and other financially less well-off

Englishmen) by the 1944 Education Act.^

In the 20th century, the growth of the Catholic population of

Great Britain has been proportional to that of the general population.

^Denis Gwynn, A Hundred Years of Catholic Emancipation (London: Longmans, Green, 1929), pp. xvi-xvii (hereafter referred to as 100 Years); Denis Gwynn and James H. Handley, Great Britain, vol. 1, no. 1: A History of Irish Catholicism (Dublin: Gill and Son, 1965), p. 49.

^Interviews with Terrence Wynn and William J. Igoe, 25 May 1976; Hugh Bums, 25 May 1976; Douglas Woodruff, 29 May 1976; Herbert McCabe, O.P., 4 June 1976. For identity of Interviewees, see "Sources Con­ sulted." of which Catholics make up six to seven per cent.^ The Catholic Direc­ tory listed the Catholic population of England and Wales as 2,245,000 in 1933 and 2,400,000 in 1940.®

The experience of official prejudice and discrimination was still a recent memory to English Catholics in 1933. Until the 1930s,

Catholics were forbidden to have public religious processions. When the Catholic Westminster Cathedral was constructed at the turn of the century, it was forbidden to build it along the main thoroughfare of

Victoria Street and it had to be constructed behind a block of other buildings instead.^ After the period of official discrimination ended, the British public generally seems to have regarded their Catholic com­ patriots with relative indifference.^^ A considerable number of

Englishmen, however, continued to regard Catholics with suspicion or hostility as an alien or disloyal group.This anti-Catholicism was so virulent among certain socially eminent and wealthy individuals that they detested Mussolini because he had made the Lateran Treaty with the

Mary Malachy Loughran, "Catholics in England" (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, University of Pennsylvania, 1954), p. 15; E. E. Y. Hales, The Catholic Church in the M o d e m World (Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1958), p. 239. O Catholic Directory (London; Bums, Oates and Washboume, 1933- 1940); figures rounded to nearest thousand. If only regular church­ goers are counted, the figures are too large; if anyone who would not repudiate the name Catholic is included, thefigures are too low. Herbert Thurston, S.J., "Statistical Progress," in Catholic Emancipa­ tion, 1829-1929. pp. 259-64.

%fynn interview, 26 May 1976.

l^Interview with Tom F. Bums, 25 May 1976.

lllnterview with Mrs. Christina Scott, 8 June 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976; John P. Rossi, "Orwell and Catholicism," Commonweal 103 (18 June 1976), pp. 404-6. 6

Pope, while they admired Hitler and Stalin for their anti-Catholic measures.One other reason for their hostility probably lay in the

exaggerated notion these men held of the influence and solidarity of 13 the Catholic minority.

In fact, the influence of the English Catholics was small, less

even than their number warranted. In 1939, there were 21 Catholics

in the House of Commons, when their number would have justified twice

that many. Forty were in the House of Lords, a considerable pro­ portion of that body, but actual Catholic influence there was even less

than in Commons. Another reason for the exaggeration of Catholic

influence in 20th century English Catholicism has been the numerous brilliant and zealous converts it has attracted; Christopher Dawson, 1 7 Gilbert Keith Chesterton and Graham Greene, to name a few. Catholics

in England are a minority which has generally failed to exert a de­

cisive influence on the nation. But they have been "a creative minority

^%oodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Scott interview, 8 June 1976; B u m s interview, 25 May 1976. Woodruff and Mrs. Scott's father, Chris­ topher Dawson, were well acquainted with the social circles where such attitudes could be expressed.

^^Amold Lunn, "The Catholics of Great Britain," The Atlantic Monthly, October 1944, p. 83; Rossi, "Orwell and Catholicism," Commonweal, pp. 404-6.

^‘^Christopher Dawson, "The English Catholics, 1850-1950," The Dublin Review 124 (October 1950), p. 2; T. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Interview with Christopher Hollis, 10 June 1976.

^^The Tablet (London), 16 November 1935, p. 627.

^^C. C. Martindale, "Catholics in England Today," The Month, October 1938, pp. 324-44.

^^Gurian and Fitzsimmons, The Catholic Church in World Affairs, p. 340; David Mathew, Catholicism in England, 3rd ed. (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1955), p. 259. reflecting some of the divisions of English life."^®

Part of the exaggeration of Catholic unity was due to some

Catholics themselves. In 1939, a writer warned against Catholics dis­ playing a "Top Church" mentality which reckoned every accomplishment by a co-religionist as if it were.a point to be scored "in some endless and all-embracing match" against all other faiths.

In reality, English Catholics are as disparate a collection of individuals as Catholics are anywhere. As one writer put it: "Catho­ lics use up all their available unity on points of defined doctrine and have nothing left over for ordinary life."^® In social and political matters, they were represented across the entire spectrum from extreme conservatism to social radicalism. Only the educated and articulate minority of Catholics supported the Conservative Party, but most Catho­ lics in the House of Commons were Conservatives. This is why Cathol­ icism in England was often accused of being reactionary: those

Catholics who were in the public eye often seemed to be so. In fact, 23 as many as 70% of all Catholics voted Labor. In spite of this solid

^^Gurian and Fitzsimmons, The Catholic Church in World Affairs, p. 339.

I9"Fra Juniper's Jottings," The Universe (London), 29 December 1939, p. 10.

^®Lunn, "Catholics of Great Britain," p. 83.

2Ilbid.; Mathew, Catholicism in England, p. 253; Loughran, "Catholics in England," p. 579.

^^Arnold Lunn, The Science of World Revolution (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 202. 23ibid. 8 support, clashes between the Labor officials and Catholics over the

1926 strike, school aid and the Spanish Civil War resulted in the party's reluctance to name Catholic candidates. Catholic influence probably did act to brake the leftward trend of some Labor positions.

By and large. Catholics proved to be unexceptionable citizens. Those

p C in parliament either behaved similarly to other Members of Parliament, or they were soon out. Specifically "Catholic" stands on issues were rare.Among Catholic voters, patriotic feelings were more important than religious ones in political matters, and the government received

2 7 the benefit of the doubt even in some highly dubious matters.

This diversity among English Catholics would lead in the 1930s to lively and even acrimonious debate over just what Catholics should think or do regarding the various European political movements and crises of that era. There was unity in the common conviction that these were matters with doctrinal and ethical ramifications. As such, it was necessary that these political matters be reflected on and tested by principles, based on Christian faith and morals, worked out by Catho­ lic thinkers over the centuries. It is those who did that reflecting and testing, their conclusions, and the consequences of their thinking who make up the subject of this study.

^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 585-7.

Z^Hereafter, individual Members of Parliament will be referred to by the common British abbreviation, "M.P."

^%.P. Car thy, O.S.U., Catholicism in English Speaking Lands, vol. 92: Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York; Hawthorn, 1964), p. 109 (hereafter referred to as English Lands).

27oouglas Woodruff, Church and State, vol. 89: Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: Hawthorn, 1961), pp. 124-5. 9

Catholic political and social principles are necessarily broad since they were formulated in an effort to make them applicable to all valid forms of government. The main outlines are as follows: the

Eternal Law by which God rules the Universe is the basis for natural law. Man can perceive the latter by reason alone, and thus possesses

p Q the basis to formulate sound judgments to govern his life. Man sees that he possesses natural rights of which he cannot be deprived. The family soon expands to a community and to secure that community's physical and intellectual life, man sets up the state. Extreme demo­ cratic practice which would paralyze government, is avoided by stressing the moral quality of the state's authority. However, tyranny is con­ demned by emphasizing the limits of state power over individual rights and the state's sole proper end; the securing of the common good.^9 In sum, the state is to serve man and not the other way around. Any form of government is permissible provided it does not violate man's 30 religious, civil, or personal rights, and is based on popular support.

Catholic social theory, especially as developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has sought a via media between the extremes of liberal individualism and socialist collectivism. State partici­ pation or aid in matters of community welfare was approved where the necessary action was clearly beyond the power of individuals or local

^®John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics (New York; MacMillan, 1940), pp. 2-5.

^^Wilhelm Schwer, Catholic Social Theory, trans. B. Landheer (St. Louis, Mo.; B. Herder, 1940), pp. 242-3, 246-8; Ryan and Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, pp. 49, 102.

^®Ryan and Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, p. 79. 10 31 bodies, a principle termed "subsidiarity." By this means, the Church hoped to encourage private initiative while protecting the welfare of the individual and the community.

Catholics seeking to have these political and social principles explained and applied to contemporary affairs had access to four major sources; their local hierarchies, the Papacy, the Catholic press, and

Catholic authors. Such explanations must be viewed in their historical perspective if the attitudes of those formulating them are to be under­ stood.

After the collapse of the European risings of 1848, the Church set its face against 19th century liberalism with its revolutions, secularism and relativist attitude towards authority,^2 but tyranny and 33 the rule of force in place of law continued to be condemned. The

English hierarchy naturally followed suit. It was Henry Edward (later

Cardinal) Manning who successfully led the fight against those Catholics who sought a compromise between Catholicism and the positive aspects of liberalism.In 1870, Manning, then Archbishop of Westminster and 35 thus leader of the English hierarchy, continued the battle at the

Schwer, Catholic Social Theory, pp. 164-8, 260.

^^Altholz, Churches, p. 63.

^^Ryan and Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, p. 79.

^^Altholz, Churches, p. 82.

^^The Archbishop of Westminster is officially only President of the bishops' meetings, in effect primus inter pares, there being no Primate of England. But his is the practical voice of the English Catholic Church and he is looked to for leadership by the laity, while the government looks to him to enunciate the Catholic position on public questions. John C. Heenan, Cardinal Hinsley (London: Bums, Oates, 1944), p. 76. 11

First Vatican Council. There he was instrumental in securing accep­

tance of papal infallibility which marked the victory of the Ultra- montanes over the liberal Catholics. It was this defeat of liberal­

ism and the triumph of the principles of hierarchy and authority within

the Church which gave conservative and even reactionary Catholics in

the 1930s theological arguments with which to attack political democ-

racy.J'37

Yet, in spite of its continuing struggle against liberalism, the

Church did act to meet the challenge of a changing society, all the while deepening its devotional and institutional life.^® Manning was

an exemplar of this conservative reform tendency. He insisted on bringing the Irish immigrants into important places within the hier­

archy, a democratic policy in opposition to the wishes of the "Old

Catholics."39 He made himself a champion of the worker, and inspired

Pope Leo XIII to write his encyclical on the condition of the working

classes: Rerum Novarum. As late as 1929, Manning was considered a political radical by many. His funeral in 1892 was attended by

thousands of laborers.

Manning's successor at Westminster, Herbert Cardinal Vaughan

3^Cwynn, 100 Years, p. 197; Altholz, Churches, p. 82.

37McCabe interview, 4 June 1976; Interview with Christopher Hollis, 10 June 1976.

3®Altholz, Churches, p. 59.

3^Gwynn, 100 Years, pp. xvii-xviii, 167.

40lbid., pp. 206, 211, 221-6. 12 continued his policies including the long-standing contacts with

Protestants.^^ But Francis Cardinal Bourne (1903-1935) was averse to the political activities and ecumenical sentiments of his predecessors.

He offended many workers by condemning the General Strike of 1926,^^ while his aloofness prevented him from seeking contact with his non-

Catholic fellow countrymen. Bourne was respected but not l o v e d .

These men, especially Manning, were instrumental in giving the

English Catholic Church the heavily Ultramontane character it has al­ ways displayed, both in the hierarchy and among much of the laity.

Illustrative of an admittedly conservative expression of this character is a 1935 comment made by Bernard Wall, then editor of Colosseum; "The

Bull Unam Sanetarn," he wrote, "is the clearest statement of the fact of the primacy of the spiritual," bluntly forcing the issue with "all those in revolt against Christ and His Vicar--for ready obedience to the Pope is the effectual symbol of man's submission to Christ." The test of real Catholicism then, said Wall, "is to think with the Pope," and follow his lead, even when he appears wrong. For to fail to do so "is the subversion of the whole supernatural order.Though an excep­ tionally strong statement, even when it was written, this view would have found acceptance among many English Catholics in the 1930s.

Since the Second Vatican Council, many Catholics have labeled

41lbid., pp. 232-44.

^^Ibid., pp. 249-250, 274; Gwynn, Great Britain, p. 45.

^^Lunn, "Catholics of Great Britain," p. 85.

^^Colossexim, September 1935, p. T64. 13

this attitude "triumphalism," i.e., a smug and self-satisfied sectarian

attitude which assumed that the Catholic Church had all the answers and

that all other approaches to life were radically d e f e c t i v e . yet,

even in the 'thirties, the first stirrings of the reforms that were to

take place after 1960 were evident "beneath a surface of stability and

sclerosis

The single most important institution for the exposition of

Catholic principles to the Church and the world is the papacy. Leo

XIII began the rapid rebuilding of papal prestige after the turmoil of

Pius IX's r e i g n . Increased control over the government of the Church

and a steady rise in papal prestige reflected the strengthening of the

Ultramontane trend which began after the French Revolution and lasted until the Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965.^® Extraordinary im­ portance was alloted to papal pronouncements of all types, addresses

and speeches as well as formal encyclicals, and the theological con-

^^Bemard Wall, Headlong Into Change (London; Harwill Press, 1969), pp. 15-20.

^^Robert Speaight, The Property Basket (London and Glasgow: Collins and Harwill Press, 1970), p. 160.

^^Thomas J. Harte, Papal Social Principles (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1956), p. 17.

^^Vatican II asserted the importance of the episcopacy in sharing the governance of the Church with the Pope. In recent years there has been an increasing assertion of the prerogatives of indi­ vidual conscience and a lessening of the importance formerly attached to papal statements. Some theologians have again raised the entire question of papal infallibility. All this is in sharp contrast to the period under discussion when papal prestige went from strength to strength. 14 49 sensus was that this was only correct.

Modem popes have generally restricted intervention in state politics to matters directly affecting spiritual affairs. The papacy has been aware that forcing an open conflict between church and state might produce schism, civil war, or charges of papal usurpation of political power.30 The papacy has generally been chary of spectacular announcements in political matters because it is aware that such appeals, if ignored, could seriously damage the influence that a pope might try to exercise in some important matters in the future.3^

The rise of national states made it necessary to insure that a universal Church did not appear aligned with any particular state.

This gave rise to the practice of framing advice to the faithful in encyclical letters addressed to the whole Church, setting forth general principles to guide public policy along Christian lines. Papal neu­ trality in temporal disputes was guaranteed by the possession of sover-

CO eign territory and by Article 24 of the Lateran Treaty of 1929.

M o d e m popes have devoted much attention to coping with the social crises of their times. Leo XIII's pontificate (1878-1903) was

^Harte, Papal Social Principles, pp. 8-11. Although these various statements, especially encyclicals, are considered authori­ tative in various degrees, none of them are officially "infallible," and therefore absolutely binding in conscience.

3®A. C. F. Beales, The Catholic Church and Intemational Order (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin, 1941), p. 122 (hereafter referred to as Intemational Order) ; John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (London: Bums, Oates and Washboume, 1935), pp. 190-1 (hereafter referred to as Catholic Tradition).

3lThe Tablet, 23 June 1934, p. 777.

32Beales, Intemational Order, pp. 38-41. 15 especially noteworthy. He made the encyclical letter the single most important tool of papal teaching. In a series of these from 1881 to

1892, he defended state authority while condemning tyranny, socialism, and communism. He declared the Church's indifference to forms of government so long as religious, civil, and personal rights were pro­ tected. He also supported religious toleration and human liberty under law, declared resistance to state injustice could become a duty, and 53 recommended that constitutions include provisions for orderly change.

Leo's magnum opus. Rerum Novarum (The Condition of Labor) which appeared in 1891, recognized the condition of the working class as the prime social problem of the day. Rejecting both socialism with its class struggle, and laissez-faire capitalism, Leo defended private property while calling for decent wages, unions, the responsible use of wealth, and positive state action to foster prosperity and economic justice.34 Here, as elsewhere, Leo's efforts were those of a moderate though constructive conservative.35 But for years. Rerum Novarum con­ tinued to be regarded by many as a prescription for radical reform.

Pius X (1903-1914) reaffirmed Rerum Novarum and continued to call for peace and justice among nations. His pleas, as well as those of Benedict XV (1914-1922) were swallowed up in the maelstrom of war and the bitterness it s p a w n e d . 33 Benedict's 1917 peace proposals which

3%arte, Papal Social Principles, pp. 34-6, 97-126, 151.

54-Latourette, 19th Century, pp. 309-10; Altholz, Churches, pp. 149-52.

35j\itholz, Churches, pp. 152-3.

33latourette, 19th Century, pp. 315-16; Harte, Papal Social Principles, pp. 22-4. 16 included calls for intemational action to keep the peace, with "sanc­ tions" for violators, were ignored by the powers.3?

Pius XI (1922-1939) was faced with the challenge of the totali­ tarianisms of left and right. With Soviet Russia, there seemed to be little question: it was unequivocally condemned. In 1920, Pius, then

Achille Cardinal Ratti, was in Warsaw and witnessed the dramatic deliv­ erance of that city from the Red Army.3^ His Secretary of State,

Eugenio Pacelli (later Pius XII), nuncio in Bavaria, had been threatened 59 at gunpoint during the brief Communist takeover in Munich.

Italian Fascism, discredited by its association with Hitler's

Germany and defeated in a war of its own making, posed a more difficult set of questions. It requires an effort to understand that an ex­ tended endeavor was made by men of good will to make some accommodation with Fascism, to strengthen its constructive aspects and reduce its evil tendencies. it is easy to assume that since these attempts failed, they were pusillanimous at best or cynical at worst. But to take this view is to fall into the trap of historical inevitability.

Pusillanimity and cynicism there were, but also quite defensible efforts, naivete and just plain blundering. Talleyrand's dictum not­ withstanding, there is a great difference between a crime and a mistake.

37prancis J. Powers, Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952), pp. 193-4.

3®Philip Hughes, Pope Pius the Eleventh (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 99-100 (hereafter referred to as Pius XI).

3^Saul Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich (New York; Knopf, 1966), pp. 21-2.

30philip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 183-4. 17

In a 1940 work, two Catholic commentators, John A. Ryan and

Francis J. Boland, set forth a Catholic view of Fascism. It could be considered a legitimate form of government, they said, if; (1) it reasonably provided for the common good, (2) there were no practical alternative to it (a view they rejected), or (3) if its overthrow could only be brought about at a disproportionate cost in human suffer­ ing (accepted as probable). But pure Fascist theory, exemplified in

Mussolini's slogan, "Everything for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the state," which made the state the end and the individual merely a means to serve that end, was judged totally inadmissible in Catholic thought.Pius XI had rejected this Fascist theory as immoral as early as 1926, but a basis of accommodation was present because (1) the state rarely preached it and (2) practiced it even less.32

Still, clashes occurred when Pius judged them necessary. One public condemnation even came during the delicate negotiations leading 63 to the Lateran Treaty. And when Mussolini turned on Catholic Action, the social action arm of the Church in Italy, in 1931, the reply was the encyclical. Non Abbiamo Bisogno. Mussolini's right to govern was not questioned, but the Fascist statist ideology, including its claims on youth, were utterly c o n d e m n e d . ^4 A realist, Mussolini ended the

31catholic Principles of Politics, pp. 120-1. 32ibid.

^^Hughes, Pius X I , pp. 230-33.

34ibid., p. 242. 18 assault, but relations between the Vatican and the Fascists were cool ever after. A harder line might have been taken against Mussolini but

Pius feared that his fall might usher in a Communist regime.

As for Italy's "corporative state" which was to replace capital­ ism with a cooperative order, Pius' 1931 social encyclical, Quad­ ragesima Anno, while commending such efforts, warned that there was a danger of substituting state activity for private initiative and that the new order might be too centralized and bureaucratic. As such, it risked serving political ends rather then the good of society.The encyclical reaffirmed Rerum Movarum's call for social peace and recom­ mended encouraging the re-establishment of structures like the medieval guilds to restore class cooperation by uniting workers and employers in particular professions. In this way, Pius hoped to avoid the evils of

Communism and capitalism alike.A lively debate ensued during the

1930s as to whether or not the various corporative experiments attempted were in accord with the model outlined by Leo and Pius XI.

Although the basic Catholic principles and positions outlined above are important to assess properly the position of the English

Catholics during the 1930s, it must not be assumed that knowledge of them was universal or that eager efforts were made to put them into

G^Hales, Catholic Church in the M o d e m World, pp. 264-66.

^^Quadragesimo Anno, in Seven Great Encyclicals (Glen Rock, N. J.; Paulist Press, 1963), pp. 150-1.

^^Ibid., pp. 125-168; W. C. (Lord) Clonmore, Pope Pius XI and World Peace (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938), pp. 145-8. Exact termin­ ology is lacking. This paper will use "corporate" to distinguish papal ideas from fascist or semi-fascist "corporative" ones. 19 practice. Certain sections of the English Catholic press and a portion of the hierarchy tried to increase knowledge of the papal encyclicals, but their efforts were only moderately successful due to a basic theological and social conservatism among English Catholics, especially in the hierarchy, and the resistance imposed by simple human inertia.

Understanding did increase throughout the era, the main impact being among professional and middle-class Catholics and the readers of the 69 Catholic press.

The diversity of English Catholicism was reflected in its press.

Unfortunately for those who hoped to secure a wide readership, the inexpensive weekly publications designed for a mass audience tended to be conservative and even reactionary in their politics. As a result, most Catholics, being neither rich nor upper-class, avoided them.^®

Less conservative views were available among the monthlies and quarter­ lies, but these journals were too sophisticated for a general reader­ ship. The upshot was that, according to the Catholic Truth Society, sixty per cent of England's Catholics bought no Catholic paper of any kind.

The largest of the Catholic publications was The Universe. The

^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 292-4.

69ibid., pp. 298-9.

70gee "Parochus," "The World We Live In," The Sower, January- March, 1938, pp. 6-8. ("The World We Live In" was The Sower's editorial section. Hereafter, references to this section will be identified as "The Sower".)

71catholic Truth and Catholic Book Notes, September-October, 1939, p. 160 (hereafter referred to as Catholic Truth). 20 paper was founded in 1860 as an inexpensive weekly. It was aimed directly at serving the Irish community in England, and was intended to bring them news free of the anti-Catholic prejudices common in the secular newspapers. From 1917 to 1938, the paper was under the 73 editorship of Herbert S. Dean, a convert. But it was George F.

Barnard, news editor from 1924 to 1938 who was responsible for dramat­ ically boosting the paper's circulation. Barnard had visited the

United States and been impressed by the impact made by the new tabloid format and style. On his return to England, he transformed The Uni­ verse into a tabloid. In 1920, circulation reached 100,000 copies a week; by 1930, it was up to 130,000.With a penchant for screaming headlines, atrocity stories, sensationalistic reporting, and opinionated editorializing. The Universe displayed some of the worst characteristics of tabloid journalism. It was also the biggest-selling religious news­ paper in Great Britain.7^

Even when he became editor in 1938, Barnard never had a financial interest in The Universe. He was a professional journalist who ran the paper and wrote the editorials, and was paid by the proprietor. Sir

72Editorial, The Universe, 8 Dec. 1860; Wynn interview, 26 May 1976.

73j. J. Dwyer, "The Catholic Press, 1850-1950," in The English Catholics, 1850-1950, ed. George A. Beck (London; Burns, Oates, 1950), p. 506 (hereafter referred to as English Catholics).

7^Gwynn, 100 Years, p. xxiv; Advertisement, rear cover. The Dublin Review, October 1939. British publications do not keep records of circulation figures; all figures are estimates.

75owyer, "Catholic Press," in English Catholics, p. 506. 21

Martin Melvin.

In an editorial written on the occasion of his twentieth anni­

versary as editor. Dean noted the boundaries he had set for The Uni­

verse' s operations. "Our policy," he wrote

...was to avoid all subjects on which Catholics are at liberty to differ, while undertaking the advocacy of all causes, in whatever sphere, upon which our Catholic author­ ities have given the lead.''

This policy, said Dean, immobilized the paper as an organ of opinion

and often forced it to restrict itself to general principles when

commenting on affairs of the day.78 A perusal of The Universe, however,

indicates that in several areas, especially Italy and Spain, other

Catholics drew concentrated and sustained fire from Dean and his

successor, George Barnard, for refusing to heed the bounds laid down

by their paper.

The Universe restricted itself not only ideologically but social­

ly as well. Throughout the 1930s, it continued to be primarily a publi­

cation for and about the Irish Catholics in Britain. Striving to

please its readers, the paper emphasized Irish news, even stinting its

reporting of the growing menace abroad, including Nazi persecution of

the Church, in order to concentrate on what was happening to Irish

Catholics in Britain and Northern Ireland. The readers of The Uni­

verse, according to a veteran journalist, "didn't care a damn, really.

78wynn-Igoe interview, 26 May 1976.

7?The Universe, 3 December 1937, p. 12. 78ibid. 22

about what Hitler was doing or even Mussolini, so long as they weren't

actually quarreling with the Pope."^^ This parochialism, which was made worse by Barnard's lack of intellectual sophistication, prevented

The Universe from grasping what was happening abroad until it was 80 almost too late.

The Tablet was a weekly journal started in 1840 by laymen.

From 1868 to 1936 it was owned by the See of Westminster. From 1923

to 1936 its editor was Ernest Oldmeadow, a convert from the Methodist ministry. Oldmeadow had been very successful as a wine merchant, but he gave his business up when Cardinal Bourne asked him to take over The

Tablet. Oldmeadow had to run the paper in accordance with the wishes of Cardinal Bourne. These wishes were made known at a weekly meeting with the Cardinal and usually were restricted to the injunction to con­ tinue to attack the Church of England as a splinter which had broken off from the Catholic Church. Oldmeadow was happy to oblige since he had had to endure similar taunts from Anglicans when he was a

Methodist.®^ Oldmeadow's writing was literate with an air of Victorian

floridity which was not without its charm. (He used to write standing

and wearing a hat, claiming it contributed to a vigorous prose style.)

The paper's writing on politics was pertinent and interesting. But the doctrinal controversy was narrow-minded, ludicrous, and repellent to all

79jnterview with Hugh Bums, 26 May 1976; Wynn interview, 26 May 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

®®Wynn-Igoe and Hugh Burns interviews, 26 May 1976; McCabe interview, 4 June 1976.

^4voodruff interview, 29 May 1976. 23 but a small group, and the paper's circulation and influence steadily

On dropped.

In 1936, Bourne's successor, Arthur Hinsley, sold the paper to a distinguished lay group including Douglas Woodruff, Christopher Hollis and Christopher Dawson.

Woodruff was the editor and the paper was very much his to con­ trol. He came to The Tablet from the editorial staff of the London

Times and the B.B.C. Under him, the paper soon achieved a reputation for its reporting, especially in foreign affairs, and people who utterly disagreed with its editorial policy bought it for its news and anal- go ysis. Aimed at the Catholics who read The Times, the paper's circu­ lation grew to just about that number, from 13 - 14,000.®^ Woodruff made The Tablet a defender of aristocratic government, in opposition to what he thought was the badly flawed democratic system creating social, 85 economic, and political turmoil in England, France, and elsewhere.

Such criticism was extended to the League of Nations which was attacked, first as merely ill-conceived, and finally as an abomination, devoid of all moral principles.

Congratulating the paper on its centennial in 1940, Blackfriars

On Ibid., Dwyer, "Catholic Press," in English Catholics, pp.482-8; Tom F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Robert Speaight, The Property Basket, p. 163.

g O Speaight, Property Basket, p. 163.

^^Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

85 Carthy, English Lands, p. 91; Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 157-61.

®^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 615-18. 24

(see below) wondered whether The Tablet's unblushingly partisan pol­ itics represented "the views of more than an able and influential 87 minority of English Catholics." Its vigor and intelligence were undeniable.

The Catholic monthlies are a notable lot. Blackfriars, a

Dominican publication founded in 1920 by Father Bede Jarrett, and edited by him until his death in 1934, became in the 1930s a lively journal with many lay contributors. Its scrappy editor, Victor White,

QQ O.P., writing under the pseudonym "Penguin," readily criticized other

Catholic publications and writers when he deemed it necessary, defending full discussion as the sole path to truth, and resisting all efforts to 89 make English Catholics follow a single "line."

This independent and democratic attitude, traditional in the

Dominican order, combined with the journal's somewhat unconventional left-bf-center political stance, spread the influence of Blackfriars beyond its educated and progressive readership which numbered about 3 ,000.90

Although meant for a specialized audience, Clergy Review provided valuable and interesting political commentary until a restructuring, carried out in 1937, possibly for economic reasons, sharply reduced the

Penguin," "Extracts and Comments," Blackfriars, June, 1949, p. 406 ("Extracts...", being always signed by "Penguin," hereafter will be referred to only as "Penguin."); Tom F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976.

O^Letter from Bede Bailey, O.P., 27 May 1976; Scott interview, 8 June 1976.

8%wyer, "The Catholic Press," in English Catholics, p. 511; Blackfriars, June 1934, pp. 375-6.

90McCabe interview, 4 June 1976. 25 size of the magazine and the space allotted to such matters. Until then, the reports of C. F. Melville on Central Europe and Richard L. Smith from Rome provided thoughtful and sometimes provocative looks across the Channel. After 1936, book reviews provided the largest source for such commentary.

The Month, a Jesuit publication founded in 1864, was edited from

1912 to 1939 by Father Joseph Keating, S.J. In 1933 he began to pre­ cede the journal's articles with editorials wherein he dealt with problems of social justice and the international order, seeking to 91 increase understanding of the new "secular" world emerging. Father

John Murray took over the editorship after Keating's death in 1939. 92 Throughout the thirties, circulation stood at about 4,000.

The English Review was not a Catholic periodical, but from 1931 to 1936 it was edited by one of the most vocal, not to say strident.

Catholic personalities in England, Douglas Jerrold. In his editorial

"Current Comments" and in occasional articles, this convert fought the battle for "Christian civilization" as he saw it, and for conservative 93 principles against monopoly capitalism and collectivism.

The Catholic Truth Society, founded in 1884, was directed by 94 Bishop Edward Myers from 1930 to 1948. Besides publishing encyclicals and pamphlets on a wide variety of doctrinal and moral topics, the

91obituary, The Month, April 1939, pp. 289-292; Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 129-31.

9^Interview with Peter Hebblethwaite, 4 June 1976.

93 "Current Comments," The English Review, August 1933, p. 121, December 1935, pp. 654-655.

9^wyer, "The Catholic Press," in English Catholics, pp. 511-13. 26 society possessed its own bi-monthly organ: Catholic Truth And Catholic

Book Notes. Catholic Truth included a few articles on religious matters, reviewed books of interest to Catholic readers and reported on the sale of the society's publications. In 1929, sales amounted to

1,237,343; in 1937, 1,573,310; and in 1938, the last pre-war year, 1,421,587.95

Among the Catholic quarterlies, Colosseum had a brief and brilliant career, appearing in March 1934 and suddenly expiring in mid-1939. Its editor, Bernard Wall, possessed a wide knowledge of

European currents of philosophy, theology, and literature. but not 97 practical politics. As a result, his political commentary was at a rather abstract level. All his life long. Wall felt a deep affinity for the Latin countries of Europe, especially France. In the 1930s, this was coupled with a strain of thinking which owed much to Hilaire

Belloc (see below) and a bit to Charles Maurras. This strain, which was really socially rather than theologically based, tended to deni­ grate English culture, Anglicanism, and democracy as inferior to ultra­ montane Catholicism, Continental culture, and authoritarian govern-

QQ ment. Interestingly enough. Wall combined a passionate interest in religious concerns with a total lack of that self-conscious concern

95catholic Truth, May-June 1938, pp. 83-4; May-June 1939, pp. 72-3.

9^As is evidenced by his autobiography. Headlong Into Change; see Chapters I and II.

97, Ibid., p. 78.

g o ^IntInterview with Mrs. Bernard Wall and Dr. Bernard Bergonzi, 30 May 1976. 27 with being a Catholic that made so many of his contemporaries seem so

9 9 parochial.

Wall appears to have absorbed the proverbial Latin temperament and often reacted emotionally to being pushed in one direction by moving even more strongly the opposite way. He had read and been shocked by Mein Kampf by 1933 and he attributed the founding of

Colosseum to the subconscious influence of Hitler whose coming to power aroused Wall's desire to address current political and social con­ cerns. In Colosseum's first issue, editor Wall declared his journal would "not be a polite review," but would openly "pamphleteer" against the "contradictions" of the age; "Capitalism, Bolshevism, Yogi, Democ­ racy, Usury, Determinism, Freudianism, Starvation and. . .Poison

Gas."^®^ Apart from contributed articles. Wall did most of the writing and reviewing for the journal, which was aimed at Catholic intellec­ tuals.^^2

The passionate arguments of the thirties affected Wall deeply and he admits his views swung from radical left to radical right. 103 Naturally, Colosseum* s editorials followed suit on every change.

The experience of World War II and new contacts in Italy changed him once again and the radical ultramontane of the thirties became a pro­ nounced liberal in the following decades, eventually even translating

^^Wall, Headlong Into Change, p. 103.

lOOwall interview, 30 May 1976; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 64-5.

^^^Colosseum, March 1934, p. 5.

^8%all interview, 30 May 1976.

^8%all, Headlong Into Change, p. 76. 28

the works of the avant-garde Catholic thinker, Pierre Teilhard de

Chardin.

In 1881, the Benedictine Monks of Downside Abbey founded the

philosophical and theological journal. The Downside Review. Political

affairs were well-treated in excellent book reviews, review essays,

and occasional articles.

Oldest of the English Catholic publications was The Dublin

Review. Founded in 1836 in London as an independent lay journal, it was named to indicate its opposition stance to the often anti-Catholic

Edinburgh R e v i e w . a distinguished series of 20th century editors

raised it to ever-increasing heights of eminence. Algar Thorold, a

convert son of an Anglican bishop, guided the journal from 1926 to

1935.^^^ Denis Gwynn, a scholar of Irish affairs, took over until

November 1939. Lord Clonmore served a brief period until July 1940,

when Christopher Dawson became editor. The Dublin Review was un­

surpassed in the quality of its articles.

The Sower, an educational journal, was founded in 1919 by Canon

Francis H. Drinkwater. The journal was intended to substitute a

reasoned approach to religious faith for the prevailing system of

instruction by rote. In 1928, Drinkwater asked a friend and long-time

associate. Father Samuel J. Gosling, to take over the journal. Though

not an editor by training. Gosling accepted the task as a means of

194yall-Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976; T. F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976.

^95j)^er, "The Catholic Press," in English Catholics, pp. 475-481.

^^^obituary. The Dublin Review, July 1936, p. v. 29

"bearing witness" to the principles he believed in, and he discharged the duties of editor very well.^^^ Gosling was an intelligent, inde­ pendent, somewhat unapproachable Yorkshireman of pronounced views who exercised a powerful attraction on many and repelled probably almost as many.^®® Education was not his forte; rather, he excelled in political and social commentary and devoted much of The Sower's editor­ ial commentary to such questions which he addressed with vigor and insight.109

In an era when many Catholic writers seemed to be sharing in the general despair over democracy. Gosling vigorously defended democratic institutions, sharply criticizing those attacking them, especially when the attackers were Catholic. The Sower may have been the smallest of the Catholic publications; none was bolder or more outspoken.

All of these organs of the Catholic press were privately owned, most by laymen. Thus, while the hierarchy encouraged their efforts, such papers were purely unofficial publications.As such, they represented not the "Catholic line," (indeed, there was none, outside of areas of faith and morals) but the reactions of Catholics testing events by the standards of their consciences and broad Catholic prin­ ciples.

The Catholic press, even those journals owned and operated by

^®7jnterview with F. H. Drinkwater, 31 May 1976.

^®®Obituary, The Cottonian (Spring 1951), pp. 33-5.

^*^9])i-inkwater interview, 31 May 1976.

llOgee statement by Cardinal Hinsley and comment. Penguin, Blackfriars, March 1937, pp. 218-19. 30 clerics, were free of direct control by the Catholic hierarchy. As long as they did not deviate from doctrinal orthodoxy, they could take pretty much whatever political and social line they chose. The Uni­ verse was most sensitive to clerical pressure because 75% of its sales were from racks in the rear of churches. Thus, if its positions were considered too extreme, irate pastors could bar the paper from their churches as harmful to their flocks. In fact. The Universe was so anxious to please its readers that it would have closely followed a safe, conservative line without the pressure of this not-so-benevolent clerical paternalism.In fact. The Universe took a position on political and social issues considerably to the right of that publicly held by the Archbishop of Westminster without suffering the least trouble.

The other journals treated here were impervious even to that pressure. When The Sower took a position on the Spanish Civil War that displeased the Archbishop of Westminster, it was asked to stop. Fathers

112 Gosling and Drinkwater simply refused, and that was the end of that.

Turning to those Catholic authors who contributed to shaping the atmosphere of the time, it is striking to note that most of those of the first rank were converts. Often deliberately eccentric and even pugnacious in approach, their behavior was dictated by their conviction that Catholics were deliberately ignored by English society. Their strategy was designed to break the "siege" and get a hearing. A common

^^^Wynn-Igoe interview, 26 May 1976.

drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976; McCabe interview, 4 June, 1976. 31

strategy adopted by figures such as Belloc, Chesterton, and Evelyn

Waugh was to try to portray Catholics as somehow gayer and wittier than

other people, and Catholic Medieval England as merrier than modern

Britain. There was an element of snobbery involved in the idea that 113 they were representing something "older and more English." Christo­

pher Dawson's eminence lies in the fact that he was one of the few free

from this "we"-"they" mentality.Signs were present of a change to

a greater open-mindedness, but this did not gather real strength in

England until after the war.

No one exemplifies this ultramontane, ultra-conservative type of

English Catholic more than Hilaire Belloc. In the 1920s, he saw, in

Continental figures such as Jacques Maritain, the first signs of the

changes coming in Catholicism, and he viewed them with distaste. Fur­

ther, though he denied it, his writings tended to equate European civi­

lization and Catholicism, as exemplified in his famous slogan: "The

Faith is Europe and Europe is the Faith," one of the most extreme

oversimplifications of a man generally more aware of nuances.

Belloc's political attitudes were determined by what he saw as

the decay of social and political structures occurring all around him,

and the rise of a crudely materialistic society. He set forth the

thesis that people would eventually surrender their economic, if not

^^%ebblethwaite interview, 4 June 1976; McCabe interview, 4 June 1976.

^^^Frank J. Sheed, "Catholic England," Thought, vol 26, (Summer 1951): 269-71.

^^^Robert Speaight, The Life of Hilaire Belloc (London; Hollis and Carter, 1957), pp. 386-7 (hereafter referred to as Belloc); Wall, Headlong Into Change, p. 21. 32 their political freedom to a state dominated by capitalists or social­ ists in return for social security and a minimal but guaranteed level of material well-being.The only way to avoid this slavery, he said, was to restore the widespread ownership of small farms characteristic of the Middle Ages.^^^ This program, called distributism, and labeled 118 by one wag "three acres and a cow," was an unrealistic solution.

Belloc did not see (though he seems to have suspected) that the responsibilities of m o d e m property ownership, including taxation, had become so great that most individuals did not equate ownership with freedom. Also, with his tendency to discuss abstract ideas, e.g., socialism or a free economy, as ideal, unmodified types, he did not grasp the possibility of the mixed system of state and private control 119 advocated by the Labor Party.

In politics, Belloc, once himself a Liberal Member of Parliament, came to feel parliamentary democracy was a sham. A low opinion of the intelligence of the mass of voters was combined with a contempt for party politicians who he thought were only interested in pursuing their 120 own interests. His solution was to restore the House of Commons to aristocratic control and strengthen the monarchy to enable it to play a

Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State (London: T. N. Foulis, 1912), pp. 3, 124-5, 140; H. Belloc, Crisis of Civilization (New York: Fordham University, 1937), pp. 164-60, 194.

^^^Belloc, Servile State, p. 187; Belloc, Crisis of Civilization, pp. 225, 242.

^^%all. Headlong Into Change, p. 23.

^^9gpeaight, Belloc, pp. 484, 268, 315.

^^Oibid., pp. 294-305, 317; T. F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976. 33 121 governmental role above all classes and interests. Belloc saw

Britain progressing towards socialism and prescribed a return to an idealized past as a solution. He, did not see that all classes were cooperating in changing England to a form of "mitigated socialism" which, after 1945, would eventuate in the welfare state. Belloc's hostility to democracy eventually drove him to become "the champion of whoever, in any c o m e r of Europe, decreed or threatened the death of 122 Parliamentary institutions." The anti-democratic element so notice­ able among conservative English Catholics like Douglas Woodruff is 123 largely attributable to Belloc's influence. Finally, a staunch nationalist, Belloc believed the League of Nations worse than a sham.

That one could be both a patriot and internationally-minded was for him "the precious m o d e m lie."^^^

Belloc came under fire for promoting his ideas in the voluminous histories he published, ostensibly as works of scholarship. The disdain for documentation he displayed in these histories involved him in a dispute with the Catholic historian Rev. Philip Hughes, who charged him with errors and bias as well as lacking evidence for statements and loc conclusions. "Life is too short for the verification of references,"

1 91 Ibid., p. 486; Hilaire Belloc, The House of Commons and Monarchy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1920), pp. 13, 72-3.

^^^Speaight, Belloc, pp. 483, 306.

^^^Interview with Christopher Hollis, 10 June 1976.

^^^Hilaire Belloc, The Jews (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1922), pp. 11-12.

^^^Philip Hughes, "Notes on a Recent History," Clergy Review, Dec. 1934, pp. 480-5; H. Belloc, Reply, Feb. 1935, pp. 122-3; P. Hughes, Reply, April 1935, pp. 317-21. 34

Belloc later growled, "and they never m a t t e r . An unsigned review of one of his books in Catholic Truth in 1939 put its finger directly on the point: "Mr. Belloc is not, strictly, writing history, but he is using history for a purpose..," namely, to explain the evils of m o d e m 127 society and preach his own solutions to those problems.

Belloc's popularity has declined considerably since his death in

1953. The chief reason for this is what his biographer Robert Speaight 128 calls his "strident, exotic anti-Semitism." Much of this reputation is based on Belloc's rabid anti-Dreyfus stand. He never admitted

Dreyfus's innocence and, in 1938, was still taking not-so-oblique 129 swipes at him.

Belloc was no Julius Streicher and he was appalled by the fan- 130 atical anti-Semitism he saw in Europe and America. But his effort to solve the "Jewish problem," expounded in The Jews (1922) is based on the standard anti-Semitic myth that supports the uglier varieties.

Karl Dietrich Bracher has stated the major themes of this "standard anti-Jewish myth": (1) Jews are the main prop and beneficiaries of (a) intemational capitalism or (b) intemational Marxism; (2) and all their activities are part of a global conspiracy against national or racial

^^^The Universe, 4 November 1938, p. 19.

^^7^eview of The Great Heresies, Catholic Truth, Jan.-Feb. 1939, p. 19.

^^^Speaight, Belloc, p. 97; David Lodge, "Chester-Belloc and the Jews," The Critic, May-June 1971, p. 34 (hereafter referred to as "Chester-Belloc'.'). 129 Lodge, "Chester-Belloc," p. 38; The Universe, 30 December 1938, p. 7.

130Speaight, Belloc, p. 363; Lodge, "Chester-Belloc," p. 41. 35 131 interests. The Jews, Belloc said, were an alien element in Gentile society. While Jews neither originated capitalism nor, as a whole, joined revolutionary movements, that "...revolutionary leadership is mainly Jewish" was, he said, as well known as "that international 132 finance was mainly Jewish." The recent mushrooming of maniacal 133 anti-Semitism again threatened the Jews with pogroms. The only way to prevent this, the only solution to the Jewish problem, was "recog­ nition," i.e., segregation or apartheid within Western Society, and

"respect."^54

Coming from one so consciously Catholic, Belloc's comment that

Christianity had inherited much from Athens, Rome "and even Jerusalem"

(emphasis Belloc's) implies, says Speaight, a blind "inability to see that the Catholic is a son of Israel...in a profounder sense than he is 135 a son of Greece or Rome..." Belloc did not see that anti-Semitism, rather than proving the existence of a problem, was itself the prob- , 136 lem.

One cannot speak long of Hilaire Belloc without soon encountering his close friend, Gilbert Keith Chesterton. Though dissimilar in personalities, their intellectual unanimity was so great that the two

131 Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, trans. J Steinberg (New York; Praeger, 1970), p. 34. 132 Belloc, The Jews, pp. 3-4, 11-12, 64.

IS^Ibid., pp. 11-12, 146-50. ^^^Ibid., pp. 5, 262.

Speaight, Belloc, p. 393.

^^^Lodge, "Chester-Belloc," p. 40. 36 were often spoken of collectively as "The Chester-Belloc." Chesterton too was a disillusioned former Liberal who saw the parliamentary 137 system as a sham. But Chesterton never ran to the despotic ex­ tremes of some critics. He praised Mussolini's Italy for its tolerant attitude to the Church and its apparent ending of the corruption of the 138 former Parliamentary regime. But he recognized that, at bottom.

Fascism was strictly negative, a reaction against something, lacking in any ultimate purpose for the authority it claimed. It had restored order to the state, he said, but it would fail unless it also restored 139 order to the mind. With Belloc, Chesterton adopted distributism as well as opposition to the welfare state and the League of Nations.

Though there has been a revival of interest in him of late,

Chesterton's reputation suffered the same eclipse as Belloc's, and for the same reason: anti-Semitism. Again, the elements are similar. In one essay he remarked that some Jews had indeed adopted usury or Com­ munism, both of which seek "a concentration of wealth which destroys private property.In The New Jerusalem, he stated that the Jew

Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), pp. 295-9, 318 (hereafter referred to as GKC). 1 88 Christopher Hollis, The Mind of Chesterton (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1970), p. 14 (hereafter referred to as Mind).

l^^Gilbert K. Chesterton, The Resurrection of Rome (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1930), pp. 229-51.

l^Onollis, Mind, p. 15; Ward, GKC, p. 323.

l^^Gilbert K. Chesterton, "The Judaism of Hitler," in The End of the Armistice, compiler, F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1940), p . 94. 37

could never.be a true patriot; he could only really love "Zion."^^^

His solution was like Belloc's: the establishment of self-governing

Jewish "cantons" on the Swiss model in Palestine and elsewhere.

Chesterton's friend and biographer, Masie Ward, calls his position on

the Jews "an excessive simplification,and W. H. Auden, noting the

anomaly of this anti-Semitism in a very decent man who was one of the prime scoffers at racism, blamed the influence of B e l l o c .

Belloc and Chesterton often denied that they were anti-Semites.

They both had Jewish friends; they both condemned persecution, hatred,

and conspiracy tales. But they made the "homeless Jew" a necessary

partisan of intemational finance and Communism. That they attributed

this partisanship to "some" and not "all" Jews was, ultimately, a minor

distinction. Religion played a small part in Belloc's attitude. For

both, usury was the key and segregation the cure. They did not see

that the Catholic minority could become the "Jews" of tomorrow. They

should have; it had happened before. The easy contempt often displayed

by Belloc was part of the intellectual atmosphere of the time, present

in T. S. Eliot, H. G. Wells, and D. H. Lawrence among others. Belloc

and Chesterton contributed to that evil atmosphere.

Christopher Dawson, a dignified, somewhat aloof Yorkshireman

like S. J. Gosling, was a convert, a distinguished historian and a

(New York: George H. Doran, 1921), pp. 285-8.

143ibid., pp. 301-3. ^^'^Ward, GKC, p. 45.

^4^W. H. Auden, Foreword to Gilbert Keith Chesterton: A selection from his non-fictional prose, ed. W. H. Auden (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 11. 38 sociologist. In the 1930s, he examined the phenomenon of Fascism, carefully setting out its constructive and destructive tendencies. He set forth Italy's professed intention to establish a socially cooper­ ative, corporative state as a via media between socialism with its class conflicts and liberalism with its partisan political disputes.

But Dawson also pointed out Mussolini's disturbing imperialistic rhetoric as an indication of the dangerous alternative Fascism might follow.^4^

So calm and dispassionate was this analysis that the widespread misunderstanding developed that Dawson was in favor of totalitarian government at first and, by the end of the decade, had turned against it.^47 In fact, Dawson was and always remained a believer in con­ servative, orderly democratic government, European unity, and Christian ecumenism, all sharply in contrast to the authoritarian and parochial

Bellocian circle around him. His concern was to warn that, if the economic crisis continued or worsened. Great Britain, in spite of its attachment to political liberty, might seek salvation in the fascist solution.As his daughter and biographer put it; "Above all, my 149 father was anti-totalitarian and anti-Communist." In fact, according to one source (who insisted on remaining anonymous), Dawson left the

^46christopher Dawson, Enquiries Into Religion and Culture (New York; Sheed and Ward, 1933), pp. 11-17 (hereafter referred to as Enquiries). 1 '1.7 See Michael De La Bedoyere, Catholic Profiles (London: Paternoster Pub., n.d.), pp. 57-9.

^48gcott interview, 8 June 1976; Speaight, Property Basket, pp. 217-218; Wall, Headlong Into Change, p. 89.

^49gcott interview, 8 June 1976. 39 directorship of The Tablet because of disagreements with its editor,

Douglas Woodruff, a follower of Belloc.

Throughout the thirties, Dawson was appreciated more by non-

Catholics and non-Englishmen than by English Catholics. During and after World War II, he finally began to have an impact on his fellow

English co-religionists.^50

Douglas Jerrold was the enfant terrible of the Catholic Right.

Bedoyere's description of him as a b o m reactionary is right on tar­ get. ^5^ Along with his mentor, Belloc, Jerrold shared much of the 19th century liberal spirit of personal freedom and detestation of con- 152 straints on the human spirit. As he wrote in 1936: "It is the whole essence of liberalism that it dislikes the persecution of its enemies 153 as greatly as the persecution of its friends." In practice, Jerrold proved more indulgent toward excesses from the right. With Chesterton and Belloc, he espoused distributism as the answer to modern society's social ills.154

Sharing in the despair over democracy, and fearful of the Com­ munist danger, Jerrold called for some sort of vaguely authoritarian, corporative government to replace parliament, and he thought that

Britain must stand with the totalitarian states of Europe to bar the

150gcott interview, 8 June 1976.

l^lgedoyere. Catholic Profiles, p. 7. ^^^ibid.

ISSwcurrent Comments," The English Review, 1936, pp. 262-3.

1^4ibid., December 1935, pp. 654-5. 40 door to the advance of Soviet Russia.He saw Catholicism as part of this militant anti-Communist force, an idea which tended to lead him to identify his religion with his political v i e w s . A self- appointed defender of "Christian civilization," Jerrold conducted his campaign from the pages of The English Review and, later, in his writings and speeches.

Jerrold was a charming man, a devoted friend, brave and straight­ forward. Many liked him who utterly disagreed with his views.1^7 gut he was hampered by an outlook which his friend Robert Speaight says was 158 characteristic of the pre-World War I era. His life seems to have ended in a series of disappointments. He never got the parliamentary seat he desired for so long.159 Graham Greene imagined him going about wearing a hairshirt under his impeccably tailored suit.l^^

Like Jerrold, Arnold Lunn was a convert, a political conserva­ tive, a distributist and an anti-Marxist. But he differed in two important respects: he was much less a reactionary and he was an un­ ceasing, vocal, and biting critic of all forms of anti-Semitism.1^1

Margaret George, The Warped Vision (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1965), pp. 117-118, 123-4; Douglas Jerrold, Georgian Ad­ venture (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 356.

156p. -p. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976.

157>f^ F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Speaight, Property Basket, pp. 155-6.

158gpeaight, Property Basket, p. 158.

15^Hollis interview, 10 June 1976.

IGOgpeaight, Property Basket, p. 156.

^^Igedoyere, Catholic Profiles, p. 9. 41

Here, then, were the English Catholic commentators, thinkers and press at the threshold of the 1930s, as disparate a collection of individuals as could be found anywhere, yet a community, united with their religious leaders including the pope, possessing, in greater or lesser degree, a body of principles and attitudes formulated over centuries by Catholic thinkers, and open to the influence of Catholic writers in books and their own press. Withal, they were exposed to all the social and political influences of English society at large, being affected by that society and affecting it in return. And with that society, they passed through an era when, desperately seeking peace,

Britain found war. It is the role of the English Catholic thinkers, writers and journalists in this agonizing passage from peace to war that is the subject of this study. CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF APPEASEMENT AND THE ACCESSION

OF HITLER

Evolution of the Appeasement Policy

The period of the 1930s in Britain has been called the era of

"appeasement," a term covering both the state of mind of the era and the policies arising from that mentality. The foundations of that policy, however, had been laid down in the preceding decade. A brief explanation of the policy's evolution is necessary here.

In Great Britain, the brief euphoria of victory following the end of World War I soon gave way to disillusionment. The conviction spread, not only in Britain but throughout Western Europe, that the war had been a ghastly mistake and that no reasonable statesman would con­

sider starting another one.^ Majority public opinion was opposed to the "balance of power" politics that was considered a prime cause of 2 the war.

These sentiments were most pronounced in Great Britain. Paci­

fism was stronger there than anywhere else in Europe. Thousands took

^William N. Medlicott, Contemporary England 1914-1964 (London: Longmans, 1967), p. 77.

2 Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 249

42 43 O the 1934 Peace Pledge vowing never to fight again. This pacifism was combined with the comfortable feeling that Britain's insular position made her immune from invasion.^

By 1930, the thinking of most Englishmen was based on three major assumptions. First, the Versailles treaties had imposed an unjust settlement on Germany and this settlement must be peacefully revised.^ Second, every effort must be made to avoid another general

European war. To prevent war, the British people put their faith in

the contradictory marriage of collective security through the League of

Nations and pacifism. They demanded that Germany not be allowed to rearm, but objected to the kind of sanctions which would have made

international action to prevent armed violations of the peace possible.^

This "Leagueomania," shared by both left and right, undermined efforts

to build national defense without creating the international forces necessary to replace it.^ Finally, the British public considered domestic problems more important than foreign affairs by far, and the

^Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976.

4john F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York; Wilfred Funk, 1940), pp. 20-1.

^Bentley B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918 (New York; Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 87-8; The Times (London), The History of The Times (Nendeln/Liechtenstein; Kraus Reprint, 1952), vol. IV, part 2, 1921- 1948, pp. 797-9 (hereafter referred to as History of Times); Medlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 328-9; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

^Sir George Clark, gen. ed.. The Oxford History of England. 15 vols. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1965), vol. 15; English History 1914- 1945, by A. J. P. Taylor, p. 311; Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 53.

7Charles L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (Chicago; University of Chicago, 1955), p. 537; Bernard Norling, "Mirror of Illusion," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1954), pp. 397-8. 44 Q Depression reinforced this indifference to foreign politics. All in all, the psychological attitude of Great Britain in the 1930s was one of retreat and retrenchment. This indifference had an immediate effect on the secular press. British papers could not take a firm line on

Germany until quite late because most writers would not write it and the public would not read it.^

In his 1971 study. The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939,

Franklin R. Gannon examined the rise and fall of support in the secular press for the policy of appeasing Nazi Germany. Gannon noted that, in spite of conservative or liberal leanings on various issues, the vast majority of British press figures were liberals in the broad sense of that term and perceived themselves as such. Appeasement, then, Gannon saw as "the product of a crisis of the liberal conscience,that conscience reacting to a number of contemporary factors. The most im­ portant of those factors were; the revulsion against any future war; the belief that the Versailles Treaty was unjust and must be revised in

Germany's favor; an aversion to political entanglements east of the

Rhine; the conviction that the revolting nature of the Nazi regime did not invalidate the justice of Germany's claims to redress of past grievances; and, finally, the certainty that the speedy redress of those grievances was the surest way to temper the character of the New

^Medlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 323-4; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976. Q Franklin R. Gannon, The British Press and Nazi Germany 1936- 1939 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 2.

^^Franklin R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany. 1936-1939 (Oxford, Eng.; Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 4. 45

Germany, to induce her to settle down, and to restore the peace and stability of Europe. All the British press wanted was that Hitler should pursue his just claims in the east in a peaceful fashion and respect the inviolability of the Low Countries and France.

Gannon's book has helped to demonstrate the wide consensus on appeasement that existed across the spectrum of British political opinion and to point up the fallacy of the old view that the farseeing

liberals of the left urged resistance to Germany while the purblind conservatives of the right pressed for accommodation. In fact, the men of the British press held many ideas and attitudes in common and

the majority of them settled on appeasement as the only policy which 12 should— or even could— be followed in dealing with Germany. This

stance did not really change until Hitler demonstrated the emptiness of the appeasers' hopes by marching into Prague in violation of the pledges made by him at Munich.

Sharing the public's belief in treaty revision and collective

security and its aversion to continental commitments. The Times,

throughout the 1930s consistently interpreted German words and deeds

in the most favorable possible light, portraying a Germany that did not

exist.13 The notion, widespread abroad, that The Times represented the

"unofficial" voice of the British government worried the Cabinet enough

so that it occasionally delegated a minister to state publicly that the

llpbid., pp. 288, 292-300. ^^Ibid., pp. 4-5.

l^History of Times, pp. 795, 830; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 536. 46 opinions of the newspaper were strictly its own.

The Times reflected the conservative and liberal attitudes of the governing classes it appealed to, but the performance of the more left-wing press was little better.Though it often correctly saw the significance of the repeated Nazi and Fascist aggressions, its ideo­ logical bias made it hope that economic concessions alone would placate the dictators, while its pacifism vitiated its calls for collective security.1^ And the public, not wishing to be disturbed, accepted 17 these nostrums uncritically. The thinking of the British government paralleled that of the general public, and so goveimmental policy was also based on this foundation of treaty revision, disarmament, and 18 collective security.

All agree on calling the policy that arose from these assumptions and attitudes "appeasement," but the definition of that term has pro­ duced much controversy. Irrespective of its linguistic validity, the term has come to be used to characterize the policy adopted by the

l^Great Britain, Public Records Office, Minutes of Cabinet Meetings (CAB 23/81), 20 (35) 2; 21 (35) 2. In this citation, CAB 23/81 indicates the volume number of the cabinet records; 20 indicates the twentieth meeting of the cabinet, (35) indicates 1935, and 2, the second minute. Hereafter, references to cabinet documents will be cited as CAB followed by the volume, meeting number, year, and minute number.

^^Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 141.

^^Norling, "Mirror of Illusion," p. 326.

^^Mass-Observation, The Press and Its Readers (London; Art and Technics, 1949), p. 93.

18 Donald C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (Notre Dame, Indiana; Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 117, 134. 47

British government (mainly) towards the dictator states of Europe, especially Germany, during the 1930s.

William N. Medlicott defines appeasement as "tranquillisation, or constructive peacemaking,"^^ but this would make it identical to all peace negotiations. William R. Rock states that it defies precise definition, being more an emotional than an intellectual affair, but he describes it as the promotion of reconciliation by removing the just 20 grievances of the powers defeated in the World War. Although this is better than Medlicott's definition, it is still too general to be fully satisfactory. R. Keith Middlemas characterizes appeasement as the

"policy of meeting German demands and grievances, asking in return, not 21 for firm reciprocal advantages but only for 'mutual understanding.' "

While the restriction of the definition to Germany is debatable, this description of the policy as it actually emerged is perhaps the most accurate. For, in fact, real, tangible concessions were made to Hitler and Mussolini in return for nothing more than verbal assurances of future concord.

Debate over the policy has raged from the time of its formula­ tion to the present day. In 1932, Winston Churchill argued that "the removal of the just grievances of the vanquished ought to precede the 22 disarmament of the victors." The view of appeasement which was

l^Medlicott, Contemporary England, p. 2l3n. 20 Appeasement on Trial (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), pp. 337-8.

3^The Strategy of Appeasement (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 8n.

^4%artin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 136. 48 dominant from 1940 to the late fifties, held that, since Hitler's objectives were clearly set down in Mein Kampf and each succeeding crisis showed him following this blueprint. Prime Minister Neville

Chamberlain's policy was futile from the start. A. J. P. Taylor's revisionist thesis states that Hitler was in fact only pursuing tradi­ tional German foreign policy aims, that he had no grand strategy but was an opportunist, exploiting errors in Western policy which vacillated between appeasement and resistance, and that he stumbled into war. En bloc condemnation of appeasement, a well-meant policy followed by well-intentioned and sorely beset men, said Taylor, was incorrect, 23 though Chamberlain could be faulted for specific errors.

There is much validity in the assertion that before Munich, practically everyone was in favor of appeasement.^^ Medlicott has a point when he says that the opposite of an appeaser was a "war-monger," 25 not a "resister." Though this is too strong, it points up the degree of differences which have been argued in recent years.

There is general agreement that Neville Chamberlain's appease­ ment policy had been originated by his predecessors. However, he has

33a . j . p . Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, 2nd. ed. (Greenwich, Conn.; Fawcett Books, 1966), pp. xi, 70, 291 (hereafter referred to as Origins). Taylor's thesis discussed in Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, pp. 158-9. D. C. Watt grants some of Taylor's thesis but states that by 1937 Hitler had decided on aggressive war. "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School," Political Science Quarterly, 36 (April-June 1965): pp. 201-4.

3^Neville Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 2, 43; Arthur Koestler, The Invisible Writing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), pp. 188-9.

^^Medlicott, Contemporary England, p. 213n. 49 been blamed by some for launching it on a new phase in which he sur­ rendered the rights of others in the supposed interests of British

external security.From 1934 on, Chamberlain, first as Chancellor of the Exchequer and then as Prime Minister, did press for a deterrent

force and limited rearmament as a necessary complement to successful negotiation.37 But, sharing the common confusion of the era, he never drew the conclusions his thinking seemed to be leading to and, even 28 after Munich, was t o m between resistance and appeasement. What is

certain is that he supported the policy till it was shown to be 29 patently bankrupt.

British foreign policy, by inadvertance or (some writers say) by

design, was so vaguely articulated and explained that the public had 30 little real understanding of that policy. Little public outcry was

raised over this, however, since until the Munich crisis most English- 31 men displayed little interest in foreign affairs.

3^Mary A. Wathen, The Policy of England and France Toward the "Anschluss" of 1938 (Washington, D. C . : Catholic University Press, 1954), p. 102; Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 481.

Z^Keith G. Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: MacMillan, 1946), pp. 252-3.

3®Lewis B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude (New York: H. Fertig, 1948), p. 41.

3^Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 448.

3®John W. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 35; Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 48; Henry Durant, "Public Opinion Polls and Foreign Policy," British Journal of Sociology, 6 (June 1955): 150. Wheeler-Bennett and Durauc see the British govern­ ment as deliberately keeping the public uninformed.

3^Taylor, English History, p. 408. 50

In view of government secrecy and wide popular indifference, gauging the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is diffi­ c u l t . ^3 Observers have drawn attention to the close contact between 33 British Members of Parliament (M.P.s) and their constituencies. With democracy under fire in the 1930s, politicians tried to discover what the public wanted and guided their activities accordingly, but that perception was often unclear and inaccurate.

The situation at the cabinet level was worse. By 1934, the

National Government had generally excluded anyone who might contradict the line they had set out, and Labour lacked any effective orator who might have received a hearing from the government— or the public— in 35 the face of official opposition. Chamberlain, always impatient of any kind of criticism, tended, as Prime Minister, to lay down the policy lines he thought correct and to treat contrary opinions with disdain.

Public opinion was often invoked in the cabinet and press, but 37 there was no effort made to substantiate its presence or analyze it.

The result for the press was that it often failed to examine the

32purant, "Public Opinion Polls and Foreign Policy," p. 152.

33gee Ivor Jennings, Parliament (2nd. ed.; Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1957), p. 523.

^^arwick, Britain in the Century of Total War, pp. 249-51. OC Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week-End (London: Faber and Faber, 1940), p. 331.

Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 109; Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 248. 87 Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 108; Mass Observation, Press and Its Readers, pp. 32-4. 51 38 direction of present policies or possible alternatives to them. But public opinion did influence policy in two ways. First, the general assumptions of the British people in the 1930s were shared by the

39 government, including Chamberlain. Secondly, popular outcry could and did act to impede or arrest certain policies.The government found this out at the time of the Hoare-Laval pact and the Prague coup of 1939 when government willingness to compromise outstripped the public desire to do so. These instances indicated the public's ability to overturn policies which were widely considered repugnant. The pub­

lic's more usual silence (regular opinion polling only began at the

time of Munich) was taken as tacit approval of governmental policy, which it generally was. Therefore, in this limited sense, it is pos­

sible to say that the public supported appeasement from beginning to

end.^^ Finally, considerations of foreign policy made even Hitler exercise some restraint. If he wanted to exploit the divisions in

foreign opinion, it was important not to unite that opinion against him 42 by rash actions which would needlessly arouse opposition abroad.

Appeasement, then, was a product of many forces and minds, and

the "Guilty Men" tradition that makes it the product of a small, weak.

OO History of Times, pp. 1008-11, 1020.

39 Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 481; Wheeler-Bennett, George VI, pp. 268-9; Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 157.

^^William W. Hadley, Munich; Before and After (London: Cassell and C o ., 1944), p. 6. 41lbid.

^^Lawrence D. Walker, Hitler Youth and Catholic Youth 1933-1936 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1970), pp. 35-7. 52 and foolish group of men is simply inadequate to explain it.^^

The religious attitude of most Englishmen reflected the psychol­ ogy of the era. After a remarkable burst of involvement in social questions during the 1920s, the Protestant Churches, criticized by

Continental thinkers for their activities and suffering from the 44 Depression, retreated from these concerns during the 1930s.

Catholic thinking in the 1930s followed suit and generally supported appeasement.^^ Many, including the hierarchy, gave the League of Nations firm support as the means of collective security against future war, though, as previously noted, men like Belloc, Chesterton, and Jerrold were opposed to the League from the start.At first, non-military measures alone were considered sufficient and, in a 1933 pamphlet. The Prevention of War by Collective Action, Lord Howard of

Penrith, an eminent Catholic member of the House of Lords, proposed to 47 halt aggression by a total economic boycott of the aggressor. Ernest

Oldmeadow in The Tablet approved Lord Howard's plan, even though he 48 recognized that it could eventually lead to war. Further, although

Catholics had been among the most vocal in calling for disarmament in the years after 1919, the arming of Soviet Russia and the Left-wing's

^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. xiii.

^^George S. Spinks, Religion in Britain Since 1900 (London: Andrew Dakers, 1952), pp. 99-105, 184-6.

^^Gurian and Fitzsimmons, Catholic Church in World Affairs, p. 348.

^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 610, 614, 618.

^^Lord Esme W. Howard of Penrith (London: Bums, Oates, and Washboume, 1933), pp. 13-17.

^^The Tablet. 7 April 1934, pp. 426-7. 53 promotion of pacifism (which only began to change slowly in 1936) led 49 a number of them to begin early to advocate military preparedness.

Sharing in and reflecting the general psychology of the time, the British Catholic press naturally shared many of the assumptions held by its secular counterpart.^^ Both had their organs which sympa­ thized with the political and social left and right; both were anti-war, anti-Versailles, and anti-interventionist. Most noticeably, though they proceeded from different sets of assumptions and demonstrated a wide variety of approaches and reactions to the problems of European politics in the 1930s, both the Catholic and secular press settled on a common policy to meet those problems, namely, appeasement.^^

Together with these similarities, there were important differ­ ences. Among secular newspapers, ideological considerations were gen­ erally weak while concern for profits was strong. Because of their religious orientation, ideology was important within the Catholic papers while profits (beyond avoiding insolvency) were a minor concern.

Furthermore, Gannon's characterization of the secular organs as all 52 broadly liberal is not true of the Catholic papers where one could find strong representations of opinion ranging from the near authori­ tarian right to the liberal left. Their religious outlook immunized

Catholics against sympathizing with the frankly atheistic government of

Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 633-4; David Thompson, England in the Twentieth Century (Hairmondsworth, Eng.; Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 159-60, 162; Henry Felling, M o d e m Britain 1885-1955 (New York; W. W. Norton, 1960), p. 129.

^^Gannon, British Press and Germany, p. 31.

S^lbid., pp. 4-5. ^^Ibid., p. 120. 54

Stalin's Russia. Third, several organs of the Catholic press long supported the efforts of the German Catholics to support Hitler's anti­ communist foreign policy, while deploring the Nazi domestic policies.

The secular press felt itself generally unable to back this ambiguous line. Finally, the secular press gave a fairly accurate picture of the state of general British public opinion during the 1930s. The Catholic press, however, was more heavily weighted to the right than the mass of

British Catholics and so imperfectly reflected the attitudes of that portion of the British people.

In this atmosphere, then, of horror of war, of unrealistic hope being placed in a toothless collective security, with a government often out of touch with its public and with democracy in travail, the

English Catholics, in company with their compatriots, viewed the coming to power of Adolf Hitler.

The Accession of Hitler

Hitler's view of England was ambivalent throughout his career.

He would have liked an alliance with her, but only in return for a free hand in Eastern Europe. Realizing that this was impossible, the Führer 53 decided that an eventual war with England was inevitable.

Hitler's rise to power created widespread unease in England.

Labor disliked his promise of dictatorship and Conservatives feared he

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, ed. John Chamberlain, e^. al. (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), pp. 182-3, 979-80; Adolf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Book, trans. Salvator Attanasi (New York; Grove Press, 1961), pp. 147-51; Alan Bullock, Hitler (New York; Harper Torch Books, 1962), pp. 337-8, 352-3; Eberhard Jackel, Hitler's Weltanschauung, trans. Herbert Arnold (Middletown, Conn.; Wesleyan University Press, 1972) p. 41 and Chapter II. 55 might pose a threat to Britain. But Labor sympathized with German complaints of injustice, while Conservatives feared Communism more than

Nazism.Many dismissed Nazi violence as a temporary phenomenon which would be moderated after a brief period of consolidation.^^ The gen­ eral public, though suspicious of Germany, above all wanted no re- 56 armament and no commitments beyond the Rhine.

The thinking of the British Government paralleled that of the public: it hoped to correct the injustices of Versailles and cooperate with Germany. But since the British Government deliberately eschewed the use of force in settling continental affairs while the Nazis con­ sidered it a prime tool, the appeasement policy suffered from fatal defects from the s t a r t . ^7 Baldwin and Chamberlain had doubts, but they kept them to themselves, thus insuring disaster. In 1930, Gilbert

Chesterton warned that Hindenburg, no dictator himself, was holding the

eg seat for some future dictator. In January 1933, this dire prophecy began to come true as Hitler became Chancellor.

The reaction of the English Catholic Press was to try to analyze the reasons for the Nazi victory and to see it in as positive a light as possible. The main points of this approach were summarized in an

^^Taylor, English History, pp. 374-5.

^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, pp. 141-3.

^^Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, p. 126.

^^Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, pp. 6-7, 26; Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 448.

3®Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 75, 83-4.

3%ard, GKÇ, p. 634. 56 article in The Dublin Review. The article cited the Depression as the main reason for Hitler's being named Chancellor. The Nazi program, it said, was a promise of a new, vague, social order, similar to Italy's, comprising "an extraordinary hotch-potch of Socialism, materialism, anti-Semitism, reaction and revolution," a melange containing something for everyone.Nazism's success was attributed to its criticism of the status quo which coincided with the popular belief that "no change can be for the worst.Finally, it concluded, while the German bishops had pointedly criticized many individual Nazi ideas and actions,

"...the Zentrum recognizes the justice of the claim that Adolf Hitler, as leader of the strongest party in Germany, should be given a fair chance to demonstrate his capacity for constructive statesmanship."^^

The Tablet and The Month adopted a more guarded attitude and found the greatest cause for confidence in the presence of a majority 63 of non-Nazis in the cabinet. When Father Joseph Keating, S.J., editor of The Month, was told by a friend that Hitler was "only a harmless lunatic with a gift for oratory," Keating replied: "No lunatic with a gift for oratory is harmless.

The violence of the March election campaign confirmed that the

J. Stanley, "Is German Democracy Doomed?," Dublin Review, April 1933, pp. 245-51.

G^Ibid., p. 256.

^3%bid., p. 256-9; "Notes on the Month," April 1933, p. 246; Karl Tollman, "Hitler's EntwicklungsmoeglichkeitenI" Blackfriars, June 1933, pp. 450-4.

^^The Tablet, 4 Feb. 1933, pp. 129-30; 11 Feb. 1933, pp. 122-3; The Month, March 1933, pp. 200-201.

^ ^ a l l interview, 30 May 1976. 57

Nazis were indeed seeking dictatorship. The Tablet* s editor, Ernest

Oldmeadow, hoped that the Center Party and the Catholics could hold fast against Nazi attacks on religion and liberty.But C. F. Mel­ ville, the perceptive writer on Central Europe for Clergy Review, gloomily predicted that a Hitlerian dictatorship was a virtual certainty and that any opposition mounted by the Center and the Catholic states of the South was probably doomed to failure.

The results of the election and the continuing Nazi violence angered Oldmeadow and saddened Keating. In spite of pleas by the

Catholic Bishops for fairness, the Nazis had used every foul tactic possible. "Hitler's Dictatorship is a usurpation," said Oldmeadow,

"and his enforcement of i t is a b r u t a l i t y ."^7 The Tablet found the

"new Germany" promised by Hitler "only a resuscitation of the old one,"^^ and The Month warned that Nazi violence at home was damaging

Germany's position abroad.

The support of the Center Party for Hitler's request for the emergency powers law known as the Enabling Act was clearly embarrassing to the English Catholics. Blackfriars and The Tablet indicated their disagreement with the position of the Center Party and pointed out that

^^The Tablet, 25 Feb. 1933, p. 225; 4 March, pp. 257-8.

^^"Germany," March 1933, pp. 259-60.

^7xhe Tablet, 18 March 1933, p. 326; "Back to Potsdam?", The Month, April 1933, pp. 294-6.

^®"The Spirit of Potsdam," 25 March 1933, p. 357.

^^"Back to Potsdam?", The Month, April 1933, pp. 294-6. 58 its religious character gave it no claim to special competence in political matters.Oldmeadow hoped that the Center could find a basis for collaboration with the Nazis as they had previously worked with the Socialists. But he feared "that the Centre has lost moral prestige and has gained little save a respite from persecution."^^

Keating tried to stress what he took to be the positive elements in the

situation, praising Hitler's anti-war comments and his anti-pornography

campaign (though he regretted that Mein Kampf, which Keating had been

among the first in England to read, had not been burnt also). Still, he concluded. Hitler's program would be judged successful only if he restored the rule of law and liberty which alone marked a truly civil- 72 ized state. Clergy Review was more alarmed. The Nazis, wrote C. F.

Melville, were attacking Jews, Communists, and Center politicians,

emasculating the governments of the local states, and appeared to be

completely uninfluenced by the moderating efforts of Von Papen and 73 Hugenberg.

Optimism continued to be eroded by further Nazi blows. The

Tablet was bewildered by the success of the machinery of Nazi repression

in crushing out almost every voice of opposition within Germany.The self-immolation of the Center Party on 5 July 1933 was attributed to main force. The Nazi attitude that regarded all opposition as treason

^^The Tablet, 1 April 1933, p. 394; Blackfriars, Feb. 1934, p. 86.

7^The Tablet, 1 April 1933, p. 394; 15 April 1933, pp. 458-9.

7^The Month, June 1933, pp. 481-6.

73"Central Europe," Clergy Review, April 1933, p. 342.

^^The Tablet, 1 July 1933, p. 2. 59 was viewed with alarm, but still the futile hope was expressed that the

German Catholics could retard extremist policies while Blackfriars dis­

counted the reports of Nazi atrocities and pleaded with English Catho­

lics to take a "balanced" view of the new Germany.But even the

ultraconservative Douglas Jerrold, while stating that Hitler's over­

throw would probably be a "disaster," admitted to grave misgivings at

the Nazis' lack of any positive program or any promise of one.^^

Chesterton's summary was typically apt; "By far the stupidest thing

done, not only in the last year, but in the last two or three centuries, 77 was the acceptance by the Germans of the Dictatorship of Hitler."

As 1934 began. The Tablet noted reports that concentration

camps were appearing in Germany, with the comment that "a tyrant and a 78 torturer" was no answer to Communism. Writing under his pseudonym

"Jacobin," Father Thomas Guilby, O.P.^^ a writer for Blackfriars, ex- 80 cused the military displays and called for respect for Germany. Fr.

S. J. Gosling of The Sower, however, viewed the growing militarization 81 of German society with deep suspicion. The Month called Nazi racism.

"The End of the Centre," The Tablet, pp. 69-70; "The End of the Centrum," The Month, Sept. 1933, p. 193; Karl Pottman, "The Centre Party," Blackfriars, Aug. 1933, pp. 669-72; Nov. 1933, p. 888; Victor White, O.P., "Reviews," p. 965.

^^"Current Comments," The English Review. Sept. 1933, p. 269.

77”The Stupidest Thing," in Avowals and Denials (New York; Dodd Mead, 1935), p. 61.

7^27 Jar 1934, pp. 97-8.

/ Letter from Bede Bailey, O.P., 27 May 1976.

®*^Jacobin, "Observations; Potsdam," Jan. 1934, pp. 8-9.

81The Sower, April-June 1934, p. 72. 60

"a series of absurd propositions which has no basis in history or

ethnology,while the sterilization and breeding policy was cited 83 for its "intrinsic rottenness."

Hopes that the Nazi regime might move to moderation were smashed

on 30 June 1934, in the "Night of the Long Knives." Oldmeadow, whose

capacity for outrage was large when he felt basic human dignity was being infringed upon, was aghast at the scope of the murders, and The

Tablet continued to excoriate the "Frightfulness in the Third Reich"

for weeks.Melville joined in dismissing the Rohm plot as a canard, made even less convincing by the murder of a number of Catholic lay

leaders. The SS, the Gestapo, and the Army were in the saddle, he wrote, but he hoped that the regime might now stop attacking Christians

QC and Jews and tackle the concrete problems facing it.

Hitler's becoming Reich president on Hindenburg's death did not

improve matters and the assumption was called illegal by The Month and

The Tablet. T h e "plebiscite" to approve it was declared a farce in

advance, and the 90% "yes" vote--98% from the concentration camp at 87 Dachau!--was mocked as ridiculous. Bernard Wall, whose studies at

Fribourg (Switzerland) had given him first-hand contact with refugees

^^The Month, Jan. 1934, p. 11.

B^The Month, May 1934, p. 394; June 1934, p. 494.

^^The Tablet, 7 July 1934, pp. 1-2, 5; 21 July 1934, p. 67.

®^"Long Knives," Clergy Review, Aug. 1934, pp. 167-8.

3^The Month, Nov. 1934, p. 387; The Tablet, 4 Aug. 1934, p. 130.

® 7 n Aug. 1934, p. 161; 18 Aug., p. 194; 25 Aug., p. 227. 61 88 from Nazi persecution, was equally hard on the Nazis. In his journal,

Colosseum, he expressed his fear that Hindenburg's death had removed the last moderating element in Germany. He classified the Rohm purge as worthy of a Chicago mobster, and, with Keating, deplored the major­ ity's supine acceptance of even such a disgraceful regime after a brief

on tenure had "legitimized it." Among the English Catholics, only

Douglas Jerrold took a different stance. He defended the validity of the plebiscite and called the "new internationalists" who were hoping that an increase in German economic troubles would keep her busy at home, "strangely unpleasant people" who should be allowed no role in 90 determining British policy.

Somewhat shy of commenting on Germany's domestic politics out of fear of being charged with interference in internal affairs, the Eng­

lish Catholics felt much less inhibited in commenting on state-church relations in the Third Reich. The picture of these relations, however, was clouded and distorted for a long time by a number of local German

factors.

The first of these local factors was Hitler's own attitude. In his youth, he had admired the ritual and dogmatism of Catholicism. This gave him the idea of establishing a "Jewishless" Christianity as a tool of control, but he soon rejected this, unable to tolerate a possible

3®Wall interview, 31 May 1976.

^^Colosseum, Sept. 1934, pp. 49-51; The Month, Nov. 1934, p. 387.

^^"Current Comments," English Review, Sept. 1934, pp. 269-70; Dec., pp. 652-3. 62 91 rival. During the 1020s, he flattered the churches, calling in his speeches for a deliberately undefined "positive Christianity." Even after he came to power, he left direct attacks against the churches to 92 his subordinates. But the ultimate goal remained unchanged; the churches would be progressively emasculated and a new substitute faith in blood and race created which would draw off an ever-increasing num- 93 her of apostate Christians until the older religion finally collapsed.

And many did apostatize, attracted by Hitler's nationalism, anti- 94 Communism, and promises of order.

The second confusing element was that the German Catholic Church accepted Hitler's government. The reasons for this were varied. Nazi attacks on Catholic patriotism made Catholics, still sensitive from

Bismarck's Kulturkampf, anxious to prove their loyalty by supporting the party.Then there was the general weariness with democracy and a contempt for the strife-ridden Weimar Republic which led many Catholics to see Nazi authoritarianism as the answer to parliamentary crises and

91 Hermann Rauschning, The Revolution of Nihilism, trans. F. W. Dickes (New York; Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), p. 49; John S. Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-1945 (London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), p. 3 (hereafter referred to as Nazi Persecution).

92conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 4-5; Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 578n, 825n, (editorial notes). 93 Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York; G. P. Putnam, 1940), pp. 45-57; Franklin Littell, "Kirchenkampf and Holo­ caust," Journal of Church and State, 13 (Spring 1971); 210-13. QA Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 5; Littell, "Kirchenhampf and Holocaust," p. 213.

^^Michael Power, Religion in the Reich (London; Longmans, Green, 1939), pp. 22-4; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 22. 63

Bolshevik threats.Some Catholic leaders, like Michael Cardinal

Faulhaber of Munich, were so restricted by an anachronistic, essentially medieval view of society, that they were incapable of understanding

democracy or 20th century pluralism. They tried to defend religion without also defending basic political liberties and found that was 97 not possible.

Further, the bastions of the German Church proved to be less

formidable than they seemed. The great, national Catholic organiza­

tions of youth, labor, etc., were so highly centralized that the Nazis 98 were easily able to constrict, control, and finally disband them.

The German bishops, whose great prestige was exceeded only by 99 Hitler's, had lost much of their leadership to the great organiza­

tions. When these organizations disappeared, the bishops were unable

to reclaim that leadership.The Nazis restricted communication with

Rome and contact among the bishops was limited almost completely to the

yearly episcopal conferences at Fulda.

Many German Catholics supported Hitler at first, sympathetic to

Emst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, "German Catholicism in 1933," trans. Raymond Schmandt, Cross Currents 11 (Summer 1961): 285, 291-2; Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), pp. 12-13.

^^Mother Mary A. Gallin, "The Cardinal and the State," Journal of Church and State 12 (Autumn 1970): 404. 98 Teeling, Pope in Politics, pp. 202-4; Ronald Knox, Nazi■ and Nazarene (London: MacMillan, 1940), p. 22.

99walker, "Hitler Youth," p. 37.

^®®Teeling, Pope in Politics, p. 203.

lOlwilliam Teeling, Crisis for Christianity (London: J. Gifford, 1939), p. 160. 64 his anti-Coiranunism and imagining they saw papal corporate principles 102 in the Nazi program. This popular support made the bishops fear that the German Church would not survive a new Kulturkampf, a view 103 shared by the Papal Nuncio. Therefore, a strategy resulted of offering accommodation in return for guarantees of minimal religious freedoms. For years, the hishops had condemned Nazi ideas on religion and race, though not on domestic or foreign politics.In March 1933, with assurance from Hitler that, in exchange for support of the Enabling

Act, the rights of the Church would not be impaired, the bans on voting for or joining the Nazi Party were withdrawn, though condemnation of particular Nazi views was kept in force.

Some writers have seen this accommodation by the bishops as a cynical trade-off, others as a means to retain access to the sacra­ ments, while still others attribute it to wishful thinking.German

Catholics were never released from their moral obligations to obey the

Arthur S. Duncan-Jones, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany (Westport, Conn.; Greenwood Press, 1938), p. 157; Klaus Epstein, "The Pope, the^^Church and the Nazis," M o d e m Age 9 (Winter 1964-65): 85-6; Bockenforde, "German Catholicism in 1933," p. 293. 103 Beate Ruhm von Oppen, "Nazis and Christians," World Politics 21 (April 1969), p. 406.

^^^Sister Ethel M. Tinneman, "Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy Towards the Nazi Regime," Western Political Quarterly (22 June 1967), p. 334 (hereafter referred to as "Attitudes").

^^^Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 17-23.

^^^Epstein, "The Pope, the Church and the Nazis," p. 89; Bocken­ forde, "German Catholicism in 1933," pp. 285-6; Ruhm von Oppen, "Nazis and Christians," pp. 394-7; W. H. Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See; The Historical Background of Mit Brennender Sorge 1933-6," Catholic Historical Review 47 (July 1961): 165 (hereafter referred to as "Nazi Germany & Holy See"). 65 r e g i m e , though, in a searing critique of German Catholicism, Carl

Amery flatly states that the mass of middle-class Catholics would have capitulated to the Nazis even had pope, bishops, and Center Party de- 108 d a r e d unyielding opposition to Nazism. The few Catholics who did 109 call for resistance were generally dismissed as troublemakers.

But perhaps more radical critics like Guenter Lewy and Sister

Tinneman were viewing these issues with too much hindsight.Though the critics who would have liked a firmer resistance may have a valid point, Beate Ruhm von Oppen argued that the Church strove to keep some rallying ground in a hostile atmosphere for "the defense of decency and 111 humanity." In fact, in defending basic Christian principles, the

German bishops were driven into opposition to Nazism in spite of them­ selves. And, she said, the Nazis saw this resistance that eventually led some, e.g., Klaus von Stauffenberg, to strike out, and others to 112 keep silent when they learned of plots. The SS certainly saw Church 113 opposition to Nazism as the rule, acceptance as the exception. Even

^®7conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 87; Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw, Hill, 1964), pp. 98-9.

^^®Carl Amery, Capitulation trans. E. Quinn (New York: Herder and Herder, 196?'), pp. 22-34, 46-7.

^^^Ibid., p. 46; Epstein, "The Pope, the Church and the Nazis," p. 88; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 46.

^^®See Epstein, "The Pope, the Church and the Nazis," p. 85; Tinneman, "Attitudes," p. 346.

m paligion and Resistance to Nazism (Princeton, N. J. : Prince­ ton University Center of International Studies, 1971), pp. 64-7.

ll^Ihid., pp. 68-71.

ll^Beate Ruhm von Oppen, "Nazis and Christians," p. 412. 66 the innocent-sounding Fulda pastorals used phrases which deliberately evaded formulas preferred by the Nazis, driving Himmler and Heydrich to fury.^^^ In Germany as in England, what would later be called

"appeasement" was as much a product of ignorance and wishful thinking 115 as outright cowardice. And the English Catholics, viewing events in

Germany, found them as hard to understand as their German brethren.

Mild optimism mingled with distrust characterized English Catho­ lic reports on the first contacts between Hitler's government and the

German Church.The Nazi breakup of legal meetings of Catholic associations shocked The Tablet but did not shake its confidence that 117 the denouement of a real struggle could only be a "Canossa" for Hitler.

Clergy Review's correspondent in Rome, Father Richard Smith, joined his colleague C. F. Melville in declaring that the Vatican was viewing events in Germany with a guarded caution and that reports that the pope 118 approved the Nazi takeover "should be taken with the utmost reserve."

Joseph Keating's democratic sympathies set his boiling point over Nazi actions lower than some others. In July, he attacked Nazi anti-Semitism, raids on Catholic meetings and the general suppression of liberty. The

Church, he said flatly, did not fit into a totalitarian state, be it

ll^ibid., pp. 408-11.

^^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 143.

^^^"Notes on the Month," Blackfriars, May 1933, p. 344; Clifford Howell, "How Catholic Germany Fights for its Schools," The Month, Feb. 1933, pp. 119-25.

^^^The Tablet, 17 June 1933, p. 750; 24 June, p. 780; 8 July, pp. 33-4.

^^3"Central Europe," April 1933, pp. 342-3; "Rome," June 1933, p. 513; "Central Europe," July 1933, p. 82. 67 119 atheistic Russia or nationalistic Germany.

Early in 1933, negotiations got under way for a possible Vatican-

German agreement. Pius XI, who commended Hitler's anti-Communism in 1 90 early 1933, would have liked to add an anti-Communist Germany to 121 anti-Communist Italy. But because the Vatican was not anti-author­ itarian in principle, it was not necessarily pro-totalitarian. Both

Pius XI and Pius XII commended the "most resistant" bishop against Nazi tyranny. Preysing of Berlin, for his outspoken demands for law and

impartial j u s t i c e . ^^2 Further, Pius XI warmly praised the spirit of 123 freedom and tolerance that prevailed in England.

Hitler, realizing the political benefits that could flow from a treaty with the Vatican, almost immediately proposed a concordat to regulate church-state relations through the entire Reich.Cardinal

Pacelli, a former nuncio in Germany with first-hand knowledge of the

^^% h e Month, July 1933, pp. 8-9.

^^^Gordon Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler's Wars (London: Sheed and Ward, 1962), p. 319; Franz von Papen, Memoirs. trans. Brian Connell (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1933), p. 279.

^3^Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 73.

^^^Ruhm von Oppen, "Nazis and Christians," pp. 405-6.

123gj.eat Britain, Legation (Holy See) H.M.S.O., Anglo-Vatican Relations 1914-1939, ed. Thomas E. Hachey (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1972), p . 242 (hereafter referred to as Anglo-Vatican Rel.).

^^^Foreign Ministry Memo, 7 April 1933, German Foreign Ministry, Documents in German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (Washington, D. C . : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949- ), Series C, I, no. 145; Bergen to For. Ministry, 18 April 1933, no. 162 (hereafter referred to as DGFP); Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 27. 68 inc Nazis, preferred to wait. He finally supported the proposal for two reasons. First, the German bishops wanted a legal agreement to provide the protection of Catholic interests formerly afforded by the

Center Party.Second, the Vatican seems to have feared that the

Nazis would interpret refusal to sign a concordat as a declaration of war on the regime by the Church, and Pacelli told this to the French 127 and British ministers to the Vatican. Pacelli's selectivity in choosing what documents were to be filed or published plus the destruc­ tion of the documents by the Gestapo and the Vatican before and during the war make it necessary to take Pacelli's word for this interpretation 128 of the Vatican's motives, but it appears to be essentially correct.

As the British Minister to the Vatican noted; "A concordat...does not 129 imply mutual respect, still less affection." The agreement was signed on 20 July 1933. The English Catholic press initially greeted

H. Harrigan, "Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a Detente in German Vatican Relations, 1939-1940," Catholic Historical Review 49 (July 1963): 173.

IZbpriedrich Zipfel, Kirchenkampf in Deutschland 1933-1945 (Berlin: Walter de Cruyter, 1965), p. 28; Callin, "The Cardinal and the State," p. 395.

^^^Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz, Nationalizmus und Kirke (Düssel­ dorf: Droste Verlag, 1974), pp. 117-8; Anglo-Vatican Rel.. p. 250.

^^^Siegele-Wenschkewitz, Nationalizmus und Kirke, pp. 118-19; Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," p. 171.

^^^Anglo-Vatican Rel., 1933, p. 250.

130^ext in The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, (London: B u ms, Oates, 1940), pp. 516-22 (hereafter referred to as Persecution), and DGFP, Series C, I, no. 371. 69 131 the news of the Concordat with cautious satisfaction.

The Concordat raised the prestige of Hitler's regime abroad 132 while it inhibited incipient Catholic resistance at home. The Nazis tried to interpret the agreement as an endorsement of National Social- 133 ism, an interpretation which the Vatican consistently denied. The

Nazis repeatedly infringed upon the agreement, adhering to just enough of it so that Rome would still be reluctant to repudiate it alto­ gether .

The Nazis created problems over the Concordat right from the start. Nazi cynicism was demonstrated by the promulgation of a law on 135 sterilization on July 20, the very day the agreement was signed.

Catholic workingmen's meetings were broken up, youth groups dissolved, 136 and Catholic officials of Jewish descent were refused employment.

Most of these acts were aimed at the laity in order to isolate the 137 clergy and deprive the latter of support. Complaints from Rome were unavailing, and by October Pacelli was threatening an official protest

^^^The Tablet, "Rome and the Reich," 29 July 1933, pp. 133, 145; Melville, "Central Europe," Clergy Review, Aug. 1933, p. 169; The Month. Aug. 1933, p. 103; Sept. 1933, p. 273.

^^^Konrad Heiden, Per Fuehrer, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston; Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 635; Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 90.

^^^Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 86.

^^^Amery, Capitulation, p. 65.

^^^Duncan-Jones, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, p. 173.

^^^Power, Religion in the Reich, pp. 39-41; George 0. Kent, "Pope Pius XII and Germany," American Historical Review 70 (October 1964): 61. 137 Amery, Capitulation, p. 66. 70

TOO over violations of the pact. Protests by the German bishops reached

a peak in Cardinal Faulhaber's famous Advent 1933 sermons in which he 139 denounced "German paganism" as no answer to Russian Communism. But he made it clear that he was not criticizing the government or the party.140

The clashes over the Concordat continued into the next year.

In January, the Vatican placed Alfred Rosenberg's The Myth of the 20th

Century on the I n d e x . In June, the bishops attacked Nazi racism, a

stand which the Gestapo correctly interpreted as a direct assault on

the root of Nazi i d e o l o g y . ^42 their meeting in Fulda on July 7, the bishops protested that official harassment was unwarranted in the face

of their unimpeachable loyalty.^43

In England, The Tablet and Tlie Month rebuffed the accusation

that the Concordat had been a capitulation to Hitler by pointing to the

continuing protests by the Pope against Nazi restrictions on Catholic

organizations and the religious press, Faulhaber's Advent sermons, and

l^^Bergen to For. Ministry, 14 Oct. 1933, DGFP, Series C, I, no. 501. 139 Power, Religion in the Reich, pp. 44-6; Duncan-Jones, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, p. 167.

^40callin, "Cardinal and the State," p. 396.

^4^Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 80; Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," p. 176.

^4^Ruhm von Oppen, "Nazis and Christians," pp. 412-13.

^4%arrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Histor­ ical Review, p. 178. 71

the widespread arrests and imprisonment of c l e r g y . ^^4 glackfriars optimism steadily decreased as Nazi Gleichschaltung throttled all the 145 Catholic organizations and the Nazis spread the new Nordic paganism.

By January 1934, one writer could wonder whether the pagan Nazi regime was not "the worst menace to Christianity and to civilization that

Europe has yet s e e n . "^46

At first, Joseph Keating thought that Hitler and a few moderates were exerting strenuous efforts to hold back extremists among the

N a zi s.^47 This was a common misconception of the early 1930s, namely that there were certain elements among the Nazis whose activities were 1A O nearly uncontrollable by Hitler. By April 1934, however, Keating was blaming Hitler himself for trying to suppress twenty million Catho­ lics by methods indistinguishable from R u s s i a ' s . ^49 However, he said,

Nazism was "Not Wholly Bad." "Apart from its anti-Semitism, its racial pride, its exaltation of militarism, its aggressive nationalism, its stock-yard eugenics, its civil tyranny, the Nazi programme contains not a few commendable ingredients.Keating still hoped that Christian

The Tablet, 23 Sept.. 1933, p. 386; 28 Oct., p. 554; 9 Dec., 1933, pp. 770-1; 6 Jan. 1934, p. 26; 20 Jan., p. 89; 13 Jan., 1934, p. 36; "The Church and the Nazis," The Month, Dec. 1933, pp. 538-47.

^45"Reviews," Sept. 1933, pp. 799-800; Dec. 1933, pp. 986-7n.

^4^A. Manson, Blackfriars, Jan. 1934, p. 65.

147ii.j^g Church and the Nazis," The Month, Dec. 1933, pp. 538-47; March 1934, p. 174.

^48por example, see C. F. Melville, "Germany and the Concordat," Clergy Review, May 1934, p. 449 and Lee J. Stanley, "The Catholic Church in Nazi Germany," The Dublin Review, Jan. 1934, pp. 16-23.

1 49^6 Month, April 1934, p. 293. ^^^Ibid., p. 294. 72 influence could yet purge Nazism leaving it with its efforts to help unemployment and its curbing of Communism and other evils.

Every succeeding month brought its litany of fresh outrages with the invariable chorus of protests from the German bishops and the Vati- 152 can, all fully reported in the English Catholic press. The Tablet's coverage was typical: 27 January 1934: youth organizations attacked;

3 February: shots fired at Faulhaber's palace; 17 March: newspapers shut down and their staffs jailed; 28 April: Nazi demonstrations in

Rhineland Churches.20 May— an editorial: "No day passes without some act of oppression in the sphere of r e l i g i o n .

Then, on 30 June, the "Long Knives" cut down some of the most prominent Catholic laymen in Germany, raising outcries from Rome and muffled protests in Germany itself.Oldmeadow was shocked, but he could not believe that the German Catholics would be cowed. Surely, he said in The Tablet, they must now force Hitler to curb anti-Catholic

e x c e s s e s . ^56 xhat it was well-nigh impossible to mount such an

ISllbid. 152 Richard Smith, Clergy Review, "Rome," Jan. 1934, p. 80; C. F. Melville, "Germany and Austria," Clergy Review, Feb. 1934, pp. 172-5; Richard Smith, "Rome," April 1934, p. 367; C. F. Melville, "Germany and the Concordat," May 1934, pp. 448-9; "Germany," June 1934, p. 535; "The Catholic Church in Nazi Germany," The Dublin Review, Jan. 1934, pp. 16- 27; Part II, April 1934, pp. 212-21.

^^^The Tablet, 27 Jan. 1934, p. 122; 3 Feb., p. 152; 17 March, p. 342, 28 April, p. 556.

154,„phe Wars of Religion," The Tablet, p. 674.

^Conway says the Germans were silent but Beate Ruhm von Oppen claims much camouflaged protest which enraged the S.S. and Gestapo. Nazi Persecution, pp. 92-4; "Nazis and Christians," pp. 412-14.

^^^The Tablet, 7 July 1934, p. 2; 14 July, p. 49; 21 July, p. 92; 28 July, p. 114 73 opposition in a m o d e m totalitarian state was a realization that was beyond Oldmeadow and most of his contemporaries. The phenomenon was

still fairly new and it was difficult to realize the extent of the coercive power at the disposal of a m o d e m state.

The persecution continued.The Dublin Review concluded that

the Catholic Church had become the last organized opposition force sur- ICO viving in Germany. Assurances given by Hitler that persecution would cease were now greeted with distrust. And when the Nazis suddenly

reduced their attacks to a very few, the general suspicion was that the

sole German motivation was the wish not to upset the Catholic popula­

tion of the Saar in view of the upcoming plebiscite there, and that the battle would be resumed once the vote had been taken and (as was ex- 159 pected) the area returned to Germany.

The sole dissenting voice was that of Douglas Jerrold. After

all, he said. Concordat violations by the German government or not,

"the Christian churches retain their freedom and their rights," in

glaring contrast to the total proscription in effect in Russia.

Jerrold regarded the rapidly diminishing scope of that "freedom" with

considerably less alarm than most of his co-religionists.

The matter of Nazi anti-Semitism necessitates some discussion

^^^The Tablet, 18 Aug. 1934, p. 209; 23 Sept., p. 356; 6 Oct., p. 440; The Month, Aug. 1934, pp. 98-9.

^^^The Dublin Review, July 1934, p. 93.

^^^The Tablet. 22 Sept. 1934, p. 356; 6 Oct., pp. 440-2; C. F. Melville, "Catholics in Germany," Clergy Review, Sept. 1934, p. 257; "Germany." Nov. 1934, pp. 424-5; The Month, Sept. 1934, p. 195; Nov. 1934, pp. 389-90; Nov. 1934, pp. 389-90; The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1934, p.193.

160,'Current Comments," The English Review, Sept. 1934, p. 268. 74 of the relationship between Catholics and Jews during the Nazi era.

There has been a strain of anti-Semitism among many Christians since antiquity.Part of this has been based on certain pseudo-theo­ logical notions such as the collective responsibility of all Jews for

Christ's death and the accusation that Jews are responsible for the

1_69 secularization and lack of religion of modern society. When the

"theological" reasons were largely forgotten, the hostility remained to fuel the standard anti-Semitic myth.of the homeless Jew, the root­ less alien in every land, the promoter of international capitalism or

international Communism. The presence of some Jews among the great

financiers, their appearance as prominent figures in the communist revolutions after World War I and their preeminence among the repre­

sentatives of German culture during the Weimar era provided the anti-

Semite, especially in Germany, with sufficient evidence to put flesh on his phantom of a Jewish global conspiracy. As Walter Laqueur says,

this was "a caricature based on a kernel of truth," but in Germany, the caricature was accepted, at least in part, by too many educated Ger-

164 mans.

The popes had to contend with this problem of Catholic anti­

semitism. Papal criticism of capitalist society was used by anti-

^^^T. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Bernard Wall, European Note-Book (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), pp. 47-8.

^^^Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Wall, European Note-Book, p. 48.

^^^See above, p. 33.

IG^laqueur, Weimar Culture, p. 76; Wall, European Note-Book, p. 65. 75

Semitic Catholics to support their attacks on the Jews,^^^ in spite of statements by Leo XIII, Pius X, and Pius XI defending the unity of the human race irrespective of race, color, or nation.

Another area of controversy has been whether or not a solemn public protest against and condemnation of anti-Semitism should have been made by the papacy, especially under Pius XII. The Vatican never approved racial anti-Semitism and, when Italy adopted its anti-Semitic laws in 1938, the most pro-Fascist of cardinals denounced them.

The crux of the matter is whether or not one accepts Pius XII's con­ tention that public protest would have made matters worse for the Jews.

Pius has been defended by Jews and criticized by Catholics.Certain­ ly he did plead for the Jews, supported them with funds and approved rescue efforts.Still, the best judgment delivered may have been that rendered in 1964 by the editors of the American lay Catholic journal Commonweal; when all allowances have been made for good faith and prudence, the Church's voice was "muted and erratic." Too little was risked and the Church must share in the terrible moral failure of the era.170

l^^Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 44.

l^Ojjarte, Papal Social Principles, pp. 40-1.

l^^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 928n, (editorial note).

^^Opinchas E. Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews (New York; Haw­ thorne, 1967), pp. 224-9, 254; Epstein, "The Pope, the Church and the Nazis," pp. 91-3.

l^^Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 250-4, 257-68; Robert Serrou, "Saint Pie XII?", Paris Match, 17 Février 1973, p. 82.

170"xhe Deputy," Commonweal 79 (28 February 1964): 647-8. 76

It was individual Christians who helped the Jews most. Some­ times this took the form of sabotaging the Nazi bureaucracy.Of one million Jews saved from the Nazis all over occupied Europe, Catholics accounted for 700,000 to 860,000, a number, says a Jewish writer, ex­ ceeding that "saved by all other churches, religious institutions and 172 rescue organizations combined."

In England, virulent anti-Semitism was the creed of only a small group of eccentrics, and the vicious Nazi form of anti-Semitism was actually a prime force in reducing the English repugnance for war with 173 Germany. But the milder form of this disease was widespread, es­ pecially among the more conservative English Catholics, even among those who protested the Nazi p o g r o m s . The influence of Belloc is especial- 175 ly important here. Douglas Woodruff, who became the editor of The

Tablet in 1936 was (and still is) very much a follower of Belloc.

Questioned about this issue in 1976 by this writer, he deplored the

Nazi pogroms but still was concerned about the prominent position of

Jews in m o d e m English society, an issue which, he said, the Nazi

17T Leuner, Compassion, p. 102; On this bureaucratic sabotage see Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 436-44.

172%apide, Three Popes and the Jews, p. 214; Ruhm von Oppen, Religion and Resistance to Nazism, pp. 30-1.

173colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 120; Taylor, English History, p. 420.

B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; H. Burns interview, 26 May 1976; Wall-Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; and see Wall, European Note-Book, pp. 48-51; 71-7.

Burns interview, 25 May 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; McCabe interview, 4 June 1976; Scott interview, 8 June 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976. 77 experience had made impossible to discuss.

Q; "Well, is it important?"

A: "Oh, I think so, yes. I think the ordinary English people know they're foreign...."

Q; "You think the Jews are a foreign element even when they're citizens?"

A: "Well, in the sense that they could go somewhere else... In that sense, you see, they are a nomadic people."

Questioned about his friend Woodruff's attitude, Christopher

Hollis admitted that, "Well, on the whole, he's rather anti-Semitic; he wasn't so very shocked at the... treatment of the Jews as he should 1 77 have been." Father Herbert McCabe, the editor of Blackfriars in

1976, wondered if perhaps some Catholic anti-Semites weren't "secretly"

(subconsciously) gratified that Hitler was doing something about what 178 they saw as the Jewish problem. This may have been a bit hard on 179 Woodruff, a kindly man personally who has Jewish friends, and whose wife Mia undertook the most strenuous efforts to help Jewish refugees 180 escaping from Germany. But it illustrated the dark shadows present in the attitudes of some prominent Catholics during that terrible era.

Fortunately, other prominent Catholics would have nothing to do with racism. Christopher Hollis, Arnold Lunn, F. H. Drinkwater, and

^^^Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

^77Rollis interview, 10 June 1976.

^7®McCabe interview, 4 June 1976.

179igoe interview, 26 May 1976.

^®®Comments by Mia Woodruff, 29 May 1976; Wall interview, 31 May 1976. 78 181 Robert Speaight were among these. Blackfriars was saved from the least trace of anti-Semitism due to the influence of Jacques Maritain 180 and his Jewish wife, Raissa. In 1932, Christopher Dawson told a conference of the Royal Italian Academy in Rome that European culture was a product of "a continuous process of international and inter­ racial collaboration."^®^

The virtual pogrom that followed the Nazi accession to power raised a furor in Britain.^®4 there were a disproportionate number of Jews in certain fields, wrote Oldmeadow, the way to correct the situation was for Gentiles to work harder and for the government to 185 establish just, approximate quotas. Oldmeadow tried to distinguish between "irreligious international Judaism" and "the great majority" of honorable religious Jews for whom he asked greater Christian sympathy.

Blackfriars interpreted the attacks on Jews and Catholics as part of a single effort directed against any group which based its life 187 on elements outside the State. The Month joined the protests, and

^®^Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976; Speaight, Property Basket, p. 91.

^^^cCabe interview, 4 June 1976.

!®®C. Dawson, "The Interracial Cooperation as a Factor in Euro­ pean Culture," (Roma: Reale Acca^emia D'ltalia, 1933) p. 9. Mrs. Scott stated that Mussolini, Hermann Goring and Alfred Rosenberg were in the audience.

^^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, pp. 138-9.

^®^The Tablet, 8 April 1933, p. 425.

^^^The Tablet, 18 March 1933, p. 322; 26 Aug., p. 260; 12 June 1933, p. 715; 16 Aug., p. 260; 30 June, 1933, p. 813.

187ifjjQtes on the Month : Pogroms," April 1933, p. 246. 79 when Franz Von Papen asked how the English would like a lot of Jews in their universities and government, Keating shot back "We doubt whether

1 OO the English people would care a jot...." But Keating did express resentment that persecution of Catholics in other countries was met 189 with silence. Douglas Jerrold was shocked at the pogroms, but he blamed the many Jews who he said had aligned themselves with Communism

for making people think that many Jews were basically "opposed to the 190 European world order."

Among the Catholic members of Parliament, one of the warmest expressions of sympathy for the Jews came from Henry Northcote, Earl of Iddesleigh, a convert from a prominent family. Speaking "not only on my behalf, [but] as a member of the Roman Catholic Church" he proffered the sympathy of the world's Catholics for those "victims of 191 a movement which has been condemned by our Bishops." John McGovern

(Ind. Lab., Glasgow) and John Morris (Cons., Salford) called for 192 protests to be made to the German government. When one Catholic member, Edward Doran (Cons., Tottenham) repeatedly objected that German-

188"The Persecution of the Jews in Germany," The Month, May 1933, pp. 388-9; The Month, June 1933, pp. 482; 486-7/

IB^Ibid., pp. 487-8.

^^®Current Comments, The English Review, July 1933, pp. 7-8.

^^^Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th series, 87 (1932-3), p. 222 (hereafter referred to as HL, followed by vol., year, and column numbers. Since all volumes used in this work are from the 5th series, series designation will be omitted in future references).

^^^Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th series, 276 (1932-3), pp. 842, 1578, 1913-14; 277 (1932-3), p. 488; 280 (1932-3), pp. 397-402, 738 (hereafter referred to as HÇ, followed by vol. and column numbers. Series number will be omitted below as in Lords debates.), 80

Jewish refugees entering England were exacerbating the unemployment 193 situation, McGovern replied, "May I ask whether the hon. Member is 194 here as the Hitler agent in the country?" Doran need not have worried. Except for admitting a few prominent and talented Jewish refugees who would benefit Britain materially and allow the government to exhibit a humanitarian "image," the cabinet was equally determined not to open the door to a large number of refugees who might become 195 an economic burden on the country.

In Germany, the campaign against the Jews was reduced in intens­ ity, but attacks were continued at this reduced level. The Catholic press continued to report these horrors and Faulhaber's Advent 1933

sermons defending the Old Testament and (partially) the Jews, were

singled out for special praise.

Finally, Gilbert Chesterton poured contempt on all this racial nonsense. The idea that all of Europe's greatness came from Germany 197 he ridiculed as Carlyle's "joke of the great Teutonic Theory." And,

in "The Judaism of Hitler," he mischievously interpreted the claim that

Nordics were a chosen people as proof that "Hitlerism is almost entirely

19®HC 275 (1933): 1351-2; 276 (1933): 2361; 280 (1933): 2576; 283 (1933); 1028-9.

276 (1933): 2361.

^^^CAB 23/75: 27 (33) 8.

^^®Catholic Truth. July-Aug. 1934, p. 151; A. J. McIntyre, Re­ view, The Sower. July-Sept., 1934, p. 186; Leuner, Compassion, p. 103; Jacobin, Blackfriars, "Remarks," March 1934, p. 280; The Tablet, 29 Sept. 1933, p. 407; The Month, p. 489.

197i,^g Tribal Triumph," in End of the Armistice, pp. 65-7. 81

1 no of Jewish origin." It is tragic that, in the case of men such as

Oldmeadow, Keating, Chesterton and even Jerrold, so much of their protest against Nazi anti-Semitism was vitiated by their own partici­ pation in the general anti-Semitic myth of the time.

The subject that concerned Great Britain most directly was, naturally, German foreign policy. The British government was pleased that the newly appointed Hitler expressed peaceful sentiments, asking 199 only that Germany be treated as an equal among the European powers.

British ministers found the French insistence on a firm British guar­ antee in the event of a German violation of treaty restrictions tire­ some and refused to agree, claiming British public opinion would never agree to further commitments abroad.^®® Hitler carefully maneuvered to divide the powers. He joined Mussolini's Four-Power Pact of 15 July

1933, since that agreement seemed to afford Germany diplomatic room in 201 which to play a larger role. Then, when the French refused to disarm without further guarantees for their security. Hitler announced on 14 October that Germany was withdrawing from the Disarmament Con­ ference and the League of Nations, camouflaging his move with a renewed

198"The other Cheek," in Ibid., pp. 95-6.

^^^Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1946- ), Second series, V, Rumbold to Simon, 7 April 1933, no. 23; Rumbold to Simon, 10 May 1933, no. 130; Patterson to Simon, 11 May 1933, no. 133. (hereafter cited as Brit. D o c .).

200vansittart to Paris, 5 Feb. 1934, Brit. Doc., 2nd series, VI, no. 255.

^O^Circular telegram from For. Minister, 7 June 1933, DGFP, series C, I, no. 291; Jurgen Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 64-5; Taylor, Origins, p. 178. 82 call for a peaceful general settlement.No one moved. Hitler had succeeded in this first public blow against the spirit of the 1919 settlement and he pushed along the rearmament program he had secretly 203 set in motion in April.

Throughout the years 1933-1934, the British government remained generally undisturbed by events within Germany. The cabinet was well aware that Germany was r e a r m i n g . Measures to improve badly neg­ lected British defenses, especially the air force, were discussed, but

Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald and his ministers decided that the situation had not reached a point where they could convince a reluctant

British public of the need to rearm. The cabinet contented itself with keeping an eye on the situation while striving to reach a modus vivendi 205 with Germany.

202Memo by State Secy., 4 Oct. 1933, DGFP, Series C, I, no. 479; Minutes of Ministers Conf. 13 Oct. 1933, no. 499; Hitler's speech announcing withdrawal in My New Order, pp. 210-19; Brit. Doc. 2nd. series, VI, Phipps to Simon, 21 Nov. 1933, no. 60; For. Office Memo, 25 Jan. 1934, no. 206.

^^^EXigabeth Wiskemann, Europe of the Dictators 1919-1945, Fontana History of Europe Series (London; William Collins Sons, 1966; reprint ed.. New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 100; Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World 1919-1949 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), pp. 247-50. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 207-8; 281-2.

^®4qab 23/78: 10 (34) 3; Great Britain, Public Records Office, Prime Minister's Papers, packet 1/155, letter from Lord Londonderry, Secretary for Air to Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald 13 Nov. 1934 (here­ after referred to as PREM followed by packet number and a description of the document referred to); Tyrrel to Simon, 26 June 1932, Brit. Doc. 2nd series, V, no. 270; Harvey to Vansittart, 26 July 1933, no. 275; Vansittart to Paris, 3 Feb. 1934, VI, no. 252.

205CAB 23/78: 12 (34) 1; 23/79: 18 (34) 3, 4. 83

More serious was the reluctance of the British government to fulfill even those agreements, such as the Locarno Treaty, to which it had committed itself. The government decided to resist French attempts to define the Locarno obligations more closely, seeing in the vagueness of the existing language a safeguard against being pressed to automatic fulfillment of its requirements, which public opinion would oppose.

The view of the Cabinet.. .was that demilitarization of the Rhine­ land was not a vital British interest, and that if the French raised the question...the British negotiators should state that we were bound by the Locarno Treaty and had no intention of repudiating it.206

This policy was not only disingenuous; it was ill-conceived.

Had German rearmament been allowed to continue in order, as MacDonald implied, to make the evidence of that rearmament all the more dramatic once it had been brought to the attention of the British public, a case might be made on that basis. But in fact, the government never under­ took to educate that public opinion, which it so often invoked, as to the danger to British security which was arising in Nazi Germany. In­ stead, Germany was left to continue her reamament unimpeded, while the 207 British government watched with disastrous complacency.

The British Catholic press was also deeply concerned with German foreign policy. There were a number of articles calling for a new 208 European settlement to replace that of the Peace of Paris. "If

2°®CAB 23/81: 3 (35) 2.

^®7igoe interview, 26 May 1976; Sontag, Broken World, p. 265; Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 228.

Jacobin, "Notes on the Month," Blackfriars, April 1933, p. 246; The Month, March 1933, pp. 200-1. 84 peace is to be assured," wrote a Blackfriars contributor, "the treaties 209 must be revised."

The Tablet welcomed the Four-Power Pact, but the agreement did 210 not dispel Oldmeadow's inveterate distrust of Germany. When Hitler withdrew from the League and the Disarmament Conference, Oldmeadow

remarked that while the Führer had said that Germany was not raising

sons to be shot down on a battlefield, "...is she not bringing them up

to shoot down, when all is ready, the sons of France, of Poland, and

Oil perhaps of our own country."

Keating thought Hitler's walkout was probably a tactic designed

21.2 to bring about a truly comprehensive disarmament plan. The Tablet was less optimistic and began to speak of the need for British rearm- 218 ament. "The notion that Nazi Germany is practically unarmed is

ridiculous, "^^4 wrote Oldmeadow, and he shrewdly guessed that the same

tactic used against domestic opponents--strike first and later excuse 215 it by false charges--might be used against foreign opponents as well.

Renewed German belligerence was seen, however, as an immediate

threat not to England, but to Austria. That small state on the Danube

R. Kirwan, "Peace and Disarmament," Blackfriars, Nov. 1934, p. 730.

^^®The Tablet, 20 May 1933, p. 617; 3 June 1933, p. 682; 17 June, p. 747; 24 June, p. 780; 22 July, p. 101.

^^^The Tablet, 21 Oct. 1933, pp. 521-2; 28 Oct. 1933, p. 555.

^^^The Month, Nov. 1933, pp. 385-90; April 1934, pp. 292-3.

Tablet, 20 Jan. 1934, p. 69; 21 April 1934, pp. 489-90; 28 April, p. 525.

2^^”Quien Sabe?" The Tablet, 7 July 1934, p. 5. ^^^Ibid. 85 was the object of special concern to English Catholics by virtue of its having an overwhelmingly Catholic population, and a government publicly committed to implementing papal social principles. It was hoped that the state might be an important link in a bloc against both

Communism and Nazism.

The Tablet applauded the defense of Austrian independence by its Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, against Nazi interference and called for British support of her in her resistance to an Anschluss.

Clergy Review was heartened by the support given Austria by the Vatican 217 and Italy. The Month agreed that an Anschluss, hitherto deemed inevitable, had been scotched by the Nazi madness, and Keating applauded

Dollfuss' rejection of Germany's "ludicrous and unchristian racial ideas, 918 hitherto the property of the Ku Klux Klan...."

The English Catholic press hailed the adoption by the Austrian government in October 1933 of a new Constitution making her a "corpor­ ative state," ostensibly founded on lines laid down in Quadragesimo

Anno. B u t the new arrangement provoked an outbreak among the

Socialists which, ill-handled by the government, resulted in the violent crushing of the Leftists. Dollfuss' action was defended by The Tablet,

^^®The Tablet, 13 May 1933, pp. 585-6; 10 June, p. 714; 17 June, p. 750; 17 Aug., p. 225; 20 Jan. 1934, p. 65; 27 Jan., p. 97.

217"Central Europe," Jan. 1933, pp. 81-2; April, pp. 323-4; "Rome," June 1933, p. 513; "Central Europe," June 1933, p. 515; July, pp. 81-3; "Central Europe," Sept. 1933, p. 286.

^^®The Month, Aug. 1933, p. 105.

219"central Europe," Clergy Review, Oct. 1933, pp. 338-9; "Austria," Nov., pp. 422; Jan. 1934, p. 81; "Danubianus," "Austria Yesterday and Today," Dublin Review, Jan. 1934, pp. 29-42. 86 990 The Month, and Colosseum. Interestingly enough. Clergy Review con­ tained the most reservations. Melville had feared the state was heading

for a violent clash with the Left; now he hoped that the Right would 221 not force Dollfuss to remake Austria on Nazi lines. Both Oldmeadow 222 and Melville were gratified when Dollfuss moved against the Nazis.

Then, on July 25, 1934, Dollfuss was murdered in a bungled Nazi putsch

in Vienna. Mussolini, feeling personally affronted by the Nazi coup, rushed troops to the Brenner while Britain and France filed protests.

Hitler realized that his Austrian followers had led him to back a reck­

less adventure and he ordered that a slower, evolutionary path be 223 followed to the Anschluss.

This murder provoked the strongest reaction of any Nazi action 99A in the first two years of Hitler's rule. "Murder Most Foul" cried

Oldmeadow in The Tablet, warning that the coup "promises dreadful possibilities for all Europe in the bloody attempt to Nazify and

220,j,he Tablet, 24 Feb. 1934, p. 230; The Month, March 1934, pp. 196-7; Colosseum, June 1934, p. 7.

221"central Europe," Clergy Review, Oct. 1933, pp. 338-9; "Central Europe," Clergy Review, Feb. 1934, pp. 267-8; Richard Smith, "Rome," April 1934, pp. 356-7.

222"Quien Sabe?" The Tablet, 7 July 1934, pp. 5-6; "Central Europe," Clergy Review, Aug. 1934, p. 169. 990 Ivone Kirkpatrick, Mussolini (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1964), p. 196; Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 96-102; Sontag, Broken World, p. 282; For. Ministry Memo, 7 Aug. 1934, DGFP, Series C, III, no. 149; Hess to Chief of Viennese Nazis, 21 Aug. 1934, no. 173.

22\fatt, Personalities and Policies, p. 122. 87 225 Hitlerize new tracts of Middle Europe." "Nazism is fundamentally unsound, even from the temporal point of view," exploded Keating in 226 The Month. "The world," said Bernard Wall in Colosseum, "is sick to the teeth with Nordic diplomacy and Nordic explanations and Nordic 227 brains excogitating Nordic lies..." Richard Smith summed up Rome's feeling toward Germany: "In the common opinion she is preparing for 228 229 war..." and no trust at all was put in Hitler's statements. 230 Chesterton also felt that Hitler was intent on war.

In the aftermath of the Vienna putsch, the Catholic press wel- 231 comed Kurt von Schuschnigg, the new Chancellor. Melville wrote an article for Dublin Review outlining how the new state was planned along 232 Italian lines, but that "...it avoids full-blooded Fascism." The

Month's view, however, was startling. Keating wrote that the Austrian workers had been neglected for years and the Church had been lax in its 233 duties. An article in the same issue was even more somber. One- third of the workers were unemployed, it said. The Social Democrats

The Tablet, 28 July 1934, p. 101, p. 145; Catholic Truth, Nov.-Dec. 1935, p. 224; "The Tragedy of Dr. Dollfuss," Clergy Review, Sept. 1934, p. 254.

^^^"Infelix Austria," The Month, Sept. 1934, p. 193, p. 156.

^27"commentary," Colosseum, Sept. 1934, p. 49. noQ 229 "Rome," Clergy Review, Nov. 1934, p. 427. Ibid. 230 Ward, GKÇ, p. 634; Chesterton, The Well and the Shallows (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), pp. 72, 250; Chesterton, End of the Armistice, p. 81.

^S^The Tablet, 25 Aug. 1934, p. 228.

232"jjr. Dollfuss and Mgr. Seipel," Oct. 1934, pp. 169-74.

23®0ct. 1934, pp. 296-7. 88 had revolted to save democracy, and fifty years of clerical indiffer­ ence had alienated almost all save the peasantry from Catholicism.

Reform might be possible, it concluded, if it was not already too 234 late.

J. J. Jones, a Catholic M.P. (Lab., West Ham), called for aid to 235 distressed Austria, but the British government felt little inclined to exert any real effort in Austria's behalf. The cabinet had been anxious to establish a common front with Italy and France to stabilize the European situation. But it was not willing to render economic aid to Austria and was determined to refuse to join with Paris and Rome to 236 provide a guarantee for the Danubien state.

In their concern over the fate of Austria, many English Catho­ lics looked for help from Italy. The political reasons were obvious: the state maintained a strong military posture and must naturally be concerned with an annexation that would place Germany on its northern frontier. But ideological reasons were important. As well as possess­ ing the largest population of Catholics of any country in Europe, Italy had for a decade been embarked on the Fascist experiment, which seemed to promise a social reconstruction along papally-inspired lines.

Together with much of English society, Catholics shared in the 237 disillusionment with democracy in the years of the Great Depression.

Beer, "Relief Work in Austria," pp. 335-43.

ZS^HC 295, (1934); 191.

2®®CAB 23/77: 50 (33) 1; 23/78: 2 (34) 1; 23/79: 32 (34) 1.

^®7gee Hilaire Belloc, Robespierre (2nd ed.; New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920), p. vii. 89

With unemployment and unrest widespread, many cast a long glance at the authoritarian corporative experiments which seemed to offer an alterna- 238 tive to a capitalism which had failed. Christopher Dawson stated that the disruption of Western capitalism by World War I had weakened the middle class which had founded and supported parliamentary democ­ racy. He thought Mussolini's effort to establish a corporative struc­ ture as an alternative to capitalism and Communism a constructive approach, one close to the papal social ideals, iiut Dawson was dis­ turbed by the authoritarianism, violence and militarism of the regime, all of which violated Catholic principles and threatened to vitiate 239 Fascism's constructive aspects. He did not see Britain turning to dictatorship unless a military or economic collapse occurred, but

Dawson warned that the sole cure for dictatorship was to reduce the pressures which would drive people to it,^4®

Even among non-Catholic Englishmen, there was a measure of re­ spect for Italian Fascism's internal policies in the years before the

Ethiopian w a r . ^4^ Douglas Jerrold and Gilbert Chesterton supported

Mussolini, but their praise was qualified and they never considered

^®®Heenan, Cardinal Hinsley, p. 100. 239 Christopher Dawson, "The Church and the Dictators," Catholic Times (London), 1:27 April 1934, p. 9; 11:4 May, p. 9; 111:11 May, p. 4; IV;18 May, p. 9; C. Dawson, "Fascism and the Corporative State," Catholic Herald (London, 3 Aug. 1935, p. 4.

240i,^e Origin of Fascism and Other Modern Dictatorships," The Tablet, 20 April 1935, p. 509. 241 Lunn, "Catholics of Great Britain," p. 83; P. G. Edwards, "The Foreign Office and Fascism, 1924-1929," Journal of Contemporary History v. 2, p. 161; Norling, "Mirror of Illusion," pp. 192-5, 226, 350; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 85. 90 242 themselves fascists. Some British Catholics were grateful to

Mussolini for having gotten rid of a regime that had been viewed by many Catholics with intense dislike, and for settling that regime's quarrel with the papacy by the 1929 Lateran Treaty and Concordat.

Other Catholics were impressed by the apparent similarity between

Fascism and papal corporatism. Still others feared that Mussolini's 243 fall might usher in socialism, Communism, or anarchy. Many Catho­ lics were distressed by being accused of pro-Fascist sympathies. Part of the blame for this pro-totalitarianism was due to the Vatican, whose fear of Bolshevism made the Papacy favor a strong anti-Communist

r e g i m e . ^44 Mother Loughran in her study declares that the Vatican only wanted a stable government established that would allow the free prac­ tice of religion; there was no intention to justify dictatorial rule.

But she admits that this misunderstanding was widespread and was a major factor in distorting the efforts of English Catholics to under- 245 stand papal teaching.

It is interesting, therefore, that as early as 1933-34, detailed criticism of Fascist theory began to appear in the English Catholic press. Blackfriars conducted an extended debate on the problem. A

^4^Loughran, "Catholics in England," p. 549.

^4^. B u m s interview, 26 May 1976; Wynn interview, 26 May 1976; Wall interview, 31 May 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976; Canon F. H. Drinkwater letter to author, 16 June 1976; Rev. Edward Quinn, letter to author, 10 June 1976; Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 659-60, 448.

244Michael De La Bedoyere, Christian Crisis (New York; MacMillan, 1942), p. 85; see above, pp. 15-18; William Teeling, The Pope in Pol­ itics (London; Lovat Dickenson, 1937), pp. 280-1.

2^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 641-2. 91

Dominican reviewer favorably greeted John Strachey's The Menace of 246 Fascism which termed Fascism a fraud to exploit the Italian worker.

In his first appearance, under his pseudonym "Penguin," Father Victor

White, O.P., cited an article in the October 1933 Hochland which de­ clared an irreconcilable opposition existed between Catholicism and 247 Fascism's state-worship, blind obedience and Machiavellianism.

An article by Mrs. V. M. Crawford sharply distinguished the papal corporate idea from the Fascist "corporative State" in Italy,

Austria, and Germany. By his criticism of the "'excessively bureau­ cratic and political character'" of the structures which had been set up, Pius XI, said Mrs. Crawford;

condemns the very characteristics that distinguished the Fascist, and the Nazi conception of the Corporative State from that recognized by the Catholic-social school, which was non-politicg^g and essentially based on free and autonomous vocational groups.

But the pithiest criticism of all those Catholics who criticized

Mussolini was offered by F. H. Drinkwater; Mussolini was a "gangster" who rose to power by assassination, violence, and war (Ethiopia). What­ ever good came out of those means, he concluded, "God doesn't want 249 things done like that'."

Other articles took a favorable view of Fascism but it becomes evident that, compared with articles criticizing it, the former were

^^^Aelfric Manson, O.P., Blackfriars, Sept. 1933, pp. 794-5.

^47penguin, Blackfriars, Jan. 1934, pp. 213-14; March 1934, p. Ill; May 1935, pp. 377-9.

O A Q Crawford, "The Corporative Order," Blackfriars, Sept. 1933, pp. 630-33.

^4^Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976; "Money Free From Usury," Blackfriars, June 1935, p. 451. 92 recommending an ideological corporatism that bore little resemblance to actual fact while the latter were discussing the phenomenon as it 250 actually existed in Italy. Blackfriars itself remained consistent in its defense of democracy and social reform. This position was succinctly put by its editor, Bede Jarrett, O.P., in 1933: "Every

Catholic must set himself actively to defend personal liberty in the state, the recognition of the family as the true unit of society, and 251 a wider distribution of private property."

The greater number of Catholic publications took a stand similar to Blackfriars', opposing Fascism and favoring democracy while calling 252 for social and political reform to combat the Depression. Don Luigi

Sturzo, former head of the Italian Parti Populare and now living in exile in England, recommended a voluntary economic corporatism retaining private initiative and competition to coexist alongside parliamentary 253 government. Others as different as S. J. Gosling and Douglas Jerrold

M. D. Scott, "One Way Out," Blackfriars, pp. 1033-38; Herbert Shane, "Fascism and Religion," Blackfriars, Jan. 1934, pp. 49-52.

^^^June 1933, pp. 6-7; Blackfriars, Aug. 1933, p. 641; J. F. T. Prince, "In Search of Democracy," Blackfriars, Dec. 1933, pp. 1006-11.

^^^Stanley D. James, "Fascism and Christian Economics," The Month, March 1933, pp. 218-224; Oct. 1934, pp. 292-3; Colosseum, Sept. 1934, p. ii; J. Keating, "Democracy Under a Cloud," The Month, Oct. 1933, pp. 346-53; The Sower, Jan.-March 1934, pp. 1-2; F. R. Hoare, "The Church's Right to Intervene in Politics," Clergy Review. Feb. 1933, pp. 115-24; March, pp. 182-92; Richard Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, Sept. 1933; "Rome," Dec. 1933, pp. 510-11; "Rome," March 1934, p. 265; C. F. Melville, "Austria's Catholic Future," April 1934, p. 360; Colosseum, Sept. 1934, pp. 7-8.

^S^Luigi Sturzo, "The Crisis of Democracy," The Dublin Review Jan. 1935, pp. 22-33. 93

recommended distributism as a partial answer at least.Most com­

plimentary to Mussolini's Fascism were The Tablet, Clergy Review's

Richard Smith (briefly), and The English Review, but only the letter's

editor, Douglas Jerrold, really favored the adoption of a Fascist-style 255 solution in England.

Differences among Catholic writers carried over to Italian

foreign policy. The Tablet praised Mussolini's diplomacy as contrib­

uting to peace, though Oldmeadow and Joseph Keating were disturbed by

his militaristic speeches.Clergy Review dismissed the bellicose

talk as a device to build local pride, and gave Italy credit for saving 257 Austria's independence at the time of the Dollfuss murder.

It was hoped that Italy would serve as the keystone of a bloc,

not only against a resurgent Germany, but also against Communist Russia

as well. Fear of the Soviet Union was present in England throughout

^Hilaire Belloc, "The Restoration of Property," The English Review, July 1933; "Current Comments," Aug. 1933, pp. 118-20; J. D. C. rev. of Flee to the Fields in The Sower, July-Sept. 1934, pp. 186-7; Editorial The Month, Jan. 1933, p. 9; Anthony Crossley (Cons., Lanca­ shire), HÇ 175 (1933): 665-7. 255 Sir George Shee, "Mussolini and Hitler: A Parallel and a Con­ trast," 8 Sept. 1934, pp. 295-7; 15 Sept., pp. 327-8; The Tablet, 22 July 1933, p. 98; 30 Sept., p. 418; 25 Nov., p. 706; 30 Dec., p. 890; 25 Aug. 1934, pp. 226-7; R. Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, May 1933, pp. 426-9; "Rome," Jan. 1934, p. 80; The Tablet, 22 July 1933, p. 98; "Current Comments," The English Review. Dec. 1933, p. 569; Hilaire Belloc, "The Crown and the Breakdown of Parliament," Feb. 1934, pp. 145-52.

^^^The Tablet, 24 March 1934, p. 354; 1 Sept., p. 260; The Month, Oct. 1934, pp. 292-3; Dec. 1934, p. 488.

^^^R. Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, May 1933, pp. 426-9; C. F. Melville, "Dr. Dollfuss and Mgr. Seipel," The Dublin Review, Oct. 1934, p. 172; R. Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, Nov. 1934, p. 423. 94

the era. But until the Spanish Civil War, some English Catholics tried

at least to understand Communism. Articles in Blackfriars and The

Dublin Review warned that poverty caused Communism and that positive measures to help the poor based on Catholic social principles were 258 necessary if Communism were to be defeated. When the Soviet Union moved to enter the League in 1934, The Month approved her admission. 259 Perhaps, wrote Keating, she might be subjected to some good influences.

The Clergy Review's Rome correspondent. Smith, said flatly that the

Pope would not hesitate to negotiate with Russia if it would help stop

persecution there.

On the other hand, there were those implacable foes of all deal­

ings with Russia, such as The Tablet, Catholic Truth and Douglas

Jerrold. A comment of Oldmeadow's typifies this group's attitude:

"Better a break with Moscow for minor reasons than no break at all."^^^

Even the usually judicious Christopher Dawson wrote that, in Russia,

Blackfriars, Feb. 1933, p. 86; See Joseph Clayton, "Anti- Communism is Not Enough," Jan. 1933, pp. 2309; J. F. T. Prince, "The Necessity of Revolution," Sept. 1933, pp. 758-61; Henry Cardinal Man­ ning, The Dignity and Rights of Labour, Catholic Truth, Sept.-Oct. 1934, p. 177; A. J. McIntyre, rev. of the work in The Sower, July-Sept. 1934, pp. 182-3; Review of Bolshevism: Theory and Practice, by Waldemar Gurian, in The Dublin Review. Jan. 1933, pp. 134-6.

ZS^The Month. Sept. 1934, p. 198; Oct. 1934, pp. 189-90.

^^^"Rome," Clergy Review, Jan. 1934, p. 8.

ZGlihe Tablet. 8 April 1933, p. 430; 23 Sept., p. 386; 1 Dec. 1934, p. 682; 22 July 1933, p. 98; 30 Sept., p. 418; 20 May, 1934, p. 650; G. M. Godden, "Moscow and Anti-War," The Dublin Review. Oct. 1934, pp. 191-204; The Tablet, 2 Sept. 1934, pp. 357-9; Catholic Truth, July-Aug. 1933, pp. 121-2; "Current Comments," The English Review, Sept. 1933, pp. 225-6; Oct. 1934, pp. 393-4. 95

"...the Kingdom of Antichrist has acquired political f o r m . .."^62 Fear of Communism did much to increase the tolerance of some Catholics to 263 the Nazi regime.

In the House of Lords, Earl Rudolf Feilding of Denbigh declared that the famine then occurring in Russia was "the deliberate policy of that bloodthirsty and callous system..In the Commons, Nicholas

Grattan-Doyle (Cons., N. Newcastle) objected to the purchase of timber produced by Russian prison labor, and he joined John Potter (Cons.,

Eccles) in protesting the arrest in Russia of several British citi- 265 zens.

The need for a new European settlement to replace that of the

Peace of Paris was much on the minds of English Catholic commentators in the 1930s. "If peace is to be assured," wrote a Blackfriars contrib­ utor, "the treaties must be revised.The Month was the most in­ sistent of those pressing for a new settlement. Distaste for the Nazi regime did not alter the need to render justice to Germany, said

Keating. "Versailles was not a just but a vindictive settlement, im­ posed by force on a temporarily beaten foe, and needing force for its

262"^e church and the Dictators," Catholic Times, II; 4 May 1934, p. 9.

^^^H. Burns interview, 26 May 1976; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976; E. Quinn letter to author, 10 June 1976.

2^^HL 93 (1934): 1112-4.

265h c 278 (1933): 511; (275) 1943-4.

^^^J. P. Kirwan, "Peace and Disarmament," Blackfriars, Nov. 1934, p. 730; Jacobin, "Notes on the Month," April 1933, p. 246. 96 267 continued maintenance." The Tablet was skeptical. Give Germany the

Saar and Austria, predicted Oldmeadow, and she would ask for Schleswig, the Low Countries and Strasbourg. Then Britain "would bitterly repent having put her money on a horse with Selfishness for sire and, for dam.

Folly."268

Throughout the 1920s, a rising chorus of pacifist voices had called for disarmament. In the first two years of the Nazi regime, only Count Michael De La Bedoyere, the editor of the Catholic Herald,

Father S. J. Gosling, editor of The Sower, a World War I chaplain who had been at the worst of the Battle of the Somme, and Blackfriars held 269 to a position against the use of force to restrain aggression. By the end of 1934, the rest of the English Catholic press had reluctantly come around to the position that, as a last resort, military measures might be necessary to stop aggression, but only The Tablet and The 270 English Review called for immediate rearmament. Finally, Oldmeadow

267ii^ar Clouds Again," The Month, April 1935, pp. 289-90; empha­ sis Keating's; "Back to Potsdam," The Month, April 1933, p. 295; Aug., pp. 104-5; Dec., p. 486; Richard Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, June 1933, pp. 513-14; July, pp. 79-80.

268xhe Tablet. 1 Sept. 1934, pp. 257-61; 4 Nov. 1933, p. 489.

28^Michael De La Bedoyere, "Military Service or Military Slavery," Blackfriars, May 1933, pp. 346-53; Jacobin, "Remarks," April 1934, p. 328; The Sower, Jan.-March 1934, p. 7; July-Sept. 1934, p. 132.

^^^The Month, July 1933, pp. 5-6; Oct., pp. 294-5; Dec., pp. 481- 3; Feb. 1934, pp. 99-100; The Tablet, 22 July 1933, pp. 101-2; 14 Oct., p. 490, 494; 21 April 1934, p. 490; "Current Comments," The English Review, Aug. 1933, pp. 118-20; Nov., pp. 449-452; The Month, Feb. 1934, p. 98; April, p. 292; Aug., p. 101; Dec., p. 484; Review of Ethics of Peace and War by H. Gigon in Catholic Truth, May-June 1935, pp. 117-118; J. R. Kirwin, "Peace and Disarmament," Blackfriars, Nov. 1934, pp. 730- 1; K. I. T., rev. of Ethics of Peace and War by H. Gigon in Downside Review, April 1935, pp. 222-3 (hereafter referred to as Downside); 97 271 and Chesterton deplored pacifism as an abdication of responsibility.

Catholics in Parliament reflected the growing concern over

Germany and the various approaches that were taken to cope with it.

David Logan (Lab., Liverpool) criticized inflammatory language in the 272 press, while Denis Hanley (Cons., Deptford) expressed concern over 273 indiscriminate aerial bombardment. Nicholas Grattan-Doyle (Cons.,

N. Newcastle) asked about rumors of German research into germ-war-

f a r e ,27^ and Patrick Hannon (Cons., Birmingham) urged an immediate 275 international conference to settle outstanding disputes with Germany.

Col. James Baldwin-Webb (Cons., Shropshire), Sir Reginald Banks (Cons.,

Wiltshire) and Earl Jeffrey Amherst called for immediate steps to be

taken to r e a r m . 2^^

But while the Nazi programs had led to some uneasiness over the

appeasement policy, the 1934 by-elections indicated that the general

British public was still firmly committed to that policy, and, in spite 277 of rising doubts, so were the English Catholics.

Richard Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, Nov. 1934, p. 424; The Month, Nov. 1934, p. 392; "Rome," Clergy Review, Aug. 1934, p. 157; Hilaire Belloc, Letters from Hilaire Belloc, ed. Robert Speaight (London: Hollis and Carter, 1958), p. 240.

271see The Tablet, 28 Oct. 1933, pp. 557-8; 20 Jan. 1934, p. 65; 14 July, p. 43, criticizing the "Oxford oath"; 29 Sept. 1934, pp. 389- 90; Ward, GKC, pp. 634-5; Hollis, Mind, pp. 17-19.

272h c 275 (1933): 600-2. 273^^ 275 (1934): 1831-2.

291 (1934): 1902-3. 275^^ g91 (1934): 4-5.

27GHÇ 275 (1933): 1447-9; 281 (1933): 118-22; 292 (1934): 2413-18; HL 93 (1934): 214-15.

^^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 139; History of Times, p. 889. 98

While the debate over the appropriateness of a Fascist solution to Britain's problems was under way in Catholic circles. Sir Oswald

Mosley was trying to court Catholic support for his own effort to 278 establish Fascism in England, the British Union of Fascists (B.U.F.).

Mosley claimed Mussolini as his inspiration and, in his sole criticism 279 of Hitler, deplored Nazi anti-Catholicism. His effort had some

success among the poorer working classes and, in 1935, Catholics were

"perhaps slightly overrepresented" in the B.U.F., making up 12% of its officials.280

The Catholic press was deeply suspicious of the B.U.F., espec­ ially its anti-Semitism, its lauding of violence and its implied sub- 281 ordination of religion to politics. S. J. Gosling, the staunchly democratic editor of The Sower, spoke for many Catholics when he declared: "For ourselves, we nail our colours to the mast: we are anti-

Fascist. With many--perhaps most--of Fascism's aims we are in sympathy; 282 with its methods. No." Among prominent Catholics, Mosley was

^78(jolin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (New York: St. Martin's 1936), p. 141.

27^Ibid.; Oswald Mosley, My Life (New Rochelle, N. Y . : Arlington, 1968), pp. 330-4.

280cross, Fascists in Britain, p. 141.

28^4 Nov. 1933, 585-6; 12 May 1934, p. 586; "Current Comments," English Review, Jan. 1934, p. 11; May, pp. 527-8; HÇ 280 (1933): 837; The Month, March 1934, p. 197; The Month, "Shirts," April 1934, pp. 296-7; Rev. of Oswald Mosley and British Fascism by James Drennan, May 1934, p. 375; C. Dawson, "The Church and the Dictators," Catholic Times (London) IV, 18 May 1934, p. 9.

^82i'b ,u .F." April-June 1934, pp. 74-5. 99

supported by Roy Campbell, a romantic, politically reactionary poet,

and Douglas J e r r o l d . jerrold declared that Mosley's program de­

served a hearing, though he admitted that the B.U.F.'s ideas were too 284 vague to entrust it with power at that time.

The outbreak of violence at Olympia Hall on 2 July 1934 closed

the argument for the vast majority of Catholics. "A private army was

at Olympia," stormed Oldmeadow, "and private armies are not to be 28S tolerated in this country..." Blackfriars, The Sower, and The

Month condemned what they saw to be an effort to turn the government 286 into a tyranny and the citizenry into slaves. "The glory in a State,"

said Joseph Keating, "rests in the fact that its members are citizens, not subjects, giving loyal obedience to a Constitution which exists for 287 their interests and respects their inalienable rights." In Parlia­ ment, Lt. Commander Robert Tattan Bower (Cons., Yorkshire) and David

Logan (Lab., Scotland div. of Liverpool), joined J. J. Tinker (Lab.,

Lancashire) in attacking Mosley and the B.U.F.^®®

Jerrold continued to defend Mosley, quoting a speech by him

^88pobert Skipelsky, Oswald Mosley (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), pp. 346-7.

284"current Comments," The English Review, Jan. 1934, p. 11; May, pp. 527-8; Edward P. Doran, M.P., HC 280 (1933): 837.

285"six and Six Make Twelve," The Tablet, 16 June 1934, pp. 49- 50; 23 June 1934, p. 778; 8 June 1935, p. 714.

286"yideant Consules," June 1934, pp. 385-94; "Fascism in the Schools," The Sower, Jan.-Mar. 1935, pp. 35-8.

Month, June 1934, p. 490; "Towards an Absolute State," July 1934, pp. 63-70.

288h c 288 (1934): 14; 290 (1934): 2022-5; 292 (1934): 1302. 100 pledging to seek power only by the ballot. But in all this, he stood 289 almost alone. The overwhelming reaction of the Catholic press and parliamentarians to the B.U.F. was an intense distaste and a profound mistrust. Olympia caused a widespread revulsion against the B.U.F., 290 and thereafter it went into rapid decline.

Hard pressed though they were by political, social, and economic crises, the greatest part of English Catholic opinion rejected the

Fascist solution to English problems, preferring to hang on to democ­ racy if at all possible. Only Douglas Jerrold, disillusioned with the modern "sham" of democracy, dared to go so far as to accept the idea of eventual dictatorship with equanimity, but his was a rather isolated if eloquent voice in the Catholic camp.

By the end of the second year of Hitler's rule, the attitudes were rapidly forming that would determine the thoughts and actions of the next five years. The British government felt little inclined to engage in continental commitments, partly from its own reluctance and partly from the judgment that the British public, in its anti-war frame of mind, was opposed to such commitments.

But the cabinet records show that the government was well aware

that Germany was already rearming in clear violation of the Versailles

Treaty and that the Nazi government, in matters like the putsch against

Dollfuss, was beginning to take alarming initiatives in foreign policy.

289"current Comments," The English Review, July 1934, pp. 7-12; HC 289 (1934): 740; 290 (1934): 1693-4.

2 ^^. George, Warped Vision, pp. 127-8. 101

The cabinet's public response, however, remained basically one of

silence.

Here was a contradiction. It is a basic duty of a responsible

democratic government to inform its citizens of threats to its security

and, fortified by this educated public opinion, to prepare to meet those

threats. MacDonald had called for a policy of watchfulness until the

evidence of German rearmament should become clear. When that situation

arrived, it would presumably be time to sound the alarm and take action

to prevent the danger from becoming acute. Given the aversion of the

British public to substantial rearmament, this approach had something

to recommend it provided the resolve existed to take action when the

time came. Such resolve, coupled with the already-existing willingness

to negotiate, might either have averted a revisionist war launched by

Hitler or reduced its magnitude when it came. The next three years

tested whether or not the British government possessed that resolve.

By the end of 1934, reaction by the British Catholic press to

the Nazi phenomenon was also beginning to take shape. The attempt to

be tolerant of the new Germany in the expectation that the regime's

initial excesses would soon be modified was quickly ended as Nazi con­

solidation proceeded with increasing speed and violence. Feelings

aroused by attacks on the Catholic Church and the Jews were raised to

a peak by the spectacles of the "Night of the Long Knives" in June 1934,

and the Dollfuss murder. Still, most English Catholics agreed that the

only lasting solution to the problem of European unrest was to revise

those post-war treaties and attitudes which, it was almost universally

believed, had produced Hitler. Perhaps, then, an appeased Germany 102 might take her stand with the rest of Europe in opposing that Bolshevik menace which still seemed to loom as the greatest threat to world peace. Until that day arrived, English Catholics hoped that Italy, supported by England, would remain the keystone of a European bloc against dangers from both Berlin and Moscow. But, in spite of the ad­ miration of and hopes placed in Mussolini as an Italian and a European statesman, few English Catholics saw Fascism as providing an answer to their own domestic problems.

Examination of the British Catholic press for 1933-1934 enables one to begin to explain the positions of some of the papers and indi­ viduals helping to make Catholic opinion. Blackfriars, in its debate on Fascism, exhibited a typical open-mindedness, and it. The Month,

The Sower, The Dublin Review and Christopher Dawson were lining up in the forefront of those defending democracy from its detractors. C. F.

Melville of Clergy Review was in line with this group, while his col­ league Richard Smith took a somewhat more pro-authoritarian line.

Ernest Oldmeadow's Tablet stood for a form of 19th century liberal democracy as shown by his mild disillusionment with modern mass democ­ racy and his utter revulsion at any assault on individual rights.

Chesterton, Belloc, and Bernard Wall's Colosseum were fairly close to this view, but Belloc's sympathies for authoritarianism were much more pronounced than either Oldmeadow's or Chesterton's. Far to the right was Douglas Jerrold, in revolt against democracy, yearning for authority, often the sole apologist for Germany. Finally, of those Catholics in

Parliament in 1933-34, only Edward Doran's anti-Semitic voice was raised in support of Nazi Germany and Fascism. The varied reactions of the different Catholic editors and writers present an interesting 103 example of how differences in psychological, social and political orientation can, in spite of an identity of religious beliefs, produce

quite different perceptions of a particular set of external phenomena

such as the theory and practice of Nazism and Fascism.

That Germany was a growing menace was recognized as early as

1934 by the English Catholics, But, together with the rest of their

countrymen and the British government, English Catholics refused to

face the necessary conclusions of their thinking until it was almost

too late. Still, in 1934, the situation seemed stable. Italy stood with France and Britain against German adventures; Communism remained

confined to Russia. The next two years wrecked that stability and

threw Europe into the crucible. CHAPTER III

DISRUPTION AND DISARRAY

The years 1935-1937 were marked by three great crises: the

Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the German remilitarization of the Rhine­ land, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The policy of appease­ ment with which the British government finally met each of these crises was well-intentioned but unwise and irresolute. Furthermore, the govenunent's already noted tendency to consider its continental commit­ ments a set of tiresome responsibilities to be met with the least ex­ ertion possible, indicates an attitude in these matters on the cabinet's part which was perilously close to indolence.

At the beginning of the period, the strength and prestige of

Britain and France was sufficient, had it been employed with determin­ ation, to prevent armed aggression by Italy and Germany or to insure that, if it did come to a fight, any attempt at aggression would be defeated. By the end of 1937, the prestige of the Western powers had suffered repeated blows while the military power and reputation of the dictator states had been allowed to grow to a point where they could mount even bolder challenges to the power of Britain and France. The foreign policy errors of the Western states in these three years led directly to the disasters of 1938-1939: the Anschluss, Munich, Prague, and the outbreak of the Second World War.

The British public continued to generally support the govem-

104 105 merit's policy throughout these three years. The one major exception was the Spanish Civil War, where the fierce ideological passions aroused by that struggle made many Englishmen call for a more benevolent atti­ tude on their government's part to the Spanish Republic. Considerably fewer voices were raised in favor of Franco, but English Catholics were conspicuous among these.

While the Catholics of Great Britain were noticeably involved in their own government's efforts to appease the dictators, they also had a special interest in the continuously frustrated efforts of the

Catholic Church in Germany to reach a modus vivendi with the Nazis.

Any chance that this exposure to two discouraging efforts at appease­ ment would make the English Catholics see the futility of the effort sooner than others was wrecked by the Spanish Civil War. The danger of a Communist take-over that seemed to loom there made many Catholics even more eager than their compatriots to accommodate the self-pro­ claimed anti-Communist champions of Italy and Germany. Other Catholics opposed the positions of their co-religionists and a debate of remarkable bitterness divided Catholics from each other, reflecting,

in a somewhat exaggerated fashion, the divisions that wracked British

society as a whole. Britain entered the fateful year of 1938 with deep divisions in its social fabric, divisions that were not healed until

Prague or even later, and the British government bore a share of responsibility for that, too.

By 1935, Germany was emerging as the main problem for British

foreign policy. In spite of the brutalities of the Nazi regime, most 106

of the British people thought Russia was definitely worse.^ In fact,

they were right at the time. Not until the war began did Nazi atroci- 2 ties outstrip those of the Soviets. For this reason, Nazi anti-Com- munism made a strong impact in Great Britain and proved to be one of

the major justifications for the appeasement policy, even among those 3 who otherwise deplored the Nazi regime.

The general conviction of the British government and people was

that judicious removal of Germany's grievances over the settlement of

1919 would assuage her belligerence and make her settle down.^ Brit­

ain's proper role, as seen by her political leaders, would be that of

mediator between the Germans and the French, whose insistence on main­

taining the Versailles settlement the British saw as a major obstruction

to peace.^ Unfortunately, this policy of appeasement was pursued in the

face of mounting evidence that it would not work. But, desperately

hoping for the best, British statesmen in charge refused, in whole or in

part, to see what was going on.^

Hledlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 136, 177, 341; Taylor, English History, p. 416; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 590.

^Sontag, Broken World, pp. 154-5, 258-60; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976. 3 Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 143; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 323-4; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 15; Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, p. 120.

^att. Personalities and Policies, p. 118.

^Charles Bloch, "Great Britain, German Rearmament and the Naval Agreement of 1935," in European Diplomacy Between Two Wars ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 126-7 (hereafter referred to as "Naval Agreement").

^Sontag, Broken World, p. 270; Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 190. 107

In January 1935, formidable barriers to German expansion existed on all sides. Italy stood in support of Austria, blocking Germany on the south. To the east, Poland and Czechoslovakia counted on their alliance with France which Czechoslovakia augmented by powerful forti­ fications along her mountain border. In the west, the Rhineland lay defenseless before a possible French invasion. Finally, Germany lacked the arms requisite to fight.

The first barrier fell when, in March 1935, Hitler announced that

Germany would undertake to build an army of 36 divisions and an air force, both in violation of the Versailles Treaty. In reply, Britain,

France, and Italy formed the Stresa Front in April, re-affirming their commitments under the Locarno treaties. The following month, France signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union and sponsored one between Russia and Czechoslovakia. The results of the "Peace Ballot," a British public opinion poll which was concluded in June, seemed to many, including the British Catholic press, to provide popular support for measures of collective defense through the League of Nations.^

Germany seemed more isolated than ever.

The discussions in the British cabinet immediately prior to the

Stresa meeting seem to indicate that there were few illusions as to the dangers posed by the Nazis. The ministers discussed plans to make the RAF equal to the Luftwaffe, declared an independent Austria to be a British interest, agreed on the necessity of keeping in tandem with

^Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 245; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 284-6; Medlicott, Contemporary England, p. 341; B. B. Gil­ bert, Britain Since 1918, p. 91; Blackfriars, April 1935, p. 140; The Month, March 1935, pp. 201-2; The Tablet, 6 July 1935, p. 1. 108

France and Italy in defense of the Locarno Treaty, and, while wishing to keep the door open to negotiations with Hitler, recognized that

"... there was much evidence to show that Germany could not be brought O to an acceptable agreement." However, the cabinet members agreed that

British public opinion might wish to overlook a minor violation by

Germany of the demilitarized status of the Rhineland as opposed to

"a major infraction like the mobilization of large forces in the de- 9 militarized zone." Here, in the midst of so many resolute words, is evidence of that essential weakness in British policy which Hitler was able to exploit so effectively. This weakness was increased by the ambiguous results of the Peace Ballot. The government was more im­ pressed by the 4,700,000 who abstained from or opposed military sanc­ tions to restrain aggression than the 6,700,000 who were in favor of . 10 such measures.

Thus, the Stresa front was less solid than it seemed. On 18

June, the British, anxious to take some action that might serve to limit arms expenditures, created the first breach in it by concluding a naval agreement proposed by Germany which permitted her to expand her fleet to 35 percent of that of the British. The French, who had not been consulted, were furious with the British. By undertaking the agreement, London had accepted that German rearmament which had been

8cAB 23/81: 20 (35) 1; 21 (35) 1. *Ibid.

lOgir Charles A. Petrie, Twenty Years Armistice— And After (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1940), pp. 145-6; see M. A. Wathen, Policy of England and France Towards the Anschluss, pp. 67-8; Hadley, Munich, p. 24; Durant, "Public Opinion Polls and Foreign Policy," p. 157. 109 condemned by all the Stresa parties.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was only a crack in the Stresa front; the Ethiopian crisis destroyed it altogether. Mussolini, who had been planning the conquest since 1933, expected the subject to be broached at the Stresa meeting. French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval seems to have given Mussolini verbal approval for some action against

Ethiopia in order to secure Italy for a coalition against German ex­ pansion.^^ Partly out of embarrassment and partly because MacDonald's 13 infirmities made him unable to deal with this delicate matter the

British delegation resorted to silence, which Mussolini interpreted as 14 tacit consent.

But as the Italian campaign against Ethiopia was preparing in earnest during the summer months, British public opinion demanded that the government take some action short of war to defend Ethiopia as a

League member.

The British government was anxious to accomplish three objectives: first, to maintain good relations and the Stresa Front with Italy; second, to support the principle of peaceful settlements through the

League, "the avowed policy of His Majesty's Government;” and, third.

Sontag, Broken World, p. 287; Alfred Cobban, A History of M o d e m France, 3 vols. (Hammondsworth, Middlesex, England; Penguin Books, 1965), 3; 165.

^%eiling. Life of Neville Chamberlain, pp. 257, 265-7; North- edge. Troubled Giant, p. 411.

^^Robert Vansittart told Douglas Woodruff that at Stresa he had to tie MacDonald's tie every morning. Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

^^Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, pp. 302-3; Medlicott, Contemporary Eng­ land, p. 342; Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 411-12; Felling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 257; B. B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 92 110 to comply with the public's w^ish to avoid major rearmament. The government was determined to run no risk, especially since the burden of a war on Italy seemed likely to fall most heavily on an ill-prepared 16 Great Britain and the Dominions were not eager to help. Of all the items on the proposed embargo list, oil was the only critical one, and

Laval advised Baldwin that placing oil on the list must lead to a war with Italy in which France could not guarantee to support Britain.

The British government was determined to avoid such a war which, it was feared, might result in a sudden German coup aimed God-knew-where, and 18 a possible Communist revolution in Italy.

The "answer" decided on was disastrous. Baldwin pledged his government to defense of the League and promised that no great rearma­ ment program would be undertaken. This promise, which appealed to pacifists and those favoring the League, proved successful with the 19 voters in that election year of 1935.

Unfortunately, the diplomacy to support these intentions was a total failure. Mussolini refused all efforts of the British to arrange

CAB 23/81; 28 (35) 9; Taylor, Origins. p. 89; Thompson, Eng­ land in the Twentieth Century, p. 158; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 287, 289.

^6pREM 1/95 Cab. memo of 12 Dec. 1935; 1/97 Memo., discussion, A. Eden and Dominion reps., 17 Sept. 1935.

^^Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 273.

^^Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 416-17, 249; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 289-90.

^%avighurst. Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 245-50; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 542-6; Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 103; Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London; Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), pp. 193-4. Ill

a compromise and invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. Britain

supported the League's imposition of economic sanctions on Italy, but

the British refused to add oil to the embargo list, thereby guaranteeing

an Italian victory. Italy's response to this British position was not gratitude but contempt for a state which seemed unable to decide be- 21 tween resistance and concession.

As the war fever mounted in Italy in the summer of 1935, the

Pope began to speak out against the dangers and injustices of war.

These efforts only served to irritate Mussolini, who rebuffed all Vati- 22 can representations on behalf of keeping the peace. The English

Catholic press shared the general disbelief that the dispute would end 23 in war. But by mid-year, with the prospect of war imminent. Catholic writers began castigating Mussolini for his threats against Ethiopia

and calling for defense of the L e a g u e . Even Douglas Jerrold, who had defended Mussolini's claims, wrote, just prior to the outbreak, that

2°CAB/23/82: 35 (35) 2; 40 (35) 1.

2^Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 273; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 546, 557.

OO Francois Charles-Roux, Huit ans au Vatican (Paris: Flammarion, 1947), pp. 134-6; Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1935, p. 330. A frequently repeated papal phrase of this time, "Scatter the nations that want war," was taken from Psalm 67, v. 30; in the next verse appear the words: "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God."

^^"Rome," Clergy Review, Jan. 1935, pp. 76-8; Feb., p. 165; The Month, Feb. 1935, p. 99.

2^The Month, July 1935, pp. 5-6; Aug., pp. 97-101; Sept. pp. 193- 4; The Tablet, 2 March 1935, p. 262; 20 April, p. 493; 15 June, p. 756; 13 July, p. 34; 20 July, p. 64; 27 July, pp. 98-9; 3 Aug., p. 133; 10 Aug., p. 165; 24 Aug., pp. 225, 276; 14 Sept., p. 321; 21 Sept., pp. 354-6; Penguin, Blackfriars, Sept. 1935, pp. 698-9; Anthony Crossley, HC, 304 (1935): 870-73. 112 the proper method of settlement of Italy's demands was through the 25 League. There was even the suggestion that some relatively unused areas of the British Empire might be opened to Italian immigration and even jurisdiction. Only Clergy Review's correspondent in Rome, 27 Father Richard Smith, continued to defend Mussolini. Then, abruptly, all reports from him ceased until November 1936. It may have been due to Italian censorship, but it is possible that action may have been taken by the new Archbishop of Westminster, Arthur Hinsley.

Francis Cardinal Bourne died in January 1935 and, in April,

Hinsley succeeded him. Hinsley was a Yorkshireman of English and Irish 28 stock, an intelligent, bluff, affable, great-hearted man. The new archbishop was ecumenically-minded, in favor of lay responsibility, 29 and passionately concerned over social justice. Hinsley hated oppres­ sion and persecution of all kinds, and detested Hitler, Mussolini, and

Stalin, but he considered the first two more dangerous because they on were more subtle. Hinsley was rector of the English College in Rome

25"current Comments," The English Review, March 1935, p. 267; "Current Comments," July 1935, pp. 10-13; "What is Collective Security?" Sept. 1935, pp. 268-9.

28"The Last Hope of Liberty," The Month, Sept. 1935, p. 196; A. Hinsley, letter to The Times (London) printed in The Tablet, 7 Sept. 1935, p. 302; The Tablet, 31 Aug. 1935, pp. 212-13.

2^"Rome," Clergy Review, July 1935, pp. 71-3; Aug., p. 155. no Mathew, Catholicism in England, p. 262; Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 25-9.

2^Lunn, "Catholics of Great Britain," p. 85; Mathew, Catholicism in England, p. 268; Heenan, Cardinal Hinsley, pp. 165-72.

8®Mathew, Catholicism in England, pp. 264-5; Heenan, Cardinal Hinsley, p. 2. 113 during the 1920s. During his tenure there, groups of Fascist toughs frequently broke up meetings of the Catholic student organizations.

This naturally gave Hinsley a personal grievance against Mussolini.

The Xateran Treaty of 1929 ended such clashes, but Hinsley had been dispatched to the African missions as Apostolic Visitor (later promoted to Apostolic Delegate) the year before. He developed a warm love for the Africans and got along well with British colonial officials in 31 East Africa.

The Italian threat to Ethiopia aroused Hinsley's love for 32 Africans and antipathy for Fascism. But he generously suggested that

Italy might be peacefully granted rights within more sparsely settled 33 areas of the British Empire. It was not Italian colonialism per se but Italian violence which he was opposed to, thinking it immoral and unjust.• _ 34

When the war broke out, only The English Review, Hilaire Belloc 35 and Evelyn Waugh supported Mussolini. Gilbert Chesterton and the rest of the Catholic press condemned Italy and, except for Chesterton

8^Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Mathew, Catholicism in Eng­ land, p. 264; Biographical sketch. The Dublin Review, Oct. 1935, p. 4.

8^Mathew, Catholicism in England, pp. 264-7; A. Hinsley, "Abyssinia," The Dublin Review, Oct., 1935, pp. 187-209.

83gee above, p. 104, n. 26.

8^ollis interview, 10 June 1976; A. Hinsley, letter to The Times cited in The Tablet, 31 Aug. 1935, p. 225.

35iicurrent Comments," English Review, Oct. 1935, p. 391; Speaight, Belloc, p. 435; Bedoyere, Catholic Profiles, p. 131; The Tablet, 12 Oct. 1938, p. 451; Knightly, First Casualty, pp. 181, 185; Christopher Sykes, Evelyn Waugh (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 165-8. 114

and Bernard Wall, supported League s a n c t i o n s . pew Catholics in

Parliament spoke out on Ethiopia. Of the six who did, only Alfred

D envilie (Cons., Newcastle-on-Tyne) had any sympathy for Italy. The 37 rest supported the League and sanctions.

John McGovern was a Catholic M.P. from Glasgow. He was a polit­

ical maverick, one of four members of the Independent Labour Party in

Commons, warm-hearted, outspoken, articulate, feisty, and rigidly

honest. But McGovern's reputation for intelligence was not very high

and he was hampered by a rather rigidly socialistic outlook that 38 attributed too much to economic and ideological factors. He con­

demned the League as a sham, called Mussolini and Haile Selaisse two

tyrants and he declared that the Labor Party should refuse to fight in

a war that sanctions might provoke between the capitalist powers of

Britain and Italy.^9

Meanwhile, Britain and France were being subjected to increasing

8^ard, GKC. pp. 647-8; Blackfriars, Nov. 1935, pp. 803-5; Victor White, O.P., "The Case for Italy," Nov. 1935, pp. 807-10; J. P. Wordsworth, "Collective Security in St. Augustine," Clergy Review, Jan. 1936, pp. 22-30; Herbert Thurston, S.J., "Abyssinia's Devotion to Our Lady," The Dublin Review, Jan. 1936, pp. 29-41; The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1935, p. 179; Jan.-Mar. 1936, p. 6 ; Colosseum, Dec. 1935, pp. 281-9; The Month, Nov. 1935, pp. 388-91; Dec. pp. 482, 485; Jan. 1936, p. 1; Feb., p. 100; The Tablet, 12 Oct. 1935, pp. 449-53; 19 Oct., p. 490; 26 Oct., p. 521; 9 Nov., pp. 589-90; 14 Dec., pp. 772-3.

87h c 310 (1936): 2945; 311 (1936): 305; 313 (1936): 964-5; Lord Howard of Penrith, HL 98 (1935): 1167-73; Pierce C. Loftus (Cons., Suffolk), HC 305 (1935): 242-6; Edward L. Fleming (Cons., Manchester), 307 (1935): 207-9, 1897-99; J. J. Tinker, 311 (1936): 1786-9.

8®lgoe interview, 26 May 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976.

89r c 305 (1935): 90-100; 307 (1935): 236-7, 242-3; 309 (1936): 163-8; 311 (1936): 1709-10. 115 pressure from other League members to cut off Italy's access to oil.

Determined to avoid this, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval formulated a compromise by which it was hoped that Haile Selaisse could be compelled to cede vast tracts of Ethiopia to Italy as the price of peace. When the proposals were leaked to the press on 9 December 1935, they caused an explosion of indignation in Great Britain that compelled Baldwin to disavow the entire arrangement and to replace Hoare with the pro-League Anthony

Eden.^^ Mussolini's disgust was complete. He now began to reorient

Italian policy in a pro-German direction and agreed to allow increased

German influence in Austria. The journey to the Axis and the Anschluss had begun.Douglas Jerrold defended the Hoare-Laval proposals but the rest of the Catholic press condemned them as a disgraceful bribe to an aggressor.^2 unfortunately, Ethiopia failed to derive any practical benefit from this outburst of moral outrage. The Italian advance re­ sumed in February and the conquest of the country completed with the capture of Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936.

Embarrassed by the Italian invasion, the Baldwin government tried to charge that papal silence had been partly to blame for Mussolini's attack.This accusation was heatedly denied by the English Catholics.

^^Taylor, Origins, pp. 94-5; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 790-1.

^^Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 121-2, 133.

^^B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 74; Blackfriars, Jan. 1936, pp. 3-4; The Sower, Jan.-Mar. 1936, pp. 5-6; The Tablet, 21 Dec. 1935, pp. 809, 821; 28 Dec., p. 837; "Current Comments," The English Review, Jan. 1936, pp. 9-11.

^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," p. 663. 116

The Pope, they pointed out, had repeatedly condemned any resort to force to settle international disputes (to Mussolini's annoyance) from the moment war had first threatened. Hinsley seconded that argument and noted that while the Pope could speak on general moral principles he was bound (by the Lateran Treaty) to official neutrality in political disputes unless all parties to the conflict invited his participation.^^

The 1936 report of the British Minister to the Vatican supported this

Catholic defense of the Pope. While the papal policy was one "of care­ ful and strict neutrality," it read, "The fascists do not themselves dare to claim that the Pope favors their enterprise in Abyssinia, and 46 their silence is significant."

Before the issues of the Ethiopian war had been settled. Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland and civil war broke out in Spain. These events complicated the problem of what to do about Italy. Colosseum switched to a strongly pro-Italian position. Its editor, Bernard Wall, had grown increasingly irritated at what, to him, seemed to be the hypo­ critical refusal of the two largest colonial powers to allow Italy a modicum of empire.The Rhineland coup, he wrote, demonstrated the need to end sanctions before they drove Mussolini to Hitler and restore

^^The Tablet, 19 Oct. 1935, p. 494; The Month, Nov. 1935, pp. 385-6; rev. of Must War Come? by John Epstein in The Sower, Jan.-Mar. 1936, p. 48.

^^A. Hinsley, speech. The Tablet, 19 Oct. 1935, p. 500; Heenan, Cardinal Hinsley, pp. 55-61.

^^Anglo-Vatican Relations, XXXIII-iv; 1936, pp. 317-322.

^7^all interview, 30 May 1976, Wall, Headlong Into Change, p. 76. 117 the common front with Italy against German expansion.

Douglas Woodruff, the new editor of The Tablet^^ outlined the arguments which would become the major themes of conservative thinking on Italy in the next few years: (1) the League should at best be an adjunct and never a substitute for Britain's own foreign policy;

(2) Italy was justified in conquering Ethiopia; (3) therefore, no real quarrel existed between her and Britain; (4) and so the Stresa Front should be restored to bar the door to German and Russian adventures.

Blackfriars and The Month continued to condemn Italy. S. J. Gosling in The Sower was increasingly disgusted by the "political hysteria" of the pro-Italian apologists.

The weekly spectacle presented by our Catholic publicists in their scrambling efforts to adjust themselves to the kaleidoscopic changes of international politics is neither dignified nor edifying. Would it not be better to get hold of some Christian principles and stick to them, irrespective of what people do or do not do? ^

Finally, many lower-class Catholics regarded the quarrel with Italy with indifference due to a lingering feeling that it was a British matter 53 with which they as Irish were unconcerned.

In the Ethiopian crisis, the British government demonstrated that

48 Christopher Dawson agreed with Wall about sanctions, Scott interview, 8 June 1976; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 77-8; Colosseum, Dec. 1936, p. 251.

^^See below, p. 113.

^^The Tablet, 11 April 1936, p. 454; Douglas Woodruff, "The Abyssinian Record," 2 May 1936, pp. 596-7.

^^The Sower, April-June, 1936, pp. 64-5.

^^The Sower, July-Sept. 1936, pp. 115-6.

B u m s interview, 26 May 1976. 118 it was unwilling to honor a sworn commitment, namely to the League

Covenant. It then tried to compensate for this by casting itself in the role of a mediator in the dispute. However, if its mediation failed, Britain was unwilling to take action against Italy, and there­ fore its mediation was no real substitute for its tre ?,ty responsibili­ ties. The only thing achieved for certain was that the British govern­ ment had evaded its pledged word. It was a pattern that would be repeated later.

Had the British government stood up to Mussolini in the Ethi­ opian crisis and clearly demonstrated that aggression would not pay, or sacrificed Ethiopia as the price to keep the Stresa Front against

Hitler, all might have been well. What was indefensible was to make a pretense of both principle and practicality and then pursue neither.

In the midst of the imbroglio over Ethiopia, Hitler, on 7 March

1936, sent troops to reoccupy the Rhineland. The French would not march to stop this flagrant violation of the Locarno treaty without

CC British support, and that was not forthcoming. The British public, confused and frightened, condoned the action as rectification of one injustice of the Versailles treaty, and believed Hitler's promises of peace and friendship.

^^Hollis interview, 10 June 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Petrie, Twenty Years of Armistice--And After, pp. 149-50.

55john C. Caims, "March 7, 1936 Again: The View from Paris," in European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939, ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 174-82; Cobban, M o d e m France, 3: 168.

^^owat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 564; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 97; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 253. 119

The German coup had placed the British government in an uncom­ fortable position. France was pressing for action against Germany under the Locarno provisions, but British rearmament had hardly begun while the cabinet felt that public opinion opposed the use of force in the Rhineland. "All that was perfectly clear to the French govern­ ment- -and it seemed very unfriendly of them to put us in the present dilemma.The government's inclination to move from acting as a treaty guarantor to acting as a mediator was strengthened by the re­ fusal of South Africa and Australia to support a war over the Rhine-

CO land. And so the British government kept its importunate French ally at arm's length while proposing a number of compromise solutions to the crisis, including the suggestion that Germany declare she would not fortify the Rhineland. Hitler, naturally, refused them all, but he promised to formulate a compromise plan for "settling the problem of 59 the European continent for all timel" The government objected, but did nothing else.^^

The cabinet was relieved now that it seemed that Britain would not be compelled to automatically respond to further treaty violations.

S^CAB 23/83; 18 (36) 1; PREM 1/194 Memo of Foreign Affairs Committee of Commons, 12 March 1936.

^®PREM 1/194, telegram from P.M., S. Africa, 12 March 1936; telegram, P.M. Australia, 19 March 1936; Felling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 279.

^^CAB 23/83: 20 (36) 1; 21 (36) 6 ; 22 (36) 3; 24 (36) 1; 23/84: 31 (36) 5; 38 (36) 2; 41 (36) 4; PREM 1/194 letter of Sir John Simon to S. Baldwin, 25 March 1936.

GOpetrie, Twenty Years of Armistice— And After, p. 164. 120

Now there would be plenty of time to talk things over during a crisis.

"The situation, therefore, was an improvement on the Locarno Treaty.

In order not to spoil the chances for a negotiated settlement with

Hitler, it was decided not to tell the French that Hitler had refused

to forbear from fortifying the Rhineland. The ministers also de­

cided that they must begin to educate the British public that Germany had not been guiltless in the matter of the Rhineland.

In January, Anthony Eden had said that it was "vital to hasten

and complete our armaments.. Now the government took the first

steps towards that goal. But the same erroneous vision that had made

the British blame the French for the Rhineland crisis and think that

a weakening of allied unity was a help to peace was present here. The

rearmament measures taken were so slow, halting, and inadequate that

it is evident that no sense of crisis was present.Britain con­

tinued to drift. The lesser powers were not deceived. They sought

their safety in accommodation with the rising fascist powers, as Poland

did in signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934, or

neutrality as Belgium did in denouncing her alliance with France in

^^CAB 23/83: 24 (36) 1.

^^CAB 23/84: 38 (36) 2.

^^CAB 23/83: 24 (36) 1; 26 (36) 4.

^^CAB 23/83: 3 (36) 4.

^^Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 567-8; Kennedy, Why Eng­ land Slept, pp. 117, 128, 137, 143. Sontag refutes the notion re­ peated by Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 216, that Baldwin refused large-scale rearmament to prevent an election defeat. See Broken World, pp. 312-13; CAB 23/83: 23 (36) 3 and Appendices I and II. 121

October 1936.^^

Catholic observers of the German scene were as surprised as anyone else at the German march. No Catholic in Parliament discussed it on the floor. Joseph Keating and Ernest Oldmeadow were shocked at the flagrant violations, not of the Versailles settlement, but of the

"freely entered and freely endorsed" Locarno Treaty which Hitler had pledged to uphold.Oldmeadow considered Hitler's peaceful promises fit only for "simpletons," but, revealingly, he made no call to throw 68 the Germans back. "War," he wrote, "is too terrible a prospect."

Then, in April 1936, The Tablet changed hands.

Douglas Woodruff was on the staff of The Times when Archbishop

Williams of Birmingham asked him if he would take over The Tablet.

Woodruff told Cardinal Hinsley that he would take the paper, provided the Cardinal allowed him complete independence. Hinsley agreed and happily sold the paper (which had been steadily losing money) to a group including Woodruff, Tom F. Burns, Arthur Pollen and F. W.

Chambers. Ernest Oldmeadow was not consulted and was rather summarily bundled out in an episode that did not show Hinsley at his best.^^

^^Elizabeth Wiskemann, Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945, Fon­ tana History of Europe Series (London; William Collins Sons, 1966; reprint ed.. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 114; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 270, 272-3.

^^The Month, April 1936, pp. 204-6; The Tablet, 2 Feb. 1935, p. 129; 23 March, p. 357; 1 June, p. 6 8 8 ; 22 June, pp. 777-8; 1 Feb. 1936, p. 134; 15 Feb. p. 199; "A Breach of Promise," The Tablet, 14 March 1936, pp. 329-30.

^®"A Breach of Promise," The Tablet, 14 March 1936, pp. 329-30; 21 March 1936, p. 357; 28 March, p. 389.

^^T. F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976. 122

Woodruff took over as editor and The Tablet became very much a personal paper under him. He wrote all the editorials and the front page summary and analysis of the news, even sending in material when he was abroad. In his absence, the paper was run by his assistant editor, Michael Derrick, who agreed with Woodruff's views and could imitate his writing style. Very occasionally, Christopher Hollis would take over for a week or so. Woodruff's writing was vigorous, intelli­ gent, and very well-informed. He was part of the club world where he mingled with a number of governmental and political figures who dropped him many bits of unattributable information which then found their way into The Tablet. Not surprisingly, circulation grew and the paper was restored to financial health.

The Tablet reflected Woodruff's character as well. He was, as has been noted, very much a Bellocian, disillusioned with modern democracy, sympathetic to authoritarianism and fascism, a believer in laissez-faire economics tempered by a kindly paternalism, mildly anti-

Semitic and, in matters of religion, a triumphalist, believing in a rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian Church. One source summed

Woodruff up rather aptly when he called him "very much an Edwardian.

I don't think Douglas is even post World War I."^^

In an editorial in his first issue. Woodruff undertook to explain his view of foreign policy. It was Hitler's fear of the Franco-Russian pact that had induced him to reoccupy the Rhineland, he said. Though

70Ibid.; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976.

^^Igoe interview, 26 May 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 23-4. 123

Woodruff understood the apprehensions of the French, they had to recognize, he said, that "Locarno was not an engagement entered into 72 by equal contracting parties," but, with the Versailles Treaty, was 73 a "continuation of the War," and, as such, "an interim affair."

Woodruff approved the friendly aloofness of London to Paris since it insured that the French would not be adventurous. Calls to defend treaties must be moderated, he argued.

In this matter of signed undertakings, the strict letter cannot be insisted upon, and is of much less importance than the negotiation of understandings which will be likely to endure because they really meet the needs of both parties.

A better summary statement of the appeasement policy than that last

sentence could hardly be asked for.

The most realistic comments on the Rhineland coup came from

Vatican City. There, an astonished French ambassador was subjected to

the urgent entreaties of Pope Pius IX himself to the effect that

...l'Allemagne ne fît des poussées successives dans toutes les directions où elle avait quelque chose à attraper ou à rattraper: Dantzig, Memel, le corridor polonais, l'Autriche, les régions germaniques de Tcheco-Slovaquie. Cette énumération me fut faite par Pie XI lui-meme.

Pie XI ne m'en a pas fait mystère, après s'être aperçu que nous ne bougerions pas. — Si vous aviez tout de suite fait avancer 200,000 hommes, vous auriez— me dit-il— rendu un immense service a tout le mondeI -

^^The Tablet. 4 April 1936, pp. 421-3. ^^Ibid., p. 423.

74ibid., pp. 423-9.

..Germany would make successive thrusts in every direction where she had something to capture or recapture: Danzig, Memel, the Polish Corrider, Austria, the German regions of Czechoslovakia. This list was made to me by Pius XI himself.

After having seen that we were not about to budge, Pius XI did 124

Cardinal Pacelli told the new British minister, Francis D'Arcy

Osborne, that the signature of the Nazi government was not worth the paper it was written on.^^ The advice was ignored by the "realists" in London and Paris.

The Ethiopian war had opened a crack in the unity of English

Catholics with both their fellow countrymen and within the Catholic community. The event which widened that crack into a gaping breach was the Spanish Civil War. A complete examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this work, but it seems possible to state that both right and left must share the responsibility for the conflict.

The political and social situation in Spain had been deteriorating for years. The spirit of compromise was dead and the country was wracked by violence.After the victory of the left-wing parties in the

Popular Front election of 1936, political extremes among both the pop­ ulace and the government engaged in shootings, beatings, and arson.

Heady with success, the left radicals called for a "dictatorship of the proletariat." This wild rhetoric, probably only intended as a political ploy, alienated the moderates while frightening the disunited right

into closing ranks. Military leaders and the rightists reactivated

not play coy. "Had you immediately dispatched 200,000 men," he said to me, "you would have rendered an immense service to all mankind!" Charles- Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, p. 106. My translation.

^^Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1936, p. 356.

^^"Is Spain Going Communist?" The Tablet, 2 May 1936, pp. 552-3; 9 May, pp. 583-4; 16 May, pp. 615-6. 125 78 long-made plans for a coup.

The pretext needed by the Spanish rightists was provided by the discovery of documents outlining plans for a left-wing coup. These papers were only speculations and hypotheses, not blueprints for revo­ lution.^9 Nevertheless, these documents together with the murder of the Catholic conservative, Calvo Sotelo, provided the necessary "justi­ fications" for the Army's military rising.

One problem for the Spanish rightists was that General Francisco

Franco who was to play a leading part in the revolt was in virtual exile in the Canary Isles. Luis Bolin, London correspondent of the monarchist A.B.C., later Franco's press officer, was ordered to get a plane to take Franco to Spanish Morocco. Bolin approached an old friend of his, Douglas Jerrold, who had earlier helped to smuggle some guns to Spanish right-wing forces. Now Jerrold was asked to provide a plane, another man and two pretty girls, all to accompany Bolin on a secret mission, disguised to look like a vacation. Jerrold probably

suspected what was up and he got Bolin his plane and passengers. On

19 July 1936, Franco landed in Spanish Morocco and raised the standard of revolt.

Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp. 90-111; Salvador de Madariaga, Spain (New York: Creative Age Press, 1943) pp. 343-9; Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (New York: MacMillan, 1943), pp. 307-14; Luis Bolin, Spain: The Vital Years (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), pp. 9-10.

^^Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 108n; Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, p. xiii; Koestler, Invisible Writing, pp. 334-5.

B^Bolin, Vital Years, pp. 11-50, 148; Jerrold, Georgian Adven­ ture, pp. 360-75; T. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976. 126

Left and right, believers and atheists were mixed on either side, but in general, the Spanish clergy, the rich, the upper classes, and the military were allied against the intellectuals and the workers.

The involvement of Germany and Italy on one side and Russia on the 81 other, however, simplified the complex for many abroad.

New and skillful propaganda techniques were used in the Spanish

Civil War. Both sides, and their respective allies, tried to portray their battle as a crusade, either for Christian civilization (Nation­ alists) or democracy and progress (Republicans). The left had much the better of this battle, but neither version bore much resemblance to the truth. The civil war in Spain was, in fact, a vicious, brutal struggle whose origins had deep roots in Spanish history, complicated by ideo­

logical overtones. But millions abroad swallowed the propaganda and backed one side or the other in what was really a desperate tragedy for 82 all concerned.

The question of the Spanish Civil War divided Britain as no other foreign issue had since the French Revolution. Opinion rapidly polarized into two camps which labeled their opponents "Reds" or

"fascists." Soon, British partisans were criticizing the tangled Span­

ish imbroglio in black-and-white terms that had little resemblance to

reality. Bitterness increased in direct proportion to the decrease in

81 Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, p. xiii-xvi; Knightly, First Casualty, p. 192; Koestler, Invisible Writing, p. 313; Sontag, Broken World, p. 300; Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976.

®^Koestler, Invisible Writing, pp. 206-7, 314, 325-7; Knightly, First Casualty, p. 216; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 78-9. 127

OO accuracy. The secular press split in two except for The Times and the Daily Telegraph which remained neutral. Intellectuals generally supported the Republicans as did the greatest part of the general pop­ ulation. Many conservatives supported Franco as at least the lesser of two evils.

In the face or this internal disunity, the government, itself slightly pro-nationalist, strove for a policy of neutrality which

OC suited most Englishmen. To this end, London and Paris put forward an agreement pledging its signatories to non-intervention in Spain.

Germany, Italy, and Russia signed this Non-Intervention Agreement along with twenty-four other nations in August 1936, and then blatantly violated it in spite of repeated British efforts to have it respected.

The Anglo-Italian "Gentlemen's Agreement" to respect the status quo in the Mediterranean and the territorial integrity of Spain also had little 87 effect on the conduct of the struggle. In Spain, as elsewhere.

W. Watkins, Britain Divided (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), pp. 28, 50, 139.

®\[atkins, Britain Divided, pp. 28, 32; see Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 214.

OC Taylor, English History, p. 337; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 253, 258-9; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 573-9; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 98; Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 440-3.

®^CAB 23/87: SS (37) 2; 8 (37) 2. "SS" refers to Service Staffs. Thompson, England in the Twentieth Century, p. 168; Memo, Charge d'Affairs in Portugal, 27 Aug. 1936, DGFP, Series D, III, no. 58; von Neurath to Ambassador to France 27 Aug. 1936, no. 59; Phipps to von Neurath, 6 Jan. 1937, no. 184. 87 Taylor, Origins, pp. 124-5; Thompson, England in the Twentieth Century, pp. 163-4. 128

Britain and the democracies appeared timid and vacillating while the 88 fascist states displayed resolution and strength.

The Vatican was afraid that the civil war might lead to a Com­ munist takeover in Spain. But it retained its nuncio in the Republic throughout 1937 and, while protesting atrocities against the Church, tried to make it clear that there was a religious and a political struggle going on in Spain and that the Vatican was uninterested in the 89 latter. This attitude drew sharp protests from the Falange.

No single event of the 1930s affected British Catholics as deeply and as traumatically as the Spanish Civil War. It divided them from other Englishmen and from their fellow Catholics, and drove close friends into passionate disagreements with each other. Some adopted new political attitudes under the impact of the war, while others be­ came more fixed in old ones. Finally, it made them more amenable to appeasement.

British Catholics divided themselves into three groups on the issue of the Spanish Civil War: those who favored Franco's cause, those who approved of him as the lesser of two evils, and those who assumed a neutral position. No prominent Catholics supported the

Republican side; too many Spanish clergy had been murdered and too many

% . Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe: A History, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 310-11; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 524.

®9charles-Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, p. 177; Anglo-Vatican Re- lations, 1936, pp. 344, 361-2; 1937, pp. 373, 379-80; Leocadio Lobo, Primate and Priest (London: Spanish Embassy, 1937), pp. 1-2; German ambassador in Italy to Foreign Ministry, 9 April 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 644; Anthony Rhodes, The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators, 1922-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 124. 129 churches burnt for that.

Among those Catholics supporting Franco in England were a majority of the clergy, including all the bishops except one, the upper and middle classes, and most of the Catholic papers.

Douglas Woodruff was one of the first to leap to Franco's side and he quickly articulated the arguments most Catholics cited in defense of their pro-Nationalist stance. Franco's rising, he said, had saved Spain from the Communists who had tried to use the Popular

Front government of 1936 as a Trojan Horse to seize control. Now, these Communists infested the Republican government. Since that gov­ ernment was being aided by Russia, Italy and Germany were quite prop­ erly counterbalancing that assistance by aid to Franco. He approved

Britain's non-intervention policy, probably realizing, though he did not say it, that this policy aided the Nationalists. English Catholics, 90 he concluded, "must face the Spanish conflict on their own."

Bernard Wall's enthusiasm for the Nationalists was so great that he gave his eldest daughter the middle name of Alcazar to commemorate 91 that Insurgent stand in Toledo. The war had a drastic effect on

Joseph Keating, driving him far to the right in defending Franco and turning him into a determined anti-Communist. "If ever a revolt against

The Tablet, 25 July 1936, p. 101; 1 Aug., pp. 133, 136; 15 Aug. 1936, p. 197; 29 Aug., p. 264; 26 Sept., p. 427; 3 Oct., p. 438; 8 Aug. 1936, p. 165; 10 Oct., p. 474; 24 Oct., pp. 546, 548; 30 March 1937, p. 398; "A Spanish Balance Sheet," 17 July, pp. 76-7; 16 Oct., p. 505; 20 Nov., p. 678.

^^Wall-Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Colosseum, Dec. 1936, pp. 248-50; Colosseum, March 1937, p. 7; Odysseus, "Suggestions About Spain," Colosseum, March 1937, pp. 55-9; J. A. Munoz-Rojas, "Spain's Historical Background," Jan. 1938, pp. 29-39. 130 92 existing authority were justified," he wrote, "it is so here...."

Belloc and Chesterton led a group of Catholic writers in Franco's 93 defense. Among these was the romantic and reactionary poet, Roy

Campbell, who actually fought on the Nationalist side for a short while and wrote a long poem. The Flowering Rifle (1939) celebrating Franco's cause. Campbell's extreme partisanship was actually something of an 94 embarrassment to other pro-Franco Catholics. Catholic M.P.s tended 95 to favor Franco or at least dislike the Republic.

The Month, Aug. 1936, p. 106; Sept. 1936, pp. 193-9; The Month, Jan. 1937, pp. 4-6; Feb. 1937, pp. 167-9; May 1937, p. 390; July 1937, pp. 1-4; Wall interview, 30 May 1976; for other publications supporting Franco, see Anon. Spanish correspondent, "The Martyrdom of Spain," Oct. 1936, pp. 201-16; G. M. Godden, "Communist Operations in Spain," pp. 217-38; an A. A. Parker review of The Spanish Tragedy by Allison Peers, Jan. 1936, pp. 148-9; Dom Fabian Pole review of In Franco's Spain, by F. McCullough, Jan. 1938, pp. 113-14; Belloc, The Universe, 3 Dec. 1937, p. 24; 10 Dec., pp. 3, 14; 17 Dec., p. 3.

^^Speaight, Belloc, p. 464; Belloc, Crisis of Civilization, p. 189; Hollis, Mind, p. 207; Hughes, Pius XI, pp. 308-11; Arnold Lunn, Spanish Rehearsal (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936), pp. 12, 127; Robert Sencourt, Spain's Ordeal (London: Longman's Green, 1940), pp. 3, 37-44, 64-89; Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, p. 338; The Universe, 10 Dec. 1937, p. 3; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 391; Lunn, Science of World Revolution, p. 147; Sencourt, Spain's Ordeal, pp. 87, 345; Waugh's support did not include hero-worship of Franco, Sykes, Evelyn Waugh, p. 189.

^^Bemard Bergonzi, "Roy Campbell, Outsider on the Right," Journal of Contemporary History, (2 April 1967) : 133-48; Wall-Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976.

^^See Lords Strickland, Rankeillour and Denbigh in HL 103 (1936): 432-5; 106 (1937): 229; 107 (1937): 45; M.P.s R. T. Bower, A. Crossley, A. Denville, N. Grattan-Doyle, Patrick Hannon, David Logan and E. Wick­ ham in HÇ 320 (1937): 35-6; 328 (1937): 1540; 319 (1937): 124-32; 322 (1937): 1115-6; 328 (1937): 1515-22; 321 (1937): 6-7, 1353; 326 (1937): 2635; 318 (1936): 5-6; 323 (1937): 773; 326 (1937): 1821; 330 (1937): 360-1; 319 (1937): 141-5; 321 (1937): 225-7. 131

Christopher Dawson, Christopher Hollis, and others also supported

Franco, but as a lesser evil than the Communism they saw as the alter­ native. As the Catholic pacifist E. I. Watkin put it, he preferred to

see the victory of the Nationalist "twilight over the night of its

Godless opponents.

The largest number of Catholics who favored neigher side in

Spain were among the working-class who made up the majority of the 97 Catholic population. The Labor Party to which they usually belonged

exerted some effort to prove that not all Spanish Catholics supported go Franco, but many lower-class Catholics never solved the painful

dilemma of having to choose between political dictatorship and religious 99 persecution. Most English Catholics, probably, ignored the whole

matter, occupied as they were with their own economic problems in a

E. I. Watkin, Men and Tendencies (Freeport, N. Y . : Books for Libraries, 1939), pp. 308-9; Letter from C. Dawson, et. al., Colosseum March 1937, pp. 80-1; Scott interview, 8 June 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976; Speaight, Property Basket, p. 164; The Clergy Review and The Dublin Review were in this group. See Henry W. Hawes, "Spain," Clergy Review, Aug. 1936, pp. 169-70; "Repercussions of the Spanish Situation on Catholic Interests in Austria," Clergy Review, Sept. 1936, pp. 258-60; "Roman Documents," Clergy Review, Jan. 1937, pp. 35-6; E. Allison Peers, "General Franco's New Spain," The Dublin Review, April 1937, pp. 221-31; Peers, "The Evolution of the New Spain," Jan. 1938, pp. 1-12; William C. Atkinson, "Spain's Two Republics," Jan. 1937, pp. 8-20; Atkinson, "Portugal and Spain," July 1937, pp. 40-50; Luigi Sturzo, "Oppressed Peoples," Jan. 1938, pp. 58-75; G. M. Godden, "Spain Under Communist Control," July-Dec. 1936," April 1938, pp. 200-20.

^^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 664-6.

^®See Labor pamphlets; A. Ramon Olivierea, Catholics and the Spanish Civil W a r , Nov. 1936; Jose Maria Semprun Gurrea, A Catholic Looks at Spain.

^^Telephone conversation with Robert Walsh, on the staff of The Catholic Worker (London) in the 1930s, Oxford, England, 4 June 1976. 132 100 none-too-prosperous time.

Blackfriars and The Sower were in the forefront of those advo­ cating neutrality in Spain. With brutal honesty, these publications set forth the failures of the Church in Spain that had earned it the enmity of so many Spanish people. Non-Spanish Catholics had no right making a choice, they said, between the Republicans who would persecute the Church, and the Nationalists who would twist it into a political tool. As Father Victor White, Blackfriars' Penguin, wrote, "The fact is that the struggle in Spain is a detestable and a sinful business and should be regarded as such by Christians.John McGovern echoed this position in the House of Commons. The Republic should be allowed to buy arms, he said, adding that the Spanish worker had been victim­ ized not only by capitalists but by "the very Church itself, steeped in 102 greedy, selfish, soulless materialism." Challenged to visit

Nationalist territory, McGovern did so. On his return, he roundly denounced the Francoists. Delighted, Republican propagandists invited 103 him to their area. He went and, on his return, denounced them tool

^^^Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976.

^^^Penguin, Blackfriars, Sept. 1936, pp. 704-11; The Sower, Oct.- Dec. 1936, p. 174; Blackfriars, Oct. 1936, pp. 725-9; Penguin, Feb. 1936, pp. 141-3; Walter Gumbley, O.P., "Spain— Persecutions Old and New," Oct. 1936, pp. 748-51; Penguin, Oct. 1936, pp. 783-4; Francis Drinkwater, "Praying for Spain," The Sower, Oct.-Dec., 1936, pp. 204-5; Jan.-Mar. 1937, pp. 1-3; April-June, p. 67; Bernard Mailey, "The Two Spains: A Way to Unity," pp. 87-93; Parochus, "Arriba Espana," pp. 104-7.

321 (1937): 283-5; 327 (1937): 111; He was joined in this stand by William Kelly (Lab., Rochdale): HÇ 320 (1937): 822.

^O^igoe interview, 26 May 1976. 133

On the vexing question of atrocities, both sides of the Spanish conflict were guilty of terrible cruelty. Hugh Thomas accepts the

Nationalist figure of 85,940 Republican atrocities, most of them occurring in 1936, while he estimates the number of those killed out­ side military action by the Nationalists at 40,000.^^^

The single most notorious and still controversial incident was the bombing of Guernica on 26 April 1937. After an initial period of confusion, the Nationalists finally settled on the story that, while the town, a legitimate military target, had suffered some bombing by

German planes of the Condor Legion, "Most of Guernica was deliberately dynamited and set on fire by the Reds."^^^ The correspondents who had inspected the town could not distinguish bomb damage from arson and so, the Francoists concluded, they had blamed it all on the Nationalists.^®^

Most contemporary reports, however, accepted the Republican version that an innocuous civilian town had been wantonly and brutally destroyed in order to break the morale of the Basque Nationalists in the north.

Recent studies seem to make the following analysis possible. The

Spanish northern command approved an operation against the bridge and road junction, a true military objective, 300 meters in front of Guern­ ica. The execution was left in the hands of Wolfram von Richthofen,

^®^Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 173, 631; Madariaga, Spain, pp. 425, 486.

^®^Quote by Luis Bolin, Franco's press officer in the Civil War, in his Spain; The Vital Years (1967), pp. 419-20.

l®®Ibid., Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 419-20.

^®^Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 113-15. 134

Chief of Staff of the Condor Legion. The means chosen by him completely on his own initiative were bombing from 6,000 feet with high explosives and— useless for a bridge--incendiaries weighing as little as 2.5 pounds.

This, plus the normal procedure of his pilots in disregarding civilians near an objective resulted in the bridge remaining undestroyed while a 108 wide swath was cut across the town. 109 Guernica was not the first city to be bombed by the air but the ferocity of the assault and the propaganda battle that followed made it known world-wide. Pro-Franco English Catholics accepted the

Nationalist version of events and dilated on anti-Catholic atrocities occurring in the Republic.

Breaking this solid front were Blackfriars and The Sower. Vic­

tor White and S. J. Gosling attacked all this "reporting" of atroci­

ties as tendentious propaganda and White condemned the Catholic press's whitewashing of "the deliberate air-raid-massacre of Guernica" when

lOSiije Nationalist version is in Bolin, Spain; The Vital Years, pp. 274-81; for analysis of the attack, see letters from Hugh Thomas and H. Southworth in Knightly, First Casualty, pp. 208-9; Gordon Thomas and Max M. Witts, Guernica (New York; Stein and Day, 1975), pp. 17, 62-3, 106, 118-21, 146, 184, 205-86; Thomas, Spanish Civil W a r , pp. 420-1; Berlin denied German planes were responsible and refused to agree to an international investigation. See State Secy, to German Ambassador in Nationalist Spain, 4 May 1937, DGFP, Series D, III, no. 249; German Ambassador to For. Ministry, 5 May 1937, no. 251; For. Ministry Memo, 15 May 1937, no. 258.

Madrid was struck in the fall of 1936; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 329; Koestler, Invisible Writing, p. 725.

llOihe Tablet, 3 Oct. 1936, p. 438; 1 May 1937, p. 621; 8 May, p. 158; 29 May, p. 771; The Universe, 30 Dec. 1938, p. 7; Leslie A. Toke, "Why the Pope has Condemned Communism," Catholic Truth, Nov.-Dec. 1936, pp. 181-5; The Month, June 1937, p. 545; July, pp. 1-2; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976. 135

"any civilized newspaper" should only have expressed regret and con- 111 damnation.

Catholics who opposed jumping on Franco's bandwagon were sub­ jected to considerable pressure from the English bishops, the clergy, the Catholic press, their friends (Victor White had a terrific feud with Bernard Wall), and even the Vatican. Some, like Count Michael De

La Bedoyere, editor of the Catholic Herald, who had tried to stay 112 neutral, finally caved in and joined the Francoists. It is striking evidence of the spirit of freedom and independence of the English Church that when those clergy and laity who were outspokenly anti-Franco re­ fused to heed requests from Church authorities to desist, they were left alone. These men were all well liked, loyal, active Catholics, and this evident loyalty allowed them room to maneuver. As Michael 113 Walsh put it, "We got away with murder." Furthermore, Blackfriars and The Sower, the periodicals most willing to criticize the Spanish

Church and to insist on careful evaluation of the Spanish conflict, were published by clergy. By contrast, the highly pro-Nationalist

Tablet and Colosseum were both lay owned and operated.

The battle in the press continued unabated until the war's end.

Penguin, Blackfriars, July 1937, p. 531; Gerald Vann, "The Psychology of War-Mongering," Dec. 1937, pp. 886-904; The Sower, Jan.- March, 1938, pp. 4-5; Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976.

^^^Wall interview, 30 May 1976; Drinkwater interview, 31 May 1976; Letter, Blackfriars. April 1937, pp. 703-4; Penguin, p. 704, Penguin, May 1937, p. 384.

^^^alsh telephone conversation, 4 June 1976; Drinkwater inter­ view, 1 June 1976; McCabe interview, 4 June 1976. 136

The Universe lamented that some "wildly misled" Catholics did not real­ ize that "...Franco is saving Christianity from the Devil.Its editor, George Barnard, joined with the other pro-Franco organs in painting the Nationalist cause as a crusade and making derogatory re­ marks on the intelligence and even the orthodoxy of Catholics like

Maritain who refused to see the "truth" about Spain.White and

Gosling refused to consider Franco a crusader, defended the right of

Catholics to differ on Spain, and warned that parading all this right- wing propaganda as the "official” Catholic position was alienating the

English Catholic worker not only from the press but from the Church.

114"The Press and Spain," The Universe, 17 Dec. 1937, p. 14.

^^^The Universe, 7 Jan. 1938— 21 April 1939; The Tablet, 5 June 1937--15 April 1939; H. C. O'Neil, "Spain on the March," Downside Re­ view, Oct. 1939, pp. 431-47; Hugh Broughall, "The Church in Spain," The Dublin Review. Oct. 1938, pp. 212-24; Barbara Ward, "Revolution from the Right," Oct. 1939, p. 317; review of Spain's Ordeal by Robert Sen­ court, in Catholic Truth, Sept.-Oct. 1938, p. 172; Nov.-Dec. 1938, p. 191; Sept.-Oct. 1939, pp. 159-60; review of Spain, The Church and the Orders by E. A. Peers, in Catholic Truth, p. 165; R. J. Dingle review of Spain's Ordeal by R. Sencourt, and Our Debt to Spain by E. A. Peers, in Clergy Review, Oct. 1938, pp. 368-9; Colosseum, July 1938, pp. 76-7; Erik M. von Kuhnelt-Leddihn, "Spain and the Old World," Oct. 1938, pp. 178-88; Jose Antonio de Rivera, "The New Spain," pp. 189-95; The Month, Jan. 1938, p. 7; May 1938, pp. 394-5; June 1938, pp. 484-6; Aug. 1938, pp. 103-4; R. J. Dingle, "Two Years of Spain's War," Aug. 1938, pp. 129- 36; March 1939, pp. 197-201; The Tablet, 15 Jan. 1938--3 June 1939.

^^^Penguin, Blackfriars, Nov. 1936, p. 857; Penguin, April 1937, p. 300; Nov., pp. 862-5; Parochus, "The Case of Our Catholic Press," The Sower, Jan.-March, pp. 27-9; Penguin, Blackfriars, March 1937, pp. 219-23; Feb. 1938, pp. 141-2; April 1937, pp. 294-9; Sept. 1937, p. 700; Feb. 1938, pp. 840-1; The Sower, Jan.-March 1937, pp. 1-2; Parochus, The Sower, Jan.-March 1938, pp. 4-8; J. D. C. review of Arms for Red Spain, by P. Hericot, in The Sower, April-June 1938, p. 110; April-June 1939, p. 6 6 ; Penguin, Blackfriars, Aug. 1938, pp. 608-13; April 1939, pp. 299-301. 137

The battle spilled over into the House of Commons where William

Gallacher, the sole Communist M.P., cited The Universe and the Catholic

Herald as sources for false propaganda about Communists in Spain. He was interrupted by Alfred Denville who declared that the best elements had deserted the Republic, leaving the extreme Left "scum" in con­ trol. John McGovern accused the Labor Party of being afraid "to face up to the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in this country...Christianity has never been prostituted to such depths as it is in Spain, in the

Catholic Press of this country, and by the bishops and clergymen of 118 that territory."

The increasing revelations of Nationalist atrocities, especially in Georges Bernanos' Les grandes cimitieres sous la lune (1938), in­ duced some English Catholics like Dawson and Lunn to modify their support of Franco, and others, like Wall and the actor Robert Speaight, to desert him altogether.The welcome given to the victorious 190 Franco in March 1939 by Pius XII, Cardinal Hinsley and others was not as extensive as it would have been two years earlier.

The Spanish Civil War polarized the British Catholic community, throwing men as dissimilar as Joseph Keating and Douglas Jerrold

316 (1936): 89-90. ^^®HC 321 (1937): 285-7.

^^®Amold Lunn, Come What May (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941) , pp. 328, 333; C. Dawson, Beyond Politics, p. 120; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 78-9; Speaight, Property Basket, p. 164.

^^*^The Tablet. 15 April 1939, p. 482; Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 312; A. Crossley, HÇ 333 (1938): 518-22; 338 (1938): 2990; Lord Rankeillour, HL 112 (1939): 108-14; Hinsley, cited in C. Rankin, The Pope Speaks (London: Faber and Faber, 1940), p. 6 ; Jerrold, Britain and Europe, p. 247; The Universe, 30 Dec. 1938, p. 7; 10 Feb. 1939, pp. 1, 6 . 138 together and driving others as similar as Victor White and Christopher 121 Dawson apart. But the anti-Catholic atrocities of 1936 set a barrier to the limits of Catholic sympathy for the Republicans; for most, that limit was neutrality. On the other hand. Franco's claim to be fighting for the Church together with his less obvious (at first) brutalities, earned him the wholehearted partisanship of many English Catholics.

That support made Catholics unpopular with many of their fellow citi- 122 zens, most of whom favored the Republic.

Mussolini's support for Franco did not create many problems.

His 1929 accords with the Vatican seemed to make him an acceptable ally. Hitler's support was more embarrassing. Most English Catholics thoroughly disliked the Nazi regime as the persecutor of the Church in

Germany. But, fearing the threat, as they saw it, of a Communist regime in Spain that would utterly destroy the Church, they tolerated Hitler 123 almost with an attitude of "My eneny's enemy is my friend." The

Nazis were seen as a definite evil— but a lesser evil than the Com­ munists. In the appearance of this Red bogey in Spain lies the answer to the question of why Catholics, in spite of the added perspec­ tive of their religious outlook, did not see that the Nazi regime was

^^^Wall-Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; These divisions were intellectual ones; no friendships seem to have ended over them.

^^^Hollis interview, 10 June 1976; Lunn, Catholics of Great Britain, p. 84.

^^^Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Sykes, Evelyn Waugh; but Waugh's detestation for Hitler never lessened.

^^^Scott interview, 8 June 1976; K. W. Watkins, Britain Divided, pp. 28, 32; see Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 214. 139 irredeemable sooner than their fellow citizens. Furthermore, Hitler's involvement in Spain throughout 1938 made English Catholics more amen- 125 able to appeasing him at Munich.

The acrimonious split among British Catholics was part of a split caused throughout Britain by the Spanish Civil War. Generally, the conservative right was reinforced in its pro-German, anti-Russian tendencies while the left began to put aside its pacific attitude and call for arms to resist the forces of fascism. This reaction did occur within the Catholic community with one significant variation.

The number of Catholics on the political right was proportionately greater than in the general population because normally moderate and liberal people like Joseph Keating were forced to the right over Spain and because a large number of ordinary lay men and women moved to the right with them. Not until the Spanish Civil War ended and the Germans marched into Prague in 1939 did the configuration of opinion in the

Catholic community again generally resemble that within Britain as a whole.

Finally, vociferous Catholic opposition to the Republic aided

the government in keeping free of the Spanish struggle. Chamberlain told the proprietor of The Universe, Sir Martin Melvin, that without 127 it he might have been driven to intervene against Franco.

Stanley Baldwin never understood foreign affairs, but, unlike

125j^oughran, "Catholics in England," p. 667.

^^^Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 118-9; Norling, "Mirror of Illusion," p. 363; Thompson, England in the Twentieth Century, p. 131.

IZ^Bolin, Spain; The Vital Years, p. 3. 140

Neville Chamberlain who succeeded him as Prime Minister on 28 May 1937, 128 he never deluded himself into thinking that he did. Like the good, honest Birmingham businessman that he was, Chamberlain had a predi­ lection for material facts and a naive confidence that all questions were susceptible to rational solutions. This left him utterly un­ prepared for the cynicism and irrationality of the situations with log which he was faced.

Convinced that British foreign affairs had been characterized by drift, Chamberlain determined to actively seek reconciliation with

Germany and Italy by trying to meet at least some of their most im­ portant claims against the Peace of Paris. His immediate objective was to try to get Mussolini to guarantee Italian withdrawal from Spain as the price of British recognition of his conquest of Ethiopia. That, it was hoped, would bring about an Anglo-Italian rapprochement that would allow Britain to reestablish the Stresa Front which, together with the League, would prevent any violent German expansion. With the

European situation thus stabilized, the Powers might then undertake a negotiated revision of the treaties of 1919 and thereby establish a 130 stable foundation for a lasting peace.

^^^Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1962), p. 502; See Churchill's brief, incisive appraisal of both men in Gathering Storm, pp. 221-2; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 560-1; Medlicott, Contemporary England, p. 341.

^2%enneth Clark, Another Part of the Wood (New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint ed. New York: Ballentine Books, 1976), pp. 273-5; Petrie, Twenty Years Armistice— And After, pp. 180-1; Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

^^®Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, pp. 281, 351, 380; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, pp. 104-5; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 266-9; Taylor, Origins, p. 132. 141

To support this policy, Chamberlain moved to build up Britain's military power so that she could deter Germany from rash actions.

Then it would be possible, he said, to pursue "appeasement through

strength." But, convinced by the general view of Western military

experts that defense was paramount, he moved from Baldwin's idea of a

deterrent force based on bombers, the navy, and a large field army to

a defense built on fighter aircraft and a small field force. This made

it impossible for Britain to prevent losses in Central Europe which 132 could only be stopped by launching offensive military action.

This new and important departure from an informal to a formal

appeasement policy never had a chance of success. Shortly after its

formulation. Hitler decided that, while Britain would probably never

formally agree to hand over Central Europe to Germany, the will of the

British government to resist him was so weak that he could afford to 1 22 flout it. He rejected the advice of those who warned that Britain

would fight and, by November 1937, Hitler had changed his immediate

target from Russia to Britain and France.As for Italy, the Spanish

Civil War had completed Mussolini's estrangement from the Western

powers and cemented his friendship with Hitler. By January 1937,

^^^Medlicott, Contemporairy England, p. 360.

^^^iddlemas. Strategy of Appeasement, pp. 2, 37, 59, 125; R. J. Sontag, "Appeasement 1937," Catholic Historical Review 38 (January 1953): 388, 394.

^^%esse. Hitler and the English, pp. 25-6, 9, 33-43; Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, pp. 174-6.

^^^Sontag, "Appeasement 1937," p. 395; Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English, ed. and trans., F. A. Voigt (London: Allen Wingate, 1954), pp. 25-6, 29, 33-43; Watt, "Appeasement," p. 206. 142

Mussolini was telling Goring that he would not resist an Anschluss if 135 it came.

Germany was the prime concern of British foreign policy, but the

British attitude towards that country was strongly influenced by their perception of the Soviet Union. Russian intervention in Spain and the purge trials of 1936-1938 increased the widespread suspicion of Moscow.

Hitler's anti-Communism became the main reason for support of Germany, breathing new life into an appeasement policy which otherwise would probably have been discredited by a Nazi tyranny which was heartily

1 2 6 detested by the vast majority of Englishmen.

Chamberlain's Italian policy led to a conflict with his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. Throughout 1937, Britain had tried to nego­ tiate with Italy while she continued to violate the Non-Intervention

Agreement of November 1936 and the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of January

1938. Finally, Eden declared that Italy would only respect a rearmed, resolute Britain and that Mussolini should be made to comply with his 137 former commitments before fresh concessions were granted. When 138 chamberlain disagreed, Eden quit the cabinet on 20 February 1938.

^^^Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, p. 134; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918. p. 106; the Vatican also wished Italian policy to be pro-British and anti-German. See Anglo Vatican Relations, 1936, pp. 344-60; 1937, pp. 372-3.

^^^Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 25-8, 120; Failing, Life of Neville Chamberlain, pp. 340, 347; Taylor, English History, p. 416; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 590; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 353-4; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 143.

^^^Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 473-4, 478-86; PREM 1/276 A. Eden letter to N. Chamberlain, 31 Jan. 1938; CAB 23/92; 6 (38) 1.

^^®CAB 23/92: 7 (38) 1. 143

Two months later, an Anglo-Italian pact provided for British

recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia in return for with- 139 drawal of Italian troops from Spain. Though Italy had barely begun

to comply, London put the agreement into effect in November.It was

to little avail; Mussolini continued to move closer to Hitler.

The thinking of the more conservative British Catholics was in

perfect accord with Chamberlain's appeasement policy. These Catholics wanted the government to detach British policy from dependence on the

League of Nations where, as they saw it, the false lead of France and

Russia threatened to push Britain into a conflict with Italy and Ger­ many from which Russian Communism would be the only winner. Instead,

they thought that Britain should strengthen herself by building up her

armaments and by restoring the Stresa Front. Then, Britain could act

as a mediator in rectifying the Versailles settlement and unite a re­

stabilized Europe against the Communist danger. Even German rearma­ ment was tolerated as an anti-Russian measure.

1 9 0 Foreign Office memo, 2 Oct. 1938, Brit. Doc., 3rd Series, III, no. 326.

^^^Earl of Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 3 Oct. 1938, Ibid., no. 329; Halifax to Perth, 26 Oct., no. 356. 141 The Month, June 1937, p. 487; Oct., pp. 289-95; Oct. 1937, pp. 292-3; Nov., p. 388; Jan. 1938, pp. 10-11; Feb., pp. 98-102; Feb. 1935, p. 100; March, pp. 199-200; April, pp. 389-93; July, pp. 1-2; March 1936, p. 194; J. Keating, "The Plague of Extremists," Aug., pp. 102-5; J. Keating, "A Pacifist Heresy," Oct., pp. 347-54; March 1937, pp. 195-7; April, pp. 289-90; Dec., pp. 485-6; "Current Comments," The English Review, April 1935, pp. 391-2; June, pp. 651-2; July, p. 9; April 1936, pp. 395-6; D. Jerrold, "Looking Back and Looking Forward," Nov., p. 462; D. Jerrold, "The League and the Rule of Law," Feb. 1937, pp. 157-67; The Month, April 1936, p. 196; May, p. 385; "Current Com­ ments," The English Review, April 1935, p. 392; Colosseum, Sept. 1935, p. 198; June 1937, pp. 71-2; Sept., pp. 101-2; B. Wall review of Genevre Contre la Paix by Comte de Saint-Aulaire, in Colosseum, Dec. 144

Douglas Woodruff displayed his usual skill in articulating the general conservative position. Of the treaties of 1919, he wrote:

"The present disposition of public opinion in Great Britain to consider that the time has come for a complete liquidation of those settlements is in the main a sound one.Woodruff heartily approved Chamberlain's policy of eschewing general settlements in favor of trying "to settle problems one by one" backed by rearmament sufficient to make Britain's voice credible.There was no alternative, he said, to frontier revision east of the Rhine: "The temper of this country is profoundly pacific, and no Government could bring it into a European War on a

Central European issue.Britain's proper role, said Woodruff, was to help bring about those changes peacefully.

1936, pp. 304-5; Wall, "Problems of Pacifism," Colosseum, pp. 264-75; "Christianity and War: A Symposium," Colosseum, March 1937; Wall, pp. 3-10; Jerrold, pp. 24-7; C. Dawson, "The Catholic Attitude To War," The Tablet, 13 March 1937, pp. 365-8; R. Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, Nov. 1936, pp. 421-3; The Month, Nov. 1936, pp. 385-6; Dec., p. 489; The Tablet, 9 May 1936, p. 587; 23 May, p. 646; 13 June, p. 754; 4 July, pp. 1-2; 7 Nov., p. 622; 26 Dec. 1936, p. 894; 17 April 1937, pp. 538- 9; 15 May, pp. 693-4; 25 Sept., p. 401; 18 Dec., p. 825; Christopher Hollis, Foreigners Aren't Fools (London: Longmans, 1937), pp. 1-26; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 352-5; Christopher Hollis, Italy in Africa (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941), pp. 9, 233-4, 238-45; The Tablet, 16 May 1936, p. 611; 1 Aug., p. 134; 3 Oct., p. 439; 21 Nov., p. 693; 6 Feb. 1937, p. 181; 14 Aug., p. 213; 11 Sept., p. 338; Christopher Dawson, "The Remaking of Europe," The Tablet, 4 April 1936, pp. 428-9; Baron Rankeillour, HL 102 (1936): 373-4; Patrick Hannon, HÇ 327 (1937): 181-2; Nicholas Grattan-Doyle, 328 (1937): 1743; HL 100 (1936): 184-6; 102 (1936): 375-8; 104 (1937): 485-6; 107 (1937): 152-6.

142The Tablet, 18 April 1936, p. 481.

^^^The Tablet, 27 June 1936, p. 811; 20 Nov. 1936, p. 730.

^^^The Tablet. 1 May 1937, p. 622.

145The Tablet, 20 Nov. 1937, p. 677; 27 Nov., p. 709. 145

Anti-fascist Catholics who promoted collective security through the League justified the use of force as a court of last resort. But the preconditions they set up as necessary before they would consider a war justified were so stringent, and their attitude to rearmament to put teeth into collective security was so negative, as to render their position almost pacifistic. The Sower, expressing a position typical of this group, held that "...the ultimate sanction of all law is force..." but Gosling called for equal acceptance of conscientious objectors, took a stand against large arms expenditures and suggested ceding unused territories to states that really needed land.^^^

Only a few spoke as practical politicians. Don Luigi Sturzo warned that, if the League were not given the military power to re­ strain Hitler, then, "...when he judges his adversaries to be in a position of inferiority, he will launch the most tragic war that human­ ity has ever known or dreamed of

A very few took a position of complete opposition to modern war

The Sower, Jan.-March 1935, pp. 5-6; April-June, 1936, p. 18; April-June 1937, p. 6 8 ; July-Sept., pp. 128, 144-7; Review of Must War Come? by J. Eppstein, Catholic Truth, Jan.-Feb. 1936, p. 21; Peace and the Clergy, Jan.-Feb. 1937, p. 32; E. Quinn review of Peace and the Clergy, Clergy Review, Feb. 1937, pp. 53-52; Downside Review, Jan. 1937, pp. 108-9; Penguin, Blackfriars, Dec. 1936, pp. 946-7; Gerald Vann, "The Ethics of Modern War," Blackfriars, Dec. 1936, pp. 900-2; Vann, review of Peace and the Clergy, pp. 952-3; Vann, "The Psychology of War-Mongering," Dec. 1937, pp. 887-903; E. Quinn, "War, Just or Unjust," March 1935, pp. 206-12; Quinn, "International Problems; the Catholic and the Secular Approach," Dec. 1937, pp. 907-14; H. J. Carpenter re­ view of Ethics of Peace and War by H, Gigon, pp. 229-31; Penguin, Nov. 1936, pp. 853-5.

^^^L. Sturzo, "The Roots of Peace," Blackfriars, Dec. 1936, pp. 927-30; Bernard Alexander, "The Organization of Peace," Blackfriars, Dec. 1936, pp. 920-26. 146 on the grounds that the destructive power of modem weaponry had made it impossible for war to ever do more good than evil. Among these men were Father Gerald Vann and the Catholic members of E. I. Watkln's pacifistic society. Pax, which included the artist Eric Gill. Eric

Gill was an artist, a stonecarver who carved the Stations of the Cross for Westminster Cathedral and worked on the BBC's Broadcasting House.

A convert. Gill's Catholicism was of a mystical, love-centered, rather unecclesiastical sort.^^® Gill's solution to the dehumanization of much of modern industrial society was practically a Christian communism very close to distributism in which the workers themselves would own 149 machinery rather than profit-seeking capitalists.

In Parliament, Lords Semphill and Strickland joined M.P.s

Colonel Baldwin-Webb (Cons., Shropshire), John Morris (Cons., Salford),

John Tinker (Lab., Lancashire), and Edward Doran (Cons., Tottenham) in calling for rearmament. Several of the Catholic Labor M.P.s joined their party's normal opposition to Chamberlain.^^® John McGovern, in his singular fashion, mocked the government's efforts to negotiate with

Italy— "Mussolini knows only one doctrine, that of force...The man is

^^®Donald Attwater, A Cell of Good Living (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969), p. 50.

^^^Review by E. Gill of Tradition and Modernism in Politics by A. J. Plenty, Blackfriars, July 1937, pp. 550-1; Attwater, Cell of Good Living, pp. 74-5; Robert Speaight, The Life of Eric Gill (New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1966), pp. 234-43; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 40-2.

ISOgL 101 (1936): 854-61; 102 (1936): 474-80; 103 (1936): 260-5, 976-85; HÇ 299 (1935): 1142-5; 307 (1935): 246-7; 309 (1936): 2439-40; 310 (1936): 353-4; 313 (1936): 1729-34; 321 (1937): 610-14; 322 (1937): 1141-6. 147 not capable of telling the truth...,attacked the proposed defense

spending as preparation for a capitalistic war, and then said that he 152 thought a war with Italy and Germany was virtually a certainty.

Throughout 1937, the inability to make progress in achieving a

settlement with Germany bothered The Tablet but, together with The

Month and The Universe, it approved of the British government's efforts

to negotiate with Hitler without reference to the League, now thought 153 poisoned by Russia's presence. Woodruff accepted Germany's interest

in eastern and southeastern Europe as only natural.And he practic­

ally exulted over the withdrawal of Belgium from the Franco-Russian

defensive system. The paper wished that all the small states were

"free from the necessity of linking their national fortunes to the 155 vagaries of the new international politics,"

Interestingly enough, in the atmosphere of rising political

tension of 1935-1937, everyone except pacifists like Gerald Vann and

Eric Gill was in favor of strengthened British defense and constructing

some sort of collective security. But writers in Blackfriars, The

Sower, The Month and elsewhere were unable to follow the logic of their

thinking on defense through to its natural conclusion, due to their

^^IgC 327 (1937): 110; 331 (1938): 327-31.

320 (1937): 2252-6; 321 (1937): 288-91.

153The Tablet, 23 May 1936, p. 645; 19 Sept., p. 637; 24 Oct., p. 547; 1 Jan. 1938, p. 1; The Month, Jan. 1938, p. 5; March, p. 200; The Universe, 28 Jan. 1938, p. 12.

^^‘^The Tablet, 11 July 1936, p. 33; 19 June 1937, p. 870.

^^^The Tablet, 16 Oct. 1937, p. 507. 148 view, a product of the post-World War I mentality, that m o d e m war was foolish, futile, and probably immoral. Those taking a firmer, almost

Realpolitik stand on the necessity for arms such as The Tablet, The

English Review and Colosseum were, paradoxically, those most in favor of appeasement of the authoritarian states, viewing them as a bloc against the "Red menace." This latter group, (including The Month) was also critical of the League and sanctions.

This confusing split among the journals and writers who were philosophically hostile to the authoritarian states but weak on the question of rearmament and those who were most in favor of accommo­ dation with the authoritarians but also strong for rearmament was mirrored in the secular press. As Franklin Gannon notes;

...it was precisely those papers which proved most blind over, obtuse about, or sympathetic towards Hitler's regime, which pursued the strongest line over the armaments which would be needed if the others' dire predictions proved correct.

Starting, then, from the most divergent standpoints, all Catho­ lic opinion— liberal like Blackfriars, pacifist like Gill, socialist like John McGovern, moderate like most Catholic M.P.s, conservative like The Tablet, or far right like Jerrold--by the beginning of 1938, was converging on appeasement as the only policy that should or even could be followed. It explains in part the remarkable unanimity of the terrible year of Munich, a part of the broader unanimity present within

British society as a whole.

Although the effect of the Ethiopian and Spanish crises was to increase the desire of Catholic spokesmen to seek accommodation with

^^®Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, p. 8 . 149

Mussolini, there was a decreasing tendency to look kindly on Italian

Fascism as a model for proper government. Douglas Woodruff was espec­ ially prominent among those who continued to defend Fascism. Woodruff was imbued with a romantic, elitist vision of an orderly, hierarchical, and authoritarian society quite different from the English society in which he lived. The idea of Fascism (if not the reality) seemed to offer a return to that idealized time when the values he admired had been the dominant values of society. This return to proper order had its international aspect as well. Italy seemed on the way to becoming the linchpin of a new, stable European order. Woodruff certainly hoped

Mussolini would be the key to preventing Hitler from going to war. This 157 was, as one commentator put it, "very much the Chamberlain policy."

Later, Woodruff was to claim that his main hopes for Italy rested on her role in foreign policy and that he had little regard for a re- 158 gime that "wasn't at all like Salazar's or Pius XI's" A reading of

The Tablet's papers of that era does not quite bear him out. In Jan­ uary 1937, Woodruff lamented that Italy was not properly appreciated in Britain. This, he said, was because she had been compelled to reject British notions of liberty and been faced with the choice of

"strong but arbitrary government and the progressive inroads of an- 159 archy." She had then reconstructed her social and economic system by reverting to "the system traditional to Catholic Europe by which

^^^T. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976; Hollis interview, 10 June 1976.

^^®Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

159"Friendship with Italy," The Tablet, 9 Jan. 1937, p. 40. 150 private enterprise continues as a mainspring of industrial life, but functions in a clear, moral framework and under sharp limitations.

Italy, he concluded, was in the lead of the universal effort to reunify the divided life of modern man.^®^ While this typical expression is free of fulsome praise, its sympathetic tone indicates more than the grudging toleration of a regime with whose foreign policy one happens to agree.

One further comment is in order here. In Woodruff's attitude there was an element of that contempt for other peoples which is present among some upper-class Englishmen. As Robert Speaight said of

Hilaire Belloc, Woodruff's great mentor: "He would have hated fascism if he had been obliged to live under it, but he seemed to think that, 169 on the whole, fascism was a good thing for foreigners."

Only George Barnard of The Universe. Robert Sencourt,^®^ an inveterate admirer of authoritarianism^^^ but not a widely respected figure in the Catholic community,and, for a while, Bernard Wall, joined Woodruff in this sweeping support of Italy, though the three editors freely allowed differing views into their publications.^^®

IGOibid. IG^Ibid., pp. 40-1. 169 Speaight, Property Basket, p. 372. 1 63 Real name, Robert George.

^®^See his book, Napoleon III: The M o d e m Emperor (London: 1933),

^®®T. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976.

^®®The Tablet, 10 July, p. 38; "The Church and Fascism," 20 Nov., p. 681; E. Quinn, The Tablet, 21 Nov. 1936, p. 702; Address by H. J. Carpenter, 2 May 1937, p. 782; Letter by Carpenter, 26 June, p. 930; "Rome Letter," The Tablet, 27 Nov. 1937, p. 717; review of What Next, o' Puce? by B. Rockewill, The Universe, 3 Dec. 1937, p. 18; 151

The Clergy Review was mildly complimentary to Fascism, and

Catholic Truth neutral.The remainder of the press was downright hostile. Although Joseph Keating recommended diplomatic accommodation

of Italy, his dislike of Fascism did not change. "The fascist, the

Nazi, the Bolshevik all spring from the same diabolical root— the

deification of the civil power,he warned Catholics in September

1935. Two years later, he repeated the same comment, almost word for word.^®^ And in several articles in The Dublin Review, Luigi Sturzo

set forth the basic incompatibility between the claims of the totali­

tarian state and Christianity.^^®

Of Mussolini, Franco, or Hitler, S. J. Gosling of The Sower de­

clared: "There is not one of them whose friendship does not entail 171 some compromise with our common Christianity." Of the partiality

towards Italy displayed by Woodruff and others. Gosling wrote; "We

cannot understand the baleful fascination that fascism has for certain

F. Melville, "Austria," Clergy Review, March 1936, p. 224; T. E. Flynn, "The Church and Revolution," Clergy Review, April 1936, pp. 296-304; Richard Smith, "Rome," Clergy Review, Nov. 1936, pp. 420-2; Count Bennigsen, "Pope Pius XI and Communism," Clergy Review, Oct. 1937, pp. 361-8; review of Religion and the M o d e m State by C. Dawson, and Freedom in the M o d e m World by J. Maritain, Catholic Truth, Sept.-Oct. 1935, p. 178; review of The Future of Bolshevism by W. Gurian and The Will to Freedom by Ross Hoffmann, July-Aug. 1936, pp. 132-3.

^®®The Month, p. 195.

^®^The Month. July 1937, p. 9; Oct. 1936, pp. 292-4; John Murray, "The International Outlook," March 1937, pp. 203-11; May 1937, p. 391; July, pp. 9-10; Dec., pp. 483-4.

17®L. Sturzo, "The Totalitarian State," The Dublin Review, July 1935, pp. 104-20; L. Sturzo, "Rome and Anti-Rome," Jan. 1937, pp. 42- 59; L. Sturzo, "Experiences and Reflections," July 1936, pp. 27-45.

^^^The Sower, Jan.-March 1937, p. 2. 152

Catholic publicists," adding that some Catholic writers were "so enamoured of Italian fascism that they are constantly engaged in trim- 172 ming their (Christian) principles to suit their chosen policies."

All this, he warned, was material for Communist propaganda while it 173 alienated the Catholic worker.

In Blackfriars, Luigi Sturzo and Edward Quinn called the totali- 174 tarian state a "monstrous" perversion of corporatism, while John

Eppstein and Victor White demonstrated that the Pope had not been in favor of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.White countered the charge that Catholicism had proven itself to be in league with fascism by its alleged uniform support of the Ethiopian War and of Franco by referring the accusers to Catholic publications both foreign and domestic which had consistently opposed either or both conflicts.Challenged by 177 Colosseum for not defining fascism. White defined it as a term applied to various post-war movements and governments inspired by Mus­ solini's Italy, whose characteristics included: the forcible stifling of criticism or dissent; party control of the press; abolition of strikes while industry remained in private hands; a contrived "mystique du

^^^Ibid., Jan-March 1938, p. 4; The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1937, pp. 190-1; The Sower, Jan.-March 1938, pp. 5-6.

^^^The Sower, Jan.-March 1938, p. 6 .

^^^Luigi Sturzo, "Giuseppe Toniolo and Christian Democracy," Blackfriars, May 1936, pp. 358-68; E. Quinn, "Christian Spain," Nov. 1937, p. 841; H. J. Carpenter, "What Can We Do About It?" Aug. 1937, pp. 611-15.

^^®Penguin, Blackfriars, July 1937, p. 6 .

17®Ibid., Nov. 1936, pp. 855-7.

177'»a Comment," Colosseum, Dec. 1936, pp. 291-3. 153

Chef;" a claim that the party represented the popular will and the

state; "hypemationalism" or racism with all its arrogance, militarism,

and hatred; and varying degrees of absolutism or totalitarianism in

government. The Tablet's accusation that Blackfriars' use of the

term "pro-fascist" was "theatrical" drew the reply from White that he

could not see why those who were so enamored of the thing were so sen- 179 sitive to the word, especially in discussing Italy.

This concern with fascism was part of a broader discussion of what political and social structures were suitable for the m o d e m world. Blackfriars recognized the widespread post-war disillusionment with democratic and humanitarian ideals and a number of contributors 180 suggested ways to revitalize European society. John Eppstein, Secre­

tary of the League of Nations Union, recommended that work begin on the

building of a United States of Europe, kernel of a future world govern- 1 0*| ment. Many Catholics had been so terrified by Communism that they

regarded every call for social justice— even Papal ones--as Communist- 189 tainted. Blackfriars warned them that they were making those social

^^^Penguin, Blackfriars. July 1937, pp. 462-3.

^^^The Tablet, 8 June 1937, p. 836; Penguin, Blackfriars, July 1937, pp. 528-9.

^®®Andre D. Toledano, "Past and Present," Blackfriars, Oct. 1936, pp. 735-8.

IBlj. Eppstein, "Order or Chaos," Blackfriars, Dec. 1936, pp. 915-19; Penguin, Blackfriars, Oct. 1937, pp. 781-2.

IS^Loughran, "Catholics in England," pp. 535-7; Harte, Papal Social Principles, pp. 654-9; see Catholic Truth, July-Aug. 1935, p. 126; Leslie A. Toke, "Why the Pope has Condemned Communism," Nov.-Dec. 1936, pp. 184-5; May-June 1938, p. 80. 154 183 problems worse. And Victor White pointed out that the atheism and materialistic dehumanization of Communist had actually been put into practice by capitalism.

Others following Blackfriars' lead insisted that those seeking models on which to base reforms should look not to Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin but to the papal encyclicals and basic Christian prin­ ciples.^®^

Even Woodruff did not despair of democracy altogether.That was reserved for men like Bernard Wall, Hilaire Belloc and Douglas

Jerrold, whose attitude was summed up in Wall's comment that "Liberal 187 democracy in Europe is bankrupt." Only Jerrold, however, went so

183 Edward Quinn, "Church and State in Europe," Blackfriars, April 1937, pp. 248-58; Jacques Maritain, "Right and Left," Nov. 1937, pp. 807-12; Blackfriars, May 1936, pp. 405-6; J. F. T. Prince, "Universal Diagnosis: The True Menace," July 1936, pp. 527-53.

^^^Victor White, O.P., "Thoughts on an Encyclical," Blackfriars, I, May 1937, pp. 325-32; II, June, pp. 405-15; Penguin, Aug., pp. 622-4; Letter, Sept., pp. 782-5; Penguin, Dec., pp. 943-4.

^®®Review by E. Gill of Tradition and Modernism in Politics by A. J. Plenty, Blackfriars, July 1937, pp. 550-1; Attwater, Cell of Good Living, pp. 74-5; Robert Speaight, The Life of Eric Gill, pp. 234-43; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 40-2; Lunn, Science of World Revolu­ tion, p. 203; Lewis Watt, S.J. Review of The Future of Bolshevism by W. Gurian, Clergy Review, June 1936, pp. 494-5; The Month, May 1936, p. 387; The Sower, Jan.-March 1938, pp. 3-4; The Month, Nov. 1936, pp. 385-6; Dec., p. 489; May 1937, pp. 391-2; The Sower, Jan.-March 1937, p. 8 ; review by Gosling of Why Communism Gets Away With It by D. Att­ water, July-Sept. 1937, p. 172; E. Quinn, "Church and State in the New­ est Age," Dublin Review, Oct. 1937, pp. 311-24; Dom C. Butler, "A Manual of Catholic Action," Downside Review, April 1936, pp. 204-11; The Sower, July-Sept. 1937, p. 129; Jan.-March 1938, p. 834.

186"The Next Election," The Tablet, 16 Feb. 1935, pp. 197-8; 26 Oct. 1935, p. 522; 2 Feb. 1935, p. 131; 24 Oct. 1936, pp. 546-9; 16 Jan. 1937, p. 74. 187 Colosseum, Dec. 1936, p. 245; review by Lewis Watt of The Restoration of Property by Belloc, Clergy Review, June 1936, p. 496. 155 far as to call for bringing Germany into a "Christian" bloc to defend 188 European civilization. Other Catholics wondered whether Jerrold*s violent hatreds, simplistic solutions and complete distrust of modem society were suited to discover Christian solutions to present prob- lems.189

Wall's right-wing social radicalism was the kind of answer favored by these men. He joined Maritain in denouncing those "re­ spectable" Christians whose ignoring of the social demands of the

Gospels had driven the masses to embrace Marxism, and w a m e d Catholics away from men like Charles Maurras who would bind the Church to re- 190 action.

Mit Brennender Sorge

The continued persecution of the Catholic Church in Nazi Ger­ many throughout 1935-1937 engaged the deepest interests of the British

Catholic press. No sooner had the Saar been safely retumed to Germany in January 1935 when a full-fledged campaign began against the German

Catholic Church. The Nazis soon found that tactics which were less obvious than blatant persecution were more effective in breaking down the Church because such tactics were harder to identify and fight against. In November 1935, Hitler ordered that this more subtle

1 OQ George, Warped Vision, pp. 130-1; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 294-5; Jerrold, Future of Freedom, pp. 299-300. 189 Reviews of The Necessity of Freedom by Douglas Jerrold, Blackfriars, June 1938, pp. 460-461; M. B. in The Dublin Review, April 1939, pp. 202-3. 190 Colosseum, March 1936, p. 8 ; Viator, "Thoughts on May-Day," June 1936, pp. 116-18; The Universe, 3 Dec. 1937, p. 9; 10 Dec., pp. 1, 23. 156

approach was to be followed; the Church would be strangled, not 191 bludgeoned, to death.

In line with this new strategy, the Nazis set to work. Catholic doctrines and practices were attacked. A campaign of official mockery

and ridicule was directed against Catholic religious beliefs, while the 192 state preached a substitute faith of race, blood, and nation. The bishops were prohibited from printing their pastoral letters issued 193 after their regular meetings at Fulda. Seminaries were closed down while religious orders were harassed, their work in hospitals and

charitable institutions gradually stopped and their assets and property

confiscated. A favorite tactic was to trap clergymen who had violated

the stringent and complex currency laws and subject them to show trials

and Draconian p e n a l t i e s . ^^4 Catholic youth organizations were labeled

subversive and even pro-Communist and dissolved.Religious schools were a special target. By 1939, they had been completely abolished.

19] Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1935, p. 333.

^^^The Tablet, 18 May 1935, p. 619; 15 June, 1935, p. 768; 6 July 1935, p. 26; L. Sturzo, "Germanism and Christian Civilization," Blackfriars, Nov. 1935, pp. 833-41; review. Catholic Truth, March-April 1935, p. 43; The Tablet, 7 March 1936, p. 318.

^^®The Tablet, 7 Sept. 1935, p. 290. 194 Power, Religion in the Reich, pp. 62-7; The Tablet, 6 April 1935, p. 426; 27 April, p. 546.

^^^The Tablet, 4 May 1935, pp. 554, 635; 18 May, p. 635; The Tablet, 2 May 1936, p. 556; 30 May, pp. 687-8.

^^®Melville, "Catholics and the Saar," Clergy Review, Feb. 1935, pp. 169-70; "Germany and the Concordat," March, pp. 260-1; "Germany," Clergy Review, March 1936, p. 263; Melville, "Germany," Clergy Review, Nov. 1936, pp. 424-6; Dec. 1936, p. 504. 157 197 Most Catholic newspapers were suppressed. Finally, the Nazis tried to discredit the clergy by haling large numbers of them into court on charges of gross immorality, subjecting them to lurid show trials which 198 were covered in literally obscene detail by the Nazi press. This last tactic backfired, creating sympathy for Catholics and antipathy for the regime. The government stopped the trials after 1935.

The papacy protested these actions which were all in violation of the 1933 Concordat, but to no effect.Between 1937 and the first months of 1938, Berlin rebuffed fifty-four written communications from the Vatican dealing with the persecution.^®® As for the German bishops, they strove mightily to defend the Christian faith, refute Nazi doc­ trine, answer charges of clerical political machinations and moral turpitude, and to encourage their congregations. At the same time, they insisted that they were patriotic, loyal Germans who sought nothing but

^^^The Tablet, 29 Feb. 1936, pp. 260, 284.

^^%arrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Histori­ cal Review, vol. 51 (January 1966), pp. 191-2; The Tablet, 25 Jan. 1936, p. 126; 7 Nov., p. 633; For documentary evidence of Nazi persecution, see U. S. Chief for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), I: 263-96.

^^%arrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Histori­ cal Review, pp. 188-91; Duncan-Jones, Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, p. 183; Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1935, p. 315; W. M. Harrigan, "Pius XI and Nazi Germany, 1937-1939," Catholic Historical Review, vol. 51 (January 1966), p. 458.

^®®Duncan-Jones, Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, pp. 215-7; Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Historical Review, p. 174; The Tablet, 28 Nov. 1936, pp. 744-5. 158 201 peace with the regime. It was all to no avail; the persecution continued.

With reports of Nazi assaults on the Church regularly entering

Britain, Ernest Oldmeadow did not appreciate advice that The Tablet should support Germany as a barrier to Russia.

We reply that, although Nazi Germany may be a bulwark against Communism, we have no confidence that her rulers are to be counted among the champions of Christendom.. .Both are atheism but only Russia is h o n e s t . ^02

Keating declared that, "Ethically, there is not a whit to choose be- 203 tween the German Terror and that of Russia...." Gilbert Chesterton compared Hitler to Herod and even Douglas Jerrold was forced to call

Germany a "ruthless dictatorship. "^®4 the low-key but intense Nazi pressure on the Church continued throughout 1936, C. F. Melville noted

^®^The Tablet. 5 Jan. 1935, p. 2; 16 Jan., "Orbis Terrarum," p. 58; 16 Feb., p. 195; 23 Feb., p. 227, 252; 2 March, p. 258; C. F. Melville, "Germany and the Concordat," The Clergy Review. March 1935, pp. 260-1; The Tablet, 25 Jan. 1936, p. 125; Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1936, p. 755; The Tablet, 1 Feb., p. 135; 4 July 1936, p. 21; 16 Aug. 1936, p. 209; 5 Sept. 1936, p. 295; 305-6; Duncan-Jones, Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, pp. 215-7; Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Historical Review, p. 174; The Tablet, 28 Nov. 1936, pp. 744-5; Persecution, pp. 13-39.

ZO^The Tablet, 27 April 1935, p. 525; 4 May 1935, pp. 554, 635; 18 May, pp. 619, 635; 15 June, p. 768; 6 July, p. 26; 27 July, pp. 117-8; 17 Aug., p. 209; 7 Sept., p. 290.

203The Month, May 1935, pp. 388-9; Oct., pp. 295-7; Feb. 1936, p. 108.

^®\fard, GKC, p. 637; "Current Comments," The English Review, March 1935, pp. 266-7; Melville, "New Nazi Drive Against the Church," Clergy Review, Aug. 1935, pp. 161-2; Melville, "Central Europe," Clergy Review, Sept. 1935, p. 239; "Germany," Clergy Review, March 1936, p. 263. 159 the failure of the German episcopate's efforts to conciliate the

Nazis.The latter, he said, had changed their methods but their goal of destroying the Church remained the same.^®®

By the end of 1936, a number of observers had begun to realize that, at bottom, Nazism was not so much a political movement as a secular religion, a Weltanschauung, and that in this fact lay the root of its clash with Catholicism, each system intent on winning the souls of men. Most notable in this group were Father Edward Quinn and Wal- 207 demar Gurian. Quinn was a perceptive student of German affairs and 708 had read Mein Kampf as early as 1933. Gurian was a Jew and a Catho­

lic and a refugee from Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, two countries of 709 which he had expert knowledge. In 1937, he became an instructor at

the University of Notre Dame in the United States. An avid anti-Nazi and anti-appeaser, he virtually persecuted Christopher Hollis, who was then also at Notre Dame, for the appeasement posture of The Tablet, of 710 which Hollis was a director. Though Gurian never lived in England,

^®®Melville, "Germany," Clergy Review, Nov. 1936, pp. 424-6; Dec. 1936, p. 504.

20®c. F. Melville, "The Church in Germany and Austria," Dublin Review, April 1937, pp. 232-7.

2®7john Murray, "A New Kulturkampf," The Month, Dec. 1935, pp. 504-11; review of Hitler and the Christians by Waldemar Gurian, in Catholic Truth, March-April 1937, p. 58; E. Quinn, The Tablet, 19 Dec. 1936, p. 882; Dom Ninian Fair, Downside Review, April 1937, pp. 274-6; Heiden, Per Fuehrer, pp. 633-9, 637.

^®®E. Quinn, "No Soup Kitchens," New Blackfriars, August 1974.

209j^all, Headlong Into Change, pp. 88-9.

Hollis, Along the Road to Frome (London; G. G. Harrap, and Co., 1958), pp. 160-3. 160 articles by him appeared regularly in English Catholic journals.

The clenched fist which characterized The Tablet's attitude toward Hitler changed to an open hand when Douglas Woodruff took over in April 1936, Nazism and Fascism, he said, were "often heretical but they are not necessarily so...Their doctrine is not inevitably incom- 211 patible with the Catholic faith...." This, he explained, was in sharp contrast with Communism and was the reason for the Pope's tolera- 212 tion of Germany. The threat of Communism was even held to justify 213 the internal "severities" of the Nazi regime. The Tablet held to this line in spite of a constant flow of reports of persecution coming out of Germany. In February 1937, it printed an article characterizing the Nazi regime as essentially a "defensive" one with a program of

"popular patriotism." It had ended the rule of "privilege" and was led by "a man of the people." It was unfortunate, the article went on, that, now that many Englishmen were coming to see the Germans had had a better appreciation of the evils of Communism, that feelings were being alienated by the clash with the Church.

Woodruff's tone of sorrowful solicitude indicates that the only thing that prevented him from advocating wholehearted accommodation of

Germany was the news of Nazi attacks on the Catholic Church. And yet a grim report in his own paper declared that, "Despite the brave stand made by the German bishops, the Catholic ranks, probably demoralized

^^^The Tablet. 30 May 1936, p. 679. ^^Sbid.

^^®The Tablet, 31 Oct. 1936, p. 586.

214The Tablet, 6 Feb. 1937, p. 181. 161 215 by intensive propaganda, seem to have deserted the trenches....'*

There was a grave fear, a later item read, that Germany's youth had been lost to the Church.

Meanwhile, the continuing attacks on the Church within Germany and the utter frustration of every effort of the Pope and the German bishops to conciliate Hitler convinced Pius XI that Nazism was as evil as Communism. This brought his thinking into agreement with bishops like von Galen of Munster and Preys ing of Berlin. Finally, even conciliationists like Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich were forced to agree that it was time for some bold move to help keep alive the spirit of 218 resistance to Nazi persecution.

On 18 January 1936, Cardinals Faulhaber of Munich, Schulte of

Cologne, and Bertram of Breslau, and Bishops Preysing and von Galen arrived in Rome for the meeting with the Pope that would result in the 219 issuance of the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge. Secretary of State

Eugenio Pacelli and Cardinal Faulhaber produced a draft of the encycll- 220 cal which was approved by the Pope. On their return to Germany, the

^^®The Tablet. 6 Feb. 1937, pp. 193-9.

^^®The Tablet, 20 March 1937, p. 460.

^^^Tinneman, "Attitudes," Western Political Quarterly, pp. 341-2.

^^®For instances of this popular resistance, see Melville, "Ger­ many," Clergy Review. Oct. 1935, pp. 319-20; Teeling, Crises for Christ­ ianity , pp. 157-9, 169-80; The Tablet, 16 Feb. 1935, p. 195; 29 June, p. 834; 12 Dec. 1936, p. 836; 26 Dec., p. 907.

219»Rome Letter," The Tablet, 23 Jan. 1937, p. 121; "Rome Let­ ter," The Tablet, 30 Jan. 1937, p. 157.

^^®Primary credit is difficult to assign. Harrigan and Fried- lander say Faulhaber; Paul Molinari, S.J., investigator for Pacelli's canonization and Lapide cite the Secretary. See Harrigan, "Nazi 162 bishops again saw Hitler in a final effort at accommodation. The 221 failure of this effort was the signal for action.

The encyclical was smuggled across the German frontier, repro­

duced in absolute secrecy and distributed to every c o m e r of Germany, 299 without the Gestapo's knowledge. On Palm Sunday, 21 March 1937, it was read in every Catholic Church in Germany. In the encyclical, the

Pope declared that the Concordat had been signed to give the Nazi

regime a chance, in spite of the misgivings of many Catholics. How­

ever, said Pius, the consistent violations of that accord indicated

that the German government was trying to exterminate the Church. The

Pope condemned neopaganism together with the cult of race, state, and

leader. He asked Catholics to defend Christ, the Old Testament, the

papacy, and the natural rights of man. He especially exhorted youth 223 and parents to be strong in defense of the faith. It is true, as

Lewy says, -that the encyclical was not directly aimed at the political

aspects of Nazi Germany.But Harrigan rightly pointed out that Lewy

underestimates the force of the encyclical whose arguments were com-

Germany and the Holy See," Catholic Historical Review, p. 197; Fried- lander, Pius XII and Third Reich, p. 6 ; Molinari, drawing on Vatican archives in Serrou, "Saint Pie XII?" Paris Match, pp. 81-2; Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, p. Ill cited Pius XI crediting Pacelli; Rhodes, Vatican in Age of Dictators, p. 203 cites contradictory evidence.

^^^uncan-Jones, Struggle for Religious Freedom, pp. 213-5; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 165.

^^^Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 165.

^^®Text in Persecution, pp. 523-37 and The Tablet, 3 April 1937, pp. 482-3; Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 165-6.

^^'^ewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, pp. 157-9; Philip Hughes admits this. Pope Pius XI, p. 301. 163

pletely antithetical to the Weltanschauung on which the Nazi regime 225 was built.

The encyclical drove Hitler into a fury. On his direct orders,

copies of the letter were seized, printing presses confiscated, the

sex and currency trials renewed, and a stiff protest lodged at the

796 * Vatican. In a speech on 1 May, Hitler declared that he would not

tolerate Church interference in political matters by "letter. Encyclica 277 or otherwise." The clergy, he said, had no right "to criticize the morals of a State when they have more than enough reason to concern

themselves with their own morals.Meantime, it was Pacelli's turn

to refuse protests and he wamed that the Vatican might publish a

"White Book" proving its case against Germany.Still, he insisted 230 that the Vatican wanted peace.

The Nazi campaign against the Church continued. In all, between

1935 and 1939, 25,635 members of the clergy were tried on morals

^^%arrigan, 'Pius XI and Nazi Germany," Catholic Historical Re- view, p. 460n. Also see Kent, "Pope Pius XII and Germany," American Historical Review, p. 62.

^^®Foreign Ministry Memo, 23 March 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, doc. 632; Foreign Ministry Memo, 7 April 1937, no. 642; Memo, 30 June 1937, no. 6 6 a; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 166.

^^^Adolf Hitler, My New Order, ed. by Raoul De Roussy De Sales (Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p. 420. ZZ^lbid.

229poreign Ministry Circular, 15 April 1937, DGFP. Series D, I, no. 646; Bergen to For. Ministry, 15 April 1937, no. 642, Pacelli to Bergen, 30 April 1937, no. 649. 230 Bergen to For. Ministry, 23 March 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, no, 634; Bergen to For. Ministry, 15 April 1937, no. 647; Harrigan, "Pius XI and Nazi Germany," Catholic Historical Review, pp. 466-8. 164 charges, of which fifty-eight priests and two religious brothers were 231 found guilty— less than % of 1 percent. The Nazis appeared to be moving to a complete repudiation of the Concordat when the noisy 232 attacks ceased. Hitler had agreed with a Gestapo recommendation that a stepped-up version of the former strangling tactics would be more effective than frontal assault.^®® Pacelli told British minister

Francis D'Arcy Osborne that the German racial cult was ’"a frenzy of primeval barbarism, and Osborne told London that Germany had replaced 234 Russia as the Vatican's prime concern. In December 1938, Pius XI attacked German policy in a public audience and at Christmas, con- 235 demned the Nazi persecution.

The English Catholic press responded instantly to Mit brennender

Sorge. The Catholic Truth Society published a translation with the title, "The Persecution of the Church in Germany."^®® Joseph Keating explained the change in The Month' s policy. "In common with most other reputable periodicals," he wrote. The Month had tried to sympathize with efforts to recover German prosperity and self-respect, even where the means chosen were

sometimes needlessly crude and self-centered.. .But now that the Holy Father has spoken so clearly and emphatically in his

^®^Power, Religion in the Reich, pp. 69-72.

^^%arrigan, "Pius XI and Nazi Germany," Catholic Historical Re- view, p. 469.

Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 169-74.

^^^Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1937, p. 379; p. 370.

235persecution, p. 8 ; Bergen to For. Ministry, DGFP, D. I,, no. 687. 236catholic Truth. May-June 1937, p. 89. 165

Encyclical on the violated Concordat, his children must follow his lead....237

It was recognized that the Vatican had not wished to preclude any future possibility of peace. Waldemar Gurian wrote of the encyclical that

"...while on the one hand it has revealed the destructive struggle against the Church, it is nevertheless in an attitude of arms out-

OOQ stretched towards any possibility of conciliation."

In the months that followed. The Tablet followed the noisy clash of Nazi blows parried by protests and statements from the Vatican and 239 German bishops. But only two months after the encyclical appeared, the paper reverted to its previous posture of hand -wringing over the inability of accommodating Germany. The attitude of the Nazis to religion was the best test of the quality of the movement, admitted

Woodruff, who then added the interesting understatement that the present

German attitude raised "the most serious forebodings."^^®

Years later. Woodruff was to say that.

The great turning point was Mit brennender Sorge in 1937, but that wasn't a general condemnation; it was a chapter and verse on how they'd violated the Concordat.

Perhaps, but it was a point at which Woodruff failed to turn. He was

Comment to R. E. Wolfe's "The Church in Germany at Bay," The Month, Sept. 1937, p. 205; Wolfe, pp. 205-213; John Murray, "Germany and the Encyclical," May 1937, pp. 440-9; July 1937, pp. 5-8.

2 3 % . Gurian, "In the Utmost Anxiety," Blackfriars, July 1937, p. 488.

^®^W. Gurian, The Tablet, 27 March 1937, pp. 437-8; 10 April 1937, pp. 513-14; 15 May, p. 706; "Rome Letter," The Tablet. 19 June 1937, p. 879.

^^®The Tablet. 5 June 1937, p. 800.

24%oodruff interview, 29 May 1976. 166 too perceptive not to see that the encyclical implied a radical cri­ tique of the Nazi regime, but he downplayed that implication because of his fear of the Communists, a greater danger according to Woodruff 242 due to their efforts at global subversion. As a veteran journalist put it: "The Tablet was definitely sympathetic to fascism, and I don't think I'm doing anyone an unjustice when I say they soft-pedaled

Hitler...[because of Mit brennender Sorge] they should have been aware 243 of the enormity of fascism."

But the implications of the encyclical were missed in other

Catholic circles where Realpolitik was not a consideration. When the

Bishop of Leeds gave Father Edward Quinn permission to publish an article on "The Religion of National Socialism" he asked Quinn: "'Can

National Socialism be a religion? If it were, wouldn't the Holy Father have condemned it as such?' This was after Mit brennender Sorge which did precisely t h a t . "244

The quieter Nazi measures continued throughout the year,

accompanied by protests from the pope, the papal nuncio to Germany,

Von Galen, Preysing, and Faulhaber, the last named insisting on Catho­

lic loyalty to Germany all the w h i l e . The Universe cited the pope's

Christmas message. "We will call things by their right name. Hence, we

242%bid. 243jgQ6 interview, 26 May 1976; concurring opinion, Wall inter­ view, 30 May 1976.

Quinn, "No Soup Kitchens," New Blackfriars, August 1974; letter from E. Quinn, 10 June 1976.

245i»j^oine Letter," The Tablet, 19 June 1937, p. 879; The Tablet, 7 Aug. 1937, p. 196; 4 Sept., p. 325; 2 Oct., p. 445; 27 Nov., p. 717; 11 Dec., p. 798; 18 Dec., p. 839; "Rome Letter," 25 Dec., p. 872. 167

say that in Germany there is a real religious persecution.'*^^®

But Mit brennender Sorge and the efforts of Pope and bishops notwithstanding, by August 1937, reports began appearing which indi­ cated that the Church was losing the battle. In the opinion of Edward

Quinn, it appeared that "... in five or six years time there will be accomplished a total destruction of Christianity.Many Con­

tinental Catholics, he concluded, looked to English Catholics "to make their influence felt against this monster...which may destroy Europe itself."248

These discouraging reports were in the main correct. In spite of the encyclical, the policy of the German church remained one of accommodation; the bishops protested violations of the Concordat, but 249 they insisted on the unshakeable loyalty of Catholics to the regime.

This protest, based heavily oh patriotic and even nationalistic appeals, proved ineffective, says Gordon Zahn, in defending the Church while it 250 prevented many from contemplating resistance. Some resistance there was and, at times, it was forceful and courageous. But if the Nazi measures in Poland after September 1939 are any indication, the

248 % e Universe, 31 Dec. 1937, pp. 1, 14.

247^ g Tablet, 21 Aug. 1937, p. 253; the Nazis realized this was a prime concern of Catholics. See Zipfel, Kirchenkampf in Deutschland, pp. 459-60.

248qyinn, The Tablet, 28 Aug. 1937, p. 253; 28 Aug. 1937, pp. 277-9; 16 Oct. 1937, p. 514.

249jiarrigan,"Pius XI and Nazi Germany," Catholic Historical Re­ view, p. 80; Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 174-5.

250cordon C. Zahn, "Catholic Opposition to Hitler: The Perils of Ambiguity," Journal of Church and State XIII (Autumn, 1971), pp. 413-25. 168 accommodation policy of the German Church in the event of a Nazi victory would have occasioned a catastrophe for Catholicism in Central 251 Europe.

Persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany increased the revulsion felt by British Catholics for Hitler's regime, but that re­ vulsion was not translated, from 1935 through 1937, into the feeling that Germany must be brought down. That sentiment was only produced by the hammer blows of repeated foreign policy disasters which im­ perilled the security of Britain and Europe.

From 1935 to 1937, British diplomacy fell into disarray. Britain had tried to retain the Stresa Front and the collective security of the

League. By her vacillating and irresolute policies, she alienated

Italy from the Stresa Front while failing to support the League in defense of Ethiopia. The result was that both Stresa and the League were ruined. Britain had tried to restrain German adventurism while stabilizing the Continent by peaceful treaty revision. By refusing to support France in opposing the German coup in the Rhineland, she had encouraged German adventurism while adding to Continental instability.

She effectively ignored German rearmament while neglecting her own and not alerting the public to the danger, adding further to that instabil­ ity. Britain had wanted to stop the involvement of outside powers in the Spanish Civil War and instead virtually stood by while her wishes were flouted and Spain turned into an ideological battleground between the forces of fascism and Communism. Finally, the apparent rise of a

^^^Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 175. 169

Communist threat in Spain further weakened Britain's resolve to stand up to Hitler and Mussolini. Instead, it made her even more eager to accommodate the authoritarian states as a barrier to Communism.

The basic unity of the English Catholic press in opposing

Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia was jolted by Hitler's remilitariza­ tion of the Rhineland. In the view of the more conservative organs,

Germany and not Italy posed the most immediate threat to European security. In order to bar the door to German adventurism, therefore, it was necessary to restore the Stresa Front, and that meant accepting

Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, if not as a positive good, then, compared to Hitler, as the lesser of two evils. More liberal Catholic writers considered this position to represent a surrender of principles in favor of expediency.

The Spanish Civil War widened this fissure in the Catholic position into a chasm. The appearance of Communists in the Republican ranks created a stampede to Franco's side among most Catholics in the public eye, including the clergy. Catholic M.P.s and the greater part of the Catholic press. Those favoring neutrality included many working-class laymen, John McGovern in the Commons and those writers rallying around the standard held by Blackfriars and The Sower. Fear of Communism made the more conservative journals favor British rearm­ ament and appeasement of Germany as well as Italy. The more solidly anti-fascist papers could not bring themselves to really support re­ armament to guard against dangers from the continental right. The clash between the Nazis and the Catholic Church in Germany shook the conservatives but did not alter their basic position. This readiness 170 to accommodate Germany dovetailed with the official attitude of the

British government to pave the way for future appeasement.

Hitler had not been blind to this lack of resolution in Great

Britain. It had served him well, allowing him to rearm in defiance of

Versailles, to reoccupy the Rhineland in defiance of Locarno, and to

intervene in Spain in defiance of Anglo-French opposition. Now, at

the end of 1937, his period of preparation was over and he was ready

to accelerate his pace. That is the real significance of the famous

Hossbach Conference of 5 November 1937. Now Hitler was ready to take 252 greater risks to achieve his objectives, including the risk of war.

The sequence of events came out differently from what Hitler had ex­

pected; the results did not. 1935-1937 had sown the seeds of disaster;

1938 produced the first harvest of that dolorous crop.

^^%ossbach minutes of 5 Nov. 1937 in DGFP, Series D, I, no. 19; Ribbentrop seems to have independently reached the same judgment. Memo to Hitler, 2 Jan. 1938, no. 93; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 367-71; Gordon- Brooks-Shepherd, The Anschluss (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), pp. 8-12; on the controversy over interpretation of the Hossbach Conference, see Alan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War," in European Diplomacy Between the Wars, 1919-1939, pp. 221-46; Hitler, pp. 369-71; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 326-7; Taylor, Origins, pp. 134-5; Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School?" Political Quarter- ly 36 (April-June 1965); 191-213. CHAPTER IV

FROM VIENNA TO MUNICH

The Anschluss

The first concrete step taken by Neville Chamberlain in the pursuit of his concept of appeasement was to dispatch Lord Halifax to

see Hitler on November 19, 1937 to discuss the framework of a general

European settlement. Halifax told the Führer that Great Britain would not oppose "alterations" in the future status of Danzig, Austria, or

Czechoslovakia, but that such changes should be carried out peace­

fully.^ This coincided with the general program that Hitler had out­

lined only two weeks before in the Hossbach conference, where Austria

and Czechoslovakia were marked out to be eliminated, in some fashion, 2 as the precondition to expansion to the east. Specific steps to

implement this more aggressive attitude depended on the opportunities which political circumstances would present. Halifax's statements

indicated that when such opportunities arose. Great Britain would not

stop Germany from making use of them. On 4 February 1938, by means of

a major governmental shaking-up, Hitler made sure that no domestic

opposition would be offered to his new and risky approach. Joachim von

Ribbentrop was made Foreign Minister, the position of Minister of war

^Foreign Office Memo, 19 Nov. 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 31.

^Hossbach memorandum, 5 Nov. 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 19.

171 172 was abolished, and Hitler assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces. A new High Command of the Armed Forces was created which was completely subservient to Hitler. Its Chief of Staff was the O pliant General Wilhelm Keitel, Hitler was now prepared for whatever opportunities might arise. He was sure they would ; the only question was where.

The first opportunity for a German initiative arose over Austria.

Worried about the impact of the recent governmental changes on German public opinion. Hitler quickly accepted Franz von Papen* s suggestion of a meeting between the Führer and Austria's Chancellor Schuschnigg. The conference was held on 12 February 1938, and Hitler used the occasion to browbeat Schuschnigg into making concessions that granted the Austri­ an Nazis a very much broadened role in Austrian affairs. Quite satis­ fied that this success would smooth over the bad news of the "purge" of 4 February, Hitler looked forward to a gradual, "evolutionary" drawing together of Austria and Germany.^

Because Austria's population was overwhelmingly Catholic, at least nominally, and because the state's strategic location made it either a barrier or a bridge to eastward Nazi expansion, the British

Catholic press evinced a strong interest in the progress and the fate of Austria. Before 1938, the strongest defense of her independence

^iskemann, Europe of the Dictators, p. 116; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 418-20; Shirer, Rise and Fall of Third Reich, pp. 314-20.

^ u r t von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem trans. Franz von Hilde­ brand (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 3-27; Protocol of Conference 12 Feb. 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 294-5; Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 42-63; Bullock, Hitler, p. 420-21; Taylor, Origins. pp. 138-41. 173 was made in the pages of Clergy Review and The Month. The Austro-

German Agreement of 11 July 1936 was taken by Joseph Keating as a

German acceptance of Austrian independence, but Clergy Review's C. F.

Melville more perceptively saw that the agreement had, in fact, opened

the door to a gradual Nazi takeover.^

These friends of an independent Austria naturally considered the

primary threat to the state to be from Germany. But they also recog­

nized that the violent social crises of recent years had split Austria

into Communists, socialists, Nazis, and pro-Anschluss groups without

creating any strong body in favor of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg's

effort, applauded by the English Catholics, to create a corporative

state,^

While Keating and Melville did not call for Britain to defend

Austria by force, they at least encouraged Vienna by their sympathy.

The Tablet and The Universe refused to give even that meager support.

Referring to questions "like the independence of Austria," Woodruff

wrote that no British government "will be able to carry public opinion

to the point of fighting Germany on any Central European issue.

Woodruff shared the general realization that Italy had been the only

^The Month. Aug. 1936, p. 97; Melville, "The German-Austrian Rapprochement," Clergy Review. Aug. 1936, pp. 664-6; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 347-8.

^Melville, "Austria," Clergy Review. Jan. 1936, p. 79; June 1936, pp. 513-6; G. Luke, "The Mission of the New Austria," The Month. Oct. 1936, pp. 301-9; J. Murray, "Problems of M o d e m Austria," The Month. Part I: Feb. 1937, pp. 107-16; part II; June, pp. 529-39; Luigi Sturzo, "Giuseppe Toniolo and Christian Democracy," Blackfriars. May 1936, p. 367; The Tablet. 23 Jan. 1937, p. 122.

^"The Coming Crisis in Austria," The Tablet. 25 April 1936, p. 514. 174 real barrier to a German move, and that that barrier had been steadily g lowering since Ethiopia. Therefore, he was cool to any idea of

Britain trying to prevent an Anschluss which, he felt, the Austrians 9 themselves desired.

As German pressure on Austria increased after Hitler's meeting with Schuschnigg on 11 February 1938, The Universe simply declared this pressure to be a blow against the Paris treaties, "And those treaties we all know had to go, in one way or another, and ultimatelyAccord­ ing to editor George Barnard, the League's ability to resolve inter­ national differences had been wrecked by admitting Russia to Geneva.

"Small wonder," he wrote, "that it is now necessary to seek out other 11 ways of European appeasement." Austria's independence was "in God's 12 hands," he concluded.

It was Schuschnigg who precipitated the crisis leading to the

Anschluss. Convinced that he was losing control of the situation, he decided to call for a plebiscite by which the Austrians could register their support for independence, scotching Hitler's claim that it was

Anschluss they desired. On 9 March, he announced the vote would be 13 held in three days and the crisis was on.

^The Tablet, 1 May 1937, p. 630; 25 Sept., p. 402; 19 Feb. 1938, p. 226; Melville, Clergy Review, Oct. 1935, p. 320; April 1936, pp. 346-7; The Month, March 1938, pp. 195-6.

^The Tablet, 29 May 1937, p. 762; 21 Aug., p. 245.

^*^The Universe, 25 Feb. 1938, p. 14. 11 12 "Reaping the Whirlwind," 4 March 1938, p. 14. Ibid.

Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 77, 118-23; Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 28-39; Bullock, Hitler, p. 426; Taylor, Origins, 175

The Tablet supported Schuschnigg's call for a plebiscite, and a headline for 9 March 1938 in The Universe cried: "Vatican Backs

Austria's Independence--Right of Absorption Not Justified.

If Schuschnigg's gamble were to succeed, he would need outside help to support Austria against the inevitable German reaction. None was forthcoming. Halifax told him that no assistance could be expected from London and France would not move without Britain.Mussolini sacrificed Austria to those foreign ambitions which were gradually making him a prisoner of German policy. He consoled himself by throw­ ing the blame on France and Britain.

Meanwhile, assured that Britain, France, and Italy would not act to support Austria, Hitler overcame his initial surprise at Schuschnigg's 17 move and quickly recovered his poise. Emboldened by the degree of passivity he had encountered. Hitler rapidly escalated his aims from simply ousting Schuschnigg to complete annexation of Austria. On 12

March, German troops crossed the frontier. The following day, the

^^The Tablet, 5 March 1938, pp. 289, 295; 12 March, p. 324; The Universe, p. 15.

^^Halifax to Palairet, 11 March 1938, Brit. Doc., 3rd Series, I, no. 25; Georges Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, English trans. (Isle of Man: Times Press and Anthony Gibbs and Phillips, 1965), pp. 159-63; Middle- mas. Strategy of Appeasement, p. 181; Anglo-Vatican Relations, p. 387.

^^Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 139-40; 188-9; Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 2-5; Giano, Hidden Diary, 11 March 1938, p. 87; Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1938, p. 387.

l^Hitler to Mussolini, 11 March 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 352; Memo by Ribbentrop, 11 March, no. 150, 151; Henderson to Halifax, 12 March 1938, Brit. D o c . 3rd Series, I, no. 46; Memo, Ger. Embassy in Paris, 11 March 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 347; Plessen to For. Min­ istry, 11 March 1938, no. 350; Hitler letter to Mussolini; 11 March 1938, no. 352; Woermann to Ger. Foreign Ministry, 12 March 1938, pp. 359; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 431-2. 176

Anschluss was proclaimed. Hitler had got his way by threats and force. 18 It was a lesson he learned well.

The British government and people were willing to accept the

Anschluss as a rectification of one of the Versailles injustices, but there was consternation over the swift brutality of the means employed to bring it about.Meeting on the day Austria was invaded, Chamber­ lain’s cabinet was upset at Hitler's use of force and discussed how to prevent such tactics from being used against Germany's next most likely target, Czechoslovakia. Increases in the Navy, anti-aircraft forces, and the air force were considered, the air force plan being "below the 20 minimum Scheme considered necessary by the Air Staff for security."

But two days later, Chamberlain rejected the air force plan saying it 21 would disorder British finances and work to Britain's long-term harm.

Even critics of the government's policy only suggested an increased 22 pace of rearmament. No one favored resistance.

English Catholic opinion was similar to that of the general public. The Tablet displayed the most equanimity. The Anschluss, said

Woermann to For. Ministry, 14 March 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 381, 386; Wathen, Policy of England and France Towards the Anschluss, pp. 169-70; Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 190-5.

^^Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 495; Wathen, Policy of England and France Towards the Anschluss, pp. 187-90; Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 182; Madge and Harrison, Mass-Obseirvation, pp. 43-4; B. B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, p. 107.

2°caB 23/92: 12 (38):1. ^^CAB 23/92: 13 (38): 3

^^Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 217; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 272-3; History of Times, pp. 915-16; Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 152, 156; Wathen, Policy of England and France Towards the Anschluss, pp. 188-91. 177

Christopher Dawson, "is in the logic of history...But though we must admit the legitimacy of the end, it is a very different matter to approve the means." Barbara Ward, Arnold Lunn and George Barnard 24 blamed the Versailles Treaty for the Nazi triumph. The Universe thought additional armaments might be necessary but it still put its 25 faith in "general appeasement."

Reaction elsewhere was less tempered. Keating was enraged at the Germans' "ruthless pursuit of national ambition...in violation of 26 pledges both local and international." C. F. Melville, formerly

Clergy Review's writer on Central Europe, wrote that the Anschluss had been a tragedy, a fact recognized at the Vatican if not in "certain

Catholic circles in England...The next German threat will undoubtedly be to Czechoslovakia. Eventually Germany will threaten Western

Europe.

In Parliament, Prime Minister Chamberlain told J. J. Tinker

^^"The March of Austria," The Tablet, 19 March 1938, p. 358; Christopher Hollis agreed, interview, 10 June 1976.

^^B. Ward, "Iganz Seipel and the Anschluss," The Dublin Review, July 1938, pp. 33-50; A. Lunn, "Shadow Over Austria," The Universe, 1 April 1938, p. 3; "The Weeks' Tragedy," The Universe, 18 March 1938, p. 14.

25l8 March 1938, p. 14.

^^The Month, May 1938, p. 385; E. Quinn, "What is Christendom?" Downside Review, April 1938, p. 173; Wilfred Parson, review of The Mission of Austria by E. Quinn, in Downside Review, July 1938, p. 381; John Murray, "The Fourth Austria," The Month, May 1938, p. 418; Wall interview, 30 May 1976.

^^"Austria at the Cross-Roads," The Dublin Review, April 1938, pp. 230-2; Charles-Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, p. 121; Anglo-Vatican-Re- lations, 1938, p. 392; Charles Pichon, The Vatican and its Role in World Affairs, trans. Jean Misraki (New York; E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 142. 178

(Lab., Lancashire) that there were no plans to call a Dominion confer­ ence to discuss European affairs. Tinker protested that to wait until 28 the next crisis broke would be too late. John McGovern declared that it was stupid to allow small states to be swallowed up with impunity and that efforts to make agreements with the two fascist "liars" were futile.At the Vatican, officials from the Pope on down predicted 30 that, with Austria gone, Germany would seek to destroy Czechoslovakia.

British Catholics were naturally concerned over Nazi treatment of the Austrian Catholic Church, Ironically, the initial troubles were of that Church's own making. When the Germans marched in. Cardinal

Michael Innitzer of Vienna, who had previously supported the effort to retain Austrian independence, called for the Austrians to obey the new 31 authorities "willingly and with good grace," united the other

Austrian bishops with him in supporting the Anschluss, and ended a 32 letter to the new Reich Commissioner with "Heil Hitler!"

Many, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, in and out of Germany, were shocked and confused by this seeming capitulation. Initial com­ ment in the English Catholic press was somewhat embarrassed, and tried to put the best face on things: Innitzer was only hoping for the best; he was trying to avoid a political clash; he was glad no blood had been

^®HC 333 (1938): 1995. ^^HC 333 (1938): 1473-77.

^^Charles-Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, p. 121; Anglo-Vatican Re­ lations . 1938, p. 392; Charles Pichon, The Vatican and its Role in World Affairs, p. 142.

^^"The Church Abroad," The Tablet, 19 March 1938, p. 363.

^^Austrian Bishop's statement. The Tablet, 2 April 1938, p. Duncan-Jones, Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, pp. 237-8. 179 33 shed; censorship precluded definitive judgments. The Vatican was not so shy. It declared that the Austrian hierarchy's statement had been made without consulting Rome. A German language broadcast from Vati­ can radio warned churchmen not to succumb to "the mighty and successful

figures of the day."^^ The Vatican disavowed official sponsorship of

the broadcast in the wake of German protests, but the British minister reported that "...there is no doubt that it represented the Vatican's real feelings.The English Catholic press agreed.

Meanwhile, Innitzer was summoned to Rome. After meeting with

the Pope and Cardinal Pacelli, he issued a "clarification" of his earlier statement. That statement, he said, was

of course not an approbation of anything incompatible with the laws of God and the liberty of the Catholic Church. This declaration must not be regarded by the state or by the Party as binding in conscience, and it must not be used for propaganda purposes.37

Finally, he said, the Austrian Concordat with its guarantee of OQ Catholic schools and religious organizations remained in effect. The

The Tablet, 19 March, 1938, p. 363; 26 March, p. 369; "Cathol­ icism and the Nazi Movement," 2 April, pp. 432-3; D. Esdraile, report. The Universe, 1 April 1938, p. 1; 0. Woods, "Kulturkampf," Dublin Re­ view, July 1938, p. 16; The Month, April 1938, pp. 291-2; The Universe, 18 March 1938, p. 1; 25 March, pp. 1, 29; Rauschning, Revolution of Nihilism, pp. 118-19; E. Quinn, letter to author, 10 June 1976,

3^ergen to German Foreign Ministry, 1 April 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 698; 2 April 1938, no. 699.

33gergen to German Foreign Ministry, 4 April 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 700; Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1938, p. 392; Persecution, pp. 9-10; The Tablet, 4 April 1938, pp. 468-9; The Universe, 8 April 1938, p. 468.

3^Penguin, Blackfriars, July 1938, p. 535; The Tablet, 16 April 1938, p. 494.

37The Tablet, 4 April 1938, p. 468. ^®Ibid. 180

Nazis naturally objected and the German press was silent on the state-

OQ ment. More than one observer has called Innitzer naive. Six months after the Anschluss, he was the most persecuted Cardinal in the Reich.

The German episcopacy issued no public call to support the up­ coming plebiscite to approve the Anschluss, but The Tablet reported that the Bishop of Fulda said that he hoped for a solid "Ja" vote in the hope that it would mark "a significant appeasement."^^ The Gauleiter of

Bavaria demonstrated the government's concept of appeasement with the comment reported in The Tablet that, "There will be no peace in Germany until the political priests are exterminated,"^^ and, the Minister of

Justice added, "with the same rigours as the Jews."^^

The Nazi assault on the Austrian Catholic Church began from the start of the Anschluss and fulfilled Edward Quinn's shrewd estimate that "...there is every sign that the Church will suffer persecution more brutal and more obvious than... in the Reich. The Catholic youth organizations were dissolved. Catholic newspapers shut down and the police raided the offices of the Archbishop of Salzburg."One gathers the impression," declared The Universe, "that the Nazis wish to

39 Bergen to German Foreign Ministry, 6 April 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 702; The Universe, 17 April 1938, p. 1.

^ ^rs. Douglas Woodruff, who met him in 1946, commented: "He was such a silly man; he would say anything to anyone [to be accommo­ dating]," comment by Mia Woodruff, 19 May 1976; Harrigan, "Pius XII and Nazi Germany," Catholic Historical Review, p. 477.

^^The Tablet, 8 April 1938, p. 471. ^Zjbid. “^^Ibid.

^^The Tablet, 19 March 1938, p. 361.

^^The Tablet, 19 March 1938, p. 363; The Universe, 25 March 1938, p. 1; 1 April, p. 9; The Tablet, 26 March 1938, p. 397. 181 accomplish in five days in Austria what it took them five years to do in GermanyA meeting between Innitzer and Hitler and the

Cardinal's call to keep religion and politics separate had no effect as the Nazis revoked the Austrian Concordat, attacked organizations, prohibited interracial marriages, closed schools, and unleashed mobs to attack the residences of bishops who had not supported the Ansch- lus1 s. 47

Thousands of Austrian Catholics suffered either imprisonment or exile in trying to resist these actions.Finally, Innitzer's stub­ born optimism broke down and he protested Nazi violations of the AO Austrian Concordat. For his troubles, a Nazi mob attacked his palace, smashed the ground floor, broke every window and defenestrated a priest.

The Nazis then blamed Innitzer for provoking the incident. All agree­ ments between the state and the Church were ended, it was declared, due to the disloyal attitude of the c l e r g y . The Universe called the attack on Innitzer's residence the worst outrage since the Spanish

46Ibid.

^^Ger. For. Ministry draft note to Vatican, 11 June 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 705; Ger. For. Ministry memo, 4 Aug. 1938, no. 724; The Tablet, 23 April 1938, p. 536; 7 May, p. 598; 14 May, p. 630; 16 July, p. 75; 30 July, p. 140; 20 Aug., pp. 236-7; The Universe, 29 April 1938, p. 27; 3 June, p. 21; 17 June, p. 11; 15 July, p. 7; 29 July, p. 16.

4&The Tablet, 28 May 1938, p. 698.

4^1he Universe, 19 Aug. 1938, p. 13; 9 Sept., p. 1.

3®"ln Austria Today: Religion and Life After Six Months of Nazi Rule," The Tablet, 15 Oct. 1938, p. 487; 22 Oct., pp. 522-4; The Universe, 14 Oct. 1938, p. 1; "The Outrage in Vienna," p. 14. 182

Civil War.^^

The Nazis were unable to crush the Church completely. When

Innitzer preached in St. Stephen's for the first time following the attack, the Cathedral was packed and well-wishers mobbed his car when he left.32 But Nazi efforts continued to cut down the scope of the 53 Church's activities, hemming it into narrower and narrower spaces.

Many Austrians left the Church, others simply accepted the regime as a cross, and many others were convinced that collaboration was necessary to save what little religious life was left.^^ Accommodation, collab­ oration, appeasement--of the unappeasable.

Munich

The Anschluss accomplished, attention immediately turned to what was almost universally regarded as the next German objective: Czecho­ slovakia and its German Sudetenland.^3

From 1920 to 1929, most of the large German minority living in

Czechoslovakia's border area of the Sudetenland was generally content with its status, though it did have a number of justified grievances against the government in Prague. The Great Depression and the rise

3^"The Outrage in Vienna," 14 Oct. 1938, p. 14.

32The Tablet, 17 Dec. 1938, p. 823.

33ihe Tablet, 29 Oct. 1938, p. 555; 7 Jan. 1939, p. 11; 14 Jan., p. 43; The Universe, 4 Nov. 1938, p. 18; 11 Nov., p. 12; 20 Jan. 1939, p. 28; 3 Feb., p. 17.

34”in Austria Today," The Tablet, 15 Oct. 1938, pp. 487-8; E. Quinn letter, 29 Oct., p. 569; 18 Feb. 1939, p. 205; E. Quinn, 11 March, p. 317; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 228.

3%edlicott, Contemporary England, p. 374; History of Times, p. 915; Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 273. 183

of Hitler increased friction between the Czechs and the Sudeten Ger­ mans. The result was that, by 1935, a majority of the Germans sup­ ported the Sudeten German Nazi Party headed by Konrad Henlein.^^

A French ally since 1924 and a Russian ally since 1935, Czecho­

slovakia represented an obstacle to the eastern program Hitler had outlined in Mein Kampf. At the Hossbach Conference, he named Bohemia

as a central part of his future Reich. Henlein's movement presented

the Führer with a ready-made instrument to stir up trouble in Czecho­

slovakia from which Germany might profit. Therefore, immediately after

the Anschluss, Hitler summoned Henlein to Berlin and gave him the task 58 of keeping Czechoslovakia in a state of agitation. Who knew what

fish might surface in those troubled waters?

Meanwhile, the British government had been grappling with the

problem of Czechoslovakia. In a cabinet meeting of 22 March 1938,

Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, Eden's successor as

Foreign Minister, declared that they had abandoned any idea of ex­

tending guarantees to Czechoslovakia since the Chiefs of Staff had

informed them that, if it came to war, Great Britain and France could

not prevent the Germans from overrunning Bohemia. Furthermore, the

Chiefs had warned them that the effort to succour the Czechs would

J, W. Bruegel, "The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia," in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948, ed. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Lu%a (Princeton, N. J . ; Princeton U. Press, 1973), pp. 157-87; Johann Wolfgang Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich (Cam­ bridge, Eng.: University Press, 1973), pp. 38-53, 63, 124-5; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 336-7.

^^Hossbach minutes, 4 Nov. 1937, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 19.

3®Henlein report, 28 March 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 107. 184

result in a world war for which Britain was utterly unprepared. Cab­

inet members who tried to warn that allowing Germany to continue to

expand would create an even worse situation were argued down.

The government decided to urge Prague to negotiate with the

Sudeten Germans and to try to persuade Germany to accept such a settle- 59 ment. Accordingly, on the twenty-fourth of March, Chamberlain told

the House of Commons that Britain would neither join in any power bloc which would polarize the continent, nor give France any prior commit­

ment to aid her if her Czech ally became involved in a war. But, he

added, if war did break out then it would probably spread beyond those

states which were immediately involved.

This tortuous policy of the Prime Minister's was intended to

keep all parties to the Czech dispute reasonable. Unfortunately, the

whole approach was vitiated by three things. The first was the meager

support which Britain was willing to provide France in the event of a

war. Discussing this support in the cabinet, Chamberlain agreed with

Halifax that, aside from air and naval support, "our maximum Army con­

tribution, if we gave one at all, could not exceed two Divisions...."^^

Halifax summed up the general opinion:

Everyone was anxious to avoid commitments... it was important to make plain at the outset that we could not commit ourselves to send any troops to the Continent. But it was also important not to say that in no circumstances would we ever send any troops. 2

CAB 23/93: 15 (38) 1; Foiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, pp. 347-48; Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, pp. 181-2, 188-99, 204, 207; Medlicott, Contemporary England, p. 374.

^°HC 333 (1938): 1404-6. ^^CAB 23/93: 21 (38) 3. 32ibid. 185

Second, the French themselves were completely unenthusiastic

about fulfilling their commitments to Czechoslovakia, a reluctance 63 which the British were happy to increase. The result was that the

initiative in the Czech matter fell to a British government which was 64 equally, if not more, desirous of avoiding commitments. Third,

London spoiled any chance of moderating the German demands by telling

Hitler, by word and deed, that Britain was eager to give him what he w a n t e d . ^3 Hitler was delighted. The gradual, evolutionary strategy he had mapped out to solve the Czech problem was going beautifully and he looked forward to the future with confidence.Only a few voices

in Britain were raised against Chamberlain's approach.Most people,

including the most important organs of the Catholic press, agreed with

the Prime Minister.

Then, on 19 May, mysterious reports began to fly that the Ger­ mans were preparing a sudden descent on Bohemia. The stories were

incorrect but the Czechs mobilized and stiff warnings were sent to

Berlin from London and Paris. The German government pleaded innocence.

6%emo of Anglo-French conversations, 28, 29 April 1938, Brit. Docs.. 3rd Series, I, no. 164; CAB 23/93; 19 (38) 2; 24 (38) 6 .

^^Taylor, Origins, pp. 150-1.

33cer. Foreign Ministry to Ger. Embassy in Italy, 7 May 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 149; Memo by Bismarck, 10 May, Ibid., no. 151.

36fiemo by Keitel, 20 May 1938, Ibid., no. 175.

^Tchurchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 275-78.

^^The Tablet, 21 Nov. 1936, p. 693; 6 March 1937, pp. 325-6; 21 Aug., pp. 245-6; 27 Nov., p. 710; 25 Dec., p. 862; 5 March 1938, p. 290; 19 March, pp. 354-5; "War and Peace," 19 March, pp. 355-6; The Month. April 1938, pp. 293-4; "War Clouds Clear," The Universe, 1 April 1938, p. 14. 186 honestly this time, and the "crisis" was over by the twenty-third.

But the crowing of the foreign press that Hitler had been forced to

back down infuriated the Führer. On 28 May he issued a revised mili­

tary directive to his generals that began; "It is my unalterable will

to smash Czechoslovakia by military action.Conversely, Cham­ berlain was so frightened by the prospect of war and annoyed at the

Czechs for bringing it about that he was determined never to get so

close again.The French agreed to allow the British government to 72 try to force the pace of negotiations in Czechoslovakia. This shifted

the primary responsibility for the Czechs from Paris to London. After

some efforts, Prague was persuaded to accept the services of Lord 73 Walter Runciman as a mediator in the dispute.

As the German pressure on Czechoslovakia increased from March

Henderson to Halifax, 19 May 1938, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, I, no. 232; Newton to Halifax, 22 May 1938, no. 238; 21 May 1938, no. 244, 247; Henderson to Halifax, 21 May 1938, no. 255; Phipps to Halifax, 21 May 1938, no. 261; Eisenlohr to Ger. For. Ministry, 20 May 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 169; Ger. For. Ministry Minutes, 20 May 1938, no. 171; Ger. For. Ministry Memo, 21 May 1938, no. 185; Welczeck to Ger. For. Ministry, 23 May 1938, no. 194; Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich, pp. 187-90.

7®Directive by Hitler, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 221; Joachim Fest, Hitler, trans. Richard and Clara Wilson (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 551-3; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich : Prologue to Tragedy (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1948), pp. 54-8; Cooper, Old Men Forget, pp. 220-1.

7^CAB 23/93: 26 (38) 1; Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 348; Gilbert Gott, The Appeasers. p. 115; Taylor, Origins, p. 161.

^^Halifax to Phipps, 31 May 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, I, no. 354; Phipps to Halifax, June 1938, no. 357.

7%alifax to Newton, 18 July 1938, Ibid., no. 508; 19 July, no. 516; Newton to Halifax, 20 July, no. 521; 21 July, no. 525, 531; 23 July, no. 536, 537. 187

through May, The Tablet and The Universe reiterated what became their

standard position on the issue: Britain should refuse to be dragged

into involvement in Central Europe, most especially a war in which she would be aligned with the detested Russians in defense of a patchwork

Czechoslovakian state whose structure must be amended in any case.74

Then tensions relaxed and, though rumblings were still heard

from Bohemia, the crisis passed. The Tablet and Colosseum complimented

Chamberlain's stand which, said the former, had clearly warned Hitler

away from a "unilateral and violent settlement," while evincing "a

great and obvious preoccupation, a desire to see a spirit of com­

promise. The Tablet and The Universe thought the root of the prob­

lem was the Russian guarantee to Czechoslovakia. Woodruff and Barnard

felt that this guarantee disinclined the Czechs from making concessions

(though Prague's attitude so far was commended) and made Germany fear

an attack on her eastern flank. Both papers thought that, while Ger­

many was exploiting the situation, she had a right to just concessions

in the Sudetenland. After all, said The Universe. Hitler was not trying

to annex the whole country, "a very different proposition."^^

Opinion elsewhare in the Catholic press was less sanguine. S. J.

Gosling in The Sower congratulated France and Britain for saving Czecho-

74jhe Tablet. 26 March 1938, p. 386; 2 April, p. 431; 1 April, p. 462; 23 April, p. 527; 30 April, pp. 557-8; 14 May, p. 622; 21 May, p. 654; "War Clouds Clear," The Universe. 1 April 1938, p. 14; 6 May, p. 14.

7^The Tablet. 28 May 1938, p. 695; Colosseum, July 1938, p. 78.

7^"Realities in Czechoslovakia," 27 May 1938, p. 14; The Tablet. 28 May 1938, pp. 693-4. 188 77 Slovakia "for this week-end at any rate," but Gosling wondered whether 78 or not this display of courage would last. The Month thought that the whole "crisis" was exaggerated, but Keating thought that, once

Germany became strong enough to risk a war, she would simply take the

Sudetenland.^^ Edward Quinn also thought annexation was Hitler's ultimate goal. He thought that, were Germany to make further such 80 claims on other states, "...in a very short time it must mean war."

In the House of Commons, several Catholic members joined a rising chorus of voices which had doubts about the government's foreign policy.

Conservative Anthony Crossley expressed growing doubts over the appease­ ment policy. He approved the Runciman mission but warned that concil­

iation was only possible through strength, not capitulation to threats.

England was not weak, he said, but was ready to fight Hitler if neces- 81 sary. John McGovern mocked the efforts to separate Mussolini and

Hitler and jeered at the government for allowing small states to be 82 swallowed up.

The tensions leading to the Munich crisis built slowly. In June,

Sudeten Nazi leader Konrad Henlein won almost 90 percent of the German vote in local elections.Following Hitler's instructions, Henlein

^^The Sower, July-Sept. 1938, p. 123. ^^Ibid.

7^The Month, July 1938, pp. 489-90.

^^E. Quinn, "Nazi Apologetics," Blackfriars, Aug. 1938, p. 594.

®^HC 332 (1938); 287-8; 338 (1938): 2990-2991.

®2h c 333 (1938): 1473-5; 335 (1935): 633.

^^The Times (London), 13 June 1938, p. 14; The Tablet, 7 June 1938, p. 765; 18 June, p. 790. 189 continued to prevent the success of negotiations between himself and 84 Prague.

The Tablet praised the "moderate" Nazis led by Hitler while The

Universe deplored what he called the left-wing propaganda of the League of Nations Union which was urging intervention in the German-Czech dis- OC pute "on behalf of the post-war treaties." Woodruff, Barnard, and

Keating joined the general British public in welcoming the dispatch of

Lord Runciman on his mediation mission.However, Keating feared that granting autonomy to the Sudetenland would wreck the security and 87 stability of Czechoslovakia.

By September, tensions between the Sudeten Germans and their

German backers on one side and the Czechs on the other were near the breaking point and reports flowed in to every capital that a crisis was in the offing which would probably end in a German attack on Czecho- 88 Slovakia. With the British pressing him to make concessions, Czech president Eduard Bene&, on 4 September, pulled the rug out from under

^Eisenlohr to Ger. For. Ministry, 14 July 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 291; Ger. For. Ministry to Ger. Embassy in Great Britain, 19 July, no. 298.

Q C The Universe, 17 June 1938, p. 14; The Tablet, 23 June 1938, p. 98; 2 July 1938, p. 3; 23 July, p. 98.

^^The Tablet. 30 July 1938, pp. 129-30; 6 Aug., p. 161; 13 Aug., p. 194; The Universe, 5 Aug. 1938, p. 12; The Month, Sept. 1938, pp. 194-5; Madge and Harrison, Mass-Observation, p. 50.

^^The Month, Sept. 1938, pp. 193-6.

®®Chilston (Moscow) to Halifax, 29 Aug. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 708; Farquhar (Bucharest) to Halifax, 29 Aug., no. 709; Newton (Prague) to Halifax, 29 Aug., no. 712; Ogilvie-Forbes (Berlin) to Halifax, 29 Aug., no. 714; Campbell (Paris) to Halifax, 30 Aug., no. 721; Henderson to Halifax, 4 Sept., no. 767; Phipps to Halifax, 4 Sept. no. 768. 190 the Sudeten leaders by agreeing to meet all their demands. Henlein evaded the offer and broke off negotiations on a flimsy pretext, but

BeneS had proven that the issue was not Sudeten grievances but German demands.

The crisis continued but BeneS' offer was important in beginning the change in the orientation of British thinking from meeting the justice of German claims to resisting the power of German arms. Fur­ thermore, in view of the constant bullying of Czechoslovakia by Germany the continuing efforts of Britain to urge Benes along the path of further concessions began to change the British public's view of appeasement. Though it had begun as an effort to reconcile just griev­ ances, that policy now began to seem to be a surrender to the threat of force.But resistance was not yet to be. The Times called for the outright cession of the Sudetenland on September 7 and Hitler's Nurem- 91 berg speech on the 12th touched off a rising in the Sudetenland. The crisis point had been reached.

The Catholic press reflected the attitude of a British public still generality convinced of the justice of the basic German demands but increasingly puzzled and annoyed at the violence of German methods.

The Tablet and The Universe declared that the use of force would touch

Halifax to Newton, 31 Aug. 1938, Ibid., no. 727; Newton to Halifax, 4 Sept. no. 758, 759; Runciman to Halifax 5 Sept. no. 783; Hencke (Prague) to Ger. For. Ministry, 6 September 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 441, 442; Ger. Embassy in Gt. Britain to Ger. For. Ministry, 10 Sept. no. 452; 12 Sept., no. 458, 459.

90iaylor, Origins, pp. 164-5.

^^The Times (London) 7 Sept. 1938, p. 13; Hitler, My New Order, pp. 504-14; For. Ministry Minute, 13 Sept. 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 464. 191 off a protracted struggle. The Germans, wrote Douglas Woodruff, had 92 "no chance either of winning a short war or of surviving a long one."

As the situation further deteriorated, the two papers grew even more bitter towards Germany. They warned Hitler that the violence of Nazi politics was angering British public opinion and that, if the Führer insisted on a violent solution to the Czech problem, he would find that 93 opinion united foursquare against him. Woodruff, formerly so criti­ cal of the Czechs, now praised them for their demonstrated spirit of accommodation and agreed with the British government's rejection of The 94 Times' proposal for outright cession of the Sudetenland.

By September, the attitude of the British public and press, though not yet ready to fight, was hardening against Gemnany. Several cabinet members and foreign governments were urging Chamberlain to stand fast. Furthermore, a highly placed group of German conspirators informed him that they were ready to remove Hitler if he were to de­ clare war. But the Prime Minister was fixed in his belief that accom­ odation with Germany represented the only practical solution to the 95 crisis. The British cabinet met on the day of Hitler's speech. All

^^The Tablet, 27 Aug. 1938, p. 258; The Universe, 2 Sept. 1938, p. 12 .

^^The Universe, 2 Sept. 1938, p. 12; 16 Sept., p. 12; The Tablet, 3 Sept. 1938, p. 292.

^^The Tablet, 10 Sept. 1938, pp. 321-2; Kordt to Ger. For. Min­ istry, 8 Sept. 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 443. gc Rock, Appeasement on Trial, pp. 115-16; Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, pp. 135-41; Phipps to Halifax, 8 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 848, 855, Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 106; Cooper, Old Men Forget, pp. 226-7; Donald hammers, Explaining Munich (Stamford, Conn.; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stamford Univ., 192 agreed with Foreign Secretary Halifax's judgment that "...Hitler was 96 possibly or even probably mad...," and that if he were pushed in any way he would rush off to war. Duff Cooper's objection that the govern­ ment's course was leading to the surrender of Czechoslovakia were 97 brushed aside. Negotiation, it was decided, was the only way. Then, on September 13, with the Sudetenland swept by riots, the wavering

French resolve gave way. Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet desperately begged Chamberlain to make the best arrangement he could with Hitler 98 in order to prevent the terrifying prospect of war. The same day,

Chamberlain put into effect a plan he had considered for some time but which was known to only a few members of the government; he proposed an immediate meeting to Hitler.The delighted Chancellor agreed, the

British cabinet concurred on the 14th, and the next day Chamberlain flew off to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden.^^®

1966), pp. 7-13, 30-8, 49, 63n, 77, 65n, 90; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 608-9; Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 24-9, 207- 17; Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 168; Fabian von Schlabren- dorff. The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (New York; Pitman, 1965), pp. 85, 91-3; Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, Minn; University of Minn., 1968), p. 103; Gilbert andGott, The Appeasers, p. 155.

^^CAB 23/95; 37 (38) 1; Halifax's phrase was probably modeled on one of Ambassador Sir Neville Henderson's in a note to Horace Wilson PREM 266/A,cf. Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 329.

^^CAB 23/95; 37 (38) 1. 98 Daladier message via Phipps to Halifax, 13 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 861; Bonnet, Quay d'Orsay, pp. 181-4. 99 Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 315; Draft telegram, Chamberlain to Hitler via Henderson, 13 Sept. 1938, PREM 266/A.

^^®Ger. For. Ministry Minute n.d. (14 Sept. 1938) DGFP, Series D, II, no. 480; CAB 23/95; 38 (38) 1. 193

In deciding to deal directly with Hitler, Chamberlain did not

simply act out of naive trust in the Führer, but out of the mistaken belief that Hitler's stated, limited objectives were the real ones.

This, combined with his disbelief in the justice of fighting a war over

Czechoslovakia or winning such a war determined his decision, That being said, it must be admitted that a good deal of confusion was

present, demonstrated by contradictory expressions of trust and mis­

trust of Hitler's word and, later, defending Munich as a true step to

peace and as a device to buy time to rearm. In this, he reflected, as

A. J. P. Taylor put it, the general state of British opinion, "a mix- 102 ture of fear and good intentions...In retrospect, fear predominated."

Chamberlain's gloomy estimate of the military situation was

shared by the British and French Chiefs of Staff. But voices were not

lacking which urged that Germany could be defeated. These included

Duff Cooper and, eventually, General Gamelin, the French Chief of Staff

as well.The debate continued after the war. Keith Middlemas's

careful study agrees with the more general view that Germany could not

have won a general war in 1938.^^^ However, this dispute is rather

^®^Medlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 381, 388.

^^^Taylor, English History, p. 431.

^*^^iddlemas. Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 246-7, 386-7; CAB 23/95: 38 (38) 1; 45 (38) 2; Gamelin's pessimistic estimate, cited by Middle- mas, was changed to a more optimistic one in the latter cabinet record cited.

^^^See Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 246-7, 420; Lawrence V. Thompson, The Greatest Treason (New York: W. Morrow, 1968), pp. 72, 75-6 disparages Czech military power; see also Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 182-93; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 336-9; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: MacMillan, 1970), pp. 132-3, 194 academic since not only the French and British leaders but BeneS him­ self were opposed to going to war over the Sudetenland. Convinced that a war would devastate Czechoslovakia, Bene% had built up Czech defenses only as a tool to strengthen his diplomacy. When that diplomacy failed, the only choice was surrender.Thus, BeneS must also, finally, be included among the appeasers, though one might note that, unlike some others, he was not surrendering the interests of any country but his own.

The announcement of Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden evoked an outpouring of public support.Reflecting the pacifistic tenden­ cies of its editor, Victor White, Blackfriars came out more strongly for appeasement than The Tablet. Writing on 15 September, White said that neither the Czechs nor the Germans could claim to have justice all on their side and he was angered at the calls for an anti-fascist war in

"defense of the idiotic frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia."^^^ He declared himself in favor of any settlement attainable "without doing injustice," and ended by setting forth the stringent requirements that had to be 108 met for a war to be considered just. The Tablet was more cautious in its judgment of Chamberlain's mission. "It cannot make matters

Piotr Wandyczc, "The Foreign Policy of Edvard Bene&," in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1945, ed. Victor Mamatey and Radomir LuSa (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), p. 233; Thompson, Greatest Treason, p. 15.

^^^Madge and Harrison, Mass-Observation, pp. 63-4.

^®^Scott interview, 8 June 1976; Penguin, Blackfriars, Oct. 1938, pp. 765-6.

^°®Ibid., pp. 766-7. 195 109 worse," it said; "It may well make them better." Woodruff was clearly exasperated and angry that, in spite of claims which seemed basically just, the Nazis' belligerence and their "glorification of violence as a policy" was again pushing Britain forward against Germany as a makeweight in the scales of the balance of power.

At the Berchtesgaden conference on 15 September, Hitler began with a long tirade against the Czechs which culminated in a demand that the Sudeten Germans be united with Germany. This represented the max­ imum offer that Chamberlain was prepared to make. But, impressed by

Hitler's demonstration of urgency, he immediately agreed to the prin­ ciple of cession based on self-determination. Hitler assured Chamber- lain that he did not wish to dismember Czechoslovakia and declared that the Sudetenland was the last territorial claim that he had to make in

Europe. Chamberlain said that he was confident that he could secure this plan's acceptance in London, Paris, and Prague, He then took his leave. Hitler agreed not to take any unilateral action until he re­ turned, an easy promise to make since his army could not move before

October 1 in any case. The Führer was not worried; he was sure that

Prague would refuse, thereby isolating Czechoslovakia and allowing him to militarily smash the state as he had wanted to do all along.

On his return to London, Chamberlain overcame the objection of some cabinet members like Duff Cooper and won the government's consent

109The Tablet, 17 Sept. 1938, p. 353. ^^°Ibid.

^^^Notes by N. Chamberlain of meeting with Hitler, 15 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 895; German record in DGFP. Series D, II, no. 487; Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 343, 348. 196 to the Berchtesgaden proposals. Chamberlain was confident. He had formed the impression, he told the cabinet, "that Herr Hitler's objec- 119 tives were strictly limited." On Sunday the 18th, the French Prime

Minister Eduard Daladier and his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, arrived in London. The proposal for a plebiscite was dropped since it would raise the question of other minorities in Czechoslovakia. Instead, areas whose inhabitants were over half-German were to be simply trans­ ferred to Germany. Daladier insisted on Britain joining as a partner on the proposed new guarantees to be given to Czechoslovakia to re­ place her former alliances which were to be abrogated as part of the 113 settlement. The British agreed. It was a rather summary treatment of Czechoslovakia's rights and interests.The following day (19

September), the Czechs were presented with the Anglo-French proposals.

When they tried to refuse them, they were warned that if war broke out, no help would be forthcoming from the West, and that meant the East as well, since Russian help was contingent on French assistance being effected first. On the twenty-first, the Czechs, feeling miserably betrayed, capitulated, and Chamberlain prepared to set out to bring the

11 s "good news** to Hitler at Godesberg,

^^^CAB 23/95: 39 (38) 1. ^^^Ibid., 40 (38) 2 and appendix.

^^^iddlemas. Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 352.

^^^Hallifax to Newton, 19 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 937; 21 Sept. no. 991; Phipps to Halifax, 21 Sept., no. 1001; Newton to Halifax, 21 Sept., no. 1002; Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, pp. 185-8; William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 388-91; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 300-6. 197

When the Berchtesgaden proposals were published, they produced a large, negative reaction in Britain.The Catholic press was angry at the peremptory tone of Hitler's demands but saw partition as unavoidable. The proposals, said The Tablet, with conscious or uncon­ scious irony, were worthy of Solomon. What was infuriating and humili­ ating was that they had been made and accepted "at the pistol's point."

Even if war resulted, the problems would remain and it was doubtful that Czechoslovakia would be reconstituted as it was. Therefore, in spite of everything, it was better that such changes occur peace­ fully. "C'est n'est pas magnifique," wrote Woodruff, "mais ce n'est 1 1 Q pas le (sic) guerre."

In spite of the manner of Nazi demands, said George Barnard in

The Universe, there was no good reason for not meeting them. The only justification for war, he concluded, would be if "larger issues" arose which compelled Britain "to mobilize in resistance to a threat of national aggression against territories to which no honest claim can 119 be made." The stands of The Tablet and The Universe illustrate the contention of John Wheeler-Bennett that, once the principle of partition had been admitted, the sole problems were ones of dates and boundary lines. It would have been impossible to fight over these with complete popular support.

ll%adge and Harrison, Mass-Observation, pp. 34-5; Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, p. 444.

117ihe Tablet, 24 Sept. 1938, p. 385.

118iiTalking at Random," Ibid., p. 404.

Reissenberger, The Universe, 23 Sept. 1938, p. 12.

^^^\jheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 116. 198

When Chamberlain met Hitler at Godesberg on 22-23 September, the

Prime Minister was shocked by the Führer's refusal to accept his pro­ posals, Hitler now demanded that the Czechs withdraw from the Sudeten­

land immediately so as to allow the German a m y to march in on 1 Octo­ ber, Chamberlain was furious at this "Diktat" but he was slightly mollified when Hitler set the date for Czech withdrawal at 1 October

and reiterated that this was his last territorial demand in Europe. 121 Chamberlain gloomily set off for home.

Back in London on 24 September, Chamberlain tried to persuade

the cabinet to accept the Godesberg proposals. He had come to under­

stand Hitler, he said. The Führer was narrow-minded and prejudiced, but

he would not deliberately deceive a man whom he respected and with whom he had been in negotiations, and he was sure Herr Hitler now felt some respect for him.

It would be tragic, said Chamberlain, to miss an opportunity to settle

"all points of difference" between Germany and Britain.

The cabinet was displeased with this exposition and they ad- 123 joumed for the night to study the proposals. When they reassembled

the next morning, 26 September, the displeasure had become a revolt.

Foreign Secretary Halifax had contacted Anthony Eden who counselled

rejection of the terms. After consideration, Halifax agreed.

...he could not rid his mind of the fact that Herr Hitler had given us nothing and that he was dictating tçms, just as though he had won a war but without having to fight.

^^^Notes of Godesberg meeting of 22-23 September 1938 in Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 1033, 1073; German Minutes in DGFP, Series D, II, no. 562, 583.

^^^CAB 23/95: 42 (38) 1. ^^^Ibid. ^^\bid: 43 (38). 199

Halifax had here put his finger on the basic flaw in the whole strategy of appeasement: it was completely lacking in that mutual reciprocity which distinguishes a genuine mutual agreement from surrender. Lord

Hailsham, Lord President of the Council, read a statement made by Hit­ ler after the Rhineland coup disclaiming German territorial demands in

Europe. Duff Cooper urged resistance. War Secretary Leslie Hore- 125 Belisha declared it a moral issue.

The Prime Minister struggled to save his policy. He secured approval for continued efforts— they could not hurt--to get Hitler to moderate his demands.When he met Daladier that afternoon, he badgered him— as he had never dared badger Hitler— on France's intentions if Germany attacked the Czechs. Daladier wavered but finally, if re- 127 luctantly, held his ground: France would support the Czechs. Cham­ berlain felt well-nigh trapped. On the next day, he informed the cab­ inet that he had sent Sir Horace Wilson as his personal emissary to plead with Hitler. If the German dictator refused to budge, then Wilson was instructed to hand him a message warning him that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, she would find herself at war with France and 128 Britain. Hitler's reply to Wilson's appeal was to deliver a violent 129 speech in Berlin attacking the Czechs. The next day, 27 September,

^^^Ibid. ^^^Ibid.

^^^Anglo-French negotiations, 25 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 1093; CAB 23/95: 44 (38).

^^®CAB 23/95: 45 (38) 2. 129 Notes, Hitler-Wilson conversation, 26 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, no. 1118; Hitler, My New Order, pp. 517-32. 200 130 Wilson delivered Chamberlain's warning.

In London, the atmosphere grew bleak. Reports arrived that

Czech morale was low. The attitude of the Dominion governments was typified by a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia;

...the transfer of the Sudeten area to Germany having been agreed upon in principle, the precise method of giving effect to that decision was not of sufficient importance to warrant a dispute leading to war.

Faced with the prospect of imminent war, the public mood was dazed, 1 29 fearful and resigned. Halifax asked the French not to initiate 133 offensive action even if Hitler attacked the Czechs. In Paris, one-third of the populace left the city and the government offered further concessions to Hitler if he would refrain from going to war.

But there was hesitation in Berlin also. Hitler's resolve had been shaken by the reports of Anglo-French military preparations and the glaringly obvious reluctance of the Germans to go to war. He 135 accordingly sent Chamberlain a note encouraging him to further efforts.

130 Notes of Conversation, Hitler and Wilson, 27 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 1129.

131c a b 23/95: 46 (38) 1.

^^%adge and Harrison, Mass-Observation, pp. 88-9; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. Ill; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 159.

^^%alifax to Phipps, 27 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, 1143, 1150.

^^^"Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 159; Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 316; Ger. For. Ministry Minute, 28 Sept. 1938, DGFP. Series D, II, no. 656. 1 QC Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 308, 313-17; Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 396-404, 407-11; Fest, Hitler, pp. 556-63; letter. Hitler to Chamberlain, 27 Sept. 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 635. 201

Chamberlain replied on the 28th that Hitler could get what he wanted peacefully while Mussolini was asked to try to persuade the Führer to agree to a conference.Hitler was listening to the French Ambas­ sador tell him that his new proposals would allow Hitler to move into part of the Sudetenland on 1 October when Mussolini's message arrived, 137 followed by Chamberlain's note. It was enough. That afternoon.

Hitler agreed to meet in Munich on 29 September with the Duce, Cham­ berlain and Daladier; Czechoslovakia and Russia were expressly left out.138

The position of the British government was fully supported by the Catholic press. The Month, The Universe, and The Tablet all agreed that, while the basic demands for the cession of the Sudetenland were justified, the German ultimatum delivered at Godesberg was an intoler­ able affront to the peaceful resolution of the question and that to capitulate to these demands would endanger the peace and security of

Europe. While The Tablet was skeptical of protestations by the Nazis of their love of peace, these publications were confident that the

British government had upheld the principle of peaceful treaty revision 139 and the refusal to be intimidated by force.

^ Chamberlain message to Hitler, 28 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 1158; Chamberlain to Mussolini, no. 1159; Musso­ lini's agreement, no. 1161.

^^^Ciano, Hidden Diary. 28 Sept. 1938, pp. 165-6; Mackensen (It­ aly) to Ger. For. Ministry, 28 Sept. 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 661.

^38(]iano, Hidden Diary, 28 Sept. 1938, pp. 165-6; press release, Ger. For. Ministry, DGFP, Series D, II, no. 663.

139ii^e Threat of War," The Month, Oct. 1938, pp. 284-94; "Peace or War," The Universe, 30 Sept. 1938, p. 12; The Tablet, 1 Oct. 1938, pp. 417-18; "The Germans in Europe," pp. 420-1; The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1938, p. 183. 202

At Munich, Mussolini offered, as his own draft, a set of pro­ posals which had been drawn up in the German foreign office.These proposals, which were accepted, were essentially the same as the Godes­ berg demands, amended so that German occupation of the disputed area would take place in several stages rather than all at once. A four- power guarantee replaced Czechoslovakia's alliances with France and the 141 Soviet Union. The Czechs accepted; they were given no choice.

Chamberlain was pleased. Before leaving, he secured Hitler's signature

on an agreement pledging to solve future problems by consultation.

Long debate has ensued over whether Chamberlain really believed

that he had secured "peace in our time." He told the cabinet on 7 Nov­

ember 1938, that he had two aims : "In our foreign policy we were doing

our best to drive two horses abreast, conciliation and rearmament.

In other words, if conciliation failed, then he would have secured time 144 to make good British arms deficiencies for the eventual struggle.

In fact, Chamberlain seems to have put more trust in Hitler's word than

such statements would lead one to believe.True, he did call for

^^^Ciano, Hidden Diary. 29-30 Sept. 1938, p. 167. 141 Ciano, Hidden Diary, 29-30 Sept. 1938, p. 167; notes on Munich Conference of 29-30 Sept. 1938 in Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, II, no. 1227; text of agreement in DGFP, Series D, II, no. 675.

^^^otes of Chamberlain-Hitler conversation, 30 Sept. 1938, Brit. Docs.. 3rd Series, II, no. 1228.

^^^CAB 23/95: 53 (38) 6 .

144Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 359.

^^^See Ibid., 360 ff; J. Bettey, English Historical Documents 1906-1939 (London: Routledge and Kegan Park, 1967), pp. 185-6; Wheeler- Bennett, Munich, pp. 181-2; Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 343; Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 186. 203

increased rearmament to support future diplomatic moves. In the last two months of 1938, he led the cabinet to approve modest expansion of naval forces, the bringing of anti-aircraft batteries up to full

strength and the production of 3700 additional fighter aircraft. But

Chamberlain would not approve the construction of a heavy bomber force

or the production of medium artillery for the army. On 1 November, he had told the Commons that "We are not now contemplating the equip­ ment of an army on a continental basis.Rearmament undertaken at

this pace and on this scale was inadequate to serve either as a deter­

rent or as an effective counterforce. During the "breathing space,"

German arms grew proportionally even stronger than British arms.

The general public shared this inability to grasp what the situation

required. This too must be largely laid at the government's door, for

Chamberlain continued a policy of refusing to give information to either

M.P.s or the general public on how Britain's arms program was progress- 149 ing compared with Germany s.

There can be no doubt that Chamberlain had widespread support

from the beginning to the end of his efforts which culminated at Munich,

but it was of a mixed kind. Apparently facing almost certain war on

28 September, Chamberlain's surprise announcement that Hitler had agreed

146cAB 23/95; 53 (38) 2; 60 (38) 10.

340 (1938): 86.

^^%amier. Diplomatic Prelude, p. 41; Thompson, The Anti-Appeas- ers, p. 180; Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 200-9; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 328, 332, 339; Taylor, Origins. p. 197.

^^^Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, pp. 411-13; Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 233; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 187-8, 325-9; Madge and Harrison, Mass-Observâtion, pp. 239-40. 204

to meet in Munich brought the House of Commons to its feet cheering.

But not all cheered and those who did were really cheering release from war,^^® When Parliament convened to debate the Munich proposals, there was a great deal of uneasiness at the harshness of the terms. Duff

Cooper resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty rather than approve

them.But no one was ready to accept the alternative: a war which 152 was opposed by the Dominions.

Catholics in Parliament generally spoke in favor of the agree- 153 ment. John McGovern had been in Germany during the crisis. The

sight of German war preparations seems to have somewhat unnerved him.

He still loathed Hitler, he declared, but he was grateful for Munich and willing to try to reach accord with the dictator.The House of

Commons approved the Munich accords by a vote of 366 to 144. Six Cath­

olic M.P.s, all Laborites, voted with the "nays."^^^

Anthony Crossley said he did not see how the proposed guarantee

to rump-Czechoslovakia could be fulfilled.As a matter of fact.

^^^Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 617; Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 240; Geoffrey Mander, We Were Not All Wrong (London: Victor Gollancz, 1941), p. 18.

^^^CAB 23/95: 47 (38) 1. 152 Hadley, Munich. pp. 110-29; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 182; Wheeler-Bennett, George VI, pp. 323-4; Watt, Personalities and Policies, pp. 173-4; Ian N. MacLeod, Neville Chamberlain (New York: Athenaum, 1962), pp. 268-9. 1 53 ^^Baldwin-Webb, HÇ (1938): 143; Lord Rankeillour, HL 110 (1938): 1347-9.

^^^HC 339 (1938): 528-33. ^^^HC 339 (1938): 557-62.

^^^HC 339 (1938): 222. Neither did Douglas Woodruff; The Tablet, 8 Oct. 1938, p. 449. 205 neither did the British government, which was of the opinion that the

"Czech Government would have to come to terms with Germany on both 157 economic and political matters." By December, London had, in effect, unilaterally repudiated its pledge. Halifax declared that no help 158 could be offered if Germany attacked and Italy stood aside. It was rather shabby treatment at best.

The majority of the public accepted Munich but there is evidence that, while relieved that war had been avoided, many felt uneasiness and even shame at the Draconian quality of the settlement. A poll taken after the pact had been signed found only 10 percent of the public opposed to the settlement, but only 54 percent in favor of it. The rest were unsure.The vast majority of the regular press endorsed

Munich, but even here many only thought it was the lesser of two evils, the greater being war. Even The Times, which had called for cession of the Sudetenland all along, warned that Munich might only prove to be a 160 temporary respite.

The Catholic papers were generally more favorable in their comments than the non-religious press. The Month, The Tablet, and The

Universe declared that some of the worst injustices of the Versailles settlement had been removed. Blackfriars joined them in hoping for a

^^^Chamberlain on 19 Oct., CAB 23/95: 49 (38) 2; 50 (38) 1. 158 Halifax to Newton, 8 Dec. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, III, no. 408.

^^^Madge and Harrison, Mass-Observation, pp. 101-3; Clark, Anoth­ er Part of the Wood, pp. 277-8; Taylor, English History, p. 43; Medli- cott. Contemporary England, p. 394; Sontag, Broken World, p. 347.

IGOsee Hadley, Munich, pp. 94-110 for comments of fifty repre­ sentative newspapers; History of Times, pp. 943-4; Mowat, Britain Be­ tween the Wars, p. 591. 206 new era of trust. The Tablet's position was closest to Chamberlain's.

It called for increased rearmament to support future diplomatic moves, but, said Woodruff, "Armed conflict in Europe is not now inevitable, or necessary, or likely.These publications based their stand on the government's own stated reasons for going to Munich. In summary form they may be listed as: (1) Czechoslovakia was militarily inde­ fensible, (2) Britain was unarmed, (3) Germany had a good case,

(4) negotiations might lead to a lasting peace, (5) and, finally, if the effort failed, Britain would have bought time to rearm. O n l y S.

J. Gosling was skeptical. He limited his comments to joining George

Barnard in saying that, after the great concessions granted to Germany, if war still came to Europe in the future. Hitler clearly would be to blame.

A number of prominent English Catholics disapproved of Munich.

Hilaire Belloc disliked the Czechs, but he thought that fear had opened 164 the road to Danzig and Alsace to Germany. Arnold Lunn thought

Britain should have either built up a position of military strength from which a policy of real appeasement--and not capitulation— could

The Tablet, 8 Oct. 1938, pp. 449-51; "After Munich," p. 452; 11 Feb. 1939, p. 163; The Universe, 7 Oct. 1938, p. 14; The Month, Nov. 1938, pp. 385-7; J. Murray, "Czechs and Germans," pp. 397-408; Penguin, Blackfriars, Nov. 1938, pp. 848-9; D. Jerrold, Britain and Europe 1900- 1940 (London: Collins, 1941), pp. 145-7; D. Jerrold, England: Past, Pres­ ent and Future (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1950), pp. 199-205, 256. 1 A 9 Interviews with T. F. B ums, 25 May 1976; W. Igoe, 26 May; D. Woodruff, 29 May; Wall-Bergonzi, 30 May; C. Hollis, 10 June. 1 A2 "Appeasement," The Sower, Jan.-March 1939, p. 2; The Universe, 7 Oct. 1938, pp. 14, 28.

^^^Speaight, Belloc, p. 459. 207 have been launched, or paid the necessary price to keep Italy in the

Stresa front and held German expansion in check. Instead, Britain had done neither, and Munich was the unhappy result.Christopher Daw­ son thought Munich was inevitable because public opinion had not caught up with reality. Now it was necessary to rearm as fast as possible.

F. H. Drinkwater thought "poor trembling Chamberlain" had caved in to 1 67 a "bully." The views of these men were closer to the Pope's views than were those of most of the British Catholic press. In Rome, Pius

XI privately told Italian officials that he thought that Munich was an unjust peace and that they could tell that to Mussolini.

The events of Munich have been the object of a great deal of opprobrium since the pact was signed, an opprobrium which is largely deserved. For, as an examination of the records makes clear, the

British and French governments moved from a desire to settle what were seen as Germany's just grievances to a position where they would sacri­ fice almost anything if only war could be averted. That those sacri­ fices were made not by Britain and France, but were imposed on a friendly and even (for France) an allied country, Czechoslovakia, was bad enough. That the Czechs were fobbed off with a set of guarantees which were not intended to be honored was even worse. Further, since

Germany made no concessions and offered only verbal guarantees for the

^^^Lunn, Science of World Revolution, pp. 17-19.

^^^all. Headlong Into Change, pp. 89-90.

^^^Drinkwater interview, 1 June 1976.

IGBjharles Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, p. 129. 208

future security of her European neighbors, the agreement was almost

totally lacking in that reciprocity necessary for viable agreements

among equals. For all these reasons, Munich represented not so much

an agreement as a surrender to the threat of force.Finally,

Chamberlain's credulity in his dealings with Hitler, a credulity dem­

onstrated in his belief that he and the Führer had reached an under­

standing, and in the slow pace of rearmament after Munich, empties the

claim that the agreement was a sacrifice to buy time of most of its meaning.

However, a case can be made for the policy from another point of

view. As accounts written just after the ratification and within the next two years pointed out, it would have been impossible to go to war

in 1938 with solid popular support. For probably most Englishmen and women believed that, in spite of her bullying attitude, Germany had a

valid case in the Sudetenland whose incorporation into Czechoslovakia was considered to be one of the most glaring examples of the injustice

of the "Versailles" system. Only after the Sudetenland had been ceded

to Germany and the Franco-Russian treaty structure in Central Europe

dismantled, in short, only after the public realized that Hitler had

been given all that he could reasonably demand, could it be said, in

the words of George Barnard, editor of The Universe and long-time

advocate of treaty-revision: "If new threats to peace arise, we shall

at least know ^ a t we are asked to fight for next time."^^^ When

^^^Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, pp. 179, 186-7; History of Times, pp. 947-8.

^^^The Universe, 7 Oct. 1938, p. 14; Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, pp. 443-4; Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 186. 209

Prague was occupied by German troops, the British people, including

British Catholics, knew what they had to fight for. Czechoslovakia was a terrible, almost a fatal price, to pay for that knowledge. But, as has been seen in Chapter II, after the terrible suffering of World

War I, it would take that kind of proof to convince the British people

that they ought to go to war again and to fight with determination in

the conviction that they were in the right. In September 1939, they had that determination and that conviction.

The bright hopes so fervently placed in the Munich settlement by the British government, public, and press dimmed quickly, almost

from the moment the pact was signed. Vituperative speeches from

Germany directed against British political figures were evidence that 171 the Germans were not satisfied with the settlement. The British were increasingly annoyed, even angry, but most of them did not know what else to do except hope for the best. Criticism of Chamberlain's

optimistic talk grew. Of Catholic Conservatives, Anthony Crossley,

Edward Fleming, and Robert Bower in the Commons and Baron Strickland

in the Lords all expressed growing concern over the Government's defense plans. Bower said that Russia's assistance should be sought 172 even though, as a Catholic, he disliked that Communist government. 173 Only John Morris spoke for the government. Chamberlain overcame a

^^^Hitler, My New Order, p. 543; Sontag, Broken World, p. 351.

^^^HC 343 (1938); 1458-9; 340 (1938): 188-9; 341 (1938): 410; HL 110 (1938): 1553-9.

344 (1938): 1745-6. 210 vote of "no confidence" in late December by 340 to 143, almost the exact margin of the vote on the Munich pact. Four Catholic members, all Labor men, voted against him.^^^

The public mood began to shift against Munich in October 1938,

A Gallup poll taken on the 14th indicated a 57 percent response in 175 favor of government policy and 43 percent against it. By February

1939, polls indicated that 44 percent of the public disapproved of the 176 government's policies, 50 percent approving. This split in British public opinion which began about the time of Eden's resignation was a deep and painful one. It began to heal after Prague but the process was not completed until Winston Churchill replaced Chamberlain in May

1940.177

The press lagged behind the public, generally continuing to 178 adhere to official government optimism. At first. Catholic papers were unanimous in expecting a new and brighter era reflecting the

stronger support for the appeasement policy among Catholics than among

the rest of the British public. As a writer in The Dublin Review . expressed it:

17^Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 328-30; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 946; Mowat; HÇ 342 (1938): 2625-67.

17^Rolf Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik und der Aufstieg des Dritten Reiches im Spiegel der britischen Presse 1933-1939 (Winter­ thur: P. G. Keller, 1964), pp. 107-8.

l^^Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, pp. 445-7; David E. Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts. 2nd, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 159. 177 Petrie, Twenty Years Armistice--And After, p. 221; Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik. p. 108.

^7%heeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 328; History of Times, pp. 955-60. 211

The real achievement of Munich was the settlement without war of the last of the European disputes which, through the alliances and compacts involved, might have led to an international struggle.

The Tablet fully supported Chamberlain's policy, defended him from his

critics and speculated hopefully that Hitler might now turn east to the

Ukraine to try to fulfill, in a gradual and presumably peaceful fashion,

"the ultimate, not unworthy agricultural objective with which Mein 1 80 Kampf closes." The Universe called for unity with the Italians, a

constant theme of its editor, George Barnard, as well as with France

and Germany.In Colosseum, Bernard Wall thought that the only way

to handle the friction that seemed to be reappearing was by allowing

further concessions to Germany which, he said, had not yet received all 182 it deserved in Eastern Europe. The Month backed Chamberlain com­ pletely including, grudgingly, his rearmament program. Joseph Keating

thought the new Czech state was now stable and suggested that Germany 183 be made a partner in developing colonial areas.

^7^Reginald J. Dingle, "Europe After Munich," The Dublin Re- view, Jan. 1939, p. 34.

^®®The Tablet, 10 Dec. 1938, p. 782; 15 Oct. 1938, p. 483; "The New Czecho-Slovakia," pp. 488-9; 21 Oct., p. 515; "Mr. Chamber- lain' s Critics," pp. 516-17; "Armed Peace," 29 Oct., p. 548; 12 Nov., p. 632; 19 Nov., pp. 662, 6 6 6 ; Lancelot Lawton, 16 Nov., pp. 697-8 and 3 Dec., pp. 729-31; 10 Dec., p. 781; "National Defense," p. 784; 17 Dec., pp. 813-19; 24 Dec., pp. 846-7; 7 Jan. 1939, p. 2; 21 Jan., p. 66.

^^^The Universe, 7 Oct. 1938, p. 14; 11 Nov., p. 12; 3 Feb. 1939, p. 14.

^^^Colosseum, Oct. 1938, pp. 167-9.

^^^The Month. Nov. 1938, pp. 387, 95; Dec., pp. 483-9; J. Keating, "A New International Order," pp. 537-47; Jan. 1939, "The Fortunes of Appeasement," pp. 4-6; "The Good Fortune of Czecho­ slovakia," p. 9. 212

As Hitler's speeches and Nazi actions grew more violent in the weeks preceding the Prague coup, doubts began to appear within the

Catholic press. In December, Blackfriars quoted a French source which called Munich "a grave international disorder," and Victor White saw a rearming Britain and a violent Germany drifting into war.^^^ Keating backed away from his suggestion of sharing colonial responsibility with the Germans but he still hoped that judicious concessions could 1 8 S keep the peace. And in Dublin Review, Father Gerald Vann, a paci­ fist who frequently attacked the morality of modem war now admitted that "recent experience" indicated that if war broke out it would in­ deed be just in its cause.Vann's shift was an indication of the sea-change that Prague would bring.

After 1935, Nazi repression of the German people evoked little comment, being accepted as an evil that, at least for a time, Europe 187 would simply have to live with.

It was quite otherwise with the persecution of the Jews. The attitude of the majority of the English Catholic press to the worsening

Nazi persecution was admirable. Blackfriars subjected anti-Semitism

^^^Penguin, "The March of Munich," Blackfriars. Dec. 1938, pp. 920-27.

^^^The Month, Feb. 1939, pp. 97-104; March, pp. 202-4.

^®^G. Vann, "War: What Is the Problem for the Individual," Dublin Review. April 1939, pp. 280-9.

^^^The Tablet. 4 Feb. 1938, p. 129; 12 Feb., pp. 195, 200; E. Quinn, "Nazi Apologetics," Blackfriars, Aug. 1938, pp. 595-98; Christopher Dawson, Beyond Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), pp. 83, 120; Christopher Hollis, Foreigners Aren't Knaves (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 47-51. 213 188 to a blistering intellectual analysis, while Edward Quinn heaped scorn on the Nazi idea of Jews as a separate "race" which one was justified in treating differently from the rest of the citizenry.

The Month mocked the forged "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and under­ lined the links inseparably binding Christianity and Judaism together.

Keating insisted that "...the Christian who is bidden--and not as a counsel of perfection— to love his enemies has no possible excuse for 190 being an anti-Semite." Among these defenses, an occasional dis- 191 cordant note from the old anti-Semitic cliches appeared.

Elsewhere in the Catholic press, anti-Jewish attitudes were worse. Catholic Truth combined attacks on Nazi racism with comments that showed it adhered to the "standard anti-Semitic myth"; i.e., that 192 Jews dominated the press, big business, and the Communist party.

The worst adherent of this "myth" was The Tablet. Oldmeadow had

^®®J. F. T. Prince, "Universal Diagnosis; The True Menace," Blackfriars. July 1936, pp. 527-31.

^®^E. Quinn, "Nazi Apologetics," Ibid., Aug. 1938, pp. 596-7.

^^^The Month. July 1938, pp. 490-1; "Miscellaneous," A. S. Elwell-Sutton, "Christianity, Judaism and the New Paganism," April 1935, pp. 355-7; June 1935, p. 490; History of Times, review of The Ritual Murder Libel and the Jews, ed. Cecil Roth, pp. 561-2; Nov. 1937, p. 394; Dom Christopher Butler, review of Christianity and Rome by J. Pinsk, Downside Review, Oct. 1936, p. 605; L. Sturzo, "Experiences and Reflections," The Dublin Review, July 1936, p. 40.

D. C. Review of The Yellow Spot. The Extermination of the Jews in Germany. Blackfriars. July 1936, pp. 554-5; The Universe, Jan. 1938, p. 12; July-Sept., 1935, p. 120.

192catholic Truth, March-April 1935, p. 61; review of J. Pinsk's Christianity and Rome. Sept.-Oct. 1936, p. 172; review of Robert Sen- court's Spain's Ordeal, Sept.-Oct. 1938, p. 172; March-April 1939, pp. 34-8; review of M. Sothem, Chosen Races, July-Aug. 1939, pp. 140-1. 214

repeatedly assaulted "the poison-gas of racial hatred," and fully re­

ported those defenses of the Jews made by the Pope and by members of 193 the German hierarchy. When Woodruff took over, this generous spirit

disappeared. Under him, the publication, while deploring Nazi violence,

seldom missed an opportunity to preach a verse from the "anti-Semitic myth." A few evil Jews, declared Woodruff, discredited the majority 194 of decent, religious Jews, The Jews' trouble, he said, began when

their "numbers or influence pass beyond a certain point...and reaction 195 against them, both instinctive and instigated, too easily follows."

It could have been written by Belloc.

Practical measures by Catholics to aid Jewish refugees were

somewhat slow in getting started. By the time of the Anschluss, a

Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany had been formed. Father

Edward Quinn became its secretary while Mrs. Mia Woodruff worked tire­

lessly to aid refugee children who were Catholic by religion but Jewish . ^ 196 by ancestry.

The plight of European Jews grew sharply worse in 1938. When

Italy adopted anti-Semitic legislation. Pope Pius XI declared "We are

^^^The Tablet, 16 Feb. 1935, p. 195, 202; 15 May, p. 619; 15 Aug., p. 184; 21 Sept., p. 354; 2 Nov., pp. 554, 566; 4 Jan. 1936, pp. 1-2; 22 Feb., p. 256.

^^^The Tablet, 27 June 1936, p. 822; 14 Nov., p. 658; 1 May 1937, p. 631; 3 July, p. 13; 10 July, p. 37; 3 Jan. 1938, p. 3; 29 Jan., p. 131; 26 Feb., p. 274.

^^^The Tablet. 9 July 1938, p. 34.

Quinn, "No Soup Kitchens," New Blackfriars, Aug. 1974, pp. Conversation with Mrs. D. Woodruff, 29 May 1976; Wall interview, 30 May 1976. 215

a single great human family, the human genus, the human race— that in 197 our eyes is the true racism." This papal speech provoked anti- 198 clerical violence in Italy and drew protests from Germany. In an

address to a group of pilgrims in September, Pius said: "Note that

Abraham is called our patriarch, our ancestor. Anti-Semitism...is a movement in which we Christians cannot share...We are Semites spir- 199 itually." Cardinal Kinsley and the English Catholic press supported

the Pope and begged the government and British Catholics to aid Jewish

- 200 refugees.

On the infamous "Crystal Night" of 9-10 November 1938, the Nazis

unleashed a vicious pogrom across Germany in retaliation for the murder

by a Jew of a German diplomat in Paris. The democratic states, espec­

ially the United States and Great Britain, made their objections known, 201 infuriating Hitler. Several authorities state that no protests were

Quote from Osservatore Romano, cited in Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 113-14. Same information with some verbal differ­ ences in The Tablet, 6 Aug. 1938, pp. 169-71; "Holy Father Warns Fascists," The Universe, 5 Aug. 1938, pp. 1, 16; The Month, Dec. 1938, p. 491. 1 Q8 "Holy See and Fascists; Tensions," The Universe. 19 Aug. 1938, p. 1; 10 Sept., p. 13; 23 Sept., p. 24; 14 Oct., p. 28; The Tablet, 20 Aug. 1938, p. 237; 3 Sept., p. 300.

199"The Church Abroad: Italy," The Tablet. 24 Sept. 1938, pp. 397-8.

Universe, 14 April 1938, p. 1; "Christianity and Racial­ ism," 5 Aug., p. 14; 26 Aug., p. 11; 25 Oct., pp. 141-5; letter from Cardinal Hinsley, Clergy Review. June 1938, p. 563; The Sower, Oct.- Dec. 1938, pp. 183-5; The Tablet. 6 Aug. 1938, p. 162; 12 Nov., p. 631; "Talking at Random," p. 634.

^^^Bullock, Hitler, pp. 473-4; Ogilvie-Forbes, (Berlin) to Hali­ fax, 15 Nov. 1938, no. 309, 310; Ger. For. Ministry, Memo, 20 Nov. 1938, DGFP, Series D, III, no. 504; the U.S.A. United States Department of 216 202 lodged from the Vatican or the German clergy. While it seems true

that no official protests came from the Vatican, Pinchas Lapide states

that Pius urged various cardinals in Belgium, France, Italy and even 203 Faulhaber in Germany, to protest Nazi racial policies. Mrs. Douglas

Woodruff recollected a conversation with Cardinal Faulhaber in 1939 in which he said:

'I went and opened my house when they kicked the Jews out of the hospital in Munich.' You know, he was very brave. 'I went to Dachau,' he said, 'but they wouldn't let me in.' He did what he could.^04

Further, The Tablet reported a speech of Rosenberg's complaining that

the anti-Jewish campaign, a strictly "political" matter to the Nazis, had been described by German clergymen and by the Pope, as anti- one Christian. After what has been seen above, then, Lewy's comment

that, after 1928, Pius XI only protested racism in general and not anti-

Semitism seems both somewhat naive and inaccurate.It is naive because the Jews were the chief target of Nazi racism. It is inaccu­

rate because Pius did address himself specifically to the plight of the

State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office) 1938, II, Asst. Secy, of State to Secy, of State, 14 Nov. 1938, pp. 396-8; Secy, of State to U. S. Ambassador to Germany, 14 Nov., pp. 398-9 (hereafter cited as FRUS).

^O^George 0. Kent, "Pope Pius XII and Germany," p. 64; Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, pp. 284, 296; Conway, Nazi Persecu­ tion, p. 223. 202 Three Popes and the Jews, p. 114.

^^^Conversation with Mia Woodruff, 29 May 1976.

^^^The Tablet, 8 April 1939, p. 453.

^^^Lewy, Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, pp. 296-7. 217

Jews on a number of occasions.

In spite of their official protests. Great Britain and the

United States only opened their borders to a fraction of the Jewish 207 refugees clamoring to get out of Germany. The "Crystal Night" evoked a widespread reaction from the general British public, including the Catholics. The Tablet labeled the pogrom "an exhilaration of sus­ tained malignancy and indiscriminate cruelty." and it joined The Uni­ verse in reporting Nazi attacks on the "black" defenders of the Jews, 208 i.e., the Catholic clergy. Several English Catholic bishops joined

Cardinal Hinsley at a mass meeting in Liverpool Town Hall to protest

Nazi persecution of the Jews and to call for aid and assistance to

Jewish refugees. "Who is ngr neighbor?" asked Hinsley: "Why, every person of every class, of every nation, and of every race, and particu­ larly if he be the victim of injustice, of cruelty, and of persecu- 209 tion." The Catholic press reported the usual German anger at these 210 protests and objections. In the Commons, David Logan, speaking "as an orthodox Catholic," begged the government to help the Jews regard-

^®7j^iddlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 43; Leuner, When Com­ passion was a Crime, pp. 50-2; Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 215-23.

^^^alifax to Ogilvie-Porbes, 11 Nov. 1938, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, III, no. 302; Ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, 17 Nov., no. 314; Memo by Ribbentrop, 18 Nov. 1938, DGFP. Series D . , no 270; The Tablet. 19 Nov. 1938, pp. 661-3; 26 Nov., p. 703; The Universe, 18 Nov. 1938, pp. 1, 10; 25 Nov., pp. 1, 14.

^^^The Tablet, 10 Dec. 1938, p. 791; The Universe, 25 Nov. 1938, p. 3. 210 The Universe. 17 Dec., p. 824; The Universe. 9 Dec. pp. 1, 16, 28; 16 Dec., p. 21; 6 Jan. 1939, p. 13. 218 211 less of cost. But John J, Stourton (Cons., S. Salford) feared that 212 new inmigration would exacerbate unemployment.

The Catholic press was unanimous in condemning the Nazi persecu­ tions and calling for help for Jewish refugees. Father Gerald Vann quoted Jacques Maritain; '"It is impossible to hate the Jews and remain 213 intelligent.'" The Month. Colosseum, and, after a brief hiatus. The

Tablet, marred their protests by insisting that Jews in themselves did indeed pose a problem for society to deal with.^^^ The other publica- 215 tions were free of this blemish. The Universe frequently tied Jews

and Christians together as in a comment that "...racial hatred can dis­

tort all judgment and produce violent hatred of Christianity as well."^^^

Outside the press, Arnold Lunn brilliantly demolished the "anti-Semitic myth" and warned that future Christians would be embarrassed to look back and see Christians silent or even approving of persecution of the

ZllgC 341 (1938); 1454-6. ^ ^ ^ 343 (1938): 20-1. 213 G. Vann review of The Jews: Are They Human? by Wyndham Lewis, Blackfriars, May 1939, p. 395; G. Vann, "The Jews," Blackfriars, June 1939, p. 418.

^^^The Month, Dec. 1938, pp. 481-92; B. Wall, "Germany and Racism," Colosseum, Jan. 1939, pp. 25-43; The Tablet, 24 Dec. 1938, pp. 847, 856; 11 Feb. 1939, p. 195; 25 Feb., pp. 267, 281, 243; see letters from 10 June to 8 July 1939 discussing the validity or inval­ idity of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," 12 Aug., p. 197; Bedoyere, Christian Crisis (1942), pp. 54-5, 70; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure (1938), p. 17; Jerrold, Future of Freedom (1938), p. 288.

21 5 E. Quinn, "The Refugee Problem Today," Dublin Review, April 1939, pp. 265-79; F. R. Hoare, "This Racialism," Jan. 1939, pp. 126-39; The Universe, 25 Nov. 1938, p. 12; 9 Dec., p. 1; J. S. Cammock, "The Church and Racialism," The Sower. July-Sept. 1939, pp. 140-45.

2 % e b . 1939, p. 14. 219

Jews.217

The clash over the Jews between the Nazis in Germany and Catho­

lics everywhere was only part of a larger running battle that continued without let-up from the time of Mit brennender Sorge to beyond the death of Pius XI. The general lines of Nazi strategy have already been described: an avoidance of spectacular acts of persecution in favor of

a steady drumfire of vilification in the German press accusing Catholics

of disloyalty and political meddling, coupled with a continuous, gradual

suppression of Catholic institutions and activities: now this school, now that hospital, now that youth group, now these priests arrested,

the cumulative effect being a slow strangulation of Catholic life in

O 1 Q the Reich. All the while, the Pope and the German clergy protested

these violations of the Concordat of 1933 while declaring their perfect 219 disinterestedness in political questions.

By 1938, aided by revealing comments from the Nazis themselves,

many Catholic commentators finally recognized this camouflaged strategy

^l^Lunn, Science of World Revolution, pp. 201-5.

2^^The Tablet, 3 July 1937, p. 20; 8 Jan. 1938, p. 44; 5 Feb., pp. 168, 171; 12 Feb., pp. 202-3; 11 June, p. 761; 20 Aug., p. 236; 21 Sept., p. 397; 1 Oct., p. 425; 8 Oct., p. 461; 12 Nov., p. 631; 24 Dec., p. 854; 25 Feb. 1939, p. 251; 4 March, p. 282; The Universe. 7 Jan. 1938, pp. 13, 24; 4 Feb., p. 1; 11 Feb., p. 15; 15 July, p. 24; 4 Nov., p. 18; 25 Nov., p. 14; 2 Dec., p. 12; 23 Dec., p. 13.

219 Ger. For. Ministry memo, 9 June 1938, DGFP, Series D, I, no. 712; Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to Minister for Education, 26 Sept., no. 727; The Tablet. 1 Jan. 1938, p. 13; 29 Jan., p. 131; 26 March, p. 395; 16 April, p. 504; text of German bishops' pastoral, 10 Sept., pp. 330-1; 29 Oct., p. 555; 25 Feb. 1939, p. 251; The Uni­ verse, 11 Feb. 1938, p. 18; 28 Oct., p. 1. 220 220 of attrition for what it was. When Hitler visited Rome on 4 May

1938, Pius XI left for Castel Gandolfo, closed the Vatican galleries,

and protested the display, on the feast day of the Holy Cross, of a 221 "cross which is not Christ's." The day's issue of Osservatore Ro­ mano made no mention that Hitler was in town; it did, however, print

on page one a papal letter condemning racism as well as the views of

several German professors comparing "Mediterranean" racial types un­

favorably to "Nordics"

It was realized, however, that, in spite of many a gallant 223 battle, Germany's Catholics were being slowly ground down. "I

really doubt," wrote Belloc, "whether German Catholicism can survive

226. for more than another long lifetime." Catholic commentators, both

at the Vatican and in England, began to describe Nazi Germany as a

worse menace than Russia and to chide Catholic apologists for fascism

22°The Tablet.. 21 May 1938, p. 662; 18 June, pp. 825, 832-3; E. Quinn, "The Church Policy of 'Mein Kampf'" 24 Sept., p. 394; 3 Dec., p. 740; 17 Dec., pp. 824-5; 21 Jan. 1939, p. 75; The Universe. 2 Sept. 1938, p. 1; Oliver Woods, "Kulturkampf," The Dublin Review, July 1938, pp. 1-13; The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1938, p. 184.

^^^Bergen to Ger. For. Ministry, 5 May 1938, DGFP, Series D, no. 706; The Universe, 6 May 1938, pp. 1, 13; The Tablet, 7 May 1938, p. 592; "Germany and Italy," The Month, June 1938, pp. 481-2.

^^^Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, p. 113; Anglo-Vatican Relations, pp. 391-2.

Quinn, "Nazi Apologetics," Blackfriars, Aug. 1938, pp. 593-8; E. Quinn, "Mr. Teeling and the German Church," April 1939, pp. 285-8; E. Quinn review of H. Frank's The Salvation of the Nations in Downside Review. Jan. 1939, p. 127; The Tablet, 1 Oct. 1938, p. 428; The Universe, 3 Feb. 1939, p. 1; Hitler, My New Order, pp. 586-7; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 220; Power, Religion in the Reich, p. 35.

224Belloc, Letters, p. 256. 221 295 and Nazism. In a speech at Birmingham Town Hall on 30 January,

Cardinal Hinsley labeled fascism "Pagan" and said, "Because the Church is anti-Communist, she is not therefore pro-Fascist. Fascism, National 226 Socialism, Communism, she condemns equally."

In February 1939, Pope Pius XI died. His memory was saluted by such diverse groups and figures as Duff Cooper, Leon Blum, the Alli­ ance Israelite Universelle, the President of the World Jewish Congress, and the French Communist paper L'Humanité. pius' Secretary of State,

Eugenio Pacelli ascended the papal throne as Pius XII. German-Vatican tensions eased somewhat, but this was probably due as much to the customary damping of attacks on religion in the Nazi press which pre­ ceded the taking of new initiatives in foreign policy as it was to 228 Pius XII's admitted desire for reconciliation. But Nazi attacks on

Christians and especially Jews had done its work. The Tablet and The

Universe, both very pro-appeasement, noted that German persecution had 229 dissipated many of the high hopes that Munich had raised.

225gpeech by Carleton J. H. Hayes in The Tablet. 24 Dec. 1938, p. 856; Osservatore Romano, 7 Jan. 1939, p. 11; Speech by John Eppstein at International Catholic Peace Congress in The Universe. 26 Aug. 1938, p. 15. Universe, 3 Feb. 1939, pp. 1, 17.

^Z^Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 115-16; The Universe, 17 Feb. 1939, p. 6 ; Duff Cooper, The Second World War: First Phase (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), pp. 159-60; The Tablet, 18 Feb. 1939, p. 204.

^^^Harrigan, "Pius XI and Nazi Germany," pp. 485-6; Power, Religion in the Reich, p. 227; Bergen to Ger. For. Ministry, 5 March 1939, DGFP, Series D, IV, no. 472; 13 March, no. 475.

^^^The Tablet, 19 Nov. 1938, pp. 261-3; The Universe, 25 Nov. 1938, p. 12. 222

The British Catholic press continued a lively debate, some of

it bitter, in the years 1935-1939 on the subject of fascism. Communism, and democracy. No one approved of a Communist regime's taking control

of any European state outside of Russia. But some organs went so far

in their anti-Communism as to speak well (or as well as possible) of

totalitarian government, while slighting democracy to some degree. In

this group were The Tablet, Colosseum, Catholic Truth and, though less 230 guilty of depreciating democracy. The Universe. Bernard Wall de­

clared that Italy's wider distribution of property made her more free

than Britain. True, one could not criticize Mussolini's government, 231 but, he said, this privilege was only desired by a few anyway. As his assistant editor put it, "...the man in the street is precisely 232 the man who does not want even the vote." Woodruff expressed his

annoyance at the large number of Catholics who insisted on taking the

Labor Party's line (as he saw it) in being so critical of the right- wing totalitarian states. The Sower was singled out for particular 233 mention. It was only with sorrowful solicitude that The Tablet

joined Douglas Jerrold in rejecting Mosley's British fascists as a

The Tablet, 4 June 1938, p. 732; 2 July, p. 3; 27 Aug., p. 261; Catholic Truth, Jan.-Feb. 1939, p. 6 ; review of L. Sturzo, Politics and Morality, pp. 26-7; The Universe, 3 June 1938, pp. 15, 20; 8 July, p. 14.

^^^"Odysseus," Colosseum, July 1938, pp. 150-1.

James Oliver, "Psychological Elements in Political Liberal­ ism," Jan. 1939, p. 54.

^S^The Tablet, 23 July 1938, pp. 100-1. 223 234 viable movement.

Hinsley's Birmingham speech threw Woodruff off balance. There

the Cardinal had said:

I cannot understand how a Catholic in this country can adopt wisely and safely this foreign label 'Fascist,' however much he may modify its meaning as made clear by the words and deeds of the leaders of Fascism in other l a n d s . ^

Woodruff's interpretation of the speech was something of a tour de

force. He first delicately exempted Italy from the condemnation and

shifted the weight of Hinsley's anathema so that it fell on Russia.

Woodruff then noted that the Communists had used fascism as a label with which they condemned any opponent. He remarked sadly that most

Catholic voters, being Labor supporters, had adopted this line. This was especially regrettable, he concluded, since "...no sane and in- 236 structed man would hesitate to prefer Fascism to Communism."

After the civil war began in Spain, Keating joined the anti-

Communist crusade, and made some brief for Italian Fascism which he

considered vastly superior to Nazism. But he stoutly denied that the 237 Church was in favor of fascism and he utterly rejected Mosley.

The rest of the Catholic press was firmly in the democratic

camp. Blackfriars declared its ideal to be a state which could act

positively for the common welfare while respecting individual human

^^^The Tablet. 10 Oct. 1936, p. 474; 10 July 1937, p. 38; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 17, 322-5.

^^^The Tablet. 11 Feb. 1939, p. 185.

236i«The Lateran Treaty," Ibid., pp. 164-5.

^^Tyhe Month, Sept. 1936, p. 198; Oct., p. 793; Nov., pp. 389- 90; April 1938, p. 297; June, pp. 483-8; Nov., pp. 382-3; Dec., p. 485, 224 238 rights. The journal's dedication to the philosophical examination of basic principles, said Victor White, accounted for its refusal to jump on any bandwagon (Franco Spain, for example) as some Catholics were constantly urging it to do. This same dedication to principle, he wrote, accounted for Blackfriars* greater sympathy for the political left where principles seemed important, rather than the right where 239 they seemed weak.

The Clergy Review, Dublin Review, Downside Review and The Sower joined Blackfriars in calling for sweeping reforms within the demo­ cratic system. Their attitude towards Hitler, Stalin, and the darling of the Catholic right, Mussolini, was summed up in Edward Quinn's com­ ment that, "Not one of them has the Catholic outlook of the wildest 240 medieval freebooter."

The Sower took those Catholics who had made themselves apologists

for fascism severely to task. In a Dublin Review article, S. J. Gos­

ling wrote:

Penguin, Blackfriars, April 1938, pp. 196-301; Gerald Vann, "Introduction to Thomist Politics," Blackfriars, May 1938, pp. 323-37; M. D. Chenu, "An Open Letter to Penguin," July 1938, pp. 527-31; Penguin, pp. 537-8,

^Penguin, Blackfriars, June 1938, pp. 441-5.

^^®E. Quinn, "The New Age," Blackfriars, Oct. 1938, pp. 755-9; Penguin, Jan. 1938, p. 54; Vincent McNabb, "The New Communism," May, pp. 338-42; "Can Any Good Come Out of Communism," Aug., pp. 587-92; Penguin, Feb. 1939, pp. 134-6; F. R. Hoare, "Caeser Worship: Ancient and Mode m , " Clergy Review, II, Dec. 1938, pp. 481-98; L.A.T. review of Communism and Man by Frank Sheed, Downside Review, Oct. 1938, p. 501; E. Quinn review of Politics and Morality, by Luigi Sturzo, April 1939, pp. 280-2; Eric Gill review of The Sun of Justice by H. Robbins, The Dublin Review, April 1939, pp. 425-6; S. J. Gosling, The Sower, Jan.- March 1935, p. 5; Oct.-Dec. 1938, p. 184; Jan.-Feb. 1939, pp. 2-3. 225

There is maintained in certain spectrums of the Catholic press a steady pressure to induce us to align ourselves [Catholics] with Fascism because Fascism is fighting Communism....I cannot imagine anything more fantastic or more dangerous. It is just what the Communists want.^

When Hilaire Belloc produced one more defense for authoritarian govern­ ment, Gosling declared: "To do him justice, Mr. Belloc has not changed; 242 he has always despised democracy and upheld monarchy."

The Sower noted the widespread consternation in conservative

Catholic press circles at Cardinal Hinsley's Birmingham speech in which he condemned fascism as an unacceptable doctrine for Catholics. "The 243 Tablet, for instance, could not believe its ears or eyes." Gosling then printed a letter he had recently received from Hinsley in which the Cardinal again condemned fascism, Nazism and Communism as all equally anti-Catholic.^^^ Victor White pointed out the utter disparity 245 between Catholic and fascist corporate theories. He then criticized the anti-democratic political and social ideas of Douglas Jerrold,

Hilaire Belloc, Bernard Wall and Douglas Woodruff as being inapprop­ riate for the modern world and in conflict with the concept of a divinely created free will.^^^ Finally, White reprinted Hinsley's

^^^"Liberty and M o d e m Theories of the State," The Dublin Re­ view, Oct. 1938, p. 241.

J. Gosling review of Monarchy: A Study of Louis XIV by H. Belloc in The Dublin Review, April 1939, p. 423.

^^^The Sower, April-June 1939, p. 61.

244ibid., pp. 62-3.

245penguin, Dec. 1938, pp. 927-9.

24Gpenguin, Blackfriars, June 1938, pp. 443-4; May 1939, pp. 378-9. 226 letter to The Sower in full and warned English Catholics away from any 247 contact with Mosley's B.U.F.

After Munich, it seemed as if everything was going Hitler's way.

In eight months, he had absorbed Austria and the Sudetenland, wrecked the French alliance system in eastern Europe and made Germany the dominant power on the Continent. His success had come about less be­ cause of his own strength than by carefully exploiting the weaknesses of his opponents; their fear of war arising from the experiences of

1914-1918, their guilty consciences over the Treaty of Versailles, their errors in thinking that Hitler's aims were limited, their trust in his pledges in spite of his repeated violations of his word, and their improvidence in not seeing to their own defense while Germany rearmed. Hitler carefully exploited each of these weaknesses, ex­ tracting gain after gain and rendering nothing in return but words.

It seems that a continuation of these patient tactics must net him at least some more easy gains. But the contempt which Hitler felt for his enemies after Munich led him to believe that patience was no longer . ^ 248 required.

It could only have been such a state of mind that allowed him to perpetrate a public horror such as the Crystal Night. True, apart from the sheer enjoyment which the Nazis derived from them, attacks on

Jews and Christians and verbal assaults on Great Britain were at least

^^•^Biackfriars, Penguin, May 1939, p. 380; Sept. 1939, pp. 697-8.

^48gontag, Broken World, p. 353. 227 249 partly intended to intimidate neighboring states. In fact, such

tactics were producing the reverse effect, making people wonder whether Germany could be accommodated peacefully or whether she must be brought down. Nazi brutality was expending valuable psychological

capital. Finally, Hitler had given a hostage to the future with his

repeated assurances that the Sudetenland was his last territorial

demand in Europe. That would be remembered and held against him in

March 1939.

The British Catholic press and community had entered 1938 pre­

pared for appeasement. The psychological impact of the Spanish Civil

War, the admitted deficiency of British armaments, guilt over Ver­

sailles, pacifism and a horror of war determined the response of Catho­

lic writers to the Anschluss and the Munich crisis. Fear of Communism,

as exhibited by The Tablet and The Universe was perhaps the strongest

influence on the right; pacifism as exemplified by Blackfriars, dom­

inated the thinking of the left. The common response of both was a

readiness for appeasement that was even greater than that within the

British cabinet and British society as a whole.

This consensus began to come apart by the early months of 1939.

The strident bellicosity of Hitler's speeches in the months following

Munich coupled with the brutalities inflicted on Jews and Catholics

was making it increasingly difficult to defend the authoritarian states

as fit candidates for the role of anti-Communist bulwarks, much less

defenders of Christendom, Publications such as The Tablet and The

249ibid., p. 352. 228

Universe that tried to defend the authoritarian powers found it diffi­

cult to do so in the face of the incisive arguments marshalled in the pages of publications such as Blackfriars, The Dublin Review and The

Sower. But it was not yet impossible. The final destruction of the bases of that defense would still take some time and would result from

the actions of the authoritarian powers themselves. Similar actions would finally convince those most hostile to Hitler that the perils of

rearmament and even war were preferable to the dangers that would arise

from allowing Germany to continue her progress unimpeded. As March

1939 opened. Hitler was about to unleash the first major blow which would turn the minds of many from confusion, toleration, and even

sympathy to resistance. CHAPTER V

FRCM PRAGUE TO DANZIG

Twelve days before the Germans moved against rump-Czechoslovakia,

Pius XI's former Secretary of State and expert on German affairs, Eu­ genio Pacelli, was elected to the papacy as Pius XII. Though he had

long been aware of the scope of Nazi hostility to the Catholic Church,

Pius decided he must at least try to secure a modus vivendi with Ger­ many which might secure some protection for the Church in that country.

He was encouraged in this by the quieting down of the strident anti-

Catholic campaign of the Nazis.^ Germany's only response to these

efforts was limited to a tempering of the anti-Catholic press campaign; 2 the pressure on Catholic institutions continued. Although Pius con­

tinued his attempts until the war broke out, generally speaking, they 3 were a complete failure.

Nineteen thirty-nine began auspiciously for the forces of the

continental right. Spanish Republican resistance to Franco began to

collapse and, on 27 February, Chamberlain recognized Franco's govem-

^Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, pp. 108-9; Harrigan, "Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a Detente," p. 179.

^Bergen to Ger. For. Ministry, 18 March 1938, DGFP. Series D, VI, no. 28; Harrigan, "Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a Detente," pp. 179-82.

% e m o by Bergen, 16 May 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 395; Fried­ rich Heer, Europe; Mother of Revolutions, trans. Charles Kessler and Jennette Adcock (New York; Praeger, 1972), p. 306.

229 230 ment,^ Many lower-class, moderate and liberal Catholics in England were either unhappy at Franco's victory or grudgingly accepted it as the lesser of two evils. On the other hand, the Catholic right hailed the victory as a defeat for Communism. This anti-Communism had made the right speak well of Mussolini as well as Franco. Furthermore, while Hitler's attacks on the German Catholic Church caused it acute pain, the British Catholic right defended Germany's foreign policy as being a traditional and conservative one which was establishing a bulwark against Russia. In this light, it is easy to see how what happened in Spain helped to establish an attitude that made Munich and its illusory peace possible. In March of 1939, Hitler destroyed that illusion.

Munich represented only a pause in Hitler's forward march.

Almost immediately after, he began to prepare the final liquidation of

Czechoslovakia.^ A drum-fire of demands whittled down Czech territory and independence. ^ Alarm in Great Britain that Germany might be pre­ paring an attack against the West was dissipated by a peaceful speech which Hitler delivered on 30 January 1939.^ From then until the blow

^Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 623.

^Directive by Führer, 21 Oct. 1938, DGFP, Series D, IV, no. 81; directive by Chief of Staff, 17 Dec., no. 152.

^Ger. For. Ministry Memo, 24 Oct. 1938, DGFP, Series D, IV, no. 8 8 ; 3 Nov., no. 103; For. Ministry circular, 5 Nov., no. 106; For. Ministry memo, Hitler-Czech For. Minister meeting, 21 Jan. 1939, no. 158.

^Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), p. 206. 231 fell upon the Czechs, the British government moved in an atmosphere of deluded optimism. In February 1939, Chamberlain thought that events were heading in a peaceful direction; on 10 March, Sir Samuel Hoare

Q declared that he anticipated a "Golden Age." Then, everything fell apart. On 14 March, the Slovaks, prodded by Hitler, declared their independence. The next day, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia 9 and established a protectorate.

The British government was well aware that "...the disruption of

Czechoslovakia had been largely engineered by Germany..." and that the annexation of non-German territory represented a new stage in Nazi expansion.Nevertheless, Chamberlain's initial reaction was to state that the Slovakian secession had made the British guarantee to Czecho­ slovakia void. Therefore, he said, while he regretted the occupation of Bohemia, the British people would not "be deflected from [its] course.The British people saw things differently. Practically overnight, all shades of public opinion revolted against that course; support for appeasement evaporated. The Times' editor, R. M. Barring-

ton-Ward, a prime voice of appeasement, epitomized the change. Appease­ ment, he wrote in a memo, had been an effort to correct Germany!s just

^Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 342; Havighurst, Twentieth Cen­ tury Britain, pp. 275-6; Cowling, Impact of Hitler, p. 206.

%emo, Hitler-Tiso conversation, 13 March 1939, DGFP, Series D, no. 202; Tiso to Hitler, Draft telegram, 13 March, no. 209; Ger. For. Ministry memo, 14 March, no. 224; Memo, Hitler-Hacha conversation, 15 March, no. 228.

^°CAB 23/97; 11 (39) 2, 15 March 1939.

^^Neville Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1939), pp. 261-6, 232 grievances.

The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia shows that the Nazis are not bound by their own professions and that they are out for ^2 domination unless resisted. Very well, they must be resisted.

British newspapers except for the Daily Express and the Daily Mail 13 joined The Times in the new posture. The vast majority in Parliament and the public agreed.Even Mussolini was shaken by the brutal cynicism of the German action.

Whether responding to the reaction of the public and Parlia­ ment, advice from Lord Halifax, or (as he said) the call of his own better informed conscience, in a speech given in Birmingham on 17

March, Chamberlain made a complete volte-face. Now, he accused Hitler of a flagrant breach of the Munich agreement and a violation of his repeated statement that he had no further territorial demands in

Europe.This speech marked a revolution in Britain's foreign policy.

Chamberlain quickly moved to increase the pace of rearmament and to

line up the states bordering Germany to resist further Nazi aggression.

An effort to link Britain, France, Russia and Poland together to re­ sist further German coups broke down over the reluctance of the Poles

^^Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, p. 300. 13 Ibid., p. 301; History of Times, p. 961.

^^Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 568; Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 294; Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik, p. 110, Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976.

^^Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday & Co., 1946), pp. 42-50.

^^Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, pp. 261-75; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 344-45; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 276-7. 233

to be bound too closely to the Soviet U n i o n . Therefore, since

Poland was considered to be "the key to the situation," and in view of

some alarming rumors of imminent German action, on 31 March, Chamber-

lain extended to Poland the first of a series of guarantees that Brit- 18 ain would resist further German moves with force if necessary. After

Mussolini invaded Albania on 7 April, guarantees were unilaterally

extended to Greece, Romania, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzer- 19 land. Finally, after some stiff debate, the House of Commons passed

peacetime conscription. It was accepted by the country virtually with- 20 out a murmur. Hitler replied in a speech on 28 April in which he denied that the Prague coup had contravened the Munich pact, declared

that Britain's hostility abrogated the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, de­ manded the return of Danzig to Germany, and stated that the British

guarantee to Poland nullified the 1934 Polish German Non-Aggression

Pact.The Führer strengthened his position by convincing Mussolini

to agree to a formal military alliance. This alliance, the "Pact of

CAB 23/98; 13 (39) 2; Halifax to Kennard (Warsaw) et. al, 20 March 1939, Brit. Docs., Series IV, no. 446; Kennard to Halifax, 22 March, no. 479, 485; for. office memo, no. 496; Halifax to Kennard, 24 March, no. 518.

l^CAB 23/98: 15 (39) 2; 16 (39) 1; Halifax to Phipps, 31 March 1939, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, IV, no. 582.

l^Halifax to R. Hoare (Bucharest), 13 April 1939, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, V, no. 61; Halifax to Waterlow (Athens) 12 April, no. 136; German For. Ministry circular, 30 April 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 299. 20 Sontag, Broken World, pp. 358-9; Graves and Hodge, Long Week- End, p. 452; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 377, 381-5.

^^Hitler, My New Order, pp. 644-54. 234 29 Steel," was signed on 22 May 1939. Though Chamberlain hoped that his moves would deter Hitler and prevent war, the shift in British policy was definite.23

After the Prague coup. Greater Germany contained approximately

37,500,000 Catholics, ten percent of the world's total.Pius XII was not pleased with this latest move which he characterized as "A fine peace indeed, patched up at the expense of a weak nation which has not even been consulted.But the Vatican filed no formal protest.

The shock waves of Prague ran through the Catholic press. The

Universe attacked this "brutal and ruthless conquest of non-German 27 peoples." Editor Barnard warned that "The same fate lies in store for every other State which Germany proposes to overrun if she is not 28 prevented by concerted action from so doing." The Tablet saw Prague as "the first stage in the great Drang Nach Osten, of which the ulti- 29 mate destination is the Ukraine." Hitler's aggression against Czecb

Slovakia, declared Woodruff, "places him in the category of the great

22xext in DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 426.

23navighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 277-8; Wheeler- Bennett, Munich, pp. 356-9, 369; Cooper, Second World War, pp. 164-7; Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, p. 294; Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik, p. 115; Nicholas Bethell, The War that Hitler Won (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1973, p. 12.

24power, Religion in the Reich, p. 236. 95 Pichon, Vatican and its Role in World Affairs, p. 151; The Tablet, 15 April 1939, pp. 483-4. 26 Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 229.

27"The Nazi Crisis," 24 March 1939, p. 12. ^^Ibid.

2*18 March 1939, p. 337. 235 30 adventurer and out of the category of the great statesman." German assurances at Munich, he declared, had been proven to be fraudulent 31 from the start. Christopher Dawson predicted that Poland would be 32 the next stop on a road leading to the Ukraine, Asia Minor and India!

"The year 1939," concluded Woodruff, "marks the turning point in Nazi „33 Germany."

Father Joseph Keating died on 5 March 1939. The new editor of

The Month, Father John Murray, S.J., had long been associated with the journal. Under him the publication hardly moved from its former appeasement position. While shocked at the brutality of German tactics and professing distrust of German pledges and the deliberate vagueness of German aims, it still declared that German economic domination of

Eastern Europe was only natural. The journal only seemed to regret that Hitler had not sought to achieve that dominance peacefully.

With Prague, the policy that led to the Munich agreement began to be subjected to an examination and evaluation which has continued to the present day. Defenders of Munich said that it insured British (and

Commonwealth) unity when war finally came and that it gave Britain time 35 to repair her woefully deficient armaments. There is some point to the argument that greater unity was possible after Munich was seen to

^^The Tablet, 25 March 1939, p. 369. ^^Ibid., p. 370.

Dawson, "Hitler's Mein Kampf," Ibid., pp. 373-6.

^^The Tablet, 27 May 1939, p. 170.

^^xhe Month, April 1939, pp. 298-300; May 1939, pp. 387-9.

OC Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 192-3; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 433; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 622, Hadley, Munich, p. 153. 236

fail. As King George VI wrote to the dying Neville Chamberlain in

1940:

...your efforts to preserve peace were not in vain, for they established, in the eyes of the civilized world, our entire innocence of the crime which Hitler was determined to commit.

But it was Geirman aggression, not anything done by Chamberlain, that produced this illumination. As Hilaire Belloc put it, "...we ought

all to get up a statue to Hitler for having woken us up to the 37 danger." After Munich, the government, together with the press, had 38 fed the public a steady diet of nostrums. Prague surprised Chamber-

lain as well as everyone else. He was the victim of his own stubborn­ ness, vanity, and overconfidence. As John Wheeler-Bennett wrote: 39 "...he was culpably credulous in his dealings with Hitler."

As for the argument that the time bought by Munich was used to make good Britain's rearmament, a host of writers have maintained that, while the pace of British rearmament did increase, it did not do so at

a level which would indicate that Chamberlain had any idea just how

critical the situation actually was. As a result, say these writers,

the relative position of Great Britain to Germany was worse in 1939

than 1938. As seen above, an examination of the minutes of the cabinet meetings after Munich proves that this accusation was correct. Finally,

^MacLeod, Neville Chamberlain, p. 296; Woodruff agreed, inter­ view, 29 May 1976.

^^Belloc, Letters, p. 277. go Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, pp. 450-1; Rock, Appeasement on Trial, p. 334.

OQ Munich, p. 16; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, pp. 220-1; Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 410-13. 237 thanks in part to the government's secrecy and ignorance, and the facile optimism of the press, the morale of the British people was not 40 at all prepared to face the possibility of war with Germany in 1938.

Blame for that, too, can be laid in large part to Chamberlain; repair

..jf that deficiency can be "credited" to Hitler.

In the House of Commons, Catholic M.P. Commander Robert Bower declared that, as an opponent of the Munich policy, he was not sur­ prised by Hitler's latest move. Speaking on 15 March, the very day

Chamberlain called for continuance of the appeasement policy. Bower called on the government to cease spreading the nonsense that all was well, to admit the failure of appeasement and to rally the European states in a defense of democratic ideals. Since the realities of power politics had to be faced, he concluded, Russia had to be part of that defense.41 The Earl of Iddesleigh asked for better planning to avoid again being surprised by a German move.^^ In the wake of the annexa­ tion of Memel and Albania, Col. Arthur Evans and Anthony Crossley accused Germany of seeking to dominate the world. In the last speech before his death, Crossley said that Britain's motto should be "'Not an inch farther and no discussion with the German Government except on our terms.'"43

In the Catholic press, S. J. Gosling accepted the claim that

Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 200-10; Petrie, Twenty Years Armistice--And After, pp. 231-4; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 336-9; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 222; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 435; Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 410-13.

41gC 345 (1939); 486-9. 348 (1939); 348-9.

^^HC 350 (1939): 2044-63; 346 (1939): 95-6. 238

Munich had gained some time and given Chamberlain the firm moral ad­ vantage of having demonstrated at a great price Britain's undoubted wish for peace while proving Hitler a liar. Orthodox diplomacy would never have achieved this, said Gosling, though, he added mordantly, it probably would not have been deceived by Hitler's promises in the first placeNow, he concluded, it was necessary to call a halt to the aggression of the dictators.The Tablet declared that it was im­ possible to make further concessions to the dictators since "...they would consider anything given to them as proof of the decadence of the

givers and of their historical ripeness for disappearance."^^ The

Month and Downside Review still insisted that war must be avoided, even

at the price of further cessions to Germany. How this was to be accomp­

lished without merely whetting the aggressors' appetites further they 47 confessed they did not know.

While the new British policy indicated a willingness to fight

if war should come, it was based on the hope that resolve backed by

increased military strength would force Hitler to adopt a reasonable

attitude from which negotiations leading to a lasting peaceful resolu­

tion of outstanding international differences might be possible, and

that included the possibility of further concessions to Germany if

44xhe Sower, April-June 1939, pp. 66-7.

43ibid., pp. 67-8; July-Sept. 1939, pp. 122-3.

4^The Tablet, 1 July 1939, pp. 1-2. 47 The Month, May 1939, pp. 385-94; G. H. Moriarty, review of Peace with Gangsters?, by George Glasgow, in Downside Review, July 1939, pp. 426-7. 239 necessary.^® It was that position— the resolution to create a posture of strength which would guarantee the viability of agreements reached when the opportunity for negotiations returned— which was defended with near-unanimity by British Catholics.

"Signed agreements and the most solemn treaties," lamented The

Universe, "have been deliberately used to deceive and to disarm sus­ picion, and the verbal assurances of German and Italian ministers have 49 been shown to be not only without value but to be deliberately false,"

The paper joined The Tablet in warmly applauding Chamberlain's policy

of accelerated rearmament and guarantees to Germany's neighbors.At

the same time, they emphasized that, as Woodruff put it, "In all the present moves and counter-moves, the basic object of British policy is not to be in a stronger position for war when it comes, but to prevent war from coming.The need for genuine agreement and not capitula-

CO tion was stressed. "The point of the British guarantee to Warsaw is not, as the Axis Press claims, to prevent a settlement," said The

Cadogan (For. Office) to Kennard, 23 May 1939, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, V, no. 596; Halifax to Kennard, 25 May, no. 628; Halifax to Norton (Warsaw) 21 July, VI, no 386; Cowling, Impact of Hitler, p. 298; Taylor, Origins, p. 199. 49 "Betrayal of Trust," The Universe, 14 April 1939, p. 12.

^^"The Papacy and Peace," The Universe, 21 April 1939, p. 12; "Peace or War?" 7 July, p. 14; "The British Initiative," The Tablet, 25 March 1939, p. 372; 8 April, p. 440; 15 April, p. 473; 22 April, p. 506; "The Enemies of Peace," p. 508.

^^"Conscription and Diplomacy," The Tablet, 29 April 1939, p. 540.

^2'»xhe Enemies of Peace," The Tablet, 22 April 1939, p. 508-9; "Britain and Germany," 6 May, pp. 572-3; 13 May, p. 602. 240 53 Tablet, but to enable the Poles to meet the Germans on equal terms."

The Month and The Dublin Review, both moderately liberal, joined the conservative Colosseum in accepting rearmament as a lamentable necessity, while strongly emphasizing the need for further concessions.

As a writer for The Dublin Review put it; "The status quo in Europe cannot be maintained and if the idea of an anti-aggression front hard­ ens into an attempt to do so by force, war is inevitable.Wall's

Colosseum included in its analysis an attack on the democratic "mass

state" which it equated with the "mob."^^ Wall expressed his satis­

faction at what he saw as the declining popular interest in political

questions.Colosseum's growing conservatism was causing its circu­

lation to shrink. But Wall was indifferent. The feeling after Prague

that war was almost inevitable caused him to slip into a kind of re- 57 signed detachment. His editorial work on Colosseum grew very slack.

July 1939 was the last issue; the journal ceased publication there­

after.

The moral drift, timidity, and errors of the appeasement policy

^^"The Elusive Pact," The Tablet, 24 June 1939, p. 804; 15 July, p. 6 8 ; 22 July, p. 97.

^^Reginald J. Dingle, "The European Riddle," July 1939, p. 73; The Month, June 1939, pp. 481-5; July, pp. 5-6; Colosseum, April 1939, pp. 83-8; E.J.C., review of Peace with Gangsters? by George Glasgow, July 1939, pp. 213-15.

^^Colosseum, April 1939, pp. 89-90.

^^Ibid., July 1939, pp. 155-9.

^7^all interview, 30 May 1976; Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 91, 93-4. 241 58 were discussed at length in Blackfriars. But, in the months immed­ iately preceding the conflict, the journal was most concerned with the ethical question of whether a Christian could participate in a future war. Victor White admitted the abstract possibility of a just war but his pacifistic principles made him wonder whether future wars would be automatically rendered impermissible due to the employment of immoral 59 means, such as the aerial bombing of civilian populations. When

The Universe denied that the individual Christian was competent to make a moral judgment on the justice or injustice of a particular war and

that conscientious objection was alien to Catholic teaching. White

sprang to the defense of both principles as falling within the bounds

of Catholic practice.When The Sower took the position that war might be necessary to stop injustice. White chided even that kindred

journal for scanting the question of attacks on non-combatants.^^

Christopher Hollis gently told the members of a Catholic pacifistic

group called "Pax" which included Eric Gill, Donald Attwater and E. I.

^ A. C. F. Beales, "British Foreign Policy Since the War," Blackfriars. I, May 1939, pp. 349-51; II, June, pp. 435-47; Penguin, May, pp. 376-8.

59 Francis McDermott, "War and the Catholics," Blackfriars. May 1939, pp. 323-31; Penguin, pp. 381-3; Victor White, O.P., "Wars and Rumors of Wars," June, pp. 403-14; Letter from G. Vann, pp. 457-9; Reply from F. McDermott, p. 459; Letter from Pax Society, pp. 459-60; Penguin, July, pp. 536-45.

^^The Universe, 2 June 1939, p. 7; "Catholics and War Service," 16 June, p. 14; 11 Aug., p. 16; Penguin, Blackfriars, June 1939, pp. 449-54; Victor White, O.P., "War and the Early Church," Sept., pp. 643-54.

^^The Sower. July-Sept. 1939, pp. 123-4; A. C. F. Beales, "Catholic Action and World Peace," pp. 136-40; Penguin, Blackfriars. Aug. 1939, pp. 612-15. 242

Watkin that if Britain adopted their policy of non-resistance, then 62 Hitler would simply conquer his neighbors with impunity.

In the House of Commons, Catholic M.P.s John Stourton and

Richard Stokes called for additional measures to block further Nazi advances and prepare Britain for war while John McGovern attacked the government for preparing to send workers to die in a capitalist war for an undemocratic state like Poland

As part of his efforts to strengthen Britain's hands in dealing with Germany, Chamberlain continued to pursue the elusive goal of re­ storing the severed links with Italy. In April 1938, the British government agreed to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia in return for a promise of eventual Italian withdrawal from Spain with no annexations demanded from Franco. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had already re­ signed from the cabinet on 25 February, convinced that making conces­ sions to the dictators without demanding anything tangible from them merely convinced them of the impotence of the democratic states.

John McGovern expressed his utter distrust of Mussolini and flatly declared that Chamberlain would never divide the Italian and German dictators.Eden and McGovern were proven correct. When the British government decided to implement the agreement in November 1938, it was

C. Hollis, "The Pax Pamphlets," The Tablet. 29 April 1939, p. 554; a debate on this was conducted in the letters section, see 6 May, pp. 589-90; 13 May, p. 621; 20 May, p. 659; 27 May, p. 690.

^^HC 345 (1939): 1252, 2520; 346 (1939): 48, 101-9, 1345; 347 (1939); 2081; 348 (1939); 1545, 1789; 349 (1939); 1266.

^^see above, pp. 133-4.

®^HC 335 (1939); 626-33. 243 evident that it had neither reconciled Britain and Italy nor stiffened

Italian resistance to Germany.The visit of Chamberlain and Halifax to Rome in January 1939 merely amused Mussolini and accomplished nothing.A letter from Chamberlain asking Mussolini's help in keeping the peace was seen by the Duce as further proof of democratic weakness and it encouraged him to seize Albania on 7 April 1939.^^ In spite of this blatant violation of the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement of

April 1938, the British government did not repudiate the accord.On

22 May 1939, Mussolini signed the Pact of Steel with Hitler. Chamber­

lain's continued efforts to strike an agreement with Italy were without effect.

The conservative British organs of the Catholic press heartily

applauded these efforts to renew the Stresa links. These publications hoped that the restoration of Anglo-Italian links would free Mussolini

from German pressure and enable Italy to play a role in restraining 71 Nazi aggression. The Universe and Colosseum went further and praised

®^Sontag, Broken World, p. 324.

^^Ciano, Diaries, 11-14 Jan. 1939, pp. 9-12.

GGlbid., 23 March 1939, p. 51. ^^CAB 23/98; 20 (39) 2.

^^CAB 23/99:31 (39) 5; P. Loraine (Rome) to Halifax, 28 May 1939, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, V, no. 651, 652, 653; 2 June, no. 198; 0. Sargent (For. Office) to Loraine, 3 June, no. 706; Halifax to Lor­ aine, 4 June, no. 708; Foiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, pp. 404, 413.

7lThe Tablet, 29 Jan. 1938, p. 130; 3 Feb., pp. 164-5; 9 April, p. 464; 23 April, p. 528; 16 July, p. 6 6 ; 5 Nov., pp. 584-5; "The Rome Visit," 7 Jan. 1939, p. 4; 14 Jan. "The Two Cities," pp. 36-7; 8 April, pp. 442-3; The Universe, 22 April 1938, p. 12; 11 Nov., p. 12; 6 Jan. 1939, p. 12; 20 Jan., p. 14; 3 Feb., p. 14; The Month, May 1938, pp. 385-8; Feb. 1939, pp. 98-100; May, pp. 393-4; Sept. 1939, pp. 198-200. 244 the Fascist "corporative constitution" as reflecting the spirit of the 72 social ideals of the papal encyclicals. The Month, however, contin­ ued to make a sharp distinction between Catholic and Fascist corporate ideas especially after Mussolini adopted racist legislation in imita- 73 tion of Hitler. In spite of this new racist legislation and the protests against it of the Vatican and the English hierarchy. The Tab­ let dared to defend Fascism as a Christian system of government. Its

Rome correspondent, however, in an article full of praise for the Duce and Italy, flatly declared that, "It is true that Fascism is not 74 founded upon Catholic doctrine...."

Mussolini's seizure of Albania in April 1939 was a severe dis­ appointment to that staunch champion of Italy, The Universe. The invasion, it declared, "has dealt a blow to international confidence which it will need years to heal...."^^ But the paper soon returned to its defense of Italy and her "just" claims.On the occasion of the

Nazi-Soviet Pact, editor George Barnard declared that Italy belonged with the defenders of "the Christian traditions of personal liberty and religious freedom" and that in her lay "the real hope of recovering

^^The Universe, 31 March 1939, p. 12; 15 July 1938, p. 10; Colosseum, July 1938, pp. 78-80; Oct., p. 175.

^^The Month, Sept. 1938, pp. 197-9; Jan. 1939, p. 8 .

^^The Tablet, 9 July 1938, p. 41; 23 July, p. 99; 20 Sept., p. 324; 24 Dec., p. 855.

^^"Betrayal of Trust," The Universe, 14 April 1939, p. 12.

^^"Italy's Just Claims," The Universe. 5 May 1939, p. 14. 245 the path to peace which has been lost in these years of tragic mis­ understanding."^^ In view of the record of Fascist dishonesty in the

Albanian matter, attacks on Jewish rights and assaults on the rights of the Italian Church, all of which had been fully reported in the pages of The Universe, the statement is remarkable to say the least.

The Tablet was simply disgusted at the Italian invasion, especi­ ally since Foreign Minister Giano had categorically denied that any 78 such step had been planned. A note of disillusionment and irritation entered The Tablet's reporting on Italy which remained thereafter.

While continuing to admit that errors had been made in past dealings with Italy, the paper began to warn Mussolini that he was rapidly depriving himself of all freedom of action and, by his actions, would be left with the harsh and dominating friendship of Hitler and the 79 enmity of Great Britain.

In the immediate aftermath of Hitler's speech of 28 April in which he denounced the Anglo-German Naval treaty and the Non-aggression pact with Poland, the Vatican quietly floated a proposal for a five- power conference (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland) to see 80 to the settlement of all outstanding differences. No one flatly re-

Italy and the Pact with Moscow," The Universe, 25 Aug. 1939, p. 1 2 .

^^The Tablet, 15 April 1939, p. 473.

^^The Tablet, 6 May 1939, pp. 569-70; 13 May, p. 601; 27 May, p. 670; 1 July, p. 2; 22 July, pp. 97-8; "The Aim of the Axis," pp. 232-3.

®®Holy See, Records and Documents of the Holy See Relating to the Second World War, ed. Pierre Blet, et. al. (Washington, D. C . : Corpus Books, 1968), I The Holy See and the War in Europe, March 1939-August 1940, pp. 12-14; Cardinal Secy, of State Maglione to Vatican diplomats 3 May 1939, no. 19 (hereafter referred to as Holy See, Records). 246

jected the proposal, but Poland and the Western powers feared that

acceptance might make it seem as if another Munich were in the offing, 81 and Hitler's agreement was insincere. The Vatican withdrew its

initiative temporarily, ostensibly due to relaxation of international

tensions, but probably out of disappointment at the response received.

London urged that it be reopened at another time, hoping that it might help to bring about a reconciliation between France and Italy which might induce Mussolini to press Hitler to accept a negotiated settle- 82 ment of his demands. With his excellent sources in the government,

Douglas Woodruff knew from the start that a papal peace initiative had been made and that it was feared in some quarters that further conces­

sions would be "merely strengthening and not placating insatiable neigh- 83 hors." The Universe at first denied that such a conference was being 84 discussed. Only later did Barnard find out about it.

The gradualist tactics of the Nazis, closing schools, forbidding

processions, attacking clergymen in the press, as reported week after

week in The Tablet and The Universe, were slowly crushing the Catholic

B^Halifax to Osborne (Vatican) 5 May 1939, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, V, no. 380, 385; Osborne to Halifax, 9 May, no. 438; Holy See, Records, pp. 16-17; Summary conversation. Nuncio and For. Minister Beck, 9 May 1939, no. 34; CAB 23/99: 27 (39) 3.

82 Osborne to Halifax, 29 May 1939, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, V, no. 661; Holy See, Records, Card. Maglione to Vatican Reps., 10 May 1939, no. 38.

B^The Tablet, 13 May 1939, p. 601.

®^"What Do They Want the Pope to Do?" The Universe, 5 May 1939, p. 14; 12 May, pp. 1, 12; 9 June, p. 3. 247 85 Church throughout Greater Germany. Pius XII's continuing efforts to find a modus vivendi with Germany resulted only in a series of frustra­ tions and disappointments,^^ until finally the Vatican was forced to revert to protests. Though a Universe correspondent noted that German

Catholics "never suffered one-tenth the physical degradation of the 87 Jews," The Tablet reported the statement of the German Bishops' Fulda pastoral letter of 19 August 1939 that "...the utter destruction of the 88 Catholic Faith in Germany is aimed at...."

Central to any discussion of forming a barrier to further Nazi expansion was the question of a link between Britain and Russia. The

British public and press together with political figures such as Lloyd 89 George and Churchill were heartily in favor of such a link. In

January 1939, 50 percent of those responding to a public opinion poll preferred to see Russia win a war against Germany while 10 percent

Harrigan, "Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a Detente," Catholic Historical Review, pp. 182-3; The Tablet. 13 May 1939, pp. 609, 611; 20 May, p. 642; 3 June, p. 711; 17 June, p. 780; Central European Correspondent, "The Tradition of German Catholicism," IV, 5 Aug., pp. 169-71; 19 Aug., p. 240; Michael Blair, "Persecution Behind a Smoke Screen," The Universe, I, 17 March 1939, p. 7; II, 24 March, p. 3; III, 31 March, p. 1; IV, 6 April, p. 7; 28 April, p. 15; 19 May, p. 1; 25 Aug., p. 13; Ciano, Diaries, 18 Dec. 1939, p. 186.

-®^Nuncio to Italy to Card. Maglione, 1 July 1939, Holy See, Records, no. 81. 87 M. Blair, "Persecution Behind a Smoke Screen," The Universe, III, p. 6 .

^^The Tablet, 26 Aug., 1939, p. 299.

^%istory of Times, p. 965; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Brit­ ain, p. 278; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 362-5, 372-3; Taylor, Origins, pp. 218-19. 248 90 favored the latter country. After Prague, 92 percent of those re­ sponding to a Gallup Poll declared themselves in favor of an alliance 91 with the Soviets.

Still, many conservative figures in and out of Parliament were reluctant to make a pact with Stalin. Chamberlain was one of these.

"I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia," he wrote 92 after Prague. The Prime Minister, along with many others both in and out of the government, underrated her military power, and magnified the 93 difficulties of cooperation between Poland and Russia. But, pressured by British public opinion and the French government, trying to put some fear into Hitler and, no doubt, hoping that some sort of acceptable bargain might be struck with Stalin, the British government began cautious, not to say dilatory, negotiations with the Russians in April.

It is not surprising that no agreement was reached. Each side was suspicious that the other might be trying to embroil it in a war with Germany and neither really wished to break its relations with the

Nazi government. The Russians thought the British were practically

asking for a unilateral Soviet guarantee of Germany's threatened neigh­ bors with no quid pro quo, while the British thought Russian demands on

90 Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 28, 250-63.

^^Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 394.

^^Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 403.

^^Ibid; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 278; Wheeler- Bennett, Munich, p. 389.

^^Seeds (Moscow) to Halifax, 13 April 1939, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, V, no. 52; Halifax to Seeds, 14 April, no. 170; Seeds to Hali­ fax, 15 April, no. 152; Taylor, English History, pp. 447-8; Wheeler- Bennett, Munich, pp. 388-9. 249

the Baltic States too high. In May, Stalin replaced his pro-Westem

Foreign Minister Maximilian Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov. Now the

Russian position stiffened and, though Chamberlain began to negotiate 95 in earnest, an agreement proved elusive. Moscow had set out on the path that was to lead to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.^^

The question of Anglo-Russian alliance divided the British Catho­

lics into two camps. One group intensely distrusted the Soviets, de­ preciated Russian military power, declared that anything other than a

strictly limited agreement could be made only with a total disregard

for principles and morality, and warned that Stalin would probably seek

to use any such agreement to embroil Europe in a war from which he would seek to remain aloof in the hope of profiting from the aftermath.

The second group judged that the menace posed by Hitler necessitated

strong if carefully arranged links with Russia in order to stop Germany

from dominating Europe.

The first Catholic group described above comprised the larger

part of both the Catholic press and those Catholics in the public eye.

Hilaire Belloc, Robert Sencourt, Evelyn Waugh, The Universe, and The 97 Month were foremost among this group. The Universe called on its

^^CAB 23/99: 27 (39) 1; Seeds to Halifax, 9 May 1939, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, V, no. 421, no 436; 11 May, no 481, 494; Seeds to Oliphant (For. Office), 16 May, no. 533; Seeds to Halifax, 28 May, no. 657; Hal­ ifax to Seeds, 7 June, no. 735; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 641-3; Hadley, Munich, pp. 162-3; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 279.

^^German For. Ministry memo, 5 May 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 332, 9 May, no. 351, 17 May, no. 406, Schulenburg (Moscow) to Weizsacker (For. Ministry), 22 May, no. 424.

97speaight, Belloc, p. 518; Belloc, "Church vs. Revolution," The Universe, 17 March 1939, p. 10; letter from R. Sencourt. The Tablet. 22 April 1939, p. 524; Bergonzi inteirview, 30 May 1976. 250 readers to make their opposition to a pact with Stalin known to their 98 political representatives. The paper said that joining Russia in a

"democratic" bloc would not only fail to deter Germany but that it would be a "nightmare which every Catholic will recognize as the cer- 99 tain prelude to a world war." John Murray at The Month thought

Russia's "main interest" was to foment revolution, warned that Catho­ lics might feel uneasy fighting in a war alongside a "frankly and revoltingly atheistic" Russia.

The Tablet repeated these themes, if somewhat less stridently, and lamented that "uninformed" public opinion was forcing the govern­ ment to negotiate with the Soviets.The journal declared itself in favor of "a strictly regional and limited defense agreement for joint aid to third parties" as opposed to a broadly based mutual assistance pact.^^^ Woodruff plainly considered Stalin's demands on the Baltic

States excessive and voiced his exasperation at the Russian refusal to 103 sign a limited defense agreement with Britain and France. In the

9826 May 1939, p. 14.

99"The Path to Peace," The Universe, 14 April 1939, p. 12; 31 March, p. 12; 26 May, p. 14.

^^^The Month, May 1939, p. 392; June, p. 487; Francis March, "That Russian Alliance," pp. 498-508; July, p. 8 .

101"The Enemies of Peace," 22 April 1939, p. 508; Lancelot Lowton, "The Soviet and Central Europe," 15 April, pp. 477-8.

^^^"Negotiations with the Soviet," 20 May 1939, p. 636; "The Elusive Pact," 17 June, p. 804; 1 July, p. 2; 8 July, pp. 36-7.

^^^The Tablet, 22 July 1939, p. 98; 29 July, p. 134; 5 Aug., p. 165; 19 Aug., pp. 230-1. 251

Commons, Patrick Hannon asked that the matter of negotiation with 104 Stalin be left to Chamberlain to deal with.

On the other side were those who argued that Germany was the greatest danger facing Europe and that Russia was a necessary partner in any coalition to stop her from further aggression. Among those holding this view were conservatives such as Arnold Lunn, moderates such as M.P. Robert Bower and liberals such as S. J. Gosling of The

Sower.

Commander Bower was the first of these to speak out. On 15

March 1939, the very day German troops marched into Bohemia, Bower declared that the appeasement policy was dead and that it was necessary to join with all states that were ready to stand against the now dom­ inant power of Germany— and that, in spite of its being a dictatorship, included the Soviet Union. In reply to an interruption from the floor,

Bower sarcastically remarked; "I know they have shot a lot of people but there are about 17,000,000 of them still left."^^^

In a letter to The Tablet, Arnold Lunn declared that, while he detested the Soviet Union, an alliance with her might be necessary to defend Europe against Hitler. "No Catholic who defended Franco's alliance with Hitler," he wrote, "can logically refuse help to his country if his country is allied to Russia.In a fight for its life, a nation had to get help wherever possible, he declared. "I have seen enough of Nazi rule in Germany and Austria to believe that, if

^°^HC 345 (1939): 2015. ^°^HC 348 (1939): 486-9.

^°^The Tablet. 29 April 1939, pp. 556-7. 252 war comes, the Catholic ranks must be closed.S. J. Gosling agreed with this assessment, and he taunted those Catholics who were now de­ nouncing the anti-Christianity of Russia while they had downplayed that 108 of Germany due to its service to Franco in Spain. But Victor White disagreed with Lunn, saying that the question was not whether Russia could help Britain but whether Britain might give Russia help which 109 could help Stalin to spread Communism. Doubts like those which troubled White bothered many Englishmen. Those doubts were not resolved until the announcement was made of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Poland had little to recommend her as an ally against Nazi

Germany: it was farther away than Czechoslovakia, undemocratic and anti-Semitic. Only Hitler's arrogance in marching into Prague had made

Britain and France choose Poland as the place to make a stand against

Germany.Hilaire Belloc viewed Poland as Catholicism's champion in

the east and his friend Gilbert Chesterton had shrewdly guessed that a 111 German-Polish frontier dispute might easily provoke a future war.

On the other hand, Douglas Jerrold thought that Britain's guarantee to

Poland was utterly impractical, and would serve only to make Warsaw and 112 Berlin more intractable than ever. The Universe and The Month

^°^Ibid., p. 557. ^°^The Sower, July-Sept. 1939, pp. 122-4.

^®9penguin, Blackfriars, June 1939, pp. 452-4.

^^^Message from Neville Henderson, 24 May 1939, PREM, 1/331A; Graves and Hodge, Long Week-End, p. 451; History of Times, p. 962; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 375-6; Gannon, British Press and Nazi Germany, pp. 262-3.

^^^Speaight, Belloc, p. 461; Ward, GKÇ, p. 590.

Jerrold, England, pp. 256-7. 253 113 defended Poland as a Christian country.

Until the extension of a British guarantee to Poland, The Tab­ let maintained the position that Poland could only avoid trouble with

Germany by making concessions to Germany or at least by eschewing a patently anti-German stand.Even after the British guarantee had been extended. The Tablet hoped that the problem of Danzig and the

Corridor would be settled by negotiation. Woodruff was clearly dis­ turbed because the initiative to accept or reject negotiations was in the hands of the Poles and not the British government.But he recognized that, "The shadow of the fate of the Czechs lies across the path of negotiation, for moderation so plainly availed the Czechs nothing.and that "There is no sort of urgency about the future of Danzig except the urgency of Herr Hitler's ambitions and impa- 117 tience." '

Throughout the summer. Hitler continued to increase the pres­ sures on Poland. On 3 April and 23 May, he had set preparations in train for a war against the Poles though, not until the last moment, did he rule out a peaceful solution should the Poles succumb to his

11 o The Universe, 5 May 1939, p. 486; Monica Gardner, "The Spirit of Poland," The Month, pp. 517-24; Aug., pp. 97-8.

^^'‘^•The Tablet, 21 March 1938, p. 387; 22 Oct., pp. 517-18; 7 Jan. 1939, p. 7; 1 April, p. 411, 416; "The Polish Corridor," pp. 448-9. IIS "Poland After the British Pledge," The Tablet, 15 April 1939, pp. 480-1; 22 April, pp. 509-10; 29 April, pp. 537-8; "Poland and the Soviet Alliance," 24 June, pp. 805-6; 1 July, p. 1.

^^^The Tablet, 8 July 1939, p. 33.

^^^The Tablet, 22 July 1939, p. 97. 254 demands. Otherwise, the state would be destroyed by a local war after 118 she had been isolated by diplomatic means.

Douglas Woodruff and Bernard Wall both thought that Britain's guarantee was something of a bluff.That seems to be how Hitler regarded it also. He was encouraged in this view by continual state­ ments by the British that they were eager to negotiate a settlement of outstanding differences with Hitler.The Fuhrer concluded, there­ fore, that he only had to find the right lever to pry Poland apart from her Western guarantors. Thus isolated, he could then compel the 121 Poles, either by negotiation or war, to bend to his will.

The question was how to bring this isolation about. The solu­ tion that presented itself was to try to destroy the confidence in

Britain and France that, if war came, Russia would join them against

Germany. Hitler believed that if he could remove Russia from the Anglo-

French camp, then London and Paris would recognize that it was im­ possible to give the Poles any help. Britain and France would then

^^8puhrer directive to Commander-in-Chief, Army, 25 March 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 99; directive Chief of Army High Command, 3 April, no. 149; directive by Fuhrer, 11 April, no. 185; minute of con­ ference, Hitler, Army commanders, 23 May, no. 433; memo, conversations, Ribbentrop-Lipski (Polish Ambassador), 26 March 1939, no. 101; Ger. For. Ministry to Ambassador in Poland, 5 April, no. 159; Abrogation of 1934 Non-aggression Pact, 27 April, no. 276; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 499, 509, 511; Taylor, Origins, p. 209.

^^9^oodruff interview, 29 May 1976; Wall, European Note-Book, pp. 155-6. 120 Memo of conversation of British and German trade officials, 24 July 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 716; Halifax to Henderson, 21 July, Brit. Docs. 3rd Series, VI, no. 395.

^^^Bullock, Hitler, p. 510. 255 pressure Poland to accept the German terms. If she refused, the

Western states would refuse to fight a hopeless battle and leave the 122 Poles to their fate. On his part, Stalin, suspicious that the

British and French were trying to direct Germany against Russia, grew

increasingly amenable to a deal with Hitler as an alternative to the

unpromising negotiations then going on with the Western Powers. At

the very least, the gains to be made by an agreement with Germany could buy valuable time as a hedge against the day when Hitler might decide

1 pq to attack the Soviet Union.

On this basis, negotiations were undertaken, at first tentative­

ly, and then, at the end of July, in earnest and, in fact, haste. Hit­

ler was determined to seal the agreement prior to September 1, the date

he had set for the possible attack on Poland. This was a game in which

Hitler was determined that France and Britain would not outbid him. In

return for a Non-Aggression Pact, a secret protocol gave Russia a

sphere of influence in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and eastern Poland, 124 Stalin was satisfied. The agreement was signed on 23 August.

Hitler's joy at the conclusion of this dramatic stroke soon

turned to disappointment. The only government which fell as a result

122 German Ambassador in Poland to For. Ministry, 5 Aug. 1939, DGFP. Series D, VI, no. 773; Sontag, Broken World, p. 370; Bullock, Hitler, p. 513,

Bullock, Hitler, p. 514.

^^^Schulenberg (Moscow) to Ger. For. Ministry, 29 June 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, no. 579; For. Ministry Memo, 29 June, no. 583; For. Ministry to Schulenberg, 22 July, no. 700; 29 July, no. 736; telegram. Hitler to Stalin, 20 Aug., VII, no. 142; telegram, Stalin to Hitler, 21 Aug., no. 159; text of Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 Aug., no. 228, 229. 256 125 of the Pact was that of his ally, Japan. Mussolini informed the

Fuhrer that Italy was unprepared to render Germany any effective 1_96 assistance should immediate war break out. The French government 127 reluctantly determined to stick by its treaty with Poland. In

Britain, the effect of the Nazi-Soviet pact was to unite the country

even more firmly against any further appeasement and to prepare the

English people to accept a war if it came as right and proper. In fact,

the removal of the necessity of dealing with Russia had the effect of

strengthening British unity. For now the enemies of the vast majority

of the British people, conservative, moderate, and liberal, were

arrayed in one camp. The ideological divisions that had split the

country apart over Spain and Munich and which were partly repaired by *L28 the Prague coup were now almost completely closed. And while Cham­ berlain still hoped that war might be avoided, he too was resolved on

resistance if it became necessary; on 25 August, the British guarantee

of Poland was confirmed by the signing of a mutual-assistance treaty.^^9

Hitler decided to make one more effort to split Poland off from Britain

and France. He cancelled the order to attack the Poles on 6 August and

^25cab 23/100; 41 (39) 3; Taylor, Origins, p. 254; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 331-2; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 419.

126j^ussolini to Hitler, 25 Aug. 1939, DGFP, Series D, VII, no. 271; Ciano, Diaries, 24-26 Aug. 1939, pp. 127-30.

^^^Daladier to Hitler, 26 Aug. 1939, DGFP, Series D, VII, no. 324.

IZ^Bergonzi interview, 30 May 1976; Hebblethwaite interview, 4 June, 1976.

1 OQ Message, N. Chamberlain to Hitler, 22 Aug. 1939, Brit. Docs.. 3rd Series, VII, no. 145; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 644; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 416; Sontag, Broken World, p. 379. 257 130 set 1 September as a new date for the attack.

Those organs of the Catholic press which had opposed a Russian 131 link felt that the Nazi-Soviet pact had vindicated their positions.

As a writer in The Tablet put it; "Those that stand for tyranny, for

the suppression of the rights of man, for the flouting of the rights of

God, for a callous disregard of national rights and frontiers, stand 132 united." The Tablet's view was typically realistic. Woodruff had repeatedly pointed out the compatibility of much of German and Russian policy. But the signing of the pact put him in a sober mood since, as

the paper noted, Russian help would greatly reduce the effectiveness of 133 a blockade in the event of war with Germany. In the House of Com­ mons, Catholic Labor Party members William Robinson and David Logan

poured scorn on the defense of Russia's actions which was made by the 134 sole Communist M.P., William Gallacher. "The Prussian and the

Russian will agree about everything," Gilbert Chesterton had once 135 written, "especially about Poland." In 1939, he was proved right.

The war of nerves entered its final stage in August 1939. The

Tablet almost exactly reflected the British government's state of mind

^^^Extract from Notebook of General Haider, 28 Aug. 1939 in DGFP, Series D, VII, p. 565. 1 n The Universe, 25 Aug. 1939, p. 16; 1 Sept., p. 1, 3, 10; The Month, Sept. 1939, pp. 200-1.

P. Titterton, "The Cause is Clear," The Universe, 1 Sept. 1939, p. 10.

^^^The Tablet, 13 May 1939, p. 603; 29 July, pp. 134-6; 26 Aug., pp. 261-2.

351 (1939): 28-37. ^^^Hollis, Mind, p. 207. 258 as it tried to combine a refusal to bow before the threat of force with an insistance that the path of negotiation remained open if Hitler 1 36 wished to take it. Woodruff was clearly impressed by the Anglo-

Polish treaty:

For the first time another nation, one singularly remote, unknown, and with only the one great common bond of a common threat, made the arbiter of whether or not Great Britain goes to war.

Again, he emphasized that the step had been taken only to strengthen the Polish hand to enable them to make "the settlement which we hope 138 to see." Woodruff correctly judged that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had been made in order to discourage Britain and France from fulfilling their commitments to Poland, and he applauded the reassurances of firm 139 support that had been forthcoming.

As the final crisis approached, the Vatican worked feverishly to find a compromise that would save the peace including suggestions for an international conference and an offer of papal mediation. These initiatives having failed due to Polish firmness in refusing concessions and Nazi obstinacy in holding out for everything or war, Pius XII ended his offers.He had another strategy in mind.

^8^The Tablet, 5 Aug. 1939, p. 165; "The War of Nerves in Poland," 12 Aug. 1939, p. 201; 19 Aug., pp. 229-30.

^^^The Tablet. 19 Aug. 1939, p. 230. ^^®Ibid.

^^^The Tablet, 26 Aug. 1939, pp. 261-3; "The Fate of Poland," p. 264.

^^^Radio message of Pius XII, 24 Aug. 1939, Holy See, Records, no. 113; Message of Pius XII, 31 Aug., no. 160, 161; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 427; Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, pp. 27-31; Kent, "Pius XII and Germany," p. 6 6 ; The Tablet, 26 Aug. 1939, p. 271; 2 Sept., pp. 295, 302. 259

Speaking in the Commons on 24 August, John McGovern, who had hurried back from a trip to Italy, said that he had been told by his

Italian friends to expect a German march into Danzig and the Corridor

in a few days, a move that neither the Pope nor Mussolini would be able

to prevent. He execrated Russia for its pact with Germany. Finally,

in the closest statement this long-time pacifist ever made of support

for military action, he declared that "...while I oppose this country.., 141 going into war, I would do nothing to baffle those in charge...,"

The Universe defended the sacrifices of the appeasement policy

since they had proved that Germany was seeking not justice but domina­

tion. Therefore, as George Barnard viewed the latest crisis, he con­

cluded that "there has seldom in history been a crisis in which Catho­

lic principles in regard to participation in a just war has been so

completely satisfied.Writing on 31 August in what was to be

the last peacetime issue of The Tablet, Woodruff pointed out that the

British government had been more than willing to render justice to the

defeated enemy of 1919, But now, he declared, a united and resolute

Britain was ready, if it must, to go to war rather than capitulate to

Nazi pressures.

The alternative would not be peace, but the gradual surrender step by step, and perhaps not so very gradually now, of the strength of France and then of Britain, and with the loss of this strength would come the imposition of the Nazi hegemony... The Czechs and the Slovaks have been reduced to servitude, which is plainly intended as the fate of others.

^^^HC 351 (1939): 37-43.

^^^"A Clear Conscience," The Universe, 1 Sept. 1939, p. 12; "Resistance to Aggression," p. 12; The Month, September 1939, p. 193.

1^3„ihe Supreme Issue," The Tablet, 2 Sept. 1939, pp. 293, 296. 260

Together with France, it was time to call a halt to the piecemeal aggression and take a stand in defense of "those traditional things, respect for the family, for the law, for religion, for nationality, upon which the civilization of the West has rested. Our mission today 144 is a greater thing than we foresaw, or merited."

It was a clarion call to battle and a battle it would be. At dawn on 1 September 1939, German guns fired on Poland. True to form, the Chamberlain government marched off to war not in quick time but with a hesitation step. Meeting on the morning of 1 September, the cabinet decided that, in conjunction with the French, it would issue a warning to Germany that if she did not withdraw her forces, then

Great Britain would fulfill her obligations to Poland.A proposal of Mussolini's for a conference was not rejected but, as Chamberlain told the cabinet at a meeting on the afternoon of 2 September, nego­ tiations with Germany could not take place "unless she was first pre­ pared to give an understanding to withdraw her troops from Poland and

Danzig.A proposed deadline of midnight for a German reply was extended at the request of the French government.

When Chamberlain announced this plodding approach to the House of Commons that evening, he was astonished at the explosion of dissatis-

144ibid., pp. 296-7.

^^^CAB 23/100: 47 (39) 1; Halifax to Henderson, 1 Sept. 1939, Brit. Docs. , 3rd Series, VII, no. 664, 669. Bethell, War Hitler W o n , p. 16.

^48c a b 23/100: 47 (39) 1; 48 (39) 1.

^47phipps to Halifax, 2 Sept. 1939, Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, VII, no. 696, 708. 261 fied anger with which he was greeted. Even John McGovern joined in the attackl^^B After the session, Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord 149 Halifax informed the French that they could delay action no longer.

The cabinet was hastily summoned at 11:30 p.m. and it agreed with

Chamberlain that the German government should be presented with an ultimatum at 9:00 a.m. the next day, 3 September, If, by 11:00 a.m.,

Germany had not consented to withdraw her forces, then, "...a state of war would exist between Great Britain and Germany from that hour."^^^

The next morning, the British ambassador delivered the ultimatum. No answer being given by Hitler, at noon, a weary and disappointed

Neville Chamberlain addressed Parliament: Britain was at war.

The Prague coup shattered the configuration of opinion within the British Catholic press as it did within the government and the general British public as well. A new, tougher attitude now appeared.

This attitude, while still expressing readiness for a peaceful resolu­ tion of outstanding issues with Germany, now demanded true reciprocity from Germany, including respect for the rights and interests of other parties to disputes. The pace of the move to this new attitude was not uniform: The Tablet, The Universe and The Sower arrived there soonest; The Month, Downside, The Dublin Review and Blackfriars only later. Those Catholics of a more practical turn of mind such as M.P.

351 (1939): 282; Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 406-7.

1A Q Minute of telephone conversation Chamberlain-Daladier, 2 Sept. 1939, 9:50 p.m., Brit. Docs., 3rd Series, VII, no. 740, Halifax- Bonnet, 10:30 p.m., no. 741.

^^°CAB 23/100: 49 (39) 1. 262

Robert Tatton Bower, S. J. Gosling and even Douglas Woodruff advocated at least some kind of limited agreement with the Soviet Union to counter the German threat. Other Catholic writers such as George Barnard and

Victor White were opposed to a pact with Stalin. Hitler resolved these divisions within the Catholic ranks. His pact with the Soviet Union simplified the alignment of forces by throwing all the enemies of the

Church into one camp; his attack on Poland gave the answer to the arguments between resistance and further appeasement. When Chamberlain announced that Britain was at war with Germany, the British Catholics, together with the general population accepted the fact without complaint.

Though the minds of many retained a trace of confusion over the out­ come of events until the German assault on the West in 1940, there was 151 a real sense of national unity and purpose. The Second World War had begun.

Taylor, English History, p. 453; B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, pp. 117-120; Marwick, Britain in Century of Total War, pp. 257- 8 ; Clark, Another Part of the Wood, p. 281. CHAPTER VI

THE TWILIGHT WAR

Neville Chamberlain had failed to make peace; he now failed to make war. True, he refused Hitler's insincere peace offer which fol­ lowed on the overrunning of Poland,^ and insisted that there could be 2 no peace with Germany while Hitler ruled that land. But, hoping that the pressures of blockade would bring about a collapse of the Nazi government without bloody battles, he did little to build support for his policies or to prepare the nation, economically or militarily, for a serious struggle. The result was a rising clamor of criticism from 3 Parliament and the British public. According to the Gallup Poll, approval for the government's policies dropped from 54 percent in Dec­ ember 1939 to 51 percent in February 1940, while those professing no 4 opinion rose from 16 percent to 22 percent. This decline of British

hitler. My New Order, pp. 749-56; The Dominions supported Chamberlain in this refusal, PREM. 1/39, 12 Oct. 1939; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 555-8; Shirer, Rise and Fall, pp. 639-43; Cowling, Impact of Hitler, pp. 355-7. 2 Medlicott, Contemporary England, pp. 415-6; MacLeod, Neville Chamberlain, p. 278; Chamberlain letter to Duke of Buccleuch and Queensbury, 2 Feb. 1940, PREM. 1/443. 3 Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 288; Marwick, Britain in Century of Total War, p. 269; Taylor, English History, pp. 456-65.

^Middlemas, Strategy of Appeasement, p. 419.

263 264 national morale during the period of inaction on land known as the

"Twilight War," although less serious than that of the French public and army (as Churchill asserts), was nonetheless severe and in large part due to Chamberlain.^

The outbreak of war unified British Catholic opinion to a some­ what greater than it did that of the public at large. The proportion of Catholics in the armed forces was much larger than their numbers warranted.^ Christopher Hollis enlisted first in the Home Guard and

then in the Royal Air Force. Evelyn Waugh secured the help of Winston

Churchill to get a commission in the Royal Marines.^ Bernard Wall first went to Italy to try to persuade the Italians not to join Hitler. When

Mussolini attacked France, Wall returned to England where he worked as a researcher for the Foreign Office under the direction of Arnold

Q Toynbee and Sir Alfred Zimmem. Father S. J. Gosling left The Sower 9 and became an army chaplain as he had been in World War I. Robert

Grant-Ferris left the House of Commons to become a flyer in the R.A.F,^®

Some Catholics accepted the war in a spirit of reparation for

their long support of Germany and appeasement which had been proved a mistake. One such figure. Sir Arnold Wilson, a friend of Douglas

^See Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 471, 479, 485, 559, 650; Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 288.

^Lunn, "Catholics of Great Britain," p. 83.

^Sykes, Evelyn Waugh, pp. 194, 198.

®Wall, Headlong Into Change, pp. 106-9. 9 Drinkwater interview, 1 June 1976.

^^The Catholic Who's Who (London, B u m s , Oates, 1940). 265

Jerrold and Tom Bums, volunteered as a tail gunner in a bomber. This was to choose what was recognized to be an extremely hazardous duty 11 and, in fact, he was later killed in action. Other British Catholics of Irish ancestry joined the armed forces to prove their loyalty to 12 England. An occasional defeatist and collaboration-minded note was heard among some conservative Catholics, but their number seems to have 13 been very small.

Figures as disparate as the anti-German Hilaire B e l l o c , ^ 4 the formerly pro-appeasement Christopher Hollis and the pro-league John C.

Eppstein wrote pamphlets defending Britain's involvement in the war as indisputably just and proper from the Catholic point of view.^^ These works were propaganda of the highest sort, with arguments soberly based on ethics, politics and philosophy, respectively. In his tract, Belloc made a statement which must be noted: that its treatment of the Jews alone was sufficient to warrant the end of the Nazi regime.Much has been said of Belloc's anti-Semitism; this eamest statement makes up

for much.

^^T. F. B u m s interview, 25 May 1976; Speaight, Property Basket, p. 207.

B u m s interview, 26 May 1976.

l^Speaight, Property Basket, pp. 217, 221; Igoe interview, 26 May 1976.

^4gee Belloc, Letters, pp. 287-8.

Belloc, The Catholics and the War (London: B ums, Oates, 1940); C. Hollis, Our Case (London: Longman's Green & Co., 1939); J. Eppstein, Right Against Might (Oxford, Eng.: Catholic Social Guild, 1940).

l^catholics and War, p. 29. 266

The Catholic hierarchy of England led by Cardinal Hinsley issued a statement shortly after the outbreak of war which read: "We have a profound conviction of the justice of our course. Our nation in this conflict stands for freedom and for the liberty of the individual and

the state.Hinsley launched an ecumenical movement called "The

Sword of the Spirit" headed by Christopher Dawson and Barbara Ward.

Aimed at uniting all Christians in opposition to Hitler and in recon­

structing the post-war world, this far-seeing effort was too advanced

for the rest of the English Catholic hierarchy. After Hinsley's death, 18 the hierarchy stifled the movement.

The entire Catholic press, including those journals which had been the most pacifistic before the war, professed the same conviction:

that Germany was clearly in the wrong and that Britain was correct in

opposing her with force. The position of The Universe was typical:

"...there is no shadow of a doubt as to the justice of the course... 19 Germany has plunged Europe recklessly into war." "Whatever our

individual or even national shortcomings may be," declared Victor White

in Blackfriars, "we are involved in a struggle for something wholly and 20 objectively good." The Tablet, seconded by other publications, set

forth Germany's indictment at length: the justice of her claims up till

^^The Universe, 15 Sept. 1939, p. 1; statement by Hinsley, 8 Sept., p. 1. 1 8 Speaight, Property Basket, p. 220.

^9"war for Christian Principles," The Universe, 8 Sept. 1939, p. 10.

^^Blackfriars, Oct. 1939, p. 724. 267

Munich; the mockery she had made of that justice at Prague; the utter inadmissability of her violent assault on Poland ; the conviction that this assault was but one more step along the road to Nazi domination of

Europe; the inability to credit Germany's word in the face of repeated violations of that word since March 1939; and, finally, the utter

impossibility of either ending the war or attempting to negotiate any kind of settlement with her while she remained under the government of 21 Hitler and his associates. The Sower, too, blamed Hitler, but also

indicted the leaders of the democracies who had failed to see and cure 22 the causes of war.

Though proceeding from a different set of premises, Douglas

Jerrold's conclusion was essentially the same as Gosling's: vacillation

and timidity had crippled any chance for an effective policy based 23 either on idealism or realism. In The Dublin Review, Barbara Ward

set forth a detailed and perceptive critique of fascism as "a revolu­

tion in a vacuum, a revolution without a creed and without a purpose.

She blamed the church for attacking only particular errors or abuses in

^ The Tablet, 9 Sept. 1939, pp. 325-6; "The Threat to Europe," 16 Sept., pp. 352-3, 348; "Britain and the German People," 23 Sept., p. 376; "War Aims," 4 Oct., pp. 423-4; 14 Oct., pp. 445-6; 28 Oct., p. 493; 4 Nov., pp. 518-19; 23 Dec., p. 713; "Fight with a Quiet Con­ science," The Universe, 15 Sept. 1939, p. 10; 29 Sept., p. 10; 6 Oct., p. 2; 8 Dec., p. 2; 15 Dec., pp. 3, 10; Blackfriars, Oct. 1939, pp. 724-5; Catholic Truth, Nov.-Dec. 1939, pp. 177, 181-2; The Month, Oct. 1939, pp. 290-3; Nov., pp. 369-71; C. C. Martindale, "The First Three Weeks," pp. 377-80; John Murray, "Looking Forward," Jan. 1940, pp. 11- 12. 22 The Sower, Oct.-Dec. 1939, p. 173.

Jerrold, England, pp. 237-54.

^‘^"Revolution from the Right," The Dublin Review. Oct. 1939, pp. 317-18. 268

fascist doctrine and practice, and not condemning fascist ideology as

a whole. Finally, she blamed Catholics for neglecting the appeals of men such as Leo XIII for social reform. This failure, she said, had 25 left the field to the fascists and the Communists.

The universal recognition of Poland's innocence in the face of

Nazi violence, her courageous, if hopeless, battle against the German

invaders, and the fact that most Poles were Catholics, all contributed

to making British Catholic opinion virtually unanimous in being against 26 Germany.

Another factor leading to Catholic unity had been the Nazi-

Soviet pact and the subsequent Russian intervention in Poland. "The

treachery of Moscow is only what we have always warned our readers to

expect, and we are more than ever thankful that no alliance with Russia 27 was concluded by this country from misguided motives." So read The 28 Universe and the sentiment was endorsed by The Tablet and The Month.

Russia's unprovoked attack on Finland and the great difficulty which

she had in overcoming the Finns increased the disgust with which the

Z^Ibid., pp. 322-6.

^^Hilaire Belloc, The Universe, 6 Oct. 1939, pp. 1, 6 ; The Tab­ let, 9 Sept. 1939, p. 326; 16 Sept., p. 351; 30 Sept., pp. 399, 402; Blackfriars, Oct. 1939, p. 724; Andrew Beck, "Gregory XVI and the Poles," Clergy Review. Jan. 1940, pp. 1-12; letter of condolence from Pius XII to Polish Cardinal Hlond, pp. 77-81; The Month, Oct. 1939, p. 289.

2?The Universe. 22 Sept. 1939, p. 10.

^^The Tablet, 16 Sept. 1939, p. 351; "The War of the Polish Par­ tition," 23 Sept., p. 373; 30 Sept., pp. 397-8, 399, 402; 7 Oct., p. 421; "The Enemies of Europe," 14 Oct., p. 448; 21 Oct., p. 469; "Moscow and Germany," The Universe. 22 Sept. 1939, pp. 10-11; "The Bolshevick Menace in Poland," 29 Sept., p. 10; 6 Oct., p. 11; The Month, Oct. 1939, pp. 289-91; Nov., pp. 373-4; March 1940, p. 168. 269

Soviets were viewed and seemed to confirm those analysts who had held 29 her military capabilities in contempt. From the Catholic far right,

Robert Sencourt put the chief blame for the outbreak of the war on 30 Russian plotting. In the House of Commons, Catholic M.P.s John

Tinker, David Logan, John Morris, and John McGovern condemned Russia for her intervention in Eastern Europe. The last three men, especially

McGovern, took delight in taunting the sole Communist M.P., William 31 Gallacher, who unfailingly followed every shift in Stalin's policy.

When Gallacher interrupted Neville Chamberlain's reading of a 1936

statement of Ribbentrop's by shouting, "He was your favorite then," 32 McGovern shot back, "Now he is yours."

Numerous writers undertook to carefully review the conditions necessary, according to Catholic teaching, for commencing and engaging

in a just war, especially the necessity of insuring that only moral 33 means were employed in the service of a good end. In all of their

The Tablet, 7 Oct. 1939, p. 422; 14 Oct., p. 445; 9 Dec., pp. 661-2; 23 Dec., p. 714; 20 Jan. 1940, pp. 49-50; 24 Feb., p. 173; 16 March, p. 245; The Universe, 8 Dec. 1939, p. 10; 15 Dec., p. 10; 22 Dec., p. 10; J. F. T. Prince, "The Heresy of the New Man," Blackfriars, Oct. 1939, pp. 746-50; The Month, March 1940, p. 168; April, pp. 245-6; Catholic Truth, May-June 1940, p. 38.

on "The Intrigues of Moscow," The Dublin Review, Jan. 1940, pp. 20-34.

SlgC 351 (1939); 997-1006, 1012-14, 1897-1903; 352 (1939): 580-1, 621; 355 (1939): 257; 356 (1940): 93-4, 100, 101; 358 (1940): 1165.

^^HC 352 (1939): 1618.

^^Gerald Vann, O.P., "In Tempore Belli," Blackfriars, Oct. 1939, pp. 727-31; "Reprisals," pp. 765-6; Victor White, review of Morality and War, by Gerald Vann, Dec., p. 836; Ambrose Farrell, O.P. "The Sanc­ tion of War," Jan. 1940, pp. 3-15; Hugh Pope, "St. Augustine on Peace and War," I May, pp. 290-303; II, June, pp. 353-63; Henry Davis, S.J., "War: Christian Principles," Clergy Review, Oct. 1939, pp. 283-300; 270 discussions, the authors defended, either explicitly or implicitly,

the justice of Britain's participation in the war.

But a small group of Catholics refused to be convinced and joined themselves to that minority of Englishmen who maintained a con­

scientious objection to the war. Two Catholic figures prominent in the public eye were included in that group of objectors. One was the critic Eric Gill. Not an absolute pacifist in principle, he protested

that the means that would be employed by the combatants, especially aerial bombardment, were intrinsically immoral. This conviction, coupled with his view that the struggle was really a battle between rival national plutocrats brought him to consider the war unjust and 34 participation in it inadmissable.

The second Catholic figure speaking for conscientious objection was John McGovern. The fourth M.P. to take the floor of the Commons after Prime Minister Chamberlain announced that Britain was at war with

Germany, McGovern expressed his sympathy for Chamberlain's position,

and for the working men who would be doing the fighting. But, while he would do nothing to obstruct the war effort and thought that any peace made with Hitler would be a disaster, he did not believe that the war aims of the Allies were so idealistic as to warrant the dreadful

E. J. Mahoney, review of Morality and War by Gerald Vann, March 1940, pp. 253-5; R.M.P. review of Morality and War by Gerald Vann, in Downside Review, Jan. 1940, pp. 118-19; Thomas Corbishley, "Crusade or Catastrophe?" The Month, Nov. 1939, pp. 459-67; Jan. 1940, p. 1; The Universe, 8 Sept. 1939, p. 10; review of Morality and War by Gerald Vann, 20 Oct., p. 7; 1 Dec., p. 2; The Tablet, 2 Dec. 1939, p. 632.

^^Speaight, Eric Gill, pp. 303-7; Attwater, A Cell of Good Living, p. 220. 271 35 suffering that war must bring. And so McGovern attacked what he

thought was carping criticism from the opposition, expressed his dis­

trust of Allied bombing policy, criticized official propaganda as "pure

humbug," and defended the rights of conscientious objectors and other harmless but irritating groups against official harassment.Protest­

ing the decision of a judge who had decided against the claim of a

Catholic conscientious objector because he had not consulted a priest

before making up his mind, McGovern gave a speech which laid bare the

manner in which faith, ethics, and action were woven together to make

up the fabric of this extraordinary man's character;

I was b o m and brought up and am a Roman Catholic, but I would no more accept the interpretation of an individual clergyman, or even the head of the Church, than I would accept the definition of the Prime Minister... My impulse towards politics was b o m of my earlier religious teaching and belief. My own interpretation and my Chris­ tian attitude were to try to improve life and leave it better than I found it.

The most hateful thing to me in life is the taking of human life... I believe in a measure of force to achieve aims and ends that I believe in, but I have seen so much force and violence and blood­ shed and brutality in the world...that I begin to doubt whether force ever achieves anything at all.^?

But Catholic opinion in the House of Commons was represented not

by McGovern but by men like John Morris who thanked Chamberlain for

calling a halt to Hitler and by J. J. Tinker who declared "...I have

^^HC 351 (1939): 296-8.

351 (1939): 702-3, 705-6, 1007, 1335, 1904-11; 357 (1940): 1599; 358 (1940): 1174; HÇ 353 (1939): 386-7, 1015; 357 (1940): 375-7, 2275; 358 (1940): 546-7, 982; 360 (1940): 356, 1382-3; 361 (1940): 202-5, 673; 365 (1940): 1424.

^^HC 357 (1940): 1598-1601. 272 38 never before known such unity of feeling in the country."

In spite of the admitted sincerity of many Catholic conscientious objectors, most Catholic writers found their ethical position too rigid. Cardinal Hinsley expressed the ethical viewpoint of the vast majority of Catholics in his first statement on the war: "However much we may individually be disposed to give our cheek to the smiter and our body to the persecutor, we cannot stand idly by and allow our 39 neighbor to be enslaved or ruthlessly done to death." Together with the conviction that the Allies would shun immoral means of waging war, this was the principle upon which criticism of conscientious objectors . . 40 was based.

The unsympathetic attitude of Most Catholic writers to con­ scientious objectors was extended to the neutral states. The Tablet was especially pointed in its remarks that those states should realize that the Allies were fighting their battle, too, and that, were Ger­ many to attack them, they might regret not having joined in a battle which was really theirs from the start.

Even before the Polish fighting had ended, proposals began to be made for peace talks by Mussolini, Hitler, and the rulers of the

^®HC 351 (1939): 301, 1012-14; Patrick Hannon, HÇ 358 (1940): 1209, 1366.

^^The Universe, 8 Sept. 1939, p. 1.

^^The Tablet, 16 Sept. 1939, pp. 352-3; The Universe, 3 Nov. 1939, p. 10; 1 Dec., p. 2; 29 Dec., p. 3; Christopher Hollis, "Catho­ lics and War," Clergy Review, June 1940, pp. 471-84; Thomas Corbishley, "The Perils of Pacifism," The Month, May 1940, pp. 331-8.

^^The Tablet, 9 Sept. 1939, pp. 328-9; 7 Oct., p. 421; "Word to Neutrals," 28 Oct., p. 496; The Universe, 8 Dec. 1939, p. 10; John Murray, "Neutrality and the Neutrals," The Month, April 1940, pp. 281- 94. 273

Low Countries and Scandinavia. The Tablet greeted the proposals from

Italy and the neutral states politely but it agreed with the reply given by the British Government--namely, that it was impossible to negotiate with the present rulers of Germany or, in fact, with any

German regime which did not first commit itself to the restitution of the wrongs done to the Poles and the Czechs and to the abandonment of force and threat as a prime instrument of foreign policy.Catholic

M.P.s Richard Stokes and John McGovern thought the government should have been more amenable to the idea. Stokes proposed a detailed list of conditions for a settlement. If Hitler refused to negotiate on this basis, he said, the Fuhrer would put himself clearly in the wrong.

At first glance, the attitudes of The Universe and The Month might have seemed more amenable to negotiation. But their willingness to accept peace talks was based on conditions such as removal of the

Nazi govemment^^ and the redress of the wrongs done to Poland, stipu­ lations flatly unacceptable to Hitler.Realization that the Nazi government would never agree to negotiate on these terms led to the hope that the pressures of blockade might induce the Germans to revolt.

But that hope faded by year's end, replaced by the warning to prepare

^^The Tablet, 9 Sept. 1939, p. 328; "The Meaning of Peace," 23 Sept., pp. 400-1; 18 Nov., p. 581; 11 Nov. 1939, p. 541; 18 Nov., p. 574.

355 (1939): 68-70; 358 (1940): 1306-9.

44%he Month, Oct. 1939, p. 295; George Glasgow, "War Aims," Nov., pp. 394-401.

^^The Universe, 6 Oct. 1939, p. 10; 20 Oct., p. 10; 27 Oct., p. 10; 17 Nov., p. 10. 274

for a long war.^^ Very early on, John McGovern had poured scorn on

the notion of a mass rising in Germany. Only the German military, he

said, had the means to overthrow Hitler.

The actions of the Nazi regime made this firm attitude for vic­

tory a fixed conviction. While astonished at the ease with which the

Nazi "Blitzenkrieg" (The Tablet*s first attempt at this new term)

smashed the Polish forces, and, sorrowful over the occupation of that

country, the journal assumed that this conquest would resemble the

others of modern times.Then, beginning in November and continuing

steadily thereafter, reports of the now all-too-familiar Nazi atroci­

ties in Poland began to come in, reports ranging from petty humiliations 49 to deportations and, finally, massacres. After this, wrote Douglas

Woodruff, "no man can honestly talk of any peace which leaves the Nazi

power undestroyed.This attitude rapidly became general. By the

The Tablet, 14 Oct. 1939, p. 447; 11 Nov., p. 541; 18 Nov., pp. 573-4; 23 Dec., p. 714; 30 Dec., p. 738; The Universe, 13 Oct. 1939, p. 10; Arnold Lunn, "Germany Through Swiss Eyes," 17 Nov., p. 10; 8 Dec., p. 10; 1 March 1940, p. 10; 8 March, p. 10; 21 March, p. 10; The Sower, Jan. 1940, p. 3.

^^HC 351 (1939): 706-7.

^^The Tablet, 16 Sept. 1939, p. 354; 7 Oct., p. 421; 14 Oct., pp. 447, 495.

49The Tablet, 18 Nov. 1939, pp. 578-9; "The Defense of the West," 25 Nov., p. 600; 2 Dec., p. 624; Christopher Dawson, "The Hour of Dark­ ness," pp. 625-6; "The Martyrdom of Poland," 20 Jan. 1940, p. 52; 3 Feb., p. 98; 2 March, p. 200; 4 May, pp. 421-22, 452; The Universe, 15 Dec. 1939, p. 1; 22 Dec., p. 1; 26 Jan. 1940, pp. 1, 10, 12; 2 Feb., p. 3; "The Vatican and Poland," p. 10; The Month, Dec. 1939, pp. 455-6; Jan. 1940, pp. 5-6; Feb., pp. 85-6; April, pp. 247-8.

^^"The Martyrdom of Poland," 20 Jan. 1940, p. 52; 16 March, p. 247; 23 March, p. 272; interview, 29 May 1976. 275

time Pope Pius XII promulgated his five-point plan for peace^^ at

Christmas 1939, they were treated as principles for a general European 52 settlement rather than grounds for negotiation with Germany.

The long and wearying efforts to achieve peace and economic im­ provement in the 1930s had ended in war and continued economic hard­

ship. The commitment to the trials and sacrifice of war released a new idealism which was determined to try to reconstruct a new inter­ national order and to accomplish social reforms that would improve the

53 lot of the great masses of the British people. Blackfriars and

Clergy Review published articles calling for a magnanimous peace settle­ ment and the construction of post-war unity by means of "a gradualist 54 Federationism." Even Woodruff admitted that the war had awakened

"the sense of European unity.Though his ideal of European unity was looser and his regard for democracy less than that of men like

(1) The right of all nations to an independent life; (2) dis­ armament; (3) a new international organization to guarantee peace; (4) protection of racial minorities; (5) a turn to God's love and jus­ tice; Blackfriars, March 1940, pp. 139-40; Catholic Truth, March-April 1940, pp. 19-21.

52"The Restoration of Europe," The Tablet, 6 Jan. 1940, pp. 4-5; "The Approach to the Germans," 13 Jan., pp. 28-9; The Universe, 29 Dec. 1939, p. 1; John Murray, "A Papal Pointer to Peace," The Month, Feb. 1940, pp. 129-38.

^%avighurst. Twentieth Century Britain, p. 288; William L. Langer, gen. ed., The Rise of M o d e m Europe, (New York; Harper Torch- books, 1968), Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945, pp. 245-6.

^^enguin, Blackfriars, April 1940, p. 278; Walter C. Breiten- feld,'Federalism and World Peace," June, pp. 364-70; A. C. F. Beales, "Catholics and the Peace Settlement," Clergy Review, April 1940, pp. 189-200. ^^"The Enemies of Europe," The Tablet, 14 Oct. 1939, p. 449; 2 Dec., p. 623; 20 Jan. 1940, pp. 52-3. 276

Victor White,^^ Woodruff definitely favored the reestablishment of what

Jacques Maritain called "a new Christendom."^^ Anglo-French unity, wrote Hollis, "is a unity from which, we may hope, the unity of Europe CO will come." This ideal of unity survived the fall of France, and 59 bore fruit after the war. John Murray of The Month remained dis­ trustful of this "propaganda," favoring instead the reestablishment of a new balance of power to hem Germany in.^^

The Universe addressed itself to the need for social and econ­ omic reform while The Tablet linked the Chamberlain government's record of errors and half-measures in diplomatic affairs to its neglect of domestic affairs as well.^^ Coming from the conservative Tablet, the latter remark is an indication of the deterioration in support for

Neville Chamberlain's policies. Earlier, Woodruff had saluted Winston

5&The Tablet, 16 Sept. 1939, p. 351; "The Rights of Man," 4 Nov., p. 520; 2 Dec., p. 624; 27 Jan. 1940, p. 74; "The Pope and the War," The Universe, 3 Nov. 1940, p. 10; Don Christopher Butler, "Democracy and the Modem World," (a review essay on For Democracy, by various writers) Downside Review, Jan. 1940, pp. 67-76; for favorable reviews of For Democracy see E. J. Coyne review in Clergy Review, Feb. 1940, pp. 145-6; A.O. review in The Sower, Jan. 1940, p. 4.

^Tj. Maritain, "The War and Human Freedom," The Tablet, 27 Jan. 1940, pp. 77-8; 3 Feb., p. 100.

^^The Tablet, 6 April 1940, p. 317.

^^"Into Battle," 18 May 1940, p. 462; The Month, June 1940, p. 404; "We Fight On," The Tablet, 22 June 1940, p. 601; "The Spirit of Britain," p. 604; "France in Defeat," The Universe, 28 June 1940, p. 8 ; see Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 205-13 where Churchill himself had grave reservations; Woodruff remains a staunch advocate of European unity. Inteirview, 29 May 1976.

^^The Month, Nov. 1939, p. 377; Jan. 1940, pp. 2-3.

^^"Social Justice in Practice" The Universe, 23 Feb. 1940, p. 10; The Tablet, 3 March 1940, p. 271; T. F. Burns interview, 25 May 19761 277

Churchill's abilities and guessed that he could easily end up as Prime 62 Minister.

Only The Tablet undertook to analyze and comment on military

operations. Woodruff was aided in this by the advice of his highly- 63 placed militairy contacts. He attributed the rapid destruction of the

Polish army to the superiority of the Germans in airplanes, tanks and

artillery.Since the Anglo-French forces were similarly equipped.

Woodruff assumed that the predominance which defense had enjoyed over

offense in World War I would still prevail.Therefore, Woodruff

judged that if the Allies carefully husbanded their growing forces,

their greater material resources must gradually exert a crushing force

on the Germans. Any attempt on the part of the latter to break the

stranglehold of blockade and siege by offensive action must result in massive German losses without corresponding Allied casualties. Then,

attacks could be confidently launched against a weakened Germany.

One should not be too hard on The Tablet for not recognizing

that German Blitzkrieg tactics had radically revolutionized warfare.

This lesson evaded most professional military men in the West, including

Sir Basil Liddel Hart, Winston Churchill, and the French General Staff

^^The Tablet, 3 Feb. 1940, p. 99.

^^Woodruff interview, 29 May 1976.

G^The Tablet. 23 Sept. 1939, p. 374.

G^Ibid., 30 Sept., p. 399; John Gurdon, "The War in the Air," 28 Oct., pp. 500-1; 18 Nov., p. 574.

G^The Tablet, 23 Sept. 1939, p. 375; 30 Sept., p. 399; 4 Nov., p. 519; 25 Nov., p. 597; 16 Jan. 1940, p. 1; 27 Jan., p. 74; 3 Feb., p. 97-9; 10 Feb., pp. 124-5; 30 March, p. 293. 278 until the Germans struck France in 1940.

The outbreak of the war and the ruthless German conquest of

Poland was a heavy blow to Pope Pius XII. His last-minute efforts to 68 keep the peace had been rebuffed by Hitler. The Vatican continued to maintain its stance of official neutrality. But statements by Pope

Pius to various people, comments in this first encyclical letter, Summi

Pontificates and the news and commentary of Vatican radio left no doubt that the papacy sympathized completely with Poland and the Allies while condemning Germany for a flagrant, unjustifiable resort to force.

"Poland cannot die," declared Osservatore Romano, "and we have not seen the last of her."^® As reports of the unprecedented Nazi atrocities in Poland began to come in, the Vatican's alarm grew.^^ Pius requested the Germans allow him to send envoys to occupied Poland to investigate the reports; not surprisingly, the request was refused, confirming the 72 Pope's worst suspicions. German-language broadcasts from Vatican

See W. S. Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 581 and The Second World War, vol 2; Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1949), pp. 43, 46-9; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, pp. 25-6.

G&Bergen to For. Ministry, 31 Aug. 1939, DGFP, Series D, VII, no. 473; Bergen to Cardinal Maglione, 1 Sept. 1939, Holy See, Records, no. 176; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 239; The Tablet, 9 Sept. 1939, p. 327.

G^Friedlander, Pius XII and Third Reich, pp. 35-6; The Tablet, 26 Sept. 1939, pp. 358-9; 23 Sept., p. 375; 7 Oct., p. 423, 431; 14 Oct., p. 455; 21 Oct., pp. 477-8; 30 March 1940, pp. 304-5; The Universe, 27 Oct. 1939, p. 11; 3 Nov., p. 1.

70cited in The Tablet, 30 Sept. 1939, p. 407.

^^Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, p. 35; The Tablet, 9 March, 1940, p. 229; 30 March, pp. 304-5.

^^The Universe, 22 Dec. 1939, p. 1; Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 242. 279 73 radio reporting these atrocities were jammed by the Germans.

In the German Reich, the struggle between the Catholic Church and the Nazi regime continued. With the outbreak of the war. Hitler forbade overt, direct assaults on the churches for the duration in order not to harm national unity. But he agreed to a continuation of the program of gradual attrition which was progressively reducing the strength of these bodies.Drawing its information from sources in the

Low Countries, France, Switzerland, Italy and the Vatican, month after month the British Catholic press set forth the same dreary story: clergy arrested, schools closed, property confiscated, religious min­ istrations restricted, religious societies and clubs abolished, churches closed, all accompanied by a steady stream of official mockery and 75 abuse, and all falling hardest on the areas annexed since 1938.

Caught by its own policy of "accommodation and compromise," the

German Catholic hierarchy did not protest the war. Rather the bishops exhorted their flocks to loyal obedience, prayed for victory, and, by these means, supported the Nazi war e f f o r t . Several British Catholic

^% h e Tablet, 27 Jan. 1940, p. 73; 3 Feb., p. 98; The Universe, 23 Feb. 1940, p. 11.

^^Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 232, 235-7; Ciano, Diaries, 18 Dec. 1939, p. 180.

^^The Tablet, 16 Sept. 1939, p. 358; 30 Sept., pp. 401-5; 7 Oct. p. 430; 14 Oct., pp. 454-5; 10 Feb. 1940, p. 130; 2 March, p. 202; 16 March, p. 254; 6 April, pp. 326-7; 20 April, p. 325; The Universe, 15 Sept. 1939, pp. 19-20; 20 Oct., p. 1; 27 Oct., p. 10; 24 Nov., p. 6 ; 1 Dec., pp. 25, 27; 12 Jan. 1940, p. 1; 2 Feb., p. 17; 29 March, p. 1; 19 April, p. 11; 10 May, p. 9.

^^conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 59, 230-4; Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler's W a r , pp. 12-15; also see Gordon Zahn, In Solitary Witness: the Life and Death of Franz Jagerstatter, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), on the hierarchy's refusal to support conscientious objection. 280 writers, after making all due allowances for simple errors and bad judgment, accused the German Church of capitulating to the Nazis.

And yet, there was an important difference between the atti­ tudes of the German and English hierarchies. The latter, as has been seem, made numerous references to the justice and moral rightness of the Allied cause. The German bishops, while expressing their hopes for a quick "peace with honor," (von Galen of Munster and Schulte of

Cologne), for a return to "religion, liberty and justice" (Groeber of

Freiburg), for diligent pastoral work among the troops (von Galen,

Groeber and Bertram of Breslau), that God would draw good from war's evil (Faulhaber of Munich), for loyal service from soldiers and civil­ ians (Klein of Paderbom and Sproll of Rottenburg) and for prayers for the government and soldiers, did not address themselves to the issue of the justice or injustice of Germany's c o u r s e . ^8 it would be too much to call this "resistance;" the German bishops never intended it as such.

But it was certainly less than wholehearted support, a fact noted by a number of observers, including the Nazis who, as usual, considered any­ thing short of total surrender to be treason.^9 Conflict between the

F. W. Foerster, "Political Catholicism in Prussianized Ger­ many," The Tablet, 6 April 1940, pp. 321-2; Francis March, review of National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church, by N. Micklem and The German Catholics by Robert d'Harcourt, in The Month, Oct. 1939, pp. 299-309; E. Quinn, review of The German Catholics by Robert d'Harcourt in Downside Review, Oct. 1939, pp. 553-6 and in The Dublin Review, Jan. 1940, p. 208; E. Quinn, review of National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church by N. Micklem, in The Dublin Review, April 1940, pp. 392-4.

78 ^ e Tablet, 4 Nov. 1939, pp. 525-6; 25 Nov., p. 606; 3 Feb., 1940, p. 106; The Universe, 20 Oct. 1939, p. 17; The Month, May 1940, pp. 324-5.

^^The Tablet, 24 Feb. 1940, p. 177; The Universe, 21 March 1940, p. 10. 281

Church and the German government was inevitable since the defense of

the most elementary Christian principles brought the bishops into clash with the Nazis, often in spite of themselves.

Meanwhile, Pope Pius had embarked on a new policy fraught with dangers to himself and the Catholic Church in Germany: an attempt to overthrow the entire Nazi regime and substitute a moderate government

in Germany. Pius did not originate this plan. He was contacted by a

group of German conspirators including General Ludwig Beck and Admiral

Wilhelm Canaris who sent Joseph Muller, a long-time anti-Nazi, to Rome

as their contact. By 18 October 1939, Pius agreed to serve as an

intermediary between the British government and the conspirators. This

policy, undertaken in the utmost secrecy, has been termed by Harold

Deutsch "among the most astounding events in the modern history of the „80 papacy."

About 1 February 1940, the conspirators received the British

proposals. They included a plebiscite to determine Austria's future,

the restoration of the Czech part of Bohemia, a compromise settlement 81 with Poland, and removal of the Nazi regime. Success depended on the

conspirators acting before German forces launched an offensive in the

West; once that occurred, all hopes for a compromise peace would be

dashed.

G^Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, pp. 111-21. Details of this papal action came slowly to light over the years. Shirer in his 1960 work. Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 648 and n. 23 cites several sources. Deutsch's 1968 work sets forth the complete story; this entire episode is treated very gingerly and downplayed in the introductory text to Holy See, Records, see p. 86.

Blpeutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, pp. 289-301. 282

Meanwhile, Pius' responsibilities as Pope forced him to follow a tortuous policy in which he had to protect the continuing persecution of the German church and raise his voice against violent solutions to international problems while maintaining the appearance of neutrality 82 in order not to destroy his effectiveness as a mediator. Documentary evidence of Nazi persecution was smuggled to Rome by Muller, where

Pius' personal aide, Jesuit Robert Leiber arranged to have it published in London and New York with no indication as to who had gathered or passed on the material.The text of this remarkable collection con­ tained the judgment that;

...a fundamental reconciliation between National Socialism and Christianity is only possible if National Socialism gives up its absolute claims, if it is no longer totalitarian--in one word, if it gives up its very essence and nature and ceases to be itself.84

Specific comments of Vatican displeasure were provided by leaks and rumors from highly-placed sources.When, on October 20, 1939, the pope issued his first encyclical, Summi Pontificatus, which defended

"the unity of the human race," mourned for Poland and condemned racism, the omnicompetent state, anti-Christian education and the solution of political questions by force, the Nazi press howled with pain that

G^Conway, Nazi Persecution, p. 243.

G^The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich; Fact and Document (London: B u m s , Oates, 1940). Leiber told Deutsch that Pius was not informed of this operation. Conspiracy Against Hit­ ler, pp. 122-3, n. 61. It seems likely that this technically contrived ignorance was to provide Pius with an excuse to plead ignorance should the need arise. Tom F. B u m s , formerly of B u m s , Oates, thinks the firm probably knew the material came from Rome; interview 25 May 1976.

84persecution, p. 515.

85gee The Tablet, 18 Nov. 1939, p. 582; 9 Dec., p. 667. 283

Germany had been singled out for attack. The British Catholic press naturally received the encyclical gladly, as a condemnation of modern 87 barbarism exemplified by Hitler (and Stalin). The Nazis also stopped publication of Pius' Christmas eve peace appeal which decried oppres­ sion and atrocities, singling out Finland (attacked by Russia, 30 Nov- 88 ember 1939) and Poland as victims of these crimes.

But in spite of Nazi protests, the Vatican managed to keep the door open to further contacts with Berlin. In March 1940, Foreign

Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop visited Pius seeking to reduce tensions which might affect Germany's wartime diplomacy or the loyalty of Catho­ lic Germans to the regime. The effort foundered when the Pope insisted on discussing details including the question of atrocities in Poland.

All efforts to effect a detente were obviously at an end and Ribbentrop returned to Germany in a rage.®^ The Universe and The Tablet both took note of this "chilly visit" by von Ribbentrop. Barnard thought nothing

Text in The Tablet, 11 Nov. 1939, pp. 555-0; 28 Oct., pp. 494, 502; The Universe, 27 Oct. 1939, p. 1; 5 Jan. 1940, p. 1; Persecution, p. 239; Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, pp. 37-8; Message, 24 Dec. 1939, Holy See, Records, no. 235.

87yhe Tablet, 4 Nov. 1939, pp. 521-2; Catholic Truth, Jan.-Feb. 1940, pp. 5-7; The Month, Dec. 1939, pp. 449-52; Philip Hughes, "The New Encyclical," Dublin Review, Jan. 1940, pp. 1-19.

G^The Tablet, 30 Dec. 1939, p. 748; 2 March 1940, p. 193; John Murray, "A Papal Pointer to Peace," The Month, Feb. 1940, pp. 129-38; Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker, trans. John Andrews (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1951), p. 219; Pichon, Vatican in World Affairs, p. 156.

G^Pius XII to Ribbentrop conversation, 11 March 1940, DGFP, Series D, VIII, no. 6 6 8 ; Vatican record in Holy See, Records, 11 March 1939, no. 257, 358, 259; Conway, Nazi Persecution, pp. 241-2; Fried­ lander, "Pius XII and Detente," Catholic Historical Review, p. 189; Pichon, Vatican in World Affairs, p. 158. 284 would come of it while Woodruff was gratified by the Pope's firm stand 90 against "the Nazi gospel of self-sufficient violence."

There was little time left for gratification. Towards the end of March, Pius despaired of the conspirators ever deciding to act.

With information supplied by Muller, Pius had the Low Countries, France, and Britain informed of an imminent German blow against Scandinavia.

Similar warnings were issued just before the invasion of Holland and

B e l g i u m . Nazi successes in Norway and, later, France scotched the 92 conspirators' plans. Pius then ended all contacts with them.

There had been little indication that Hitler's first move in the

West would be against Scandinavia, though the area was of critical strategic importance. Admiral Eric Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the

German Navy, had been pressing Hitler since October 1939 to allow the seizure of Norway. The Führer hesitated until, on 17 February 1940, a

British destroyer seized the German prison ship "Altmark" in Norwegian waters. Hitler then gave the go-ahead to Raeder to occupy Denmark and

Norway in order to safeguard Germany's source of iron ore and to seize 93 bases for attacks against Great Britain.

90ihe Tablet, 16 March 1940, pp. 246-7; 30 March, pp. 300-1; The Universe, 15 March 1940, pp. 1, 10.

91cardinal Maglione to Nuncios in Brussels and the Hague, 3 May 1940, Holy See, Records, no. 293; Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, pp. 332-8; Charles-Roux, Huit ans au Vatican, pp. 373-4, 384.

9^Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, pp. 323, 352; Schlabren- dorff, Secret War Against Hitler, pp. 109, 113, 116-17.

93cer. For. Ministry telegram, 17 Feb. 1940, DGFP, Series D, no. 615; Führer directive, 1 March, no. 644.

, . ' - 3. . • 285

The Allies, meanwhile, were still moving at the somnolent pace of the "Twilight War." German displeasure at the "Altmark" incident 94 was noted but no one expected it to lead to anything serious. On 5

April 1940, Chamberlain delivered a speech which included the fateful phrase that Hitler had "missed the bus." Four days later, the German blow struck Norway and Denmark. Britain, in the words of Winston

Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had been "forestalled, 95 surprised, and...outwitted.

The shock of the attack announced that the "Twilight War" was over. "That the war has now entered upon its decisive phase is beyond all doubt," said The U n i v e r s e . and it lamented that any chance to make peace without further fighting had gone because of what Osserva­ tore Romano called "a flagrant violation of Norway's rightsCatho­ lic opinion expected that Germany would squander her resources in Nor­ way and that she might easily suffer a grave setback there. By the time the news came in of the Allied withdrawal, only Lord Rankeillour

(who warned against panic) and The Tablet had time to take note of it.98

The Tablet, recognizing that a political crisis was at hand, took the opportunity for a last defense of Neville Chamberlain who.

^^The Tablet, 24 Feb. 1940, p. 169; 16 March, p. 296; The Month, March 1940, pp. 164-5.

95churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 584-5, 601.

9G"The Attack on Scandinavia," 12 April 1940, p. 10.

97The Universe, 19 April 1940, p. 1; "Does Italy Approve?", p. 10.

98The Tablet, 13 April 1940, p. 341, 346; 20 April, p. 365; 4 May, "The War in Scandinavia," pp. 416-17; HL 116 (1940): 316-21. 286

since 7 May, had been under heavy fire in the House of Commons. While

the mistakes made in Norway and the responsibility for them were laid

at the government's feet. Woodruff refused to accept that the errors were "attributable to temperamental defects in the Prime Minister....

The suggestion is that he was nerveless and supine in peace, and re­ mained so in w a r . "99 Such criticism was unfair, said Woodruff, espec­

ially from Labor M.P.s who had consistently voted against military

preparations. Chamberlain's need to fight for time was compared to

that of Fabius Cunctator.

The era of appeasement was just sufficient, the situation was just retrieved, and we could and did cry halt to Nazi Germany in September last, knowing we could fight with some confidence.

Then, in an attempt to have it both ways. Woodruff added:

The policy of appeasement was something more than the tactics of delay; it was a genuine attempt to avert the trend to war, and in history it will appear as the supreme German blunder that it was rejected.

It was very nearly a classic statement of the apologia for

appeasement made at the time and years later, but there was little

time to consider its esthetic niceties. While this very issue of The

Tablet was still in the presses, the German blitzkrieg struck the Low

Countries.

Since 7 May, Neville Chamberlain had been desperately trying to

hold his government's position together. In the debate on his govern­

ment's policy that began that day, Chamberlain was attacked not only

by his opponents but by former supporters and members of his own party.

^% e Tablet. 11 May 1940, p. 437. ^°°Ibid.

lOlibid. 287

The speech delivered on 8 May by Catholic M.P. Lt. Commander Robert

Tatton Bower, a Conservative, exemplified this revolt against Chamber- lain:

I am not one of those who think that the war started on 3rd September last year. The war started long before that, and...we we have had a succession of retreats, defeat after defeat— Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and now Norway...Every time it happens the same story is told. Up he [Chamberlain] gets and expresses surprise and indignation that this should have happened once more.102

Decisive action might have saved the situation in Norway, Bower went on.

But no, the dead hand from above descended and stopped these operations. Wild horses will not drag from me what dead hand it was... everybody knows it...I cannot but say that the whole of our policy before and since the declaration of war has been utterly lacking in initiative.

Today, our loyalty is not to a man or to a party, or even to a country. It is a loyalty to all those things which 2,000 years of Christian civilization have built up and which we cannot possibly let go.1^8

That evening, Chamberlain asked for a division of the H o u s e . ^ ^ 4

He retained a badly shrunken majority and the next day. Pierce Loftus and John McGovern joined their voices to Bower's in asking for Cham­

berlain's resignation and the creation of a National government. 1^5

The following morning, 10 May 1940, messages began to pour in reporting the German invasion of the Low Countries. Chamberlain futilely tried to rally Labor support for a National government under his leadership.

lO^HC 360 (1940): 1322-3. lO^Ibid., pp. 1328-8.

10^iy£ 360 (1940): 1266. In a division, a party's members gather to ascertain who supports a policy.

lO^Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 658-62; Medlicott, Contempo­ rary England, p. 427; HÇ (1940): 1438-9; 1449-50. 288

When he was refused, he resigned. That evening. King George VI asked

Winston Churchill to assume the office of Prime Minister. On the 13th

Churchill addressed the House of Commons; "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat...What is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war...What is our aim?...Victory--vietory at all costs.

The Commons passed a vote of confidence by 381 votes to none a- gainst.^®^ John McGovern was absent, the sole Catholic member not to vote for Churchill. Pope Pius offered his public sympathies to the

Low Countries on the tenth; in July, he made his last efforts for peace. After that, papal diplomacy fell silent for the duration of 1 no the war. The era of appeasement was over.

The battle in the West drove home to the British Catholics that one epoch had given way to another. The Month and The Tablet watched with astonishment as the Low Countries collapsed and the German break- 109 through in the Ardennes brought catastrophe to the Allied armies.

Only now was the revolution in warfare that had given the preponderance to the offensive side understood, in spite, as The Tablet admitted, of

^^^Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 293; Failing, Life of Chamberlain, pp. 438-42.

^°7h c 360 (1940): 1521-6.

lOBpope Pius XII to rulers of Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxem­ bourg, 10 May 1940, Holy See, Records, no. 301, 302, 303; for documents on last abortive peace effort, see 29 June, no. 363, 4 July, no. 365ff.

IG^The Month, June 1940, pp. 402-4; The Tablet, 18 May 1940, pp. 521-2; 1 June, p. 542; Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 40-51; Shirer, Rise and Fall, pp. 720-9; the German version is in Heinz Guderin, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York; E. P. Dutton, 1952), Chapt. V; "Into Battle." 289 the evidence of Ethiopia, Spain, Poland and Norway.The enervating effect of remaining on the defensive, the military counterpart to peacetime appeasement, was also recognized. "The Maginot Line," de­ clared Woodruff, "was also a state of mind."^^^

The new note of national resolution rang through the utterances of Catholic spokesmen like a battle cry. "We fight for ourselves," said The Tablet, "but we fight also for all men, and for the survival among them of all that makes life noble and gracious.The Month cited Cardinal Hinsley; "'There will not be, there cannot be, peace, 113 till, by God's aid, this hideous system vanishes from the world.'"

"There can be no thought now of compromise," declared The Universe,

"until the German menace has been broken for e v e r . "^^4 Comfort and encouragement were taken from the condemnation by Pope Pius of the invasion of Scandinavia and the Low Countries as being without "'a

semblance of justification.Christopher Hollis, the papal

statement clinched the matter. Quoting St. Augustine of Hippo, the declared, "Roma locuta est; causa finite est."^^G The accession of

Winston Churchill was applauded. The Universe thanked Chamberlain for

^^^The Tablet, 25 May 1940, pp. 521-2; 1 June, p. 542.

ll^Ibid., 25 May 1940, p. 521.

112"Into Battle," 18 May 1940, p. 462. ^^^June 1940, p. 401.

^14"por Life and Faith," The Universe, 17 May 1940, p. 8 .

servetore Romano, cited in The Tablet, 25 May 1940, p. 530; 13 April, p. 345; 11 May, p. 448; text of Papal message to monarchs of Low Countries, 18 May, p. 514; The Universe, 17 May 1940, p. 1; 24 May, pp. 1, 3, 8 ; The Month, June 1940, pp. 405-6; Arnold Lunn, Whither England? (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940), pp. 188-91.

llG"catholics and the War," Clergy Review, June 1940, pp. 476-84. 290

a policy which, while it failed to keep peace, at least proved Hitler 117 to be completely in the wrong. The Tablet had no more kind words to

spare. The country's feeling, it said, was that "...the Government had

an elderly jog-trot character, that its members listened too readily 118 to excuses, explaining inaction or insufficient war effort." The

Sower, with a voice that sounded like Gosling's, cheered the fall of

the government of the "Means Test and Munich" which tried to fight the 119 war by "financial resources and trade tricks."

The new spirit of resolve was more than sufficient to withstand

the terrible defeat in northern France and the Dunkirk evacuation which,

in fact, was greeted as a minor victory over German arms (which it was).

"If we have lost a great battle, we have not lost the war, and if we 170 stand firm we shall win." Thus The Tablet, which went on to support

an increase in the government's authority to enable it to more effec- 171 tively prosecute the war. Some Catholics went further, asking in

their fright, for measures against possible "Quislings" which came close 122 to repression. John McGovern and Richard Stokes opposed such actions

117Ï7 May 1940, p. 8 .

118 "The New Premier," 18 May 1940, p. 464.

Tt Sower, July-Sept. 1940, p. 4. 120 ,,,'The British Way," The Tablet, 1 June 1940, p. 540; "The Mir­ acle of Dunkirk," The Universe, 7 June 1940, p. 8 ; Christopher Dawson, "Democracy and Total War," The Dublin Review, July 1940, pp. 4-16.

121tiihe Total State in England," 1 June 1940, p. 544; 8 June, p. 561.

^^^The Month, June 1940, pp. 402-3; Catholic M.P.s E. L. Fleming, Patrick Hannon and David Logan. HÇ 361 (1940); 194, 671, 1125-7, 1150; 362 (1940): 1018, 1287-9. 291 while Stokes and John Tinker demanded that the financial burdens of war 123 fall on the rich as well as the poor. Fortunately, the British government was more inclined to follow the path of the latter group rather than the f o r m e r . The Tablet spoke for the great majority of all Catholics when it declared after the fall of France that "The decision to fight on alone rests on a conviction that we can carry that 125 policy to success."

The disasters of 1940 changed the thinking of some Catholics on

Russia. The conservative Tablet and the liberal Month united in moving away from their stance of total opposition to any dealings with the

Soviet Union. Now they adopted the pragmatic stance of conservatives like Arnold Lunn who declared that, when one was fighting a just battle for survival, it was permissible to accept help from wherever it was available.In line with this, the two journals approved the appoint­ ment of Sir Stafford Cripps as ambassador to Moscow, to keep up contacts with a goveimment which, it was guessed, could not feel too comfortable 127 in view of recent German successes. George Barnard of The Universe 128 still objected to dealing with Russia, but the British government's

361 (1940): 169-70; 363 (1940): 163-9, 730; 364 (1940): 1226-31.

^^^Thompson, England in the Twentieth Century, pp. 205-6.

125ii^jg Fight On," 22 June 1940, p. 601; "France in Defeat," The Universe, 28 June 1940, p. 8 ; The Month, July 1940, p. 1; Igoe inter­ view, 26 May 1976.

^^G^unn, Come What May, pp. 327, 333.

Tablet, 1 June 1940, pp. 542-3; The Month, July 1940, pp. 2-3, 6.

1287 June 1940, p. 8. 292

action bore fruit after Hitler attacked Russia the following year.

The war had revolutionized the perceptions of many English

Catholics of military tactics, European unity, social reform and the

Soviet Union. The final revolution, one that completed the liquidation

of the era of appeasement, concerned Fascist Italy. The refusal of

Mussolini to join his Axis partner in the war and the coolness which

characterized Italo-German relations through the winter were hailed by

the British Catholic press as evidence of the Duce's sagacity and moder­

ation, proof that Rome stood against Berlin and Moscow, and another

argument for making a settlement of outstanding problems with him to 1 9Q restore the long-lost Stresa front. The press might have saved its

ink. On 18 March 1940, Hitler met Mussolini at the Brenner Pass and 130 talked him back into full partnership in the Axis. A decisive shift

in the direction of Germany was noted in the tone of Italian pronounce­ ments when Scandinavia was attacked.

The tone of the British Catholic Press now also began to change.

It admitted that Mussolini had just claims in the Mediterranean but 131 insisted that these claims could be settled peacefully. Italy was

The Tablet, 9 Sept. 1939, p. 327; 30 Sept., p. 407; 14 Oct., p. 446; 21 Oct., p. 470; 4 Nov., p. 519; 23 Dec., p. 713; 6 Jan., 1940, p. 4; 27 Jan., p. 74; 10 Feb., p. 123; 2 March, p. 195; "The Choice Before Italy," 30 March, pp. 296-7; The Universe, 13 Oct. 1939, 15 Dec., p. 2; 5 Jan., 1940, pp. 1, 10; 12 Jan., p. 10; The Month, Oct. 1940, pp. 292-3; Nov., p. 376; Dec., pp. 456-7; Jan. 1940, p. 9; March, p. 166; April, p. 250; Herbert Thurston, S.J., "The Foreign Policy of United Italy, 1861-1939," The Dublin Review, April 1940, pp. 281-99; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 570-2.

^^Oger. For. Ministry Memo of Hitler— Mussolini conversation, 18 March 1940, DGFP, Series D, IX, no. 1; Ciano, Diaries, 2 April 1940, p. 230.

^^'Sfhich Britain and France were still willing to do; see Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 123-4. 293 exhorted not to betray her heritage but to stand with the defenders of

Roman and Christian civilization against the Nazi barbarians. Finally,

Mussolini was warned that a recourse to arms would be repaid with 132 interest, jeopardizing all his twenty-years work. On 8 May, in the

Commons, Commander Bower expressed himself forcefully on the Italian situation:

One or two hon. Members have gone so far as to talk the old appeasement stuff. That will not do. What we want now is the Copenhagen stuff of the 1801 vintage...I would simply send a telegram of two words to Mussolini "Copenhagen 1801," and sign it.133

All these messages, like the one sent by Churchill to Mussolini, were, by turns, eloquent, impassioned, earnest, sympathetic, forceful--

and unavailing. On 10 June, Mussolini declared war on Britain and

France.

The Tablet began its first editorial after the declaration of war by stating that it had always spoken well of Fascist Italy and

supported the efforts to reconcile her with Great Britain. Now, Musso­

lini had compelled a change in that position.

We must abandon the Fascist Party to its Nazi allies, whom it has chosen and preferred, and we must talk of the Italians as a people to be helped to find another regime, with a deeper sense of the. obligations of a civilized country to the rest of civilization.

John Murray of The Month poignantly recalled the Anglo-Italian

132nThe Legacy of Rome," The Tablet, 17 April 1940, pp. 392-3; 4 May, p. 413; 8 June, p. 561; "Does Italy Approve?" The Universe, 19 April 1940, p. 10; 26 April, p. 8 ; 3 May, p. 8 ; "Italy's Choice," 10 May, p. 8 ; "Quo Vadis, Italia?" The Month, May 1940, pp. 325-6.

^^^HC 360 (1940): 1327. ^^^Finest Hour, pp. 121-2.

135iiThe Italian Tragedy," The Tablet, 15 June 1940, p. 584, emphasis added. 294 friendship of former days. Of the attack on France, he said, "It was a glaring and cowardly example of unscrupulous aggression and merits outspoken condemnation"Now the issue is clear," said Cardinal

Hinsley. "The leaders of Fascism have with brutal 'realism' broken 137 with the Christian civilization which built up Europe."

The Universe had been in the forefront of the efforts to appease

Italy and secure her for an anti-Nazi, anti-Bolshevik bloc. The news of war with Italy was greeted with shock. True, Barnard's immediate reaction was to declare that "...Mussolini has betrayed the traditions of his people in a manner which cries to heaven for vengeance," and 138 that Britain was committed to victory no matter what the cost. But

then the paper fell back into a silence broken only by the forlorn comment that Britain and Italy had no serious conflicts and that their 139 relationship might yet be set back together. After that, nothing until 1 November when the paper condemned Mussolini's attack on Greece.

This conjunction of rage, a last, plaintive echo of appeasement and

sullen silence gives one the impression that The Universe felt betrayed after the long years of support for Fascist Italy. But there was no

going back.

Then and in later years, some Catholics such as Barbara Ward

reproached some of their co-religionists for their sympathies towards

136i,Italy's Decision," The Month, July 1940, pp. 405.

^^^The Universe, 14 June 1940, p. 1.

^^^"Mussolini's Crime," The Universe, 14 June 1940, p. 8 .

139"France in Defeat," The Universe, 28 June 1940, p. 8 ; 12 July, p. 6. 295

Italian Fascism. Some like John Murray in The Month admitted that some, in their anti-Communist zeal, had been guilty of moving to the opposite extreme.Others like Arnold Lunn had hoped fascism would restore order and a spirit of sacrifice without leading to militarism 142 and war. A very few like Robert Sencourt refused to admit they were wrong and continued to defend fascism even after the war. In 1940, many could have been brought into the dock as former defenders of fascism, but the times were too busy for that.

Except for a few conscientious objectors like Eric Gill, the outbreak of the war had united the British Catholic press and community in the determination to rid Europe of Nazism. The other side of this determination was a resolve that the war's end would see a serious effort made to reform British society and international relations.

This determination and resolve was only made firmer by reports of Nazi atrocities in Poland and by the fall of France. The Tablet and The

Month, recognizing the difficulty of Britain's military position vis- a-vis Germany, finally joined Arnold Lunn in conceding the necessity of maintaining a link to the Soviet regime. The Universe refused to join them, putting its hopes on a link with Italy. When Mussolini joined Hitler, the last major source of disagreement within the British

^^®Gurian and Fitzsimmons, Catholic Church in World Affairs, p . 349n.

14lThe Month, July 1940, pp. 6-7.

^^^Lunn, Whither England?, pp. 11-12, 165, 172-3.

^^^Gurian and Fitzsimmons, Catholic Church in World Affairs, p. 349n. 296

Catholic press and community disappeared. Barnard, however, never

recovered from the shock of what he felt to be Mussolini's betrayal.

For Barnard, as for many of his colleagues, the hopes of the past had

turned to ashes.

But it was to the future and not to the past that the British

Catholics now looked. The moral and intellectual fog of appeasement had been blown away by the winds of war. Now the clear recognition of

duty which lay before everyone's eyes, the conviction that they were

undeniably in the right and the willingness to do that duty acted like

a bracing tonic. "It is our task now," wrote George Barnard,

to carry that torch alone in the face of every onslaught until in God's chosen time the forces of darkness shall be routed utterly by the triumph of what is divine over all that is brutal in the nature of men.

Blackfriars called for prayers to "Our Lady of Victories.The

Tablet summed it up:

We also shall thank God that we have to live in these times, privileged to take our part in the work and suffering of the greatest battle for Christian ideals that the world has known for centuries. The greater the odds against us, the heavier our own responsibility to history and to mankind, the greater the

honour that has been conferred on us by Divine Providence. ^46

One may forgive the grand style; the rediscovery of honor, duty,

and nobility is a grand thing.

^^^The Universe, 21 June 1940, p. 8.

^^^Editorial, Blackfriars, July 1940, pp. 411-13; Esmond Klimeck, O.P., "Our Lady of Victories," pp. 423-30.

1^6„The Spirit of Britain," The Tablet, 22 June 1940, p. 604. CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has been primarily concerned with the question of whether or not the religious orientation of the British Catholic press influenced that press' attitude toward the rise of Nazi Germany. It seemed that there must have been such an effect. These organs were controlled by men who shared a consciousness of unity, of all being members of a single community which was the Church. As such, they adhered to a set of common beliefs whose basic dogmatic and ethical components commanded a particularly firm consensus in the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, as Catholics they had access to a body of thought on political matters which had been framed by Christian thinkers from antiquity to m o d e m times. The basic elements of this political thinking were inalienable human rights, limited government and the responsibility of citizens to respect authority. Here were considerable grounds for unity.

But in spite of these elements making for unity, there were other factors which opened the door to diversity. Prime among these was the nature of that body to which they all pledged their primary allegiance: the Catholic Church. A church, unless it is content to be a small and radically sectarian gathering of saints, is not a clique or a club of like-minded people. Rather, it is a broad house which strives to gather as great a part of mankind to itself as is possible

297 298

given the boundaries set by its fundamental beliefs. Such an institu­

tion, then, must allow considerable freedom in nonessentials if it is not to close itself off or shatter into sects.

With notable variances depending on historical circumstances, the

Catholic Church is such a body. It is not surprising, therefore, that

this study has revealed remarkable diversity within the English Catho­

lic ranks. In essence, those matters of dogma and discipline which

demanded absolute assent were few. Furthermore, Catholic political

principles were so broad as to be able to accommodate everything along

the political spectrum from authoritarianism to democracy excluding

only the extremes of totalitarianism or anarchy. In practice, this meant that the choice of a social or political stance was largely de­

termined by the particular personality, psychology, and predilection

of each individual, influenced by religious identity, principles, and

attitudes.

From the standpoint of the most basic of those principles and

attitudes, the British Catholic press of the 1930s was roughly divisible

into two parts. One section contained the more liberal group within

the English Catholic press and was represented by, among others, the

publications Blackfriars, The Sower, The Month, and men like F. H.

Drinkwater and Edward Quinn. These Catholics had confidence in men's

capacity to use their God-given reason to govern human affairs and to

bring about reforms within the nation, the international community and

the Church. These premises led them to be democratic, anti-fascist,

pro-social reform, pro-League, in favor of disarmament, and willing to

criticize the institutional Church. They were more idealistic and

included a number of avowed pacifists like Blackfriars' Victor White. 299

The writings of these men were pitched at too high an intellectual

level to appeal to a mass audience. Paradoxically, however, their

attitudes and thinking were closer to those of the majority of British

Catholics and Englishmen in general.

The other group of Catholics was a more conservative one, epito­ mized by Hilaire Belloc and represented by publications like The Tablet,

The Universe, Catholic Truth, and Colosseum. The men of this group

took a generally pessimistic view of human nature, reason, and the

direction of m o d e m democratic society in general. They put little

trust in reform and less in efforts at international cooperation. As

a result, representatives of this group tended to be aristocratic,

sympathetic to authoritarianism, socially conservative, anti-league,

and pro-rearmament. While less critical of the institutional Church

and, therefore, apparently "more Catholic" than the first group, these men were more willing to make "realistic" compromises with men like

Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco, in order to stop what they regarded as

the worse evil of militantly atheistic Communism. They taunted the

first group with the accusation that their pacifism would prove in­

effectual in the international sphere and that their calls for social

reform were flirting with Communism. The more liberal group replied

that arguments based on Realpolitik were incompatible with a Catholic

approach to international relations, while to treat social reform as

Communist-inspired would play straight into the hands of Moscow. The

more conservative publications, especially The Universe, had a wider

circulation than those of the more liberal group, but were less repre­

sentative of the attitudes of the mass of British Catholics. These

were largely working-class men and women of Irish ancestry, most of 300 whom did not read the Catholic press, at least partly because they found it alien to their own feelings.

With so many differences and disputes among the papers and ad­ herents of the more liberal and more conservative camps, one might be forgiven for asking whether one can speak of a "British Catholic press" as any kind of a unit, or whether it was a mass of splinters with its only mark of unity being the name "Catholic." It is a conclusion of this study that one is justified in speaking of the British Catholic press as a unit. This is so, first of all, because its editors and writers deliberately chose to respond to events from a distinctively

Catholic standpoint. But, most important, considerations arising from their Catholic orientation exerted very strong influences in certain circumstances, for instance: pushing Joseph Keating and Christopher

Dawson to defend Franco's cause; influencing Victor White, S. J. Gos­ ling, and F. H. Drinkwater to oppose even Cardinal Hinsley over the same issue; stopping Douglas Woodruff from going farther to support

Germany; turning all except Douglas Jerrold against fascism as the answer to Britain's problems; and prompting White, Gosling, Hinsley, the Earl of Iddesleigh, M.P. David Logan and others to speak out in defense of the Jews. It is a major conclusion of this study, there­ fore, that, in spite of differences and arguments among the members of the British Catholic press and community, their Catholicism created among them a sense of unity, a sense of community, that transcended all differences. Sometimes, one feels, this unity was effected against the predilections of the figures involved. Therefore, no matter how bitter arguments became, they remained, in the final analysis, "family" argu­ ments ; a turbulent, contentious family, to be sure, but a family never­ 301 theless. This leads to a second major conclusion, namely that the religious orientation of the men of the British Catholic press. Catho­ lic writers. Catholic Parliamentarians and other Catholics did in fact exert an important influence on their reactions to the rise to power of

Nazi Germany, and to the policy which evolved to deal with that phenom­ enon: appeasement.

The appeasement policy, the second major concern of this study, developed spontaneously in the British public and government during the

1920s because of the guilty feeling that the Treaty of Versailles had been an unjust settlement and out of the fear that a failure to revise that treaty would once again plunge Europe into the horror of a world war. Convinced that the pre-1914 balance of power and arms race had been a major factor in causing the war, the British people brought about a major reduction of British military forces. The League of

Nations was expected to provide for defense against aggression by unit­ ing the forces of its members to provide collective security against any state which threatened the peace. It was very late before the realization dawned that a group of virtually unarmed states was incap­ able of opposing an armed and resolute aggressor.

Appeasement began as an idealistic effort to redress the just claims of the aggrieved states of Europe. But as it developed in the

1930s, it assumed a distinctive characteristic which set it apart from other efforts at redress of grievances. That characteristic was the absence of any demand for genuine reciprocity on the part of those states, especially Germany, to whom concessions were made. The success of this approach was entirely dependent on the good will of the 302 recipient of these favors, and on the assumption that their aims were limited and reasonable. When it was proved that none of this was true and that the demanding powers were ill-willed and their aims both un­ limited and unreasonable, there were no safeguards to stave off dis­ aster.

Under Prime Ministers Ramsey MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin, appeasement was more a general attitude infusing itself into British actions than a formal policy. Under these two men, the most notable instances of this attitude at work were the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935, the refusal to stop Mussolini in Ethiopia, and the toleration of the German remilitarization of the Rhineland. Britain's policy in these three instances effectively scotched the Stresa Front, the

League, and the French alliance system, respectively. Under Neville

Chamberlain, this informal attitude became cast as a formal policy under which the British government eagerly sought to grant concessions to Hitler and Mussolini, as the price of a European settlement.

As part of the British nation, the English Catholics shared in the general fear of war, desire for treaty revision and trust in collec­ tive security. The German Vatican Concordat of 1933 and the desire to give the Nazi regime a fair chance stalled the development of an anti-

Nazi attitude that might well have reduced Catholic support for the appeasement policy. Such a hostile attitude began to develop during

the next three years due to Nazi persecution of German Catholics and events like the murder of Dollfuss.

Many Catholics looked to Mussolini's Italy to hold the pass

against possible Nazi aggression. They were reinforced in their favor­

able estimate of the Duce by the resemblance of Fascism to those 303 corporate social ideals promoted by the papacy since the time of Leo

XIII. During the 1930s, the more liberal British Catholic publicists carefully weighed Fascist concepts on the scales of Catholic ideals and found those concepts wanting. The invasion of Ethiopia came as a shock, and many British friends of Italy condemned her for this act.

1936 proved to be a cataclysmic year. The remilitarization of the Rhineland by Hitler in March began a movement (represented by

Bernard Wall and Douglas Woodruff) to accommodate Italy in order to prevent further German unilateral moves. But it was Spain that really threw the British Catholics into disarray. The appearance of the threat of Communism there, a threat which the ghastly assault on the Church in the first weeks of the war made credible, led conservative Catholics to stampede to Franco's support. They were joined by some liberals and moderates like Joseph Keating and Christopher Dawson who feared for the

Spanish Church. The mass of British Catholics were confused, t o m be­ tween fear of persecution on one hand and a hatred of fascism on the other. A few liberals like Victor White and S. J. Gosling refused to support Franco and called for neutrality. Since the majority of Eng­ lishmen were in favor of the Republic, however, a split developed be­ tween English Catholics and their compatriots. Much of this division was healed at the time of the Prague coup, but the breach between

British Catholics and their fellow citizens was not really closed until the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939. Whatever split remained was closed when Italy declared war on Britain in June 1940. The suspicion that Catholics were pro-authoritarian and illiberal persisted among 304 some British non-Catholics, however, and still remains today.^

The most important effect of the Spanish Civil War on the

British Catholic Press and community was that it stopped the erosion of support for appeasement which might have put Catholics among the leaders against appeasement. Now, many Catholics swung back strongly in favor of appeasement, not only of Italy, but of Germany as well, in order to create a barrier to the spread of Communism. This swing back was not even affected by the Nazi-Papal clash over Mit brennender Sorge in 1937.

The political tensions of 1935-1937 produced a paradoxical situ­ ation of great significance within the British Catholic press. Liberal and moderate Catholic writers and journals most ideologically hostile to the authoritarian states and most fearful of them, refused to follow the logic of their thinking to call for rearmament. Conversely, those calling most loudly for rearmament were those most sympathetic to the forces of the continental right. This split within Catholic ranks was a microcosm of that within British society as a whole. This split with-

'' in British opinion coupled with the failure of the British government to rearm does much to explain the remarkable degree of unanimity within

British public opinion in favor of the appeasement policy in general and the Munich Pact in particular; there seemed to be no alternatives except surrender or a very possible military defeat.

The high tide of the appeasement policy came in 1938. Emboldened by the flaccid response made by Britain and France to his and Musso­ lini's challenges to the status quo. Hitler determined to force the

^T. Burns interview, 25 May 1976. 305 pace of his program of German expansion. The British government was worried about the advance of the Nazi position but, under Neville

Chamberlain's leadership, they staked all their diplomatic chips on

the gamble that Germany would be amenable to peaceful concessions made

to her. The public was not told that any real danger to national

security was arising, nor was rearmament pursued with any urgency.

Chamberlain was playing a dangerous game, for high stakes and with a weak hand.

Hitler's first opportunity arose in Austria. The Anschluss was

accepted by the British in spite of the brutality of the means used,

as a rectification of one of the Versailles injustices. When Hitler pressed his claims against Czechoslovakia, the British public and government accepted his basic argument but were first puzzled, then both angry and frightened, by his threats to use force. At Munich, the

British and French governments compelled the Czechs to accept a settle­ ment which left them helpless before German power. The insincerity with which the British government extended its guarantee to the rump

state is powerful evidence that the whole business had been less a negotiated settlement than an abject surrender to the threat of force.

The shame which replaced the British public's initial sense of relief

at the agreement is evidence that many Englishmen also saw it as a

surrender. The reaction of the press, both Catholic and secular,

lagged behind that of the public, but, in the weeks before Prague, it

too began to move away from support of appeasement. The government, however, was virtually unaffected by this erosion of confidence and undertook no major réévaluation of its policy. That stubborn adherence

to a chosen path, an adherence reinforced by a wilful refusal to heed 306

contradictory advice and evidence was the cardinal flaw of Chamber­

lain's policy and the cause of its failure. Rearmament was speeded up

but still without any real sense of urgency. Later, it would be

claimed that Munich had been the necessary if regrettable price that

had to be paid to strengthen Britain's inadequate defenses. If that was the intention, then the British government got too little to justify

the cost.

Prague shattered this complacency. Chamberlain's effort to see

nothing to warrant a change in policy was swept away in a wave of pub­

lic indignation, an indignation which was fueled by the widespread

feeling of national humiliation that had been created by Munich. Cham­

berlain quickly reversed his position. A series of guarantees was

hastily extended to eastern Europe, most notably to Poland.

Yet, even with its new-found resolution, the British government

made known its eagerness to come to some accommodation with Germany.

This last stage of appeasement combined a willingness to negotiate with

the resolution that threats of force would be of no use while the re­

sort to force would be answered in kind. Perhaps if the policy had

taken this form from the beginning, it might have been successful. But

appeasement had first meant a willingness to make unilateral conces­

sions to make peace with states who would demonstrate by their good

will their willingness to settle down in peace. At Munich, this ideal­

istic approach was thrown aside and appeasement took the form of

surrender to the threat of force. Now, after Prague, it meant some­

thing else again.

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-- that's all.' 307

Since the latter question was the only one which Hitler was interested in, he refused to credit Britain's resolution and saw only the continued willingness to accommodate him. Convinced that his pact with Stalin would deter Britain and France from acting, he attacked

Poland. The British government advanced to its duty slowly. Parlia­ mentary anger spurred it to declare war on 3 September.

British Catholic support for appeasement of Germany virtually collapsed at Prague. The shock of Hitler's coup healed some of the divisions created in the British Catholic community by Ethiopia, Spain, and Munich. The split between those advocating alliance with Soviet

Russia against Germany and those opposing such a move was healed by the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Those still advocating appeasement of Germany, such as John Murray of The Month were united with their co-religionists by the German attack on Poland. Nazi atrocities in that country set the British Catholic resolution to destroy the Nazi regime in concrete.

The final division among British Catholics, that between those favor­ ing and those disfavoring Fascist Italy was settled by Mussolini's joining Hitler after German armies had attacked in the West. The progressive healing of the various breaches within the Catholic com­ munity was a microcosm of the progressive unification of British society as a whole. This unity of heart and mind was one of Great Britain's greatest sources of strength in the dark days after Dunkirk and the fall of France. The defeat of Neville Chamberlain and the rise of

Winston Churchill to power symbolized the passing of the era of appeasement.

Interestingly enough, the Vatican was ahead of both the British

Catholics and the British government in becoming disillusioned with 308 appeasement of Germany. The Concordat of 1933 was signed only reluc­ tantly and with the feeling that an agreement in writing with the

Nazis was better than nothing. When German troops marched into the

Rhineland, Pius XI recognized the strategic implications of such a move and urged that they be thrown back across the Rhine. The British

Catholic press made no such call. Franco found support for his cause among some British Catholics to be more fervent than it ever was at the Vatican. The Munich agreement which filled the Catholic press with acclaim filled the Pope with disgust. Finally, when Hitler marched into Prague, the thinking of British Catholics finally came into line with that of the papacy. Pius XII tried to find some grounds for accommodation with Hitler for seven months. When that failed, he worked to overthrow the Nazi regime.

The effort to rectify the injustices of the post-war settlement by the policy of appeasement had originally been founded upon a set of noble intentions. The policy and its aims found widespread acceptance in Great Britain. The government supported it in a spirit of humani­ tarian democracy; British Catholic support was founded on a religious- ethical approach that sought the blessings promised to those who make peace. But to render justice helpless by an unwillingness to make the sacrifices necessary to defend it against the unjust brands one as either naive or fearful. A policy built upon naivete or fearfulness is a policy built upon sand.

After the terrible calamities suffered by the British people in the First World War, it is hard to blame them for the ill-conceived appeasement policy. In their haste to escape the errors of the past, they fell upon even greater evils. It took a long time to learn that 309

effective policy is formulated by intelligently seeing what must be done to advance the cause of justice in the particular circumstances which exist in international affairs at any moment, combined with pru­ dence and humility which enable one to constantly reevaluate one's policy with a view to modifying it as circumstances require. But the proper goal of justice and the good means of intelligence, prudence, and humility are worthless if they are not supported by the courage to stand in defense of what is right. Supported by courage, even a flawed policy may achieve success, since that virtue may compensate for many deficiencies. Lacking it, even the best of plans is helpless. Built as it was on a foundation of naivete and fearfulness and wanting in courage, it is not surprising that the appeasement policy proved a

failure.

The Catholic outlook of those figures who have been the central

subject of this study gave them no special lien on wisdom. But, in general, those like S. J. Gosling, Victor White, F. H. Drinkwater, and

Edward Quinn who least subordinated their religious principles to con­

siderations of politics and self-interest ended by having less to look back on with embarrassment and, in spite of errors (like White's long- held pacifism), they proved to be right on most of the issues of the

era. This was demonstrated repeatedly in the issues of the era:

Ethiopia, Spain, Germany's pose as an anti-Communist bulwark, anti-

Semitism and social reform. Ironically, while the more "practical," more conservative men were more self-consciously "Catholic," it was the men of the first group who were, on most issues, more in accord with

the position of the papacy, the British hierarchy and the mass of Eng­

lish Catholics. More "practical" men like Woodruff and Jerrold were 310 more often proved wrong.

When the events of 1939 resolved many of these issues and united the Catholic community, their religious principles gave a strong bond in their opposition to Nazi Germany. Unifying principles such as these were a powerful weapon of resistance after June 1940, and helped Britain withstand that terrible year.

Many British Catholics shared in the responsibility for the disaster of appeasement. But the aim of history is not to blame but

to explicate the past as a guide to the present within which we must build the future. 311

APPENDIX

BRITISH CATHOLIC PUBLICATIONS

Publication Editor Political Orientation

Blackfriars Bede Jarret, O.P. (to Liberal (monthly) 1936),Victor White, O.P. ("Penguin")

Catholic Truth and Bishop Edward Myers Conservative- * Catholic Book pro-authoritarian Notes (bi-monthly)

The Clergy Review T. E. Flynn (to 1939); Moderate-liberal (monthly) Bishop Myers (to 1936); Rev. J. M. T. Barton; Rev. G. D. Smith (1939- )

Colosseum Bernard Wall Pro-authoritarian (quarterly)

The Downside (no editor listed) Moderate-conserva­ Review tive (quarterly)

The Dublin Review Algar Thorold (to 1935); Moderate-liberal (quarterly) Denis Gwynn (to 1939) ; Lord Clonmore (to 1940); Christopher Dawson (1940- )

The English Douglas Jerrold (ed. to Pro-authoritarian Review 1935; contributor to (secular publi­ 1936) cation with Cath­ olic ed.) (monthly)

*Those journals characterized as pro-authoritarian tended, in a greater or lesser degree, to favor the right-wing regimes of Mussolini, Franco, Salazar, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, and to be grateful--until Prague--for the anti-Communist foreign policy of Nazi Germany. Nazi persecution of Catholics prevented the development of real sympathy for German domestic policy, though Woodruff and Jerrold made some efforts to speak well of German internal programs from time to time. 312

Publication Editor Political Orientation

The Month Joseph Keating, S.J. (to Liberal-moderate, (monthly) 1939); John Murray, S.J. conservative on (1940- ) Spain

The Sower Rev. S. J. Gosling Liberal (quarterly)

The Tablet Ernest Oldmeadow (to Moderate under Old­ (weekly) 1936); Douglas Woodruff meadow; conserv- (1939- ) ative-pro-author- itarian under Woodruff

The Universe Herbert Dean (to 1937) Cons ervative-pro­ (weekly) George Barnard (1937- ) authoritarian SOURCES CONSULTED

I. Primary Sources

A. Interviews and letters to Author

25 May 1976 Tom F. B u m s Editor, The Tablet London

26 May 1976 Terrence Wynn Editor, The Universe London

26 May 1976 Hugh B u m s Veteran Journalist; London Former Editor in Malta

26 May 1976 William J. Igoe Veteran Journalist; London Former Asst, to A. J. P. Taylor

29 May 1976 Douglas Woodruff Former Editor, Abingdon, The Tablet (near Ox­ ford)

29 May 1976 Mrs. Mia Woodruff Nee Acton; Jewish Refugee Work

30 May 1976 Mrs. Barbara Wall Wife of late Bernard Pulborough, Wall, Editor of Sussex Colosseum

30 May 1976 Dr. Bernard Bergonzi Wall's son-in-law. Prof. English, Univ. of Warwick; Author

31 May 1976 Canon (Msgr.) F. H. Founder, The Sower As ton-by- Drinkwater Editor, Later Stone (near Contributor Stafford)

4 June 1976 Herbert McCabe, O.P. Editor, New Black- Oxford friars

4 June 1976 Peter Hebblethwaite Former Editor, The Oxford Month, Journalist, Instructor, Oxford U.

4 June 1976 Robert Walsh Former Member Pax Oxford (telephone conver­ (Catholic Pacifist sation) Society), Instructor, Oxford U. 313 314

8 June 1976 Mrs. Christina Scott Daughter and Biog- London rapher of Christopher Dawson

10 June 1976 Christopher Hollis Former Director, The MelIs, Tablet, Former M.P. (near Frome, near Bath)

Bede Bailey, O.P. Letter 27 May 1976

F. H. Drinkwater Letter 16 June 1976

Rev. Edward Quinn Letter 10 June 1976

Christina Scott Letter 9 June 1976

B. British Catholic Publications

Blackfriars January 1933-July 1940

Catholic Truth and Catholic January-March 1933-July-September 1940 Book Notes

The Clergy Review January 1933-July 1940

Colosseum March 1934-July 1939

The Downside Review January 1933-July 1940

The Dublin Review January 1933-July 1940

The English Review January 1933-July 1937

The Month January 1933-July 1940

The Sower January-March 1933-July-September 1940

The Tablet January 1933-July 1940

The Universe January 1933-July 1940

C. Documents and Speeches

Bettey, J. English Historical Documents 1906-1939. London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1967.

Germany, Foreign Ministry. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918- 1945. Edited by Raymond J. Sontag et. al. Washington, D. C.; U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1949- . Series C (1933-1937); vol. I; Series D (1937-1945), vols. I-IX. 315

Great Britain, Legation (Holy See), H.M.S.O. Anglo-Vatican Relations 1914-1939. Edited by Thomas E. Hachey. Boston: G. R. Hall, 1072.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. London: H.M.S.O., 1946- . Second series (1930-1938), vols. V-VI; Third series (1938-1939), vols. I, VII.

Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 5th series, vols. 272-366.

Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Debates (Lords). 5th series, vols. 86-116.

Great Britain. Public Records Office. Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, vols. 23/75 (1933) to 23/100 (1939).

Great Britain. Public Records Office. Prime Minister's Papers, packets PREM 1/142 (1934) to 1/443 (1939).

Hitler, Adolf. My New Order. Edited by Raoul de Roussey de Sales. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941.

United States, Dept, of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D. C .: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, vol. 1938, II.

United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1946-1948. 10 vols. vol. I.

(Vatican) Leo Xlll-John XXIII. Seven Great Encyclicals. Glen Rock, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1963.

(Vatican) The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich; Fact and Document. London: Bums, Oates, 1940.

Vatican. Records and Documents of the Holy See relating to the Second World War. Edited by Pierre Blet et. al. Washington, D. C.: Corpus Books, 1968.

D . Memoirs

Bonnet, Georges. Ouai d'Orsay. English translation. Isle of Man: Times Press and Anthony Gibbs & Phillips, 1965.

Chamberlain, Neyille. In Search of Peace. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1939.

Charles-Roux, Francois. Huit ans au Vatican, 1932-1940. Paris: Flammarion, 1947. 316

Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. Vol. 1: The Gathering Storm. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948.

. The Second World War. Vol. 2: Their Finest Hour. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1949.

Ciano, Galeazzo. The Ciano Diaries. 1939-1943. Edited by Hugh Gibson. Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday and Co., 1940.

_. Hidden Diary. 1937-1938. Translated by Andreas Mayor. New York: Dutton, 1953.

Clark, Kenneth. Another Part of the Wood. New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint ed. New York: Ballantine Books, 1976.

Cooper, Duff. Old Men Forget. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953.

The Second World War: First Phase. New York: Chas. Scrib­ ner's Sons, 1939.

Eden, Anthony. Facing the Dictators. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1962.

Hesse, Fritz. Hitler and the English. Edited and translated by F. A. Voigt. London: Allen Wingate, 1954.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated and edited by John Chamberlain et. al. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939.

______. Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944. Translated by Norman Gannon and R. H. Stevens. New York: Octagon Books, 1972.

Mander, Geoffrey. We Were Not All Wrong. London: Victor Gollancz, 1941.

Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. Translated by Brian Connell. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1953.

Schuschnigg, Kurt von. Austrian Requiem. Translated by Franz von Hildebrand. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946.

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: MacMillan, 1970.

Weizsacker, Ernst von. Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker. Translated by John Andrews. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951.

E. Works By Catholic Authors Who Are Subjects Of This Study

Beales, A. C. F. The Catholic Church and International Order. Hammondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1941. 317

Bedoyere, Michael De La. Christian Crisis. New York: MacMillan, 1942.

Belloc, Hilaire. The Catholic and the War. London : B ums, Oates, 1940.

______. The Crisis of Civilization. New York: Fordham Univ., 1937.

_. An Essay on the Nature of Contemporary England. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937.

. The House of Commons and Monarchy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1920.

. The Jews. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin, 1922.

. Letters from Hilaire Belloc. Edited by Robert Speaight. London: Hollis and Carter, 1952,

. The Servile State. London: T. W. Foulis, 1912.

Chesterton, Gilbert K. Avowals and Denials. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1935.

______. The End of the Armistice. Compiled by F. J. Sheed. London: Sheed and Ward, 1940.

______. G. K. Chesterton: A Selection From His Non-fictional Prose. Edited by W. H. Auden. London: Faber and Faber, 1970.

. The New Jerusalem. New York: George H. Doran, 1921.

. The Resurrection of Rome. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1930.

______. The Well and the Shallows. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935.

Dawson, Christopher. Beyond Politics. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939.

Enquiries into Religion and Culture. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933.

______. Religion and the M o d e m State. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935.

Eppstein, John. The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations. London: Bums, Oates & Washboume, 1935.

Right Against Might. Oxford, Eng.: Catholic Social League, 1940.

Hollis, Christopher. Along the Road to Frome. London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1958.

______. Foreigners Aren't Fools. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937. 318

Hollis, Christopher. Foreigners Aren't Knaves. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

_. The History of Britain in M o d e m Times. London: Hollis & Carter, 1942.

. Italy in Africa. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941.

. Our Case. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

Howard, Lord Esme W. Howard of Penrith. The Prevention of War by Collective Action. London: B ums, Oates & Washboume, 1933.

Jerrold, Douglas. Britain and Europe, 1900-1940. London: Collins, 1941.

_. England: Past, Present and Future. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1950.

. The Future of Freedom. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938.

. Georgian Adventure. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938.

Knox, Ronald. Nazi and Nazarene. London: MacMillan, 1940.

Lunn, Arnold. Come What May. Boston: Little, Brown, 1941.

_. The Science of World Revolution. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938.

. Spanish Rehearsal. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937.

. Whither England. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940.

Sencourt, Robert. [Robert E. G. George] Italy. Bristol, Eng.: Arrow- smith, 1938.

______. Spain's Ordeal. London: Longmans, Green, 1940.

Speaight, Robert. The Property Basket. London & Glasgow: Collins and Harvill Press, 1970.

Teeling, William. Crisis for Christianity. London: J. Gifford, 1939.

______. The Pope in Politics. London; Lovat Dickson, 1937.

Wall, Bernard. European Note-Book. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939.

______. Headlong Into Change. London: Harvill Press, 1969.

Watkin, Edward I. Men and Tendencies. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries, 1968 (1937). 319

II. Secondary Works

A. Biography

Attwater, Donald. A Cell of Good Living. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969.

Bedoyere, Michael De La. Catholic Profiles. London: Paternoster Pubs., n.d.

Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Rev. edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1962; Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Churchill, Winston S. Great Contemporaries. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937.

Foiling, Keith. The Life of Neville Chamberlain. London: MacMillan, 1946.

Fest, Joachim. Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1973.

Heenen, John C. Cardinal Hinsley. London: B u m s , Oates and Washboume, 1944.

Heiden, Konrad. Der Fuehrer. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1944.

Hollis, Christopher. The Mind of Chesterton. Coral Gables, Florida: Univ. of Miami Press, 1970.

Hughes, Philip. Pope Pius the Eleventh. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937.

Kirkpatrick, Ivone. Mussolini: A Study in Power. New York: Hawthome Books, 1964.

MacLeod, Iain N. Neville Chamberlain. New York: Atheneum, 1962.

Skidelsky, Robert. Oswald Mosley. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.

Speaight, Robert. The Life of Eric Gill. New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1965.

_____ . The Life of Hilaire Belloc. London: Hollis and Carter, 1957.

Sykes, Christopher. Evelyn Waugh. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.

Ward, Masie, Gilbert Keith Chesterton. New York; Sheed and Ward, 1943. 320

B. Catholic Church

1. General

Altholz, Josef L. The Churches in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.

Gurian, Waldemar and Fitzsimmons, M. A., ed. The Catholic Church in World Affairs. Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1954.

Hales, E. E. Y. The Catholic Church in the Modem World. Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1958.

Harte, Thomas J. Papal Social Principles. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960 (1956).

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. The Nineteenth Century in Europe: Back­ ground and Roman Catholic Phase. New York: Harper, 1958. Vol. 1 of Christianity in a Revolutionary Age.

_. The Twentieth Century in Europe: The Roman Catholic, Protestant and Eastem Churches. New York: Harper, 1962. Vol. 4 of Christianity in a Revolutionary Age.

Powers, Francis J. Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order. Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1952.

Ryan, John and Boland, Francis J. Catholic Principles of Politics. New York: MacMillan, 1940.

Schwer, Wilhelm. Catholic Social Theory. Translated by B. Landheer. St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder, 1940.

2. In Great Britain

Beck, George A., ed. The English Catholics, 1850-1950. London: Bums, Oates, 1950.

Carthy, M. P. Catholicism in English-Speaking Lands. New York: Haw­ thome, 1964. Vol. 92 of The Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholocism.

Catholic Emancipation, 1829-1929. Freeport, N. Y.: Books For Libraries Press Inc., 1966 (1929).

Gwynn, Denis and Handley, James E. Great Britain. Dublin: Gill and Son, 1968. Vol. 6 of A History of Irish Catholicism.

_. A Hundred Years of Catholic Emancipation. London: Longmans, Green, 1929. 321

Loughran, Mary M. "Catholics in England, 1918-1945." Ph.D. disser­ tation, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1954.

Mathew, David. Catholicism in England. 3rd edition. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955.

Spinks, George S. Religion in Britain Since 1900. London: Andrew Dakers, 1952.

3. In Germany

Amery, Carl. Capitulation. Translated by Edward Quinn. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967.

Conway, John S. The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Deutsch, Harold C. The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War. Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1968.

Duncan-Jones, Arthur S. The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1971 (1938).

Gallin, Mary A. The German Resistance: Ethical and Religious Factors. Washington, D. C . : Catholic Univ. Press, 1961.

Leuner, H. D. When Compassion Was a Crime. London: Oswald Wolff, 1966.

Lewy, Guenther. The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. New York: McGraw, Hill, 1964.

Micklem, Nathaniel. National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church. London: Oxford U. Press, 1939.

Power, Michael. Religion in the Reich. London: Longmans, Green, 1939.

Prittie, Terrence. Germans Against Hitler. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964.

Ruhm von Oppen, Beate. Religion and Resistance to Nazism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Center of International Studies, 1971.

Schlabrendorff, Fabian von. The Secret War Against Hitler. Translated by Hilda Simon. New York: Putnam, 1965.

Siegele-Wenschkewitz, Leonore. Nationalsocializmus und Kirche: Religions-politik von Partei und Staat bis 1935. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1974. 322

Walker, Lawrence D. Hitler Youth and Catholic Youth, 1933-1936. Washington, D. C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1970.

Zahn, Gordon. German Catholics and Hitler's War. London: Sheed and Ward, 1972.

Zipfel, Friedrich. Kirchenkampf in Deutschland, 1933-1945. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965.

C. Great Britain

Clark, George, gen. ed. The Oxford History of England. 15 vols. Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1965. Vol. 15: English History, 1914-1945, by Alan J. P. Taylor.

Cross, Colin. The Fascists in Britain. New York: St. Martin's, 1963.

George, Margaret. The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933-1939. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1965.

Gannon, Franklin R. The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939. Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Gilbert, Bentley B. Britain Since 1918. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Gilbert, Martin. Britain and Germany Between the Wars. London: Longmans, 1964.

_. The Roots of Appeasement. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.

Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard. The Appeasers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.

Graves, Robert and Hodge, Alan. The Long Week-End. London: Faber and Faber, 1940.

Hadley, William W. Munich: Before and After. London: Cassel and Co., 1944.

Havighurst, Alfred F. Twentieth Century Britain. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1962.

Kennedy, John F. Why England Slept. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1961 (1940).

Kieser, Rolf. Englands Appeasementpolitik und der Aufstieg des Dritten Reiches im Spiegel der britischen Presse, 1933-1939. Winterthur: P. G. Keller, 1964. 323

Lammers, Donald. Explaining Munich. Stanford, California; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford Univ., 1966.

Madge, Charles and Harrisson, Tom. Britain by Mass-Observation. Harmondsworth, Eng.; Penguin, 1939.

Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change, 1900-1967. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Medlicott, William N. British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919- 1963. London: Methuen, 1968.

______. Contemporary England, 1914-1964. London: Longmans, 1967.

Middlemas, R. Keith. Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-1939. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.

_. The Strategy of Appeasement. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Mowat, Charles Loch. Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1955.

Namier, Lewis B. Diplomatic Prelude. New York: Howard Fertig, 1971 (1948).

Norling, Bernard. "Mirror of Illusion." Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Notre Dame, 1954.

Northedge, F. S. The Troubled Giant. London: London School of Econ­ omics and Political Science, Bell, 1966.

Pelling, Henry. M o d e m Britain. New York: W. W. Norton, 1960.

Petrie, Charles Alexander. Twenty Years Armistice--and After. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1940.

Rock, William R. Appeasement on Trial. Hamden, Conn.; Archon Books, 1966.

Seton-Watson, R. W. Britain and the Dictators. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ., 1938.

Sontag, Raymond J. A Broken World, 1919-1939. New York: Harper and Row, 1971; Harper Torchbooks, 1972.

Taylor, Alan J. P. The Origins of the Second World War. 2nd. ed. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Pubs. Inc., 1966.

Thompson, David. England in the Twentieth Century. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1965.

Thompson, Laurence V. The Greatest Treason. New York: W. Morrow, 1968. 324

Thompson, Neville. The Ahti-Appeasers. Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon, 1971.

The Times (London). The History of The Times. Nendeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1971 (1952). Vol. 4, part 2; 1921-1948.

Wathen, Mary Antonia. The Policy of England and France Towards the Anschluss of 1938. Washington, D. C . : Catholic U. Press, 1954.

Watkins, D. W. Britain Divided. Edinburgh, Scot.: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963.

Watt, Donald C. Personalities and Policies. Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1965.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. King George VI. New York: St. Martin's, 1965.

_. Munich: Prologue to Tragedy. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1962 (1948).

Wiskemann, Elizabeth, Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945. Fontana History of Europe Series. London: William Collins Sons, 1966; reprint ed. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966.

Wolfers, Arnold. Britain and France Between Two Wars. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940.

D . Germany

Bracher, Karl D. The German Dictatorship. Translated by J. Steinberg. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Grunberger, Richard. The 12-Year Reich. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Jackel, Eberhard. Hitler's Weltanschauung. Translated by Herbert Arnold. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1972.

Laqueur, Walter Z. Weimar: A Cultural History. 1918-1933. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974.

Peterson, Edward N. The Limits of Hitler's Power. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.

Rauschning, Hermann. The Revolution of Nihilism. Translated by E. W. Dickes. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939.

______. The Voice of Destruction. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1940.

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. 325

E. Spain

Bolin, Luis. Spain; The Vital Years. Philadelphia and New York; J. P. Lippincott Co., 1967.

Brenan, Gerald. The Spanish Labyrinth. New York: MacMillan, 1943.

Koestler, Arthur. The Invisible Writing. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954.

Lobo, Leocadio. Primate and Priest. London: Spanish Embassy, 1937.

Madariaga, Salvador de. Spain. New York: Creative Age Press, 1943.

Thomas, Gordon and Witts, Max Morgan. Guernica. New York: Stein and Day, 1975.

Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

F. Vatican

Clonmore, W. L. Pope Pius XI and World Peace. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938.

Falconi, Carlo. The Silence of Pius XII. Translated by Bernard Wall. Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1970 (1965).

Friedlander, Saul. Pius XII and the Third Reich. New York: Knopf, 1966.

Gwynn, Denis. The Vatican and War in Europe. London : B u m s , Oates and Washboume, 1940.

Heer, Friedrich. Europe: Mother of Revolutions. Translated by Charles Kessler and Jennetta Adcock. New York: Praeger, 1972 (1964).

Lapide, Pinchus E. Three Popes and the Jews. New York: Hawthom, 1967.

Pichon, Charles. The Vatican and its Role in World Affairs. Translated by Jean Misrahi. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950.

Rhodes, Anthony. The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators, 1922-1945. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1973.

G. Other Works

Bethell, Nicholas. The War That Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, Sep­ tember 1939. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. The Anschluss. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963. 326

Bruegel, Johann Wolfgang. Czechoslovakia Before Munich; the German Minority Problem and British Appeasement. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1973.

Cobban, Alfred. A History of M o d e m France. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1965. Vol. III.

Gehl, Jurgen. Austria, Germany and the Anschluss. 1931-1938. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963.

Knightly, Philip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.

Parkes, James. Antisemitism. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963.

III. Periodicals and Articles

Bergonzi, Bemard. "Roy Campbell: Outsider on the Right." Joumal of Contemporary History. 2 (April, 1967): 133-148.

Bloch, Charles. "Great Britain. German Rearmament and the Naval Agreement of 1935." In European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939, pp. 125-151. Edited by Hans W. Gatzke. Chicago, 111.: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Bosworth, F. J. B. "The British Press, The Conservatives and Mussolini, 1920-1934." Joumal of Contemporary History 5 (n.m. 1970): 163-182.

Bockenforde, Emst-Wolfgang. "German Catholicism in 1933." Translated by Raymond Schmandt. Cross Currents 11 (Summer, 1961): 283-304.

Bruegel, J. W. "The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia." In A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, pp. 167-187. Edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Lu%a. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973.

Bullock, Alan. "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War." In European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939, pp. 221-246. Edited by Hans W. Gatzke. Chicago, 111.: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Caims, John C. "March 7, 1936, Again: The View From Paris." In European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939, pp. 172-192. Edited by Hans W. Gatzke. Chicago, 111.: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Commonweal. "The Deputy" (special issue). 79 (28 February 1964).

Dawson, Christopher. "The Church and the Dictators." Catholic Times (London). 27 April 1934, p. 9; 4 May, p. 9; 11 May, p. 4; 18 May, p. 9.

"The English Catholics, 1850-1950." Dublin Review. 124 (Fourth Quarter, 1950): 1-12. 327

Dawson, Christopher. "Fascism and the Corporative State." Catholic Herald (London). 3 August 1935, p. 4.

"The interracial cooperation as a factor in 'European culture.'" Roma: Reale Accademia D'Italia, 1933.

Durant, Henry. "Public Opinion, Polls and Foreign Policy." British Joumal of Sociology. 6 (June, 1955): 149-158.

Edwards, P. G. "The Foreign Office and Fascism, 1924-1929." Journal of Contemporary History. 5 (n.m., 1970): 153-162.

Epstein, Klaus. "The Pope, the Church and the Nazis." M o d e m Age. 15 (Winter, 1964-5): 83-94.

Gallin, Mary A. "The Cardinal and the State." Joumal of Church and State. 12 (Autumn, 1970): 385-404.

Harrigan, W. M. "Nazi Germany and the Holy See: The Historical Back­ ground of 'Mit brennender Sorge,' 1933-1936." Catholic Histor­ ical Review. 47 (July, 1967): 164-198.

______. "Pius XI and Nazi Germany, 1937-1939." Catholic Historical Review. 51 (January, 1966): 457-486.

"Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a Detente in German-Vatican Relations, 1939-1940." Catholic Historical Review. 49 (July, 1963): 173-191.

Kent, George 0. "Pope Pius XII and Germany: Some Aspects of German- Vatican Relations, 1933-1945." American Historical Review. 70 (October, 1964): 59-78.

Littell, Franklin. "Kirchenkampf and Holocaust." Journal of Church and State. 13 (Spring, 1971): 209-226.

Lodge, David. "Chester-Belloc and the Jews." The Critic. 29 (May- June, 1971): 34-43.

Lunn, A m o Id. "The Catholics of Great Britain." The Atlantic Monthly. October, 1944, pp. 81-85.

Rossi, John P. "Orwell and Catholicism." Commonweal 103 (18 June, 1976): 404-6.

Ruhm von Oppen, Beate. "Nazis and Christians." World Politics. 21 (April, 1969): 392-424.

Serrou, Robert. "Saint Pie XII?" Paris Match. 17 Février 1973, pp. 80-85.

Sheed, Frank J. "Catholic England." Thought. 26 (Summer, 1951): 267-278. 328

Sontag, Raymond J. "Appeasement 1937." Catholic Historical Review. 38 (January, 1953); 385-396.

Tinnemann, Ethel M. "Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy To­ wards the Nazi Regime." Western Political Quarterly. 23 (June, 1969): 333-349.

Wandyczc, Piotr. "The Foreign Policy of Edvard Bene%. In A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, pp. 216-238. Edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luâa. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973.

Watt, Donald C. "Appeasement: the Rise of a Revisionist School." Political Quarterly. 36 (April-June, 1965): 191-213.

Zahn, Gordon C. "Catholic Opposition to Hitler: the Perils of Ambig­ uity." Joumal of Church and State. 13 (Autumn, 1971): 413-425.

IV. Guides

Butler, David E. and Freeman, Jennie. British Political Facts. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's, 1968.

Carr-Saunders, A. M. and Jones, D. Caradog. A Survey of the Social Structure of England and Wales. 2nd ed. Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1937.

Craig, F. W. S., ed. British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918- 1949. Glasgow: Political Reference Publications, 1969.

The Catholic Directory. London: B u m s , Oates and Washboume. Vols, for 1933-1940.

The Catholic Who's Who. London : Bums, Oates and Washboume. Vols, for 1933-1940.

"Dod" [W. D. S. Taylor]. Dod's Parliamentary Companion. London: Dod Business Directories. Vols, for 1933-1940.

Madge, Charles and Harrisson, Tom, eds. First Year's Work 1937-1938. London: Buckingham House, 1938.

Mass-Observâtion. The Press and its Readers. London: Art and Technics, 1949.

Medlicott, William N. The Coming of War in 1939. London: Historical Assoc., 1963. 329

Soames, Jane. The English Press. London: L. Drummond, 1938.

Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1971.

Willing's Press Guide. Croyden, Eng.: Thomas Skinner Directories, 1972.